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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

PART X.

JANUARY TO JUNE 1922.



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## CONFIDENTIAL.

## Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

## PART X.

## CHAPTER I.—THE CAUCASUS.

[E 5052/165/58]

No. 1.

*Mr. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 16.)*

(No. 277.)

My Lord,

Moscow, May 9, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 87 of the 17th October last, I have the honour to report that a conference of plenipotentiary representatives of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan concluded an agreement on the 10th March for the formation of a Caucasian Federation, the seat of which will be at Tiflis. It does not seem that the existing relations between the Central Russian Government and the above republics are essentially affected. A copy of the agreement has, however, not yet been received in Moscow, and I will report further as soon as I am able to obtain it.

I have, &amp;c.

R. H. HODGSON.

[E 8378/8378/58]

No. 2.

*Outline of Events in Transcaucasia from the beginning of the Russian Revolution in the Summer of 1917 to April 1921.*

[WITH MAP.]

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## CHAPTER I.—Introduction.

FROM the outbreak of the war in 1914 until the collapse of Russia during the summer of 1917, events in Transcaucasia belong rather to the history of Imperial Russia. Thenceforward, for a time, Bolshevik Russia was unable to control the



affairs of what had been her Transcaucasian provinces, or to give these provinces any protection. These border regions, therefore, were compelled to shift for themselves, and a period of more strictly Transcaucasian history thus began.

#### *Transcaucasia a Gateway to Western and Central Asia.*

Geographical position and the distribution assumed by masses of land and water in South-Western Asia have had much to do with the course taken by events in Transcaucasia. Through Transcaucasia run the great natural routes connecting the Black Sea and therefore the outer oceans of the world with the vast inland regions of Asia. Following these routes are railway lines, from Batoum on the Black Sea into Northern Persia, to the Caspian Sea, and also into Russia. The Caspian itself affords remarkable facilities for water communication between Transcaucasia and Northern Persia, and, by the Volga, with the interior of Russia-in-Europe. The Transcaspian railway, extending eastward from Krasnovodsk, on the further shore of the Caspian, as far as the Pamirs brings Central Asia into easy communication with Transcaucasia and the Black Sea. Through Transcaucasia therefore lie the routes which all must follow who seek those inland regions of Asia, whether in commerce or for military purposes.

#### *Economic Influence of the Baku Oilfield.*

Another important factor in the making of recent Transcaucasian history has been the existence of great deposits of oil near Baku. Ease of communication by the Caspian and the Volga has made Baku the ready and indispensable source of oil supply for the greater part of Russia. Baku, in addition, sends its oil all round the Caspian. By pipeline it goes also to Batoum, whence it is shipped to various parts of the world. So great is Russia's dependence on the oil of Baku that her economic life could be strangled at will by any Power holding the oilfield. With Baku under one Government and Batoum under another, the commerce of Baku with the Western world could be cut off. It is apparent therefore that Transcaucasia forms an economic unit in itself, but knit to Russia by common economic interests in the closest way, and to Europe and the outer world by similar if less important ties.

#### *Ethnic and Religious Influences.*

Though geographically and economically Transcaucasia constitutes an almost indivisible unit, yet ethnical and religious influences work strongly towards subdivision and disunion. The country is peopled chiefly by seven races, who differ, too, in faith. These are: Georgians, of the Georgian Orthodox Church; Armenians, of the Gregorian Church; Azerbaijan Tatars, a Turkish race, but Moslems of the Shiah rite; Daghestani tribes, Moslems chiefly of the Sunni rite; Anatolian Turks of the Sunni rite; Adjarians, a Laz tribe of Sunni Moslems; and Russian settlers, generally of the Greek Orthodox Church.

#### *Distribution of Races.*

The distribution of these races also makes for disunion. Georgians are compactly settled in the west and hold the Black Sea coast except around Batoum, which is the Adjarian country. Armenians are found chiefly in the south-west and south, towards the Turkish and Persian frontiers. Tatars occupy the south-east, including Baku and the Caspian coastline. In the north-east are the Daghestanis, holding another portion of the Caspian littoral, and going up into the eastern part of the Caucasian Mountains. Between the Georgians and Adjarians, and the Armenians, is an area, round about Kars and Ardahan, in which Anatolian Turks predominate. And between Armenia and Azerbaijan are the regions of Nachichevan and Karabagh, where Armenians and Tatars are separated from the main body of their compatriots by interposed areas peopled by the rival race. Of all Transcaucasian people Armenians are the most widely dispersed, for almost as many live outside the recognised Armenian Districts of Erivan and Kars as within them. In fact if Turkish Armenia be taken into account Erivan and Kars contain only a minority of the race. The Russians are somewhat scattered, but the greater number are in Baku, Batoum, and the Georgian region.

#### *Sub-divisions of Transcaucasia under Russian Administration.*

Under Russian administration the main sub-divisions of Transcaucasia were: The Governments of Kutais and Tiflis, and the Province of Batoum, the two former containing chiefly a Georgian population, the latter chiefly an Adjarian population. The Government of Erivan, and Province of Kars, peopled by Armenians and an

important minority of Anatolian Turks. The Governments of Elizavetopol and Baku, and the District of Zakataly, in all of which Tatars predominate; and the Province of Daghestan, occupied by Daghestanis.

#### *National Consciousness of the Transcaucasian Peoples.*

Of these various Transcaucasian races, Georgians and Armenians alone possess a national consciousness and national traditions. An independent Georgia existed until the year 1801, when the country was absorbed by Russia in violation of her covenants. Armenian independence has a much older tradition, for every form of Armenian independence in this region came to an end during the 11th century; but the Armenian people exhibit, notwithstanding, a stronger national consciousness than any other race in Transcaucasia. The Tatars have no national traditions. The area which they occupy, the Governments of Elizavetopol and Baku, formed part of the Persian Province of Azerbaijan until the year 1813, when the province was divided, and the northern portion ceded to Russia. The Daghestanis have, as yet, scarcely attained to more than tribal ambitions, except for a certain community with other Moslem peoples.

#### *Influences operating against Transcaucasian Unity.*

Between these several peoples, but more particularly between Armenians and Moslems, exist racial and religious hatreds which present almost insuperable difficulties to the growth of Transcaucasian unity. These animosities have been given a wider and deeper importance by two or perhaps three active and powerful political movements. The first, maintained by the Armenian secret society known as the Dashnaktsutiun, sought to obtain Armenian autonomy, or perhaps, complete independence of Russia, by methods of violence and revolution. The second and third are the pan-Islamic and pan-Turanian movements, which have been supported and pushed by the "Young Turk" Government of Turkey with every method of intrigue and violence. The aims of the pan-Islamic movement in particular—much more dangerous than the academic ideas of pan-Turanianism—sought to unite all Moslem peoples, from the Balkans to Central Asia, into one great religious and political confederation of Moslem States under the leadership of Turkey. Transcaucasian Moslems, more especially the Tatars, have displayed considerable passive and even active sympathy with the ambitions of pan-Islamism. Between the various Transcaucasian peoples there are, in addition, conflicting economic interests of the acutest kind.

The influences making for disunion are, in fact, so deep-seated and powerful that nothing less than control by an external power can enforce a permanent working unity among the bickering peoples. Such necessary control was exerted by Russia until her collapse in 1917.

From the conditions so outlined it appears, that, if free from external compulsion, the tendency of Transcaucasia is to break into at least three parts, corresponding roughly with the areas occupied by the three chief races—to the formation, in fact, of the independent and mutually hostile States of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

#### *Problems before the Transcaucasian Peoples on the Collapse of Russia.*

It was under these circumstances of geographic, strategic and economic position, and racial, religious and political differences, that the collapse of Russia threw the Transcaucasian provinces on their own resources; at a time, too, when the issue of the war was entirely uncertain. The people of these provinces were now to decide whether they should remain Russian subjects or seek independence. If independence, whether it should be on the basis of Transcaucasian unity or on the basis of separate States. Supposing the choice to be for independence of any kind, then they must decide where their true interests lay externally, and to what Power or group of Powers they should look for support. They must seek solutions of political and economic questions vitally affecting the whole of Transcaucasia, but incapable of settlement to the exclusive interest of Georgia or Armenia or Azerbaijan. Not only must they create the machinery of government and administration, but, more important still, they must undertake immediately their own defence. Transcaucasia formed the battle front of Russia and Turkey, and when Russian armies were dissolving like snow Transcaucasia, whether Russian or independent, stood to be overrun by Turkish armies burning to seize an unexpected opportunity. Nor could the Transcaucasian provinces hope for much aid from the Western enemies of Turkey. To these Transcaucasia was practically inaccessible as long as the Dardanelles and Bosphorus were closed against them; access through Persia was possible, but attended by many difficulties and the most serious limitations.



## CHAPTER II.—*The Transcaucasian Federal Republic.*

From the declaration of the Republic on September 20, 1917, to the dissolution of the Republic on May 26, 1918, and the substitution of three Independent Republics.

### *July 1917. Action by Transcaucasian Members of the Russian Duma.*

During the spring and summer of 1917 events in Russia clearly portended the downfall of the Empire. Following the appointment of M. Kerensky to the position of Prime Minister on the 19th July, in place of Prince Lvov, the Georgian, Armenian and Tatar members of the Duma left Petrograd and hastened back to Transcaucasia, convinced that a crisis of serious import to the peoples of that region was at hand. They had already discussed the situation among themselves, and decided that a policy of independence for Transcaucasia as a whole was the only policy adequate to the emergency. But in Georgia and Armenia movements in favour of separate independence were strong. Georgia, in fact, had already presented a demand to the Duma for the restoration of her old autonomous rights. It was doubtful, therefore, how much support could be found among the Transcaucasian peoples for the wider policy of Transcaucasian independence advocated by these members of the Duma. Informal conferences accordingly were held at Tiflis and elsewhere, attended by representatives in the Duma and other influential Georgians and Armenians, and by some of the more enlightened Tatar Moslems. In the end, Georgians and Armenians agreed to adopt Transcaucasian independence on the basis of a Federal Republic as their aim; but it was found that the Tatars, their views coloured by the ideals of pan-Islamism, were in general opposed to the proposed course, or even strongly hostile to it. Well-to-do Moslems as a class, were, however, in favour. Propaganda, therefore, was undertaken to create, if possible, a stronger Moslem movement in support of Transcaucasian unity.

### *August 1917. Diet of the Transcaucasian Peoples.*

Meanwhile, for events in Russia were moving fast, arrangements were made for electing and convoking a Diet of the Georgian, Armenian and Tatar peoples. This Diet assembled in Tiflis at the end of August 1917. On the 10th September M. Kerensky became Dictator of Russia, and on the 15th September Russia was proclaimed a republic. Transcaucasian leaders now deemed that the moment had come for them to take definite action. Avoiding the question of complete independence for the time being, the Diet, as the "Council of the Transcaucasian Peoples," declared Transcaucasia a Federal Republic on the 20th September, though, technically, the republic remained an integral part of Russia. At the same time the tribes of Daghestan proclaimed the independence of the province as the "Mountain Republic."

### *Influence of the Grand Duke Nicholas.*

The Russian army on the Transcaucasian front was already far-gone on the way to dissolution. The process had been hastened by an action of the Revolutionary Government. The Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the ex-Tsar, who, by his great personal influence and popularity, had been able to hold the army together, was a figure commanding too much power to be acceptable to the Provisional Russian Government. He was offered, and accepted the supreme command of the Russian armies, and left Transcaucasia on the 19th March, 1917, to take up his new position. But the offer was no more than a lure. When safely parted from his troops he was arrested, and, though personal injury to him, or even trial, was deemed inexpedient, he was exiled to the Crimea. After he left Transcaucasia the administration of the country was carried on by the army commanders, with rapidly diminishing influence and efficiency.

### *Russian Military Policy in Transcaucasia.*

In addition to direct revolutionary causes a long-standing principle of Russia's military policy contributed not a little to her collapse in Transcaucasia, as on all fronts. This principle was to use the troops raised in her conquered and repressed provinces in any region but their native land. Her Georgian and Armenian troops, therefore, numbering in all nearly 300,000 men—Tatars were exempt from military service—had been sent to European fronts, and the army of the Caucasus formed of Siberians, Poles, West Russians, Finns and others. These troops had no strong personal motive for preventing a Turkish advance into Transcaucasia. Their chief

desire, under revolutionary influence, was to return to their distant homes. This policy further affected Georgia and Armenia prejudicially in their endeavour towards independence; for when the need for a native army arose their men of military age were elsewhere; and when the survivors did return it was as apostles of the Bolshevism which had secured their repatriation.

Later experience and the nature of the struggle had, indeed, shown the Russian military authorities the advantage of employing local troops on the Transcaucasian front, and then many thousands of Armenians were drafted or volunteered into Russian units of the army. But they formed at best only a small proportion of the Grand Duke's forces. These Armenian elements, distributed among non-Armenian units, were, however, all that could at first be expected to stand between Transcaucasia and Turkish invasion when the Russian army should have dissolved.

### *September 1917. Transcaucasian Delegation to the British Minister at Tehran.*

Before the Federal Republic was proclaimed a Transcaucasian delegation had been sent to consult the British Minister at Tehran, and thus get into communication with the British Government, and, if possible, obtain their support. The outcome was that His Majesty's Government promised financial assistance to the Transcaucasian peoples provided they would organise and endeavour to defend their frontiers against the enemies of the *Entente* Powers. British financial boards for this purpose were to be established at Hamadan—where anti-Bolshevik Russian forces were in occupation—and at Tiflis, which would support the Armenian and other troops on the Transcaucasian western front. During these negotiations the word "Armenian" was unfortunately used in a communication to the delegation as synonymous for all the forces on that front. The Armenians were, in consequence, able to make mischievous use of the promise by boasting that British support was being given to them alone, and not to the Transcaucasian peoples as a whole. The effect of the misapprehension was unfortunate, persistent and far-reaching. Do what they might, British officials in Caucasasia were never able to overtake and entirely destroy the unfortunate impression thus created in the minds of Georgians and Tatars.

### *Dissension in the Federal Diet.*

From the time the Diet of the Federal Republic first met it was struggling in deep waters with little hope of surviving. The three parties, Georgians, Armenians and Tatars, could agree upon no common policy, could not recognise even a common danger, could, in fact, attain no harmony on any subject. Georgians stood out for complete separation from Russia, and the full independence of Transcaucasia, Armenians desired an autonomous Transcaucasia which should retain the Russian connection, considering that without Russian support the Armenian people in particular would go to the wall. The Tatars, possessing no national traditions, and steeped in pan-Islamism, not only saw no danger from the Turk, but looked towards union with Turkey as a desirable future, at least for themselves.

### *November 1917. Effect on Transcaucasia of Lenin and Trotsky coming to Power in Russia.*

Matters drifted on thus into November 1917. And then, on the 8th November, came the Bolshevik *coup d'Etat* in Petrograd, which placed Lenin and Trotsky in power, with all that the change might mean. Hostilities between Russia and the Central Powers were suspended on the 2nd December; the armistice of Brest-Litovsk was signed on the 15th December, and negotiations for peace were begun. With these negotiations appeared the Bolshevik formula for peace: "No indemnities, no annexations, and the free determination of peoples."

### *Collapse of the Russian Front against Turkey.*

It gave the signal for the collapse of the Russian front against Turkey. The non-Caucasian troops, shouting "No indemnities, no annexations," forsook their positions and retired behind the pre-war Russo-Turkish frontier. Here a halt was made and a partial front re-established. But not for long. Bolshevik principles and influence apart, the troops had an over-powering desire to have done with the war and regain their far-off homes. In their view the retreat was essentially a homeward movement; and they had no intention of remaining on the historic battlefields of the Transcaucasian border with the certainty or even the possibility of there renewing the struggle. That a halt was made at all was due to the devoted



efforts of the Russian officers. But disorganisation and the breakdown of military discipline had gone too far for remedy, too far for interruption, too far for the end to be long delayed.

*Russian Troops entrain themselves for Home.*

A little later some 500,000 Russian troops of the Caucasian army between the Caucasus Mountains and the Turkish frontier were, as a disorganised armed rabble, struggling to entrain themselves for home by the one line of railway leading into Russia. However, the Armenian elements of the army, numbering something less than 40,000 men, stood fast on the abandoned Russian front in Anatolia, and were able for the time being to prevent a Turkish advance.

*Defection of the Tatar Delegates in the Federal Diet.*

As soon as the Russian army had dissolved, the pan-Islamic Tatars showed their hand. The majority of Tatar delegates left the Diet, and established themselves as a Tatar Government at Elizavetopol, on the railway to Baku and Russia. From this centre, urged by German and Turkish agents, they incited the Tatar villagers and tribesmen to block the railway, dig entrenchments, and disarm the crowded train-loads of deserting Russian soldiery. Their operations were continued for several weeks with great success, and secured arms and munitions on a large scale for the Tatar population. The adroit opportunism of these Tatars was no partial or merely tribal action. Large numbers were employed; the railway line was flanked by elaborate trenches; formidable military positions, not to be easily captured, were created; and the homeward movement of the Russian troops was completely stopped. These troops, however, were in no mood to be balked. Finding their flight obstructed in this manner they at last organised themselves on a sufficient scale, crushed Tatar opposition, and restored railway communication.

*Efforts to create a Transcaucasian Army.*

With the dissolution of the Russian army, and while these Russo-Tatar hostilities were in progress, the Georgian and Armenian members of the Diet, and what remained of the Russian General Staff, endeavoured to organise a force sufficient to hold the front against the Turks. The Armenian elements who had remained in their positions were inadequate to the defence. Additional units, therefore, were enlisted of Armenians, Georgians, Assyrians, Russian volunteers—of all, in fact, who could be persuaded to take arms against the threatened Turkish invasion. The British Military Mission at Tiflis, under Colonel Pike, gave assistance and offered to finance and control the enterprise. Equipment was collected, a new Armenian division formed, and agents were sent out to raise the Assyrians of Urmia and North Persia. Preparations were also begun in Mesopotamia for despatching 350 British officers via Baku to the Caucasian front to organise and lead the army now being formed.

*Bolshevik Sympathies of Returning Georgian Troops.*

Much was hoped for too from the Georgian troops who were at this time returning from the European front. But they proved to be steeped in Bolshevik theories, and refused to defend any front not actually on Georgian soil; nor would they take any orders which had not previously received the sanction of their committees. They advocated a policy of peace with Germany and Turkey forthwith, if necessary at the expense of the Armenians.

*Animosity of Armenian Troops against Moslems of the Federal Republic.*

If the attitude of these Georgians did not make for Transcaucasian unity, still less did the actions of the newly enlisted Armenian troops. Their hatred was directed against Moslems, and they could allow no opportunity for paying off old scores to pass, even against their Moslem fellow-citizens of the Federal Republic. Instead, therefore, of proceeding to the positions assigned them on the front, these Armenians, reckless of considerations of unity, at first occupied themselves with massacring and exterminating the Tatars within reach. The Tatars retaliated and rose on the Persian frontier, thus severing communications between Armenians of Transcaucasia and the Assyrians of Urmia who were coming to their assistance. Notwithstanding all difficulties, however, the defence of the western Transcaucasian front was sufficiently maintained to prevent a Turkish advance at the time.

*January 1918, First Attempt to establish Bolshevik Control in Transcaucasia.—March 1918, Bolshevik Administration established at Baku.—Eviction and Massacre of Moslems at Baku.*

In January 1918, the Bolshevik Government at Petrograd made an attempt to re-establish Russian control in Caucasasia by sending to Tiflis an important official named Stephan Shaoumian—a Russian Armenian, Dashnak and Bolshevik—to assume the position of Chief Commissar for the Caucasus. He failed, however, to obtain a hearing either in Georgia or Armenia. Nor were his efforts to secure the abolition of the Transcaucasian Diet more successful. Hostility to him and to the purpose of his mission became so strong at last that, in March, he was compelled to flee from Tiflis disguised as a private soldier. He succeeded in reaching Baku, where, with the aid of the Armenian Dashnaksutiun Society—whose policy at the time was to seek Russian support as necessary to any form of Armenian existence—he was able to set up a Bolshevik administration. The resentment of the Tatar population was aroused by this act, more particularly against the part taken by the Armenians. The Tatars therefore threatened resistance. Whereupon Shaoumian contrived that the Dashnak forces—numbering about 10,000 men—and the remnants of the Russian army in the town, should make common cause with the local Bolshevik elements and the Bolshevik fleet which controlled the Caspian. Agreement having been secured, the united forces evicted the Moslem inhabitants of Baku on the 14th March and massacred some 3,000 of them in the process.

*March 1918. Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: its effect on Transcaucasia.*

On the 3rd March, 1918, Bolshevik Russia, after various delays, signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers and their Allies. By this treaty Russia was compelled to cede to Turkey the three Transcaucasian districts of Ardahan, Kars and Batoum, the two former in the area claimed by Armenia, the latter in the area by Georgia. Here was a direct and pressing menace to the territorial integrity of the Transcaucasian Republic, which intensified the conflict of interests between the Georgian, Armenian and Tatar peoples. Georgia and Armenia stood to lose much under the treaty, but had different ideas of how to safeguard themselves. Azerbaijan stood to lose nothing, and was, on the whole, in favour of the treaty.

*March 1918 Turkish Offensive against the Federal Republic begins.*

So far the western front maintained by the Republic had proved sufficiently strong to deter the Turks from a general offensive, though they had recaptured Trebizond on the 24th February. But with the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on the 3rd March, Turkish operations on a serious scale were begun with the purpose of occupying the districts awarded to Turkey under the treaty. Erzeroum fell to Turkish arms on the 12th March, Sarykamish on the 4th April, and Van on the 5th April. The republic meanwhile attempted to negotiate; but these efforts proving fruitless, the Diet broke off negotiations on the 13th April; and on the 15th April the Turks occupied Batoum. By this time the republic had become little more than a name. The Diet itself was split upon racial lines. No force capable of offering effective resistance to the Turkish invasion could be got together. By the action of the Armenians and Bolsheviks the Mahommedan elements in all Transcaucasia had been alienated beyond hope of recovery, and, at least in sympathies, had gone over to the Turko-German side. The Georgians were at loggerheads with the Armenians owing to the continued intrigues and association of the latter with the Russians, both revolutionary and reactionary—in fact the Armenians in Baku had joined hands with the Bolsheviks while the Armenian army in Erivan and the west still regarded itself as under the orders of the reactionary party in Russia. Racial hatred ran higher than ever, and civil war appeared inevitable.

*April 1918. Declaration of Independence by the Federal Republic.*

Amid these distractions the Diet, on the 22nd April, declared the independence of the republic, in a vain attempt to place the country outside the operation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. At the same time the Diet resolved to reopen negotiations with the Turks, claiming that Transcaucasia was now an independent State, in fact, if not in law. These measures, too, were unavailing, and the occupation of Caucasian territory by Turkish troops continued without check. Bayazid was entered on the 23rd April, Kars on the 27th April, and Alexandropol on the 18th May.



*May 1918. Dissolution of the Federal Republic. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia become Separate Independent States.*

On the 26th May the Transcaucasian Federal Government dissolved. At the same time Georgia declared her independence and formed a National Government; the Tatar National Council proclaimed the establishment of a "Republic of Azerbaijan"—taking that name in the hope of attracting to the new republic the adjoining Persian province of Azerbaijan—and the Armenian National Council assumed charge of Armenian affairs. Henceforward each State followed the policy it considered most advantageous in its own interests. Georgia, in fact, had already decided that from Germany alone could she hope to obtain without delay the protection she desired.

### CHAPTER III.—*The Independent Republics during the War.*

From the dissolution of the Federal Republic on May 26, 1918, to the armistice of Mudros, October 31, 1918.

#### *Attractions of Transcaucasia for Germany.*

The Baku oilfields had long attracted the attention of the German military authorities. From these fields might be obtained the enormous supplies of liquid fuels which aerial and motor-transport development required during the war. The Transcaucasian route from Batoum to Baku also had attractions for the German General Staff. It led to Persia, to the Caspian Sea, to Transcaspia, to Central Asia—it offered great opportunities for encouraging and aiding movements against Great Britain. Use of the route to the Baku oilfields and to the untold opportunities beyond Baku had been barred to Germany and her allies, first by Russia, and then by a hostile Transcaucasia. But Transcaucasia, with all that occupation and control of that country promised, had from the first days of Turkish participation in the war, lain within reach of military operations by the Turkish ally of the Central Powers. The Turkish campaign of December 1914 and January 1915 directed against Kars, which failed so disastrously at Sarykamish, was, in its wider motives, an attempt encouraged by Germany to secure possession of the Transcaucasian route, with its supplies of Baku oil, its cotton from Central Asia, and its possibilities against Great Britain and Russia.

#### *German Approach towards Transcaucasia.*

But not until three years later had Germany a prospect of controlling and using this route and of obtaining Baku oil. Her troops were in the Ukraine when the Federal Republic of Transcaucasia was nearing its end and the individual States were casting about for external support. Germany occupied Odessa on the 13th March, 1918, where she secured a certain quantity of shipping; on the 29th April she established a military dictatorship in the Ukraine; on the 1st May she occupied Sevastopol and seized a portion of the Russian Black Sea fleet. She was now in a position to reach Transcaucasia with troops without having to use the route through Constantinople. She could now, in fact, ignore the violent hostility of her Turkish ally to German ambitions in Caucasia, and play for her own hand.

#### *Georgian Republic and Germany*

Georgia would have preferred British assistance—she had, indeed, applied for it—but British assistance on a sufficient scale and with the promptitude necessary to serve Georgian needs was, at the time, an impossibility. So far Georgian territory had been untouched by war, and Georgian policy was definitely influenced by the strong desire to maintain this fortunate aloofness. The Georgian Government, therefore, who had already had negotiations with Germany, now fell back upon German support.

#### *May-June 1918. Treaties of Peace between Georgian Republic and Germany.*

On the 6th May, German and Turkish delegates arrived at Batoum for the purpose of negotiating peace with the Georgians and Armenians. On the 8th June, the Georgian Government signed a treaty of peace with Germany by which Germany recognised the Republic of Georgia, undertook to assist the republic financially, and to establish at once a friendly occupation of the country by German troops. Germany further undertook to secure peace between Georgia and Turkey—now in possession

of the port and district of Batoum under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk—and to take whatever measures might be requisite to prevent Turkish infringement of the rights and neutrality of Georgia. The purpose of this last provision was to ensure that Turkey should not use Georgian railways, either from Batoum or from Armenia, for the conveyance of troops in furtherance of Turkish designs. In return for these substantial benefits Georgia was to grant Germany priority in mineral concessions. On the same day (the 8th June) that this treaty was signed the Georgian Government and the Armenian National Council each concluded a treaty of peace with Turkey.

#### *German Expeditionary Force lands in Georgia.*

On the 8th June, too, immediately the German-Georgian Treaty was signed, the German expeditionary force to the Caucasus was landed at the Georgian port of Poti, Batoum being unavailable owing to the Turkish occupation. On the same day, Turkish troops entered Tabriz in North Persia. The British Mission was now withdrawn from Tiflis, and made its headquarters at Vladikavkas, in Cis-Caucasia. Here the members of the mission were eventually captured by the Bolsheviks.

In justice to the Georgian Government, it should be stated that they did not accept the German offer until they had been definitely informed that the Allies were unable to grant them similar terms.

#### *Turkish Occupation of Armenia under Treaty of June 8, 1918.*

Under the terms of the Turko-Armenian Treaty of the 8th June, Turkey recognised the independence of the Armenian Republic. But in return for this complaisance Armenia was to accept a Turkish occupation of the country, and, in consequence of the route from Batoum to Baku being closed by Germany, to give Turkish troops free passage across her territory. The point of these provisions was that without some such arrangement Turkey would be cut off from access to Azerbaijan, which she already regarded as a Turkish preserve.

#### *Germans prevent Turkish Troops entering Georgian Territory.*

Turkish armies now overran Armenia and Azerbaijan, except Baku—which was held by Bolsheviks and Armenians acting together—and made their headquarters at Elizavetopol, the seat of the Government of Azerbaijan. Notwithstanding the German-Georgian Treaty the Turks endeavoured, during these operations, to convey forces by rail from Batoum across Georgia. They were, however, turned back at the Batoum-Georgian frontier by German troops. Indeed, the exact and unswerving manner in which Germany carried out at least the military part of her treaty obligations to Georgia can only be regarded as a measure of what she expected to gain from the alliance. Her troops of occupation were picked men; their military efficiency was beyond question; their behaviour to the inhabitants correct, even sympathetic, and until the armistice compelled their withdrawal they won the respect and gratitude of the Georgian people.

#### *July 1918. Bolshevik Government at Baku overthrown by the "Central Caspian Dictatorship."*

On the 26th July a *coup d'Etat* took place at Baku, by which the Bolshevik Government were replaced by the "Central Caspian Dictatorship." The change came about by the "Social Revolutionaries" of the Russian Caspian fleet joining with the Dashnakist Armenians of Baku to suppress the Bolshevik Government directed by the Commissar, Stephan Shaoumian. Not to put too fine a point upon it, the revolution was in preparation for the first British occupation of Baku, and had been arranged for that purpose.

#### *August 1918. First British Landing at Baku.*

On the 4th August, a small body of British troops, the advance party of General Dunsterville's force, arrived at Baku from Mesopotamia, via Persia and the Caspian. As previously mentioned, the original intention had been to send a military mission of 350 British officers to organise and lead the Armenian-Russian-Assyrian force on the Transcaucasian western front. But this plan became impossible of execution, and a small military expedition—the strength of which never reached 1,000 men—was sent instead to assist the "Central Caspian Dictatorship." British officers and gunlayers were placed upon various Caspian steam vessels, which they armed, and thus provided a sufficient naval force. The expedition, however, was in a precarious position. Only the German occupation



of Georgia, by compelling the Turks to use the difficult route across Armenia, had made it possible for General Dunsterville's force to occupy Baku.

*September 1918. The British evacuate Baku.*

During the first week in September the Turkish troops outside Baku received their long-expected reinforcements and supplies of munitions; General Dunsterville's position then became impossible, and he re-embarked his troops on the 14th and 15th September. The charge that the expedition was betrayed by the Armenians has no foundation in truth. General Dunsterville himself informed the Armenian leaders that he would be compelled to evacuate the town, and urged them to accept the not unsatisfactory terms already offered by the Turkish general commanding the attacking force. The Armenians categorically refused, and continued street-fighting for two days after the British had withdrawn. During this period of unavailing resistance some 15,000 Armenians of both sexes and all ages were butchered in retaliation for the massacre of Moslems in March.

CHAPTER IV.—*The Independent Republics under the British Occupation.*

From the armistice of Mudros, October 31, 1918, to the British evacuation, August 28, 1919.

*October 1918. The Armistice of Mudros.*

The armistice of Mudros, between the Allies and Turkey, which came into operation on the 31st October, 1918, provided for the evacuation of Transcaucasian territory by Turkish troops. The armistice of the 11th November between the Allies and Germany required a similar evacuation by German troops. Acting on behalf of the Allies a British occupation of Transcaucasia now began in order to ensure the execution of the terms of both armistices.

*November 1918, Second British Occupation of Baku.—December 1918, British Occupation of Batoum.*

On the 17th November, 1918, therefore, a British force from North Persia, under Major-General Thompson, accompanied by a force of Russian Social Revolutionist troops, under General Bicharachef, arrived by sea, and occupied Baku. On the 27th December another British force, detached from the Salonika army, under General Forestier-Walker, occupied Batoum. The Salonika force eventually occupied Georgia and made its headquarters at Tiflis. This force was under the War Office; many of its officers, too, had been attached to General Denikin's staff. The Republic of Azerbaijan was occupied by troops from Mesopotamia, via Baku, mainly officered from the Indian army; the whole of the troops from Mesopotamia, in fact, had originally been under the India Office.

*Opposing Sympathies of the British Troops.*

These two British divisions occupying Transcaucasia had, therefore, very distinct predilections and antipathies. The Salonika division disliked Moslems, preferred Christians, and sympathised with all and any Russian reactionary movement; the Mesopotamian division were said to adore Moslems, despise Eastern Christians, and to have the traditional Anglo-Indian suspicion of everything pertaining to Russian imperialism. Between these two opposing lines of sympathy held by the British military authorities, and to some extent affecting their actions, the peoples of Transcaucasia could discover no definite British policy. Georgians found the British in Georgian territory sympathetic enough, but also strangely sympathetic towards every reactionary Russian party, whether of Koltchak, Denikin or Yudenitch, to all of which the Georgian people were fiercely opposed. The Tatars of Azerbaijan, on the other hand, found the British steeped in Moslem sympathies, and regarding reactionary Russians with almost as much hostility as did the Tatars themselves. The Armenians stood apart from these differences to some extent. On the strength of British support of the Armenian cause, and recent British statements of policy, they were supremely confident of being the chosen Transcaucasian allies of Great Britain.

*Intrigues of the French Military Mission.*

The French Military Mission, under Colonel Chardigny, merely added to the confusion. The members of this mission were, at the time, strongly opposed to the existence of any Transcaucasian republic, whether of Transcaucasia as a whole, or

of its sub-divisions, and did their utmost to persuade the Armenians that the only hope for the future lay in supporting Russian reactionaries, and being again incorporated in an Imperial Russia. With all these cross-currents of influence breaking in upon the confusion already inherent in the internal politics of Transcaucasia a situation difficult beyond satisfactory solution was bound to arise. Following the arrival of the British and the evacuation of German and Turkish troops, a reorganisation of Transcaucasia was begun. Little was necessary in Georgia. The German occupation had left the country untouched by war, and administration was in the hands of experienced Georgians, many of whom had held high administrative posts under the Russian Government.

*Conditions in Armenia.*

But in Armenia conditions were nearly desperate. The country and towns along the Turkish lines of communication had been ravaged and swept of everything by Turkish troops. There was no money, little food and little clothing. To add to the difficulties of the republic its territory contained, besides the ordinary population, some 300,000 destitute Armenian refugees from Turkish provinces. Disease of every kind was rife, and the death rate abnormally high. The Government was in the hands of the Dashnaksutiun Party, whose chief object appeared to be revenge upon all Moslems. The leaders of the party, though advanced Socialists, were controlled by Russian reactionaries; and the Armenian army, mainly officered by Russians, styled itself "Denikin's 9th army." Co-operation between an Armenia of these sympathies and anti-Russian Georgia thus became an impossibility. British assistance in Armenia was therefore confined chiefly to relief work and to the settlement of disputes between Armenia and her neighbours.

*Conditions in Azerbaijan.*

In Azerbaijan difficulties were of another kind, serious enough in themselves, but not impossible of solution. The Government of Azerbaijan had been removed from Elizavetopol to Baku, when the Turkish occupation of that town took place; and with Turkish support it became tolerably effective. On the retirement of the Turks, however, after the armistice, the Government collapsed and left the country in chaos; and it became necessary for the British to re-establish an administration in almost every department of the country's life. There were difficulties too with the Turkish troops, for many officers and men sought to evade the armistice by enlisting in the Azerbaijan army. Martial law was proclaimed; the Turkish troops turned out; and public order maintained by British military police.

*British Measures of Reconstruction in Azerbaijan.*

The Russian and Azerbaijan State banks were amalgamated and worked by a British staff, and the issue of notes regulated. Food control was established, and the population placed on rations under the card system in use in England, with the result that supplies of food became abundant. A British Labour Control Office was set up to investigate and settle industrial disputes. Industry and shipping, which had been nationalised by former Socialist Governments, were now released and placed again in private hands. Trade between Baku and Persia was encouraged, the Baku-Batoum pipe-line restored, and oil pumped between those towns; and, in accordance with the terms of the armistice, the whole system of transport and communications was taken over by the British. Continual quarrels regarding rolling-stock and engines had occurred between the republics; it was found advisable, therefore, to set up a British railway board at Tiflis, and place all the railways of Transcaucasia under their exclusive control. In fact, on almost every subject in which the interests of the republics touched, it became necessary to set up British arbitration commissions to settle questions in dispute.

*Conditions in Batoum.*

In the province of Batoum, which the Turks had occupied under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk—only to evacuate under the armistice of Mudros—the British adopted similar administrative measures to those taken at Baku, but a commission of Russian and native inhabitants was appointed to assist in governing. The destiny of Batoum was the all-absorbing question during the British occupation. The town and province were claimed by Georgia, Armenia, and the Russian supporters of General Denikin. This conflict for the reversion of the province gave issue to endless intrigues, and involved the British staff in much trouble and no little friction with the inhabitants, the Georgian Government and the Russian reactionaries.



*British Political Aims in Transcaucasia during the Occupation.*

During the period of the British occupation, British political efforts in Transcaucasia were in fact confined to essentials. It was sought to reconstruct and reorganise as far as might be possible; to give the republics the opportunity of working out their own destiny; above all to keep the peace between the republics, and between them and the forces of General Denikin. The British authorities therefore did what they could to foster Transcaucasian federal unity as a policy for the republics to follow. But no success attended their efforts.

*Armenian Attitude towards Russia.*

As has been stated, Armenia, alone of the Transcaucasian republics, was in favour of Russian control being re-established over Transcaucasia. It would be difficult to deny that on the whole the instincts or reasons prompting the Armenians to this view were sound in the interest of the Armenian people. Armenians were at once the least numerous, the most inaccessible as to the territorial position they occupied, and the most disliked race in Transcaucasia. And, further, the majority of their people were settled in Turkish territory. Russia alone of the Great Powers, so it was firmly held, could ever hope to be in a position that would afford the Armenians of Transcaucasia and Asia Minor any effective protection. In fact the Armenian race had long looked for annexation by Russia of the Armenian vilayets of Asia Minor as the ultimate and satisfactory solution of Armenian difficulties.

*January 1919. War between Armenia and Georgia.*

Holding these views, confirmed in them by the French Military Mission, and beset with the intrigues of General Denikin to obtain active Armenian support for his cause, it was not surprising that Armenia, in January 1919, found herself at war with Georgia over the disputed territory of Borchalinsk. The war did not go far, however, for General Forestier-Walker persuaded the hostile States to accept his arbitration, by which a neutral zone was established, and peace secured.

*Hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan.*

In the east, too, in the bitterly disputed areas of Zangezur and Nachichevan, Armenians were in active hostilities with the Tatars of Azerbaijan. The Armenian General Antronik, who, with some 10,000 irregulars, was making a conquest of the debated territories on behalf of the Armenian Republic, had got beyond the control of his Government. The general and his army refused to recognise the armistice of Mudros, or, indeed, any armistice. Massacre and counter-massacre by Armenians and Tatars had become regular features of a warfare in which every prompting of racial and religious hatred found expression.

*Disbandment of General Antronik's Force.*

But here, again, the British military authorities were able to effect a settlement. General Antronik was persuaded by General Thompson, commanding at Baku, to disband his following in January-February 1919, as a measure of importance to Allied policy; and the disputed territories were temporarily placed under the administration of Azerbaijan, but subject to British control. With the dispersion of General Antronik's force—a force which had its origin among Turkish Armenians, and which represented their ideals—the influence of Turkish Armenians on the policy of the Armenian republic almost disappeared. General Thompson's action in obtaining the disbandment of General Antronik's army has remained the cause of vehement Armenian misrepresentation ever since.

*The Paris Peace Conference and Transcaucasia.*

Early in January 1919 the Peace Conference at Paris began to sit, and it was not long before Caucasian affairs with all their obscure, involved and dangerous implications were calling for the attention of the Supreme Council. Russia, as has been shown, dominated every Caucasian question, and the fluctuating Russian situation forbade any definite or thorough Allied policy towards Caucasasia and Caucasian independence. Allied efforts in Caucasasia were ever limited by the conviction that the re-emergence of Russia as a Great Power would mean the peremptory termination of any Allied undertakings which were in conflict with Russian interests as Russia saw them. The one reasonable hope for preserving Caucasian independence in the event of a revived Russia appearing lay in the previous creation of a strong, firmly united, Federal Caucasian State. But this hope was rendered impossible of realisation by internal dissensions. In their resolve to

oppose the introduction of Bolshevism, the Transcaucasian peoples were, however, at this time in complete accord. It was therefore in the Allied interest to give what support they could to a population of seven or eight millions, whether united or disunited politically, who were planted across the most important routes into Asia, and resolved to bar to the utmost the advance of Bolshevism.

*Allied Policy in Caucasasia and the Russian Reactionary Movement.*

But though welcoming Allied—or British—control for the present, the Caucasian peoples desired above all else to know what policy the Allies intended to adopt towards Caucasasia if the Bolsheviks were overthrown and a reactionary Government established in Russia. Indications were not wanting that if such a development took place Caucasasia would be handed back to Russia with, at best, some form of autonomy assured by covenant. This prospect, though agreeable enough to the Allies and to Armenia, did not suit Georgia, Azerbaijan and Daghestan. The more the Supreme Council examined Transcaucasian problems the less they cared to commit themselves to definite or permanent solutions, nor did any Great Power appear anxious to undertake responsibilities in the country. The British occupation, at the request of the Allies, provided a satisfactory temporary solution, the more so that the cost was borne entirely by the British taxpayer.

*British Interests and the British Occupation.—Offer of a Mandate for Transcaucasia to Italy.*

But British interests were not sufficiently great to warrant more than a brief continuance of this thankless responsibility. In fact, early in 1919, His Majesty's Government had decided that on financial and other grounds the occupation could not be maintained much longer. At the beginning of April the Supreme Council agreed that British troops should be withdrawn, and their place taken by Italian troops, the mandate for Transcaucasia having been offered to, and accepted in principle, by the Italian Government. The proposal caused a storm of protest throughout Transcaucasia. It was urged that Italy would be unable to give effect to the mandate; that she lacked alike prestige, financial resources and experience; that she had no interest, except exploitation, in any of the republics. Some six weeks later, however, the Italian Government definitely refused to accept the position of mandatory.

*July 1919. Appointment of Colonel Haskell as Allied High Commissioner for Armenia.*

In July 1919 the Supreme Council despatched Colonel Haskell, an American officer, to the Caucasus with the title of Allied High Commissioner for Armenia. His duties were primarily concerned with relief work, the main part of which was being carried out by the American Near East Relief Commission; but he also used his influence to prevent hostilities breaking out again between the Armenians and Tatars in the disputed territories of Nachichevan, Zangezur and Karabagh.

*Government of United States and the Mandate for Transcaucasia.—Offer of Transcaucasian States to bear Cost of British Garrison.*

The Government of the United States in turn seemed disinclined to accept the position of mandatory for Transcaucasia, even though the mandate might include the whole of Turkey as well. No Power now being willing to undertake the task, and the British evacuation finally decided upon, the three republics of Transcaucasia offered to bear the cost if the British garrison were allowed to remain. On political grounds His Majesty's Government found themselves unable to accept this offer; chiefly, it would seem, because of their belief that General Denikin's movement appeared to promise success, and British commitments to Transcaucasia would be in conflict with those to General Denikin.

*Russian Anti-Bolshevik Movement in Cis-Caucasia.*

But it is necessary now to go back a little in point of time and give some attention to the Russian anti-Bolshevik movement which developed in Cis-Caucasia, north of the Caucasus Mountains, and reached its chief importance under General Denikin. It contained—or seemed to contain—incalculable possibilities for the Allies, by whom it had to be treated with the utmost circumspection; indeed, it fundamentally affected Allied policy in Transcaucasia, and the policy of each of the Transcaucasian States. The Allies saw in this movement the chief hope of Bolshevism being overthrown by Russian effort. The movement kept before their vision the prospect of a reconsti-



tuted Great Russia emerging, whose interests it would be highly impolitic for the Allies to injure in advance; a Russia, too, whose immediate aim, as the Transcaucasian States well knew, would be to destroy the independence of those provinces which had detached themselves from her. The Allied policy followed, therefore, was to support the anti-Bolshevik movement in Cis-Caucasia in every way short of armed assistance, and at the same time to go cautiously in the matter of recognising the independence of the Transcaucasian States. These States, however, as has been said, were divided on the matter of their future position regarding Russia. Armenia desired autonomy under Russia; Azerbaijan, on the whole, looked towards Turkish protection, but was opposed to any form of Russian domination; Georgia desired complete independence, and was exceedingly hostile to anything favouring a Russian recovery.

*British Policy in Transcaucasia apparently Contradictory both to Russians and the Caucasian Peoples.*

Though disinclined to give formal recognition to the independence of the Transcaucasian States until the Russian situation should have become more clear, Great Britain, at least, recognised that these States were entitled, subject to the decisions of the Peace Conference, to make their own choice. Great Britain therefore sought during her occupation, to maintain peace in Transcaucasia, to give the States assistance, and an opportunity of working out their own destiny. In a way her policy appeared contradictory, both to anti-Bolshevik Russians and to the Georgians, Azerbaijanis and Armenians, who all believed that in reality she was playing for her own hand. To them she seemed to be running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. In this opinion they were confirmed by the assurances alike of German and Turkish secret agents and French and Italian military missions.

*Beginning of Anti-Bolshevik Movement in Cis-Caucasia.*

The anti-Bolshevik movement in Cis-Caucasia, which gave rise to all these complications, began as far back as November 1917, when General Alexeief undertook to organise a volunteer army in the Kuban Province. The army grew rapidly, in spite of varying fortune, and at the end of 1918 had reached a strength of about 140,000 men. It was regarded as forming the European wing of Admiral Koltchak's great anti-Bolshevik operations, and as such received lavish Allied support in arms, munitions and military stores.

*General Denikin assumes Supreme Command of Anti-Bolshevik Forces in South-East Russia.*

In January 1919 General Denikin assumed supreme command of all Russian anti-Bolshevik forces from the Don to the Caucasus Mountains. Admiral Koltchak, too, at this time, voluntarily placed himself under General Denikin's orders. The headquarters of the army were at Ekaterinodar in the Province of Kuban, and its chief port was Novorossisk, on the Black Sea. The volunteer army at this period held two fronts against the enemy: the Don front in the north, and the Cis-Caucasian front in the south-east. Ignoring the Don front, the general in the middle of January, began a strong offensive on his Cis-Caucasian front.

Before the end of January he had defeated Bolshevik forces of 100,000 men first at Stavropol and then at Vladikavkaz, and captured over 30,000 prisoners and occupied both these towns. On the 3rd February he reached Mosdok, where he again defeated the Bolsheviks. A few days later his troops reached the Caspian Sea at Petrovsk in the Province of Daghestan.

*General Denikin and Baku.*

As soon as this offensive of General Denikin's began it was evident that his real objective was Baku—he had always strongly urged that possession of Baku and its oilfield was of vital importance to Russia. His military aims now came into conflict with British policy, and even with British undertakings. For the Mahomedan Province of Daghestan, which had formed the "North Caucasian Republic"—or the "Mountain Republic"—since May 1917, had been more or less unofficially recognised by the British military authorities at Baku after the armistice. In January 1919, therefore, General Thompson, commanding at Baku, had laid down, in agreement with General Denikin, a temporary line of demarcation following the main range of the Caucasus from the Black Sea to Daghestan, and thence by the northern frontier of that province to the Caspian Sea; southward of this line General Denikin's operations were not to extend. Transcaucasia and the whole of Daghestan (or the North Caucasian Republic) were thus placed out of bounds to General Denikin.

*General Denikin violates the Line of Demarcation.*

But with his enemy on the run the general was not to be deterred by what, at best, he regarded as a merely temporary arrangement. After his success at Mosdok on the 3rd February, Petrovsk, the capital of the Daghestan and an important port on the Caspian, lay not far away, and open to seizure by his troops. The general, therefore, anxious only to gather the fruits of his successes, pushed on, ignored the agreed line, and occupied the capital and the northern part of Daghestan. The republic, of course, protested against this violation, but it was not in the power of His Majesty's Government to insist on the withdrawal of the Volunteer army; nor, perhaps, would that course have been politic. Acting on instructions from London, therefore, General Thompson, in June 1919, revised the line of demarcation by bringing its eastern part five miles south of Petrovsk. General Denikin was thus confirmed in his occupation of Petrovsk, which provided him with a port on the Caspian, and assured him possession of the line of railway between Petrovsk and his northern front on the Don. Having secured these advantages, it was supposed that he would be less anxious to reach Baku.

*Georgian and Azerbaijan Intrigues in Daghestan.*

But Georgia and Azerbaijan took alarm at this encroachment on the North Caucasus Republic. The violence offered it at the hands of General Denikin and his Volunteer army, notwithstanding British promises, might well, they argued, happen to themselves. Both Governments, too, were anxious that Daghestan should be independent of any present or future Russia; they therefore took secret measures for stirring up opposition to General Denikin in Daghestan.

*Risings in Daghestan.—The whole of Daghestan placed under Control of General Denikin.*

Conditions in the republic were already favourable for the creation of trouble. Ever since the armistice the country had become the centre of German and Turkish activities; Nuri Pasha—brother of Enver Pasha, and lately the Turkish Commander-in-chief—who had already escaped from British captivity at Batoum, was known to have found hospitality here with a number of German and Turkish refugee officers. From Daghestan, in fact, German and Turkish agents radiated throughout the Caucasus. General Denikin soon had to deal with small sporadic risings by the tribesmen, and with persistent interruption of his communications. To suppress these activities and to protect the railway he found it necessary to ignore the line of demarcation fixed by General Thompson in June. It speedily became evident that if General Denikin was to prevent Daghestani raids and protect his position he must occupy the whole of Daghestan—that, in fact, the line of the 4th June bore no relationship to the practical requirements of the situation. On the 4th August, therefore, on the advice of the British military mission, attached to General Denikin's army, the War Office laid down yet another line of demarcation, this time coinciding with the southern frontier of Daghestan. The whole of the republic being now placed under General Denikin's control, the sphere of his operation was thus brought up to the northern frontier of Azerbaijan.

*Caspian Fleet handed over to General Denikin.*

About the middle of August General Denikin's cause received a still further increase of power. In consequence of the decision of His Majesty's Government to withdraw all British forces from Caucasia, and because of the evident inability of the Republic of Azerbaijan to man a fleet capable of resisting Bolshevik aggression on the Caspian, the British Caspian fleet was handed over to General Denikin.

*Caucasian Dissatisfaction with Great Britain's Action.*

These developments, coloured by the impending British evacuation of Transcaucasia—which would throw the various republics again on their own resources—caused violent dissatisfaction in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Daghestan, and seriously affected the confidence of their people in the word and good faith of His Majesty's Government. The republics, it was said, were to be sacrificed to the Russian reactionaries; their nearest interests counted for little, their future for nothing, when weighed by Great Britain against her own immediate convenience. She was charged, indeed, with having broken faith with the republics.



### *Further Risings in Daghestan.*

Holding in uncompromising hostility General Denikin's avowed purpose of re-establishing Russian control in the Transcaucasian provinces, and anxious to seize any opportunity that might be turned to their own advantage, Georgia and Azerbaijan now gave further support to discontent in Daghestan. In October 1919, when General Denikin attempted to conscribe the tribesmen into his army, the widespread rising which resulted was secretly assisted by the two republics—by Georgia in particular—with officers, men and money. This rising General Denikin suppressed, though not before the tribesmen had gained several important successes over his troops.

### *October 1919. General Denikin's Movement at the Zenith of its Power.*

General Denikin was now at the zenith of his power. The Volunteer army under his command had grown from modest beginnings to nearly 300,000 men. He controlled the Cossack country of the Kuban and the Don, and had almost completely subdued the North Caucasian Republic, or Daghestan. He commanded both the Black Sea and the Caspian. In the Black Sea Province between Novorossisk and Sochi, a force calling itself "The Green Guards," anti-reactionary, but also anti-Bolshevik, was co-operating with him. General Yudenitch was marching on Petrograd, and in Siberia, Admiral Kolchak, though in difficulties, was more or less holding his own. The Western Powers, now convinced that General Denikin's movement would end in the overthrow of Bolshevism, were granting almost limitless supplies—by the end of December, Great Britain alone had contributed military stores to the value of 26,000,000*l.* It was in these circumstances that General Denikin again turned his attention to the Don front, and, at the head of large forces, advanced into the heart of Russia, driving the Bolsheviks before him. By the middle of October he had occupied Orel. He was now well on the way to Moscow, and regarded it merely as a matter of days before the ancient capital of Russia should fall into his hands.

But good fortune proved to be the undoing of General Denikin's operations against Bolshevik Russia. The whole movement was based upon misrepresentation, subterfuge, and pretence, regarded as justifiable or even creditable means to the end in view.

### *Causes of General Denikin's Failure.*

General Denikin himself had doubtless held liberal enough views in the early stages of the revolution, when the movement contained no stronger supporters than those at the Imperial court and among officers of the army and navy. The motives of these highly-placed revolutionaries were patriotic and not at all in the direction of social change. Nothing was further from their thoughts than a revolution in which the leading part should be taken by workmen and peasants, and which should have for its aim the overthrow of the existing social order. But the revolution which was begun with the desire of purging and reforming the existing Government speedily drew its strength from deeper and ever deeper sources of the national being, and passed with accelerating rapidity under the control of leaders whose aims were not reformation, but complete and uncompromising subversion. General Denikin's counter movement had no prospect of success unless it could command peasant support to at least a considerable extent. In the provinces of South-Eastern Russia occupied by the Volunteer army various alluring promises were therefore held out to the peasants. The new movement was said to be not at all reactionary. The peasant was to keep everything he had gained by the Bolshevik revolution; if the Volunteer army were successful he was to benefit again under the new Government which would be set up. Certain of these promises doubtless General Denikin honestly intended to fulfil, if possible. The great bulk of his supporters and officers, however—thorough-paced reactionaries as by the nature of things they were—had no such intention. They spoke openly of using the peasants for the time being, but of placing them in their proper position when success should have crowned reactionary efforts. Any system of government for Russia which should confirm the peasants in possession of their newly acquired lands, and confer upon them dominant political power, was unthinkable to the dispossessed reactionaries from whom General Denikin's movement derived its real energy. General Denikin's successes during the summer of 1919 turned the heads of these people, and the old Russian spirit within them emerged. Justice and far-sighted tolerance in the treatment of the peasantry gave place to exaction and rigid repression in Daghestan, and a similar spirit was shown towards the armed forces on which the reactionary movement itself depended. There was, in fact, no recognition of changed conditions by General

Denikin's staff, no understanding that upon the goodwill and contentment of the population whose country was occupied by the Volunteer army depended, in the long run, a continuance of success.

### *General Denikin's Aggressions on Georgia.*

Nor did General Denikin himself avoid high handed and exceedingly impolitic action at this stage. He had always regarded with ill-concealed impatience the aspirations of the Transcaucasian States to independence of Russia—towards Georgia, in particular, he had made no secret of his animosity. He now had the power to give effect to his hostility, and took aggressive action wherever possible, notwithstanding the intimate relations between Georgia and Great Britain on the one hand, and himself and Great Britain on the other. He disputed the right of Georgia to sail her ships on the Black Sea under the Georgian flag. He seized and interned two of these vessels. He blockaded Georgian ports. He demanded a rectification of the Georgian frontier on the north-west and attacked Georgian frontier guards on the river Bzyb. At this stage, indeed, only British influence prevented Georgian military action on a scale which would have caused General Denikin the most serious embarrassment.

### *October 1919. Defeat of Russian Reactionary Movements.*

But the tide was about to turn against all the widely dispersed reactionary armed forces opposing Bolshevism. Towards the close of October, General Yudenitch was completely defeated outside Petrograd; and at the same time external difficulties, internal dissensions, and the overbearing, unteachable reactionary spirit of his officers reduced Admiral Kolchak's army to political and military impotence. A heavy Bolshevik offensive, launched against General Denikin's army, stopped his advance on Moscow. The population of the country in his rear had been exasperated and alienated by the exactions and maladministration of his subordinates, and his lines of communication were difficult to maintain.

### *Mutiny in the Caspian Fleet. Collapse of General Denikin's Movement.*

The whole Province of Daghestan rose in revolt. The Caspian fleet which had been handed over by the British became permeated with discontent, and the crews of several vessels mutinied. General Denikin's troops, too, were now largely composed of unwilling conscripts; the spirit of the old Volunteer army—an army formed chiefly of officers serving in the ranks—no longer existed. The rot which set in could not be arrested, and the army which had been counting the days before it should enter Moscow was compelled to retire. No stand was found possible until the familiar line of the Don was reached. Here, however, the Cossack elements, once the chief support of the Volunteer army, refused to continue the struggle, and some even threatened to attack Denikin's flank. By the end of December 1919, General Denikin's great adventure, from which so much had been expected, so much had been possible, had collapsed beyond recovery, and danger to Georgia, Azerbaijan and Daghestan from this source thus disappeared.

In carrying the foregoing sketch of General Denikin and the operations of the Volunteer army up to the point where the Russian reactionary movement ceased to exert much influence in Caucasia, the narrative has got a little ahead of events in Transcaucasia. We must now, therefore, go back to August 1919 in order to complete the present chapter.

### *Suggestion by His Majesty's Government that the United States should bear part of the Cost of Transcaucasian Occupation.*

Early in that month His Majesty's Government informed the American Ambassador that further British expenditure in the military occupation of Caucasia was impossible, unless the United States were prepared to bear a portion of the cost. The American Government, however, refused, and there now seemed no prospect that America would accept a mandate for any part of the Near East.

### *August 28, 1919. British Troops evacuate Transcaucasia.*

On the 28th August, 1919, the British troops were therefore withdrawn from Transcaucasia. But a small garrison was left to hold Batoum in order to prevent an immediate dispute between General Denikin, the Georgians, and the Turks for possession of the port. A battalion each of French and Italian troops were to assist in the occupation, but they never arrived.



CHAPTER V.—*The Independent Republics during the Continuance of the British Mission at Tiflis. Period of the Russian Reactionary Movement.*

From the British evacuation, August 28, 1919, to the Bolshevik occupation of Baku, April 28, 1920.

With the evacuation of British troops from Transcaucasia, the risk of dangerous complications ceased, an awkward entanglement was definitely ended, and His Majesty's Government were able to follow a more detached policy in dealing with Caucasian affairs. During the occupation, British aims had been of a temporary and palliative nature. British troops were sent into the country to ensure the complete evacuation of Transcaucasia by Turkish and German troops. That was the primary aim. Secondary aims were to maintain peace between the Transcaucasian peoples, to assist them in establishing the elements of good government and administration and to make a beginning with reconstruction. At the time of the evacuation, these temporary aims may be said to have been attained.

*August 1919. The British Mission under Mr. Wardrop arrive at Tiflis.*

His Majesty's Government recognised, however, that in spite of outward signs of comparative peace there were forces at work which might at any time cause the downfall of the Transcaucasian republics. General Denikin's anti-Bolshevik movement seemed likely to succeed—a movement which Georgia, Azerbaijan and Daghestan appeared determined to resist as containing a decided danger to their independence. With the removal of the British garrison, danger from this quarter had obviously increased. It was certain, too, that a great increase of Bolshevik and Turkish propaganda would follow the British withdrawal. His Majesty's Government, therefore, despatched to Transcaucasia a diplomatic mission under Mr. O. Wardrop, which arrived in Tiflis in August 1919.

*Instructions to Mr. Wardrop.*

The instructions given by the Foreign Office to Mr. Wardrop may be summarised briefly under three heads. He was to safeguard British interests. He was to give such moral support and advice to the Republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia as he might be able to do without involving His Majesty's Government in any form of continuous obligations. He was to use all his influence to prevent hostilities between General Denikin and the republics, or between the republics themselves.

*Situation in Georgia on arrival of the Mission.*

On the arrival of Mr. Wardrop's mission the situation in Caucasasia was exceedingly involved and difficult, both internally and externally. The British troops were being withdrawn, and no Great Power was willing to accept the position of mandatory, nor to garrison the country temporarily. All attempts at federating the republics had failed: the only aim they had in common was to resist Bolshevism. Georgians were obsessed with the idea of maintaining their complete independence, both of Russia and of their neighbours; they were inflated with their own traditions and history; and because their territory had escaped the ravages of war they held vastly exaggerated opinions of the powers of their country and Government.

*Situation in Azerbaijan.*

The Tatars of Azerbaijan desired independence, but recognised that without the British army of occupation they could not maintain the independence they possessed. Though not altogether anxious to fall under Turkish rule, the people were saturated with pan-Turanian and pan-Islamic sympathies, and hesitated between a Turkish and a Persian protectorate. The existing Government had been moulded by General Thompson out of the Moussavat Party, which was pan-Islamic and anti-Socialistic; the rival Ittihad Party was also pan-Islamic, but held advanced Socialist theories, and was closely united to the infamous Turkish Committee of Union and Progress. The Moussavat Party as a whole favoured union or intimate agreement with Persia, which at the time was regarded, at least in this part of the world, as a British protectorate. In fact, proposals to bring this union between Azerbaijan and Persia into effect were actually made by the Persian Minister at Baku, and by certain members of the Moussavat Government of Azerbaijan. At the same time, however, other members of the Government were in

secret agreement with the Committee of Union and Progress, represented by Nuri Pasha and Halil Pasha. But neither party in Azerbaijan had any desire for a federation of Transcaucasian States which should place the Christian elements in predominance.

*Situation in Armenia.*

In Armenia the Government was in the hands of the advanced Dashnaks. Their greatest interest appeared to be the prosecution of hostilities with the Azerbaijan Tatars in the disputed areas of Nachichevan, Zangezur and Karabagh. The Armenian army was chiefly officered by Russian reactionaries, who, together with Colonel Chardigny's French mission, did their utmost to maintain and increase ill-feeling between Armenia and her neighbours. Hostilities in the disputed districts broke out again with the evacuation of the British troops and the arrival of Mr. Wardrop's mission in Transcaucasia. These disputed territories, as has been stated, had been placed under a Mahommedan governor by the arbitration of General Thompson. The French mission had opposed the settlement and urged the Armenians to resist it; the Americans, under Colonel Haskell, the Allied High Commissioner to Armenia, had also supported Armenian claims to the provinces in dispute. But soon after Mr. Wardrop took up his duties at Tiflis, Colonel Haskell carried out a singular settlement of his own; he arbitrarily handed over the districts of Zangezur and Karabagh to Azerbaijan, and formed Nachichevan into a neutral zone under an American commissioner. The settlement pleased no one, for it brought many Armenian villages within Azerbaijan territory, and also prevented the seasonal migration of nomad Tatar tribes.

*The British Mission and General Denikin.*

Adding to the difficulties of the situation with which the British mission at Tiflis had to contend at this time was General Denikin's movement, now greatly exciting the Caucasian republics. Incessant appeals were received from the republics for the recognition of their independence. The republics were informed that their requests were receiving consideration; yet simultaneously General Denikin, known to be dependent upon the British, was taking aggressive action against the Caucasian States wherever possible, and actually blockading Georgian ports.

Conflict between General Denikin's forces and Georgia seemed to be the most pressing danger. Only the tact exercised by Mr. Wardrop prevented a serious collision, for the Georgian Government were conscious of being in a position to affect the whole course of General Denikin's fortune.

*November 1919. Meeting between Mr. Wardrop and General Denikin's Staff. Collapse of Russian Reactionary Movements.*

In November 1919 Mr. Wardrop arranged a meeting between himself, members of General Denikin's staff and the British military mission attached to the Volunteer army's headquarters. The outcome was that General Denikin agreed to raise the blockade of Georgian ports and return the Georgian ships he had interned. The settlement was a precarious one, and could scarcely have been maintained long. The collapse of General Denikin's movement, however, during December 1919 removed the danger threatening from reactionary Russia; and, though it threatened again in General Wrangel's campaign from the Crimea, the failure of that adventure finally eliminated reactionary Russia from Transcaucasian politics. But Turkish influences were now to become more active.

*Turkish Influences become More Active in Transcaucasia.*

Since the armistice of Mudros, as already stated, Turkish and German officers, including Nuri Pasha, had taken refuge in Daghestan, and that province had become a centre of Turko-German activity. In their opposition to General Denikin's movement, both Georgia and Azerbaijan were by these doubtful channels brought into close contact with Turkish influences. In November 1919 a secret agreement was signed between the Nationalist Turks and, it was alleged, the Government of Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Government, however, denied the existence of the compact, and it subsequently transpired that the agreement was concluded by Nuri Pasha and Halil Pasha with certain pro-Turk members of the Moussavat Government of Azerbaijan and not with the Government as a whole. In effect, the agreement was a preliminary endeavour to bring Daghestan under the control of



Azerbaijan in case the Daghestanis should succeed in freeing their country of Denikin's forces. With the collapse of General Denikin's movement in December 1919 a definite policy in this direction seems to have been adopted, under Turkish prompting and guidance, by the Moslems of Daghestan and Azerbaijan.

The fact was that at this time the Transcaucasian policy of the Allies, and especially of His Majesty's Government, had become entirely inexplicable to the Mahomedan mind. On the one hand was the British mission at Tiflis, urging the federation of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, but excluding Daghestan, although in the estimation of the natives that province formed an irreparable part of Transcaucasia. As understood by Mahomedans, the British reasons for this exclusion were somewhat as follows:—

*Caucasian Mahomedans' Idea of British Reasons for Exclusion.*

The exclusion of Daghestan from Transcaucasia was needed in order to provide the Cossack portion of an anti-Bolshevik Russia with a sea coast on the Caspian. If Russia remained Bolshevik, British policy was believed to envisage the creation of a Cossack State in which Daghestan would be included, again to give a Caspian coast line to the new State. In either case the exclusion of Daghestan from Transcaucasia would ensure the domination of Transcaucasia and the Cossack State by the Christian elements of the population. By the same arrangement the Mahomedan elements would be placed in a permanent minority in either State.

*Creation of a Moslem State advocated by Colonel Stokes.*

On the other hand it was well known that Colonel Stokes, the British political officer at Baku, strongly advocated the creation of a single Mahomedan State extending from the northern frontier of Daghestan to the Persian Gulf, and eastward from the Black Sea to beyond the Caspian, so as to include the Turkoman Mahomedans of Russian Central Asia. Such a State would be peopled chiefly by Moslems of the Shiah rite, and, its advocates somewhat fondly supposed, would be in enmity with any Turkish Sunni Moslem State in Asia Minor. It was expected that the Shiah State would lean upon Great Britain and provide a buffer between Russia and the British Asiatic possessions. It was known, further, that Khan Yurmutsky, a Mahomedan colonel in the Russian army, and representative of the Turkomans, had made proposals for the creation of this State in several interviews with Colonel Stokes. Put shortly, Transcaucasian Moslems knew that Mr. Wardrop's mission had sought to create a Christian buffer State, containing a Moslem minority, and that Colonel Stokes stood strongly for a Mahomedan buffer State on a much more grandiose scale, a State intended to divide Islam in Western Asia into two rival, and perhaps hostile, Mahomedan nations. Turkish propaganda in Transcaucasia lost no time in fastening on these conflicting policies. Among other wild statements it was asserted that delay by the Peace Conference in formulating terms of peace for Turkey was due to Great Britain, who would commit herself to nothing until the Russian situation should have cleared.

*Effect of these Two Policies on Mahomedans of Western Asia.*

Meanwhile, the two policies produced reactions in Transcaucasia and Transcaspiia. On the one side, Moslems of Azerbaijan, Daghestan and Turkestan, working under Turkish influence, strove for union with the Turkish Nationalists in Asia Minor, who had grown to be a power at the close of 1919. The definite policy was followed, also, of seeking to establish a common frontier between Nationalist Turkey and Azerbaijan. To this end Turkish officers were despatched to lead the Tatar tribesmen against the Armenians in Zangezur and Karabagh, as these districts, if occupied, would give the common frontier desired. On the other side, the Transcaucasian republics unceasingly pressed the Allied Powers, particularly Great Britain, for political recognition, and for assistance in arms and munitions and other military stores, applications which received sympathetic consideration.

*Mahomedans of Daghestan and Azerbaijan openly adopt a Turkish Orientation.*

The failure of General Denikin's movement at the end of 1919 cleared the situation, however, and led to changes of Allied policy. It became evident thereafter that Great Britain no longer intended to support the reactionary forces opposing Bolshevism. In January 1920 the Supreme Council at Paris raised the blockade

of Russia. With such developments apparent, the Mahomedans of Azerbaijan and Daghestan openly adopted a definitely Turkish orientation. Against a reactionary Russia these Moslem peoples knew they would have had no prospect of maintaining their independence. Russia had, however, plainly become Bolshevik; Bolshevik Russia was in close alliance with Nationalist Turkey; by going over to this militant Islamic State, with which they were in racial and religious sympathy, the Moslems of Caucasia believed they might be able to maintain themselves against a Bolshevik Russia.

*Bolshevik Russia turns her Attention to Caucasia.*

But already fresh complications were in preparation, prompted by the inherent Russian interest in Caucasia. Bolshevik Russia took the same interest in Caucasia that the reactionary movement of General Denikin had shown, the same interest that old Tsarist Russia had taken. It seemed impossible for Caucasia to tear herself free from the geographical and economic bonds which bound her fortunes with those of Russia.

*Chicherin's Declaration regarding Transcaucasia.*

As far back as October 1919 the Bolshevik Government of Russia had turned their attention to the wider political possibilities presented in Transcaucasia and Turkey by the rise of Nationalist Turkey. From this time onward the existence of a very definite Russian policy regarding these regions became evident. In the same month Chicherin published his declaration that Soviet Russia entertained no aggressive designs against the independence of the Caucasian States. By Russian Bolshevik efforts an agreement was arranged between Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia regarding transport facilities and the territories in dispute between the three republics, and though the settlement was not of long duration, it served to establish for Soviet Russia a certain footing in these republics. Another step in Bolshevik policy was the systematic reconquest of Turkestan and Bokhara, which placed all Transcaspiia again in Russian hands by February 1920.

*November 1919. Bolshevik Approach to Turkish Nationalists.*

But the most important development of Russian policy at this stage was the approach to Turkish Nationalism. Bolshevik Russia and Nationalist Turkey had various aims in common: they had the same enemies; they were both in political, military and economic isolation; each was capable of giving invaluable assistance to the other. In November 1919 serious negotiations took place between the Soviet Government and the agents of Mustapha Kemal Pasha's Government; from this time onwards a series of treaties and agreements appear to have been concluded between Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey. Apparent harmony in the aims pursued, in the measures taken, soon showed itself. Working together, Turkish and Bolshevik agents fostered and directed revolts against Russian reactionaries in Daghestan, and, finally, after the failure of Denikin and Wrangel, both Nuri Pasha and Halil Pasha disappeared from Daghestan, and left the tribesmen to the unquestioned control of the Bolsheviks.

*January 1920. De facto Recognition of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.*

As some sort of offset to the common policy now being pursued by Bolshevik Russia and Nationalist Turkey, the Allied Powers, in January 1920, granted *de facto* recognition to the Governments of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. At about the same time His Majesty's Government withdrew British support from the Russian reactionary movement. In February 1920 the Allied Powers announced that Constantinople, together with a small piece of territory in Europe, would remain in Turkish hands.

*Russia Suspicious of the Allies in Caucasia. Withdrawal of Mr. Wardrop from the British Mission and Appointment of Commander Luke, R.N.R.*

The three events mentioned in the previous paragraph, which fell closely together, had a great and immediate effect upon Russian policy in Caucasia. The Soviet Government deduced from them that the Allies had only recognised the independence of the Transcaucasian States after Russian reactionary movements had definitely failed, and when no possibility remained of



placing Caucasia under friendly reactionary Russian tutelage as a buffer State between Bolshevism and the East. The Soviet Government deduced, further, that the concessions to Turkey and to Mahomedan feeling by the Allies portended an eventual arrangement between Turkey and Great Britain regarding Caucasia and Central Asia, perhaps even an arrangement in which a British-protected Persia would be included. They were confirmed in these suspicions by the withdrawal of Mr. Wardrop, whose earlier career in Russia had shown him to be a friend of the Russian people, and his replacement by Commander Luke, R.N.R., who had spent much time in the East, and whose particular knowledge was Eastern and not Russian. In the view of the Soviet Government, Great Britain was now seeking to create a Mahomedan buffer State in the Middle East, which should be hostile to Bolshevism.

#### *March 1920. Bolshevik Russia's Measures in Caucasia.*

The moment did not appear propitious for aggressive Bolshevik measures to combat the imagined danger. Russia could not spare large numbers of troops for an offensive in Transcaucasia; and the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement was being negotiated. Certain precautionary steps, however, were taken. The Bolshevik mission to Afghanistan was strengthened in importance and numbers. A new and more explicit agreement with Mustapha Kemal Pasha was signed in March 1920, and the Nationalist Government was supplied with money and arms from Moscow. The subjugation of hostile tribes in Central Asia was continued with increased rapidity. And, also, in March, at the invitation of the Moscow Government, both Azerbaijan and Georgia entered into peace negotiations with Soviet Russia. The result of the agreement which followed was that Azerbaijan withdrew her forces from the Samur River in Southern Daghestan, and permitted a considerable Soviet army, which had been assembled on that line, to cross the river on the pretext of subduing certain rebellious hill tribes. Bolshevik Russian troops were thus established along the northern frontier of Azerbaijan.

#### *April 27-28, 1920. Bolshevik Revolution at Baku, and Occupation by 11th Soviet Army.*

Everything being now in readiness, a prepared revolution took place at Baku on the 27th April, 1920, under the direction of the Ittihad Party and a number of Turkish officers, joined by a few members of the Mussavat Government. The Government resigned, and were replaced by a Turko-Ittihad Government, which proclaimed a Soviet Republic and Administration. According to previous arrangement, an appeal was then made to Soviet Russia for armed assistance, and instructors versed in the theory and practice of Communism. The Bolshevik army on the northern frontier was then transported to Baku. The Turkish agents, who had played their part, and were now much in the way, were shot or expelled. A declaration was issued stating that the new Government in Baku was in complete harmony with that of Moscow; industry and shipping were nationalised; the Azerbaijan army was partially disbanded, and the remainder incorporated in the 11th Soviet army; and an Extraordinary Commission against espionage and revolts was established. By means of what was called an internal and peaceful revolution, Baku was thus endowed with Soviet Government and again brought under Russian control.

#### *Russia's Purposes in Reoccupying Baku.*

The recovery of Baku at a time when Russia was, apparently, fully occupied with her war against Poland, was prompted by two chief practical objects, the accomplishment of which, in the Soviet view, admitted of no delay. They were: The destruction of the Mahomedan bloc, in process of formation under Turkish guidance and impulsion in Azerbaijan, Daghestan and Transcaspia, which it was feared might fall under British control, and the seizure of the oil-fuel resources at Baku, for use during the winter of 1920, and in the campaign against Poland. But in its wider political aspects the Russian recapture of Baku was the first deliberate step by the Bolshevik Government to regain Transcaucasia and to re-establish Russia in her old advantageous and dominating position in South-Western Asia.

#### *CHAPTER VI.—The Independent Republics during the Continuance of the British Mission. Period of Bolshevik and Turkish Aggression.*

*From the Bolshevik occupation of Baku on April 28, 1920, to the overthrow of the independent republics, the creation of Soviet republics and the withdrawal of the British mission.*

After their recapture of Baku the Bolsheviks lost no time in pushing their advantage further, in spite of the Polish war which made pressing demands upon the resources and energy of the State. They at first encouraged the Tatars of Azerbaijan to continue the struggle against the Armenians in the disputed area of Zangezur, though with no intention that the Tatars themselves should gain possession of the territory and thus establish permanent communication with Nationalist Turkey.

#### *May 7, 1920: Treaty between Azerbaijan and Georgia.—June 7, 1920: Treaty between Georgia and Russia.—Armenia refuses to sign Treaty with Russia.—Bolshevik Risings follow in Armenia.*

But it was soon found that Bolshevik interests would be better served at this stage by peace making than by war. On the 7th May, therefore, a treaty was signed between Azerbaijan and Georgia providing for the settlement of disputes by arbitration, for the resumption of trading, and the transportation of goods. This treaty was followed on the 6th June, by a treaty between Georgia and Bolshevik Russia, in which assurances of good faith were exchanged. Treaties between Bolshevik Russia and Armenia and Azerbaijan were also drafted; but the Armenians refused to sign owing to conditions which required the transportation of Soviet troops upon the Armenian railways, and the handing over of the disputed areas of Zangezur and Karabagh to Russian control as a temporary measure. Bolshevik propaganda had been intensified in Armenia since the fall of Baku, with the result that Bolshevik risings had taken place at Alexandropol, Kars, Novo Bayazid and Kargisman, during May and June. The Armenian Government, however, had repressed these movements with vigour, and having the prospect of soon receiving supplies of arms and munitions from Great Britain saw no reason why they should yield to pressure applied from Moscow.

#### *Rising against Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan.*

Meanwhile the Tatar tribesmen of Azerbaijan had risen against Bolshevik rule. In June a rising on a considerable scale occurred in the district of Elizavetopol in which 2,000 Bolsheviks were killed. Red troops were at once despatched from Baku; they were joined by the Armenians of Elizavetopol; and between them they massacred some 10,000 Tatars. The result of these savage reprisals was to alienate Moslems from Bolshevism yet further.

#### *The Supreme Council propose to create a Free State of Batoum.—July 7, 1920: British Garrison withdrawn from Batoum.—Agreement regarding Access to Batoum by Georgia and Azerbaijan.*

In drafting the Treaty of Peace with Turkey the Supreme Council, recognising the great international importance of Batoum, had proposed to make the port and province a free State under the protection of the League of Nations. But the scheme fell through, as likely to be unworkable in practice. It was bitterly opposed by Georgians, by Russians—whether reactionary or Bolshevik—and, so far as they mattered, by the Nationalist Turks. Nor was it at all clear that the League of Nations would be competent to discharge the onerous responsibilities—almost certain to require the exercise of armed strength—which the trust would imply. On the 7th July 1920, therefore, the British garrison was withdrawn, and the town and province were handed over to Georgia under an agreement between the Allied Powers and the Georgian Government. Unhampered transport rights by rail and facilities in the port of Batoum were provided under the agreement for Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Georgia further undertook to grant Armenia a concession for a railway through the valley of the Chorukh, between Batoum and Armenian territory. By these provisions, it was hoped, the inland republics would be secured perpetual and unfettered communication with the Black Sea.



*July 1920. Bolshevik Ultimatum to the Armenian Government.*

By the end of July 1920 the Polish campaign had turned definitely in favour of the Bolsheviks. Relieved of this anxiety Moscow presented an ultimatum to Armenia demanding the immediate acceptance of the draft treaty of June; to this ultimatum Armenia returned no reply. Orders were given, in consequence, for the 11th Soviet army to occupy the disputed areas of Zangezur and Karabagh.

*August 1920. Armenian Government accept Bolshevik Terms. De jure Recognition of Armenia by the Allies.*

On the 10th August, the Soviet representative at Erivan threatened a still further advance of the army, and compelled the Armenian Government to sign the treaty. Commander Luke, the acting British Commissioner, protested to the Armenian Government against their acceptance of the Soviet terms. On the 5th August, a large consignment of arms and munitions for Armenia reached Batoum, and were forwarded through Georgia to their destination. Curiously enough, on the 20th August, the Armenian delegates in Europe were invited to sign the Treaty of Sèvres, and in this way their Government secured *de jure* recognition by the Allies.

A period of comparative peace followed, broken only by periodical armed conflicts between Armenian partisan forces and the Red troops in occupation of Zangezur and Karabagh. In these affairs, the Government at Moscow appear to have taken little interest. Having secured territory giving direct access to Nationalist Turkey, they were satisfied to wait, and leave the completion of their designs until they were less occupied elsewhere.

Even in this unfortunate condition of the Armenian Republic dissension was not abated. The Dashnak Government was in ill-favour, and efforts were made to form a coalition Government of all parties; the Dashnaks, however, refused to take part, and their opponents were unable to persuade or compel them either to agree to combination, or to modify their policy and enter into a defensive alliance with Georgia. Meanwhile, Bolshevik and Turkish propagandists were busy among the population, with results which became apparent a few months later.

*The Oriental Congress at Baku.*

During the period immediately following the capture of Baku, Russia made full use of the opportunities conferred on her by the re-establishment of her authority in Azerbaijan. In a wide sense Baku occupies the position of metropolis in the Caspian basin—Caucasia, North Persia, the Volga region and Mahomedan Central Asia all look to Baku, not only as the chief commercial centre, but as the one centre of news, education and general culture within reach. This position in her hands, Bolshevik Russia made it the headquarters of her propaganda for the Near East and Inner Asia. Here, further, during the latter part of 1920, she convened a series of conferences—particularly the Oriental Congress under the presidency of Zinovief, attended by thousands of delegates from all parts of the East—with the view of spreading Bolshevik doctrines and influence. This congress, whatever its wider advantages to Bolshevism, was the scene of much plain speaking against Bolshevism by various delegates. Tatar delegates complained of the massacre of Tatars by Bolsheviks at Elizavetopol, and Transcaspian delegates recounted the massacre and oppression of Moslem populations in Central Asian States by Bolshevik troops. Even Zinovief himself and Enver Pasha opposed each other in heated controversy. In this exchange Zinovief stated plainly, if unwisely, that the Turks should cherish no illusions regarding the Russo-Turkish agreement lately concluded, for it was a measure intended to serve only the immediate convenience of Russia and Nationalist Turkey.

*September 1920. Withdrawal of Commander Luke and Appointment of Colonel Stokes in his place.*

A British diplomatic change which produced considerable results in Transcaucasia deserves some attention at this stage. Commander Luke was withdrawn, during September 1920, from the position of acting British High Commissioner, and Colonel Stokes, to whose views reference has already been made, was appointed in his place. Commander Luke had continued the policy followed by Mr. Wardrop in giving support to anti-Bolshevik and anti-Turk elements in Transcaucasia. He had thus greatly disappointed the Mahomedan inhabitants in general. On several occasions he had been approached by the pro-Turkish party in Daghestan with the

proposal that Great Britain should encourage and finance a rising in Daghestan to expel the Bolsheviks from that province and from Azerbaijan. Circumstances indeed were propitious for such action, but for obvious reasons His Majesty's Government could not entertain the policy suggested.

*Effect on Transcaucasian Opinion of Colonel Stokes's Appointment.*

The appointment of Colonel Stokes, therefore, who was known to be a Russophile and to hold the view that it was a necessity for the British Empire to obtain and retain Mahomedan friendship in every quarter, was taken to indicate the adoption of a policy other than that which had guided Mr. Wardrop and Commander Luke. Various matters combined to give colour to this idea. The province and port of Batoum had just been handed over to the Georgian Government. It was known that the collapse of General Wrangel's reactionary effort from the Crimea was not only imminent, but that the collapse would be final. Press utterances in Great Britain and India, coupled with the recent decision of the Allies that Constantinople should remain under Turkish sovereignty, were regarded as proving the existence of a great body of British and Indian opinion anxious to make the utmost concessions to secure Mahomedan goodwill. Caucasian Mahomedans, therefore, putting two and two together, were convinced that Colonel Stokes's appointment marked a change of British policy in their favour.

*Bolshevik Propaganda and the Appointment of Colonel Stokes.*

Playing upon these beliefs, an insidious propaganda was conducted by Bolshevik agents in Georgia and Armenia. Great Britain, it was said, intended to place the Caucasus under the tutelage of a friendly Turkey, and thus create the friendly buffer State between Russia and her Eastern possessions which she regarded as a necessity. Armenians, in particular, were advised that Russian Bolshevik domination would be greatly preferable to domination by a Turko-Georgian alliance. With this view the great majority of Armenians were likely to be in hearty agreement. It is improbable that the propagandism in question affected the course of the Caucasian campaign upon which Russia had just decided; but it certainly influenced the developments which took place after the campaign.

*Russo-Turkish Military Operations against Armenia and Georgia.*

We come now to the Russo-Turkish military operations against the republics of Georgia and Armenia, whereby the aggressor Powers achieved the aims upon which they had agreed. By these operations Nationalist Turkey obtained the greater part of the territory awarded to Turkey by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but evacuated under the armistice of Mudros, and Russia re-established herself in the remaining portions of Transcaucasia.

*The Treaty of Sèvres as the Origin of Turkish Nationalism.—Ambitions of the Pontic Greeks.—Negotiations between the Armenians and the Pontic Greeks.*

To follow this aggression more closely it is necessary to go back to July 1920, and to glance, also, at the draft Treaty of Sèvres, then in its final form. Article 88 of the treaty referred to the decision of President Wilson the questions of how much Ottoman territory should be incorporated in the Armenian State and the line of frontier to be adopted. Resistance of the surrender of any Ottoman territory to the Armenian State was one of the chief aims of the Turkish Nationalist movement. To give effect to this purpose a comparatively strong Turkish force, under the command of Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha, was assembled and maintained in and around Erzeroum. This army was also charged with the duty of watching the Pontic Greeks, who had ambitions of establishing a republic in the vaguely defined region of Pontus, bordering on the Black Sea. The Government of the Armenian Republic had in view measures of their own for obtaining possession of territory in Turkish Armenia; one of these measures was to secure the co-operation of the Pontic Greeks; in fact informal negotiations between the Armenians and the Pontic Greeks seem to have taken place during July 1920, in which each party endeavoured to use the other for its own ends. Certain Greeks, possibly without the knowledge of the Hellenic Government, made the Armenian Government an offer of arms and munitions conditionally that Armenian forces should attack Kiazim Kara Bekir's army when the Pontic Greeks rose in revolt. It is reported, indeed, that at this time a million rounds of small-arm ammunition was delivered at Batoum from Greek sources for Armenian use.



*July 1920. Ultimatum from Nationalist Turkey to the Armenian Government.*

The Turkish Nationalist Government, doubtless, were not unaware of these negotiations. At the end of July 1920, the Government of Angora required the Armenians to withdraw their troops from the Province of Olti, and retire behind the frontier laid down by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Armenian Government refused to comply with this demand. They maintained that the treaty having been concluded with the Central Turkish Government at Constantinople, which the Angora Government did not recognise, it did not apply between Nationalist Turkey and Armenia. And, also, that Armenia having just signed the Treaty of Sèvres, under which the western frontiers of Armenia were to be defined by President Wilson, no discussion on the subject of the frontier was possible. The Armenian Government stated further, that in the meantime they had no intention of sending troops across the former Russo-Turkish frontier, and that they expected the Nationalist Government to observe the same correct attitude.

*United Action in Transcaucasia by Russia and Turkey.*

So far no active use had been made of the Nationalist-Bolshevik understanding or agreement—of November 1919—by either contracting party. The agreement seems to have been rather in the nature of an arrangement by which each side had first call on the services of the other in case of necessity. Under it, however, the Nationalist Government had already obtained arms and munitions, and a measure of financial assistance, and had certainly gained increased prestige among their own people, as well as an added sense of security. But now the two Powers proposed to avail themselves of the greater advantages their pact conferred, and settle Transcaucasian problems to their own benefit.

*Internal Conditions in Transcaucasia at this Stage.*

The internal condition of the Transcaucasian republics was promising from the Russian point of view. A pro-Russian spirit was displaying itself in Armenian Government circles, stimulated by fear of the Nationalist Turks, on the one hand, and of the Azerbaijan Tatars on the other. Armenia and Georgia had also grown, if possible, even more distrustful of each other than before, and any degree of combination between them had become exceedingly unlikely.

*Military Embarrassments of Russia.*

In the field of Russia's external activities, however, the situation was not, as yet, free from embarrassment. She was conducting a campaign in Poland. She was negotiating the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement, and a military attack of Georgia and Armenia might well cause failure in this important matter. She had, therefore, to go warily, and, for a time, mask her co-operation in Transcaucasian military operations by acting through the Red Republic of Azerbaijan, and by supporting the Nationalist Turks.

*October 1920. Armistice between Russia and Poland.*

But at the beginning of October 1920 an armistice was signed between Russia and Poland, which led to the Treaty of Riga, ratified in November following. Free on the Polish front Russia was able to crush the remnants of General Wrangel's army in the Crimea. By the end of October both her Polish and Crimean military entanglements had ceased to exist, and she could give undivided attention to prosecuting her designs against the Republics of Georgia and Armenia. At the end of September, indeed, events in Transcaucasia seemed to be taking, as the outcome of Turkish policy, a course not altogether in accordance with Bolshevik desires, and to call for immediate Russian action.

*Action by Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha.—September 1920; Surprise Attack on Armenia by Turkish Troops.*

We have seen that at the end of July 1920 the Nationalist Government at Angora had required the Armenian Republic to withdraw its troops from the district of Olti, and retire behind the frontier defined in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and that the Armenian Government had refused to comply. It is not possible as yet to trace the various influences and intrigues at work in Anatolia and Transcaucasia at this time. But it seems probable that in September 1920 Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha,

commanding Nationalist troops in North-Eastern Anatolia, exceeded his instructions and adopted measures at variance with the policy on which Moscow and Angora had decided. He was opposed to Turkish co-operation with Bolshevik Russia on the ground that Bolshevism was in flat contradiction to the teachings of Islam. He was in bitter personal enmity with Enver Pasha, the chief Turkish protagonist of Bolshevism; on occasion, too, he had not hesitated to oppose even Mustapha Kemal Pasha. In his command at Erzeroum he occupied a position of great independence. He was, further, an able man, of strong and determined character, who may well have cherished the ambition of becoming dictator himself. In view, therefore, of the Armenian reply to the Turkish demand in July, and the knowledge that the Pontic Greeks were preparing a rising, it is not astonishing that, at the end of September, Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha made a surprise attack upon the Armenian forces holding Olti, the most westerly frontier town in the Armenian Republic. The fighting which ensued in this district was at the time inconclusive, for both sides were able to claim successes.

*October 1920, Azerbaijan, too, begins Hostilities against Armenia.—Another Turkish Offensive against Armenia.—October 1920, Bolshevik Mission to Angora.—Turks and Bolsheviks in Conference at Baku and Erzeroum.*

But the advance on Olti appears to have been part of a much larger and more ambitious series of operations. During the first week in October Azerbaijan Red troops began hostilities against Armenia in the districts of Karabagh and Zangezur, an attack which coincided with the arrival of strong Russian reinforcements at Baku. At the same time Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha opened a third offensive, now in the south-western part of Armenia, and directed against Sarykamish and Kargisman. At this point the Moscow Government seem to have had much to say. They had already despatched a large and important mission to Angora, which arrived in the Nationalist capital during the first week in October, provided with a great sum of money, chiefly in gold. An incident, not without meaning at this juncture, was the appointment of a prominent Georgian, Budu Mdvniani by name, to an important position in the Russian mission. As soon as the mission had reached Angora, Moscow also convened conferences at Baku and Erzeroum, attended by Turkish Nationalist leaders and representatives of Soviet Russia and Red Azerbaijan. At the Erzeroum conference Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha was present, and it is believed that here he was persuaded to Turkish co-operation with Russia—instead of following an exclusively Turkish policy in Transcaucasia—by a Russian promise to hand over the districts of Kars and Ardahan to Turkish sovereignty.

*October 1920, Moscow Ultimatum to Armenia.—Georgian Government declines to make an Offensive Alliance with Armenia.—Georgian Offers to Armenia.*

Meanwhile, military operations against Armenia were continued without pause. On the 12th October the Armenian forces were compelled to evacuate both Sarykamish and Kargisman. On the 13th October the Moscow Soviet directly asserted itself by sending an ultimatum demanding immediate acceptance of the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by the Armenian Government. The Armenian Government refused, and put forward counter-claims with the view of gaining time, and in the hope that Georgia would give armed assistance. Of such help being given there was, indeed, but little likelihood. After long discussion the Georgian Government declined to make any kind of defensive alliance with Armenia, but made instead an offer which, if accepted, would be of advantage to their own republic, and at the same time involve it in no liabilities. They would carry out a compulsory mobilisation of all Armenians in Georgian territory—a measure intended to get rid of the Armenian element—and thus strengthen the Armenian army. They would permit the delivery in Georgian ports and the conveyance by Georgian railways of arms and munitions for Armenian use, subject to a tax of 27 per cent. in kind upon everything received or conveyed. They would address a request to the Allies for arms to be supplied to both republics; and that Allied troops should occupy Trebizond.

*Armenia in Straits.—October 20, 1920, Russian Troops Concentrate against Armenia.—Moslem Rising in Armenia.—November 7, 1920, Turko-Armenian Armistice.*

Nothing better than these facile offers of aid being forthcoming from Georgia, the Armenian Republic could hope for no external help; and the spirit and



determination of the people and Government seem, in consequence, to have weakened. Resistance, though hopeless, was, however, continued. On the 20th October the Armenian troops were forced out of Igdir by the Turks, who were now approaching the Armenian capital. On the same day Russian troops from Baku began to concentrate at Delijan on the north-eastern frontier of the republic, though no fighting took place. On the 21st October, Kars, the chief Armenian fortress, fell to the troops of Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha. On the 6th November a rising of the Mahommedan population in the Province of Alexandropol began, which cut the communications in the rear of a large part of the Armenian army. The Armenian position was now so hopeless that the troops became demoralised; on the 7th November, therefore, the general commanding requested and obtained an armistice.

*November 1920, Mustapha Kemal Pasha's Terms of Peace.—Armenian Government Refuse Nationalist Terms of Peace.—Turks Recommence Hostilities.—November 13, 1920, The Armistice Renewed.*

Terms of peace were received from Mustapha Kemal Pasha on the 19th November. They included the surrender of large quantities of arms and munitions; and the surrender of Armenian territory north of a line drawn from the northern end of Lake Goktcha to the junction of the Arpa Chai with the Araxes. This line of frontier would have given the Turks nearly the whole of the district of Etchmiadzin, in addition to the districts of Kars and Ardahan—which they claimed under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk—and left the Armenian Republic little more than the district of Erivan. Even in the present desperate position of their country the Armenian Government found these terms too onerous for acceptance. They accordingly asked for a conference to discuss the conditions proposed; but Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha replied by recommencing hostilities and driving the Armenians out of Ani and Karaklis. The armistice was renewed on the 18th November, under which Armenian troops were withdrawn to the eastern bank of the River Arpa Chai, and the Turks occupied the Provinces of Olti, Ardahan and Alexandropol. It became known later that during the autumn and winter 1920-21 the Turks had massacred some 50,000 Armenian inhabitants in the area under their occupation.

*Demoralisation in Armenia.—Bolshevik Revolution in Armenia; a Soviet Government Established.—November 1920: Treaty of Peace between Soviet Armenia and Turkey.*

For the time being Armenian prospects were of the darkest. Administration, communications and supplies, all were in a state of chaos. Every unit of the army had recently received large drafts of recruits without training or discipline, with the result that the utmost demoralisation prevailed. Bolshevik propaganda, too, had been busy with army and people alike, demonstrating to all the folly of relying upon any external aid except from Russia or Turkey. In the light of recent experiences, this advice found many Armenians in agreement. Amid these conditions Bolshevik agents did not find revolution a difficult movement to organise and carry through. It was effected in a few days, and the Dashnak Government were removed. As at Baku, a Soviet Government was established, Bolshevik troops were invited to assist in maintaining order, and competent Bolshevik instructors were asked for in order to establish Bolshevik rule in all its purity and intricacies. The new Government then signed a peace with the Turkish Nationalists. The chief territorial change under the treaty was that the districts of Kars and Ardahan, and Armenian territory up to the right bank of the Arpa Chai, passed to Turkish sovereignty.

*A Dashnak State set up in Zangezur.—1921. Dashnak Zangezur Suppressed.*

A portion of the Armenian army, however, remained loyal to the Dashnak Government, and retreated to the mountainous region of Zangezur under its leader, Rhupen Terminissian. Terminissian and his troops subsequently attacked Erivan, and re-established a Dashnak Government for a few weeks. But reinforcements of Red troops were brought up, dislodged the Dashnak force, and replaced the Soviet Government in power. Terminissian and his army then again retired to Zangezur, where an independent Dashnak State was maintained until the summer of 1921, when it was finally suppressed by Red forces from Azerbaijan and Russia.

### *Causes of Armenian Downfall.*

As a wide generalisation it may be said that the chief cause of the downfall of Armenia was internal dissension. Not so much, perhaps, during the final attack upon the republic—it was then too late for unity to avail—as at all earlier times since the collapse of Russia. Dashnaks and Democrats had always their own unpromising aims. But another line of cleavage, which, as it were, ran diagonally across all others, was between Transcaucasian and Turkish Armenians. Between these two main divisions of the race there was, indeed, a certain native incompatibility, not only in political outlook, but also in personal intercourse, which under the stress of events grew sometimes to positive dislike and even hostility.

### *Political Development of Caucasian Armenians.*

Taken as a whole, the Armenian peasants of Transcaucasia are an exceedingly primitive people, in this respect not far removed from their Tatar neighbours. The Armenian commercial and professional classes, on the other hand, are steeped in Russian tradition, and have gone far towards being Russianised. Almost instinctively they turn to Russia for protection, whether Russia be Tsarist, Reactionary or Bolshevik, and are usually able to carry the ignorant mass of their Armenian peasant countrymen with them.

The reason for this feeling of dependence on Russia is not difficult to find. During the period of Prince Galitzin's vice-royalty, 1905-7, Caucasian Armenians had suffered greatly from insecurity; but under the succeeding Viceroys, Count Vorontsof Daskof and the Grand Duke Nicholas, security was assured them and they received particular attention. This treatment had a marked effect on the well-to-do and educated classes of Caucasian Armenians. Already they had shown a tendency to make their political aims subservient to their commercial aims and to the accumulation of wealth; during the years of security and prosperity, however, they more and more lost interest in Armenian national and Church affairs. Such matters were left to fanatical Nationalists and Socialists—to idealist partisan soldiers, writers, poets and orators—generally men with little knowledge of the world, and little reading outside the bounds of their own particular aims. Armenians of education and familiarity with the outer world, men who might have influenced and led their more ignorant Armenian countrymen, had, in fact, almost universally neglected their national duties and opportunities, with the result that the bulk of the Armenian race in Caucasia had already gone far on a revolutionary course. They had largely given their support to the Dashnaksutun Society, to its political aims, to its secret and terrorist methods. And their extremist and idealist leaders had found in this great terrorist society the effective means of financing their projects by compulsory contributions from the rich commercial class, who took no interest in Armenian politics. In a very intimate way, in fact, the Dashnaksutun Society represented the Armenian population of Caucasia.

### *Political Development of Turkish Armenians.*

But Turkish Armenians, as a whole, had been affected by conditions of another character. The perpetual insecurity in which they lived under Turkish rule had bound all classes together in a common Armenian cause, hardly distinguishable from a ceaseless struggle for life. Among Turkish Armenians education had become almost an obsession. Many had lived in America and England, and many more had attended American mission schools and colleges in Anatolia. A large proportion of Turkish Armenians could read and speak English, and habitually read English and American newspapers and books, and sought the company of English and American residents and visitors. Turkish Armenians had, therefore, a far more complete and correct conception of the outer world, its movements, influences and politics, and the relationship of the Armenian cause to such matters, than had their Caucasian brethren. Their political ideals were democratic rather than socialistic or revolutionary; and racial persecution had ever kept their hopes fixed upon national aims, alike in politics and Church. Their leaders, too, were men of the highest capacity and attainment among the people. This comparatively well educated and enlightened section of the Armenian race was thrown upon the hospitality of its much less civilised countrymen in Caucasia by the Turkish horrors of 1915-16. They came as destitute refugees, but anxious to do what they could for the cause of Armenia as they saw it. That the two sections of the race, driven into this close involuntary contact amid such unhappy and disastrous circumstances, should develop differences of opinion, policy and ultimate aim need cause no astonishment.



### *Differing Armenian Territorial Aims.*

On the important and highly involved question of what regions an independent Armenia should comprise Turkish and Caucasian Armenians were seldom able to agree. Turkish Armenians hoped to secure as much as possible of the so-called Six Armenian Vilayets of Anatolia—Van, Bitlis, Erzeroum, Sivas, Diarbekr and Kharput—a project ever fraught with difficulty. They had ambitions, too, in Cilicia. Transcaucasian Armenians generally considered these aims impracticable, and it was only at the Paris Peace Conference that Transcaucasian and Turkish Armenians agreed to suppress their rival policies and seek a common Armenian State. Even so it was with misgivings on the part of Caucasian Armenians. With such grave differences ever preventing harmony of aim Armenian power never reached its full development, either in attainment or resistance.

### *Change of View by Turkish Armenians.*

After the destruction of the Independent Armenian Republic and the failure of the Allied Powers to obtain for the Armenian people the territory in Anatolia awarded by President Wilson, the views of Turkish Armenians seem to have undergone a change. They recognised that no immediate hope existed of an independent or autonomous Armenia being established in North-Eastern Asia Minor. But they recognised, too, that a large body of Russian opinion favoured the idea of obtaining President Wilson's frontiers for a future Armenian State, when a suitable opportunity should offer, and of thus extending Russian influence, and perhaps Russian territory, to this extent. For the time being, therefore, the efforts of Turkish Armenians appear to be concentrated on securing, if possible, some kind of Armenian national home in Cilicia. But even this more modest aim, one supposes, will prove as little likely of attainment as the other, so long as the Turkish State retains its present national disposition and military power.

### *Overthrow of Georgian Republic by the Bolsheviks and Turks.*

We come now to the closing events of the Independent Republic of Georgia, whose people had been unable to understand that, in the presence of Bolshevik Russia and Nationalist Turkey, their own fate was inseparately bound up with the fate of their Armenian neighbours. To these neighbours the Georgians had steadily refused assistance; they had stood out for their own immediate interests as they understood them; they were now to reap the reward.

### *Georgia already a Socialist State.*

With two provinces of the Armenian Republic annexed to Turkey, and the remaining portions subjected to Bolshevik Russia, Georgia stood isolated as the only anti-Bolshevik State left in Transcaucasia. To Russia the subjugation of Georgia appeared a more difficult and dangerous problem than of Azerbaijan or Armenia. The movement in favour of Georgian independence was based on a deep national sentiment, and Bolshevik risings attempted in 1919 and early in 1920 had failed entirely. The Social Democratic Government of Georgia had already nationalised land and industry, and given the people nearly as much as was required by the complete theory of Bolshevism. Russian Communism had, in fact, been forestalled, and largely robbed of any advantages it could promise. At this time Georgia was, indeed, an advanced Socialist State, in which the people retained a strong sense of nationalism.

### *Russian Secret Military Report on Operations needful against Georgia.*

A despatch from the Russian commander-in-chief in the Caucasus to his Government, intercepted by the Georgian authorities in December 1920, showed clearly the intentions of Russia towards the republic, and what the Georgians might soon expect. The despatch in question, written by General Hecker, was in reply to a request from Moscow asking for his views upon the possibility of immediately overrunning Georgia. The gist of his report was that the co-operation of Armenia and Nationalist Turkey with Russia was essential to secure success.

### *December 1920. The Armenian General Dro advocates the Overthrow of Georgia.*

The Russian Government appear to have called for Hecker's report as the result of arguments advanced by the Armenian General Dro, at once a Socialist and Dashnakist, who had been summoned to Moscow, after

Armenia became a Soviet republic, to give his views in person. Dro urged his opinion that the existence of an anti-Bolshevik Georgian State, supported by the *Entente* Powers, was a standing menace to the Armenian Soviet Republic; that revision of the Treaty of Sèvres had become certain; that revision, when it came, would inevitably be in a direction seeking to placate Nationalist Turkey; and that the outcome was likely to be an alliance of Georgia and Azerbaijan with Turkey with the goodwill of the *Entente* Powers, or at least of Great Britain. If this happened, Russia, he argued, would lose her influence with Turkish Nationalists. With these as probabilities Dro therefore urged that the subjugation of Georgia before the Treaty of Sèvres could be revised was of vital importance. If that were done, Russia would obtain possession of the whole of the Transcaucasian railway system, and an alliance between Turkey and any of the Caucasian States would become out of the question.

### *Lenin Disapproves of Dro's Scheme, but the Russian Central Executive Committee Approves.*

Lenin is believed to have strongly disapproved of the idea of military intervention, saying that peace and reconstruction were more important, and that no infringement of the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement, then nearing completion, should be allowed to take place. Dro's report, however, was approved by Trotsky and the majority of the Russian Central Executive Committee. A plan of operations then seems to have been adopted, whereby the proposed aggression should appear to come from Armenia and Azerbaijan.

### *February 12, 1921: Russo-Armenian Rising in Georgian Territory.—Armenian and Azerbaijan Armies Mobilised against Georgia.*

On the 12th February, 1921, therefore, a rising of Molokan Russians and Armenians occurred in the district of Bortchalinsk—a district always in dispute between Georgia and Armenia—against Georgian administration, and Georgian garrisons were attacked. Moscow disclaimed all knowledge of this outbreak. Chicherin, indeed, actually telegraphed instructions to the Armenian Government at Erivan to cease fighting. But by the 18th February the whole of the Armenian army was mobilised against Georgia; and on the Azerbaijan frontier, troops, identified as of the 11th Red Army from Azerbaijan, had crossed into Georgia and reached Sadakhlo. At this stage both Moscow and Angora offered to mediate. The terms of the settlement proposed are not known for certain; but the Transcaucasian clauses of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk seem to have been brought up again. The Georgians, however, refused to accept mediation on the terms put forward, convinced that now there was nothing for it but to resist.

### *February 20: Russian Troops in Action.*

On the 20th February two attacks developed, both of which, from the position of the operations, must have been made by Russian troops. The first was at Dariel Pass, on the Russian military road leading across the Caucasus Mountains from Vladikavkaz to Tiflis; the other at Gagri, on the Black Sea coast, a little north of the river Bzyb. A day later, the 11th Red Army from Azerbaijan, composed of Tatars and Russians, attacked in force at Poili, the frontier station on the railway from Azerbaijan to Tiflis. The whole offensive, in fact, developed on the lines laid down in the intercepted report by General Hecker.

### *Turkish Ultimatum to the Georgian Government.*

On the 21st and 22nd February the Georgian Government, their country surrounded and attacked on every front, repeatedly endeavoured to communicate with Moscow, but could obtain no reply. On the second of these days occurred an event the full history of which is still shrouded in doubt. The Nationalist Government at Angora sent an ultimatum to the Georgian Government, demanding the immediate evacuation of the districts of Artvin and Ardahan by Georgian troops. To this demand the Georgian Government replied with an official protest. It is clear, however, that for some time secret negotiations had been taking place between the Georgian Government and Angora with the purpose of securing Turkish assistance against the Bolsheviks; and there is tolerable certainty that the ultimatum was by arrangement. The outcome of the ultimatum was that the Georgian Government complied, maintaining that they had no choice but to accept the Turkish



demands; however, they also made it a condition of their acceptance that Turkish forces should temporarily occupy Batoum as well. The apparent purpose of this move was to obtain Turkish aid in retaining the port for Georgia. To the Turks, on the other hand, the scheme seemed to offer prospects of securing the place for themselves again.

*February 25: Georgian Army evacuates Tiflis.—March 11: Turkish Troops enter Batoum.*

On the 25th February the Georgian army was compelled to evacuate Tiflis. During the succeeding ten days severe fighting took place at various points, in which the invaders did not always have everything their own way. But they greatly outnumbered the Georgians, who were gradually forced westward towards the Black Sea coast. Eventually, one portion of the Georgian army retired to Kutais, where the Government were established temporarily, and the other portion retreated towards Batoum. On the 11th March, Turkish troops entered Batoum, having already occupied Ardahan and Artvin.

*Position at Batoum.*

The position at Batoum at this time was curious. The Georgian Government had been transferred hither from Kutais; the remnant of the Georgian army, reduced now to 4,000 men, lay outside the town; and Turkish troops were in occupation of the town itself. Further Georgian resistance being futile, an armistice was proclaimed on the 14th March.

*March 17, 1921: Peace Signed between Georgia and Russia.*

On the 17th March peace was signed between the Georgian Government and the Bolsheviks, under which the Bolsheviks were invited to occupy the town and province of Batoum, notwithstanding that a similar offer had been made to and accepted by the Turks, who were now in occupation.

*Fighting at Batoum between Georgians and Turks.*

The result was that on the 17th March fighting broke out between the Georgians and Turks for possession of the town, and continued until evening without decisive results. Some 1,500 Russian Bolshevik infantry then marched in, though they took no part in the Turko-Georgian conflict. On the 19th March a truce was arranged between the Turkish and Georgian forces until definite orders should be received from the Governments at Moscow and Angora. The members of the Georgian Government and several commanders then left for Constantinople by sea, and a Georgian Soviet Republic was proclaimed. In the end the Turkish troops were withdrawn from Batoum.

*March 19: Withdrawal of the British Mission from Transcaucasia.*

On peace being concluded between the Georgian Government and the Bolsheviks the withdrawal of the British mission to Transcaucasia became necessary. Colonel Stokes, the Chief British Commissioner in Transcaucasia, together with his staff, therefore evacuated Batoum on the 19th March, and official intercourse between Great Britain and the Transcaucasian States ceased.

*The Treaty of Kars a matter more for the Documentary History of Recent Events in Turkey.*

From this point onwards little reliable information upon events in Transcaucasia has been available. Much has happened, but there is much obscurity. It does not seem desirable, therefore, to attempt, in an historical paper based upon official documents, a continuation of the story up to the conclusion of the Treaty of Kars, though the execution of that instrument marks the logical point at which a review of recent Transcaucasian history should close. And, further, although the completion of the Treaty of Kars is an event of great importance to the republics of Transcaucasia, as representing the consummation of Bolshevik and Turkish policy in these regions, yet a detailed account of the treaty and its implications falls more conveniently within the scope of a history of events in Turkey. It is proposed, therefore, to deal with the Treaty of Kars at length in the history of recent events in the Ottoman Empire now in course of preparation.

But in order that the overthrow of the independent republics of Transcaucasia shall not appear here as a story incomplete, a few words may be given to events immediately following the conclusion of peace between Georgia and the Bolsheviks.

*CONCLUSION.—The Transcaucasian Republics under Soviet Rule.*

*Bolshevik Methods in Georgia.*

In her handling of the Georgian problem with which she found herself confronted, Bolshevik Russia adopted other courses than those she had followed in Azerbaijan and Armenia. She contrived no internal revolution followed by an invitation to herself to come in and take control of reconstruction. She chose instead direct military aggression, though making an attempt that her operations, at least in their earlier stages, should appear as revolutionary action by the Soviet Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. There remains, however, the incontrovertible fact that, if the initial aggression was not by Russia, it was the Russian army which overthrew the Georgian Republic, and forced upon the people a Soviet Government to which they were opposed. By these means Georgia was again brought into the position of a Russian province.

But the conquest once achieved, the Russian authorities displayed remarkable tact in avoiding all unnecessary offence to Georgian national susceptibilities. A Georgian Communist Party already existed, upon the council of which, in January 1921, were six Armenians, five Russians and two Jews, but not a single Georgian. No use was made of this organisation, it was ignored; and the Georgians were invited to form their own Government on Soviet lines. This they did and called it Bolshevik, and it was not until August 1921, when the well-known Georgian Bolshevik Budu Mdivani, whom we have seen on a Bolshevik mission to Angora, took charge of Georgian affairs, that any Russian official appeared in the Georgian Administration.

*March 16, 1921. Treaty of Moscow between Russia and Turkey.*

During the time that Armenia and Georgia were being reduced to Soviet rule, an important conference, between representatives of Russia and Nationalist Turkey, was sitting at Moscow. The conference eventually resulted in a Treaty of Moscow, signed on the 16th March, 1921, by which the two contracting States were brought into a more binding and definite alliance than ever; the conference also settled, as between Russia and Turkey, certain territorial questions in Transcaucasia.

*Recognition of the National Pact by Russia.*

By this Agreement the two Governments bound themselves to refuse recognition to any treaty imposed on either against the will of the people. The treaty recognised the frontiers of Turkey as those laid down in the National Pact, adopted by the Turkish Chamber of Deputies on the 28th January, 1920, but added to the Turkish territory, so defined, a part of the Province of Batoum, and the whole of the two Armenian districts of Ardahan and Kars. The treaty further assigned the port and town of Batoum to Georgia on certain conditions, and the disputed district of Nakhichevan to Azerbaijan, but as an autonomous province. The independence of the Caucasian States was certainly though indirectly recognised in the treaty, but Russia reserved paternal rights over them whereby she undertook to ensure the acceptance of the treaty by the individual republics.

*June 1921. Old Governments of the Transcaucasian Republics exile themselves to Paris.—Agreement for Transcaucasian Federation signed in Paris.*

Their countries overrun, and Soviet rule imposed, the majority of the members of the Transcaucasian national Governments exiled themselves to Paris. There, in June 1921, these refugees, including self-appointed representatives of the non-existent Republic of Daghestan, made an Agreement in which, regarding themselves as adequate sponsors of the representative Governments of their several countries, they formed a confederation of the four Caucasian States. The signatories were officially received by the French Government, who also recognised the Agreement.



*Origin of the Agreement.*

It might appear that this singular performance could have had no other purpose than to offer a belated gesture of agreement with *Entente* or British policy of the past; that it was an effort to show the *Entente* the willingness of the Caucasian States for confederation, had not the overpowering force of circumstances prevented their Governments adopting that policy at the time it was urged upon them. Such a view would, indeed, be merely a charitable view. The fact is that the Agreement was instigated by certain French statesmen with very definite aims before them—aims diametrically opposed to the earlier French policy of supporting Generals Denikin and Wrangel, and securing for Russia the return of her former frontiers. These changed French aims seem to have been adopted when General Wrangel's campaign had definitely failed.

1921. *Action of the French Government in controlling the Finances of the Transcaucasian Federation.*

The considerable financial means necessary for maintaining in Paris the representatives of the Confederated States of Transcaucasia were adroitly provided and controlled by the French Government without cost to the French Exchequer. The Azerbaijan representatives had brought all available State monies to Paris. The Georgian representatives had escaped with very little money, but with the greater part of the Georgian State treasures. The French Government placed an embargo on these Azerbaijan and Georgian national reserves, but allowed the representatives a certain fixed income, which could, of course, be withheld at any moment if any recalcitrancy were shown. The Armenian representatives were supported by their own people and societies, and therefore were more or less free of French control. The Armenians, apparently, displayed the greatest reluctance to binding themselves by the Agreement.

*French and American Oil Interests involved. Intrigues of Nationalists.*

It has transpired, further, that French and American oil interests had a considerable influence in procuring the execution of the so-called Caucasian Federal Agreement. Both the Azerbaijan and Georgian representatives had several secret interviews with a certain group of French Nationalist Deputies before signing. It is further reported on good authority that the Turkish Nationalists are bearing a part in these intrigues, and that Bekir Sami Bey has made tentative proposals to the French Government, urging them to support the anti-Bolshevik elements in Azerbaijan and Georgia with the ultimate purpose of bringing Caucasia under Turkish protection when Bolshevism should have lost power. In return for such intelligent French support Turkey would then ensure that to France should go concessions for exploiting the oil deposits of Azerbaijan.

So it is reported. Nor do any of these reports appear at all improbable in the light of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of Angora. But after all, the destinies of the Caucasian Republics are contained within the much greater destiny of Russia.

W. J. CHILDS.  
A. E. R. McDONELL.

Foreign Office, May 31, 1922.

## PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.

One Document, being map showing various frontiers of Turkey and the three Trans-Caucasian Republics and the districts in dispute between the Republics.

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AAH Knightbridge.

TO ENQUIRE INTO THE TREATMENT OF THE JEWS. IZZET PASHA SAID THAT THE TURKS would welcome such missions of enquiry if only these missions would publish their findings. They had not done so in the case of the excesses at Yalova and Ghimlek.

7. Izzet Pasha said that the Armenians were equally to blame, and had committed atrocities on their side. He went so far as to say that certain Armenian leaders had deliberately provoked Armenian massacres for their own ends. As examples of Armenian atrocities, he quoted the case of a member of his staff at the time when he was commanding an army against the Russians in the second year of the war. He had noticed that the officer in question was always silent and seemed very dejected. On enquiring the reason he was informed that the officer's whole family had been murdered by Armenians. A friend of his, a man of 70, had likewise been killed by Armenians.



## CHAPTER II.—TURKEY.

[E 305/5/44]

No. 3.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 9, 1922.)*

(No. 1206.)

Constantinople, December 31, 1921.

My Lord,

I PAID a visit to Izzet Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to-day.

2. One of the objects of my visit was to define to him my attitude towards Hamid Bey, who, as your Lordship is aware, is the unofficial Nationalist agent at Constantinople. Hamid Bey recently visited General Harington's headquarters, and stated that he was authorised by the Angora Government to "talk to the British." The officer who saw Hamid Bey very properly informed the latter that whatever he had to say should be said to myself. I thereupon took advantage of a message which I wished to convey to Hamid Bey in connection with the recent prisoners' exchange agreement to let him know that there had been nothing in the Henry Mission, and that I was the proper medium of communication between the Angora Government and His Majesty's Government. I let Hamid Bey know that I had no statement to make to him pending the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers at Paris, but that if he wished to communicate anything to me I was ready to receive him for that purpose.

3. I therefore informed Izzet Pasha that, just as I had explained to him at the time that Major Henry had no mission of any sort either from His Majesty's Government or from General Harington, so I had thought it well to make the same statement to Hamid Bey, adding that I was the only medium of communication at Constantinople between the Turks and His Majesty's Government.

4. His Highness then alluded to the forthcoming meeting of the Allied Foreign Ministers at Paris. He wondered what the procedure would be and whether a conference to which both Greeks and Turks would be invited would follow the meeting at Paris.

5. I replied that I imagined that that would be the procedure. Izzet Pasha said that he had heard rumours that the proposed conference might take place at Constantinople. There have been rumours to this effect for some time past in this town, and I replied that I had heard these rumours. I enquired how Izzet Pasha would view Constantinople as the meeting place for the conference. He seemed to be gratified at the idea, but said that the Nationalists might make some difficulties, though he thought that they would be obliged to come to Constantinople.

6. He then went on to talk about minorities in Turkey, and alluded to the recent meeting at the Mansion House. He said that it was evident that the British nation was apprehensive regarding the safety of minorities under Turkish rule and mistrusted the Turks in this respect. I replied that he ought not to be surprised at this mistrust, having regard to the Armenian massacres, which had horrified the world by their extent and ferocity. Izzet Pasha then developed a theme which I have heard from other Turkish Ministers, namely, that the minorities had in the past lived contentedly under Turkish rule for several centuries. He pointed out that at the time when the Inquisition was flourishing in Spain Christian minorities were not suffering from persecution in Turkey. I said that events which had occurred in recent years had anyhow quite shaken the faith of Western nations in Turkish tolerance, and that it would be necessary to have real guarantees for the protection of minorities. The Western Powers had shown great interest in minorities in Europe. Thus, while I had been in Poland, two official missions, one American and one British, had been sent to Poland to enquire into the treatment of the Jews. Izzet Pasha said that the Turks would welcome such missions of enquiry if only these missions would publish their findings. They had not done so in the case of the excesses at Yalova and Ghimlek.

7. Izzet Pasha said that the Armenians were equally to blame, and had committed atrocities on their side. He went so far as to say that certain Armenian leaders had deliberately provoked Armenian massacres for their own ends. As examples of Armenian atrocities, he quoted the case of a member of his staff at the time when he was commanding an army against the Russians in the second year of the war. He had noticed that the officer in question was always silent and seemed very dejected. On enquiring the reason he was informed that the officer's whole family had been murdered by Armenians. A friend of his, a man of 70, had likewise been killed by Armenians.



8. I admitted that the Armenians had no doubt committed excesses in certain cases, but these excesses could not be compared for one moment with the wholesale massacres and deportations of which the Turks had been guilty. It had been computed that nearly 1,000,000 Armenians had perished as the result of these massacres, &c.

9. Izzet Pasha asked on what evidences Lord Bryce's report was based. I said that there was a great mass of evidence of an unimpeachable character, and quoted the testimony of Dr. Lepsius, who, having regard to the policy of his country towards Turkey at the time, must be considered as an impartial witness. Izzet Pasha then tried to argue that the number of Armenians scattered throughout Turkey at the beginning of the war had not exceeded 800,000. I replied that, though I could not off-hand give statistics of the Armenian population in Turkey, I thought that his Highness was mistaken, and that there must have been fully 1½ million Armenians in Turkey proper.

10. On taking leave of Izzet Pasha, I said that I hoped that the New Year would bring peace to this part of the world.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 311/311/44]

No. 4.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 9.)*

(No. 13.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 3, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith the annual report on the heads of missions at Constantinople.

2. I have rewritten this report.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 4.

*Annual Report on Heads of Missions at Constantinople.*

*High Commissioners*

*France.*

GENERAL PELLÉ, who is a man of sixty and looks even older, came to Constantinople in March in succession to M. DeFrance, who had been appointed Ambassador at Madrid. General Pellé had been at the head of the French Military Mission in Czechoslovakia before his appointment as French High Commissioner at Constantinople. He had also, I believe, served as Chief of the Staff to Marshal Joffre early in the war.

General Pellé is a hard-working man with a clear head. He did not take long to grasp the position here, and I have always been struck with the business-like way in which he presides at the High Commissioners' meetings when these are held at the French Embassy. He has always shown himself conciliatory at these meetings, and when any question of a particularly controversial nature is likely to arise he has discussed the question with me beforehand in order to avoid controversy at the meeting itself. He has only once to my knowledge forwarded an inaccurate report to his Government, and this was in connection with a special meeting held by the three High Commissioners on the occasion of the so-called plot last summer against the army of occupation.

As he is superior in rank to General Charpy, commanding the French corps of occupation here, he considers General Charpy as his direct subordinate, an arrangement which I believe does not please General Charpy. General Pellé appears to seize every opportunity of making speeches, and the requisite publicity is given to these speeches owing to the French having a propaganda organ of their own. General Pellé tends to play up to the Turks, or at least poses as their friend in public. He is anti-Greek.

When he first came here General Pellé had the services of M. de Chambrun, a remarkably intelligent career diplomatist. M. de Chambrun left some little time ago,

and General Pellé is very understaffed, with the result that he is swamped with detail and has the appearance of being overworked.

General Pellé recently married a Czechoslovak lady.

On the whole, I am well satisfied with General Pellé as a colleague, and I like him very much.

*Italy.*

The Marquis Garroni was Ambassador at Constantinople for some years before the war. This fact gives him a certain standing both with the Turks and with the European community. He is a man of nearly 70 years of age, and is a political "boss" in his own country. He was Prefect of Genoa for fifteen years, and I think was created a marquis by his friend Signor Giolitti. He is a Senator. The Marquis Garroni informed me on one occasion that the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Washington were his political friends, and that he had, in fact, brought about their appointments. He added that none of the three would, he thought, remain long in the diplomatic service, as they had too many interests in Italy.

The Marquis Garroni, under an appearance of benevolence, conceals a remarkably astute mind. At High Commissioners' conferences he sometimes appears to be half asleep, but is in reality following the proceedings very carefully, and is very much alive to any question affecting Italian interests. He is often very stubborn and difficult to convince, and my French colleague and I have to be careful not to be rushed by him into decisions by which he hopes Italian interests may benefit.

I have found that my Italian colleague generally takes a sound view of affairs here. He appears to be well-informed, and has certainly shown every wish to co-operate with me. He is a widower, and his daughter-in-law keeps house for him. He has lately caused a flutter in diplomatic circles by attempting to force his daughter-in-law into the position of Ambassadress by giving her precedence over wives of Ministers.

*Japan.*

Mr. Uchida came here in the spring of last year. He had been Minister at Stockholm during the war. He lost no time in trying to play a part, and, having little to do, rushed into intercourse with the Turks without in the least understanding Turkish mentality. It was soon clear that he imagined that his rôle might be that of intermediary between the Nationalists, and even the Turkish Government, and this Embassy, to the advantage of both. His efforts in this direction were embarrassing, and I have done my best to discountenance them.

Mr. Uchida has also made somewhat indiscreet attempts from time to time to obtain previous communication of the agenda of the High Commissioners' meetings in order, as he said, to see for himself whether the High Commissioners were going to discuss any questions affecting Japanese interests. My Allied colleagues and I have, however, formally declined to give way on this point. Mr. Uchida, whether from inclination or from policy, wishes to shine in local society. He takes dancing lessons, and recently created a bad impression by appearing at a fancy dress ball on New Year's Eve in the uniform of a Japanese officer. Mr. Uchida is certainly not a clever man, and, whilst agreeable enough personally, and perhaps well-meaning, is anything but a high-class Japanese.

*United States.*

Admiral Bristol, the United States High Commissioner, came to Constantinople early in 1919. He has therefore been here longer than any of the High Commissioners. Before I arrived here he was described to me by the American Naval Attaché in London as a man of "transparent candour." I have always found him friendly, and certainly in one case, in which an American citizen and the British military authorities were concerned, conciliatory. I am under the impression, however, that he is, or was, inclined to be jealous of the fact that the Allied High Commissioners are practically directing the administration of Constantinople.

The first few months after my arrival here, Admiral Bristol used to take every opportunity to allude to the oil policy of His Majesty's Government. He professed to believe that the British Empire was up against America in the oil question, and did not hesitate on occasion to hint that Great Britain owed America nearly 1,000,000,000L., and that, in view of this fact, Americans could not easily understand the desire of the British Government to secure monopolies for themselves in mandated territories. But it is only fair to admit that of late Admiral Bristol seems to have changed his attitude.



There was perhaps a genuine feeling in his mind that the Allied High Commissioners disregarded American trade interests. On the other hand, the Allied High Commissioners were entitled to think that Admiral Bristol was purposely obstructing their efforts to obtain relief for the Turkish Exchequer. I think this misunderstanding has now been cleared away, with the result that Admiral Bristol is infinitely more conciliatory and pleasanter to deal with.

#### *Greece.*

M. Votsis, who commanded one of the Greek ships here, was appointed Greek High Commissioner early last year in succession to M. Canellopoulo. The post of Greek representative here must be difficult at any time, but it is especially so just now. Under the present Greek Government the Greek High Commissioner must necessarily be a Constantinist. The bulk of the Greek colony here is Veniselist in sympathy. The Patriarchate is also Veniselist. Nevertheless, prior to the recent election of the Greek Patriarch, there had been a rapprochement between the Greek High Commission and the Patriarchate. This rapprochement is now at an end, in view of the failure of the Greek High Commissioner to influence the election of the Patriarch.

M. Votsis has had absolutely no training for the post of Greek High Commissioner, and it is a pity that the Greek Government did not select a civilian with the necessary qualifications. The Turkish Government having refused to recognise the Greek High Commission officially, correspondence between that High Commission and the Turkish Government passes through the Allied High Commissioners. M. Votsis appears much worried by his work, and has often struck me as unable to sift and appraise the value of the numerous intelligence reports which he receives. Thus there is always a risk of his starting a hare. He does not, I imagine, carry much weight with his Government, and the representations which the Allied High Commissioners constantly have to make to him produce little or no effect.

#### *The Vatican.*

Mgr. Dolci is the Apostolic delegate. He has now been at Constantinople some seven years. During the war Mgr. Dolci was very active on behalf of the British prisoners, and eventually received a British decoration in recognition of his services in that direction. Mgr. Dolci is very friendly and pleasant, and, as is usually the case with Papal representatives, is a man of considerable intelligence. He was offered the post of Nuncio at Warsaw last year, when Mgr. Ratti vacated that post on his elevation to the Cardinalate, but refused on account of the climate. He tells me that he was destined for Brussels, but that the present incumbent did not wish to leave. I understand that Mgr. Dolci will shortly be transferred to Lisbon. The French look with some suspicion on the presence of an Apostolic delegate at Constantinople, and I noticed that my French colleague recently expressed some surprise when he heard that Mgr. Dolci had dined at this Embassy.

#### *Legations.*

##### *Denmark.*

M. Wandel plays no part whatever, and is only seen at big parties.

##### *Netherlands.*

Baron Rengers came here from Rome. He is a remarkably young-looking man and an agreeable colleague. At a post like this, where there are so few diplomatists *de carrière*, it is pleasant to be able to discuss matters with a man like Baron Rengers. I understand that Baron Rengers finds his social duties somewhat strenuous.

##### *Spain.*

The Spanish Minister, M. Servet y Vest, is the doyen of the Ministers. He has spent most of his career in South America, and finds this climate somewhat trying. Owing to the difficulty of finding suitable accommodation in Constantinople itself, he lives rather an isolated life at Bayuk Dere, where he spends the whole year. He is a quiet man of literary tastes.

##### *Sweden.*

M. Wallenberg realised on his arrival that he was under suspicion of having been very pro-German during the war. The fact that he is in charge of German interests

here made it more difficult for him to get rid of this suspicion, but he works hard to dispel the legend that he is Germanophile. After the conclusion of the prisoners' exchange agreement with the Angora Government some of the returned Turks did not hesitate to state in the Nationalist press that they had been badly treated at Malta and had suffered indignities there. M. Wallenberg procured a report from the Swedish consul at Malta on the treatment of the Turks. This report was very favourable to the British authorities, and M. Wallenberg lost no time in communicating it to the Turkish Government. His wife is a good-natured lady, who pours forth an unending stream of talk in a somewhat strident voice, which makes her a trying neighbour at dinner.

#### *Delegates.*

##### *Belgium.*

M. Michotte de Welle was Belgian Minister at Belgrade when the war broke out. His personal effects there were plundered, whilst his property in Belgium was likewise stripped, and his wife lost her family possessions in France. These misfortunes have saddened him and, to use his own expression, made him very nervous. He lives at a fine Legation, which until recently was sparsely furnished. He has now commenced to receive. He states that he has a considerable amount of work to do, presumably in connection with the electric light and tramway companies, which are Belgian concerns. He is very bitter about the Italian High Commissioner for insisting that his daughter-in-law should take precedence of Mme. Michotte de Welle.

##### *Czechoslovakia.*

The Czechoslovakian delegate is a M. Svetlik, married to an English lady. They are quiet people and not much seen about. M. Svetlik strikes me as an intelligent man.

##### *Poland.*

M. Baranowski is the Polish delegate. He was employed on propaganda work in Switzerland during a part of the war, and was afterwards at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Warsaw. He has quite a number of Polish subjects in and around Constantinople, including the Polish farming colony situated in Anatolia, several miles from the entrance of the Black Sea. He gives receptions, which are very dull affairs, and is evidently keen on playing a part socially.

##### *Roumania.*

M. Filaliti is the Roumanian delegate. I have seen little of him since I came here because he has been absent at Warsaw negotiating with the Bolshevik representative. He is presumably a man of some ability or else his Government would not have selected him for that purpose.

##### *Jugoslavia.*

M. Chaponitch is the S.H.S. delegate. He is little seen about, but I suspect that he plays a larger part politically than the delegates of other countries.

[E 312/312/44]

No. 5.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 14.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 3, 1922.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 1400 of the 20th December, 1921, relative to Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha, I have the honour to report the following facts, which have not hitherto seemed of sufficient importance to be brought to your notice. Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha, who, as your Lordship is aware, was Turkish Ambassador in Berlin before and during the first portion of the war, has spent most of his time since the armistice in Switzerland. He formed one of the not very coherent group of Turkish politicians assembled in that country, but did not identify himself with any side in Turkish internal politics. Ferid Pasha made a strong effort to induce him to join the Turkish Peace Delegation in Paris in 1920, but Mukhtar Pasha firmly refused.

2. Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha returned to Constantinople some months ago for  
[8975]



the first time since the armistice. A few weeks ago I received a confidential message from the Sultan to the effect that the pasha had asked His Majesty to use his influence to obtain permission for him to go to London on private business connected with the property of his wife, who is an Egyptian princess. In his message to me the Sultan professed to have no interest in the matter, and said that he had referred the pasha to the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I found, on enquiry, that he had at that time made no application in the ordinary way for permission to go to London, but I took no action beyond letting the Sultan know that I personally would have no objection to Mukhtar Pasha being allowed to proceed to London on *bonâ fide* private business, but that, if an application were made, it would have to be dealt with in the ordinary way.

3. Very shortly after this, Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha, whom I had known in Berlin, called on me personally. He spoke very much on the lines of the third paragraph of his letter to Sir F. Barker of the 24th November. He conveyed the impression that he had either come to me at the instance of the Sultan or, at any rate, that he wished me to think that he was acting for His Majesty. Our conversation was, however, of a very general nature, and though he spoke of his idea of going to London in connection with his wife's affairs, he mentioned this almost as an afterthought, and did not make any definite request for assistance in obtaining permission. Subsequently to our interview it came to my knowledge that the Sultan had himself suggested that the pasha should see me, but this was represented as being merely an attempt on His Majesty's part to get rid of the pasha's importunity.

4. About a fortnight ago Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha obtained the authorisation of the Armistice Commission at the Porte, composed of Turkish and Allied representatives, for his journey. This is merely a preliminary formality necessary in the case of all Turkish subjects wishing to travel abroad. It does not in any way bind the passport authorities of the country of destination, and Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha has not, so far, approached the British passport control officer.

5. Just before I received your Lordship's despatch under reference, I learnt from very secret sources that Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha had come to be regarded as being in some sense a British candidate for the post of Grand Vizier. It has been put about for some weeks past that I am unfavourably disposed towards the present Cabinet, and it now looks as though I were credited with a wish to bring Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha into office.

6. I have lost no opportunity of letting it be known that I have no intention of intervening in questions relating to the composition of the Turkish Government, and that, even if abstention from such interference were not a fixed rule of His Majesty's Government, I should see no advantage in promoting a change of Government here in present circumstances.

7. It is a little difficult to understand what is at the back of all this so far as Mahmoud Mukhtar is concerned. It seems not improbable, however, that the Sultan, dissatisfied with the present Cabinet, but realising the uselessness of attempting to install a definitely anti-Kemalist Government, is casting about with great caution for a Grand Vizier unconnected with either side in the struggle between the Kemalists and anti-Kemalists, and that Mukhtar Pasha is attracted by the idea of taking office, but is also, on his side, displaying great caution. The Sultan would like any new Grand Vizier to be favourably regarded by His Majesty's Government, and the pasha would doubtless feel much more disposed to accept office if he could hope that His Majesty's Government would show benevolence towards Turkey during the future peace negotiations.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 313/313/44]

No. 6.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 3, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report a minor incident which illustrates the increasing difficulty of avoiding dissension in the Allied camp here.

2. I had observed that the French point of view in the submarine controversy was being widely advertised in the local press a few days ago. When Mr. Balfour's explicit

statement of the British point of view was telegraphed from London on the 31st December, I considered it only fair that this should receive equal publicity. I therefore let Reuter's agent know that I wished the statement to be reproduced in the daily bulletin of telegraphic news issued by the Turquie-Havas-Reuter Agency, and I directed the British delegate on the Inter-Allied Censorship Committee to contest any attempt to exclude it from the press.

3. Reuter's agent informed me on the morning of the 2nd January that the publication in the daily Turquie-Havas-Reuter bulletin had been held up on the previous day by his French colleague at the instance of the French High Commissioner. I at once informed Reuter's agent that he would have my support in insisting on publication, and a translation of the statement duly appeared in the bulletin of the 2nd January.

4. Meanwhile, the French High Commissioner sent a member of his staff to see me about the matter. I said that the submarine question was not a local one. I had, in the case of the controversy over the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, collaborated very loyally with my French colleague in excluding from the press here anything calculated to emphasise the divergence of views of the two Governments in a matter affecting the Near East. The submarine question was, I pointed out, on a different footing. It would be futile to attempt to conceal every disagreement between Great Britain and France, and as great pains had been taken to explain the French view to the local public, I must insist that the British view should also be made known. I agreed to two modifications in the French version, which, without altering Mr. Balfour's language more than could be accounted for by freedom of translation, attenuated it somewhat. I agreed also to some purely verbal alterations not affecting the sense. On this being reported to General Pellé, he suggested a further modification, which would have altered materially what Mr. Balfour said, and to which I therefore refused to assent. General Pellé was evidently not prepared to push the matter to the extreme length of exercising his veto in the Censorship Commission, and the statement appeared in the local press on the 3rd January in the form to which I had agreed. I enclose copies of the French version as published in the Turquie-Havas-Reuter bulletin and in the local papers respectively, in the "Journal d'Orient."

5. I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of this incident. I report it partly in case the French Government should bring it to your Lordship's notice, and partly because it is a good instance of the difficulties which I have had to confront of late. These difficulties are particularly great in the case of the inter-Allied censorship. The French have a well-organised propaganda service. We have none. If, in addition to propaganda, the French censor uses his powers on the Censorship Commission to veto matter favourable to the British point of view on every given question, there is a danger of a complete lack of balance. I have happily been able to adjust the question of Mr. Balfour's declaration by taking a firm line with my French colleague, but it might at any moment happen that we should have to choose between a collapse of the inter-Allied censorship, which can only be run on lines of mutual accommodation, and reference to our respective Governments.

6. I need hardly say that I shall do my best to avert any such crisis. The questions which arise are certainly not of sufficient importance to become a subject of discussion between London and Paris. On the other hand, I am anxious to avoid a breakdown of the inter-Allied censorship, as, although it now operates with great leniency, it still serves as a useful brake on journalism of a kind calculated to disturb public order and excite local feeling to a dangerous pitch.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 414/6/34]

No. 7.

Sir P. Loraine to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 11, 1922.)

(No. —. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, December 11, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a memorandum summarising, so far as I can, a long conversation which I had yesterday with His

\* Not printed.



Majesty the King of Irak. The interview was of an entirely private and unofficial character.

I have handed a copy of the enclosed memorandum to His Majesty's High Commissioner.

I have, &c.

PERCY LORAINÉ.

Enclosure in No. 7.

*Memorandum of an unofficial Interview with His Majesty King Feisal, dated December 10, 1921.*

ON the evening of my arrival at Bagdad I had the honour of meeting the King of Irak at dinner with the British High Commissioner, and His Majesty was good enough to invite me to call on him in his own residence yesterday afternoon. The only other person present at this interview was His Majesty's private secretary, Rustam Beg Haidar.

I enquired of King Feisal whether he had any recent news in regard to the situation in Persia and what he thought of the present state of affairs in that country. His Majesty replied that news reached him from time to time, but not through any regular channel; he understood that, at the moment, there were only two people who counted for anything, and they were the Prime Minister, Kawam-es-Saltaneh, and the Minister of War, Reza Khan; that the latter was in a strong position owing to his personal command of all the available forces, but he doubted whether he could be trusted to use his power wisely, as he was an ignorant and uneducated man. His Majesty said that British policy had no doubt had a set-back owing to the rejection by the Persians of the Anglo-Persian Agreement. He thought the various Tehran Governments had been lacking in wisdom in this respect, but the principal blame lay with the Ulama and the Mujtahid, both at Kerbela and Nejef and in Persia. These men he considered as the greatest bar to any progress in Persia, and they wielded unscrupulously a most pernicious influence, generally used to thwart every effort made to improve the state of Persian affairs. The Persian population was ignorant, fanatical and credulous, and the Ulama made it their business to maintain their fellow-countrymen in this condition, which was the most favourable one for the continuance of their own authority and influence. As things were, it was quite easy for them to say that any particular measure—e.g., the Anglo-Persian Agreement—was contrary to religion and to issue a "fetwa" enjoining resistance to it by the Persian people, and such fetwas still carried great weight. The Ulama were well aware that any progress in education was a direct menace to their authority, and they had, therefore, systematically blocked every attempt in this direction. Moreover, the members of the ruling class in Persia, who filled the various offices of State, really worked in accord with the Ulama, and had in common with them an interest in preserving the present conditions and opposing real progress. His Majesty expressed strongly the opinion that until the influence of the Ulama was broken no satisfactory progress could be made in Persian affairs.

I enquired by what means His Majesty thought that this result might be obtained, and pointed out that if the English or any other foreigner undertook such a task they would almost certainly defeat their own object, as any interference by them in such matters would arouse the susceptibilities of all classes of Moslems and incur their resentment. King Feisal agreed with this view, and said he thought there were two methods which might be employed: one was to start as many schools as possible in Persia and obtain facilities for Persians to get a liberal education; the other was to divide the Ulama among themselves. His Majesty said that we had done something in this direction, especially as regards education, both in Egypt and India, and he thought similar tactics might be successful in this part of the world. I replied that this was indeed the case, but that the British had been handicapped in their task for the reasons which I had previously explained, and especially because, as His Majesty was well aware, the British Government had at all times been particularly scrupulous in avoiding any measures likely to arouse or offend Moslem religious susceptibilities. It seemed to me that His Majesty and his advisers had, in this country, a far better opportunity for carrying out a scheme of liberal education and enlightenment, as their action would not be open to any shadow of the suspicion which similar action by a foreign authority might arouse, and it seemed to me that if His Majesty could bring about the creation of a great and liberal Moslem University in Bagdad, he would be doing a great work, and one which would be of incalculable benefit to the Moslem

world. King Feisal said he hoped that something on these lines might eventually be accomplished, and he agreed entirely that the opportunity, as I had expressed it, was a far more favourable one than any that had occurred hitherto; besides ordinary education he was very keen on the development of the arts and sciences among his fellow-countrymen; these were the best cures for both ignorance and fanaticism, and as knowledge spread the baneful influence of the clergy would proportionately diminish; moreover, if such a project could be carried out it would most certainly react on the situation in Persia, and, in a sense, be entirely favourable to British interests and influence. In fact, His Majesty went on to say, he thought that our position in Persia would, to a considerable extent, depend on the wisdom and liberality of the policy which we adopted towards Irak. If the Persians saw Irak rapidly progressing as a modern and enlightened State, aided by the friendly advice of His Majesty's Government, they would at once institute in their minds a comparison with those conditions and the ones prevailing in their own country, and if our policy here were a generous one they would realise that the British participation in that development was a really disinterested one, and that it had been a great mistake for Persia to refuse our proffered assistance. Indeed, he thought that this idea was dawning in the minds even of Persians who had, at the time, been opponents of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, and even, perhaps, in the minds of some of the Mujtahids themselves, though they would not go so far as to avow it. He was inclined to think that the ordinary population was realising that our withdrawal had only been succeeded by disorder and insecurity, where security had before prevailed and money was plentiful, and laid the blame at the door of the Persian rather than at that of His Majesty's Government.

The conversation then turned on the Turkish question, and His Majesty dwelt with considerable feeling on the policy pursued by France. He condemned the Franco-Kemalist Agreement as a disloyal act, and one which was entirely contrary to the Treaty of Sèvres. However that might be, His Majesty continued, French policy in Asia seemed to him to be frankly hostile to Great Britain, and France seemed to be securing successes all along the line owing to the absence, so far as he could see, of any clear and definite policy on the part of His Majesty's Government towards the Turkish question and towards the Islamic world in general. He understood the difficulties of His Majesty's Government, and that the facts as regards their policy were often quite different from what was represented in this part of the world. It was, nevertheless, the case that the population in general, judging from what it saw, was firmly convinced that Great Britain stood behind the Greeks, who were Christians, and that France was backing the Turks, who were Moslems, and the conclusion was that Great Britain had abandoned her traditional attitude of friendliness towards Islamic States. His Majesty added that he was speaking quite personally, and with complete frankness; he, of course, did not share these views himself, but he knew how widely they were held and how much damage they were doing to British interests. Were he an Englishman he thought he would have quarrelled with France long ago—his patience with her would have been exhausted. I ventured to remind His Majesty that there were Western as well as Eastern problems, and that a breach with France involved the virtual collapse of the whole system embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, a result which hardly anyone could desire.

At the close of the war, His Majesty continued, Great Britain had a unique position in the East. Her arms had been everywhere victorious, and she stood without a rival; but in the three years which had passed since then everything which she had gained seemed to be being frittered away. I told His Majesty that I should understand that point of view if gain in the East had been our object, but once our enemies had been overthrown I could not see what we had stood to gain except the safeguarding of our existing interests, the restoration of peaceful conditions and the promotion of order and prosperity, with such assistance as we could afford, in the regions freed from Turkish misrule. His Majesty said that all would have been well if we had made that clear from the outset, but he feared that we had not, and that the uncertainty prevailing in everyone's mind as regards our intentions was exercising a bad influence. Quite apart from the question of gain, we had more to lose in the East than any other Power, and it seemed to him that we were standing by while our position was being attacked from several quarters. Everyone was puzzled to know what our real intentions were. I expressed the opinion that the real drag on the situation was the absence, as yet, of any solution of the Kemalist-Turk question, and I very much hoped that, now that such a happy issue had been found out of the negotiations on the Irish question, His Majesty's Government might be able to concentrate a greater share



of their attention on the Turkish problem, although, as His Majesty well knew, that problem bristled with difficulties. I had no doubt, however, that a settlement would be ultimately reached, and felt convinced that its entry into force would have a pacifying and salutary effect in many directions, the benefit of which would be likewise felt in Tehran.

I was struck by the manner in which King Feisal evidently thinks out himself the problems which come under his notice, and also by the breadth of his views as regards education and enlightenment. He did not seem to me to have any axe to grind, but there could be no doubt as regards the great earnestness of his plea that a sagacious generosity should guide the policy of His Majesty's Government in the formation of the new Irakian State. His Majesty's attitude was frank, friendly and cordial. At the conclusion of the interview he was so good as to wish me a safe journey to Tehran and success in the mission which had been entrusted to me there.

PERCY LORAINÉ.

December 11, 1921.

[E 527/5/44]

No. 8.

*Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 14.)*

(No. 7. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Athens, January 6, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, whilst I was in Rome on my way to my new post, the Marquis della Torretta, who was my colleague both in Russia and Vienna, and whom I know intimately, invited me to dine quietly with him. During a long conversation after dinner the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs developed his views on the Græco-Turkish question at considerable length. Before leaving Rome next day, the 31st December, I communicated the gist of this conversation to Sir R. Graham, but it may be of interest to put it on record in greater detail.

The Marquis della Torretta began by saying that he believed his views coincided closely with those of your Lordship. The important thing was to restore peace in the East, and to re-establish the Turkish Government at Constantinople, where it would be more amenable to pressure from the side of the Allies than in the fastnesses of the interior. It was also essential to reinforce the authority of the Sultan, and to give him at least the appearance of being at the head of an independent Government. These objects could not be obtained so long as the Greeks were in Asia Minor and the Greek zone in Thrace came so near the capital as the Chataldja lines. It would, therefore, be necessary for the Greeks to evacuate Smyrna and to withdraw sufficiently far from Constantinople to free the capital from the constant menace of a military descent. So long as this was done he did not care how much or how little of Thrace was retained by the Greeks.

The Minister went on to say that it was impossible for the Allies to assent to the abrogation of the Capitulations, but they might agree to some modifications which would remedy the undoubted abuses which had gradually grown up in their practical application. The freedom of the Straits must certainly be guaranteed and some form of financial control established. He saw little advantage in military control, since every Turk was a trained soldier, and paper restrictions in this direction would merely cause difficulties with the Turks without offering real safeguards against an expansion of the army.

At this point I drew the Minister's attention to the intractable mood now prevailing at Angora, and the disinclination of the Turks to abate one jot of the national pact. He replied that the Turks were in a very elated state, and Signor Tuozi had been treated with so little consideration, and had found the atmosphere so unfavourable for his conversations that the Minister had recalled him. He might arrive at Rome any day. Nevertheless, it was necessary to make peace in the Near East, and some way must be found out of the present situation. The question of the recognition of King Constantine must be settled at the same time. The only thing was to find a formula which, while respecting the will of the Greek people, would save the face of the Allies and put an end to the existing ridiculous and undignified state of things.

The above conversation was understood by both sides to be of a purely private character. The general impression that I gathered was that the Marquis della Torretta would be ready to go to any lengths in making concessions to the Turks if

peace could be thereby attained. I do not believe that he would, in the last resort, stand out either for the Capitulations or financial control, much less for any cession of Thrace to Greece.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch by bag to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, &c.

F. O. LINDLEY.

[E 528/5/44]

No. 9.

*Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 14.)*

(No. 11.)

My Lord,

*Athens, January 7, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, when in Rome on my way to Athens, I called on MM. Gounaris and Baltazzi, who were staying in the capital. I explained to them that I had no instructions to speak to them on political matters, but that I was glad to take the opportunity to make their acquaintance. I was going out in exactly the same capacity as Lord Granville, and had a letter addressed by your Lordship to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs setting forth my official position. In reply to questions from the two Ministers, I stated that, speaking as a private person who had heard a good deal of talk from different sides, I felt pretty certain that no settlement with the Turks was possible so long as the Greeks remained in Asia Minor. I advised them, therefore, to get accustomed to the idea of a withdrawal. They asked, in reply, what would then happen to the Christian populations of the district. I presumed that the Powers would make the necessary arrangements.

2. During my second interview with M. Protopapadakis, the Acting Prime Minister at Athens, I held much the same language: as it seems to me necessary that those in authority here should have time to prepare public opinion for what will, if it comes about, be a bitter pill to swallow. M. Protopapadakis, like M. Gounaris, asked me what would happen to the Christian populations, and I replied as I had done to his chief. Neither the one nor the other seemed to me to be taken aback by the suggestion of evacuation, which they had probably already heard often enough before, and there have been certain signs during the last two days that public opinion is to be carefully prepared beforehand.

3. It would be presumptuous on my part, after a few days at my post, to hazard any personal opinion as to the effect of such an evacuation on the internal political situation. I have questioned a good many persons whose judgment commands respect, and the more weighty opinion is to the effect that the news would be taken noisily but without dangerous effervescence. Both the Venisists and their opponents would make capital out of the withdrawal. The former would declare that, but for the return of King Constantine, Greek aspirations in Asia Minor would have been fulfilled. The latter would point to the withdrawal as definite proof of the disastrous results of following the policy of Veniselos. In short, it seems probable that the evacuation would supply about the same quantity of ammunition—or mud—to both parties and would leave their relative strength unchanged.

4. The effect which might be produced by evacuation on the army of Asia Minor is more important. It is quite impossible to form any useful judgment regarding it. An English acquaintance of mine told me to-day that he questioned a number of Greek privates on leave from Asia Minor a few days ago in the train. They were ready enough to complain of everything, but, when he suggested that it was time they came home for good and cut their losses, they protested unanimously. Other people will tell you that the army of Asia Minor is completely weary of the campaign and would willingly forgo their ideal of a Greater Greece in return for a passage home. Others, again, declare that General Papoulas and many officers and men have decided to take a leaf out of the book of Zeligowski and Kemal, and will refuse to leave Asia Minor if ordered to do so.

5. In June of last year Colonel Hoare Nairne, military attaché to this Legation, visited the Greek army in Asia Minor and made a most interesting report on its moral and its military efficiency (see telegram written by Colonel Nairne from Smyrna to your Lordship for the C.I.G.S. and dated the 15th June, and referred to

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in Constantinople telegram No. 447 of the 22nd June). I have been carefully through the archives, and that is the last report which is of any value to this Legation from the political point of view. Lord Granville suggested that further visits should be made, but neither the military attaché nor his assistant was again allowed to visit Smyrna. I am aware that British officers from Constantinople are with the Greek forces, and they keep the military attaché regularly informed of military events. But the Greek army is part of the Greek nation—perhaps the most important and most politically active part—and yet the Legation is cut off from all direct knowledge of what is happening in it. This seems a most extraordinary state of affairs, and I have asked Colonel Nairne, who leaves for London with this despatch, to take the matter up as soon as he arrives home.

6. While unable myself to form any opinion as to the state of the Asia Minor army, I venture to warn your Lordship against accepting, as accurate, views which emanate either from Veniselist sources in Constantinople or European residents in Smyrna. The former are completely unreliable as regards political feeling, and the latter are, and always have been, just as biassed against the Greeks as are all European residents in the China ports biassed against the Japanese. I would particularly call your Lordship's attention to the fact that, as regards the military value of the Greek army, the past has proved that the judgment of British officers who have studied that army is alone of any value. Colonel Nairne's report above mentioned is a typical instance of a British officer's report, contradicting in vital particulars reports from other sources, which has been thoroughly justified by events. In the forthcoming negotiations concerning the Near Eastern question, it may become of paramount importance to form a correct estimate of what the Greek army is capable, if given the material and moral support of the Allies or of Great Britain; and I earnestly hope that His Majesty's Government will not base their judgment on reports from anyone save from British officers thoroughly acquainted with Greek peculiarities.

7. Although I have thought it well to prepare the Greek Government for the possibility of sacrifices in Asia Minor, I have made no mention of Thrace. Some people aver that the loss of Smyrna would be a more severe blow to Hellenism than that of Thrace. This may be the case, but it is certain that the loss of both would be resented by the whole country as a piece of rank injustice. In paragraph 4 of this despatch I mentioned the possibility of a Greek Zeligowski in Asia Minor. In that country it would be difficult for such an adventurer to maintain himself, but in Thrace it would be a simple matter, and, should the bulk of the new province be taken from the Greeks, we must be prepared for a recrudescence of that band activity and general unrest in the Balkan Peninsula which has preceded and been the immediate cause of so many wars. After all that has passed in this part of the world, I do not believe that any Greek contemplates the possibility of having to renounce Thrace, and it seems inconceivable that the reinstatement of the Turk should be seriously contemplated. The loss of Thrace, which has been formally annexed, would produce consequences of the utmost gravity in Greece, and would in all probability compromise its whole future existence. Nevertheless, I do not doubt that the French will do all they can to effect this operation, and, as stated in my despatch No. 7 of the 6th instant, I do not anticipate that the Italians will offer any effective opposition to them.

I have, &c.  
F. O. LINDLEY.

[E 504/18/44]

No. 10.

*Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 14.)*

(No. 123.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 12th January, 1922, respecting Armenian refugees from Cilicia going to Constantinople.

*Paris, January 13, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 10.

*French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Lord Hardinge.*

DANS une note du 29 décembre dernier, l'Ambassade britannique a bien voulu exposer les raisons pour lesquelles le Général Harington estimerait inopportun de laisser les Arméniens de Cilicie venir s'établir à Constantinople. Elle a fait part en même temps au Ministère des Affaires étrangères du désir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté que de nouveaux émigrants, venant de Cilicie notamment, ne soient plus autorisés à se rendre à Constantinople.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, a l'honneur de faire savoir à son Excellence Lord Hardinge qu'il est d'accord pour estimer que l'afflux d'éléments nouveaux venant s'ajouter aux nombreux réfugiés de Constantinople présente de sérieux inconvénients. Mais il croit nécessaire de rappeler que les autorités françaises de Cilicie n'ont en rien encouragé les Arméniens de Cilicie à quitter ce pays et qu'elles se sont bornées, lorsque ces Arméniens ayant abandonné leur domicile se sont trouvés en détresse à Mersine et sur les confins de la Syrie, à mettre à leur disposition des moyens de transport pour se rendre en Syrie, où ils devaient trouver assistance. Elles se sont, par contre, abstenues de les diriger sur Constantinople. Leur intervention, loin de contribuer à créer la situation signalée par les Hauts-Commissaires et le Général Harington, n'a eu, par suite, pour effet que de l'atténuer en facilitant le transport vers la Syrie de la majorité des émigrants.

*Paris, le 12 janvier 1922.*

[E 810/314/44]

No. 11.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 23.)*

(No. 55.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, January 16, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 4th January, relative to the recently concluded treaty between the Angora and Ukraine Governments, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a much fuller version of the treaty which appeared (with the exception of certain censored passages, which have been included in the translation) in the "Wakt" newspaper of the 9th January.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 11.

*Extract from the "Wakt" of January 9, 1922.*

TEXT OF THE TURCO-UKRAINIAN TREATY.

ARTICLE 1.

THE two contracting parties agree in principle not to recognise any peace treaty or other international instrument which it may be wished to impose on one of them. The Government of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Ukraina agrees not to recognise any instrument relating to Turkey which has not been approved by the National Government of Turkey, as at present represented by the Grand National Assembly. In this treaty, by "Turkey" is meant the territory as given in the national pact which was drawn up by the Chamber of Deputies assembled at Constantinople on the 28th January, 1920, and communicated by the press to all the Powers. The Ukrainian Government recognises the boundaries of Turkey as defined in articles 1 and 3 and annexes of the Turco-Russian Treaty of Friendship of the 16th March, 1921. Moreover, the Ukrainian Government undertakes to recognise the stipulations of every agreement reached between Turkey and the Soviet Republics of the Caucasus.

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## ARTICLE 2.

Turkey recognises as an independent and sovereign State the Socialist Soviet Republic of Ukraina, which was brought into being on territory of the former Russian Empire and which has a common frontier with the Allied Republic of Russia.

## ARTICLE 3.

The two contracting parties agree that the treaties concluded up to the 16th March, 1921, between Turkey and the former Russian Empire or between Turkey and Ukraina are not in conformity with their real interests. They consequently agree that these treaties shall be null and non-existent. Ukraina, as having formed part of the former Russian Empire, declares that Turkey is free from every kind of financial or other obligation towards her based on international agreements concluded between Turkey and the Government of the Tsar.

## ARTICLE 4.

With a view to assuring the freedom of passage of the Straits and their being open for the transport of the commerce of all nations, the two contracting parties agree to entrust the preparation of an international statute dealing with the Black Sea and the Straits to an international conference, which will shortly meet, on condition that the decisions of this conference in no way infringe the absolute sovereignty of Turkey or affect the security of Turkey and her capital, Constantinople.

## ARTICLE 5.

The two contracting parties, as riverain States of the Black Sea, agree that no regulation shall be maintained or made regarding the international rivers flowing into that sea without their active participation. The two parties express the desire to co-operate by every means they consider fitting to obtain the recognition of their rights.

## ARTICLE 6.

The two contracting parties undertake to prevent persons or organisations engaged in revolutionary propaganda against one of them, or their agents, from operating or residing in their territory. Turkey and Ukraina will enter into this undertaking with the Soviet Republics of Russia and the Caucasus on the basis of reciprocity. As regards this article, Turkish territory means the territory directly under the civil and military administration of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

## ARTICLE 7.

The two contracting parties agreed to the application of "most-favoured-nation treatment" to the nationals of one of them residing in the territory of the other. This article will not be applied as far as the rights of the subjects of Moslem States in alliance with Turkey or of Soviet Republics in alliance with Ukraina are concerned, nor will it be applied to commercial relations, which are to be regulated by a separate agreement.

## ARTICLE 8.

The subjects of one of the two contracting parties residing in the territory of the other shall have the rights and duties determined by the laws of the country in which they reside. They will not, however, be subject to the laws and regulations relating to national defence. The nationals of both parties will be excepted from the stipulation of this article in matters relating to the law of the family and inheritance and to legal capacity. These matters will be dealt with by a special agreement.

## ARTICLE 9.

Ukraina declares that she accepts and approves the stipulations of article 7 of the Turco-Russian Treaty of the 16th March, 1921, and article 3 of the Treaty of Kars of the 13th October, 1921, respecting the abolition of the "Ancient Treaties" (Capitulations) maintained by the so-called Capitulatory Powers.

## ARTICLE 10.

It has been decided to conclude conventions respecting wireless telegraphic communication and posts and telegraphs and a consular convention.

## ARTICLE 11.

Until the conclusion of the consular convention mentioned in article 10, the consuls-general, consuls and vice-consuls appointed by one of the two parties to towns, ports and commercial centres of the other, where foreign States have representatives, will be treated in accordance with general international law in matters relating to their privileges and functions and subject to reciprocity. The consent of the party concerned must be obtained to the appointment of consuls to places where there is no foreign consulate.

## ARTICLE 12.

With a view to the maintenance of intercourse between the two countries, the two contracting parties pledge themselves to take the necessary joint action as promptly as possible for guarding and improving transport by sea and rail, the transmission of telegrams and so forth and for ensuring the free and easy passage between the two parties of persons and goods. The two parties will take concerted action to bring about the necessary arrangements with the Soviet Republics of Russia and the Caucasus. In any case, until a trade treaty or agreement has been concluded, the laws and regulations in vigour in each of the two countries will be scrupulously applied on the entry and exit of travellers or merchandise.

## ARTICLE 13.

It is decided to begin as soon as possible the study of economic, financial and similar agreements.

## ARTICLE 14.

The two contracting parties unanimously undertake to prepare, with the least possible delay, regulations respecting the sanitary measures to be enforced in the ports of the Black Sea which form part of their territory.

## ARTICLE 15.

The two contracting parties will set about establishing regular diplomatic relations immediately after the execution of this treaty. The two parties will then forward to each other a description with illustrations of their national flags and coats of arms.

## ARTICLE 16.

This treaty will be subject to ratification. Ratifications shall be exchanged at Kharkof within three months from the date of signature, and the treaty will be put into force on the day of the exchange of ratifications. In confirmation of the accord reached with regard to the foregoing stipulations, the delegates of Turkey and Ukraina have signed and sealed this treaty in the presence of one another. This treaty was drawn up and signed in two copies in French at Angora on the 2nd day of January, 1338 (1922).

YUSUF KEMAL.  
KRUNZE.

*Note.*—A photograph of the delegates is reproduced by the "Wakt," which gives the following names:—

Krunze (evidently a misprint for Frunze); Pushkin Sakalon [*sic*]; Dr. Braun, Reouf Bey of the F.A.; Colonel Kiazim; Hikmet Bey, Director-General of Political Affairs; Munir Bey, Political Counsellor; Yusuf Kemal Bey; Yusuf Akchura Bey; Hilmi Bey, Secretary-General and Counsellor at Kabul.



*Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 23.)*

(No. 49.)

My Lord,

Rome, January 20, 1922.

AS I have already had the honour to report to your Lordship by telegram, the "Messaggero" of yesterday's date published a long article on the Near Eastern question, in which it is stated that the British Government have resumed the conversations initiated some time ago at Ineboli with Refat Pasha. The article alleges that conversations are taking place at Constantinople between the representative of the Angora Government and General Harington. Further, that the British negotiators have precise instructions from the Foreign Office, and the tenor of these instructions is given. A summary of the article in question is enclosed herewith.

I should not have been inclined to pay much attention to this article beyond the instruction which I had given to Mr. McClure, of the Press Department, to see the editor of the "Messaggero" and to endeavour to ascertain the source of this misleading information, also to correct it. But I found the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I saw yesterday evening, considerably perturbed over it. The Marchese della Torretta said that he was being attacked on all sides on the ground that, while France had already concluded her agreement with the Turks, Great Britain was now negotiating a similar arrangement, and Italy would, as usual, come in too late and be placed in a disadvantageous position. His Excellency asked me whether I could not take some action to mitigate the disagreeable impression produced by the "Messaggero" article. I said that, as his Excellency was well aware, we were acting in the Near East in a spirit of complete loyalty and co-operation with the Italian Government. There could be no truth in any report of separate negotiations between His Majesty's Government and that of Angora, and I was perfectly prepared to give a brief *démenti* to any allegations of such a character. His Excellency thanked me warmly and returned to the subject when I met him at a dinner at the American Embassy on the same evening. I have therefore issued this morning a brief *démenti* to the "Messaggero" article.

In the course of conversation yesterday the Marchese della Torretta told me of the conversations which he had had with your Lordship at Cannes on the subject of Turkey, and said that he would shortly furnish me with the official observations of the Italian Government on your memorandum, which he considered an excellent basis for the discussion of the whole question. He was in general agreement with your Lordship, but thought that we should have considerable difficulty in persuading the French Government to adopt a similar point of view.

I referred to the very interesting conversation reported by Sir H. Rumbold that he had had with Signor Tuozi; but the Marchese della Torretta had not yet seen Signor Tuozi, who had only just arrived in Rome, and until he had seen him preferred not to enter into a discussion.

I have, &c.  
R. GRAHAM.

Enclosure in No. 12.

*Summary of Article in "Messaggero" of January 19, 1922.*

THE "Messaggero" of the 19th January published a long article on the Near Eastern question which expressed the usual doubts and fears regarding Italian interests. After referring to the Paris conversations between Lord Curzon and M. Poincaré, and the abandonment of the meeting of Foreign Ministers which was to have discussed the situation, the "Messaggero" points out the danger of Italian "exclusion," and proceeds to examine what it conceives to be the British programme. This programme was definitely injurious to Italian interests, and it was urgently necessary for Italy to resume direct negotiations with Angora.

The "Messaggero" continues:—

"The Paris conversations have not been without their value in clarifying French and British policy in regard to the Ottoman problem. We may indeed add that Lord Curzon has probably given an assurance to M. Poincaré that the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement will not be an obstacle in the question of Franco-British relations. We are brought to this conclusion by the fact that the British Government—while it is discussing in Paris—is not losing time in Turkey.

"In fact, notwithstanding previous *démentis* and those which may come in the future, the British Government has resumed the conversations which it had initiated some time ago at Ineboli with Refat Pasha, the Angora Minister of National Defence, through Colonel Groyel [*sic*] and Captain Benet [*sic*]. We base what follows upon private information which we have received from an unexceptionable source.

"The actual conversations at Constantinople are taking place between Hamid Bey (representative of the Angora Government in the official capital of the Ottoman Empire and at the same time administrator of the Ottoman Bank and member of the Red Crescent) and General Harington, assisted by the colonel who initiated the conversations at Ineboli.

"The instructions given by the Foreign Office to the British negotiators are particularly precise.

"According to these instructions, England is disposed to withdraw opposition to the Franco-Kemalist Treaty, provided that certain modifications are made in regard to concessions in detail [*sic*].

"According to the British plan for an agreement with the Kemalists, Greece would be obliged to abandon Asia Minor, and at Smyrna there would be established an international commission to safeguard minorities. The Enos-Midia line would be recognised as the European frontier of Turkey. The international commission for the Straits laid down by the Treaty of Sèvres would be maintained. Eastern Thrace would be given an autonomous régime and placed under a British mandate.

"The conditions attaching to these concessions would be: That Mustapha Kemal should come to an agreement with the Sultan; that the Turco-Persian and Turco-Afghan Treaties should not be directed against England; that Mustapha Kemal should accept the existing situation in Mesopotamia and accord official recognition to Feisal; that England should receive concessions equal to those granted to France by the treaty of the 20th October.

"Turkey would be allowed to maintain an army of 100,000 to 150,000 men until Bolshevik Russia should disarm. England would agree to the inclusion of Mosul within the Turkish frontiers.

"The Armenian frontiers would be the subject of early discussion, but on the basis of those actually in existence."

*Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 30.)*

Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 27 janvier 1922.

M. le Marquis,

J'AI l'honneur d'adresser, ci-joint, à votre Seigneurie un memorandum où sont exposées dans leurs grandes lignes des propositions qui, de l'avis du Gouvernement de la République, pourraient servir de base aux conversations qui doivent avoir lieu à Paris le 1<sup>er</sup> février prochain, au sujet de la révision du Traité de Sèvres.

Ce memorandum a été rédigé, non pour répondre au memorandum britannique, mais pour exposer le point de vue français dont M. Poincaré a déjà entretenu votre Seigneurie. Comme le memorandum anglais tenait compte des dispositions des Grecs manifestées par M. Gounaris au cours des longs entretiens avec votre Seigneurie, le document français tient compte des dispositions des Turcs, que nous connaissons d'après les indications de notre Haut-Commissaire à Constantinople, de M. Franklin-Bouillon et de Ferid Bey, représentant officieux d'Angora à Paris.

Ainsi que M. Poincaré l'a sûrement déclaré à votre Seigneurie, le Parlement français ni l'opinion française n'accepteraient qu'il soit pris de mesures coercitives contre les Turcs pour les obliger à accepter des conditions qui seraient arrêtées au profit du Gouvernement grec actuel et que le Gouvernement de la République ne pourrait, en aucune manière, participer à une action, de quelque nature qu'elle fût, tendant à les leur imposer. Dans son entretien du 16 de ce mois avec votre Seigneurie, M. Poincaré a fait ressortir également que, dans les négociations à engager, il ne s'agissait pas tant de discuter des intérêts respectifs des Alliés que de mettre d'accord les Turcs et les Grecs.

Or, au moment où a été préparé entre les Alliés le texte du Traité de Sèvres, la



situation respective de la Grèce et de la Turquie était toute différente de la situation présente.

La Grèce était dirigée par un Gouvernement qui, ayant décidé l'intervention de son pays dans la guerre aux côtés des Alliés, avait donné à l'Entente des preuves de son amitié et participait alors de l'autorité morale que donnait la victoire. Elle était unanimement soutenue par l'opinion qu'avaient émue les désordres de l'Administration turque et les crimes commis, notamment contre les Arméniens, avec la complicité des autorités allemandes. Matériellement, enfin, l'armée grecque, qui avait occupé sans difficulté la région de Smyrne, paraissait en mesure d'aider puissamment les Alliés à imposer à la Turquie des conditions de paix. La conception pouvait alors prévaloir de ne laisser subsister qu'une Turquie territorialement très diminuée, militairement désarmée, et, d'une manière générale, soumise à un contrôle international restreignant considérablement ses droits de souveraineté.

La situation actuelle est fort différente. La Grèce est maintenant gouvernée par le Souverain et les Ministres qui, pendant la guerre, se sont efforcés de la maintenir dans une neutralité dissimulant mal une secrète connivence avec les ennemis de l'Entente et qui demeurent responsables des attentats dirigés contre les armées alliées en Macédoine et contre les marines anglaise et française à Athènes mêmes. D'autre part, les abus et les violences commis par l'armée et les autorités helléniques en Asie Mineure, constatés par des commissions internationales d'enquête, ont encore réduit la part d'autorité morale que la Grèce tenait de sa situation d'allié. Enfin, l'armée hellénique s'est montrée incapable de remplir le rôle qui lui paraissait dévolu. Dans la lutte qu'elle a entreprise contre les forces nationalistes, elle a essuyé deux échecs et sa situation apparaît maintenant gravement compromise.

La Turquie, par contre, a fait preuve d'une vitalité et d'une force de résistance qu'on avait sous-estimées. Le Gouvernement d'Angora, qui paraissait, il y a deux ans, n'être qu'une organisation de fortune, d'existence très précaire, n'a cessé depuis lors de croître en cohésion et en puissance. Le sentiment national turc s'est prononcé en sa faveur et lui a donné tout son appui.

Ce sentiment national s'est trouvé renforcé par le sentiment religieux de l'ensemble des musulmans, pour lesquels il est essentiel que le Khalife demeure à Constantinople, qu'il soit indépendant et suffisamment fort pour remplir son rôle de défenseur de l'Islam.

C'est dans la conscience même des peuples musulmans que les Alliés heurteraient directement s'ils ne tenaient pas compte de ces nécessités. Le Gouvernement britannique ne se dissimule certainement, pas plus que le Gouvernement français, la gravité des difficultés qui en résulteraient pour les deux pays qui ont le plus grand intérêt à maintenir le calme dans l'Islam.

Mustapha Kémal a su improviser une armée qui, malgré son infériorité en nombre et en matériel, a résisté victorieusement à l'armée hellénique. Cette infériorité en matériel et en effectifs est sur le point de disparaître et il y a tout lieu de penser que si, au printemps, les opérations militaires reprenaient, le problème de la paix en Orient deviendrait insoluble pour les Alliés et créerait une situation délicate dans leurs propres établissements d'outre-mer.

Le rétablissement de la paix est donc une nécessité urgente et un nouvel insuccès des efforts des Alliés pour y parvenir serait déplorable. Aussi, le Gouvernement français a-t-il tenu à examiner, dans l'esprit le plus objectif, la situation respective présente des Grecs et des Turcs. Il ne peut dissimuler qu'à son avis les modifications au Traité de Sèvres, envisagées au mois de mars 1921, et communiquées aux parties en présence, ne sont plus suffisantes pour entraîner l'acceptation des Turcs qui peuvent faire valoir avec raison que, depuis cette date, les Grecs ont subi un échec militaire grave et ont — en repoussant en mars la proposition de commissions d'enquête, en refusant en juin l'intervention des Puissances — commis deux fautes politiques lourdes dont ils doivent supporter le poids.

Les conditions nouvelles de la paix ne paraissent par suite pouvoir comporter que des diminutions très restreintes du territoire proprement turc (le sort des territoires de population arabe n'étant pas modifié), une limitation des forces militaires plutôt qu'un désarmement et un contrôle de l'administration de la Turquie conciliable avec ses droits de souveraineté.

Neuville agréer, &c.

SAINT-AULAIRE.

Enclosure in No. 13.

*Propositions en vue de la Réunion des Ministres des Affaires étrangères relatives à la Revision du Traité de Sèvres.*

AINSI que le rappelle le memorandum britannique du 30 décembre 1921, trois tentatives infructueuses ont déjà été faites par les Alliés en août 1920, mars et juin 1921, pour arriver à la conclusion de la paix avec la Turquie. Les propositions faites à ces deux dernières dates ont été repoussées par le Gouvernement hellénique.

Pour assurer le succès, reconnu indispensable, d'une quatrième tentative il est nécessaire qu'un accord préalable entre les trois Gouvernements alliés s'établisse sur des conditions précises comportant une complète unité de vues des Alliés.

A cet effet, le Gouvernement britannique a, dans son memorandum du 30 décembre, exposé ses vues sur les principales questions qu'il y a lieu d'examiner en vue d'une revision du Traité de Sèvres. Le Gouvernement français a l'honneur de faire connaître ci-après son avis les différents points visés par le memorandum précité.

*Smyrne.*

Il est évident que, dans l'intérêt d'un règlement général, les vœux formulés par les Turcs sur la question de Smyrne doivent être réalisés dans toute la mesure du possible. L'existence de l'administration grecque et surtout la présence des forces grecques dans la zone de Smyrne, ont été le principal stimulant du nationalisme turc et un obstacle insurmontable à une solution pacifique. Il est nécessaire, d'autre part, que cette zone ne soit point évacuée par les forces grecques sans que des mesures spéciales ne soient prises pour protéger la nombreuse population chrétienne qui l'habite.

Or, le retour de Smyrne, sous la souveraineté ottomane et entière paraît être une condition sur laquelle les Turcs se montreront irréductibles. Toute intervention directe d'une autorité étrangère serait difficilement conciliable avec cette souveraineté. Enfin, on sait quelle invincible répugnance la Turquie oppose à toute délimitation de zone sur son territoire, parce qu'elle interprète une telle délimitation comme le prélude d'un démembrement.

Des mesures transitoires destinées à sauvegarder les personnes et les biens dans la région de Smyrne devront être prévues, pour être appliquées pendant un certain temps après l'évacuation complète de Smyrne par les forces grecques. L'évacuation par les Grecs doit être immédiate et complète. Des commissions mixtes, composées d'officiers et de fonctionnaires des Puissances alliées, avec une garde militaire, pourraient être installées dans les centres principaux, elles exerceraient une surveillance dont la durée serait différente selon les zones. Hors de la zone de Smyrne, soit sur la ligne Ismid, Brousse, Eskichéir, Kutahia, Afioun-Karahissar, les commissions pourraient séjourner trois mois. Dans la zone de Smyrne, elles resteraient un an. Aucun détachement de gendarmerie ou de troupes turques ne réoccuperait le territoire avant l'arrivée des commissions interalliées. Il semble, d'autre part, qu'il n'y ait pas à prévoir de régime spécial pour les populations chrétiennes de la région de Smyrne et que les garanties qu'elles devront recevoir ne puissent être autres que celles qui seront accordées aux minorités de tout l'Empire ottoman. Peut-être, en raison des très nombreux éléments étrangers que contient la population de Smyrne, pourrait-on envisager que cette ville fût dotée, comme Alexandrie, d'une administration municipale à laquelle participeraient ces éléments étrangers, cet organisme municipal demeurant, bien entendu, sous l'autorité du Gouvernement ottoman.

*Thrace occidentale.*

Le statut de la Thrace occidentale a été réglé par le Traité de Neuilly. Enlevée à la Bulgarie, cédée aux principales Puissances alliées, la Thrace occidentale a été rétrocédée par elles à la Grèce, en vertu d'un traité séparé, signé en août 1920, mais non encore ratifié. Elle est occupée depuis 1920 par les troupes grecques. Il ne peut être question de rouvrir cette question sans mettre en péril le règlement balkanique fixé par les Traités de Saint-Germain, de Neuilly et de Trianon, sur lesquels il n'y a pas lieu de revenir.

*Thrace orientale.*

La population de la Thrace orientale, jusqu'à la Maritza, est en majorité turque, sauf la partie qui touche la Thrace occidentale et la presqu'île de Gallipoli. Le recours au plébiscite serait une source de difficultés dans un pays où les populations sont si



mélangées et où l'état civil est incertain. D'autre part, la nécessité d'assurer la sécurité stratégique de Constantinople rend désirable le rétablissement sur le sol européen d'une zone qui mette la capitale hors d'atteinte en cas d'attaque brusquée. La ligne partageant les territoires turcs et les territoires grecs pourrait donc suivre le cours de la Toundja jusqu'à Andrinople, puis la source de la Maritza jusqu'à Kouleli-Bourgas, puis de là rejoindre la mer de Marmara vers Rodosto. Le territoire rendu à la Turquie serait immédiatement évacué par les Turcs et surveillé pendant six mois par une commission intéralliée comme la zone de Smyrne.

#### *Constantinople.*

Le Gouvernement français estime qu'il y a lieu de ne faire aucune réserve subordonnant le sort de Constantinople à l'exécution du Traité de Paix. Constantinople devrait faire retour au Gouvernement ottoman sans aucune limitation de ses pouvoirs. Le déplacement vers l'intérieur de l'Anatolie de la capitale de l'Empire ottoman, en soustrayant le Gouvernement turc aux influences de l'Occident, irait à l'encontre du désir des Puissances de voir la Turquie conformer son attitude à leur politique générale de paix et s'orienter vers un régime intérieur compatible avec l'existence sur son territoire de nombreuses populations chrétiennes. Le maintien jusqu'à la ratification de la paix des troupes alliées dans la ville même de Constantinople ne présente pour les Puissances aucun avantage réel. Ces troupes, rassemblées dès maintenant aux abords de la ville, s'y trouveraient dans une situation aussi forte qu'actuellement. Ramenées sur la mer de Marmara, aux Dardanelles, jusqu'à la signature de la paix, elles constitueraient une garantie suffisante pour la ratification.

#### *Zone démilitarisée.—Détroits.*

La réduction de la zone à démilitariser proposée par le Gouvernement britannique, conformément aux vues échangées à Londres en mars 1921 et la diminution des garnisons alliées à maintenir sur les rives nord et sud des Dardanelles appellent les observations suivantes : Il n'est pas à envisager que les Turcs acceptent une démilitarisation complète des Détroits, qui n'est d'ailleurs pas indispensable pour assurer la liberté du passage. Le maintien des forces alliées sur la rive anatolienne serait incompatible avec la souveraineté ottomane que les Turcs veulent conserver intacte en Asie Mineure.

En ce qui concerne la Commission des Détroits, les modifications envisagées à Londres, en 1921, donneraient satisfaction à la Turquie.

L'intervention de la Société des Nations, tant pour assurer ultérieurement la démilitarisation de la zone des Détroits que pour exercer son autorité supérieure sur la Commission des Détroits, paraît répondre à la situation actuelle et à l'opinion de tous les pays ayant des intérêts maritimes en Orient. La position prise par les États-Unis à l'égard de la Société des Nations crée, cependant, pour l'adoption de cette mesure une difficulté qui ne paraît pas pouvoir être levée par le même moyen que la France et la Grande-Bretagne ont proposé aux États-Unis en ce qui concerne les mandats.

Il y aurait lieu de lier à l'admission de la Turquie dans la Société la substitution d'une commission de la Société des Nations aux garnisons alliées des Détroits.

#### *Arménie.*

Le Gouvernement français ne voit pas plus que le Gouvernement britannique la possibilité de reprendre la question de l'Arménie turque ; mais il a examiné avec la plus sérieuse attention la proposition britannique tendant à la création en Cilicie d'une autonomie arménienne. Il ne doit pas dissimuler qu'à son avis cette proposition constitue une aggravation plutôt qu'une atténuation aux conditions de paix antérieures, toute délimitation géographique tracée sur le territoire de la Turquie apparaissant comme le prélude d'un nouveau démembrement.

Aucune analogie n'existe entre la situation de la Cilicie et celle du Liban avant la guerre. Au lieu de constituer, comme ce dernier pays, un noyau compact de 500,000 chrétiens, groupés dans une région montagneuse si pauvre que la Turquie avait renoncé à y lever des impôts, la Cilicie constitue, avec la région de Smyrne, la partie la plus riche du territoire ottoman. Les populations chrétiennes n'y constituaient après la guerre qu'une très faible minorité. L'émigration qui vient de se produire à la suite de l'évacuation de cette province par les troupes françaises a permis de s'en rendre compte avec précision : elle s'est élevée au total de 49,884 personnes, dont 40,000 Arméniens, auxquelles on doit ajouter une centaine de familles qui ont pu échapper à

la statistique. Les autorités françaises ont dû constater que, malgré les garanties données aux populations et le maintien complet de l'ordre, 4,000 chrétiens seulement étaient demeurés en Cilicie. A supposer que tous les émigrés retournent en Cilicie, qu'il s'y joigne même un certain nombre de leurs compatriotes actuellement dispersés dans le monde, le nombre d'Arméniens qui se fixeraient dans cette région n'en demeurerait pas moins infime auprès de celui des Arméniens (évalué actuellement encore à 1,500,000) qui se trouvent sur les confins de la Turquie et de la Transcaucasie russe.

Dans cette dernière région existe un État arménien. Cet État est lui-même reconnu par les Puissances, si son Gouvernement actuel ne l'est pas. Alors que son territoire constitue le berceau de leur race et comprend le siège du Catholicos, chef suprême de leur religion et symbole de leur nationalité, on conçoit difficilement que les Arméniens, si diminués par la guerre, puissent disperser leurs efforts en une région qui est séparée de l'État arménien par toute l'Anatolie.

Le Gouvernement français, qui, fidèle à des résolutions arrêtées et publiées depuis longtemps, vient de restituer la Cilicie à l'Administration turque, estime pour sa part qu'il n'y a pas lieu pour les Alliés de mettre en discussion la situation actuelle de cette province.

#### *Minorités.*

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté propose le maintien, dans leur substance, des clauses comprises dans la section IV du Traité de Sévres, l'insertion de la clause des traités relatifs aux minorités d'Europe plaçant leur exécution sous la garantie de la Société des Nations et l'insertion d'une clause spéciale instituant un Haut-Commissaire de la Société des Nations ayant les pouvoirs nécessaires pour assurer l'application des garanties accordées aux minorités de Turquie.

Le Gouvernement français, animé des mêmes sentiments d'humanité et de justice, dont s'inspire le Gouvernement britannique et désireux d'obtenir à cet égard des résultats pratiques, est d'accord avec lui sur l'opportunité de donner aux stipulations du Traité de Sévres une forme qui en facilite l'acceptation par la Turquie. C'est, d'ailleurs, dans cette intention qu'en mars 1921 les Gouvernements alliés s'étaient montrés disposés à modifier l'article 144 de ce traité.

Le Gouvernement français recommande également pour la protection des minorités en Turquie l'adoption des dispositions inscrites dans les traités intervenus avec les divers États de l'Europe, qu'il a en assurer la complète application en précisant les pouvoirs de la Société des Nations sous la garantie de laquelle elles sont placées. La rédaction de la clause finale des traités européens pourrait être complétée et précisée : l'exécution des engagements serait placée sous la garantie et la surveillance de la Société des Nations. Cette surveillance ne pouvant prendre fin qu'après que la Turquie aurait été admise dans la Société des Nations, de même qu'à ce moment une commission d'experts de la Société des Nations pourrait être substituée aux garnisons préposées à la garde des Détroits.

Au moment de la signature de la paix, l'envoi de commissions de la Société des Nations dans d'autres pays signataires de traités de minorités serait particulièrement opportun.

#### *Accord tripartite.*

Le Gouvernement français est, comme en juin 1921, d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pour estimer que la substance de cette convention ne doit pas être modifiée et qu'il y a lieu de la maintenir sous la forme d'un engagement qui ne lierait que les trois Puissances et ne serait pas notifié à la Turquie. Mais il n'est pas douteux que la Turquie en rendra l'application extrêmement difficile et qu'il serait préférable d'en ajourner la conclusion après la signature de la paix. Il est nécessaire de connaître sur ce point les propositions italiennes.

#### *Clauses financières.*

Ainsi que les deux Gouvernements l'ont reconnu aux mois de mars et de juin 1921, en réduisant—dans des conditions maintenant insuffisantes—les pouvoirs de la Commission financière, certaines des dispositions prévues par la Partie VIII du Traité de Sévres doivent être modifiées tant pour s'adapter à la situation actuelle que pour répondre à l'objet que se proposaient les Alliés. Si le maintien des engagements et des institutions antérieurs à la guerre ne peut faire l'objet d'aucune concession, par contre les pouvoirs d'intervention d'une Commission financière à laquelle participerait la Turquie peuvent être considérablement réduits et leur durée limitée au temps où la



Turquie ne se montrerait pas en mesure de satisfaire aux obligations résultant pour elle du Traité de Paix.

D'autre part, l'importance et le caractère spécial pris par les dépenses militaires de la Grèce en Anatolie pendant les deux dernières années écoulées depuis le moment où a été préparé le Traité de Sèvres obligeront sans doute à réduire le montant du remboursement aux principales Puissances de leurs frais d'occupation et à disjoindre les dépenses militaires de la Grèce. A défaut de ces modifications, il ne semble pas douteux que le rang assigné par le Traité de Sèvres à la réparation des dommages de guerre subis par les ressortissants alliés ne laisse aucune chance à ces derniers d'être, au moins partiellement, indemnisés.

#### *Clauses militaires.*

Le Gouvernement français est d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pour penser que, même en tenant compte des concessions proposées à la Conférence de Londres, les clauses militaires du Traité de Sèvres devront faire l'objet d'un nouvel examen par les Alliés. La limitation des forces turques constitue une difficulté particulière au moment où tout l'effort de l'Anatolie s'est porté sur l'organisation d'une armée où les éléments les plus actifs de la nation ont trouvé leur moyen d'existence et, dans une certaine mesure, tiennent le Gouvernement nationaliste à leur merci. Il semble, cependant, que cette limitation pourrait être obtenue si elle était liée à celle des armements des pays voisins que la Turquie croit devoir le plus craindre, et parmi lesquels la Bulgarie a déjà dû souscrire à une pareille obligation.

Le maintien de la conscription répond au désir de la Turquie d'établir l'égalité de traitement entre tous ses sujets, conformément aux principes des États modernes. On doit, d'ailleurs, convenir que l'entretien d'une armée de volontaires constituerait une charge trop lourde pour les finances ottomanes et que, composée uniquement d'éléments musulmans, cette armée pourrait donner des sujets d'inquiétude aux populations chrétiennes de Turquie. Certaines garanties pour les non-musulmans incorporés dans les forces turques pourraient être obtenues dans l'organisation du recrutement et par la présence d'officiers étrangers. Quant à l'introduction de ces derniers dans les forces turques, le Gouvernement français estime que le Gouvernement ottoman doit pouvoir intervenir dans le choix de ces officiers et conserver sur eux une certaine autorité.

Les diverses commissions militaires pourraient être maintenues si le Gouvernement ottoman y participait dans des conditions au moins égales à celles où il figure dans la Commission des Détroits.

#### *Autres Clauses.*

Ainsi que le fait observer le Gouvernement britannique, d'autres modifications seraient à apporter aux conditions antérieurement élaborées. Le Gouvernement français croit nécessaire de signaler, parmi elles, l'abrogation des Capitulations, dont le principe devrait être plus expressément énoncé. On pourrait décider la création d'une grande commission qui étudierait l'ensemble des mesures à proposer pour amender le statut des étrangers en Turquie. Il y aurait lieu de renoncer à étendre les Capitulations aux ressortissants d'États qui n'en bénéficieraient pas avant la guerre.

[E 1122/5/44]

No. 14.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 314.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, January 30, 1922.*

ON Thursday last his Excellency the French Ambassador, in the course of a conversation with me on other points, indicated his intention to send to the Foreign Office on the following day the statement of the views of the French Government with regard to the impending conference on the affairs of the East, which M. Poincaré had promised me in Paris. It did not arrive till this morning, and the Cabinet have accordingly not had the time or the opportunity to give to it the consideration which it demands. In these circumstances it would, in any case, have been well-nigh impossible for me to proceed to Paris to-morrow, as hitherto arranged, in order to commence the discussion with the French and Italian Foreign Ministers on Wednesday morning. There would have been no time to give more than a cursory examination

in advance to the detailed proposals for the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, put forward by the French Government.

A perusal, however, of these proposals, and still more of the covering letter from the French Ambassador, demonstrated that the French Government were approaching the Paris discussion from a point of view so widely divergent from the British, and that they regarded the work which it is expected to accomplish in so different a light, that there could be small prospect of an agreement until these misconceptions were removed.

I will proceed to state their nature.

The French Ambassador commences with the statement that as the British memorandum sent by me to Paris and to Rome as a basis of discussion some weeks ago takes account of the Greek attitude, as revealed by M. Gounaris in his long interviews with myself, so the French document takes account of the Turkish attitude, with which the French Government have had, as they justly remark, peculiar opportunities of becoming acquainted. In other words, as my memorandum is to be regarded a brief of the Greek case, it is incumbent upon the French to state and to espouse the Turkish case in the impending conference.

Such an interpretation of the British attitude has no foundation in fact. The suggestion that His Majesty's Government have taken sides on behalf of Greece against Turkey in the memorandum submitted by myself, or were about to take sides at the Paris meeting, must cause His Majesty's Government the greatest surprise, and demands the most prompt and emphatic repudiation. It would in any case be rendered in the highest degree improbable by the facts that Great Britain is herself the greatest Mahomedan Power in the world, that her Mahomedan subjects rendered her invaluable service in the war, for which she will ever remain grateful, and that it is a British quite as much as if not more than an international interest that the Eastern question should be settled with due regard to Turkish sentiment and the future of the Turkish nation. The last object, therefore, that His Majesty's Government had in view was to take sides for one party or the other. Their object is to see justice done to both, for if Britain is a great Mahomedan Power, equally is she a great Christian Power, and equally must she remember that Greece was her ally, and also the ally of the French, in the latter stages of the war, and in that capacity rendered conspicuous service to both.

But the French assumption meets with an even more conclusive negative in the history of the case. So far from the terms suggested by me as a basis of discussion at Paris being the result of my long interviews with M. Gounaris, or representing his ideas, they were never discussed with him at all during my conversations in London, my object being confined exclusively to obtaining the assent of the Greek Government—in which I was fortunately successful—to place themselves in the hands, not of Great Britain, but of the Allied Powers as a whole. In so acting, I thought that I was acting in the interests, not so much of Greece, or of Great Britain, as of the Allies as a whole and of peace. It was therefore with extreme surprise that I learned from his Excellency the French Ambassador that my memorandum, containing as it did proposals, many of which must be intensely distasteful to the Greeks, and which, if accepted, would impose heavy sacrifices upon them, had nevertheless conveyed to the French Government the impression that I was a political partisan, imposing upon them the obligation of stating the Turkish case with a fervour and amplitude that would win the admiration even of Mustapha Kemal.

But it may also be remarked in passing that the Greek Ministers have not conversed with myself or with the British Government alone. They did not come to London until they had visited Paris and had the privilege of more than one conversation with M. Briand, at that time Foreign Minister and President of the Council. They have also been to Rome and enjoyed similar opportunities there. Conversely, the French authorities, in spite of the advantages to which reference has already been made, are not the sole persons who are acquainted with Turkish opinion, the British High Commissioner at Constantinople having had frequent opportunities of conversing with representatives both of the Constantinople and the Angora Governments at the Sultan's capital. It would appear, therefore, that no one of the Great Powers has any claim to be regarded as the special spokesman of this or that combatant party. It has presumably been the desire of all the Allies to make themselves familiar with both sides of the case, with the object of arriving thereby at a just and equitable solution.

It must further be obvious that no discussion at Paris is likely to be fruitful—on the contrary, it will be condemned to certain failure—if those who take part in it are to be regarded in advance as advocates of this or that party or cause. The idea with



which the impending conversation was originally suggested by myself, and, as I thought, accepted both by France and Italy, was that the three Powers should divest themselves of all prepossessions, and should approach this most difficult question from the widest standpoint and with the object not of gaining a victory either for Greeks or Turks, but of removing a dark cloud from the Eastern landscape and of re-establishing the peace of the world.

Bearing in mind this aim, it is difficult to understand what useful purpose can be served by presenting, as is done in the French note, a historical narrative of recent events which will hardly stand the test of impartial examination.

The French Ambassador reminds us that Greece is still governed by the Sovereign and the Government who were responsible for so unfriendly a policy in the early stages of the war. But he fails to remember that Great Britain has no more responsibility for either factor than has France, that British Ministers have expressed themselves with just as much severity about the present Greek King as has done France, and that public opinion in this country is no more favourable to that monarch than it is across the channel.

What his Excellency, however, has omitted altogether to notice is that there was a period, not far distant, when the Turks were a far more persistent, bitter and formidable enemy to the Allied cause than any Greek Government ever attempted or could have hoped to be, that by their action in closing the Straits and forcing hostilities upon the Powers they prolonged the war for a period to be measured by years, imposing upon the Allies, and upon Great Britain in particular, an appalling sacrifice both of treasure and lives—a sacrifice which in the former respect has been continued for more than three years after the conclusion of the armistice, but is now apparently to be forgotten in the contemplation of the revived fortunes of the Angora Government and the ancient misdeeds of the Greeks.

Even in this respect the French note appears again to deviate from the path of fairness; for, in its anxiety to throw discredit upon the Greek army and authorities for the atrocities committed in Asia Minor, it appeals to the international commissions of enquiry, forgetting that in the published report of the principal of these, dated the 1st June, 1921, which investigated the circumstances of the Ismid evacuation, the conclusion was stated over the signatures of the French and Italian as well as of the British members of the commission that: "There is no doubt that there has been a large number of atrocities in the Ismid peninsula, and it appears that those on the part of the Turks have been more considerable and ferocious than those on the part of the Greeks."

To distribute the responsibility for the terrible events that have occurred and are still occurring in Asia Minor between Turks and Greeks is not required at the present moment; but to ascribe them to one party alone is not only manifestly unfair but is surely to contravene the spirit in which the impending discussion should take place. It may be said indeed that the paragraph in question in his Excellency's letter could, by a merely verbal transposition of names, have been made to apply with almost equal accuracy to the Turks as to the Greeks.

I have said enough to indicate that it is not on these lines that it will be of any use to enter upon the proposed conversations. Those who will be present are, it has hitherto been presumed, attending, not to discuss the rival merits, actions, or pretensions of Turkey or Greece, but to end the conflict on terms which will be honourable to both. Such was the spirit in which my memorandum had been prepared, and such was the spirit in which I had hoped that it would be received.

It is neither necessary nor desirable to discuss here at length the terms of the French counter-proposals which have been submitted with the Ambassador's letter—upon some among them I have indicated a provisional opinion to the Count de Saint-Aulaire. Their general character, however, is in harmony with the tone of the despatch itself, and confirms the impression produced by the latter. If they are to be regarded as a statement of the extreme Turkish claim, which they have every appearance of being, they indeed deserve full consideration from that point of view. But if they are to be regarded as the reasoned contribution of the French Government to the solution of the problem, which the French Foreign Minister intends to urge in their integrity at the forthcoming conference, I cannot conceal my apprehension that the conference may be of brief duration and that it will not be rich in results.

The fear of embarking upon a discussion, on which the eyes of Europe will be fixed, but which might be attended with such a consequence, is an additional reason why His Majesty's Government must be reluctant that their representatives should enter it with so doubtful a prospect. It would seem to be an essential condition of

success that there should be a mutual recognition, in respect both of attitude and of terms, of the spirit in which the case should be approached.

There remains a further point of the highest importance which ought also to be cleared up before any discussion can profitably begin, but which is left in doubt by the terms of the French despatch. It is stated in the third paragraph that neither the French Parliament nor French public opinion will allow of coercive measures being taken against the Turks to compel them to accept terms adopted in favour of the present Greek Government, and that the French Government will not in any way participate in any action, of any nature whatsoever, tending to impose such terms upon the Turks.

If the proposition here laid down be that it would be unfair to impose forcibly upon the Turks a solution of a markedly Greek complexion, there can be no more objection to such a thesis than to the corresponding proposition that it would be unfair to impose a markedly Turkish solution upon the Greeks. His Majesty's Government can readily join the French Government in accepting either or both propositions, but inasmuch as the object of the conference is not to devise either a pro-Greek or a pro-Turk solution, but to arrive at a decision which is fair to both, the above passage still leaves in obscurity the question what in the opinion of the French Government is to be done when such a decision has been reached by the three Allied Powers. Is it the contention of the French Government that it is in no case to be enforced upon the Turks in the event of their declining it, and that the French Government will in no circumstances participate in such enforcement, but that, on the other hand, as the passage seems to imply, it may be enforced upon the Greeks, should they refuse, and that the French will join in such enforcement? Or is the argument that the decision is not to be enforced on either party, and that the resumption of the conflict is to be witnessed by the Powers with helpless indifference?

In order to elucidate this very important question it seems desirable to examine with some precision the probable or possible course of events. Always assuming that the three Powers have come to an agreement as to the terms to be offered, is it contemplated by the French Government that when, either at Constantinople or elsewhere, these terms are expounded to the Greeks and the Turks, the former are to accept, on the strength of the attitude of M. Gounaris, while the Turks are to be at liberty to refuse? And if refusal be the course adopted by either party, is a different treatment to be meted out to both? Is the Greek to be coerced, but the Turk to remain free? And, if so, what can be the defence of such a differentiation? Why should a different procedure be adopted with regard to the Turkish Peace Treaty than has been followed with regard to all the other Peace Treaties? In this case be it remembered, it is not with the Greeks that the treaty is being made. They are belligerents, but they are not enemies. On the contrary, they are still and have been Allies. The Turks, on the other hand, have been and still are not merely belligerents, but enemies, inasmuch as they have not ratified the Peace Treaty which they signed. Why then should they receive different treatment from that which has been dealt out to every other enemy Power with whom peace has been made by the Allies? From no quarter has the importance of the necessity of sanctions in such a contingency been urged with greater insistence than France. What then is the nature of the sanction that the Allies should now hold in view? Allowing that the exact nature of any such sanction is a legitimate subject of discussion, it is nevertheless clear that if the intended discussions at Paris are to be regarded solely as in the nature of friendly advice to be offered to the combatants, which either of them is to be at liberty to accept or refuse, or which the Greeks are expected to accept while the Turks will be at liberty to refuse, there is little to be gained from entering upon the discussions at all. For if either the Greeks or the Turks may reject the terms with impunity, then the labours of the conference will have been thrown away, the meeting in which the terms are offered and refused will end in a humiliating fiasco and the responsibility for the crowning failure will rest upon the Allies.

It seems therefore to be essential that some prior understanding on this subject should be reached before the conversations begin, and that we should not enter blindfolded on a path which may end in a precipice. From this point of view it is a matter for satisfaction that the issue has been so explicitly raised by the apparent reservations of the French despatch.

In conclusion, if the first impressions of the British Government have been stated in this communication with absolute frankness, this has arisen from no desire to create difficulties or to question the sincere and earnest desire of the French Government to arrive by methods of conciliation at the goal of peace, but only from the profound



conviction that there could be no greater disaster than the failure of the projected meeting, and that unless there is a clear understanding beforehand on the subjects referred to in this letter, such failure may not be remote.

I shall be glad if you will read this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and leave a copy of it in his hands.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1179/5/44]

No. 15.

*Notes of a Conversation with M. Franklin-Bouillon on January 27, 1922.*

TO-DAY Mr. Headlam-Morley and myself met M. Franklin-Bouillon at lunch at the invitation of Sir Howard d'Egville. Those present were M. Franklin-Bouillon, Sir Howard d'Egville, Mr. Headlam-Morley and myself. The lunch took place in a private room at Sir Howard's club. In this seclusion M. Franklin-Bouillon talked at great length upon the situation in the Mahomedan East, Bolshevism, the Treaty of Angora, his own share in it, French policy in Asia Minor, the Turkish Nationalists and conditions in Asia Minor and Cilicia. It is only possible to give a brief summary of M. Franklin-Bouillon's long and often vehement discourse, given in fluent and almost perfect English.

M. Franklin-Bouillon began by saying that he was the only European—apart from members of the Bolshevik Mission, who were of only small mental capacity and of no individual importance—who had lived with the Turkish Nationalist leaders at Angora, who had seen and conferred with them intimately; and—as he added with the frank and ever-present egotism which characterises him—the only European who had any influence with the Nationalists and who could get them to do what he wanted. He had been to Angora four times. He had lived with the Nationalist leaders in Angora for fourteen months in all. He counted Mustapha Kemal Pasha and other Nationalist leaders as friends. He had known Asia Minor and the Middle East for twenty-five years. He had lived in and knew Russia well. He was therefore qualified beyond any other European to speak of the Nationalists, their aims, policy and circumstances. He was a politician; he was also an Eastern expert, and the only real Eastern expert in France. In addition, he was a strong supporter of the *Entente*. In his dealings with the Nationalists he had felt he was not working for France alone, but also for England.

He next touched upon Bolshevism and its prospects among Moslem peoples. Moslems, he said, would never accept Bolshevism as a rule of life. Moslems were the natural barrier to the spread of Bolshevism in Asia. Nationalists had taken official alarm at Bolshevism as far back as the Baku conferences of 1920. At one of these conferences Zinoviev—"the most able Bolshevik after Lenin"—had plainly stated the Bolshevik purpose of converting the Moslem peoples to Bolshevism and making use of them. The Turkish delegates, M. Franklin-Bouillon said, had come back to Angora saying: "This Bolshevism will not suit us; we must use the Bolsheviks, but we can never accept Bolshevism." Moslems now were as much opposed to Bolshevik principles as ever they had been.

At this point M. Franklin-Bouillon digressed to make a personal explanation of some interest. British attacks upon the Treaty of Angora had greatly disappointed and pained him. He had come to England, now, purposing to write a series of articles in the press in defence of the treaty and his share in it. He had seen Lord Burnham of the "Daily Telegraph," who had proved impervious to arguments, and would listen to no explanations of French action in Asia Minor. Lord Burnham's attitude he had, in fact, found disquieting. He had also seen Mr. Wickham Steed of the "Times," Mr. Gwynne of the "Morning Post," and Mr. Garvin of the "Sunday Observer." They were the only ones who mattered. As the result of these interviews M. Franklin-Bouillon had changed his mind; he would write no letters or articles to the British press. He had also seen various British Members of Parliament and expected to see others. He did not actually say so, but he made it evident that he had hoped to see the Prime Minister as well, though now he no longer entertained this hope. He said that he found everywhere a great change in English opinion towards France since the time of his previous visit. He must go back to Paris in time for the conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs on Wednesday next, he being the chief French expert on Eastern matters.

These preliminaries out of the way, M. Franklin-Bouillon gave a consecutive account of how the Treaty of Angora came about.

He had gone to Constantinople, on the way to Angora—apparently on private business—but in Constantinople found the political situation created by the Nationalists so threatening to French—and British—interests that he returned to Paris immediately instead of continuing his journey to Angora. In Paris he saw the French Government and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and laid the situation, as he saw it, before them. They were disturbed; they agreed that immediate action must be taken; they fell in with his suggestions. The outcome was, apparently, the mission of M. Franklin-Bouillon to Angora for the purpose of negotiating the treaty.

For France, M. Franklin-Bouillon said, it was absolutely necessary that some arrangement equal to peace should be made with the Nationalists in regard to Cilicia. In Cilicia, France was expending 500,000,000 fr. a year; in Cilicia were already 5,000 French graves. France would not tolerate a continuance of this situation. These losses she had incurred in defence of the Armenians. She was the only Allied Power which had spent her substance and sacrificed the lives of her sons directly in the Armenian cause; she had done so for two years, as the 5,000 French tombs testified. She could make such sacrifices no longer. There was no need to defend this decision; it was monstrous, in view of these facts, to charge France with having abandoned the Armenians. It was in these circumstances, M. Franklin-Bouillon said, that he went to Angora.

At this point he thought it well to refer, unprompted, to the secrecy with which the purpose of his mission was invested—to the reticence with which M. Briand met Lord Curzon's enquiries on the subject. M. Franklin-Bouillon said that when he left Paris he had no knowledge that such reticence towards His Majesty's Government was contemplated. He understood that he was going to renew at Angora the negotiations which had resulted in the abortive agreement with the Nationalists in February of last year, negotiations of which His Majesty's Government had at the time been aware. He was astonished when he found later that one of His Majesty's Government's objections to the present Angora Agreement was that it had been done in secrecy and behind their backs.

It must be said, however, that on this point M. Franklin-Bouillon's narrative lacked the precision of its other parts. He was evidently skating over thin ice. He was deprecatory; sometimes vague. He referred to a conversation between the Prime Minister and M. Briand, in which the latter was said to have explained that a mission to Angora was contemplated, and to have understood that the Prime Minister offered no objection. Neither Mr. Headlam-Morley nor myself found M. Franklin-Bouillon's explanations as to French reticence clear. M. Franklin-Bouillon did, however, convey the definite impression that after he left Paris M. Briand had been subjected to some influence, Governmental or on the part of the Quai d'Orsay, which produced reticence towards His Majesty's Government in regard to the Angora Mission. He obviously wished us to believe that during his absence something had happened to produce a change.

Continuing his narrative, M. Franklin-Bouillon said he went to Angora, "carrying only a stick and accompanied only by Sarrou" as interpreter, to see what he could do with the Nationalists. He found the general Nationalist conviction to be that the Western Powers had resolved upon the destruction of Turkish independence and the Moslem religion, and that for these purposes they were supporting Greece. England was regarded as the arch conspirator in the scheme.

M. Franklin-Bouillon said he immediately combatted this idea, and by his offer to make, on behalf of France, an agreement with Turkey, was able to convince the Nationalist Government that the Western Powers had no such sinister purposes. He showed that France was anxious to obtain a peace favourable to the Nationalists, and that with France acting thus, the notion of the Western Powers being banded together to destroy Turkey must be given up. He claimed that in the long negotiations which followed he won the complete confidence of the Nationalists.

Referring now to the point made by His Majesty's Government that the treaty was in breach of the mutual Allied undertaking to make no treaty with enemy States except by common action, M. Franklin-Bouillon said that the *procès-verbal* of the negotiations showed that the principle of the undertaking had been observed. The present treaty was in no prejudice to matters which the Allies would have to settle together. He asserted with much emphasis that the treaty contained no secret clauses—"none whatever"; but his manner was unconvincing.

He added, that never before in the history of the Quai d'Orsay had it supplied to



a foreign Power, as now to Great Britain, copies of its secret papers showing the detailed negotiations by which the terms of a treaty had been reached. That such papers relating to the Angora Treaty had been supplied to His Majesty's Government was a proof of French good faith.

The remainder of M. Franklin-Bouillon's remarks were more discursive. He remarked that the struggle of the Turkish Nationalist Government excited the keenest Moslem interest from Morocco to India. General Lyautey had told him that in inmost Morocco he was always being asked how Mustapha Kemal Pasha and the Turks were firing against the Greeks. In Azerbaijan, Daghestan, and among the Moslems of the Volga, and in Transcaspia, the same interest was shown. The Turkish Nationalist Government wielded more influence in Afghanistan than they did in some of the Anatolian vilayets. It was known well enough what their indirect influence was in India. Moslem influence could not be overlooked by France. The French army of the future, now being created, would contain 30 per cent. of Moslems, not merely in total numbers, but actually and permanently in garrison in France. France could not afford to estrange Moslem opinion as Great Britain had done. The Nationalists found that Greek uniforms, guns, ammunition, equipment—all had been supplied by England. The Greeks it was known were furnished with money by England. Challenged on this point, he replied that the money came from Zaharof and his group, and that they had made this money in England.

Asked as to what he thought would happen if Bolshevik support were withdrawn from the Nationalists, he replied that in that event the two would again become deadly enemies. "But Bolshevik support will not be withdrawn," he added. He entirely disbelieved the story of Enver Pasha having been handed over to the Kemalists.

As for Russia, she had no immediate future. He had lived in Russia, and knew she was rotten. Since the Baltic provinces had been detached, Russia had no race left that could supply her with brains. Russia would receive everything offered by the Powers, but had nothing to give in return. Russia would not recover for fifty years.

The Nationalist army numbers about 200,000 men. They have rifles, but little clothing or boots. A considerable amount of munitions has been accumulated. Shells are being obtained from munition dumps in Constantinople "guarded by somnolent British police." He knew of two consignments of shells which had "evaporated" from this source having reached the Nationalists—one of 8,000, the other of 45,000. They were conveyed by French steamers. Major Henry, said M. Franklin-Bouillon maliciously, went to Ineboli, and sold the first 8,000 shells from these dumps to the Nationalists.

M. Franklin-Bouillon justified the handing over of French uniforms, weapons and munitions to the Nationalists on the ground that otherwise the new gendarmerie would be in rags, and give the Christian population the idea that they were brigands. Nor would rifles be available for the gendarmerie unless the French supplied them. The aeroplanes, ten in number, were to convey information speedily in a country devoid of means of communication. They were part of the equipment of the gendarmerie.

Conditions of life in Anatolia were favourable, and had been so all through the war. No lack of food had occurred; there had always been plenty. Grain was awaiting exportation.

Since the battle of the Sakaria the Nationalist Government had removed the 40 per cent. levy on everything produced in the country. They had also increased the customs tariff to 20 per cent. During the past year £ T. 7,000,000 had been received from customs at Trebizond. The total revenue of the Nationalist Government was nearly £ T. 80,000,000 last year.

Speaking again about Cilicia, M. Franklin-Bouillon asserted that he had persuaded Mustapha Kemal Pasha to grant exemption from military service to all Christians of the district for three months. He had subsequently got Kemal to extend the period of exemption to six months, stating that by the expiration of the period peace would have been reached. Similarly he secured for the Christians who had fled from Cilicia that their property should not be immediately confiscated. It was to be vested in a joint commission of Turks and Christians for a period of one year. If the Christians returned within that time their property would be restored to them. He also referred to removal of the Vali of Adana by Kemal for having entered Adana with flags flying in token of Turkish triumph. "I ordered his removal," said M. Franklin-Bouillon. "I met his train 3 miles out of Adana and forbade the demonstration."

Touching on the Turkish enclave granted at Jaber Kalessi by the treaty, M. Franklin-Bouillon explained that the Turks had made great efforts to obtain from France the return of Syrian territory as far south as Meskene, on the Euphrates. This

request France had been unable to grant, regarding access to the Tigris as vital to her position in Syria. "But," said M. Franklin-Bouillon, "I had seen the tomb of the great Turkish Sultan Ertogrul at Segud, near Eskişehir, defiled by the Greeks in the vilest manner, and I was able to use this fact to the advantage of France." I said: "You may not come down to the Euphrates at Meskene, but I will give you an enclave at Jaber Kalessi, where is the holy tomb of Suleiman Shah, which you call Turk Mezari. (Jaber Kalessi is on the Euphrates east of Aleppo.) It shall be under the Turkish flag for ever. I have seen the tomb of Ertogrul defiled by the Greeks. I grant you Turk Mezari in compensation." This gesture, said M. Franklin-Bouillon, secured the acceptance of the treaty by the Angora Assembly.

He then spoke of Eastern Thrace. The Nationalists, he said, were absolutely resolved to recover possession of Adrianople, but Thrace was not on the same footing as Asia Minor. In Asia Minor the Nationalists would agree to no concessions in favour of the Greeks; but in Thrace he knew they would be ready to accept the result of a plebiscite. As for the Straits, the Nationalists had already admitted the principle that the Black Sea countries should have a voice in deciding the terms under which the freedom of the Straits should be secured. If the "freedom of the Straits" was to be guaranteed, the more Powers taking part in the guarantee the better. That was the Nationalists view. He did not regard the question of the Straits as one presenting grave difficulties.

Asked what the attitude of the Nationalists was towards the League of Nations, he said it was less favourable now than previously, but there was respect for the idea, and the admission of Turkey to membership of the League would be received by the Nationalists with great satisfaction and have much influence upon them.

As to the protection of Christians in Asia Minor, M. Franklin-Bouillon used the old argument that any international protection imposed against the will of the Turks would have little value. The best protection was to secure the goodwill of the Turks, which could not be obtained by attempts at coercion. Perhaps not directly in this connection, M. Franklin-Bouillon said that France would never take part in any attempt to impose terms on the Nationalists by force. As for the Italians assisting in any such policy of force, the idea moved him to mirth. The Italians would be careful to keep on the winning side.

M. Franklin-Bouillon more than once spoke of his own future. He had been rejected by the electors; but he would soon enter Parliament again, perhaps very soon. He might enter the Government, certainly he would when again in Parliament become Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, for which position his knowledge and experience fitted him.

Nothing new or of much importance may have been given by M. Franklin-Bouillon in his long discourse, but it certainly gave an excellent idea of the atmosphere in which the Treaty of Angora was negotiated. M. Franklin-Bouillon's personality is one that would favourably impress the Nationalist leaders; and doubtless he has, as he claims, obtained great influence over them. It is, in fact, impossible not to recognise the exceeding fitness of the French envoy for the purpose of his mission to Angora, and the judgment shown in selecting him. It is impossible further to avoid the conviction unconsciously produced by the envoy during the meeting with him to-day, that the Treaty of Angora represents only a small part of the promises and general encouragement given by him on behalf of France to the Nationalists Government of Turkey. Both parties, certainly, still have goods to deliver. M. Franklin-Bouillon again and again repeated that if the present efforts towards a settlement of the Turkish question fail he will make no further attempt. He will wash his hands of the whole affair, and let others do what they can.

W. J. CHILDS.

*Foreign Office, January 30, 1922.*

[E 1093/312/44]

No. 16.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 31.)*

(No. 70.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, January 19, 1922.*

THERE have been persistent rumours in the last few days of a change of Government at Constantinople. These rumours are connected with the name of Mahmoud Mouktar Pasha, but may owe their origin partly to the fact that the Minister

[8975]

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of Finance and one other Minister have not attended at their Departments for the last two days.

2. I happened to meet Chevki Bey, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, last night, and alluded to the rumours in question of an impending change of Government. He said that he had also heard these reports, and had asked the Grand Vizier a few days ago what truth there was in them. Tewfik Pasha had informed him that he had mentioned to the Sultan the report that Mahmoud Mouktar Pasha was likely to be entrusted with the formation of a Government. His Majesty had replied that there was nothing whatever in this report.

3. My Italian colleague called on me yesterday to mention these reports to me, and stated that it was asserted that "the English desired a change of Government." Was there any truth in this? I reminded him that I had several times told him that we did not mix ourselves up in the internal affairs of other Governments, and that there was not the slightest ground for the rumour that we were trying to bring about a change of Government at Constantinople. I added, that it would anyhow, in my opinion, be absurd to try and upset the present Government, and that I attributed the spreading of these rumours to interested parties, such as members of the Opposition.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

[E 1096/769/44]

No. 17.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 31.)*

(No. 71.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, January 19, 1922.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me on the 17th instant to speak again about the question of Thrace.

2. Izzet Pasha stated that he had been visited by a personage whom he was not at liberty to name, who had developed the following argument in favour of the restoration to Turkey of sovereignty over the northern shore of the Sea of Marmora. This personage had pointed out that, whereas the real strength of Turkey lay in Anatolia, she would always be weak in Europe. On the other hand, the Greeks were likely to remain strong in Europe. It was in everybody's interest that the northern shore of the straits should be in the hands of a weak rather than of a strong Power. Izzet Pasha considered this argument very forcible and wished to press it on our consideration.

3. He added that it was difficult to contemplate another war between Turkey and Great Britain, but if such a war were to take place in the future it would be quite easy for the British fleet to prevent communication between the Asiatic and European shores of the straits. Great Britain would not therefore run any risk if she restored to Turkey the territory in Thrace which would put the latter in possession of the northern shore of the Sea of Marmora.

4. I pointed out to Izzet Pasha that Turkey was not the only party to the present conflict. His Majesty's Government had to consider the claims of Greece. The Turks were asking that the Greeks should evacuate Anatolia and Eastern Thrace as well. Did he really imagine that the Greeks would tamely submit to giving up their present territory in Eastern Thrace? Izzet Pasha replied that it would be for their own good in the long run if they did so. I remarked that it was very easy for one person to state that a certain course of action would be good for another person, but it did not follow that that other person would take the same view.

5. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

[E 1100/5/44]

No. 18.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 31.)*

(No. 83.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, January 21, 1922.*

ON the 18th instant I received a message from Hamid Bey, the Nationalist agent here, asking for an appointment. I accordingly fixed an appointment for the following day, when Hamid Bey came and remained with me for an hour and a half.

The conversation was long and somewhat rambling, but I have endeavoured to condense it in the present despatch.

2. Hamid Bey began by referring to a letter which he had sent me announcing the discovery and release by the Kemalist authorities of two more British Indians. These men have actually left Anatolia, and Hamid Bey drew attention to this as one more proof of the manner in which the Angora Government had respected their engagements. I said that I had been glad to receive the above information.

3. Hamid Bey then went on to refer to the reports which were in circulation for twenty-four hours here to the effect that Mustapha Kemal had been assassinated. I said that I had noticed these reports, but that I did not believe everything that was published in the press. He then alluded to the recent changes in the Angora Government, and I suspect that a desire to explain these changes in the sense that they were of no material significance was one of the main objects of his visit to me.

4. Hamid Bey pointed out that it was necessary for a correct appreciation of the situation at Angora to dismiss Western conceptions from one's mind. Thus, in Europe, the parliamentary system implied the individual responsibility of members of the Government and the collective responsibility of the Government. This meant that each Minister was doubly responsible for his actions—on the one hand to Parliament and public opinion, on the other hand to his colleagues. Therefore the resignation of a Minister would react on the Government as a whole. Nothing of the sort prevailed at Angora. The theory of collective responsibility did not apply in the case of the Kemalist Government. There were no distinct political parties in the Grand National Assembly, whose 360 members formed a block, having the National Pact as the main plank of their platform. The Kemalist Ministers were in reality heads of departments inspired by the same aims. They might resign on the grounds of ill-health or because they felt that they were not up to the work of their respective departments, but their resignation had no other significance. Reouf Bey, who was a personal friend of Hamid Bey, and who has recently resigned, was really ill and incapable of continuing in office. The same applied to Jellal Bey, who was completely worn out.

5. I listened to this explanation with interest, but am not by any means convinced that it is an accurate explanation and that all is well with the Angora Government.

6. I then asked Hamid Bey whether he had seen the report made by the Swedish consul at Malta regarding the treatment of the Turks previously interned there. He replied in the negative. I informed him that the report showed how well the Turks had been treated. The Swedish Minister had communicated the report to Izzet Pasha, and I said that I would take an early opportunity of suggesting that it should be communicated by him to the Angora Government in view of the stories of their ill-treatment which many of the Malta deportees had spread after their return to Anatolia.

7. I enquired what Hamid Bey thought of the prospects of peace. He replied that the Nationalists would be only too ready to make peace to-morrow on the basis of the National Pact.

8. I asked whether the Nationalists expected the Allies to accept all the conditions of the National Pact. Did they, for instance, really expect to recover Eastern Thrace? He said that they certainly had that expectation, for Adrianople was just as Turkish as Broussa and contained only some 3,000 or 4,000 Greeks. He added, however, that if it could be proved that the Greeks were in a majority in Eastern Thrace the Nationalists would be prepared to accept the situation.

9. I told Hamid Bey that I had recently heard from a good source that the Nationalists were determined to establish the capital of Turkey in Anatolia in order to escape from pressure at Constantinople. He vehemently repudiated this idea and referred to the mention of Constantinople in the National Pact as a proof that Constantinople must remain the seat of the Turkish Empire.

10. I said that it would appear from versions which had been published in the press of the treaty which the Nationalists had made with the Ukraine that they claimed that the States bordering on the Black Sea must regulate the question of the Straits. He replied that he was unaware of any such intention on the part of the Nationalists, and said that in any event there would be no question of erecting fortifications on the shores of the Straits.

11. As regards the Capitulations, Hamid Bey said that he could not see why Turkey could not receive the same treatment as Greece or Roumania. Turkish justice was just as good as Greek or Roumanian justice, although he admitted that it was not comparable to British justice. I replied that I did not think that the Allied



Powers would acquiesce in the proposal under which their nationals would be tried forthwith by Turkish courts. In this connection I alluded to the recently instituted provisional mixed tribunals at Constantinople.

12. We then discussed minorities. I said that I thought, having regard to the treatment to which minorities had been exposed in recent years in the Turkish dominions, the Allies would require real guarantees for their protection in the future. Hamid Bey replied that a treaty could stipulate for such guarantees on the lines of the similar stipulations in treaties with Roumania and Poland, and that the Turks would abide by these stipulations. I pointed out that it was not possible to compare the treatment of minorities in Poland and Roumania with that meted out to them in Asia Minor. The Armenian massacres had profoundly stirred public opinion in Europe and America and had, to say the least, made the Western Powers sceptical with regard to the future prospects of such minorities as were left. I recapitulated the information which this High Commission had received from Colonel Rawlinson and others with regard to the deportations going on at the present day, and I enquired what confidence we could have in Kemalist assertions.

13. Hamid Bey repeated the arguments which I have heard so often from Turks in extenuation of their conduct towards minorities in the last few years. He said that up till thirty years ago the Christian minorities had lived on terms of friendship with the Turks. There had been no trouble. The Armenian massacres really owed their origin to the action of the Armenians at Van, where many Turks had been killed. This had aroused the Turks to a blind fury, and they had killed three or four times as many Armenians as the latter had killed Turks. As a member of the Red Crescent and a humane man he had deplored these massacres, and had even wept on hearing of them. He denied, however, that the Armenian massacres and deportations had been on anything like the scale commonly reported. It was quite untrue that nearly 1,000,000 Armenians had perished, because the Turkish Empire had not contained as many as 1,000,000 Armenians before the war. Perhaps 100,000 or 200,000 Armenians had perished in this manner. I replied that that was anyhow a terrible figure.

14. Hamid Bey then explained that it was quite incorrect to suppose that Talaat and Enver Pashas had wished to destroy the Armenian race once and for all. On the contrary, they had tried to avoid internal complications during the war, and had done their best to remain on good terms with the Christian minorities. I said that this was a new light to me. Referring to the recent exodus from Cilicia, he said that it was not in the interest of the Turks that Christian minorities should leave Anatolia. They were necessary to the Turks. I said that I had heard that the Turkish authorities in Cilicia were very much ashamed of the exodus from that province, the reasons for which were well known to them.

15. I told Hamid Bey that a perusal of the Angora press and reports which we had received from Angora showed that the Nationalists were imbued with real hostility to Great Britain. He affirmed categorically that this was not a fact. The Nationalists recognised Great Britain as the greatest Power in Europe, and it was not in their interest to quarrel with her. In the course of subsequent conversation, however, he practically admitted that the sentiments of the Nationalists towards us were anything but friendly, as they considered that we had been and were helping their enemies the Greeks. The French, he said, had shown their friendship by concluding the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement. The Italians had shown a proof of goodwill in sending Signor Tuozzi to Angora. Although the latter had not concluded any agreement, still his mission to Angora was a proof that the Italian Government took an interest in Nationalist Turkey. The British Government had stood aloof. I said that we were perfectly aware that the aim of the Angora Government had been to conclude separate agreements with the three Allies in the hope that the Greeks would be isolated. I took this opportunity of explaining the so-called Henry Mission in its true light. I pointed out that ex-Major Henry had had no authority to talk politics or to undertake any political mission. It was obvious to me that Hamid Bey was somewhat uncomfortable on bearing this. I added that, in spite of the attitude of the Angora Government, there appeared to be a more friendly feeling towards Turkey in the English press. Hamid Bey replied that the Angora Government had noticed this and had recently telegraphed to him to enquire how much importance was to be attributed to the change of attitude in the "Times."

16. Summing up our conversation, I said to Hamid Bey that the Græco-Turkish conflict in Anatolia had reached an *impasse*. There was only one way out of this *impasse*, and that was that both sides should make sacrifices. Neither side could hope to get all it was out for. Hamid Bey replied that the Turks had already made

the utmost sacrifices possible. I pointed out that these so-called sacrifices were the result of the great war in which Turkey had been beaten. If the Turks stood out for the integral acceptance of the National Pact, I was afraid that he would find that it would be difficult to bring about peace. Were the Turks prepared to go on fighting until they had realised all the conditions of their National Pact, and could their army eject the Greeks from Asia Minor? Hamid Bey, who seemed somewhat depressed at the prospect of the resumption of hostilities, replied half-heartedly that he thought that the Nationalist army could drive the Greeks out of Asia Minor. I said that even if hostilities were renewed in the spring and continued throughout the summer, the Near Eastern question would be no nearer solution. The only result would be that both belligerents would be completely ruined.

17. On rising to take his leave, Hamid Bey said that he was at my disposal whenever I wished to consult him. I impressed on him that throughout our conversation I had been expressing personal opinions. I was not impressed by Hamid Bey, who strikes me as a person of mediocre intelligence.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 1101/5/44]

No. 19.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 85.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 23, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 66 of the 18th January, I have the honour to transmit herewith extracts in translation from the "Wakt" newspaper of the 19th instant, reproducing views expressed by the "Hakimiyet-i-Millî" of Angora on the French Cabinet crisis.

2. The "Bosphore" newspaper of the 20th January appends to a not very accurate translation of these passages in the "Wakt" a paragraph based on information from "Turkish circles" to the effect that Ferid Bey, Kemalist representative in Paris, had reported fully to Angora on the French political situation and had expressed the view that the change of Cabinet would have no effect on French policy in the East, and would only strengthen the bonds uniting France and Turkey. This telegram is stated to have been read amid acclamations in the Grand National Assembly.

3. The French authorities here have been at pains to give publicity to the same view, i.e., that the change of Government in Paris will in no wise affect French policy in this country.

4. As I anticipated, the comments of the principal Greek newspapers are of no particular interest. The "Proodos" refers to M. Poincaré's hostility to King Constantine, but refrains from any but the vaguest anticipations of his future policy. The "Proia" observes at the end of its leading article that the composition of M. Poincaré's Ministry allows the Christians of the East to look upon it with more confidence than they have been feeling.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 19.

Extracts from the "Wakt" of January 19, 1922.

L'AVENIR DES RELATIONS FRANCO-TURQUES.

LE "Hakimiyet-i-Millî," vu les idées et les dispositions des membres faisant partie du nouveau Cabinet français, estime que les relations ne subiront pas de changement.

Angora, le 18 janvier. (De notre correspondant particulier.)

Le journal "Hakimiyet-i-Millî" a publié aujourd'hui un article de fond au sujet du nouveau Cabinet français constitué par M. Poincaré. Le journal précité, après avoir



donné des renseignements, par son article, au sujet de la carrière politique de M. Poincaré, nouveau Premier Ministre, ajoute :

"Il n'est pas possible de dire que M. Poincaré sera aussi conciliant que M. Briand, ex-Président du Cabinet. En ce qui concerne les relations entre ce Cabinet et le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, il faut prendre en considération que M. Poincaré a personnellement reconnu la légitimité de notre cause nationale, et que pendant qu'il était président de la Commission des Affaires étrangères du Sénat il s'est efforcé d'apprendre, au sujet de l'Accord d'Angora, les choses qui ne lui étaient pas connues. Ainsi, il a invité M. Gaulis à la Commission des Affaires étrangères pour prendre des renseignements au sujet du Gouvernement d'Angora et la commission a écouté avec grande attention les explications fournies par M. Gaulis. Il en résulte que M. Poincaré a voulu de connaître et écouter nos revendications.

"De l'autre côté, la présence au sein du nouveau Cabinet d'une personnalité comme M. Barthou, dont les sentiments à notre égard sont connus, et, de la plupart des Ministres de l'ancien Cabinet, peut être considérée comme une preuve que nos rapports ne subiront pas de changement."—*LOUTFI*.

Angora, le 16 janvier. (Agence d'Anatolie.)

Dans un article de fond que le journal "Hakimiyet-i-Millî" a consacré à la démission de M. Briand, le journal, après avoir relaté et résumé les événements qui ont précédé la démission, et les questions pendantes entre la France et l'Angleterre, déclare qu'il a été établi encore une fois que la politique accidentelle que l'Angleterre poursuit en Orient par l'entremise de la Grèce n'a pas été approuvée par l'opinion publique française, et il ajoute :

"M. Poincaré, dont on parle qu'il va succéder à M. Briand, étant une personnalité qui a écrit longuement de la nécessité de l'application intégrale du Traité de Versailles, la politique qu'il va suivre peut être considérée dès à présent comme connue. Il est permis d'affirmer qu'au cas même où M. Poincaré, qui voudra appliquer son point de vue, ne voudrait pas porter atteinte à l'amitié et à l'alliance avec l'Angleterre, il n'assurerait pas cette alliance et cette amitié au détriment de la France.

"En pensant que la politique conciliante poursuivie par l'ex-Premier Ministre avec le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie s'accorde aussi à l'opinion publique française, il faut noter et ajouter que M. Poincaré est un homme d'Etat politique qui, dans des entrevues différentes, s'était exprimé qu'il ne considérerait pas le Traité de Sévres comme un traité applicable."

Le "Hakimiyet-i-Millî" termine son article en disant que M. Briand, alors qu'il défendait à la Chambre et au Sénat l'Accord d'Angora, a montré une droiture et une fermeté rarement vues dans notre temps sur l'horizon politique de l'Occident et a approuvé la sainteté et la sublimité de notre cause nationale.

[E 1107/27/44]

No. 20.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 95.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 24, 1922.

I HAVE had occasion in recent telegrams and despatches to advert to sundry political developments in Angora which have come to my notice since I wrote my despatch No. 1089 of the 29th November last. My information is necessarily somewhat meagre, but it seems worth while to present it, such as it is, in a connected form.

2. The debate in the Grand National Assembly at the end of November, on which I reported fully in my despatch No. 54 of the 16th instant, revealed the existence of a fairly strong opposition to Mustapha Kemal, but it is still not clear whether this opposition represents merely an incoherent congeries of dissatisfied elements, or whether it is being systematically worked up by persons having a definite new policy in view.

3. In the course of the few weeks following this debate, several resignations were reported from Angora. Those of which I have definite knowledge are the resignations of the Vice-President of the Grand National Assembly, the Governor-General of Angora and three Ministers, namely, Refet Pasha, Commissioner for National Defence; Raouf

Bey, Commissioner for Public Works; and Jelal Bey, Commissioner for Economic Affairs. The resignations of the three Ministers have attracted great attention here. Kemalist sympathisers are at pains to represent all three as being simply due to reasons of health, but this explanation is not very convincing in the case of Refet Pasha, and still less so in the case of Raouf Bey. There can be little doubt that Raouf has definitely broken with Mustapha Kemal Pasha, a fact all the more significant as he was Mustapha Kemal's principal collaborator in the early stages of the national movement.

4. On the 19th January, a few days after the announcement of the Ministerial resignations, the "Wakt" newspaper of Constantinople devoted no less than nine columns to a glorification of Raouf Bey in the form of an interview given by him to the editor of the "Wakt," Ahmed Emin Bey, who was, like Raouf himself, a Malta deportee, and who is now in Anatolia. The interview was given while Raouf was still a Minister, but it is significant that the "Wakt" should have given it such prominence immediately after his resignation. In the heading of the article prominence was given to Raouf's determination to go on fighting until the Khalifate and Sultanate should be rehabilitated in conditions of complete independence for Turkey.

5. Finally, recent advices from Angora show that the question of the law on the duties and responsibilities of Ministers has been again brought to the front instead of being shelved, as might have been expected. The Angora press announces that the joint committee charged with the elaboration of a new draft law appointed a sub-committee of five to study the question. The names of the five members of the sub-committee are given. The best known among them appear to be persons of extreme and rather Bolshevik tendencies.

6. I find it difficult with my present information to put a confident interpretation on these developments. I can only formulate with great reserve a theory which must be tested by further developments, but which may be useful in attempting to appreciate the significance of such developments.

7. It looks to me as though Mustapha Kemal and those who still support him loyally had swayed back towards the Bolsheviks. There are several signs of a *décote* between the Angora Government and Moscow, whose mutual relations seemed pretty strained in November. Little is now heard of open Bolshevik support of Enver Pasha and his party. A new Bolshevik envoy has just arrived in Angora. The negotiations for the Angora-Ukraine Treaty were rushed through with great celerity at the end of December. Mustapha Kemal's recent public utterances have been characterised by cordiality towards Soviet Russia. In a speech delivered on the occasion of the conclusion of the Ukrainian Agreement, he said that it had been thought that there were misunderstandings between Turkey and Russia, and he categorically denied the existence of such misunderstandings. At another banquet in celebration of the same event he abounded in praise of the Russians, saying *inter alia* that the new administrative system in Turkey was identical with the Soviet system, and that the Russians had been the first to show a sincere desire for the independence and prosperity of the Turkish people. Again, in his speech of welcome to the Soviet Bokhara Commission (see my despatch No. 61 of the 17th instant) he spoke pointedly of the statesmen of revolutionary Russia as men who had recognised, not merely in theory but in fact, the right of peoples to dispose of their own destinies.

8. Without attaching undue importance to such *discours d'occasion*, I think that these utterances support the view that Mustapha Kemal is leaning once more on the Bolsheviks to a greater extent than he was disposed to do three months ago. This may be attributed to his internal difficulties, to his fear of being supplanted by Enver working under Bolshevik auspices, and to a realisation of the fact that, in view of the failure of the Tuozi negotiations and the intransigence of the British Government, he is further than he supposed from securing the acceptance of the national pact by the Allies.

9. On the other hand, the two most definite elements in the opposition of Mustapha Kemal appear to be Enver and some others of the old guard of the Committee of Union and Progress, and a party who hanker after better relations with the Turkish Throne. These elements are not necessarily entirely distinct, as it would suit the Enverist opponents of Mustapha Kemal to play off the Khalifate against him. There is a group of Turks at Berlin among whom, I am told, Rahmi Bey, formerly Vali of Smyrna, now plays the leading part. Rahmi Bey is one of the strong Salonica element in the Committee of Union and Progress, and he does not appear to have received any encouragement to go to Angora. Ahmed Bey, whose glorification of Raouf I have mentioned above, is a Salonica Jew who worked in closely with the Germans during the war.

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10. As a possible sidelight it is interesting to note that the Minister most talked about in connection with the latest rumours of a Cabinet crisis here appears to be Faik Nuzhet Bey, Minister of Finance. This gentleman is also a Salonica Jew, closely connected with Djavid Bey. He is said to manifest resentment at the extreme subservience of the Constantinople Government to Angora.

11. Briefly, the theory which I advance very tentatively is that Mustapha Kemal is endeavouring to reinsure with the Bolsheviks; that the Bolsheviks are less disposed than they were to run Enver in opposition to him; and that the most coherent element in the opposition to Mustapha Kemal is a group of stalwarts of the old Committee of Union and Progress, who, in order to strengthen their position, represent themselves as being favourable to the restoration of the Sultan's authority. If there is anything in this theory at all, it seems more than probable that the strings of the opposition are pulled by Turks and Salonica crypto-Jews in Berlin and Switzerland. It is most doubtful whether the active spirits in such a movement would be more conciliatory in their dispositions towards the Allies and more sincerely loyal to the Sultan than Mustapha Kemal himself, but if they should succeed in undermining Mustapha Kemal's position without themselves acquiring too much power, their activities might have the result of reinstating the Sultan in a position of greater authority, a consummation which would be to the advantage of Turkey, and should, from an Allied point of view, tend to facilitate a peaceful settlement in the East.

12. As against the theory of a real rapprochement between the Angora Government and Moscow, it is only fair to say that there is still much talk of Russian and Turkish concentrations of troops in the neighbourhood of the Turco-Caucasian frontier. Such concentrations point to a continuance of mutual suspicion, but they do not necessarily invalidate the theory, especially as Kiazim Karabekir, the Nationalist commander in North-Eastern Anatolia, does not necessarily share all Mustapha Kemal's views, and is somewhat independent in military arrangements.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 1071/5/44]

No. 21.

Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 84. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Rome, January 27, 1922.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 1035 of the 30th ultimo and to my telegram No. 28 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a *note verbale* from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the proposed revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, which his Excellency handed to me to-day.

As there was barely time to have it translated and copied for this evening's bag, I did not discuss it with his Excellency; but he made it sufficiently clear that Italian support of your Lordship's proposals was dependent upon your accepting the proposals, mainly of an economic nature, now put forward by the Italian Government.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

Enclosure in No. 21.

Memorandum from Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

(Confidential.)

(Translation.)

THE Italian Government thanks the British Government for having communicated to it the secret memorandum regarding the proposals for discussion at the forthcoming conference of the Allied Foreign Ministers.

The Italian Government has examined the document in question concerning the modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres, which the British Government proposes as a basis for discussion between the Allies, in order to render that treaty acceptable to both Turks and Greeks, and it is now able to formulate its observations and proposals regarding the various points of the memorandum.

Nevertheless, before setting them forth, the Italian Government, accepting the invitation contained in point 29 of the British memorandum, wishes to submit a

question which it considers of fundamental importance for its interests as a wholly Mediterranean Power, and which is, in its opinion, of a nature to exercise considerable influence on its whole attitude towards the forthcoming discussions at Paris.

(A.) The Italian Government is aware that the Tripartite Agreement has been erroneously interpreted in Turkey as containing the bases for a claim to the future partition of Asia Minor.

Although the fact that the Tripartite Agreement was communicated to Turkey did not imply any recognition by Turkey of the provisions of the agreement, it served as a pretext for opposition by certain Ottoman parties, since it is certain that, otherwise, such an attitude could not have been adopted towards a convention which was *res inter alios acta*.

The Italian Government, after a careful examination of the question, has come to the following conclusions:—

1. The Tripartite Agreement has a double significance and a double value for Italy. As regards the Allies, it has the significance and the value of recognising the primary interest of Italy in a zone with a Mediterranean littoral, which constitutes, moreover, a factor for economic and political equilibrium in that sea. As regards Turkey, it should not have any political value or significance, but it represents means offered to Italian economic activity—in preference to French and English economic activity—of peacefully collaborating with the Turks in the reciprocal interests of developing commerce and utilising a region whose prosperity is not only useful, but even necessary, for the improvement of the economic life of the two countries.
2. In those circumstances, the Allies have reaffirmed, as is natural, their intentions steadfastly to maintain between themselves their undertakings under the Tripartite Agreement (i.e., not only not to interfere with each other's activities in their respective zones, but to support them mutually and firmly as against eventual opposition on the part of the Ottoman Government) the question of an explicit acceptance by the Ottoman Government of the provisions of the Tripartite Agreement loses a great deal of its importance, provided that some other way of putting the agreement into practical effect be found.
3. It is, indeed, essential for Italy to achieve this, both from the economic point of view and from that of her prestige and position in the Mediterranean, where the mandates given to France and England have seriously affected, to the prejudice of Italy, an equilibrium [?] balance of power which was already compromised so far as she was concerned. The Italian Government could not therefore ever agree to the creation of a state of affairs which would practically exclude the establishment of Italian activity in the Eastern Mediterranean.
4. While gratefully taking act of the British Government's declaration that it is fully disposed to execute its undertakings under the Tripartite Agreement and to examine, in concert with Italy, the best means of giving effect to that agreement, the Italian Government is of opinion that those means are already laid down in the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres relative to the financial commission, and that, without going so far as to notify Turkey of the Tripartite Agreement or to impose it on her in any shape, a possible safeguard is thereby afforded to Italian interests.  
By a certain modification of the clauses respecting the organisation of the financial commission to render them more acceptable to Turkey, and by maintaining certain provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres (as set forth below), it will be possible to succeed in applying indirectly the Tripartite Agreement without making the least allusion to it in the new negotiations for peace with Turkey, who will have no further pretext for any sort of opposition to the acceptance and establishment of a definite peace.
5. The Italian Government, while limiting its demands to the above, feels bound, however, to declare from now onwards that it counts on the full, loyal and entire support of its Allies in order that during the negotiations with Turkey the new peace conditions offered to Turkey may be considered and imposed on her as a single whole in such a way as to make it impossible for her to accept the very important concessions made to her in the greater part of the questions at issue, while rejecting only some clauses of the original Treaty of Sèvres which are not new, but are already included in

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that treaty. If the diplomatic action of the Allies is joint and unanimous in the sense desired, there is every possibility that it will not be difficult to obtain the consent of Turkey. But if, through excessive intransigence on the part of Turkey or for lack of cohesion and efficacy in the diplomatic action of the Allies, the already restricted guarantees which Italy demands should be further diminished, the Italian Government would find itself compelled to display a less conciliatory attitude towards the other clauses of the Peace Treaty and towards the questions concerning the separation of the Arab countries from the Ottoman Empire.

(B.) The Italian Government proposes, with reference to the above, the following modifications in the financial clauses in the Treaty of Sèvres:—

#### ARTICLE 232.

La Commission financière aura pour mission :

- (a.) D'arrêter les comptes des dépenses des forces alliées d'occupation depuis le 30 octobre 1918 dans les territoires restant ottomans et les dépenses des forces alliées d'occupation dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie au profit des Puissances autres que celle qui a supporté ces dépenses ;
- (b.) De fixer les annuités par lesquelles ces dépenses seront payées, en tenant compte de la situation financière de la Turquie, de la nécessité de pourvoir aux dépenses essentielles de son administration et de permettre à la Turquie de combler toute insuffisance éventuelle dans la somme requise pour le paiement de la portion des intérêts de la Dette publique ottomane, restant à la charge de la Turquie, conformément à la présente partie ;
- (c.) D'arrêter l'annuité à affecter au règlement des réclamations relatives tant aux personnes qu'aux biens dont il est question dans l'article 236, et pour le cas où les sommes à la disposition des Puissances alliées conformément à l'article 267 seraient insuffisantes à assurer cette charge.

La Commission financière fixera la monnaie dans laquelle ces annuités devront être payées.

Le montant de ces annuités pourra être modifié chaque période quinquennale suivant la situation financière de la Turquie.

#### ARTICLE 232 bis.

Le Gouvernement ottoman affecte d'ores et déjà et irrévocablement au paiement des annuités, à déterminer en vertu de l'article précédent, paragraphes (b) et (c), et des dépenses normales des forces alliées d'occupation qui pourront être maintenues dans le territoire restant ottoman :

- (a.) Les revenus des douanes du territoire restant ottoman ;
- (b.) Les revenus de services d'intérêt public, de concessions minières, agricoles d'autres concessions existantes et à être octroyées dans l'avenir sur le territoire restant ottoman.

La Commission financière prendra toutes les mesures qu'elle jugera nécessaires pour contrôler les revenus susindiqués et en augmentera le rendement, et pour en assurer la perception.

La Commission financière assurera aussi la perception des revenus affectés au service de la Dette ottomane (annexe), et dont la gestion était faite jusqu'ici par le Gouvernement ottoman.

#### ARTICLE 232 ter.

La Commission financière prendra, d'accord avec le Gouvernement, toutes les mesures qu'elle jugera convenables pour maintenir et accroître les ressources de la Turquie.

Le budget à présenter annuellement au Parlement par le Ministère des Finances doit être soumis, en premier lieu, à la Commission financière, qui veillera au respect des garanties affectées au service de la Dette publique (voir Annexe No. 1) et au service des dépenses des armées d'occupation des annuités mentionnées à l'article 232, et fera, en outre, toutes les observations et suggestions qu'elle jugera opportunes pour l'équilibre budgétaire et la bonne gestion des finances de l'Empire, et qui devront être communiquées au Parlement.

La Commission financière surveillera l'exécution des budgets, lois et règlement financiers de la Turquie. Cette surveillance sera exercée par l'intermédiaire de l'Inspection ottomane des Finances, qui sera sous les ordres directs de la Commission financière, et dont les membres ne seront nommés ou révoqués qu'avec approbation préalable de cette commission.

Le Gouvernement ottoman s'engage à fournir à ces inspecteurs toutes les facilités nécessaires à l'accomplissement de leur tâche et à prendre vis-à-vis des fonctionnaires insuffisants des services financiers du Gouvernement telles mesures que la Commission financière pourra suggérer.

#### ARTICLE 233.

La Commission financière sera en outre chargée, d'accord avec le Gouvernement ottoman, le Conseil de la Dette et la Banque impériale ottomane . . .

#### ARTICLE 234 (à supprimer).

#### ARTICLE 235 (inchangé).

#### ARTICLE 236.

Exception faite des revenus concédés ou donnés en garantie du service de la Dette publique ottomane et de ceux affectés au service des dépenses et annuités mentionnées aux articles 232 et 232 bis, toutes les ressources de la Turquie seront à la disposition du Gouvernement ottoman.

Les revenus affectés à la garantie des dépenses d'occupation et des annuités mentionnées à l'article 232 seront à la disposition de la Commission financière, qui les emploiera en tant que de besoin de la manière suivante :

1. En premier rang, après le paiement des traitements et des dépenses courantes de la Commission financière, ainsi que les dépenses normales des forces alliées d'occupation qui pourront être maintenues après la mise en vigueur du présent traité dans les territoires restant ottomans, viendront les dépenses des forces alliées d'occupation depuis le 30 octobre 1918 dans les territoires restant ottomans et les dépenses des forces alliées d'occupation dans les territoires détachés de la Turquie au profit d'une Puissance autre que celle qui a supporté ces dépenses d'occupation.
2. En second rang, viendra l'indemnité que le Gouvernement ottoman devra payer, conformément à l'article 235, à raison des réclamations des Puissances alliées pour les pertes ou dommages subis par leurs ressortissants, non-ressortissants ottomans au 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914 et tels qu'ils sont définis à l'article 317, Partie IX (Clauses économiques), soit dans leurs personnes, soit dans leurs biens, par suite de tout acte ou négligence des autorités ottomanes pendant la guerre.

La Commission financière fixera le montant et pourvoira au paiement de toutes les réclamations pour dommage personnel. Les réclamations relatives aux biens seront examinées, fixées et payées conformément à l'article 287, Partie IX (Clauses économiques).

#### ARTICLES 237 et 238 (inchangés).

#### ARTICLE 239.

Aucune concession nouvelle ne devra être accordée par le Gouvernement ottoman ni aucune concession devra être prorogée, soit en faveur de ressortissants ottomans, soit en faveur de toute autre, sans le consentement de la Commission financière.

La Commission financière aura la faculté de nommer son propre délégué auprès des Départements compétents pour surveiller à ce que les droits qui lui sont assurés en matière de concessions par le présent traité soient respectés. Le Gouvernement ottoman fournira à ce délégué tous les pouvoirs nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de sa mission.

#### ARTICLE 239 bis.

L'Administration des Douanes sera placée sous les ordres d'un directeur général nommé et révocable par la Commission financière et responsable vis-à-vis de celle-ci. Le tarif des droits des douanes ne pourra être modifié qu'avec l'approbation de la Commission financière.

#### ARTICLES 240-245 (inchangés).



## ARTICLE 246.

La 6<sup>me</sup> partie est à supprimer.

Le 7<sup>me</sup> paragraphe est à modifier comme suit :

"Les Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie décideront à la majorité et après avoir consulté les porteurs, s'il y a lieu de maintenir le conseil ou de le remplacer par la Commission financière. La décision des Gouvernements devra intervenir dans les six mois après l'entrée en vigueur du présent traité."

ARTICLES 247-256 (inchangés).

## ARTICLE 257.

Aussitôt que les revendications des Puissances alliées vis-à-vis du Gouvernement ottoman, telles qu'elles résultent de la présente partie, auront reçu satisfaction, et dès que la Dette publique ottomane d'avant-guerre aura été liquidée, la Commission financière cessera ses fonctions.

Cependant, après une période de vingt-cinq années à partir de la date de l'entrée en vigueur du présent traité, le Gouvernement ottoman pourra examiner, avec le Conseil de la Société des Nations, si les Puissances alliées doivent continuer au Gouvernement ottoman l'assistance de la Commission financière et dans l'affirmative, la forme que pourra prendre la continuation de cette assistance.

ARTICLE 258 (à supprimer).

ARTICLES 259 et 260 (inchangés).

[E 1221/900/44]

No. 22.

*Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(Received February 3.)

(No. 300.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note to M. Poincaré, dated the 2nd February, respecting the French claim to a protectorate over Catholics in the East.

*Paris, February 2, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 22.

*Lord Hardinge to M. Poincaré.*

M. le Président du Conseil,

*Paris, February 2, 1922.*

YOUR Excellency is doubtless aware that both the British and the Italian representatives at Constantinople abstained from attending the requiem service for the late Pope held in that city on the 28th January, owing to the claim of the French representative to a special position at the service.

I am instructed by His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to point out to your Excellency that, at the conference at San Remo in April 1920, the French Government definitely abandoned their protectorate over Catholics in the East; yet this renunciation, which was recorded in the *procès-verbal* and cannot be regarded as other than binding, seems to have been entirely ignored by the French Government in the present instance.

It is, in the view of His Majesty's Government, most desirable that there should be no further regrettable incident either at the Te Deum which will be held at Constantinople on the election of the new Pope or on any other occasions. I have therefore the honour, under instructions from the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to express the hope that the French Government will without further delay inform the Vatican of their renunciation and will send the necessary instructions to their representatives in the East (particularly their High Commissioner at Constantinople) to conform to the present situation.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

[E 1252/5/44]

No. 23.

*Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(Received February 4.)

(No. 306.)

My Lord.

*Paris, February 3, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith M. Poincaré's reply to your Lordship's despatch No. 314 of the 30th January, in regard to the negotiations on the Eastern question, with the receipt of which I acquainted your Lordship in my telegram No. 59 of to-day's date.

I am sending the enclosures to M. Poincaré's note in original, and should be grateful if I might be supplied in due course with the printed copies thereof.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

*M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.*

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères,*

*Paris, le 2 février 1922.*

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

J'AI relu avec attention la lettre que Lord Curzon vous a adressée le 30 janvier et dont vous m'avez laissé hier le texte. Je ne crois pas inutile de vous exposer les considérations qu'elle m'inspire. Je pense, comme Lord Curzon, qu'il y a de réels avantages à surseoir, jusqu'au 9 février, à la réunion envisagée des trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères; ce délai permettra de continuer de causer par la voie diplomatique et d'éviter tout malentendu lorsqu'on se réunira à Paris.

Lord Curzon remarque que le mémorandum anglais et le mémorandum français ont été rédigés en se plaçant à des points de vue tout à fait différents. Je suis très heureux de prendre acte de l'assurance qu'il donne qu'il n'a pas été influencé, en faisant ses propositions, par les conversations qu'il a eues à Londres avec les Ministres grecs, conversations dont il a, à plusieurs reprises, entretenu mon prédécesseur. Je n'attendais pas moins de la hauteur de vues et d'esprit du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat; je suis sûr qu'il a recherché seulement les moyens d'arriver à rétablir en Orient la paix que tout le monde désire. Je lui demanderai d'être également persuadé que j'ai moi-même été guidé par ce sentiment. N'ayant pas de rapports officiels avec les Turcs d'Angora, je n'ai d'ailleurs pas pu, comme lui-même l'a fait pour les Grecs, obtenir d'eux, par une conversation directe, qu'ils se placent entre les mains des Alliés. Aussi bien, je voudrais qu'on ne se méprit pas sur le caractère du mémorandum que j'ai prié M. de Saint-Aulaire de remettre au Foreign Office. Je ne me suis pas plus fait l'avocat des Turcs que Lord Curzon ne s'était fait celui des Grecs. Je suis tout à fait d'accord avec Lord Curzon pour penser que les trois Puissances doivent faire abstraction de toute idée préconçue et de tout intérêt personnel et aborder cette difficile question du point de vue le plus large et avec la pensée, non pas de procurer une victoire aux Grecs ou aux Turcs, mais de dissiper de l'horizon oriental les nuages noirs et de rétablir la paix du monde.

Le mémorandum français, pas plus que le mémorandum anglais ne saurait être, à lui seul, une base de discussion. Le second n'est en tout cas pas une réponse au premier. Je considère ces deux documents comme de simples exposés des conditions qui paraissent des deux côtés requises pour arriver au rétablissement de la paix, de même que le mémorandum italien sera un exposé des vues italiennes. Dans l'entretien que j'ai eu à Paris avec Lord Curzon, j'ai dit qu'il était à mes yeux nécessaire d'arriver à une solution acceptable pour les Turcs comme pour les Grecs. J'avais suggéré à ce moment que le Gouvernement français profitant de ses bonnes relations avec le Gouvernement d'Angora, pourrait s'informer, au moins officieusement, des vues de ce dernier. Cette suggestion n'ayant pas été agréée par Lord Curzon, je n'avais pas insisté.

Nous n'avons pas été préoccupés, en rédigeant notre mémorandum, de défendre des intérêts français contre d'autres intérêts concurrents; nous nous sommes bornés, je voudrais que Lord Curzon en fût persuadé, à rechercher objectivement des bases pratiques pour le rétablissement de la paix entre les Grecs et les Turcs et il ne serait pas exact de prétendre que nous ne retenons dans notre mémorandum aucune des



conclusions du mémorandum anglais, d'autant moins, je le répète, que le premier n'était pas, dans mon esprit, destiné à constituer une réponse au second.

Pour Smyrne et pour la Thrace orientale, si l'on compare les deux propositions, on se rend compte que je me suis borné à avancer dans la voie indiquée par Lord Curzon lui-même. Pour la Thrace occidentale, il ressort de cette comparaison qu'il n'y a aucune divergence de vues entre nous. En ce qui concerne Constantinople et la Commission des Détroits, il n'y a pas non plus de divergences notables entre nos deux points de vue, et je ne crois pas qu'il soit impossible de subordonner l'évacuation de Constantinople, par exemple à un commencement d'exécution du Traité. Pour la question de l'Arménie turque, je pense, comme Lord Curzon, qu'il est difficile de maintenir les clauses de Sèvres, mais j'estime que ce n'est pas en Cilicie, où il n'y a pour ainsi dire plus d'Arméniens, qu'il convient justement de rechercher une solution à la question arménienne. En ce qui concerne la protection des minorités, ne sommes-nous pas d'accord sur le principe de l'assurer de la manière la plus pratique? Pour ce qui touche aux clauses militaires, s'il est vrai que les Turcs ont besoin d'une armée et qu'il ne faut pas les obliger à la payer un prix qui ne serait pas en rapport avec leurs ressources financières, l'argument d'ordre général mis en avant par Lord Curzon, qui invoque la nécessité de ne pas traiter différemment la Turquie des autres pays ex-ennemis, l'Allemagne, l'Autriche, la Bulgarie, me semble très fort et retient toute mon attention.

La simple comparaison des deux mémorandums ne me semble donc point si décourageante. Lord Curzon ne doutera pas que nous ne puissions arriver à un accord quand vous lui aurez fait savoir d'une manière très nette que j'examinerai volontiers, dans l'esprit le plus conciliant, toutes les suggestions anglaises, comme il examinera lui-même les suggestions françaises dans le seul désir d'arriver au rétablissement de la paix. Pour atteindre ce but, nous devons toujours avoir présents à l'esprit certains faits positifs et ne point nous bercer d'illusions. J'ai dit à Lord Curzon, lorsque j'ai eu le plaisir de le voir à Paris, que la France ne pouvait envisager la reprise des hostilités contre les Turcs et répugnerait même à des mesures coercitives. Je crois bien que l'opinion anglaise n'accepterait pas facilement l'envoi en Asie Mineure de quelques divisions britanniques. Dans ces conditions, si nous voulons imposer la paix à l'une des deux parties, nous n'aurons pas la force à notre disposition. Je ne crois pas, étant donnée la situation de l'Asie Mineure, qu'un blocus soit un moyen de pression effectif. Je ne crois pas non plus que les Turcs céderaient devant la menace de voir prolonger l'occupation de Constantinople. Cette menace, si on la réalisait, les rejetterait simplement en Asie Mineure, vers les Soviets et vers un panislamisme qui comporterait de graves dangers.

J'ai la crainte, et elle me paraît justifiée, puisque nous n'avons pas de moyens de force à notre disposition, que si nous n'arrivons pas, par la persuasion, à amener les belligérants à la paix, il ne sorte d'une prolongation de la guerre une situation tout aussi dangereuse pour la France que pour l'Angleterre, et c'est dans cette préoccupation que j'ai prié le Maréchal Foch, qui s'était occupé déjà, au cours des précédentes conférences, et d'accord avec ses collègues alliés, à dresser des plans d'intervention militaire en Orient, de remettre à jour la note qu'il avait remise au Conseil suprême sur ce sujet le 27 mars 1920. Il m'a donné hier une nouvelle note, que je me permets de vous adresser ci-joint, en même temps que l'ancienne. Les conclusions, vous le verrez, en sont bien inquiétantes. Le Maréchal Foch craint, avec raison, qu'après une offensive contre les Grecs pour les expulser d'Asie, les Turcs ne songent à une offensive contre les Détroits, accompagnée d'une action à la fois politique et militaire au Caucase, en Arabie, en Syrie, en Mésopotamie, en Perse et aux Indes. Au moment où tout le monde de l'islam est si profondément remué, des prévisions de cette nature semblent parfaitement raisonnables.

Je serais heureux que vous attiriez, d'une manière toute particulière, l'attention du Gouvernement anglais sur ces inquiétudes, que je partage entièrement avec le Maréchal Foch.

Dans la lettre qu'il vous a adressée, Lord Curzon rappelle que l'Angleterre, étant une grande Puissance musulmane, comme la France, a le souci de ménager le sentiment musulman. Je partage ses préoccupations et c'est parce que je suis d'accord avec lui que je recherche objectivement les moyens qui me semblent les plus propres à faire accepter aux deux adversaires une paix dont l'Angleterre et la France ont autant besoin que les belligérants eux-mêmes. S'il m'était démontré que d'autres moyens seraient plus efficaces, je ne témoignerais d'aucune intransigeance.

Je suis persuadé que, si vous voulez bien faire part à Lord Curzon des sentiments que je vous exprime librement dans cette lettre particulière, il reviendra

sur les appréhensions dont il avait fait part à M. de Saint-Aulaire et qu'il renouvelle dans sa lettre du 30 janvier. Il comprendra que je désire aussi vivement que lui que, le 9 février, les trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères puissent très rapidement se mettre d'accord sur des conditions telles qu'elles soient de nature à éviter un échec de nos efforts communs, échec qui aurait les plus fâcheuses conséquences.

Veillez agréer, &c.

R. POINCARÉ.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23.

Note.

I.

AU moment où les Puissances alliées vont essayer de s'entendre pour le règlement de la paix avec la Turquie, la question se pose de savoir avec quels moyens elles pourraient éventuellement lui imposer leurs volontés, de même qu'elle s'était posée au printemps de 1920, au moment de l'élaboration du Traité de Sèvres.

En mars 1920, dans un rapport,\* soumis au Conseil suprême, les représentants militaires et navals consultés ont étudié les conditions d'une action militaire capable, à leur avis, d'assurer l'exécution du Traité de Sèvres.

Sans envisager une opération à caractère décisif, susceptible d'entraîner les Alliés jusqu'au cœur de l'Asie Mineure, le programme proposé se bornait à prévoir une emprise solidement assurée sur les régions vitales de l'Empire ottoman. Il réclamait, néanmoins, alors que le prestige de la victoire était incontestable, la mise en œuvre de forces considérables évaluées à 27 D.I., ce qui, compte tenu des 19 divisions tant helléniques que françaises, britanniques et italiennes alors à pied d'œuvre, aurait exigé de la part des Alliés un effort supplémentaire de 8 D.I.

Les Alliés ont renoncé à s'imposer un pareil effort. Le Traité de Sèvres est resté lettre morte. Le maintien en Asie Mineure des forces helléniques et leurs tentatives offensives n'ont en d'autre résultat que d'exaspérer le nationalisme turc et de provoquer le rétablissement progressif de sa puissance militaire.

Aujourd'hui, la situation est encore modifiée, d'une part, du fait des occupations réalisées et consolidées sur certains points, ainsi que de l'évolution qu'ont subie les dispositions des Alliés à l'égard de la Turquie, mais d'autre part aussi du fait des réductions opérées dans les forces militaires alliées en Turquie.

Sans qu'il soit nécessaire de reprendre l'étude faite le 27 mars 1920 en l'accommodant aux circonstances actuelles, il est évident qu'une action de force visant à imposer aux nationalistes une paix à laquelle ils refuseraient de souscrire, réclamerait de la part des Alliés un effort supplémentaire considérable, tant militaire que financier. Cet effort est en dehors de leurs intentions et dépasse leurs possibilités.

II.

Les moyens dont disposeraient les Alliés pour imposer leurs décisions sont donc limités aux forces qui sont actuellement sur place :

1. Forces alliées des Détroits.
2. Armée grecque de Smyrne.
3. Ils comportent, en outre, l'application éventuelle d'un blocus des côtes turques.

1. Les forces alliées des Détroits comprennent :

14 bataillons d'infanterie,†  
2 groupes d'artillerie,  
Quelques escadrons,

c'est-à-dire la valeur d'une division au total, effectif notablement inférieur même à celui que, dans leur consultation du 14 février 1920 à Londres, les Conseillers militaires et navals avaient estimé nécessaire pour assurer l'occupation des Détroits tant que la paix ne serait pas établie (environ 2 divisions et 9 bataillons avec les forces navales suffisantes).

\* Rapport du 27 mars (pièce annexe, Enclosure 3).

† Voir répartition (pièce annexe, Enclosure 4).



2. L'armée hellénique de Smyrne compte 11 divisions d'infanterie (160,000 hommes).

Elle représente l'effort maximum de la Grèce, et son entretien prolongé risque d'entraîner pour cette Puissance des sacrifices financiers incompatibles avec ses moyens et une tension politique et morale, dangereuse pour la situation intérieure du pays. Déjà l'armée hellénique a montré des symptômes graves de fatigue et d'indiscipline; ses échecs successifs semblent avoir épuisé sa capacité offensive. En présence d'une armée nationaliste exaltée par le succès de sa résistance, elle paraît d'ailleurs pour le moment vouloir se borner à maintenir sa situation.

3. Quant au blocus d'un pays comme la Turquie d'Asie, il paraît illusoire :

Le blocus des côtes de l'Asie Mineure a déjà été écarté par les représentants navals en mars 1920 comme inefficace, difficile à exercer en raison de l'étendue de la frontière maritime et de nature à aggraver la situation précaire du ravitaillement de Constantinople.\* Il n'atteindrait en rien les communications de la Turquie nationaliste avec la Russie soviétique, d'où elle tire son matériel de guerre et une partie de ses subsides. Il n'aurait en définitive aucune influence sur un pays essentiellement agricole, qui se nourrit sur lui-même et dont les besoins économiques sont affranchis des relations extérieures.

En regard de ces moyens, ceux des nationalistes turcs se résument dans le tableau suivant :

Un régime dictatorial mettant entre les mains d'un seul chef, Kemal, tous les pouvoirs;

Une armée de 150,000 combattants environ, susceptible d'atteindre le chiffre de 200,000 hommes, disposant de 700 à 800 canons et de 2,000 à 2,500 mitrailleuses, et répartis actuellement de la façon suivante :

Front hellénique, 110,000 à 120,000 hommes.  
Front Syrie-Mésopotamie, 5,000 hommes environ.  
Front du Caucase, 10,000 hommes.  
Intérieur, 20,000 hommes.

Alors que les moyens des Alliés et des Grecs ont depuis 1920 subi une diminution très notable, les troupes kémalistes se sont accrues en effectifs et en valeur militaire. Leur force morale est celle de gens qui combattent pour leur pays et dans leur pays.

### III.

Il résulte de cet exposé qu'en présence de la force nationaliste actuelle, les Alliés, avec la coopération des Grecs, ne peuvent guère que maintenir leurs positions — dans les Détroits et sur le front de Smyrne — et encore à la condition que l'armée grecque échappe à la désagrégation.

Les moyens militaires dont ils disposent ne leur permettent qu'une attitude défensive, c'est-à-dire passive, sur ces fronts. Le seul moyen auquel ils pourraient avoir recours, réside dans le blocus, et l'on a vu que ce blocus est condamné à l'inefficacité. Par suite, les Alliés semblent dans l'impossibilité d'exercer une action coercitive efficace pour réduire la résistance turque.

Mais la continuation de la lutte contre le nationalisme ne risque pas seulement de faire éclater l'impuissance des Alliés; elle comporte en outre des dangers :

Le maintien de l'occupation de Constantinople et des Détroits, sans être de nature à faire céder le Gouvernement d'Angora, aura pour résultat de ruiner davantage le prestige du Gouvernement de Constantinople et du Khalifat et de rejeter définitivement en Asie le Gouvernement effectif de la Turquie;

Le maintien des Grecs sur le front de Smyrne entretiendra et développera l'exaltation du sentiment national turc, et continuera à fournir au Gouvernement kémaliste le levier nécessaire pour soutenir et augmenter son effort militaire;

Enfin, la politique de coercition à l'égard du Gouvernement d'Angora aboutira infailliblement à consolider l'alliance factice, mais rendue ainsi plus nécessaire, du pouvoir soviétique et du nationalisme turc. Il est même à prévoir que Mustapha Kemal, qui, dans un but de conciliation, a proclamé son renoncement à tout programme pantouranien et panislamique, sera amené à reprendre la politique ainsi abandonnée, pour s'en faire un instrument de combat contre les deux grandes Puissances musulmanes qui s'opposent à la réalisation du pacte national : la France et surtout l'Angleterre.

\* Rapport du 27 mars précité, para. III (pièce annexe, Enclosure 3).

### IV.

Les entreprises militaires à prévoir comme résultantes de ces conséquences politiques semblent pouvoir viser les objectifs suivants :

Offensive contre les Grecs pour les Grecs pour les expulser d'Asie.

Offensive contre les Détroits.

Actions politico-militaires :

Au Caucase, pour interdire aux Puissances alliées toute ingérence dans cette région si intéressante pour elles au point de vue économique;

En Arabie, contre la Syrie et la Mésopotamie;

Vers l'Orient, à travers la Perse, dans la direction des Indes.

Il est difficile de prévoir dans quelle mesure ces entreprises pourront être poursuivies simultanément. Il est même probable qu'elles ne se développeront que successivement.

En tout cas, l'offensive contre les Grecs est l'opération vers laquelle le Gouvernement d'Angora concentre manifestement ses efforts à l'heure actuelle, afin de l'entreprendre dès le printemps, si l'action des Puissances alliées ne désarme point sa révolte.

Sans exagérer les possibilités turques, ni sous-estimer la capacité de résistance de l'armée hellénique, on ne peut envisager sans crainte de catastrophe, la reprise des attaques kémalistes. Mustapha Kemal se prépare en effet à mettre en ligne contre la Grèce, non seulement ses réserves, mais encore des contingents turkmènes, afghans, &c., dont des traités récents lui promettent de concours offensif et défensif. Dans ces conditions, la situation d'équilibre instable qui caractérise le front turco-hellénique peut se rompre brusquement par un effondrement de l'armée hellénique déjà moralement atteinte.

Un succès de cette nature ne manquerait pas d'exalter les Turcs. Il pourrait les amener à une entreprise contre les Détroits visant tout au moins à en border la rive méridionale, que les forces alliées, trop faibles et privées de toute protection sur leur flanc droit, ne sauraient défendre contre une attaque sérieuse.

Mais surtout, la menace qu'une armée nationaliste hostile fait peser sur la situation militaire des Alliés en Syrie et en Mésopotamie prendrait un caractère particulièrement inquiétant du jour où cette armée, débarrassée du front hellénique, ou simplement résolue à le masquer, prononcerait un effort de ce côté.

Dans cette hypothèse, les Turcs pourraient facilement, au moyen de leurs réserves intérieures et de prélèvements opérés sur le front hellénique et au Caucase,\* concentrer, en direction de Mossoul, une force d'au moins 50,000 hommes, suffisante, non seulement pour restaurer la suprématie turque dans le Kurdistan, et y ruiner les entreprises britanniques, mais aussi pour porter un coup sérieux à l'œuvre de l'Angleterre et en Mésopotamie.†

Il paraît inutile enfin d'insister sur les dangers que comporte pour l'Empire des Indes une coopération de la Turquie nationaliste et de la Russie bolcheviste en vue de donner appui, à travers la Perse et l'Afghanistan, aux mouvements séditieux qui agitent déjà cet Empire. Des entreprises de cette nature sont actuellement en préparation en particulier par l'action de Djémal-Pacha en Afghanistan.‡

### V.

En Résumé :

Toute action militaire coercitive des Alliés vis-à-vis du Gouvernement d'Angora paraît interdite, toute action de blocus paraît inopérante.

Par suite, imposer des conditions qui porteraient atteinte au nationalisme turc, c'est-à-dire qui toucheraient des pays habités par des populations turques, serait pour les Alliés, risquer, en prolongeant la révolte du Gouvernement nationaliste,

\* Ou un resserrement de l'alliance turco-russe permettrait une diminution des forces aux ordres de Kiazim-Karabekir.

† L'Angleterre ne dispose en Mésopotamie que de 1 D.L. :

12 bataillons  
6 batteries.

8 escadrons  
6 groupes d'aviation.

‡ Djémal Pacha, avec l'aide d'une mission turque importante, a entrepris la constitution d'une armée afghane dont les noyaux sont en voie d'organisation. Le but qu'il assigne à cette armée est de peser sur l'Angleterre par la frontière de l'Inde. Il dirige une entreprise analogue en Perse et se propose d'attaquer par l'est les Anglais de Mésopotamie.



de faire éclater leur impuissance à la réduire, et même de compromettre leur maintien sur leurs positions actuelles en Asie Mineure.

La France et l'Angleterre en particulier, ne sauraient, sans grave danger, s'exposer ainsi à un échec de leur action militaire et politique dans le Proche-Orient. Un tel échec, en outre, de ses conséquences locales et européennes, aurait des répercussions lointaines dans leurs empires coloniaux. Un succès marqué du nationalisme turc sur les Puissances alliées ne pourrait manquer en effet de réveiller et d'exalter le fanatisme religieux, et, avec lui, l'esprit d'indépendance des populations musulmanes dans les royaumes arabes et aux Indes, et des provoquer des mouvements de révolte dont le développement peut dépasser les prévisions.

Ce sont là, semble-t-il, les considérations militaires qui doivent inspirer les Puissances alliées dans les prochaines négociations.

Paris, le 1<sup>er</sup> février 1922.

Enclosure 3 in No. 23.

*Rapport établi par les Représentants militaires et navals au sujet des Moyens militaires à mettre en œuvre pour faire exécuter le Traité de Paix avec la Turquie, dans le cas où le Gouvernement ottoman refuserait de signer, de ratifier ou d'exécuter ce Traité.*

L'EXECUTION du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie—dans ses clauses essentielles telles qu'elles résultent des renseignements reçus du Conseil suprême—semble comporter, de la part des Alliés, les réalisations suivantes :

1. Prise de possession des territoires à concéder par la Turquie ou à neutraliser ;
2. Actions à entreprendre dans le reste de l'Empire, en vue d'imposer la démobilisation des forces turques, la livraison de l'armement, et de sauvegarder, dans la mesure du possible, l'existence des minorités.

## I.

Les prises de possession à réaliser peuvent être définies ainsi qu'il suit :

1. Thrace ;
2. Zone des Détroits ;
3. Zone de Smyrne ;
4. Territoire situé au sud de la nouvelle frontière turco-syrienne ;
5. Mésopotamie ;\*
6. Etat indépendant d'Arménie, à libérer des forces turques qui l'occupent.

Les moyens militaires à mettre en œuvre pour ces opérations peuvent être évalués comme suit :

### 1. Thrace.

La Thrace turque à l'ouest des lignes de Tchatalja est actuellement occupée par 3 à 4 D.I. turques à effectif réduit† ; ces divisions pourraient être rapidement remises sur le pied de guerre‡.

On doit donc admettre qu'un effectif de 4 D.I.§ serait nécessaire pour réduire ces forces turques à l'impuissance, les contraindre à l'évacuation, assurer l'occupation du pays et pourvoir au maintien de l'ordre.

En raison de son importance, cette prise de possession de la Thrace devrait revêtir un caractère interallié.

A ce titre, elle devrait être placée sous une direction alliée et exécutée par une force constituée en majorité par des éléments helléniques.

\* L'occupation du Kurdistan n'est pas mentionnée, aucune décision n'ayant été communiquée au C.M.A.V. au sujet du statut futur de ce pays. Il n'est pas davantage fait mention de la Syrie proprement dite, de la Palestine et de l'Arabie, pour lesquelles l'exécution du traité semble devoir être envisagée en dehors du cadre de la présente étude.

† 3,000 hommes par division.

‡ Djafaz Tayer Bey, Gouverneur d'Andrinople, vient de lancer l'ordre de mobilisation générale, à la suite des événements de Constantinople. Il disposerait d'un armement et de réserves de munitions importants.

§ Pour simplifier les calculs, la division alliée sera considérée, dans la présente étude, comme comportant un effectif moyen de 12,000 hommes.

### 2. Zone des Détroits.

La conférence tenue à Londres le 16 février par les représentants navals et militaires a conclu à la nécessité de maintenir à la portée des Détroits environ 2 D.I. tant que ne seront pas réalisées les dispositions prévues par les clauses du Traité de Paix.

Ces propositions ont été agréées par le Conseil suprême.

Il y a lieu de les maintenir dans l'hypothèse envisagée.

### 3. Zone de Smyrne.

Trois D.I. helléniques (sur les six qui se trouvent actuellement sur place) semblent suffisantes pour maintenir la possession définitive de l'ensemble de la zone attribuée à la Grèce.

### 4. Territoire au sud de la Frontière turco-syrienne.

Trois divisions françaises de l'armée du Levant sont déjà à pied d'œuvre. Une quatrième D.I. serait sans doute nécessaire pour achever la prise de possession du territoire cédé, couvrir efficacement la voie ferrée Alep-Nisibin.

### 5. Mésopotamie.

Cette région est déjà tenue par les forces britanniques (valeur 2 D.I.).

### 6. Arménie.

Le territoire du futur Etat arménien est actuellement occupé par 4 D.I. turques, disposant de moyens matériels importants.\*

Ces divisions peuvent être renforcées par de nombreux irréguliers.

Avec les faibles forces dont elle dispose,† l'Arménie n'est pas en état d'asseoir sa souveraineté, et de résister aux attaques possibles des Turcs de l'Azerbeïdjan.

Il serait donc indispensable :

(a.) De lui donner sans retard, l'appui‡ d'une force alliée capable de contraindre les Turcs à l'évacuation. En raison de l'étendue du pays, de sa structure montagneuse, des travaux à entreprendre pour assurer les communications, cette force peut être estimée à 4 D.I. au minimum ;

(b.) De lui fournir le plus rapidement possible le moyen d'organiser et de développer ses propres forces (instructeurs, armement et matériel).

Pour assurer le transport en Arménie des forces alliées d'intervention, ainsi que le ravitaillement en vivres et matériel de ces forces et des troupes arméniennes, il y aurait lieu de prendre pour bases : d'une part, le port de Trébizonde donnant accès sur la région d'Erzeroum, et d'autre part, le port de Batoum et la Géorgie, de manière à disposer de la route et de la voie ferrée Batoum-Tiflis-Erzeroum.

L'utilisation de ces bases et communications exigerait au préalable un accord avec la Géorgie.

En résumé, les forces à prévoir pour assurer la prise de possession des territoires à concéder par la Turquie ou à neutraliser, peuvent être ainsi évaluées :

Thrace	...	...	...	...	4 D.I.
Détroits	...	...	...	...	2 D.I.
Smyrne	...	...	...	...	3 D.I.
Frontière nord de Syrie	...	...	...	...	4 D.I.
Mésopotamie	...	...	...	...	2 D.I.
Arménie	...	...	...	...	4 D.I.
Total	...	...	...	...	19 D.I.

## II.

Les prises de possession envisagées ci-dessus ne désarmeront pas l'adversaire.

Des actions sont donc également à prévoir pour lui imposer la démobilisation de

\* Matériel resté sur place et provenant des principales armées turques qui opéraient dans ces régions contre l'armée russe du Caucase.

† 15,000 hommes insuffisamment armés et dépourvus de matériel.

‡ L'opportunité de fournir à l'Arménie un appui effectif s'impose d'autant plus qu'il importe d'isoler le mouvement nationaliste turc du bolchevisme russe progressant à travers le Caucase.



ses forces, la livraison de son armement et de son matériel et pour sauvegarder dans la mesure du possible l'existence des minorités.

On ne peut envisager dans ce but une opération à caractère décisif qui risquerait d'entraîner les Alliés jusqu'au cœur de l'Asie Mineure, dans un pays de faibles ressources dépourvu de communications, où les contingents turcs pourraient organiser et prolonger la lutte de guérilla, mais où des colonnes européennes importantes auraient peine à subsister et à se mouvoir.

Le résultat visé pourra être plus utilement recherché par une emprise solidement assurée sur les régions vitales de l'Empire ottoman, en vue de priver l'ennemi des contingents, des ressources matérielles et des communications qu'elles possèdent.

L'occupation de la région limitée à l'est par la grande transversale Haïdar-Pacha-Alexandrette et, éventuellement celle de la voie ferrée d'Angora, répondrait à ce but.

Elle exigerait les effectifs suivants :

Région d'Eski-Cheir	...	...	1 D.I.
Prolongement sur Angora	...	...	2 D.I.
Région d'Akioum-Karahissar	...	...	2 D.I.
Région de Konia*	...	...	1 D.I.
Troupes chargées des communications	...	...	2 D.I.
Au total	...	...	8 D.I.

Il y aurait lieu, en outre, d'entrevoir une action des forces navales alliées, tendant à assurer la main-mise sur les Iles turques et le contrôle avec la participation des forces militaires, des ports de Trébizonde, Rozeh Samsun, Karosund, Sinope, Ismid, Mudania, Panderma, Rodosto et Silivri.†

Au total, les différentes réalisations envisagées aux chapitres I et II exigeraient la mise en œuvre de 19 D.I. ; plus 8 D.I. = 27 D.I.‡

### III.

(a.) La poursuite des deux buts : prise de possession des territoires, désarmement de l'adversaire, peut être entrevue soit *successivement*, soit *simultanément*.

Des efforts successifs présenteraient de sérieux inconvénients : liberté d'action laissée à l'ennemi, possibilité pour lui de provoquer de nouveaux massacres parmi les populations non musulmanes.

Ils auraient d'autre part pour effet de *prolonger la durée* de l'intervention alliée, puisque le transport des troupes d'un théâtre d'opérations à un autre exigerait nécessairement de longs délais, en raison des distances et de la lenteur des communications.

Il serait donc désirable que les opérations fussent, autant que possible, *entreprises simultanément dans les diverses zones* et que leur préparation fût activement poussée dès maintenant, de manière que les Alliés soient en mesure d'agir immédiatement en profitant de la saison favorable dans le cas où le Gouvernement turc refuserait de signer, de ratifier ou d'exécuter le traité.

(b.) Pour organiser et conduire ces opérations avec méthode, il conviendrait d'autre part :

De maintenir sous un commandement particulier les troupes alliées opérant en Turquie d'Europe ;

De placer sous une même direction d'ensemble toutes les troupes alliées appelées à opérer concentriquement du Bosphore au Taurus.

Quant aux forces de Syrie-Cilicie, de Mésopotamie et d'Arménie, elles devraient, en raison de leurs missions spéciales, conserver leur commandement distinct, tout en coopérant, dans leur zone propre, à l'action générale des troupes d'Asie Mineure.

\* Ce dernier secteur se prolongeant jusqu'au Taurus, où il se reliait aux forces de Cilicie. Il prendrait ses communications sur Alexandrette ou Mersina.

† Le blocus des côtes de l'Asie Mineure a été écarté par les représentants navals, comme inefficace, difficile à exercer en raison de l'étendue des côtes, et de nature à aggraver la situation déjà précaire du ravitaillement de la région de Constantinople.

‡ Le représentant italien a fait observer qu'il serait prudent de prévoir en outre une réserve d'environ 4 D.I. permettant de disposer en cas de besoin des moyens nécessaires pour briser toute attaque que l'ennemi pourrait lancer en forces sur une partie du vaste front occupé par les Alliés.

En tenant compte de cette observation, le total des forces alliées à prévoir s'élèverait ainsi à environ trente divisions.

Enfin, pour coordonner les actions entreprises sur des théâtres d'opérations aussi distincts, le Conseil suprême des Gouvernements aurait à imprimer une direction supérieure.

### IV.

Pour réaliser le programme exposé ci-dessus, les Alliés disposent à pied d'œuvre des forces suivantes :

Forces françaises	..	..	5 D.I. incomplètes (y compris la Syrie-Cilicie).
Forces britanniques	..	..	4 D.I. „ (y compris la Mésopotamie).
Forces italiennes	..	..	1 D.I.
Forces helléniques	..	..	9 D.I. (6 à Smyrne, 3 en Europe).
Total	..	..	19 D.I., dont 9 à reconstituer.

Il en exige 27, ce qui comporterait un renforcement de 8 D.I.

Ce renforcement ne peut être, dans les circonstances actuelles, demandé à la France, à la Grande-Bretagne ou à l'Italie.

La Grèce ne pourrait y satisfaire que partiellement, en mettant en ligne toutes ses disponibilités de l'intérieur préalablement remobilisées (5 D.I.).

Il convient de remarquer que les forces helléniques constituent déjà près de la moitié des forces alliées actuellement disponibles dans les territoires turcs d'Europe et d'Asie.

Un plus large emploi de l'armée hellénique dans une opération contre la Turquie aurait, d'ailleurs, pour résultat probable d'exaspérer le sentiment nationaliste et xénophobe des populations ottomanes, et de donner à la lutte un caractère d'acharnement qui en augmenterait les difficultés.

Si l'Entente bornait son effort à la mise en œuvre de ses seules forces disponibles (19 D.I.), elle devrait par suite se limiter à une exécution partielle du programme envisagé :

Maintien et consolidation des occupations déjà réalisées ;

Prise de possession des territoires à neutraliser ou à concéder par la Turquie en Europe et en Asie Mineure occidentale ;

Main-mise sur le système des communications de cette dernière partie de l'Empire ottoman.

Mais dans ces conditions, la situation de l'Arménie ne serait pas réglée, pas plus que les clauses réduisant la Turquie à une impuissance militaire, puisque cet Etat pourrait encore occuper l'Arménie et trouver en outre dans toute la partie centrale et orientale de l'Asie Mineure la possibilité de recruter ses forces, de les alimenter, et de peser sur les minorités.

C'est dire que l'exécution intégrale du traité ne peut être assurée, semble-t-il, notamment dans la Turquie d'Asie orientale, que par une intervention de forces alliées plus importante que celles actuellement disponibles, au besoin demandée aux Etats-Unis.

France.	Grande-Bretagne.	Italie.	Japon.
	Le Major-Général Sackville-West.	Pour le Major-Général Cavallero.	Le Général Watanabe.
	Représentant mili- taire permanent, (Signé) SACKVILLE-WEST.	Représentant mili- taire permanent, (Signé) BASSETTO.	Représentant mili- taire permanent, (Signé) WATANABE.
Le Contre-Amiral Le Vavasour. (Signé) LE VAVASSEUR.	Le Capitaine du Vaisseau Fuller. (Signé) FULLER.	L'Amiral Grassi. (Signé) GRASSI.	Pour le Capitaine de Vaisseau Osumi. (Signé) TAHOSHIMA.



*Réserve du Représentant militaire britannique.*

*Paragraphe III (b).* Le représentant militaire britannique ne peut pas accepter le paragraphe tel qu'il est écrit dans le rapport, et il propose l'une des deux modifications suivantes :

1. Ajouter, après les mots "du Bosphore au Taurus" les mots "y compris les troupes d'occupation de Constantinople."

ou :

2. Remplacer tout le paragraphe *III (b)*, par la phrase suivante :

"Pour organiser et conduire des opérations avec méthode, il conviendrait d'autre part d'établir dans la mesure du possible un haut-commandement unique."

*Le 27 mars 1920.*

Enclosure 4 in No. 23.

*Forces alliées des Détroits.*

1. *France:*

6 bataillons :

5 à Constantinople et environs.

1 à Gallipoli.

1 escadron de Spahis.

1 groupe d'artillerie de campagne.

2. *Grande-Bretagne:*

6 bataillons :

4 indiens.

2 britanniques.

1 régiment de cavalerie.

1 group d'artillerie de campagne.

3. *Italie:*

2 bataillons.

[E 1153/75/44]

No. 24.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 351.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, February 4, 1922.*

WITH reference to correspondence relative to the Turkish gendarmerie which ended with my despatch No. 249 of the 25th ultimo, I transmit herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople, relative to the activities of Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau.\*

2. It will be within your Lordship's recollection that in its note to you of the 14th November last, the French Government gave specific assurances that :—

- (1) M. Franklin-Bouillon had not demanded or obtained any monopoly, or promise of monopoly, of gendarmerie organisation in Turkey;
- (2) The Franklin-Bouillon agreement had not modified Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau's position;
- (3) The French Government considered the Allied agreements to remain in force in their entirety, General Filonneau's appointment and the character of his mission remaining unaltered.

3. It now appears, however, that in spite of these specific pledges the French Government has authorised Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau to act as inspector-general to gendarmerie in the districts outside the Straits zone, and indeed in the districts of Brussa and Balikesri which are at present in Greek military occupation. Under

\* Not printed.

instructions from the French Government, Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau refuses to take orders from General Filonneau, whom he recognises as being concerned only with the gendarmerie inside the zone of the Straits. He does not hesitate to give orders both of the head of the Turkish gendarmerie and to the Minister of the Interior at Constantinople, although both these officials are already receiving orders from the sub-commission of gendarmerie. Indeed, so impossible has Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau rendered the situation at Constantinople that Sir Charles Harington has requested that Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau may be withdrawn.

4. His Majesty's Government are totally unable to reconcile the proceedings of Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau and the explanations of the acting French High Commissioner at Constantinople with the assurances contained in the French note of the 14th November. They desire to register an emphatic protest against Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau's proceedings and against the support that the French Government is giving him, and they will be glad to receive satisfactory explanations and assurances on the whole matter at an early date.

5. There is also the further question of the gendarmerie in Cilicia, to which the French Government has apparently handed over arms and aeroplanes despite the Allied declaration of neutrality of the 10th August last. His Majesty's Government would welcome full information as to the nature and purpose of this force, with special reference to the arrangements for the Turkish gendarmerie which have been agreed upon and provisionally initiated at Constantinople, and also as to the apparent sale or gift of military material, including aeroplanes, to one of the belligerents between whom the Allied Governments are endeavouring to effect a settlement.

6. I shall be grateful if your Lordship will address a note to the French Government on the above lines.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1306/5/44]

No. 25.

*Memorandum on Italian Proposals for Revision of Financial Clauses of Sèvres Treaty.*

AN interdepartmental meeting was held on the 3rd February, attended by Mr. Armitage Smith, C.B. (Treasury), in the chair, Mr. Hutchinson (Board of Trade), Mr. Weakley and Mr. Forbes Adam (Foreign Office).

2. The Italian proposals<sup>a</sup> were carefully considered clause by clause. The main objection to them was felt to be as follows :—

3. In principle, the Italian intention (article 232 and 232 bis) appears to be to turn the Financial Commission into a reparation commission to obtain the payment of a war indemnity from Turkey, and for this purpose to control the collection and payment of certain specified revenues assigned to the service of that indemnity. It is no longer to administer the whole revenue and expenditure of Turkey as under the Treaty of Sèvres. Yet this reparation commission is given various wider powers quite unnecessary for its main task, such as making suggestions to the Turkish Parliament on the Turkish budget, supervising the execution of the budgets, financial laws and regulations of Turkey through a complete control of the service of Turkish financial inspectors (article 232 ter), improving the Turkish currency (article 233), and having a veto on all Turkish new concessions and on the prolongation of old concessions (article 239). At the same time, although the main purpose and function (collection of a war indemnity) of the new Financial Commission does not differ in importance from those of the pre-war Debt Council, it is still made to swallow the latter as under the Treaty of Sèvres (article 246).

4. In short, the Italians appear merely to have concentrated on obtaining certain powers to secure their advantages under the tripartite agreement and left the treaty otherwise more or less as it stood with a few drafting alterations. The result is an illogical scheme which would probably remain as objectionable as the Sèvres financial clauses to Turkey without having the merits of the latter, namely, some provision for the fundamental economic reconstruction of Turkey.

5. Objection was also seen by the meeting to the particular revenues selected for allocation to the service of the war indemnity (particularly the customs) which appear to absorb all the most easily encashed sources of Turkish revenue and thus leave little over for Turkey's budget.

<sup>a</sup> See No. 21.



6. The meeting felt generally that two alternative methods of dealing with the financial clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres were open to the Allies:—

- (a.) Aim at restoring Turkey's financial and economical prosperity on the line of the Sèvres clauses by a genuine, if camouflaged, control of Turkish financial administration.
- (b.) Aim simply at securing the payment of Allied war claims by a reparation commission (possibly with the same personnel as the Debt Council) and by the allocation of specified revenues, and forgo all other interference in Turkish administration except such as could gradually be gained, after the conclusion of peace, voluntarily from Turkey.

7. Either under (a) or (b) the Board of Trade would favour fixing a definite sum for which Turkey was to be liable by way of indemnity, based upon her capacity to pay, which might be assumed to be less than the amount of the damage for which the Treaty of Sèvres made her liable. This course, coupled with an agreement between the Allies as to the proportions in which the payments were to be divided among them, would avoid the necessity of international adjudication and assessment of claims by an arbitral commission or the Financial Commission, as proposed in the existing treaty. Each Government would settle with its own nationals in regard to their claims.

Failing this, the Board of Trade would have some amendments to propose in the procedure for adjudication of claims.

Owing to the preponderant British claims for recovery of expenses of military occupation, the Treasury may desire special provision to be made for their payment, apart from, and in priority to, the lump sum.

8. The political situation appears to make (a) impossible of attainment unless it were found practicable to use the lever of facilities for a loan in the London market to Turkey with success. This seems doubtful. If, however, the lever could be successfully used, there would be no need to redraft the Sèvres clauses as the Italians have proposed. The concession clause (article 239) might nevertheless have to be retained as strengthened by them.

9. Under (b), it does not seem politically possible to offer the Italians more as regards the concession clause (article 239) than the proposal made to Turkey in March last, i.e., that the competent departments of the Turkish Government would consult with the Financial Commission before concessions were granted, and that the commission should appoint a liaison officer for such consultation. France and His Majesty's Government might promise the Italians this post, as part of the arrangement under which the Director-General of Customs was to be an Englishman. Not only Turkey but also the United States and other countries not represented on the Financial Commission might well object to article 239 and an Allied vote on all concessions.

10. Realising the importance of keeping Italian support during the negotiations by meeting them as far as possible on these points, the meeting finally recommended that no specific reply should be returned to the Italian note, but that the Italian Government might be told that while it seemed to offer a favourable basis for discussion and while we were anxious to meet them, several points were not clear to His Majesty's Government, and we should be glad if M. Nogara would come over as soon as possible and discuss them with our financial experts before the Paris meeting.

*Foreign Office, February 4, 1922.*

[E 1304/5/44]

No. 26.

*Memorandum respecting the Means of bringing Pressure upon Turkey.*

#### *I.—Financial and Economical Blockade of Turkey.*

AN essential condition of any kind of financial or economical blockade of Turkey is that France and Italy should not merely subscribe to it but co-operate loyally at home as well as at Constantinople and Syria. A financial blockade would not greatly affect the Kemalists, for they have not hitherto been dependent on the financial help of Western Europe. There is some reason to think that they hope for a loan as part of the peace settlement, but this could only come from private sources, and therefore on onerous terms as to expenditure, &c. In any case, it is well to remember that insolvency

is a chronic state in Turkey, and that economic arguments never carry great weight with her rulers. So long as the Kemalists remain masters of Anatolia, they can conscript its manhood at will and confiscate its produce for military purposes, and so long as they have the sympathy of Russia they can rely on her for military material. They might regret losing all possibility of purchasing supplies in Western Europe, and of recovering little by little, as they are now doing, the dumps of captured Turkish ammunition at Constantinople, but latterly they appear, as far as we know, to have had so little actually from Italy and (apart from the Cilicia supplies) from France, that, provided Russia were still ready to supply them via Trebizond and the Caucasus, they would not be greatly embarrassed.

2. A naval blockade in which Greece would take part would probably cut off the bulk of the direct traffic from Southern Russia to Anatolia, just as it could effectively seal Adalia and Mersina, but owing to the absence of bases it would be almost impracticable to stop the present traffic from Batoum to Trebizond by small coasting vessels, and the land routes would remain open.

It seems, then, that the only blockade of Turkey which would coerce her is one enforced by Russia as well as the Allies. Such a measure, however, presupposes the political isolation of Turkey, an event which, it may well be thought, would of itself reduce her to submission, without the need of any organised blockade. Turkey knows that she cannot face the world without at least one big Power behind her. In fact, Russia's presence at Genoa and Turkey's absence may in itself make Mustapha more amenable to reason owing to the uncertainty created on his mind.

#### *II.—Financial and Military Assistance to Greece.*

3. Some time before the opening of the Greek offensive of last summer His Majesty's Government showed signs of abandoning their strict neutrality and of allowing Greece to obtain supplies in this country. This change in our attitude alarmed the Kemalists and made them considerably less exacting while their fear lasted. Some such effect might be produced now by an Allied agreement to assist Greece with funds and military equipment, while again preventing even private trade in arms, &c., with the Turks.

4. There appears to be no likelihood that any of the Allies would allow their forces to be engaged actively on the side of Greece, and it seems very doubtful whether the French and Italian Governments, or indeed His Majesty's Government, would feel able to make Greece any financial advance. There is no doubt that any financial facilities, with the moral support they would imply, would have a great effect in Greece and Turkey, but also, it must be remembered, in India. All that seems possible is that the Allies might agree to allow Greece to purchase military material from them direct—perhaps under an arrangement of deferred payment, or to hand over to her the captured Turkish material at Constantinople—and, at the utmost, to stiffen her army with Allied officers.

#### *III.—Increased Stringency of other Parts of new Treaty against Turkey.*

5. The formal withdrawal of all or any of the concessions (Thrace, Armenia, Smyrna, Straits, financial and military control, &c., Capitulations, admission to League of Nations) suggested in March last and since then, if it were to be of any effect, would have to be accompanied by a degree of Allied solidarity which has not existed since hostilities ceased. Even so it might not carry us any farther. The Kemalists would maintain a passive attitude and trust to an eventual split among the Allies or the result of continued pressure on His Majesty's Government of difficulties in the Moslem world.

6. The one modification of the treaty to which, given Allied agreement, we should have it in our power to give immediate effect would be the removal of Constantinople and East Thrace from Turkish sovereignty. There have been suggestions lately that the Kemalists would not mind this loss. It is quite likely that they may be inclined to remove their vital services to a safe distance in Anatolia. But that they would willingly forgo sovereignty over Constantinople, with all the political advantages which tradition and geographical position give it, is incredible. The measure of the value which the Turks really attach to Constantinople is to be found in the frantic efforts they and their supporters in this country and elsewhere made during the peace negotiations to retain it.

[8975]



7. The definite termination by the Allies of Turkish rule in Constantinople, it can hardly be doubted, would be a severe blow to Kemalism. But even supposing the situation in India to allow His Majesty's Government thus to reverse the Cabinet decision of January 1920, and even supposing such an agreement to have been reached and enforced between the Allies, much of the consequent effect would depend on the attitude of Russia, who, after Turkey, is the Power most profoundly concerned in the Straits. If we could give Russia reason to think that the expulsion of the Turk would be followed by a régime of control over Constantinople and the Straits, which suited her better, *e.g.*, immediate and unconditional inclusion in such an international body as the Straits Commission, she would be less likely to continue her support of Turkey, and we might hope to see Kemalism crumble. But if the alternative arrangement seemed to her to be the prelude to, say, Greek occupation of Constantinople, she would doubtless support Turkey in fighting it tooth and nail. In that case the expulsion of the Turk from Europe would have brought us no nearer to the establishment of peace in Anatolia. It seems, then, that here, again, the attitude of Russia is all-important.

#### IV.—*Separation of Constantinople Government from Angora Government.*

8. Sir H. Rumbold has suggested that, as a last resource in the event of Angora refusing a reasonable settlement, peace might be made with the Sultan in the hope that the moderate element would gradually melt away from Mustapha Kemal's side and leave him in a minority. This procedure failed when the Sultan's Government signed the Treaty of Sèvres, but it might run a better chance of success with a treaty modified in favour of Turkey to the extent now proposed.

#### V.—*Definite Annexation of Turkish Territory by Allies by Unilateral Declaration.*

9. There are believed to be legal precedents which would justify the Allies in agreeing among themselves to consider such and such a settlement to be at once in force irrespective of Turkish acceptance, *e.g.*, definite severance of Thrace and the Arab countries from Turkey. But an arrangement of this kind would leave the position very much as it is to-day. It would abandon Anatolia to stew in her own juice. It might be possible to combine this step with the evacuation of Constantinople and with an Allied occupation of the Smyrna zone with the troops so withdrawn from Constantinople. If Greek troops were withdrawn from Smyrna without Allied occupation, the Greek minorities would be left to their fate. In any case, Mustapha would continue to be able to stir up the tribes against Mesopotamia. Anatolia, too, would remain closed to British trade, and in these days the recovery of those markets must be one of our most urgent considerations.

#### *Conclusion.*

10. Without the definite separation of Russia from Turkey, the indirect methods of pressure on Angora open to the Allies would probably be in the nature of palliatives to keep Greece in the field rather than to end Angora's resistance. It is possible, however, but not certain, that an offer of generous concessions to Turkey, combined with some clear indication that the Allies were united and prepared in the last resort to use the indirect means of pressure on Turkey and help to the Greeks indicated above, might make Mustapha think it worth while to yield.

#### *Annex.*

##### *Guarantees for Greek Population in event of unconditional Greek Evacuation of Smyrna.*

1. If the sovereignty and full executive power remains Turkish, it seems only a delusion to think that there can be any absolutely effective guarantee. All we can do is to reduce the chances of trouble. It will perhaps be more convenient to consider the temporary measures, necessary to tide over and follow evacuation by the Greeks, separately from the guarantees of a more permanent nature.

#### *Temporary Measures.*

2. With regard to the first, Allied officers might, as General Harington has suggested, be attached to the retiring Greek army and to the incoming Turkish forces.

3. The presence of the Allied commissions, suggested by the French, for three or

six months in the outer zone, and a year in the inner zone, would be of some moral effect, but a stronger Allied military force than the proposed "guard" would be desirable for the above transition period in each zone, if troops can be spared.

4. For the above periods in each zone, it might perhaps be stipulated that the only Turkish forces allowed should be, say, a platoon to show the flag in Smyrna, Brussa and one or two other military centres. This would be a sop to Turkish prestige, but not a danger to the minorities.

#### *Permanent Measures.*

5. Perhaps the most important of all the permanent safeguards is that of insisting that the clause in the Treaty of Sèvres providing for a large proportion of foreign officers in the Turkish gendarmerie shall be applied in the Smyrna zone. Possibly all the officers in the zone should be foreign. This will ensure that the world at large will have some idea of what is going on in remote villages, and that the gendarmerie will not readily be used for measures of wholesale persecution. The presence of these officers will be a better safeguard than that of consuls.

6. The minorities provisions of the Sèvres Treaty are likely to remain for the most part a dead letter, at any rate outside the sphere where foreign influence may be brought to bear. Nevertheless it seems important to maintain them. We should probably be able to obtain Turkish acceptance by making them applicable to cases where Turks have grievances against the Greeks. Mixed commissions of enquiry, with a chairman appointed by the League of Nations are, under these clauses, to enquire into deportations and to rehabilitate victims in their homes. The Turkish Government would probably be glad to accept these conditions if the Turks could profit by them also. It would be worth while to make some such concession in order to get the commissions established on the spot. Very much practical result to the commissions' enquiries may be impossible after so many years of warfare, but where any enquiry was possible a Turkish court of law would certainly be too pressed to deal with it. The mere presence, however, of these commissions in the districts will help to bring them within the pale of civilisation and to make the perpetration of horrors rather less likely.

7. The League of Nations has already appointed a commissioner at Constantinople to enquire into deportations. If the commissions of enquiry, instead of being responsible to the Allies as they are under the treaty, could be brought under this commissioner, the direct influence of the League, which would thus be brought to bear upon the state of affairs in the Smyrna zone, would be of very real value. For whatever may be the difficulties of bringing moral pressure to bear on Turkey while she is defying the Allies and at war, it is quite possible that in time of peace when she is anxious to join the League, that body and the Allies may successfully use on Turkey the weapon of publicity.

#### *Adrianople and Smyrna.*

8. Turkish law as it already stands provides for representation of all races on local councils, *e.g.*, the Smyrna Vilayet Council, the Smyrna Municipal Council and the Aivali Kaza Council. Turkish law also admits all races to government and municipal employment. Quite apart, therefore, from the similar provisions in the minority clauses of the Sèvres Treaty, it should be easy for us to stipulate, and for the Turks to agree, that the application of the guarantees already proposed for the Moslems in Adrianople and Eastern Thrace generally shall be contingent on the equitable application of these principles in the Smyrna zone.

9. The creation of any special separate status for Adrianople and Smyrna seems impracticable and on the whole undesirable. Economically both places are dependent on the surrounding country. Administratively it would be hard to find any Western precedent (*e.g.*, Hamburg, Fiume, Zara, Danzig) the working of which would be applicable to an Eastern town, and to cities without the traditions of a separate corporate existence behind them. Alexandria has a special municipal constitution for purely municipal administrative purposes, but it is cumbrous and is understood not to have worked very well. In any case, it was primarily designed to give a large share of control to the foreign European element—hardly existent in Adrianople.

*Foreign Office, February 6, 1922.*



*Memorandum by Mr. Ryan on Turkish Peace Prospects.*

PEACE with the present Angora Government is impossible except on the basis of the National Pact. I make this statement somewhat less confidently than I should have done before reading the French note of the 27th January, as, if that note is an authorised exposition of the Angora point of view, my statement becomes too sweeping. Nevertheless, I still believe it to be substantially true.

2. Peace with the Sultan's Government is useless unless and until its authority is restored over some respectable portion of Anatolia.

3. As regards Angora, recent indications point (a) to a definite rapprochement between Mustapha Kemal and the Bolsheviks; and (b) to the existence in Angora itself of a fairly strong opposition to Mustapha Kemal. He has kept the upper hand so far, and it is impossible to appraise the value of the various elements in the opposition to him, but one of them does seem to consist of persons who hanker after a more conservative attitude towards the Sultan.

4. The Constantinople Government is so impotent that it is practically meaningless to speak of its attitude *quâ* Government either towards Angora or towards the Powers. Views expressed by its members regarding possible terms of settlement have only the value of expressions of personal opinion, not necessarily even sincere.

5. All Turks who count for anything in the settlement are solid for securing the evacuation of Asia Minor and as much as possible of Eastern Thrace by the Greeks. As regards the western portion of Eastern Thrace, it is mainly a question of the town of Adrianople, which is a matter of prestige and intensely strong sentiment.

6. The majority of Turks who count for anything in the settlement wish to see foreign control of Turkish administration, judicial affairs, finance and economic development reduced to nil or to a minimum. The same applies to foreign intervention in the question of the minorities. The extent to which such control and intervention can be imposed depends on the extent to which the Allies are prepared in the last resort to see their settlement through by force.

7. If Mustapha Kemal maintains his ascendancy, the alternatives before the Allies are—

- (a.) To capitulate and to agree to the substance of the National Pact;
- (b.) To offer the terms which they themselves consider reasonable, and, on their being rejected, to join issue with Angora without further delay;
- (c.) To tolerate the continuance of the present situation; or
- (d.) To endeavour to promote the transference of power from Mustapha Kemal to more moderate elements and by making peace with those elements to avoid the necessity for coercion.

8. It is unnecessary for me to discuss alternatives (a) and (c). We may be worn down to (a) or Allied disunion may reduce us in practice to (c), but neither of them has anything to recommend it positively. As for (b), it would mean at the very least giving both moral and material support to the Greeks, which would defeat one of our main objects—that of conciliating Moslem opinion generally. It would probably involve even more, namely, direct Allied military effort.

9. Alternative (d) presents to my mind definite advantages, if Allied unity can be restored. The one hope of an early peaceful settlement on any basis other than the National Pact lies in the destruction of the ascendancy of Mustapha Kemal and the extremists. This would have to come partly from within Anatolia. The anti-Nationalist opposition in Constantinople is worthless. The Sultan's authority, though a real potential force, is a completely dormant one. Any attempt on the part of the Allies themselves to redress the balance between Constantinople and Angora by direct intervention would do more harm than good.

10. The Allies might, however, promote a readjustment of internal forces by offering a reasonable treaty and backing their proposals by a constructive policy. The indications mentioned above of divided councils at Angora afford some ground for hoping that, if the Sultan could come into the open with the promise of reasonably favourable peace terms and with the moral backing of the Allies, he could rally round him a portion of the Nationalists and gradually re-establish his authority.

11. The procedure to be followed by the Allies would be a matter of the utmost importance. They must not compromise the Sultan's chances of success by giving him

the appearance of a bond-slave of the Powers or an ally of the Greeks. They must allow for the constitutional difficulty of his ratifying a treaty without a Parliament, which is a real one. They must offer the best terms they can, but they must at the same time show that they are the best terms available for Turkey, and that every effort on her part to get more will be resisted by every means, including the ultimate use of coercion if necessary.

12. Assuming that an agreement can be arrived at between the three Great Allied Powers, the best procedure might be to embody the main lines of it, but not all the details, in an Act exchanged between them, and to invite the Turks and the Greeks to adhere to this Act as a preliminary to the assembling of a new conference of the three Powers, the Turks and the Greeks, which conference would discuss the reserved questions of details and draw up a new treaty. In drawing up such an Act it would be essential to make it clear for the benefit of Moslem opinion generally and of all Turks, but especially Turks of moderate tendency—

- (a.) That the three Powers desired to make every concession to Turkey compatible with their own interests and their obligations elsewhere.
- (b.) That the Allies sought to hold the scale evenly between Turks and Greeks.
- (c.) That the three Powers looked to moderate elements grouped round the Sultan for acceptance of the terms offered, even if Angora, as at present constituted, should reject them.
- (d.) That the Allies really meant to use coercive measures in the last resort.

13. In order to make it clear what I mean, I have prepared the attached draft of an Act of the kind I have in view. It is obviously of the most tentative description. Its eventual form would have to be the result of close and detailed discussion.

ANDREW RYAN.

February 7, 1922.

Annex.

*Draft of Act as suggested by Mr. Ryan.*

The three Powers, animated by a common desire for the pacification of the Near East, subscribed to a preliminary Act as follows:—

1. The three Powers desire to promote the establishment of a stable and durable Turkish State united under the sovereignty of the Sultan, subject to such constitutional arrangements as commend themselves to the Turkish people.

2. The three Powers desire to give satisfaction to the national aspirations of the Turkish people to the fullest extent compatible with the safeguarding of the interests of Allied subjects in Turkey, the protection of racial and religious minorities, and the freedom of the Straits.

3. The three Powers regard the Caliphate as a matter of exclusive Islamic concern. They declare, so far as they are concerned, that they will not influence Moslems subject to their authority or inhabiting their countries under their mandate to refuse to recognise the Caliphate of Constantinople, or promote the setting up of any other Caliphate in opposition to that of Constantinople. They reaffirm their intention to ensure the maintenance of the special rights of Moslems in matters of personal status and matters of purely religious concerns, and to ensure respect for Wakf foundations in territory detached from Turkey, subject to the exercise by the sovereign authorities of such territory of rights of supervision similar to those formerly exercised by the Turkish Government.

4. The three Powers propose the following basis of a peace settlement between that part of Turkey which is at war with Greece and between the Allies generally and Turkey:—

- (a.) The European frontier of Turkey shall be the Enos-Midia line.\*

\* (a) and (b) represent an attempt to combine Sir H. Rumbold's view that Enos-Midia is the least that any Turkish Government will accept with His Majesty's Government's proposal to the French. The fact that the French, who have been in close touch with Angora, have themselves proposed to deprive Turkey of the Gallipoli Peninsula might well modify Sir H. Rumbold's view, and it may be easier than was thought in Constantinople a fortnight ago to confine the Turks to the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles.



- (b.) The territory included between the Enos-Midia line and the Midia-Rodosto line, including the Gallipoli Peninsula, shall be demilitarised, subject to the maintenance of public order by a force of gendarmerie, to be organised under the supervision of the Sub-Committee of Gendarmerie established at Constantinople.
- (c.) Article 36 of the Treaty of Sèvres, relative to Constantinople, shall be cancelled. Articles 37-61, relative to the Straits, shall be maintained in principle, subject to the discussion of any points of detail raised by the Turkish Government with a view to reconciling them with the principle of Turkish sovereignty.
- (d.) Article 86 of the Treaty of Sèvres shall be revised in such a manner as to define more precisely the obligations of the Greek Government in regard to Moslems in Thrace and the status of Adrianople.
- (e.) The Greek Government shall completely evacuate Asia Minor, subject to the creation of a special régime under Turkish sovereignty for the city of Smyrna and an area to be determined later.
- (f.) The Asiatic land frontiers of Turkey shall be the line prescribed in the recent Franco-Kemalist Agreement; the northern frontier of Mesopotamia as laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres, subject to any modifications which may be agreed upon by the British, Turkish and Irak Governments; the existing Turco-Persian frontier; and the old Russo-Turkish frontier.\*
- (g.) The three Powers desire to place the protection of racial and religious minorities in Turkey and New Greece under the supervision of the League of Nations, with a view to secure the same objects, as far as possible, by the same means as are laid down in the treaties concluded between the Allies and certain European Powers. Having regard, however, to the acuteness of the feeling which exists, to the remoteness of the places affected, and to the consequences of the deplorable events of the last eight years, they consider it necessary—

- (i.) That the League of Nations should have the right to maintain resident or travelling representatives in such parts of Turkey and New Greece as the Council of the League think fit;
- (ii.) That the traditional privileges of the non-Moslem communities in Turkey shall be maintained intact; and
- (iii.) That special provisions on the lines of articles 142 and 144 of the Treaty of Sèvres should be made in order to repair, as far as possible, the consequences of the policy pursued by the former Turkish Government during the period of hostilities.

- (h.) The military clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres shall be modified to the extent necessary for the defence of, and maintenance of order in, the future territory of Turkey, the principle that the Turkish army and gendarmerie shall be recruited by voluntary enlistment being maintained.
- (i.) The financial and economic clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres shall be modified in such a way as to reconcile the principle of Turkish sovereignty with the amount of control necessary to ensure the payment of Turkish debts to the Allies, including war claims, and the development of the resources of Turkey in such a manner as to expedite the payment of those claims. Foreigners shall not enjoy differential treatment in Turkey in respect of fiscal burdens, subject to the provision of safeguards against excessive taxation and abuse in the collection of taxes.
- (j.) Provision shall be made for the establishment of a unified judicial system in Turkey, subject to—
- (i.) The maintenance as a provisional measure of a judicial system for Allied subjects based on the Capitulations and the recent arrangements for a Mixed Court.
  - (ii.) The substitution as soon as possible for the Capitulations of a system providing the safeguards necessary to protect the personal liberty and property of Allied subjects until such time as the League of Nations shall consider the judicial system of

\* This is simply based on the Treaty of Sèvres, but the question would of course arise whether the Turks should be allowed to retain the territory in Transcaucasia ceded to them under the Treaty of Kars.

- Turkey to have reached such a level as to make special safeguards unnecessary.
- (iii.) The maintenance of the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts in matters exclusively concerning Allied subjects and matters of the personal status and family rights of Allied subjects.

5. As soon as the Greek and Turkish Governments shall have declared their adhesion to the present Act, the three Powers will be prepared to meet their representatives at a conference to be held at Constantinople not later than \_\_\_\_\_ for the preparation of a new treaty of peace, to which the other Allied Governments will be invited to adhere after it has been ratified by the parties to the conference. This conference will also determine the modalities of the retransfer to Turkey of the territories at present occupied by Greek troops east of the Enos-Midia line and in Asia Minor.

6. The three Powers mutually pledge themselves to co-operate in all measures of a naval, financial and economic description necessary to secure the acceptance of the present Act in the event of the Governments of Turkey or Greece refusing to adhere to it.

7. The three Powers recognise that the attitude of the Angora authorities must be a material factor in determining the success or failure of their efforts to promote peace. They desire to bring the points of view of the Constantinople Government and the Angora authorities into harmony on the basis of the present Act. In the event of the Constantinople Government adhering to the Act without being able to ensure the co-operation of the Angora authorities, the three Powers will give the Sultan and his Government their full moral support in re-establishing their authority. They will, in that event, postpone the proposed conference until the Sultan and the Constantinople Government have had a reasonable time to re-establish their authority.

8. The three Powers will evacuate Constantinople within six months of the ratification of a new treaty based on the present Act by a Turkish Parliament representing the territories to be included thereunder in Turkey and recognising the authority of the Sultan. They will take such action with the Greek Government as may be necessary to ensure the free election of representatives in such a Parliament in the territories at present occupied by Greece.

February 1, 1922.

[E 1547/5/44]

No. 28.

*Memorandum by Mr. Ryan respecting the Evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek Troops.*

THE Department have asked for my views as to what might be expected to follow if the Greeks decided to evacuate Asia Minor in the immediate future, following on a refusal of British financial assistance.

2. The gravest feature of this would be that the Brussa and Angora areas would pass directly under the Kemalist Government. The Central Government has no forces with which to replace the Greek army, even if they wished to do so. Angora would rejoice in a crowning victory in Asiatic Turkey and would be less amenable than ever to Allied terms regarding Thrace or matters of immediate concern to the Allies. The native Greek population would be in great danger. The situation would be far worse than in Cilicia. The Kemalist authorities would doubtless wish to avoid massacre, but the temptation to pursue a policy of revenge would be almost impossible to resist. The Greeks would probably be harried by every means short of officially countenanced massacre, and deportations and sporadic massacre might be expected to occur.

3. The Allied position in Constantinople would also be very seriously menaced. The Kemalists, now fairly secure on the Caucasian frontier, completely secure in Cilicia and relieved of the necessity for operations against the Greeks, would have a strong temptation to liquidate the situation at the Dardanelles and in Constantinople. They might hesitate to attack Allied forces immediately, but nothing except their own hesitation and their hope of seeing the Allies leave of their own accord need restrain them. If the Allies showed no inclination to leave of their own accord, the Kemalists might easily make up their minds to attack the British forces at the Dardanelles and on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. The French would probably be only too ready in these circumstances to evacuate Constantinople, and, subject to military opinion, I doubt whether the British forces alone could hold it.



4. The Greek evacuation of Asia Minor might thus easily be the prelude to a termination of the Allied occupation of Constantinople. This would probably be the end of the Constantinople Government and the present Sultan and the beginning of a new Turco-Greek war in Thrace.

5. An alternative danger is that the Kemalists might leave Constantinople alone for the present, but concentrate their attention on Northern Mesopotamia with a view to the recovery of Mosul, with the object of placing His Majesty's Government in a similar position to that which the French occupied in Cilicia.

6. While the exact nature of these ulterior consequences must be a matter of speculation, I am convinced that a hurried Greek evacuation of Asia Minor, coming before any attempt at a general settlement, would be fraught with very serious consequences for the British position in the Near East, and would render a peaceful settlement on any terms other than the acceptance of the National Pact almost impossible.

7. Kemalism would receive an enormous accession of strength in Turkey and an enormous accession of prestige in Islamic countries. In my opinion, therefore, no stone should be left unturned to deter the Greeks from evacuating Asia Minor precipitately, appeal being made to the interests of the Christians in Asia Minor and their own interests in Thrace; and every effort should be made to accelerate a general settlement, of which the eventual evacuation of Asia Minor would form part.

A. RYAN.

February 9, 1922.

[E 1252/5/44]

No. 29.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 426.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 13, 1922.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 306 of the 3rd February, I find that I have not yet instructed your Excellency to make any reply to the note of the 2nd February from the French President of the Council to me regarding the Eastern question.

2. As your Excellency is aware from my despatch No. 405 of the 9th February, I have already explained to the French Ambassador my gratification at the conciliatory tone of M. Poincaré's note, and at his evident desire, which I cordially reciprocate, to reach an Allied agreement on the subject at Paris. Without entering on any detailed discussion of the contents of the note I shall be glad if your Excellency will thank M. Poincaré and renew an expression of these sentiments. You may say at the same time that I do not underrate either the difficulties or responsibilities with which both Governments are faced in securing the cessation of fighting in Asia Minor and the restoration of peace with Turkey. In particular Marshal Foch's memorandum is receiving the careful consideration of His Majesty's Government from this point of view, and, as I informed the Comte de Saint-Aulaire, I hope, before or at the forthcoming conference, to have some suggestions to make regarding the possible methods of securing the acceptance of the agreed Allied terms. For the rest, I am hopeful that if our two Governments approach the examination of these problems in the spirit which characterises M. Poincaré's note, a satisfactory solution will soon be found.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1680/5/44]

No. 30.

*Sir A. Block to Sir B. Blackett.—(Communicated by Treasury, February 14.)*

*Provisional Financial Commission of Control,  
Constantinople, January 26, 1922.*

My dear Blackett,

IN my immediately preceding letter I made some general observations about the financial clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres, and in conclusion I stated that Mustapha Kemal and his gang would only accept complete fiscal independence. We must not lose sight of the fact that the extremists of Angora or in Constantinople will not accept the treaty on the lines we are likely to offer, unless thereby the Turks acquire greater independence financially, economically and politically than they had before the war. I

am of opinion, therefore, that at the present moment no negotiations on the treaty in general will succeed. I believe that there must be a preliminary step to all negotiations, and that is to settle the territorial questions of Smyrna and Thrace.

I consider that the settlement of these questions is of the greatest urgency, since if the Turkish armies settle them the pretensions of Mustapha Kemal will become more impossible than they are to-day.

Another cogent reason for considering this question at an early date is that it is the presence of the Greeks on Turkish territory which gives Mustapha Kemal his influence and power, and the settlement of all the other parts of the treaty will become easier once the extremists at Angora have been deprived of their grievance in respect of the Greeks.

If Mustapha Kemal has been able to mobilise the Anatolian peasants and to maintain the semblance of an army, it is simply and solely because the Greeks went to Smyrna and are in Thrace. It is in order to turn out the Greeks that the Anatolian peasant has been persuaded to fight. He has had ten years of war and wants peace, but he will continue to bear the burden of heavy taxation and of conscription as long as the Greeks are on what he considers to be his own soil. If the question of Smyrna and Thrace are settled it will make a great change in the position of Mustapha Kemal. He will certainly try to make capital out of it, but he will not be contented, nevertheless, and will endeavour to impose unacceptable conditions on the Allies.

I maintain that in this he should fail. The peasants of Anatolia are not likely to rally round him in order to fight against the Sultan or against the Allies for economic or financial advantages which they will not understand and which in the long run will not affect them detrimentally. The extremists may wish to continue the struggle, but the moderates will prefer to rally to the Sultan and come to terms with Constantinople.

Would it not be well, therefore, to take the urgent question first, and after a settlement with the Greeks call up the Turks of Constantinople, and, if you like, of Angora at the same time, and wait to see what proposals they will make as to the modifications of the clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres, always holding over their head the threat that unless they agree to a reasonable treaty they will not get satisfaction over the questions of Thrace and Smyrna? It is a well-known principle that in dealing with the Oriental one should always leave it to him to make the first offer. The French seem to be doing exactly the contrary, and in my humble opinion they will find themselves mistaken. The more you give Mustapha Kemal the more he will ask for; whereas, if the Sultan and the moderates agree to the Treaty of Sèvres with slight modifications, once the Greeks are out of Anatolia and out of Thrace the Kemal Party will disintegrate.

For these reasons I maintain it is of the first necessity for the Allies to come to an understanding as to what they are going to do with the Greeks, before making any proposals with regard to the modifications of the other parts of the Treaty of Sèvres.

All the Turks who are in Angora or in Constantinople, with the exception of a small party round the Sultan, can now be termed Kemalists; but there are Kemalists by conviction and Kemalists by necessity, and even among the former are a large number of moderates as well as the "die-hards." The mass of the peasants in Anatolia are Kemalists only by necessity, and once the Greeks are gone would be only too pleased to be relieved of the Kemal domination.

In Constantinople, again, there are few Kemalists by conviction. They know well enough that if the Kemalists returned in the plenitude of power to the capital there would not be enough posts to go round, and that what posts there are would go to the Angora extremists. They are apprehensive of what will happen to them unless they profess to be Kemalists.

If the representatives of Angora and Constantinople could be called up together, preferably to London, or, if not, to Rome, and a fair and acceptable treaty were presented to them with the distinct understanding that this was their last chance and that the alternative would mean a prolongation of the present deadlock, and perhaps the adoption of coercive measures, the moderates, I think, would come into line. There are already divisions in the Angora camp, and I believe that when the Kemalists and the army know that they are no longer up against Greece, but up against England and the Powers, many of them will show little desire to continue fighting.

Even assuming that there be a deadlock, it should be possible to establish a state of things in Constantinople and in the zone of the Straits vastly superior to the state of things in the Kemal regions, and if Angora still holds out the Anatolian population will eventually come to envy the lot of their more fortunate compatriots in districts



under Allied control, where there would be no conscription and where security and order is maintained, thus enabling everyone to go about his business without interference.

This object can be attained, I am sure, provided that the Allies work with the Turkish Government, and not against them, and it will follow that Mustapha Kemal will lose what authority and influence he may have and that the population will eventually rally round the Sultan.

If you think anything I say of any value at the present time, please make use of it as you deem proper.

Yours sincerely,  
ADAM BLOCK.

[E 1664/53/44]

No. 31.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 14.)*

(No. 133.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 3, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that considerable comment has been caused in the local French and Greek press by a formal call paid by Mgr. Dolci, the Apostolic delegate at Constantinople, on the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

2. Mgr. Dolci's visit was made in order that he might thank the Patriarchate for the sympathy which it had expressed on the death of the Pope. The interview is reported to have been most cordial, and the Apostolic delegate was accorded the greatest possible honours both on his arrival and on his departure.

3. This interchange of official courtesies is rendered the more noteworthy, as it is stated to be the first time since the fall of Constantinople that anything of this nature has taken place. The press anticipates great results from these initial steps towards what it hopes will be a better understanding between the two Churches. The "Proodos" indeed goes so far as to say that this visit will find an echo in every Orthodox heart, which will be reminded of the happy time, when the bonds which joined the two great columns of Christianity were cordial and sincere. "It only remains," it concludes, "for us to continue on these lines together with sincere zeal to bring to an end every division which wounds not only the religion of Christ, but also the whole of mankind."

4. Mgr. Dolci is reported to have expressed regret at not being able to converse in Greek; he took the opportunity, however, of quoting a few lines of Homer.

5. I have forwarded a copy of this despatch to the Count de Salis.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

[E 1667/5/44]

No. 32.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 14.)*

(No. 136.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 5, 1922.

IN my telegram No. 64 I had the honour to report that Hamid Bey had visited me to say that Youssouf Kemal, the Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs, was contemplating an immediate visit to Europe to explain the Nationalist point of view to the Allied Governments, and wished to know whether your Lordship would receive him. I ascertained that Hamid Bey had already approached my Allied colleagues in the same sense, and, according to his account, one of them had said that he must refer to his Government, whilst the other had replied that there would be no objection to the proposed visit.

2. I subsequently ascertained that Hamid Bey had made these enquiries of my colleagues at least a week before he approached me.

3. The French Acting High Commissioner informed Hamid Bey that M. Poincaré would willingly receive Youssouf Kemal Bey, but that the latter could not take part in the forthcoming conference at Paris, although there would be no objection to his being "dans les coulisses."

4. In discussing Youssouf Kemal's project with me, Hamid Bey stated that the Greek Ministers had apparently spared no effort in putting the Greek cause before

the Allied Governments. It was high time that the Nationalists did the same. I said that the proposed visit came a little late in the day, but I expressed the personal opinion that your Lordship would receive Youssouf Kemal Bey just as you had received Bekir Sami Bey. I warned Hamid Bey, however, that it would be well if Youssouf Kemal Bey had real authority to speak on behalf of the Angora Government.

5. Hamid Bey said that the visit would be an unofficial one and that Youssouf Kemal Bey would be accompanied by two advisers and perhaps two secretaries. As he expressed apprehension regarding the safety of Youssouf Kemal Bey whilst at Constantinople, I said that this town was in Allied occupation, and that I did not think there was any possibility of the Greek authorities interfering with Youssouf Kemal Bey's movements. I gather that Hamid Bey is afraid that the Greek authorities may attempt to seize Youssouf Kemal Bey on his way from Ismidt to Haidar Pasha, and I am keeping General Harington informed of the development of this matter.

6. Hamid Bey explained that Youssouf Kemal Bey wished to come to Constantinople primarily to see the Allied High Commissioners. He would no doubt talk with such Turkish Ministers as were personally known to him.

7. On receipt of your Lordship's telegram to the effect that you would receive Youssouf Kemal Bey, I informed Hamid Bey accordingly, and the latter appeared gratified at the rapidity with which he had received an answer to his enquiry.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 1669/18/44]

No. 33.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 14.)*

(No. 139.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 6, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 39 of the 10th ultimo, in which I forwarded a résumé of a report which I had received from the Armenian Patriarchate relative to the situation of the Armenian population in Cilicia, I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, two extracts from a further report received through the Armenian Patriarchate from Beirut, dated the 5th January, which give additional details of the exodus of the Christian population from Cilicia.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 33.

*Extracts from Report sent through Armenian Patriarchate, Beirut.*

TOUS les Arméniens d'Adana, de Tarsous, de Deurt-Yol et de Djébéli-Béréket ont émigré. A peine une soixantaine restent encore à Adana et peut-être une vingtaine à Mersine; tandis qu'à Deurt-Yol et à Djébéli-Béréket on ne trouve pas un seul Arménien.

A Killis et à Aintab, l'exode continue lentement autant que les moyens disponibles le permettent. L'élément fortuné a déjà quitté cette dernière ville, où environ 5,000 Arméniens restent encore, n'ayant pas les ressources nécessaires pour s'expatrier et les autorités françaises n'ayant pris aucune disposition pour cette région. Mais c'est bien malgré eux qu'ils y restent.

Le transport en Syrie des réfugiés arméniens rassemblés à Mersine s'est effectué par les soins d'une compagnie de navigation française, moyennant finances. Le prix du passage de Mersine à Beyrouth était de 855 piastres par personne et les bateaux étaient bondés. Arrivés en Syrie, les réfugiés étaient obligés de voir eux-mêmes comment ils pourraient se procurer leurs subsistances, car les autorités françaises ne semblent rien vouloir faire sous ce rapport. Il n'est même fait aucune réduction aux réfugiés qui veulent se rendre en chemin de fer à Damas. Seulement quelques trains spéciaux furent formés que les émigrés purent utiliser en payant leurs places. Les



bagages étaient transportés gratuitement, car les voyageurs payaient le prix de la troisième classe et prenaient le fourgon.

Voici les renseignements fournis par des voyageurs arrivés à Beyrouth, sur la situation actuelle d'Adana :

Les autorités kémalistes ont fait bien piètre figure à leur arrivée à Adana, car elles manquent d'argent et d'organisation. La situation générale dans la ville même est bien triste. Ce sont les Français qui ont fourni jusqu'à l'uniforme aux soldats et gendarmes kémalistes qui devaient faire leur entrée triomphale dans la cité ; mais les indigènes sont au courant de la chose et ne se laissent pas autrement impressionner.

Environ 900 gendarmes et un bataillon de soldats seulement ont été envoyés à Adana. Tous les fonctionnaires ont été remplacés, même les huissiers et les concierges. De cette manière un grand mécontentement s'est fait jour parmi les fonctionnaires remerciés. On parle même d'indices pour un mouvement anti-kémaliste.

D'autre part, la situation économique y est déplorable et entièrement bouleversée. La ville est remplie d'émigrés turcs et kurdes qui mendient dans les rues toute la journée. Il n'y a pas un seul artisan, ni un seul négociant. On pense généralement que cela ne peut pas durer. C'est également l'avis d'Abdurrahman Bey, ex-Sous-Gouverneur d'Adana, et du Gouverneur d'Aintab, qui se trouvent actuellement à Beyrouth.

Beyrouth, le 5 janvier 1922.

[E 1671/247/44]

No. 34.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 146. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 7, 1922.

I HAVE had the honour recently to receive several despatches from your Lordship, notably No. 1301 of the 28th November, No. 1356 of the 10th December, No. 9 of the 2nd January and No. 88 of the 23rd January, in regard to American activities in Anatolia.

2. It is somewhat difficult to ascertain precisely how much truth there is in the various rumours which are current here and elsewhere respecting these activities. Many of them are doubtless exaggerated and refer to schemes which may even exist only in imagination. They represent, however, a general tendency, namely, the fixed intention of the United States to extend their markets in the Near East, with particular regard to valuable oil-fields which are known to exist in the eastern provinces of Anatolia, the Caucasus and Persia. In this respect American activities here are part, and probably an important part, of the general American oil world campaign.

3. It is perhaps worthy of note that the two principal questions in regard to which the Allied High Commissioners here have come into conflict with their American colleague concern the affairs of the Standard Oil Company, namely, the consumption tax on oil and the storage of inflammable liquids. To such an extent has this been the case that it would be scarcely unreasonable to draw the conclusion that American policy here is largely dictated by the interests of oil in general and of that company in particular.

4. However, while there is no question as to the determination of Americans to seize as large a share as they can of both trade and oil in the Near East, I am, generally speaking, under the impression that, while much is contemplated, little definite has as yet been accomplished. The situation in Anatolia is still too uncertain and the validity of the signature to concessions still too insecure to permit of definite transactions, in spite of the mutual desire on the part of Americans for concessions and the Angora Government for money, and especially American money, as less tainted than some other coinages. It would be in fact but natural that, as referred to in your Lordship's despatch No. 1301, the Government of the Grand National Assembly should, in its undoubted financial difficulties, be anxious to raise a loan in America in return for those mining and other concessions which are their only *quid pro quo*. But for the reason stated above I cannot believe that any bargain has yet been struck, nor would it yet seem an opportune moment for a Turkish commission to visit America.

5. I have been unable so far to confirm the report mentioned in your Lordship's

despatch No. 1356 as to the efforts of the Standard Oil Company to acquire a seat on the board of the Anatolian Railway Company. There are, nevertheless, so many wheels within wheels in a complicated negotiation of this nature that it is quite possible that such an attempt is being made.

6. Your Lordship will doubtless have received through the S.I.S. copies of various reports on American commercial activities in this part of the world which have been drawn up by their representative in Constantinople. I would refer you in this connection to—

H. Constantinople, No. 2539 of January	7,
" No. 2555	" 13,
" No. 2558	" 13,
" No. 2562	" 14, and
" No. 2607	" 31 last.

7. There have also been frequent references in the Angora and Constantinople press to these activities, and I have the honour to enclose herein a memorandum by the commercial secretary to this high commission on the subject.

8. There has been much comment here on the recent visit to Angora of Mr. Gillespie, the commercial attaché to the United States High Commission (please see my telegram No. 10 of the 5th January), and it has been widely announced that he was returning with various signed concessions in his pocket.

9. I do not, however, anticipate any particularly tangible results of his mission. The version of it as officially given by the United States High Commission, namely, that Mr. Gillespie had been sent to study and report on the commercial possibilities of Anatolia for American trade, is probably more correct. It is likely also that a subsidiary object, as mentioned in Captain Munroe's memorandum, was the disposal of the large American stocks accumulated here some time ago in a mistaken anticipation of the reopening of trade in South Russia.

10. It would seem, in fact, to me only natural that Mr. Gillespie's mission was of the nature of a general survey. That object is in itself of sufficient importance, and indeed a necessary preliminary, to more definite action. If his report be of a favourable nature, American groups and financiers will be encouraged to go a step farther than they have hitherto done. It is certain that they are merely waiting for the suitable moment to do so.

11. I am replying to your Lordship's despatch No. 88, Secret, of the 23rd January last in a separate despatch.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Memorandum.

THE American High Commissioner informed Sir Horace Rumbold that his commercial attaché, Mr. Gillespie, had left Constantinople for Angora during the third week in December, expressly for the purpose of studying commercial conditions in the interior of Anatolia.

Mr. Gillespie went by the Ineboli-Castamouni route and is returning by way of Mersina, thus making a fairly comprehensive tour of Anatolia. He is expected back in Constantinople by the 20th February. During his absence various articles have appeared in local newspapers in this connection :—

The "Tefhid-i-Efkâr" states that he has applied on behalf of an American capitalist group for powers to complete the construction of the Angora-Erzzeroum and the Angora-Sivas Railways and for constructional rights of the harbour of Samsoun and Ineboli. The principle has been accepted that these enterprises shall be carried out by Turkish companies formed by American capitalists. Further, an application has been made for the organisation of a motor-lorry service and for the construction of bonded warehouses in various parts of the country. After Mr. Gillespie's return certain Americans acting for the capitalists will visit Angora for more detailed discussions, and the agreements will be drafted by them.

The "Yeni Gün" states that Mr. Gillespie's visit to Angora is partly for the purpose of obtaining concessions and also to convince himself as to whether or not



Anatolia is solvent, and to what extent the Angora Government can supply guarantees in return for American capital. Mr. Gillespie states that there are now in Constantinople a number of companies with American capital who want to enter into business relations with Anatolia. There is, for example, one company which is ready to put 100 million dollars to use for the construction of new railways.

The "Yeni Dunya" states that representatives of three powerful American syndicates are making overtures at Angora for the purpose of obtaining the rights for the construction of railways between Riza Bayazid and Samsoun-Adalia. They have proposed to the Government to cede to them 45 per cent. of the revenues of these lines.

Various articles have appeared in the papers published in Anatolia during the current year in connection with the proposed construction of new railways in Asia Minor, and as far back as April the Commissioner of Public Works at Angora had drawn up a scheme by which he proposed to grant concessions to foreign countries for the construction of railways between the following towns:—

Ineboli-Castamouni-Angora.  
Adalia-Courdour-Konia-Cesarea-Yozgar-Angora.  
Adana-Konia-Angora.  
Kars-Erzoroum-Erzindjian-Angora.

Mr. MacDowell, to whom reference was made in a despatch No. 1264, dated the 10th December, from the British Ambassador in Washington, arrived in Constantinople some weeks ago and has presumably been awaiting information as to the result of Mr. Gillespie's preliminary negotiations.

The "Vakit" states that he informed their representative that he intended shortly to go to Angora, and that his group propose to place in Anatolia a capital of from 50 to 100 million dollars in return for concessions of railways, mines and bridges. Later he proposes to establish sugar factories. It is intended that the Turkish public should subscribe 25 per cent. of the capital if they so desire, otherwise the full amount will be subscribed by the American group. Practically the entire capital is American, a small portion only being Canadian. In the event of successful negotiations, work is to commence in the spring of 1922. Mr. McDowell left for Angora during the first week in February.

Apart from concession-hunting on behalf of American interests, in which, in my opinion, Mr. Gillespie is undoubtedly engaged, he is also trying to unload the large quantity of goods that Mr. Mason Day, managing director of the American Foreign Trade Corporation, had landed in Constantinople in 1920 for the purpose of transshipment to Russia, which owing to the *débâcle* he has been unable to get rid of. In this connection it is interesting to note that Mr. Mason Day is the president of the International Barnsdall Corporation, a newly formed subsidiary company of the well-known and very powerful Barnsdall Corporation. Mr. Mason Day has recently left Constantinople for the Caucasus also for the purpose of obtaining oil and mining concessions.

Mention was made in S.I.S. Report H.C. 2558 that Mr. Price, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce, was recently sent to Angora as a result of negotiations on behalf of the Standard Oil Company. It appears that this report is entirely erroneous. Mr. Price has no connection whatsoever with the American Chamber of Commerce. He is a free-lance journalist in search of copy, and has recently returned to Constantinople.

The Mr. Jobler mentioned in the same report is probably Mr. Joblin Miller, who received a passport to proceed to Belgrade some weeks ago.

[E 1632/900/44]

No. 35.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 372.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 12, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a note which I have received from the President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to that which I addressed to his Excellency on the 2nd February, in accordance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram No. 32 of the

1st February. A copy of my note was forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 300 of the 2nd February.

Your Lordship will observe from M. Poincaré's note that the French Government do not consider that the secretaries' notes reporting the proceedings of the meeting of the Supreme Council at San Remo on the 24th April, 1920, have an official character, and that they hold that the decisions of the San Remo meeting deal with Palestine alone, and that they can only come into force when the Sèvres Treaty, or another treaty taking its place, has been duly ratified.

I venture further specially to draw your Lordship's attention to the last paragraph of the note of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which the French Government definitely claim the right to protect Catholic interests in the Ottoman Empire. This claim appears to conflict with the statement which, according to the *procès-verbal* of the San Remo meeting of the 24th April, 1920, was made by Signor Nitti and agreed to by M. Millerand, and which laid down that "there will no longer be any question of the protection of the Catholics in the East by one nation or another."

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

Enclosure in No. 35.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères,  
Paris, le 11 février 1922.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser, le 2 février, touchant les incidents qui se sont produits à Constantinople à l'occasion du service funèbre à la mémoire de Sa Sainteté le Pape Benoît XV.

Je souhaiterais vivement de pouvoir donner au Haut-Commissaire de la République des instructions conformes aux vœux du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

Mais, à mon très grand regret, il n'en saurait être ainsi, la France n'ayant jamais renoncé, ni à San-Remo, ni ailleurs, aux droits et prérogatives que lui reconnaissent les traités internationaux dans l'ensemble des territoires soumis à la souveraineté du Sultan.

Si votre Excellence veut bien se reporter aux notes des secrétaires de la Conférence de San-Remo, encore que ces documents n'aient pas la valeur de procès-verbaux officiels révisés et signés par les parties en cause, elle y verra que les décisions de San-Remo s'appliquent à la Palestine seule, comme le protocole de 1863 s'appliquait à la Grèce seule, et non aux territoires qui, comme Constantinople, n'ont pas cessé d'appartenir à l'Empire ottoman.

Je m'empresse d'ajouter que, même en ce qui concerne la Palestine, la renonciation de la France au protectorat des catholiques ne saurait avoir pour effet que l'abolition des privilèges d'ordre temporel, civil et politique, c'est-à-dire du droit de défendre les intérêts des individus ou communautés catholiques à l'égard de la Puissance occupante. Il n'appartenait pas au Gouvernement français de faire supprimer les honneurs liturgiques que l'Église catholique a établis à l'égard des représentants de la France au cours des cérémonies religieuses, dont l'ordonnance ne peut être réglée que par les autorités ecclésiastiques compétentes. C'est pourquoi le Président du Conseil français a pu faire admettre par la conférence que le Vatican n'était pas partie dans la question alors débattue.

S'il s'était agi à ce moment d'établir un ordre nouveau des cérémonies liturgiques, il eût été impossible de soutenir que le Vatican n'était pas partie dans le débat, puisque dans l'Église catholique le Saint-Siège seul est qualifié, comme il le proclame lui-même au canon 1257 de son code, pour y apporter les modifications qu'il peut juger convenables.

M. Millerand a pu accorder à M. Nitti "qu'il n'y aura lieu à aucune réclamation contre les religieux qui ne voudront pas rendre les honneurs à la nation qui les réclame." Mais il n'a pas dit, et il ne pouvait pas dire, que la France dût renoncer à ces honneurs là où les religieux seraient disposés à les lui rendre, soit de leur propre mouvement, soit par ordre du Saint-Siège.

Enfin, votre Excellence voudra bien reconnaître que les décisions de San-Remo, base du Traité de Sèvres, ne sauraient avoir leur efficacité qu'au jour où ce traité, ou tout autre analogue, sera mis en vigueur. Aussi, le Gouvernement français serait-il



fondé à demander jusqu'à nouvel ordre le maintien du *statu quo*, même en Palestine, si l'autorité n'y était dès à présent exercée par le Gouvernement britannique.

A plus forte raison ne saurait-il abandonner à Constantinople l'exercice d'aucun des droits que lui confèrent des traités internationaux dont l'effet n'est pas aboli.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique reconnaîtra, je n'en puis douter, le bien-fondé de cette thèse, et ne contestera pas au Haut-Commissaire de la République à Constantinople le droit non seulement de réclamer ses prérogatives traditionnelles dans les cérémonies liturgiques du culte catholique, mais encore de s'acquitter de tous les devoirs qui incombent au représentant de la Puissance protectrice des intérêts catholiques dans l'Empire ottoman.

Veuillez agréer, &c.  
R. POINCARÉ.

[E 1736/5/44]

No. 36.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).*

(No. 128.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 14, 1922.*

THE Italian Ambassador, in the course of a conversation with me this afternoon, made a number of observations on different aspects of the European situation, namely, the projected Near Eastern Conference at Paris, the Genoa Conference and other matters which it is not necessary to relate here, but which left on my mind the general impression that Paris is doing what it can to disturb the close understanding that has recently grown up between the Italian Government and ourselves, and to win Italy over to her side. The conversation that took place between us on these subjects gave me an opportunity of making a statement to his Excellency which it seems of greater importance to place on record.

I reminded him that ever since the Marquis della Torretta had assumed office I had pursued a policy of absolute candour and sincerity with him, assuming throughout that our interests and objects in the East were identical, that our point of view was on the whole the same, and that we were going to Paris with a single-hearted desire to bring the French into line with us in order to arrive at a common solution. As regards the Italian aspect of the case, arising out of the Tripartite Agreement, I had always promised the Italian Government our loyal assistance in enabling her to obtain the substance of the advantages which that agreement had secured for her, even although it was impossible, owing to the changed circumstances, to secure them in the same form. Exactly what pressure it might be possible to bring to bear on the Angora Government it was beyond my power to predict; but, so far as Great Britain was concerned, she was willing to adhere to and to implement the self-denying ordinance into which she had entered at San Remo, and to do her best to help Italy to realise her aims. In these circumstances I told the Ambassador that I was a good deal surprised and distressed at the evidence which more than once reached me in the last few weeks of an inclination on the part of Italy to make a bargain out of her support, and even to threaten its withdrawal unless at Paris or elsewhere we did exactly what she desired.

This astonishment on my part had reached its culminating point when only this morning I had received a telegram from your Excellency recording an interview yesterday with the Marquis della Torretta, in which the latter had sought an early expression of my views with regard to the Italian financial proposals in Turkey, inasmuch as the whole attitude of the Italian Government on the question of the Near East would depend on what they were. The Marquis della Torretta had added that much pressure was being brought to bear on him from Paris to take the French side in the forthcoming discussions, and that if His Majesty's Government felt able to accept the Italian proposals and support them, we could count on his whole-hearted support, but otherwise we could not be assured of it.

This, I said to Signor de Martino, was an attitude on the part of his Government which seemed to me quite unworthy and to indicate a spirit which was not at all hopeful for the success of our discussions. I had hitherto believed that the Italian Government, like ourselves, were going into the conference, not with the idea of extracting individual advantage from it or of holding a pistol at each other's head if we did not obtain it, but of bringing about a cessation of the warfare and a return of peace to the East. I for my part could not approach the conference in any other spirit, and must decline to yield to any pressure of the sort to which I had referred.

His Excellency agreed cordially with me in admitting the impropriety of the

attitude reported in the telegram from you, if it correctly represented what the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said, and I feel sure that he will convey to his chief the reproach which my protest involved.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1866/5/44]

No. 37.

*Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.—(Received February 18.)*

SINCE my arrival in London I have been struck by the fluidity of official opinion as to the course which His Majesty's Government should take in the next phase of the Turkish question.

Four main lines of thought appear to prevail, namely:—

- (a.) That there is nothing for it but to go in with the Greeks again, so far as this can be done without giving them Government money and without putting troops into Anatolia.
- (b.) That there is nothing for it but to let the Turks and Greeks fight another round without any departure from Allied neutrality as it operates at present.
- (c.) That a settlement in the Near East is contingent on a settlement with Russia, and that, therefore, no progress can be made until after the Genoa Conference.
- (d.) That we must go a good deal further than yet hitherto done to meet the Turks; seeking, however, to limit their future military effectiveness on the European side; to keep them altogether out of the European side of the Dardanelles if possible; to do what little we can for the minorities; and to make the best composition we can on questions like financial and economic control and safeguards for Allied interests in Turkey.

In attempting to define these lines of thought, I have doubtless isolated them too much. It is obvious that some of them in reality merge in each other. It is also probably an exaggeration to suggest that anyone now seriously advocates recourse to (a) without some preliminary attempt to ensure the pacification of the Near East by other means. The four currents of opinion are nevertheless sufficiently definite and distinguishable for the purpose of analysis to make it worth while to say how they strike me coming fresh from Constantinople.

(a.) We have been strongly impressing on the Turks that His Majesty's Government's policy underwent a definite change a year ago, and that while not prepared to concede the whole of the National Pact, much less to recognise Angora as the sole Government of Turkey, His Majesty's Government wished to give reasonable satisfaction to Turkey. Any decision to back the Greeks now, without first attempting to come to terms with Turkey, or after offering Turkey only such terms as no appreciable element in Turkey considers acceptable, would appear to all Turks to prove that His Majesty's Government had never seriously modified the San Remo and Sèvres attitude and wished to ruin Turkey. At the same time, what with Allied disunion and the limitations on the help to be afforded to Greece, it is more than doubtful whether the Greeks would come out on top.

If the Greeks succeeded to the fullest extent, we should have to reckon with the hostility of the active elements in such remnant of Turkey as might remain, and with the hostility of a large part of the Islamic world, including the parts which concern His Majesty's Government most nearly. This hostility would be the more bitter as, in this alternative, we could not refuse the Greeks territorial compensation for their fresh efforts undertaken under our auspices.

If, on the other hand, the Greeks failed, we should have to reckon with a Turkey arrogant in her enhanced prestige, and the hostility of Moslems elsewhere would be the more dangerous for seeing in this rehabilitated Turkey a centre round which to rally and from which to derive inspiration.

(b.) This is an admission of present Allied bankruptcy so far as the Near East is concerned. The argument in favour of resigning ourselves to it is that a fresh course of blood-letting might leave both sides so exhausted and so war-weary as to make them more amenable next winter to Allied persuasion than they now are.

The validity of this argument depends on the assumption that a new campaign

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will not materially alter the balance between the two combatants. I myself do not foresee a radical alteration unless the Greeks themselves should decide to evacuate Asia Minor. What I do think probable is a sufficient alteration in favour of the Kemalists to increase their arrogance. If they can keep up the supply of war material, neither financial strain nor war-weariness will suffice to make them amenable, even should the Allies be more united eight months hence than they are at present. The submissiveness of the Anatolian peasant is too great for war-weariness among the people to operate effectively. The leaders, who have been playing a winning game, are not particularly war-weary. There are indications of disunion among them, but they are absolutely united in their determination to keep the Greeks out of Anatolia, if not out of Eastern Thrace as well.

In the less likely event of the balance being altered in favour of the Greeks, they would be less disposed than they now are to relinquish Smyrna and part of Thrace, but they would still be a long way from having reduced the Kemalists to impotence.

In either alternative the Allies would almost certainly be in a worse position than they are even now to impose an equitable settlement.

(c.) I cannot express any confident opinion as to the probability of Soviet Russia coming so much into the Allied orbit as to be willing to throw Angora over. Recent indications from Angora point to a rapprochement between Mustapha Kemal and Moscow. The alliance, though in some ways paradoxical, is a natural one so long as both are violently revolutionary and fundamentally antagonistic to the Allies. I cannot but doubt whether any composition with the Bolsheviks which can be achieved in the near future will strike the roots of this fundamental antagonism on their side, and I doubt their readiness to cast off Angora sincerely as a result of such a composition.

I quite agree that the ultimate stability for any settlement in Turkey must depend largely on the ultimate attitude of Russia, but I do not believe that for immediate purposes we can use Russia to bring about a settlement in Turkey. We may perhaps hope, as a result of Genoa, to make Russia neutral in her attitude towards Angora, but this will leave the Turkish national movement still in being, and with sufficient life in it to give us trouble for a long time to come.

Assuming, however, for the sake of argument, that we may hope to get more from Russia at Genoa, i.e., to secure active Russian co-operation in bringing about a settlement in the Near East, it is necessary to consider the terms which we are prepared to offer to Russia as the price of her co-operation. Are we prepared to go back to the 1915 policy of allowing her to take Constantinople and to acquire a chunk of territory in North-Eastern Asia Minor? Are we prepared to let her reduce the new Turkey to the conditions of a weak vassal State, though without any immediate breach in its territorial integrity? Or, is it expected that the advantages to be gained by Russia at Genoa in the wider sphere, i.e., *de jure* recognition and reinstatement in the European economic system, will suffice without any specific advantages in the Near East itself?

Moreover, it is now pretty clear that the Genoa Conference cannot take place before April at the soonest. This means that before we can come to any arrangement with Russia, serious military operations will again be possible in Anatolia. In my opinion, such operations are bound to take place in or about April, if the situation of the parties remains as at present, i.e., if Mustapha Kemal remains in control at Angora and if the Greeks maintain their army in Asia Minor.

(d.) The above considerations lead me to the conclusion that present action on the part of the Allies is desirable, and that this alternative affords the only basis of such action. In my memorandum of the 7th February I outlined a procedure by which effect might be given to it without showing undue weakness *vis-à-vis* of Angora.

There are many difficulties—notably that of bringing the French into line, that of devising ultimate means of coercion if the opponents of a reasonable settlement maintain the upper hand in Turkey, and that of inducing the Greeks to hold on in Asia Minor in the interests of a settlement under which they must eventually clear out. Nevertheless, I consider that the effort should be made.

The proposed procedure would not compromise any real French interest, except in so far as it would commit the French to participation in ultimate measures of coercion if such were necessary. Otherwise, the French have as much to gain by it as we have. They have involved themselves with the Kemalists, but the proposed procedure gives their friends the Kemalists an opportunity to come into line. If the Kemalists will not come into line except on the basis of the full National Pact, French interests in Turkey will be threatened hardly less than ours. What we have to contend with in the case of the French is not that the proposed procedure would compromise their real interests, but that it would excite their suspicion and jealousy.

I need not deal at length with the other difficulties. That of devising ultimate means of coercion must be faced. Unless we are prepared to resort to coercion at long last, we cannot influence the course of events at all and we may as well make up our minds to the necessity of swallowing the National Pact sooner or later, except in so far as the Greeks may be able to modify it on their own account in respect of Thrace. The difficulty of getting the Greeks to hold on provisionally in Asia Minor, is one which it should be possible to get over by appealing to their own interests and the interest of the Greek population of Asia Minor. The removal of the latter concurrently with the evacuation of the Greek army seems to me to be a practical impossibility.

If the proposed procedure should fail utterly, as it might, we should be no worse off in respect of the other alternatives than we now are.

In conclusion, I would lay stress on the danger of complications in Mesopotamia this spring and summer if no settlement is arrived at. I do not wish to exaggerate this danger, but the recovery of part of Mesopotamia is an integral part of the National Pact, and there is always, to my mind, a risk of the Kemalists making an effort in that direction, possibly in conjunction with Bolshevik activity in Persia. It is true that the engagements of the Kemalists elsewhere would make it difficult for them to divert any considerable force to the northern frontier of Mesopotamia, but they might hope to achieve a good deal by a comparatively small military effort, assisted by intrigue in Kurdistan and in Mesopotamia itself.

A. R.

February 17, 1922.

[E 1927/5/44]

No. 38.

*Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 20.)*

(No. 82.)

My Lord,

Athens, February 11, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Greek press of the last few days has been full of eulogistic articles on your Lordship's recent speech in the House of Lords on the Eastern question. The speech is taken as recognising the past services of Greece to the Allies, and as a sign that His Majesty's Government have not forgotten that such services would be unjustly rewarded by desertion in her hour of need.

In the meantime, partial reports of the conversations between Mr. Lloyd George and the Patriarch Meletios, mentioned in my despatch No. 45, Confidential, of the 28th ultimo, have gradually leaked into the press and caused a good deal of comment. The Prime Minister's supposed utterances have been interpreted as definitely anti-Greek, and your Lordship's speech has, in consequence, been doubly welcome. The versions of the conversations which have been published do not, however, reproduce the most striking expressions contained in the letter mentioned in my above-mentioned despatch.

It is somewhat remarkable that the press, as a whole, continues to speak of the evacuation of Asia Minor as impossible, although the Greek Government would, as far as I can judge, be only too glad to withdraw their troops forthwith if the Christian population were only safeguarded.

I have, &c.

F. O. LINDLEY.

[E 1907/5/44]

No. 39.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 20.)*

(No. 161.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 14, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a statement giving twenty-five points, which are supposed to represent the minimum claims of the Government of Angora in a settlement of the Near Eastern question. This statement was submitted some days ago to the Inter-Allied press censorship by the "Bosphore," a local newspaper published in French, and although passed by the censorship has not yet been published. I have caused enquiries to be made of the "Bosphore" as to the source of the statement, and am informed that it was obtained from certain officials of the Constantinople Government who are in sympathy with the Nationalist movement.



2. Point No. 1, which speaks of the administrative autonomy of Eastern and Western Thrace with the line Enos-Midia, would appear to be due to a confusion, and is probably an error. In other statements of their claims, which have come to my knowledge, the Kemalists demand that Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople and the northern coast of the Marmara, should be restored to Turkish sovereignty without restrictions of any kind.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

Enclosure in No. 39.

*Les Revendications turques.*

LA commission chargée à Angora des préparatifs de paix a terminé ses travaux et soumis son rapport, qui a été ratifié par le Conseil des Commissaires.

Youssouf Kémal Bey, Commissaire des Affaires étrangères, qui se rend en Europe, se propose de défendre les revendications turques suivantes :

1. Autonomie administrative de la Thrace orientale et occidentale avec la ligne d'Enos-Midia.
2. Le contrôle des Détroits sans occupation militaire.
3. La non-intervention étrangère et *statu quo ante bellum* dans la question de Constantinople, dont le régime et la situation sont considérés comme des questions d'ordre intérieur.
4. Payement par les Hellènes des dépenses nécessitées pour la restauration des territoires occupés, ainsi que des indemnités de déplacement des "mohadjirs."
5. Restitution sans condition à la souveraineté turque de Smyrne et toutes autres localités de l'Anatolie conformément au pacte national.
6. Aucune intervention étrangère dans la question des "provinces orientales." Solution de cette question entre les intéressés considérés comme les membres de la même famille et d'une façon qui donne à tous satisfaction.
7. En ce qui concerne les frontières orientales, les clauses spécifiées dans les traités conclus entre le Gouvernement d'Angora et de Moscou sont maintenues.
8. Octroi à la Turquie de l'indépendance absolue politique, militaire, financière et économique.
9. Suppression des Capitulations.
10. Octroi aux minorités des privilèges et garanties accordés par les Traités de Saint-Germain, de Neuilly, dans les limites du pacte national.
11. Reconnaissance par les Puissances étrangères de tous les traités et accords conclus jusqu'ici par le Gouvernement d'Angora avec les grands et petits États.
12. Autorisation de l'introduction de capitaux étrangers dans toute la Turquie pour en faire bénéficier les affaires commerciales, économiques, les travaux publics sous tous les rapports.
13. Existence d'une armée turque capable de sauvegarder la tranquillité en Turquie et de défendre son territoire contre toute agression étrangère.
14. Liberté du Gouvernement d'Angora dans toutes ses affaires intérieures.
15. Admission au plus tôt de la Turquie à la Société des Nations.
16. Organisation d'une flotte turque en mesure de défendre le littoral de la Turquie.
17. Reconnaissance des dettes turques dues aux Alliés sur la base de la répartition des territoires partagés. Dettes dues aux anciens Alliés considérées comme nulles et non avenues.
18. Les paiements effectués pour la plupart des commandes militaires (telles que les dreadnoughts "Sultan Osman" et "Réchadié") faites avant la guerre à diverses sociétés seront défalqués du montant des dettes turques.
19. Le Gouvernement d'Angora sera autorisé à établir des relations politiques et commerciales avec tous les États.
20. Les kèmalistes ne feront pas de propagande dans les pays étrangers contre n'importe quel État.
21. Les kèmalistes n'interviendront dans l'organisation civile et militaire d'aucun État et ne l'assisteront pas non plus.
22. Renonciation de tous les droits de la Turquie sur la Mésopotamie, la Syrie, la Palestine, l'Arabie et la région avoisinante et établissement de bonnes relations avec les Gouvernements de ces pays.

23. Dès la conclusion du Traité de Paix, échange des prisonniers dans le plus bref délai.

24. Exécution intégrale du traité à conclure et sauvegarde des biens meubles et immeubles des minorités en cas d'exode.

25. Acceptation du contrôle provisoire pour toute l'Anatolie à l'instar de celui établie en Cilicie afin de surveiller l'exécution du traité et empêcher tous malentendus.

Le Gouvernement d'Angora n'acceptera pas la plus légère modification des vingt-cinq clauses ci-dessus considérées comme les revendications minima de la Turquie.

Au cas où le conflit turco-grec ne serait pas résolu sur ces bases, les opérations militaires recommenceraient en Anatolie.

[E 1908/769/44]

No. 40.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 20.)*

(No. 164.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 14, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship copy of a memorandum prepared by Mr. Knox, second secretary at this High Commission, on the subject of a recent journey in Eastern and Western Thrace.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 40.

*Memorandum.*

THE following impressions, brought back from a brief shooting trip in Western and Eastern Thrace with Colonel Baird, may perhaps be of some interest :—

Martial law is strictly applied throughout both provinces. Along the railway line from Cherkesskeui to Xanthi all stations and "travaux d'art," including small culverts, are militarily guarded. This precaution, though no doubt necessary, cannot but give an impression of insecurity of tenure.

Xanthi, where we spent three days, is the centre of the rich tobacco district between the River Nestos and Gumuljina. The population, like that of the corresponding tobacco area west of the Nestos, is almost exclusively Turkish. It forms a notable exception in these disputed areas, in that, being indispensable for the cultivation of the country's great asset, it has not been, nor is likely to be, displaced by the constant changes of ownership of its territory.

At the same time it appears to suffer considerably at the hands of the Government. We were told by our host, the American manager of a tobacco company with a long and intimate experience of the Near East, that he had seen in Samsun, Bafra in the early part of the war, the Turkish treatment of the Christian minorities; during two years of Government by the Bulgarians at Xanthi he saw their handling of both Turks and Greeks; he was now witnessing the measure meted out by Greeks to the Turkish population. He was of opinion that there was not a whit to choose between these administrations, and, while sympathising warmly with the peasants, expressed for the authorities of all three races a refreshingly impartial disgust. He quoted to us a very recent instance in which, on the ground of an attack on the railway by persons unknown, the whole population of a Turkish village was separated into groups of men and women and driven by Greek troops into the mountains in mid-winter.

The direct taxation bears very heavily on the cultivator, who pays a 12 per cent. tax on his crop and also a heavy percentage of his earnings when working in the off-seasons in the tobacco factories. There is much corruption in the collection of taxes.

Xanthi and its neighbourhood presents an appearance of complete neglect. The excellent road built by the Bulgarians from Gumuljina to Porto Lagos and Xanthi, which was of great value to the country, has lain unrepared for two years, and is now impassable.

The Maritza valley in the region of Safli, where there appears to be a pronounced Greek or at least Christian majority, appears neat and prosperous with well-tilled fields and a large silk industry.



At Kuleli Burgas, where we spent three days, one came into the same unpopulated desolation that marks the course of the railway through Eastern Thrace. There is an abundance here of rich well-watered land, which has clearly lain fallow for two or three years, and is still untouched. The village is sparsely populated by Greek refugees of various origin, who exist miserably and appear to exhaust their efforts in repairing destroyed hovels. The Greek soldiers complain much of their unfriendliness.

The Greek military commandant with whom we stayed was a good specimen of the Greek officer. He was promoted from the ranks, a peasant of the Peloponnese, knowing no language but his own. Whilst full of patriotism, he nevertheless showed much of the fatigue of ten years' military service without leave. He inveighed bitterly both against the French and the politicians of his own country. He could, as a peasant, see much of the potential wealth of Thrace, but appeared at the same time to realise that this could not be exploited by Greece without a capital which she does not possess.

We were everywhere received with an almost embarrassing cordiality by the Greek authorities.

In general, the journey merely revived the conviction I had reached some years ago in Eastern Macedonia that nothing can be made of these undoubtedly rich territories so long as they remain under the rule of any of the "limitrophe" States—a rule which is inevitably a brutal and costly military tyranny over a fluctuating population of perpetual refugees—in which the precarious tenure both of the State and the individual permits no useful effort. An international régime strong enough to impose respect for its frontiers and to assure to the population the fruits of its labours appears, sooner or later, to be the inevitable solution.

Constantinople, February 14, 1922.

[X 1851/336/503]

No. 41.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 171.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 14, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the morning of Saturday, the 11th February, the secretaries' house at Therapia was destroyed by fire.

2. Information was received here at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and immediately afterwards the British naval authorities reported by telephone that matters had gone so far as to make it impossible to save the building.

3. A member of my staff at once started for Therapia, but did not reach the Embassy grounds until after half-past 4, as the deep snow made it necessary to proceed on foot for a considerable portion of the journey.

4. On arrival he found the house burned down to the ground.

5. So far as could be ascertained at the time, the fire began in the room occupied by the caretaker, and was due to the over-heating of a stove-pipe. It broke out at about 10 o'clock, at a time when he was in the garden. The fire brigade arrived an hour or two later.

6. A considerable part of the furniture in the house was salvaged. There was no loss of life.

7. A full report on the matter will, I presume, be sent to the Office of Works by their representative here, but in this connection I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a copy of a report on the subject addressed by the officer commanding Bosphorus patrol to the British captain of the port.

8. I am expressing to the Russian diplomatic representative and to my French colleague my thanks for the assistance rendered by their nationals.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 41.

Officer Commanding Bosphorus Patrol to British Captain of the Port, Constantinople.

Sir,

Buyukdere, February 11, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that, whilst on duty at Buyukdere at about 12.15 P.M. to-day, I observed flames rising from a house at Therapia. A strong north-east wind was prevailing at the time, with heavy snow and sleet falling, but as best as I could judge it appeared to me the fire originated from the house adjoining the British Embassy chapel. I immediately gathered together the Russian volunteer fire brigade (under the command of Lieutenant de la Garde Guillenstein) with their fire-engine and equipment, and proceeded towards Therapia in motor launches 15 and 17, at the same time asking officer commanding 3rd Hussars detachment, Buyukdere, to send mounted patrol by land in order to keep order and prevent looting, &c.; also informed Ocean Salvage Company's tug "La Vallette," which was anchored in the bay.

Owing to the rough sea breaking over the sea wall abreast of the house, the fire brigade had to be landed at Therapia ferry landing pier, much valuable time being inadvertently lost thereby, as the engine had to be dragged over a slippery road covered with snow.

On arrival at the site of the ruins of the British Embassy grounds it was observed that the fire was burning fiercely, and that the top floor had entirely disappeared.

It was with the greatest difficulty that the brigade succeeded in getting past the house through the smoke and flames in order to get to a favourable position to windward to deal more effectively with the situation.

All efforts to keep the fire under unfortunately proved unavailing, and at about 1.10 P.M. the fire had reached the ground floor and the front of the house had fallen across the road, part of the burning debris going into the sea. At this stage it was obvious that the house could not be saved, so then every effort was concentrated to keep the fire from spreading. There was no loss of life.

From enquiries I instituted, the guardian of the house stated that the fire originated through the upsetting of an oil stove in one of the top storey rooms.

I should like to bring to favourable notice the gallant attempt made by the Russian volunteer fire brigade to extinguish the fire, at great personal risk to their lives. This brigade comes under the direct orders of the General Kirelof, the commandant of the Russian Embassy at Buyukdere.

Five French sailors from the French Embassy at Therapia also rendered valuable assistance.

I have, &c.

CLAUDE L. WOOLLARD,  
Lieutenant, R.N.

[E 1929/900/44]

No. 42.

Count de Salis to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord,

Palazzo Borghese,

Rome, February 14, 1922.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 9 of the 13th February, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the note addressed to the Cardinal Secretary of State in pursuance of the instructions conveyed to me.

I took the opportunity of saying a few words to the cardinal a couple of days ago, informing him that I should shortly be addressing a note to him on the subject. The cardinal at once replied by repeating what I have already reported to your Lordship as his views: that the protectorate was based on the Capitulations; that there where the Turks had gone the Capitulations, and with them the protectorate, had also ceased. The idea of a protectorate, once a civilised Government was established, was an absurdity.

While assenting, I pointed out to his Eminence that on previous occasions I had had to speak to him about Palestine, but at present we were not talking about a country which the Turks had had to leave but about Constantinople; we maintained that the protectorate there had also ceased in virtue of the agreement of San Remo.

The cardinal then repeated what I reported to your Lordship at the time—how

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the Consulta had shown him a copy of the *procès-verbal* of San Remo; how the French Chargé d'Affaires, M. Doucet, had denied that the text in the possession of the Vatican was correct, and had also denied that any binding agreement had been concluded. As long as the existence of the agreement was in dispute he thought it impossible for the Vatican to take action (my despatch No. 8 of the 16th January, 1921).

I told the cardinal that instructions had been sent to Paris in order definitely to clear up misunderstanding. The note which I was addressing to him would show clearly the view of His Majesty's Government, that France had abandoned her protectorate in the East and agreed with Great Britain and Italy that none of the three countries should exercise such special protection in future.

The cardinal expressed satisfaction that the matter was going to be settled now, otherwise it might be necessary to wait until the Treaty of Sèvres was ratified.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 42.

*Count de Salis to Cardinal Gasparri.*

*Palazzo Borghese,*

*Rome, le 14 février 1922.*

Monseigneur,

VOTRE Éminence aurait déjà appris qu'un requiem solennel a été célébré à Constantinople pour le repos de l'âme de Sa Sainteté Benoît XV. A cette occasion le remplaçant du Haut-Commissaire français, se conformant aux instructions envoyées de Paris, s'est fait accorder une place spéciale comme représentant de la France protectrice des catholiques en Orient. Dans ces circonstances, et bien que très désireux d'assister à la cérémonie, le Haut-Commissaire de Sa Majesté britannique ne se trouvait pas dans le cas de se rendre à l'invitation du délégué apostolique. Son attitude est pleinement approuvée par Lord Curzon.

Lors de la réunion de San-Remo, la France, à la date du 24 avril 1920, s'est entendue avec la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie pour renoncer à son protectorat des catholiques en Orient; il a été établi qu'aucun des trois pays n'exercera désormais un droit spécial de protectorat de cette nature. Je suis chargé par Lord Curzon de porter cet accord à la connaissance de votre Éminence en exprimant l'espoir que, par des instructions opportunes envoyées aux autorités de l'Eglise latine, on pourrait écarter le renouvellement de malentendus regrettables.

Je saisis, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

[E 1931/5/44]

No. 43.

*M. Gounaris to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 20.)*

My Lord,

*Greek Legation, London, February 15, 1922.*

ON the 27th October, 1921, your Lordship was pleased to communicate to M. Baltazzi and myself the views of the British Government in regard to the situation in the Near East. From the consideration of the situation in this region in connection with the general political situation, your Lordship drew the conclusion that the speedy establishment of peace was in the common interest of all parties. With a view to securing such a peace your Lordship urged us to place ourselves in the hands of the Allied Powers, whose joint mediation the British Government would try to obtain. Bearing in mind the sympathy and interest felt by the British Government for Greece, and once more manifested by your Lordship on the occasion of this interview, we decided, after careful deliberation and after consultation with our colleagues in Athens, that it was in the interest of Greece to adhere to your Lordship's proposal. Various circumstances, which your Lordship is more competent to appreciate than myself, have hitherto deferred a solution of the problem, and more than three months have elapsed without it having proved possible to establish peace in spite of the sincere efforts of your Lordship to that end.

During this interval the Greek Government did not lose sight of the fact that the surest foundation for the negotiation of peace with Turkey, in the common interest of the Allies who jointly conducted the war against that Power, and will jointly conclude the peace, consisted in the maintenance of the military *status quo* in Anatolia. To this

end the Greek Government has strained its energies to the utmost to keep the Greek army in its present position. The British Government will readily understand the serious difficulties which the Greek Government had to face in this connection. The Greek army has remained more or less constantly mobilised for the past nine years. Further, the strong patriotic feeling of the soldiers, and the consciousness of their mission to liberate their brethren under the Turkish yoke and reunite them to the fatherland—these feelings, which have served to neutralise their natural war-weariness, have been adversely affected by the growing probability that the coming peace will not fully secure the realisation of the mission of which they are conscious.

The steady depletion of the financial resources of the country, moreover, unavoidably involved increasing difficulty in supplying the needs of the army, and correspondingly increasing hardships for the troops in Asia Minor. In spite of these difficulties it has hitherto proved possible for Greece to meet the situation. Her exertions to this end have, however, created a state of things to which I feel it my duty to draw your Lordship's attention in the hope that the interest which we know the British Government to feel in the matter will impel them to accord it their careful consideration with a view to facilitating the discovery of means to meet the present difficulties which must needs prove insuperable for Greece, if she is left to her own resources.

2. In particular I wish to bring to your Lordship's knowledge that the financial resources of the Greek Government are completely exhausted. In anticipation of this inevitable development I repeatedly approached the British Government with a view to their granting facilities for the conclusion of a loan in the British market. Consequent on this, an agreement was signed on the 22nd December, 1921, between the Chancellor of the Exchequer and myself, whereby the British Government signified its consent to the conclusion of a loan not exceeding 15,000,000L., and to the granting of security for such loan. In spite of this action of the British Government it has not yet proved possible to conclude the loan. Meanwhile, information from Athens represented the situation of the Treasury as growing steadily worse, and the latest telegrams state that the Government is completely unable to meet the expenditure on the upkeep of the army for the first half of February (o.s.), in spite of the fact that in the meanwhile disbursements of public money on any other object have practically ceased.

3. Over and above this complete financial *impasse*, it should be recalled that the campaigning season in Asia Minor is approaching. Little more than a month separates us from the date on which operations were resumed last year. Meanwhile the enemy has been reinforced in men and supplies. Not to mention the war-material which he has been able to procure from Soviet Russia, we cannot but note with painful surprise the attitude taken up in this connection by the Allied Powers by whose side the Greek army participated in the war which Turkey had declared not against Greece but against the Allies. Certain of these Allied Powers have gone so far as to supply the enemy with arms and munitions to be used against their ally in the great war. Others, who themselves stopped short of such action, nevertheless, did nothing to put an end to the above flagrant violation of the armistice of October 1918 and of the Treaty of Sèvres, both of which explicitly provide for the disarmament of Turkey. Finally, all the Allied Powers without exception have refused to recognise that a state of war still subsists as between them and Turkey as a necessary consequence of the non-conclusion of peace with the latter. Hence their declaration of neutrality in the Greco-Turkish conflict which, moreover, has been so interpreted as to deny Greece full enjoyment of the rights recognised by international law to belligerents in respect of neutrals.

Your Lordship will readily understand the gravity of the danger created for the Greek army by such reinforcement of the Turkish forces and by the approach of the campaigning season in Anatolia. According to information which has just reached me from the Greek command in Asia Minor the *moral* of the troops remains unimpaired, but the enemy has a numerical superiority of some 10,000 men, is better supplied with cavalry and has twice as many aeroplanes as the Greek army, though, on the other hand, he is weaker in artillery, disposing of roughly 100 guns less than our own army. In this connection I cannot refrain from pointing out that this advantage of the Greek army would have been sensibly enhanced had care been taken to execute the disarmament clauses of the armistice, or had the Greek force despatched to Asia Minor with a mandate of the Supreme Council, been allowed a free hand to act as military considerations clearly dictated.

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Under these circumstances the Greek command in Asia Minor state that they cannot undertake to give an assurance of their ability to cope with the contingency of a Turkish offensive unless they receive (1) reinforcements sufficient to raise the units under them to full strength and thus neutralise the present Turkish superiority in number; (2) supplies of fresh war-material (especially aeroplanes, machine-guns and motor-lorries), these being indispensable if the mobility of the army is not to be affected; and (3) financial assistance as the present financial position of the army is desperate.

Unless these conditions are fulfilled, the command consider that the impending Turkish offensive will expose the army to very serious dangers, and urgently request that the above measures be instantly taken or, should they prove to be impracticable, that an order be instantly given to avoid the dangers foreseen through a withdrawal, while it is yet time to take the initiative of a withdrawal before being forced to it by the development of the situation. They consider, further, that such a withdrawal must necessarily amount to a complete evacuation of Asia Minor, since no line more to the west would afford, in the event of withdrawal from the fortified line now held, stronger defensive position which would enable the army to hold out without strengthening it by the measures above indicated.

Finally, the command of the Asia Minor army add that should the enemy receive yet further reinforcements it would become necessary similarly to reinforce our own army by calling up fresh classes to the colours, so as to neutralise the accession of strength to the enemy.

With regard to the above, the Greek Government is indeed in a position to meet the call for more troops in both of the cases contemplated. Clearly, however, the Greek Government is not in a position to furnish the Asia Minor army with the financial assistance of which it is in such need, or to supply the necessary war material, least of all in the event of the calling up of fresh classes, when considerable additional armament will be indispensable.

4. I need hardly point out to the British Government the consequences which must inevitably follow if Greece is left to her own inadequate resources. Fully conscious of the obligations assumed by all the Powers allied in the war against Turkey towards the Christian populations of Asia Minor, Greece, on the mandate of the Allied Powers, undertook to impose on Turkey the terms of peace on which the Allies had agreed in discharge of those obligations.

Throughout the consequent struggle, Greece scrupulously respected the limitations placed on her action by the Allies, even where these were a serious hindrance in the way of the discharge of her task, as in precluding for her the possibility of military action against the capital of the enemy. In this struggle Greece, inspired by her natural and legitimate interest in the fate of the Greek populations of Western Asia Minor, has put forth all her strength and exhausted all her resources. The effect of her exertions has up to the present moment succeeded in safeguarding these populations, and at the same time has been able to offer a firm foundation for the conclusion of peace. Were the Greek army, owing to the reasons already stated, to be compelled to evacuate Asia Minor, a state of things would come into being which, I have every reason to hope, will be regarded by the British Government as incompatible with the generous interest which they feel in the fate of these Christian populations. The fate of these populations Greece will henceforth be obliged to leave in the hands of the Allied Powers, who, in their turn, will no longer have at their disposal in their peace negotiations with Turkey the guarantee constituted by the presence of the Greek army in Asia Minor. The British Government will readily understand that were the Greek army to be withdrawn from its present line covering the Christian populations of Western Asia Minor and the Straits, not only would the Christian populations be exposed to the horrors of a Kemalist invasion, but Turkish arrogance would henceforth stop at nothing and the Kemalist advance would halt neither at the Sèvres enclave nor at Smyrna, but would sweep up to the Straits.

However, alive to these consequences, Greece, if left to her unassisted resources, will nevertheless be obliged to bow to the inexorable necessity of leaving to the future the vindication of ethnical rights formerly recognised by all the Allied Powers and to divert the military forces, inadequate for carrying through the campaign in Asia Minor, to the defence of the frontiers assigned to her in Europe by the Peace Conference.

5. The British Government, I am confident, will readily understand that I should have felt it to be my urgent duty to bring the foregoing to their knowledge. The situation on which I have dwelt cannot, I feel, but be a matter of concern to the

British Government. Further, the conception which I have of Anglo-Greek relations and which I have sought to manifest in my policy, makes me feel that I should be failing in my duty to my country at this critical juncture were I to omit fully and frankly to put the situation before the Power in whose friendship the Greek race has ever confidently relied, to the end that the British Government may be able to communicate to us their views in the light of this situation, and to consider the measures which it may suggest to them.

I have, &c.  
D. GOUNARIS.

[E 1928/5/44]

No. 44.

*Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 20.)*

(No. 153.)

My Lord,

*Rome, February 17, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 69 of the 13th instant, and your Lordship's telegram No. 50 of the 15th instant, I have duly noted the language held by you to the Italian Ambassador on the subject of the Italian suggestion that their support at the forthcoming conference in Paris on the Near East would depend upon the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards their proposals, which I had previously submitted to your Lordship. The Marquis della Torretta, when he originally handed these proposals to me, had made the position sufficiently clear, but at our interview on the 13th February he was even more explicit, uttering and reiterating his proposal with an emphasis which convinced me that it represented the considered opinion of the Italian Cabinet. His Excellency evidently thought that there was nothing improper or unusual in advancing such a suggestion, and I felt it was best to offer no comment at all.

Your Lordship is in the happy position of being able to declare with all truth and sincerity that His Majesty's Government are approaching the conference on the Near East animated solely by the desire to secure a prompt and lasting peace on just and equitable conditions.

The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs who gave more than lip service to such sentiments, would not be voicing either his own true feelings or those of his Government or country. Certainly the Italian Government share our desire for peace in the Near East, but principally in order that they may lose no further time in exploiting any of the advantages which may fall to their share under the Tripartite Agreement. It is, as I have on several occasions reported to your Lordship, an obsession here that while Great Britain and France have secured important benefits from the war, Italy has practically nothing to show for her efforts and sacrifices. As the Marquis della Torretta has frequently repeated here, and M. de Martino in London, the Italians consider what they obtain under the Tripartite Agreement as one of the few good things that have fallen to their lot, and they cling to that agreement for all that it is worth. I believe that it can fairly be said that the Italian Government on the whole agree with the point of view of His Majesty's Government on the Near Eastern question and are inclined to support it upon its merits. But the divergence of opinion between Great Britain and France appears a heaven-sent opportunity for Italy, having herself no strong convictions, to sell her support to the highest bidder in return for whatever she can get. It is a constant theme in the press and a source of perpetual expression of dissatisfaction with the conduct of Italian foreign policy that such a unique chance is being missed. Hence the Marquis della Torretta's candid though cynical offer.

I scarcely imagine that your Lordship's reception of the Italian proposal will come as a great shock or surprise to his Excellency. M. de Martino is understood to be an adept at repeating your Lordship's language in a softened and attenuated form, but if the Marquis della Torretta returns to the subject with me, I will not fail to make the position perfectly clear to him. His Excellency is unlikely to remain in office more than a few days longer, and it is probably with his successor that I shall have to deal. I do not think that this Italian attempt at a gentle form of blackmail need be taken too seriously, or that its failure will have much influence one way or the other upon the attitude of the Government unless some similar enterprise in Paris has produced more substantial results.

I have, &c.  
R. GRAHAM.



*Memorandum on the Russo-British Agreement of 1915 as to the future of Constantinople and the Straits.*

FOR nearly 200 years the control of the Straits and the annexation of Constantinople had been regarded by Russian national feeling as a great historical task of the Russian nation; to this all other objects would, if necessary, be subordinated or postponed. During the 19th century the chief obstacle had been the constant opposition of the British Government. The first immediate objective had since the Crimean war been the "opening of the Straits"; the acquisition of Constantinople was allowed to remain in the background. The arrangements of the *Entente* between Great Britain and Russia brought about a change in British policy which was also justified by our control of the Suez Canal and occupation of Egypt, and in 1908 Sir Edward Grey informed the Russian Government that His Majesty's Government agreed in principle to the opening of the Straits; he only asked that the definite settlement should be postponed to a convenient time.

2. As a result of the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and the defeat of Turkey, the question of Constantinople itself came into the foreground. The Russian Government were seriously alarmed lest they might be anticipated by the Bulgarians, and, as they explained at the time, if the Bulgarians occupied Constantinople, the Russian fleet would at once have been sent to the Bosphorus. Their apprehensions were increased by the control which the Germans were securing over Constantinople, and in the spring of 1914 all the arrangements were considered for despatching a joint military and naval force to occupy the city if occasion arose.

3. As soon as war broke out with Turkey at the beginning of November 1914, there was a general conviction that the time had now come to achieve the secular object of Russian ambitions. On the 12th November, Sir Edward Grey, in discussing the question whether the offensive should be taken against Turkey, or the war for the present be confined to defensive measures, added:—

"But I should like Minister for Foreign Affairs to know that however much we or Russia may assume a defensive attitude in the war with Turkey, while the issue against Germany, on which all other issues depend, is pressed to a successful conclusion, we regard the conduct of the Turkish Government as having made a complete settlement of the Turkish question, including that of the Straits and Constantinople, in agreement with Russia inevitable. This will, of course, be effected after Germany is defeated, whether or not Turkish rule is overthrown in the course of hostilities meanwhile."

In conversation with Count Benckendorf, he had made a verbal statement, which Count Benckendorf communicated to M. Sazonof in the following words:—

"Si l'Allemagne est écrasée, le sort des Détroits et de Constantinople ne pourrait cette fois pas être décidée autrement que conformément à nos convenances."

This statement was approved by Sir Edward Grey as correct.

4. On the 20th November, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in an *aide-mémoire*, stated that his Government would be prepared to recognise the annexation of Egypt to Great Britain "after the declarations made by Sir Edward Grey with reference to the ultimate fate of the Straits and Constantinople." At this stage, therefore, the Russian Government, understanding that it was the intention to annex Egypt, gave their assent on condition that their wishes with regard to the Straits and Constantinople were fulfilled. It was explained to them immediately afterwards that His Majesty's Government did not propose to annex Egypt, but only to declare a protectorate, but M. Sazonof said that the declaration he had given would hold good should His Majesty's Government annex Egypt later.

5. At this time His Majesty's Government did not know precisely what were the Russian proposals regarding the Straits and Constantinople. Information on this point is conveyed in a telegram from Sir George Buchanan of the 22nd November:—

"From language held hitherto by Minister for Foreign Affairs in course of academic conversations, settlement which his Excellency eventually contemplates

will apparently comprise expulsion of Turks from Europe, complete freedom of Straits and acquisition by Russia of territory on both sides of Bosphorus, so as to enable her to guard entrance into Black Sea in war time, as he has more than once declared he could never allow Bulgaria to go beyond Enos-Midia line. I gather he will claim territory to east of that line for Russia. He has hitherto spoken as if Russia would be content with an arrangement under which Constantinople and a certain radius of territory would be neutralised or given the status of a free port. Since Turks commenced hostilities, question of Constantinople and Straits has engrossed the attention of the Russian public to such a degree that I doubt whether they will in the end be prepared to renounce long-cherished idea of incorporating Constantinople in Russian Empire."

6. After this nothing more is heard of the matter for some time. During the month of February it came up in a more urgent form owing to the proposed attack on the Dardanelles. It was at this time anticipated that within a very short period the Allied forces might actually be in occupation of Constantinople. The Russian Government clearly desired that before this happened they should receive a precise and formal agreement to their claims. Moreover, the British Government were using all their efforts to procure the military assistance of Greece and of Bulgaria. This, especially the former, aroused the strongest opposition at St. Petersburg. The Tsar himself had declared "in most positive terms that he could in no circumstances consent to any naval or military action by Greece in the neighbourhood of the Straits." They obviously feared that if a Greek force were once established there it would be very difficult to get rid of them. The Greek Government itself disclaimed any territorial ambitions in this district, but desired that Greek soldiers should take part in the recovery of St. Sofia to Christianity. For military reasons it was most important that the Russian veto should be withdrawn, but clearly this would not be done unless a binding declaration were made as to the future of Constantinople. On the 25th February, Sir Edward Grey, in answer to a question in the House of Commons, said that a statement "that the events on the Russo-Turkish frontier will bring Russia nearer to the realisation of the political and economic problems bound up with the question of Russian access to the sea, was an inspiration with which he was in entire sympathy." He evaded, however, the question about the future of Constantinople, saying that the precise form in which Russian aspirations would be realised would no doubt be settled in the terms of peace. This answer seems to have aroused apprehensions in Russia, and he was pressed to give a more definite and binding declaration.

7. On the 2nd March, Count Benckendorf presented a memorandum, in which he said that the study of the Russian demands was not completed, but at the moment could be summarised as follows:—

In Europe the Ottoman power must come to an end; the line Enos-Midia would serve as frontier between Russia and Bulgaria. On the continent of Asia the course of the Sakaria might serve as a frontier line.

Finally, the security of our position in the Straits will have to be guaranteed on the side of the southern shore of the Sea of Marmora.

Russia will take into consideration the economic interests of Roumania, of Bulgaria and of the probable remains of Turkey, as well as of the interests of European commerce.

8. On the 4th March, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir George Buchanan pointing out that the British and French were undertaking the operations in the Dardanelles solely for the common cause. His Majesty's Government had no intention of establishing a footing there for themselves; no direct gain would come to Great Britain from the operations. He therefore pressed strongly against the Russian refusal to permit the Greeks to take any part in the occupation of Constantinople. As to the future of Constantinople and the Straits, he said:—

"I have endorsed in public the formula of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and have made no objection to anything he has said to you about it, though a formal and precise agreement must be reserved for discussion with France in accordance with the British-French-Russian Alliance of the 5th September, and can probably not be completed except in final terms of peace. . . . We readily admit that Greece must not have a footing on the Straits that will conflict with Russian interests. We had never contemplated



the annexation of any part of the Straits by Greece. The compensation contemplated for Greece out of Turkish territory is Smyrna."

At this time, then, Sir Edward Grey clearly hoped to avoid a more precise undertaking than that which he had already given.

9. On this very day, however, M. Sazonof presented to Sir George Buchanan an *aide-mémoire* (which has been published by the Bolsheviks) to the following effect:—

"Course of latest events leads His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas to think that the question of Constantinople and the Straits must be definitely solved in accordance with traditional aspirations of Russia.

"Any solution would be unsatisfactory and precarious if it did not incorporate henceforward in Russian Empire the city of Constantinople, western shore of the Bosphorus, of the Sea of Marmora and of the Dardanelles, as well as Southern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line.

"*Ipsa facto* and by strategic necessity, part of Asiatic shore included between the Bosphorus, River Sakharra and a point to be fixed on the Gulf of Ismid, islands of the Sea of Marmora, Islands of Imbros and Tenedos, ought to be incorporated in the Empire.

"Special interests of France and of Great Britain in the region above described will be scrupulously respected.

"Imperial Government likes to hope that above considerations will meet with sympathy of the two Allied Governments. Said Governments are assured of meeting with, at the hands of Imperial Government, the same sympathy for realisation of desiderata which they may form in other regions of Ottoman Empire and elsewhere."

10. From Sir George Buchanan's telegrams we learn that the French Ambassador had given these demands an unfavourable reception; he was opposed to the annexation of Constantinople by Russia. Sazonof, however, was absolutely firm, and said that if the demands were not accepted he would resign; the Tsar, basing himself on Russian public opinion, also insisted on their full acceptance. It appears also that M. Delcassé was at first much disturbed by these demands, but, after further consideration, was prepared to accept them, the great thing being to avoid friction with Russia. There was obviously considerable anxiety lest refusal might give strength to the attempts which were being made at this time to detach Russia from the alliance.

11. After discussion in the Cabinet, a telegram was sent on the 11th March to Sir George Buchanan, authorising him to present an *aide-mémoire* to M. Sazonof to the effect that "His Majesty's Government would agree to the Russian *aide-mémoire* about Constantinople and the Straits subject to the war being prosecuted to a victorious conclusion, and to Great Britain and France realising the desiderata in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere as referred to in the Russian *aide-mémoire*."

12. The next day the following draft telegram was despatched to Sir George Buchanan, after being approved by the Prime Minister; it was also communicated to the leaders of the Opposition:—

"In giving the Minister for Foreign Affairs the *aide-mémoire* about Constantinople and the Straits you should make the following observations:—

"The claim now made by the Russian Government goes much beyond what the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated as probable a few weeks ago, and Russia is asking for a definite promise in her favour as regards the greatest prize of the whole war before we have had time to consider what our own desiderata would be elsewhere in the eventual terms of peace.

"I hope, therefore, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will realise that the *aide-mémoire* now given him is the greatest proof of friendship that it is in our power to give. It involves the complete abandonment of what has been our traditional policy, and runs counter to opinions and sentiments once universal and still by no means extinct in this country, and will, I hope, be recognised as a most loyal and ample fulfilment of our previous general assurances made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs recently. It is given now in the hope and belief that the settlement proposed will, when realised, make lasting friendship between the two countries. It follows that our own desiderata, however important to us elsewhere, will not include any conditions to impair Russian control over the territory described in her *aide-mémoire*.

"We shall ask that there should be commercial freedom of the Straits for merchant vessels, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs has already promised,

and that, as Constantinople will always be a trade entrepôt for South-Eastern Europe and Asia Minor, Russia should, when in possession of it, arrange a free port for goods in transit to and from territory other than Russian.

"His Majesty's Government are engaged in operations in the Straits which it is now clear cannot, however successful, be of any advantage to them in the terms of peace, except in so far as they contribute to the general cause. The direct fruits of these operations will, if the war is successful, be gathered entirely by Russia. We think, therefore, that Russia should not now raise objection to the co-operation of any Power which offers its help as an ally on reasonable conditions. Greece is the only Power which is likely to participate in the operations in the Straits, and the Greek flotilla, if we could have secured its aid, would already have been of inestimable value, as Admiral Carden is asking for more destroyers, and we have none to spare for him.

"One of the great objects in undertaking the operations in the Dardanelles was to bring the Balkan States over to our side. We trust that Russia will now do all in her power to prevent Roumania and Bulgaria from being apprehensive that future Russian possession of Constantinople and the Straits will be to their disadvantage, and that Russia will do all she can to make the prospect of participation in the war on the side of the Allies attractive to those two States.

"I cannot formulate British desiderata as to the Ottoman Empire except in consultation with the French as well as the Russian Government, and it is clear that the whole question of ulterior British and French interests, in what is now Asiatic Turkey, must come under consideration, but whenever it becomes known that Russia is to have possession of Constantinople at the end of the war, as stated in our *aide-mémoire*, I shall want to state that His Majesty's Government have throughout all the negotiations stipulated that in all circumstances Arabia and the Mussulman Holy Places shall remain under independent Mussulman rule.

"One of the British desiderata will be the revision of the Anglo-Russian Agreement about Persia, recognising the present neutral sphere as a British sphere, but I am not yet in a position to make any definite proposals on this or any other subject.

"If the Minister for Foreign Affairs asks whether we propose to make any conditions as to the fortification of the Straits or passage of ships of war, you may reply in the negative, though it would seem reasonable for Roumania and Bulgaria to have special privileges accorded them by Russia as regards their ships of war.

"It is very desirable that the understanding now come to between the British, French and Russian Governments should not become known until the Allies are able to assure the Balkan States as to their position and prospects generally, especially Roumania and Bulgaria, with regard to the territories adjoining their frontiers, which they are known to desire, and until an agreement as to British and French desiderata in the ultimate terms of peace is more advanced.

"You can let Minister for Foreign Affairs have a memorandum of these observations, but it should be separate from the *aide-mémoire* of my telegram of 10th March, which gives the official assent of His Majesty's Government.

"Copies of what is given to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can be given by you personally to the Emperor."

13. This telegram speaks of an understanding having been arrived at by the British, French and Russian Governments, and Sir Edward Grey seems to have received information that the French were prepared to accept the Russian *aide-mémoire* of the 4th March. It appears, however, that the French Government did not, in fact, give their official approval till nearly three weeks later. A telegram from M. Sazonof to M. Isvolsky of the 8th March, which is among the documents published by the Bolsheviks, runs as follows:—

"On the 23rd February/8th March the French Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, announced to me that France was prepared to take up a most favourable attitude in the matter of realisation of our desire as set out in my telegram to you, No. 937, in respect of the Straits and Constantinople, for which I charged you to tender Delcassé my gratitude.

"In his conversations with you, Delcassé had previously more than once given his assurance that we could rely on the sympathy of France, and only referred to the need of elucidating the question of the attitude of England, from whom he feared some objections, before he could give us a more definite assur-



ance in the above sense. Now the British Government has given its complete consent in writing to the annexation by Russia of the Straits and Constantinople within the limits indicated by us, and only demanded security for its economic interests and a similar benevolent attitude on our part towards the political aspirations of England in other parts.

"For me, personally, filled as I am with most complete confidence in Delcassé, the assurance received from him is quite sufficient, but the Imperial Government would desire a more definite pronouncement of France's assent to the complete satisfaction of our desires, similar to that made by the British Government."

From this it appears that, at any rate, on the 18th March the French formal acceptance had not been given. It is clear from the correspondence that M. Delcassé and the French Government were at first surprised and embarrassed by the Russian demand for the actual annexation of Constantinople. They first suggested a personal conference with M. Sazonof; this he was unable to arrange, but it looks as if the British Government acted rather in advance of the French. The question of Constantinople and the opposition to Russian annexation had always been a special British point, and the French might not unreasonably have held that it would be better for them to wait and leave the responsibility with the British.

14. We can see that both of the Allies were surprised and annoyed at the rather peremptory attitude suddenly assumed by the Russians on this matter; they gave their consent with some reluctance; it was to be foreseen that this decision would have an unfavourable effect on the Balkan States; there were many Greeks who held that it was not worth while going to war with Turkey to win Constantinople for Russia. The French in giving their consent seem to have been more influenced by their apprehension that in case of a refusal Russian loyalty to the alliance could not be depended upon; the English, who were just at that time becoming fully pledged to the Dardanelles expedition, were chiefly influenced by the desire to remove the Russian veto on the presence of a Greek force in the expedition.

15. The results of this agreement were very far-reaching. As soon as Constantinople was promised to Russia the other Allies were compelled to place on record and ask for the adhesion of their Allies to the territorial claims which they would make in Turkey. The British required Mesopotamia, the French Syria; the British, in addition, were strongly interested in Central Asian problems, especially Persia, and including even Tibet. It also became necessary when Italy entered the war to take more account of the Turkish ambitions in Asia than probably would otherwise have been done. It leads, therefore, inevitably to the whole series of agreements with regard to the partition of Turkey which were later to give so much trouble.

16. Clearly the action of the Russian Government in making a separate peace with Germany in 1918 deprives them or any future Russian Government of the legal right based upon the assent given to their claims by the exchange of notes in 1915. On the other hand, what has been done can never be completely undone, and it will always remain on record that the British Government formally assented to the Russian annexation of Constantinople and control of the Straits. The policy of a great nation such as Russia is not permanently changed by abnormal events, even though they are of so violent a nature as those by which Russia has been distracted during the last four years. It at any time in the future Russia is reunited under a Government which commands the full allegiance of all parts of the Empire and classes of the population, the claim to Constantinople and the Straits will again be made, and it will certainly be urged that, notwithstanding the *débâcle* of 1917, Russia deserves this recompense for her immense sacrifices in the earlier years of the war. It will be represented that it would be intolerable that in the partition of the Turkish Empire, Russia should be left entirely out of account. That which Russia in the past always feared was, not the continuance of Turkish domination, but the substitution for Turkish sovereignty of that either of Greece or Bulgaria. A farseeing and patriotic Russian statesman would therefore desire that Turkey should be left with nominal sovereignty over Constantinople and all of Thrace east of the Enos-Midia line.

J. W. HEADLAM-MORLEY.

February 22, 1922.

[E 2164/75/44]

No. 45.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 482.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 24, 1922.

ON receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 351 of the 4th February, I addressed representations to M. Poincaré in regard to the attitude of Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau at Constantinople and to the gendarmerie of Cilicia.

I have to-day received from M. Poincaré a reply, of which copy is enclosed, explaining that Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau has succeeded to the functions of General Foulon, who was inspector-general of the Turkish gendarmerie constituted at the time of the armistice by the authorisation of the commander-in-chief of the Allied armies. M. Poincaré maintains that Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau's mission cannot be held to interfere with the Sub-Commission of Gendarmerie, as his activities are limited to the districts where the sub-commission's authority does not run. He therefore sees no reason to place Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau under the orders of the sub-commission, and considers it preferable to leave him and his two colleagues, in view of their nationality, under the authority of the French High Commissioner at Constantinople.

As to the Cilician gendarmerie, M. Poincaré explains that it is intended to meet local requirements alone, and will not interfere in any way with the general arrangements which may be made for the whole of Turkey as a result of the Treaty of Peace. It is with this object that the French rifles and clothing have been handed over to this body of gendarmerie, who are intended to maintain order in Cilicia. As for the aeroplanes, M. Poincaré states that they have been handed over to a French civilian society which has formally undertaken to employ them for commercial uses only.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

Enclosure in No. 45.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères,

Paris, le 23 février 1922.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

VOTRE Excellence a bien voulu par sa lettre du 6 de ce mois me faire savoir que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté estimerait que dans les questions ayant trait à la gendarmerie ottomane l'attitude des autorités françaises à Constantinople, et notamment celle du Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau, ne répondrait pas aux assurances données à votre Excellence le 14 novembre dernier.

A cette date, mon prédécesseur spécifiait que M. Franklin-Bouillon n'avait obtenu ni demandé aucun monopole ou promesse de monopole pour l'organisation de la gendarmerie en Turquie. Comme le sait votre Excellence, M. Franklin-Bouillon s'est en effet borné à accuser réception d'une lettre par laquelle le Gouvernement d'Angora exprimait le désir de faire appel pour instruire la gendarmerie à des officiers français, sans que rien dans cette lettre exclût la collaboration d'autres officiers étrangers.

L'assurance était en même temps donnée que, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement français, la nomination du Général Fillonneau, ni le caractère de sa mission n'étaient en rien modifiés, pas plus d'ailleurs que la situation du Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau.

Les intentions du Gouvernement français à cet égard n'ayant pas varié, il semble que seule une connaissance incomplète ou une interprétation différente des faits ait pu donner quelque sujet d'inquiétude au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Je crois donc utile et j'ai l'honneur de rappeler à votre Excellence et de préciser la situation exacte du Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau, qui fait l'objet des principales objections des autorités britanniques de Constantinople.

Comme le sait le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, le commandant en chef des armées alliées a laissé se reconstituer au lendemain de l'armistice une mission de gendarmerie dont l'action ne pouvait après comme avant la guerre que contribuer au maintien de l'ordre en Turquie. Son chef, le Général Foulon, tenait du Gouvernement ottoman le titre d'inspecteur général de la gendarmerie. A sa mort, le commandement intérimaire de cette mission a été exercé par l'officier le plus ancien, qui se trouve être actuellement le Lieutenant-Colonel Sarrau, sans d'ailleurs que cet officier assumât le titre d'inspecteur général.

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Le maintien de cette mission, maintenant réduite à trois officiers, ne saurait faire obstacle au fonctionnement de la Sous-Commission de Gendarmerie. Ces officiers ne sont investis d'aucun pouvoir leur permettant de donner des ordres au commandement de la gendarmerie ou au Ministère de l'Intérieur, et par suite de contrarier l'action de la Sous-Commission de Gendarmerie. Leur rôle, purement technique, se limite aux régions où ne s'exerce pas l'autorité de la sous-commission.

Aucun motif n'apparaît donc de les placer sous les ordres de la sous-commission plutôt que de les laisser sous l'autorité supérieure du Haut-Commissaire français à Constantinople, de qui ils relèvent normalement à raison de leur nationalité.

Dans cette même lettre, votre Excellence m'informe du désir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté de connaître le caractère et la destination de la force de gendarmerie à laquelle, malgré la résolution de neutralité prise le 10 août 1921, le Gouvernement français a consenti en Cilicie des cessions d'armes, d'aéroplanes et de matériel de guerre.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que les appareils d'aviation cédés l'ont été à une société civile française, qui a pris l'engagement formel de ne l'utiliser que pour des fins commerciales.

Quant aux fusils, aux vêtements et aux chaussures, ils ont été cédés pour faciliter la constitution avec des éléments pris sur place d'une gendarmerie destinée à maintenir l'ordre en Cilicie et dont j'ai à peine besoin de signaler à votre Excellence la nécessité pour la sécurité de la Syrie.

La constitution de cette gendarmerie qui répond uniquement à des besoins locaux ne saurait faire obstacle aux dispositions générales s'étendant à toute la Turquie, qui pourraient être adoptées comme conséquence du Traité de Paix avec ce pays. Ces mesures ne paraissent pas contrarier les efforts que poursuivent les Gouvernements alliés pour le rétablissement de la paix générale en Orient, auquel, je serais obligé à votre Excellence de bien vouloir en renouveler l'assurance à Lord Curzon, le Gouvernement français désire collaborer en plein accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

POINCARÉ.

[E 2218/900/44]

No. 46.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 175.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 16, 1922.

AS reported in my telegram No. 93 of the 9th instant, neither the Italian High Commissioner nor I attended the *Te Deum* service held here to celebrate the coronation of His Holiness Pope Pius XI.

2. In the account, however, of the ceremony given in the "Stamboul" of the 13th instant, an evening newspaper and the semi-official organ of the French High Commission in Constantinople, the following passages occurred: "Assistaient à cette belle cérémonie les chefs des missions diplomatiques de notre ville, les représentants de Sa Majesté impériale le Sultan," &c.; and further on: "M. de Laforcade, faisant fonctions de Haut-Commissaire, occupait la place d'honneur."

3. My Italian colleague and I considered this account to be both misleading and provocative, in that it gave the impression that all the heads of missions here attended the service, and that it laid stress on the place of honour accorded to the French representative.

4. The Marquis Garroni and I agreed that it would be impossible to allow this perversion of facts and its implied admission by our Governments of a disputed point to pass unchallenged. We accordingly decided to cause an identic explanation of the circumstances to be published in the French and English papers of the 15th instant. In drawing up this statement, copy of the French version of which I have the honour to transmit herewith, great care, as your Lordship will observe, was taken both to avoid any discourtesy to the Vatican and anything which might wound the susceptibilities of the French High Commissioner, who in the interval between the two publications had returned to his post.

5. General Pellé was informed by the French representative on the Allied Censorship Bureau at a late hour on the evening of the 14th of the terms of our proposed publication, and immediately requested Capitaine Marchal to induce his British and Italian colleagues, if possible, to suspend it. In a letter which General Pellé addressed to Capitaine Marchal in this sense, he took exception to the statement that the

5th *procès-verbal* of the San Remo Conference laid down the renunciation by France of her right to protection over Catholics in the East. He stated that, according to the verbal information he had received in Paris, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs did not admit this, and that if such an affirmation was published he would be obliged on his part to publish a rectification.

6. Marquis Garroni and I considered, however, for the reasons stated above, that it would be unwise politically and contrary to the wishes of our Governments to permit the account given in the "Stamboul" to remain uncorrected, and we instructed our censor officers to insist on the publication of our explanation in the terms in which it had originally been drawn up. I would add that General Pellé suggested as an acceptable alternative to Capitaine Marchal that the wording of the third paragraph should run: "The British and Italian High Commissioners hold the view that, under the 5th *procès-verbal* of the San Remo Conference, France renounced her right," &c. Neither Marquis Garroni nor I could of course accept a version of this nature, which would have indicated a complete misapprehension of the decided standpoint adopted on this subject both by His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government.

7. Our explanation accordingly appeared in French in the "Journal d'Orient" and in English in the "Orient News" on the morning of the 15th instant. It was immediately followed in the evening edition of the "Stamboul" on the same day by General Pellé's rectification, the text of which I have also the honour to enclose.

8. The incident, which may, pending a final decision between our respective Governments on the general point at issue, be considered as closed locally, was, I am inclined to think, partly due to the exaggerated idea which M. de Laforcade, a somewhat second-rate consular officer, held of his own importance and of his position, in the absence of any regular diplomatic officer, as Acting French High Commissioner.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 46.

Extract from the "Journal d'Orient" of February 15, 1922.

#### UNE EXPLICATION.

*Les Cérémonies de Benoît XV et Pie XI à la Cathédrale du Saint-Esprit.*

SURPRIS de ne pas avoir noté la présence de leurs Excellences les Hauts-Commissaires de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie parmi les chefs des missions diplomatiques de notre ville ayant assisté aux deux cérémonies qui ont eu dernièrement lieu en la Cathédrale du Saint-Esprit, l'un en suffrage funèbre pour la mort de Sa Sainteté Benoît XV, l'autre en l'honneur de l'élévation au Pontificat du Pape Pie XI, nous nous sommes adressés aux Hauts-Commissariats britannique et d'Italie pour avoir des éclaircissements sur les raisons qui ont motivé cette abstention, et voici les renseignements qui nous ont été aimablement fournis à ce sujet.

Un règlement de la Congrégation vaticane de Propagande datant de 1742, reconnaît aux représentants français dans le Levant le droit à la prééminence et aux honneurs liturgiques dans les fonctions religieuses catholiques en Orient.

Le 5<sup>e</sup> *procès-verbal* de la Conférence interalliée qui eut lieu à San-Remo au mois de mai 1920 établit par contre la renonciation de la France à prétendre au droit de protectorat sur les catholiques en Orient ainsi qu'aux privilèges qui en découlent.

Une divergence d'interprétation s'étant produite quant à la date d'application de la décision de San-Remo, les Hauts-Commissaires de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont jugé devoir s'abstenir d'intervenir à des cérémonies au cours desquelles le maintien en leur présence des privilèges honorifiques susmentionnés aurait été contraire à la manière de voir nettement établie de leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

Il est bien entendu que cette abstention ne saurait être en aucune façon considérée comme un acte moins qu'amical envers la France, ni comme un manque d'égards vis-à-vis du Saint-Siège ou des Souverains Pontifes honorés dans les deux fonctions dont il s'agit.



Enclosure 2 in No. 46.

*Extract from the "Stamboul" of February 15, 1922.*

— — —  
AU SUJET D' "UNE EXPLICATION."

SOUS le titre "Une Explication," un journal du matin a publié une note aux termes de laquelle la France, à la Conférence de San-Remo, aurait renoncé à prétendre au droit de protectorat sur les catholiques en Orient ainsi qu'aux privilèges qui en découlent.

D'après les renseignements que nous avons reçus d'une source autorisée, cette manière de voir n'est pas celle du Gouvernement français. Ainsi les divergences d'interprétation portent non seulement sur la date d'application de la décision de San-Remo, mais sur le fond même de la question.

[E 2225/5/44]

No. 47.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 27.)*

(No. 185.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 18, 1922.*

IN my telegram No. 102 of yesterday's date, I had the honour to report the substance of my conversation with Yussuf Kemal Bey, and I would only supplement that telegram by the following remarks:—

Yussuf Kemal Bey arrived at Constantinople in the afternoon of the 15th instant. Owing to some mistake on the part of the French naval authorities, who had undertaken to detail a destroyer to patrol the Gulf of Ismidt, whilst Yussuf Kemal's train was on its way from Ismidt to Haidar Pasha, Yussuf Kemal was held up at the former place, much to his annoyance. The British authorities sent a train on the morning of the 15th instant to fetch him. On the following day he enquired through Hamid Bey at what time I would receive him, and stated that he would like Hamid Bey to be present at the interview. The two called at this Embassy at 2 P.M. and remained for two hours.

Yussuf Kemal Bey is a smallish man of about 50 years of age. He was dressed with great care. His right hand has been injured. He speaks French fluently. His demeanour throughout the conversation was very quiet. He expressed himself temperately and in marked contrast with the tone of his communications to the High Commissioners.

I made no allusion to the Central Government during our interview. The papers state that Yussuf Kemal has seen both Izzet and Salih Pashas, who, as your Lordship is aware, were in Angora together just over a year ago on a mission from the Central Government.

The impression I derived from the interview was that Yussuf Kemal Bey was beginning to appreciate some of the difficulties in the way of the full realisation of the National Pact. I think he will realise those difficulties more and more as he gets further away from Angora and establishes contact with the Allied Governments. He made a great point of the danger to which Constantinople might be exposed if the Greeks retain any portion of the shores of the Sea of Marmora. In fact, he laid stress, both in connection with the question of Eastern Thrace and that of the Straits, on the necessity for ensuring the safety of the capital.

In the course of the conversation about Eastern Thrace, I mentioned that I had recently seen a report which showed that the population of Adrianople had greatly diminished, and that there was now a considerable Greek majority in that town. I said that the report stated that this was true of Eastern Thrace generally. Yussuf Kemal Bey pointed out that there had been considerable displacements of the population since the Greek occupation in Eastern Thrace, and that the present distribution of the population could not be considered as normal.

The fact that in discussing the question of the abolition of the Capitulations Yussuf



[E 2237/900/44]

No. 48A.

*Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 27.)*

(No. 161.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Rome presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a translation of a memorandum from the Italian Government, dated the 17th February, respecting the protection of Catholics in the East.

*Rome, February 22, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Translation of Memorandum from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs,  
dated February 17, 1922.*

IN reply to the British Embassy's *note verbale* No. 72 of the 4th instant, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs have the honour to inform them that the Royal Italian Ambassador in London was instructed by telegraph on the 1st instant to convey to the British Government the satisfaction of the Royal Italian Government on noting that their views were the same, and that similar instructions had been sent to the British and Italian representatives at Constantinople on the occasion of the funeral celebrated there in memory of His Holiness Benedict XV.

An identic line of conduct was also followed by the Italian and British representatives at Constantinople on the occasion of the invitation issued by the Apostolic delegate at Constantinople to the Corps diplomatique to assist at a ceremony in the cathedral on the occasion of the election of the new Pope.

Although the Royal Italian Government have no official relations with the Holy See, yet as early as July 1920 they communicated unofficially to the Vatican the terms of the San Remo Agreement of the 25th April, 1920, by which France gave up her protectorate over the Catholics in the East, and agreed with Italy and Great Britain that none of the three States should maintain such a protectorate in the future.

In full accord with the considerations set forth by the British Government, the Royal Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs have now instructed the Italian Ambassador at Paris to approach the French Government with a view to securing the effective execution by the latter of the engagements entered into by her at San Remo. The sense of these instructions was similar to that of the instructions sent by the British Government to their own representative at Paris.

*Rome, February 17, 1922.*

[8975]

R\*

Kemal said that the Turkish courts could be strengthened by the importation of neutral elements is an admission that those courts are not all that they should be.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 2234/5/44]

No. 48.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 27.)*

(No. 195.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 21, 1922.*

THE French High Commissioner called on me a few days ago on his return from Paris, where he had been awaiting the proposed conference on the Near Eastern question.

2. General Pellé stated that he had, whilst in Paris, seen both General Gouraud and Marshal Lyautey, both of whom had dwelt on the excellent effect produced on Moslem opinion in their respective spheres of influence by the conclusion of the French agreement with Angora. General Pellé somewhat naively remarked that this agreement had shown Muslims that France was friendly to them.

3. It is certain that the French are exploiting, and will exploit, this agreement to the fullest extent at Constantinople and with the Nationalists. They will no doubt do all they can locally to contrast the alleged aloofness of England towards Turkey with their own sympathy for this country. In fact, the well-known quotation: "Codlin's the friend, not Short," fairly describes the French attitude towards the Turks at the present moment.

4. General Pellé dwelt on the divergence in the views contained in the British and French memorandum regarding a suitable basis for a settlement of the Near Eastern question, and showed some concern lest proposals might be made by us for enforcing upon the Turks any settlement come to. He admitted, however, that it would not be possible to accept the whole of the Nationalist demands. Thus, for instance, he did not think that the Allies could agree to the abolition of the Capitulations, and he meant to utter a warning on this point to Yussuf Kemal Bey when the latter called on him.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 2501/5/44]

No. 49.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 6.)*

(No. 211.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 28, 1922.*

I HAD the honour in my telegram No. 121 to report some of the impressions formed of the state of affairs in Anatolia by M. Méry, an official of the Ottoman Public Debt. The present despatch completes the information furnished to me by the gentleman in question.

2. M. Méry accompanied Dr. Rurich in the capacity of interpreter on the latter's visit to Cæsarea to inspect the interned Greek prisoners of war at that place on behalf of the International Red Cross. He and Dr. Rurich subsequently went on to Angora, though when they started from Constantinople on their journey the Nationalist authorities informed them that it would not be possible for them to go to Angora. Dr. Rurich is satisfied that the Greek prisoners of war at Cæsarea are being satisfactorily treated. Three out of about 140 have died.

3. M. Méry was much struck by the careless, not to say heartless, manner in which certain Turkish soldiers invalided from the front were treated by the Nationalist authorities. He found a party of these soldiers working with a labour battalion on the road. They were obviously unfit for work of any description, and two of them died in hospital about the time of M. Méry's passage through the locality in question.

4. M. Méry noticed that women and children were at work in the fields, which did not present an uncultivated appearance. Without expressing an opinion on the



expediency or otherwise of the measures taken by the Greek army in its retreat from the Sakaria River to lay waste a large belt of territory, M. Méry said that the sight of their villages in flames had made a powerful appeal to the Anatolian peasantry, and had confirmed the resolve of the latter to expel the Greeks from Asia Minor.

5. My informant described Angora as a wretched place containing but few decent European houses. He was evidently disgusted by the appearance of most of the members of the National Assembly, whom he described as an unwashed and ignorant rabble, the only respectable element among them being a few lawyers and doctors. A party opposed to Mustapha Kemal was in process of formation. Mustapha Kemal himself lives 6 or 7 kilom. outside Angora, and a special road has been made for his benefit.

6. The Departments of the Angora Government seem to be run with a minimum of officials; thus he thought that there were not more than seven or eight persons employed in the Foreign Department. The Commissary for Foreign Affairs had a small room in the offices of the Public Debt at Angora.

7. M. Méry stated that Dr. Rurich and he had endeavoured, while at Angora, to get Yussuf Kemal Bey to agree to the International Red Cross assisting at the distribution of some funds for the relief of certain distressed regions. Yussuf Kemal had replied that the intervention of the Red Cross in this matter would not be in keeping with the dignity of the Nationalists. The same request was made to Yussuf Kemal Bey at Constantinople, and he agreed to it. This proved, in M. Méry's opinion, that Yussuf Kemal Bey looked at matters from a different angle at Constantinople. In other words, the Angora politicians are living in a world of their own.

8. M. Méry was decidedly of opinion that, except for the question of the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks, the Nationalists were asking for much more than they hoped to obtain.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD.

[E 2502/5/44]

No. 50.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 6.)*

(No. 212.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 28, 1922.*

WHEN Hamid Bey first informed me of Yussuf Kemal Bey's projected visit to the Allied capitals to explain the Nationalist point of view, he stated that the main purpose of Yussuf Kemal Bey in coming to Constantinople *en route* for those capitals would be to take contact with the Allied High Commissioners. I observed at the time to Hamid Bey that I presumed that Yussuf Kemal Bey would take advantage of his stay at Constantinople to exchange views with the Central Government. Hamid Bey passed over this remark somewhat lightly by saying that Yussuf Kemal Bey would no doubt visit such Turkish Ministers as were personally known to him.

2. It has now become sufficiently clear that one of the main objects of Yussuf Kemal Bey's visit to Constantinople was to get the Central Government to agree to authorise him to speak on their behalf as well as on behalf of the Angora Government. He has bent all his energies to that end, and, according to a reliable report, has been supported in this by the French High Commissioner. The latter's *démarche* cannot, however, have been palatable to the Central Government, since it took no account of such shreds of dignity as the Central Government still have left or of the Grand Vizier's plan, should the Nationalists prove intractable, to accept a reasonable settlement and then endeavour to induce Anatolia to accept that settlement. According to trustworthy information, the Central Government have definitely rejected Yussuf Kemal Bey's proposal. The latter has therefore included Hamid Bey, who is a Deputy for Constantinople, in his mission, in order to give the impression that the mission is qualified to voice public opinion at Constantinople.

3. Hamid Bey originally stated to me that Yussuf Kemal Bey's mission would consist of the Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs with two or three counsellors, but the ranks of the mission have swollen considerably since Yussuf Kemal Bey arrived at Constantinople, and now consist of some twelve persons. Yussuf Kemal Bey has arranged to leave Constantinople for Marseilles on the 1st March. The Italian High Commissioner informs me that he urged on Yussuf Kemal Bey the advisability of

proceeding straight to London. Whether this was his original intention or not, the Nationalist Minister for Foreign Affairs has in fact arranged to go straight to London.

4. During his stay here Yussuf Kemal Bey has had interviews with various journalists and has, generally speaking, made something of a stir. I have the honour to enclose the account\* of an interview between him and a representative of the "Aurora," a British weekly independent paper, as published in this week's edition of that paper. It will be seen that Yussuf Kemal Bey denies that there is hostility to England either at Angora or in the whole of Anatolia. This is not borne out by a report made to me by a M. Méry, who has just returned from Angora. That gentleman stated emphatically that the feeling in Anatolia was bitterly hostile to England. (See my telegram No. 121 of the 27th February.)

5. The visits of Yussuf Kemal Bey to the Allied High Commissioners have been kept out of the local press at the instance of my French and Italian colleagues, probably with a view to sparing the susceptibilities of the Central Government. There have been rumours that the Sultan had refused to receive Yussuf Kemal Bey and again that he had received him. It is now known from a secret source that the Sovereign did in fact receive the Nationalist Foreign Minister.

6. Though I am not able to report in any detail what my colleagues said to Yussuf Kemal Bey, I am satisfied that even the French High Commissioner urged moderation in regard to the question of the proposed abolition of the Capitulations, whilst the Italian High Commissioner went further, and intimated that it was useless to flourish the National Pact in the face of Allied statesmen and expect them to swallow it whole.

7. I am inclined to appreciate the position somewhat as follows:—

The Nationalists have made their maximum military effort and know they cannot do more. The Greek army is still facing them and, although they express confidence to foreign observers that they can expel the Greeks from Asia Minor, the Nationalists no doubt realise perfectly well that such an operation, even if feasible, will subject their army to a very severe strain. If therefore they can, under a settlement, obtain the evacuation of Asia Minor, they will, provided the Allies show a united front on other questions, have to face the necessity for a compromise on those questions. I would make one exception, however, in the case of the northern shore of the Sea of Marmora. Turks of all shades of opinion will not rest content until the Greeks have left that shore, but it might in the last resort be possible to get them to accept an arrangement under which the League of Nations would take over the Gallipoli peninsula. The peninsula is thinly inhabited and not very fertile and could be held by a small force of gendarmerie.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD.

[E 2503/5/44]

No. 51.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 6.)*

(No. 213)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, February 28, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 122, I have the honour to report that Izzet Pasha, in discussing with me the prospects of a settlement on the Near Eastern question, said that he recognised that the Turks must take account of the *amour-propre* of England. He meant by this that they ought not to expect England to give way on any point in which her honour was involved. I did not ask Izzet Pasha to define his meaning more precisely, but I infer that he was referring in particular to the question of the freedom of the Straits. Izzet Pasha also said that the Turks must take into account the legitimate commercial interests of England.

2. On the other hand, His Highness repeated that all the Turks ask for is to be allowed to keep what they consider their own possessions. They had been shorn of three-quarters of their Empire, and considered that what remained was absolutely Turkish. On my remarking that in my view it would not be possible to grant Turkey all the conditions contained in the national pact, Izzet Pasha replied that it would be necessary to find a middle course.

3. Izzet Pasha admitted to me that Yussuf Kemal Bey had proposed to the

\* Not printed.



Central Government that he should be authorised to speak in their name during his forthcoming visit to the Allied capitals. But the Central Government could not admit this, and I suspect that Izzet Pasha's contemplated journey to London is designed to forestall Yussuf Kemal Bey and to see what he can effect on his own account. Izzet Pasha has this advantage over Yussuf Kemal Bey, in that he is less likely to be disavowed by the Central Government than is Yussuf Kemal Bey by Mustapha Kemal or the National Assembly. In other words, Izzet Pasha can probably deliver the goods, whereas Yussuf Kemal Bey does not appear to have the power to bind the Angora Government.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 2472/2472/44]

No. 52.

*Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 6.)*

(No. 564.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 4, 1922.

AS reported in my despatch No. 33 of the 4th January, 1921, the French Government in 1920 granted a subvention of 500,000 fr. to the Society of the Habous of the Holy Places towards the erection of a Mussulman institute and mosque in Paris.

The laying of the foundation stone and the orientation of the mosque took place on the 1st March, and was made the occasion of a demonstration of Franco-Moslem friendship. The ceremony was presided over by M. Colrat, Under-Secretary of State, and was attended by representatives of the President of the Republic and of Marshal Lyautey, who was indisposed, by Marshal Franchet d'Esperey, M. de Peretti de la Rocca, and other high officials of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and M. Edouard Herriot, deputy for the Rhône and ex-Minister, the Prefect of the Seine, and the president of the municipal council. The Moslem world was represented by the Grand Chamberlain of the Sultan of Morocco, by the "Ministre de la Plume" of the Bey of Tunis, by diplomatic representatives of Turkey and of Persia, by delegates of the University of Fez, of Algeria, Afghanistan, Egypt and India, by officers of the African section of the Ministry of War, and by Sidi Kaddour-ben-Shabrit, president of the Association of the Habous of the Holy Places.

Sidi Kaddour, in a speech praising the French administration of Morocco, expressed the gratitude of Mussulmans to France for the homage paid by her to them in connection with the establishment of this institute. The president of the municipal council and the Prefect of the Seine followed with speeches praising the part played by Mussulman soldiers in the war, and M. Colrat closed the ceremony with a summary of the relations between France and Islam from the days of François I, and a eulogy of the policy and aims of France in her dealings with Moslem peoples.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

[E 2471/5/44]

No. 53.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. Gounaris.*

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, March 6, 1922.

I HAVE considered with the utmost care the note which you addressed to me on the 15th ultimo, and desire to express my appreciation of the perfect candour with which you have expounded to me a situation that is indubitably fraught with the gravest anxiety to the Greek Government and nation. I can only express a hope that the military position in Anatolia is less immediately critical than your note would lead me to think, and that the remarkable patriotism and discipline of the Hellenic armies, of which so many illustrations have been furnished in the campaigns of the last few years, will not fail them in any emergency that may conceivably arise.

2 As regards the financial position, your Excellency has yourself detailed the inception of the negotiations by which it was hoped by your Government to raise a

substantial loan in the London market. His Majesty's Government have, as you know, endeavoured, within the limits of their publicly declared neutrality and of the engagements entered into with their Allies, to lighten the difficulties by which these negotiations were attended; and if, as I am informed, they have failed to produce the desired result, this would appear to have been due in the main to obstacles connected with the commercial, rather than with the political, aspects of the proposed transaction.

3. In these circumstances, the wisest course is unquestionably to expedite the diplomatic solution of the anxious position in which all are placed. I deeply regret that owing to circumstances over which His Majesty's Government have had no control the proposed meeting of the Allied Ministers in Paris has been so long delayed. An Italian Ministry having however now been formed, I have hastened to propose that the conference should meet in Paris on the 13th March—a date which at the moment of writing seems likely to be again postponed for a few days to meet the convenience of the new Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I have little doubt that the first subject that will come under examination there will be the Anatolian question; and I earnestly hope that a solution may be found which will be acceptable to both parties and may relieve you of the more serious apprehensions by which you are assailed.

4. Your Government has already placed itself, in accordance with the advice which I ventured to tender to you last autumn, in the hands of the Allies, and I doubt not therefore that in a similar spirit of confidence and good faith you will be prepared to listen to such counsels as may be offered to you from Paris with regard to the immediately existing situation.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 2752/5/44]

No. 54.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 13.)*

(No. 225.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 6, 1922.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 134 and 139 of the 4th and 5th March respectively, giving the main points of Mustapha Kemal Pasha's speech at the opening of the third session of the Grand National Assembly at Angora on the 1st instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the speech as given by the Anatolian Agency under date of the 2nd March, and published in the local Nationalist press on the 4th March. The passages italicised were cut out by the Inter-Allied Press Censorship Commission.

2. I venture to draw your Lordship's attention to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the speech, in which Mustapha Kemal Pasha deals with the foreign policy of his Government. His statement, that the treaties concluded in 1921 with the Russian Republics and with France showed that the Treaty of Sévres would be incapable of application, is interesting. Mustapha Kemal Pasha evidently regards these treaties with pride, although his French friends are not likely to appreciate being coupled with Russian Bolsheviks. The diplomacy of Angora has set itself a difficult task, if it means to hoodwink both Russian Bolshevism and French capitalism. The threat to the Sultan, with which he concluded his statement on foreign policy, would probably not have been made if the Government of Constantinople had authorised his emissary, Yu-suf Kemal Bey, to speak on behalf of His Imperial Majesty's Government to the "statesmen of Europe."

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.



*Speech by Mustapha Kemal Pasha in the Grand National Assembly, Angora,  
March 1, 1922.*

(Report by Anatolian Agency, Angora, March 2.)

(Translation.)

OUR internal organisation is based upon the unrestricted sovereignty of the people. Accordingly, to give this sovereignty effectively to the people, bills relating to provincial administrative Councils, to Communal administration, to inspectors-general, and to the duty and responsibility of the Council of Commissaries have been prepared and accepted in part. Respect of the racial and social rights of the composite Turkish people will be the directive of internal policy. The Christian minority will enjoy the rights given by the most civilised nations to similar minorities. Guarantees must, however, be given that the Moslem inhabitants of foreign countries enjoy the same rights.

2. After referring to such matters as the assistance rendered by the Government during the past year to refugees, Mustapha Kemal Pasha said with reference to the administration of justice: "It is the most elementary duty of the Government to enforce the law and to distribute justice equitably. It is essential for us to raise our standard of justice to that of every civilised State. We must not be inferior in this respect. We cannot, however, allow anyone to interfere in the distribution of justice, which is the indefeasible right of every independent State. In enumerating the measures taken by the Department of Justice to attain these objects, Mustapha Kemal Pasha mentioned the extension of the system of a single judge, the creation of a judicial inspectorate, of a suitable system for dealing with sections of the population living in a tribal State, and finally of a faculty of law."

3. Turning to our economic life, he began by saying: "The lord and master of Turkey is the peasant." (Loud and continuous applause.) "The efforts of the peasant have been lavished for seven centuries without stint both on the field of battle and on the farm. In return the peasant has been treated with contempt and ingratitude, and attempts have been made to reduce him to a position of servitude. Gentlemen, let us adopt a modest and respectful attitude towards the master of Turkey." (Loud applause.) After noting the importance to the country of the social and economic position of the peasant, Mustapha Kemal Pasha explained that farming would be the axis of our economic policy, that the peasant must be protected and that therefore the Capitulations would never be accepted. He dwelt on the necessity of the development of our mineral resources, together with the protection of agriculture, of giving wide scope for the development of our national life and of adopting a benevolent attitude to home and foreign capital. It would be necessary for foreign capital to be completely subject to our national laws, and *this applied with equal force to foreign specialists.* With regard to finance, he declared, amid applause, that: "Thank God, for three years we have been able to maintain this great struggle by force of the patriotism of the nation alone and without having recourse to a foreign loan, and that our national resources would suffice to enable us to make our cause triumph."

4. "With regard to education, it is essential to deliver the peasant, who is the owner of the country, from ignorance and to teach him at least reading and writing and the history and geography of his native land, and at the same time to produce learned specialists in science and art with a view to forming a civilised and historic nation and developing the national genius. The press occupies a high position in the historic and civilised countries of the present day. The press is a most important power, a school and a guide to enlighten this nation, to give it the intellectual food it needs and to direct it to its goal, which is deliverance." (Loud and prolonged applause.) "Therefore our Government will devote special consideration to educational and press matters."

5. "With regard to affairs of the religious law, they are dealt with in accordance with the precepts of the Koran; and in order that the people may fully enjoy the blessings of religion, the sacred pulpits of the mosques must become a source of real teaching and enlightenment by the use of language which the people can understand. With regard to pious foundations (auqaf), our Government is paying attention to the development of these religious foundations, the object of which is social assistance."

6. With regard to our foreign policy, he stated that our friendship with Russia was the foundation of our foreign relations, and explained the development of the phases of our friendly relations with that State. He said that "thanks to the

conference of Kars of last year, followed by the treaty of friendship which Krunze, the representative of Ukraina, concluded at Angora, our State was in perfect accord with the States of Russia, Ukraina, Azerbaijan, Bokhara, Afghanistan, Georgia and Armenia. Our commercial and economic relations with these States were developing from day to day. He mentioned separately the names of the Russian Ambassador, Aralof, of the Ukrainian representative, Krunze, and of the Ambassadors of the Moslem States represented at Angora, and said that the treaties concluded in the same year with the Russian republics and with France showed that the Treaty of Sèvres would be incapable of application. *The fact that one of the most powerful of the States that signed the Treaty of Sèvres, viz., France, had come to a separate understanding with us, proved to the whole world that that treaty was merely a rag.*

7. In describing our foreign policy, he used the following words: "We have no intention of infringing the rights of any other nation. We are simply defending our right, our life and our country, and we shall continue to do so. The responsibility for the bloodshed, because our just claims are not recognised, falls, of course, upon those responsible for the non-recognition. They must know that there is no weakening in the desire and hope of the nation, or in its capacity and power to fight. It is our determination securely to defend the life and independence of our nation and country. Our Commissary for Foreign Affairs has been sent to Europe by way of Constantinople to explain to the statesmen of Europe these, our national rights. Constantinople is a city of ours, in which the Prophet personally interested himself, and which contains all the memorials of our national genius. It is our most intense hope that, as affirmed in the fourth article of our national pact, it may be preserved from all damage. The patriotism of the people of this city is worthy of separate mention. The other portions of Turkish territory which have been separated from us for the time being are sacred to us. The essence of the national pact is that they should return to the mother country. This is the firm determination of the Turkish people, who are the real, legitimate and true owners of Turkey. Those who dare to act in opposition to this high national determination are rebels, strangers and traitors to the nation. Such criminals cannot escape the justice of the national will. *It is therefore hoped that certain personages and the Palace at Constantinople will refrain from prejudicing the position and work of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.*"

8. His Excellency the Pasha then reviewed the events of the world during the last year, and mentioned that the Government had taken the necessary steps that Turkey should be invited to the Genoa Conference.

9. He referred next to the heroic army, which was the most devoted element of our nation, and enumerated the deeds accomplished last year on the eastern and western fronts. He held up to general execration the violence and ravages committed by the Greeks, with their princes and generals at their head.

10. Mustapha Kemal Pasha summed up the year's labours of the Assembly, and concluded his speech with the following words: "My respected and dear comrades, the solidarity of the Assembly and the nation and the joy we shall show in accepting the sacrifices imposed upon us by events are the strongest guarantees of final success. We enter the New Year in a sure but more solemn spirit than ever before. We shall proceed relentlessly towards our sacred goal, which is for us the flame of life, and for future generations the hope of salvation, and with the divine help we shall surely succeed. This country will not die, and if—to suppose what is impossible—it were to die, the surface of the globe would not sustain the immense coffin." (Loud applause.)

[E 2753/27/44]

No. 55.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 13.)*

(No. 226.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 6, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit the following translation of a message of the special correspondent of the "Vakt" at Angora, which appeared in to-day's issue of that newspaper, giving the text of the speeches made by M. Aralof, the Russian Soviet Ambassador at Angora, and of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, president of the Grand National Assembly, at a banquet in the Russian Soviet Embassy, on the 3rd March:—



"*Angora, March 5.*—At a banquet given at the Russian Embassy the evening before yesterday, the Russian Ambassador, Aralof, made the following speech:—

"There is a very strong bond of friendship between the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Russian Soviet Republic. The peoples of the two countries are struggling for independence and freedom. We shall be victorious in the future in this struggle as we have been in the past. The Turkish army will shortly achieve final victory. Before finishing my speech, I raise my glass, the contents of which are pure, clean water, and express the wish that our friendship may be clean like this pure water."

"Mustapha Kemal Pasha replied to this speech as follows:—

"Comrade Aralof has a place in our heart, not simply because he is the Russian representative, but on account of his precious personality. Russia first opened the campaign against Imperialism, and all beginnings are difficult. By their initiative, the Russians won a sacred celebrity. The attention of the oppressed was aroused. The Turks saw the necessity of rising and taking up arms to preserve their independence. To be powerful together, we must be powerful individually. Comrade Aralof took as an illustration of the relations of the two Governments the purity of the water in his glass. I desire that we shall be bound as tightly together as the hydrogen and oxygen of which that water is composed."

The Ambassadors, the principal commissaries, Yussuf Akchura Bey, Aghaoghlu Ahmed Bey and Yunus Nadi Bey were present at the banquet.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 2755/5/44]

No. 56.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(Received March 13.)

(No. 229. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 7, 1922.*

AS I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my personal and secret telegram of the 28th February, Yussuf Kemal Bey and his mission left Constantinople on the 1st March for Marseilles in the French steamer "Tadla." The newspapers state that when Yussuf Kemal Bey went on board the Turkish flag was run up at the fore. A large crowd saw him off, and he is reported to have said that his visit to Constantinople had satisfied him that he could speak on behalf of the whole of Turkey.

2. Izzet Pasha and his mission left on the 4th March by Orient express, intending to proceed direct to London. Up to the last minute he was in two minds as to stopping in Paris en route. He was afraid that if he went straight through to London he might lay himself open to the charge of want of courtesy towards the French Government. But, as at the moment of his departure it appeared likely that the Near Eastern Conference in Paris would meet on the 13th instant, he sent me a message to say that he had decided to go straight to England in the first instance. I think it possible that, when they learn that the Eastern Conference has been still further adjourned, both missions will stop a few days in Paris before proceeding to London.

3. There is no doubt that both Yussuf Kemal Bey and the French High Commissioner are much put out by the action of the Central Government in sending Izzet Pasha independently to the Allied capitals. The French High Commissioner, whether from a desire to play up to the Nationalists or because he genuinely wishes to terminate the present duality in the Government of Turkey, worked hard to obtain authorisation for Yussuf Kemal to speak in the name of the Central Government and to dissuade that Government from despatching a mission of its own. His failure in both cases will not tend to improve his position.

4. If I correctly appreciate the situation, Yussuf Kemal Bey's visit to Constantinople has had the effect of somewhat stiffening the attitude of the Central Government in regard to the terms of a settlement. Yussuf Kemal Bey has dealt mainly with Izzet Pasha, and the latter may be expected to back him as far as he can properly do so, having regard to the desire of the Constantinople Government to get the credit for any concessions obtainable. It is certain that the attitude of the Turks

as a whole must be largely influenced by the development of the military situation in Asia Minor within the next three or four weeks. The letter addressed to your Lordship by M. Gounaris, dated the 15th February, is very significant in this connection. Should the Greek army receive the order to evacuate Anatolia as speedily as possible, there will be no limit to the Kemalist pretensions, and a settlement which the Allies could accept with any self-respect will, in my opinion, become almost impossible.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 2756/5/44]

No. 57.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*—(Received March 13.)

(No. 231.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 7, 1922.*

THE Grand Vizier, who is now in charge of the Foreign Department during the absence of Izzet Pasha, called on me yesterday.

2. His Highness began by recapitulating the attitude of the Angora Government last year when he transmitted an invitation to that Government to attend the conference in London. He also alluded to the manner in which, according to his own account, the mission under Bekir Sami Bey had got in touch with himself and had been guided by his advice throughout the conference in London. Tewfik Pasha said that he had always understood that the Constantinople Government was the only Government recognised by the Allies. Such being the case, he asked whether I would transmit to your Lordship the following proposal or suggestion, namely, that "any frontier rectifications" and modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres which your Lordship might be disposed to concede to the Turks might be made to Izzet Pasha's mission, which represented the only legally constituted Government in Turkey. The Grand Vizier pointed out that this course would have the effect of strengthening the authority of the Constantinople Government, whereas if the concessions in question were made to Yussuf Kemal Bey's mission they would only be the signal for still further demands from the Kemalists.

3. It is clear that in making this proposal the Grand Vizier continued true to the plan which he has before now developed to me, namely, to secure an acceptable arrangement and then endeavour to work on Anatolia to accept it. From a further remark which he let fall, to the effect that Izzet Pasha was not trained in the art of diplomacy, I infer that the two Ministers possibly do not see eye to eye at the present moment. Izzet Pasha has indeed seen a good deal of Yussuf Kemal Bey during the latter's stay in Constantinople; he is anyhow moderate Nationalist in his views, and it may be that he is willing to go further than his chief.

4. In reply to my enquiry as to whether Yussuf Kemal Bey had seen the Sultan, the Grand Vizier replied that he would tell me in confidence that such had been the case. He added that I was the only person to whom he had admitted that this interview had taken place. He said that Yussuf Kemal Bey had come to him with Izzet Pasha with a request to be received by the Sultan. The Grand Vizier had replied that the Sultan could certainly not receive Yussuf Kemal Bey in his capacity as Foreign Minister of the Angora Government, whereupon Yussuf Kemal Bey said that he wished to be received as one of His Majesty's subjects. According to the Grand Vizier, Yussuf Kemal Bey gave His Majesty assurances of loyalty to his authority and person on the part of the Angora authorities. Tewfik Pasha denied that the Sultan had expressed an opinion one way or the other with regard to Yussuf Kemal Bey's mission.

5. I think the truth is probably that Yussuf Kemal Bey did take the initiative in asking for an audience of the Sultan, in order, if possible, to get His Majesty to say that he recognised the National Assembly, and thus to lend weight to his demand to be authorised to speak in the name of the Constantinople Government during his mission.

6. The Grand Vizier made a casual allusion to the Enos-Midia line, and then developed the argument which I had already heard from Hamid Bey, the Nationalist agent here, that the retention by Greece of a tongue of territory between Bulgaria and Turkey would be a cause of future wars. I observed to his Highness that I did not believe that either Serbia or Roumania would acquiesce in Turkey being given a



common frontier with Bulgaria. Such a settlement would reopen the Balkan question. The Grand Vizier suggested the possibility of an arrangement under which, in the event of Turkey and Bulgaria being given a common frontier, the frontier zones might be demilitarised. I did not pursue this subject, as his suggestion struck me as not practicable.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 2760/5/44]

No. 58.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 13.)

(No. 235.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 7, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 232, Secret, dated this day, transmitting translations of certain documents which were stated to have been in the possession of Kemal Bey, secretary of Yussuf Kemal Bey's Mission to Europe, I have the honour to transmit the following information, received from the same source.

2. Kemal Bey stated in conversation during his stay in Constantinople that the Grand National Assembly had allocated a sum of £ T. 160,000, which at the present rate of exchange is a little less than 25,000*l.*, to the mission. Of this sum £ T. 50,000 were for travelling expenses and the remaining £ T. 110,000 for secret purposes.

3. Among other statements attributed to Kemal Bey are the following: When Prince Eumer Farouk Effendi was sent back from Inebolu to Constantinople early in 1921, Hamdullah Subhi Bey, a member of the Grand National Assembly, telegraphed the news to Angora, stating that the Prince wished to reign in Anatolia. This telegram was read to the Grand National Assembly, and several Deputies denounced the Prince. The Deputies were given to understand that the Sultan was sold to the British, and the Assembly was adjourned for two months to enable the Deputies to visit their constituencies and carry on an anti-dynastic propaganda. This propaganda did not meet with much encouragement, especially in the regions of Sivas, Konia and Erzeroum, the inhabitants of which are devoted to the Sultanate and the Caliphate.

4. The last time M. Franklin-Bouillon was at Angora he had advocated the abolition of the dual system of Angora and Constantinople. Mustapha Kemal Pasha had told him that this could only be accomplished by the dethronement of the Sultan, who was a slave of the English and had betrayed his country.

5. Shortly before his interview with M. Poincaré, Yussuf Kemal Bey telegraphed to Ferid Bey, the representative of the Angora Government in Paris, that as long as the present Sultan was on the throne it was impossible to do anything for the French, and that the English were the most important factors in a settlement of the Near Eastern question. In principle the French are of the same opinion, but they are unable to come to terms with Mr. Lloyd George, and the question is put off from day to day.

6. The Angora Government were being pressed by the Russians to grant them mining concessions, and would probably have to give them more than twenty mines. Their only hope was to obtain more favourable terms from the French before the 20th March, when they would have to give a definite answer to the Russians. This question was of vital importance for the Angora Government.

7. Persons in touch with Mustapha Kemal Pasha have the greatest respect for him, and this respect has, if possible, increased of late through admiration of his activity. His entourage say that it is much better to be in the service of a man of sublime character, the saviour and protector of the nation, than in that of an ignorant Sovereign whose sole ambition is to continue to reign. As Yussuf Kemal Bey said to Jelal Mukhtar Bey a few days ago at the office of the Red Crescent, "The Sultan requires spectacles to see his failings, but if he purchases them from English shops and from his brother-in-law [Damad Ferid Pasha], it is not surprising that he is unable to perceive anything new."

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 2803/2803/44]

No. 59.

Department of Overseas Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received March 14.)

THE Comptroller-General of the Department of Overseas Trade presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and transmits herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Commercial Secretary, Constantinople, dated the 3rd instant, respecting French interests in Turkey.

Department of Overseas Trade,  
March 13, 1922.

Enclosure 1 in No. 59.

Commercial Secretary, Constantinople, to Department of Overseas Trade.

Sir,

British High Commission, Constantinople, March 3, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a summarised translation of a series of addresses made by the Director of the Official French Commercial Bureau in Constantinople recently. Whilst they are, of course, strongly pro-French, they are, however, valuable in their indication of the very strong financial representation that France has built up in Turkey.

I have, &c.  
C. H. COURTHOPE MUNROE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 59.

French Interests in Turkey.

FRANCE exercises a considerable control over Turkish finances, owing to the large amount of French capital invested in Ottoman public funds and in private enterprises.

The Ottoman Public Debt.

In the securities of the Ottoman Public Debt (interior and exterior) France has invested about 2½ milliard francs, representing 60·31 per cent. of the total capital of the debt, against 14·19 per cent. British capital and 21·13 per cent. German capital. This gives France a predominating influence in the administration of the debt, which is by far the most important financial organisation in Turkey. The administration of the debt is directed by a council, under the alternate presidency of a French and English representative of the bondholders. By the decree of Mouharrem, the Imperial Ottoman Bank, as representative of a group of priority bondholders, is entitled to furnish a special delegate. The director-general of the debt, nominated by the council, is in almost every case a Frenchman, and a large number of the heads of departments is filled by Frenchmen. By the decree of Mouharrem, the salt, stamps, spirits, fisheries and silk revenues are ceded to and collected by the debt. The amounts collected under these headings are shown in the following table:—

Revenue.	Financial Year, 1882-83.	Financial Year, 1913-14.
	£ T.	£ T.
Salt .. .. .	594,679	1,584,082
Spirits .. .. .	178,851	362,397
Stamps .. .. .	138,392	419,241
Fisheries .. .. .	22,636	77,426
Silk .. .. .	18,952	82,487



The assistance of French financiers has been utilised by the Turkish Ministry of Finance to reform the entire organisation of the budget and to institute an inspection of Turkish Government finances.

#### Turkish Loans.

The history of Turkish loans commenced with the Crimean war.

1. 1854-1875.—Thirteen issues of bonds were made during this period, ten of which were entirely due to the assistance of French financial houses. Up to this time France's only rivals in Turkey were certain English banks and a powerful Austrian syndicate.

2. 1875-1881.—In 1876 the Ottoman Treasury was unable to provide more than half the interest due on the external debt of the country, and this state of things continued until 1881. On the 20th December, 1881, the Decree of Mouharrem was signed, which granted to the institution known as the Ottoman Public Debt, consisting of the holders of Turkish bonds, the right to collect and administer certain revenues of the State.

3. 1881-1903.—The liquidation effected by the Decree of Mouharrem did not take into account the floating debt of Turkey. To liquidate this six loans were floated, the capital of all six being entirely French.

4. 1903-1914.—This period is marked by great German activity, particularly on the subject of the Constantinople-Bagdad Railway and the supply of military stores. Twelve loans were raised during this period, of which France subscribed entirely to six, Germany to four, England to one, and the twelfth was divided between France, England and Germany. A loan of 800,000,000 fr. was floated in April 1914, being partly subscribed to by a French financial syndicate.

#### French Commercial Interests in Turkey.

France has placed upwards of 1 milliard francs in various private commercial enterprises in Turkey. Of the foreign capital invested in this way, France has 53.55 per cent., England 13.66 per cent., and Germany 32.77 per cent. French capital is invested in many of the leading banks, railways, mines, harbour construction works, electric light company, chemical companies and tramways, &c. The following statistics show the amount of capital invested in Turkey by France, Germany and Great Britain:—

Country.	Capital.	Percentage.
	Fr.	
France .. .. .	902,893,000	53.55
Great Britain .. .. .	230,458,675	13.66
Germany .. .. .	352,653,000	32.77

#### (A.) The Régie Tobacco Monopoly.

The Decree of Mouharrem granted to the Ottoman Public Debt the control of tobacco culture and the monopoly of sale of tobacco throughout the whole of the Turkish Empire. This administration in 1884 ceded its rights to a limited company with the title of "Régie co-intéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman." The Régie was founded by the joint action of three financial groups, the first, English-French, being that of the Imperial Ottoman Bank; the second, that of the German Bank "Bleichroder"; and the third, Austrian, that of the "Kredit Anstalt." The total capital of the Régie was 100,000,000 fr., represented by 200,000 shares. Of this capital, about half was provided by France, the remainder being principally Austrian. The president, vice-president and director-general of the board of directors of the company are supplied by France.

#### (B.) Banks.

Both England and France have large financial interests in the many banks in Turkey, and prior to the war Germany was also showing great activity in this direction. Since the armistice Italy has made great progress, and has opened many branches of her big banks in Constantinople, Asia Minor and Caucasus.

(a.) *Imperial Ottoman Bank.*—The Imperial Ottoman Bank was founded 1863 by an English-French group. The shares were originally approximately divided equally between France and Great Britain, but at the present time France holds by far the largest proportion of these shares. The administration of the bank is run by a committee of twenty members, of whom ten are resident in France and ten in Great Britain. At the present time the director-general, M. Steeg, is a Frenchman. The Imperial Ottoman Bank is now an essential factor in Turkish finance. Among its privileges are the following:—

1. It is the only bank allowed to issue its own notes.
2. It is the treasurer and payer-general to the Empire.
3. It is the Ottoman Government's financial agent.

The bank was for a long time the only important financial establishment working in Turkey. It has fifty-two branches in Turkey, seven in Egypt, five in Cyprus, five in Greece, two in France and two in England.

(b.) *Banque de Salonique.*—Banque de Salonique was founded 1888 with French, Austrian, Hungarian and Greek capital. The capital has now been raised to 20,000,000 fr., the greater part of which was subscribed to in France, and the board of directors is entirely French. The Turkish branches of the bank are in Constantinople, Adrianople, Smyrna, Beyrouth and Samsoun.

(N.B.—It is reported that the Crédit foncier d'Algérie et de Tunisie has recently taken over this bank.)

(c.) *Crédit Lyonnais.*—The three chief agencies of this bank in the Near East are at Constantinople, Smyrna and Jerusalem, and there are other branches in smaller towns.

(d.) *Banque française pour les Pays d'Orient.*—The branch of this bank in Constantinople has only recently been opened, but it represents French commercial and industrial interests on a large scale.

(e.) *Banque commerciale pour la Méditerranée.*—This bank was commenced in Constantinople at the beginning of 1920 under the patronage of La Banque de la Seine.

(f.) *Comptoir Lyon allemand.*—A branch of the French Industrial Society chiefly concerned with precious metals and metal refinery.

French capital is also well represented in foreign banks, such as the Bank of Athens, the Marmorosch Bank, &c.

The distribution of foreign banks in Constantinople, apart from French, is as follows:—

Italy: Banca di Roma, Banca Commerciale.  
 England: National Bank of Turkey, Anglo-Levantine Bank.  
 United States: Guaranty Trust Company, American Express Company.  
 Holland: One.  
 Greece: One.  
 Roumania: One.

#### Lighthouses.

The administration of all Turkish lighthouses is purely French, being administered by a company with its head office in Paris. The company is the concessionaire for all Turkish lighthouses in the Mediterranean, Dardanelles, Black Sea, Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

#### Roads.

In July 1910 a contract was made between the Ottoman Government and a French company for the construction of State roads to a total length of 9,000 kilom. Work in this connection was in full operation on the outbreak of war. La Société française d'Entreprises has now taken up this question again.

#### Railways.

There has been active competition between France, Great Britain and Germany for an active share in the construction of Turkish railways. The following table shows the



amount of capital invested in railways by each of these three Powers and the length of line over which they had rights of exploitation :—

	France.	England.	Germany.
Length of line exploited .. ..	2,977 kilom.	610 kilom.	2,565 kilom.
Total capital invested .. ..	550,238,000 fr.	114,693,675 fr.	466,078,000 fr.

#### Mines.

In proportion to the mineral resources of the country, the number of mining concessions in Turkey is comparatively small. The most important companies exploiting mines in Turkey, including the Heracles coal basin, are largely under French financial control. The total foreign capital invested in the Heracles coal basin is about 38,000,000 fr., of which a large proportion is French. Apart from several mines in the Heracles coal basin, the following mines are under French control: Balia, Karaidin, Cassandra, Argana and Ak-Dagh. The copper, lead, silver and lignite mines of Balia and Karaidin, situated in the centre of Karassi, have been ceded for ninety-nine years to a French company, having a capital of 6,000,500 fr. The total of French capital invested in French mines amounts to about 42,000,000 fr. England has just over 6,000,000 fr., of which the greater part is represented by the Borax Company (Limited). German interests are negligible.

#### Quays and Ports.

France has played an important rôle in the construction of the ports of Constantinople, Smyrna and Beyrouth. Germany's chief work in this connection has been the construction of the port of Haidar-Pacha at the head of the Anatolian Railway line. The capital invested by France, Great Britain and Germany in Turkish port construction is as follows :—

France, 54,000,000 fr.
Great Britain, 10,000,000 fr.
Germany, 16,000,000 fr.

#### Constantinople Municipal Services.

A powerful company has in its hands the administration of the tramways, the electric lighting and tunnel services of Constantinople. The total capital of the company is 27,000,000 fr., of which nearly 15,000,000 are French. In the Constantinople telephone company Great Britain has 60 per cent. of the capital and France 27 per cent. In the Constantinople water and gas companies France has practically all the capital engaged.

#### Various Commercial Enterprises.

The following are the principal French commercial enterprises in Constantinople :—

#### Industrial Societies.

Société immobilière ottomane du Taxim.  
Société des Docks et Ateliers du Haut-Bosphore.  
Établissements Jost.  
Société Lille, Colombes et Bonnières.  
Syndicat d'Orient.  
Oriental Carpet.  
Société de l'Oriental Tobacco.  
Établissements mécaniques et Automobiles d'Orient.

#### Commercial Societies.

Établissements Orosdi-Bach.  
Compagnie française de l'Est Européen.  
Compagnie française du Levant.  
Société nationale pour le commerce, l'industrie et l'agriculture de l'Empire ottoman.

Compagnie Optorg pour le commerce avec la Russie et pays limitrophes.  
Société des Baraques municipales.  
Le Bon Marché.  
Établissements V. Bayol de Marseille.  
Établissements Dufey Gigandet.  
Établissements Gaumont.  
Établissements Pathé.  
Société générale de Librairie et de Publications.

#### Silk Industry.

Fédération des Grainages français.  
Société Chabrières, Morel et Cie.  
Bernardin Frères de Lyon.  
La Générale Soie.  
Comptoir commercial de Saint-Etienne.

#### Insurance Companies.

L'Union.  
La Générale.  
Consortium Assurances.  
La Foncière.  
La Garantie.  
L'Urbaine.  
L'Éveil, &c.

#### Transport Societies.

De Brousse de Paris.  
Transports généraux "La Française."

#### Steamship Companies.

Messageries maritimes.  
Fraissinet.  
Affréteurs réunis.  
Compagnie navale de l'Orient, &c.

Two of the principal newspapers of the town, the "Stamboul" and the "Bosphore," are published in French and promote French interests, as well as a "Revue commerciale d'Orient."

#### German Activity.

The volume of German trade with Turkey, not particularly powerful before the war, increased enormously during the war. The German and Austrian banks in Constantinople increased their activities to an enormous extent, whilst the operations of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, suspected of pro-Allied sympathies, were greatly impeded. After the armistice the inter-Allied financial control placed a very strong check on the activity of the ex-enemy banks, and the prohibition of commerce between Turkey and the Central Powers destroyed for the present, at all events, a strong representation that German goods had obtained on this market. In view of her financial pre-eminence in Turkey, the volume of trade between France and Turkey, compared with other countries, is disappointing. For the first nine months of 1921 France comes fourth on the list of countries exporting to Turkey, with a total of £ T. 9,000,000, the list being headed by Great Britain with a total of £ T. 17,000,000.

[E 3035/48/44]

No. 60.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 20.)

(No. 254.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 14, 1922.

I HAD occasion to invite a few days ago to this High Commission Mr. Ochs, the proprietor of the "New York Times," who had arrived here on a visit and was the bearer of a letter of introduction to me from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.



Mr. Ochs mentioned to me, in the course of conversation, that he had gathered from a number of different sources in Constantinople that discrimination was being shown here against American trade and that American merchants were being placed at a disadvantage *vis-à-vis* Allied traders. Though Mr. Ochs quoted no specific examples of this discrimination, I did not fail to gather the impression that he had been informed that the British authorities were the principal instigators of the alleged unfair treatment which was being accorded to American commerce. As I was aware that Mr. Ochs is a partisan of Anglo-American co-operation, I did my utmost to disabuse him.

2. There is some reason to suspect that Mr. Ochs's illusions were gained from the American High Commissioner here. Admiral Bristol is perhaps unaccustomed to the slowness of Oriental methods. He is somewhat prone to disregard the difficulties with which not only this High Commission but the three Allied High Commissions jointly have to contend, and he seems to have acquired the idea that they are taking advantage of their position to hamper American enterprise. During the first eight months of my residence here the relations between the three High Commissions and Admiral Bristol were none to cordial. The latter complained that he was continually being presented with accomplished facts in respect of measures which affected American interests, and the former that Admiral Bristol repeatedly opposed measures which they considered it necessary to introduce.

3. I do not wish to argue the rights or wrongs of that state of affairs. It was certainly undesirable and I did my best to remedy it. My colleagues were irritated by Admiral Bristol's methods, and it was largely due to this High Commission that an improvement in those relations was eventually effected. The Allied High Commissioners have been at pains for the past six months to consult Admiral Bristol on all matters in which American citizens or interests are concerned. An American delegate sits on an equal footing with the Allied delegates on the Advisory Trade Committee, and the Allied High Commissioners have endeavoured in every way to show consideration for the American High Commissioner.

4. Though Admiral Bristol has been recently less uncompromising in some respects, he has failed, I fear, in other questions to appreciate the conciliatory attitude of the Allied High Commissioners, and has in fact been no less yielding than before. I refer more particularly to the questions of consumption taxes and inflammable liquids, both of which have formed the subject of despatches from me to your Lordship. He is possibly hampered by instructions from his Government on these matters.

5. As I had the honour to observe in my despatch No. 188 of the 21st February, 1922, American policy here would appear to be dictated to an appreciable degree by the interests of the Standard Oil Company which is primarily interested in those two questions. It is, I cannot but help believing, due to this fact and the suspicion that the Allied attitude here is inspired by a British determination to combat American oil enterprise throughout the world, that Admiral Bristol bases an impression that American trade with Turkey is being hampered at the instigation of this High Commission. It is unnecessary for me to assure your Lordship that this is not the case. Our attempts to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the inflammable liquids controversy appear indeed likely to end in failure, and the question will in all probability be referred back to his Government by Admiral Bristol. I propose to transmit to your Lordship further correspondence on this subject, to supplement that contained in my despatch No. 188 of the 21st February last, as soon as my Allied colleagues and I are in agreement as to the definite standpoint we propose to adopt. It is conceivable that our inability to meet Admiral Bristol's wishes in this matter may revive the question of the consumption taxes in an acute form. Those taxes have hitherto been paid under protest by American citizens and it is not impossible that Admiral Bristol may ask the authority of his Government to instruct his compatriots to refuse to pay them in future. Action in this sense would provoke a serious financial situation. Its consequences cannot escape the notice of Admiral Bristol and it is more probable that he will propose as an alternative that, with a view to equalising the incidence of the consumption duties a duty should be also levied on coal which is now almost entirely a British import.

6. In any case, and in view of the deadlock which may ensue on the question of inflammable liquids, I should like to draw your Lordship's attention to certain aspects of the American position here.

7. The United States never declared war on Turkey, but merely broke off in 1917 relations which have never been resumed. In fact, Admiral Bristol continues to communicate with the Turkish Government through the Swedish Legation here. In point of law, therefore, the United States representative here has no *locus standi*

whatsoever in the civil administration of this city, which has devolved to all intents and purposes on the representatives of the three occupying Powers, namely, the French and Italian High Commissioners and myself. The two former are particularly insistent on our duties and powers in this respect. They have maintained under their direct authority the passport and police controls, which, in so far as the British are concerned, remain directly subordinate to General Headquarters and not to this High Commission. All the *de facto* authority in this town—police, sanitation, customs, finance, port controls, &c.—is vested in the representatives of the Allied Powers, civil or military. Nevertheless, so far as is compatible with this situation, the Allied High Commissioners have endeavoured, in virtue of the world position of the United States, to associate their representative in all measures which they may consider it necessary to adopt.

8. It should, furthermore, be recollected that the present situation is not the outcome of any desire on the part of the three Allied Governments. They have been forced into it against their will and at very considerable expense. Yet Admiral Bristol gives the impression of wishing to claim the right to full participation therein without, however, sharing in any way in the financial burden. This attitude appears to my Allied colleagues and to myself to be unreasonable, and it tends to make for friction.

9. Moreover, if Admiral Bristol were seriously to formulate the charge of discrimination it might be pointed out that, owing to the self-denying ordinance which precludes Allied subjects from acquiring concessions during the armistice period, American enterprise in fact enjoys exceptional facilities. The erection by the Standard Oil Company of its tanks at Selvi Burnu, the right to apply for facilities for the construction of similar reservoirs at Laz Burnu having been denied in virtue of that ordinance in 1920 to a British firm, is an example of this preferential position. Similarly, American groups and firms are at this moment busily engaged in seeking concessions in Anatolia and laying the basis for future American trade development in this part of the world. It is therefore the more disheartening to hear of these complaints when it is recollected that American enterprise in this connection is being fostered under the aegis of an Allied administration to which the United States does not contribute one farthing.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

*High Commissioner.*

[E 3036/5/44]

No. 61.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 20.)*

(No. 255.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 13, 1922.*

HAVING seen in the local press a statement to the effect that the Turkish Government had received several telegrams from Izzet Pasha, in one of which he had reported at length an interview he had had with your Lordship, I called on the Grand Vizier to-day with a view to ascertaining from his Highness what foundation there was for the statement in question. I also mentioned to his Highness the further statement in the press that the Council of Ministers had considered yesterday the results achieved by Izzet Pasha's Mission.

2. The Grand Vizier replied that beyond knowing that Izzet Pasha had reached Paris, the Turkish Government were without news of him. Tewfik Pasha stated that the telegrams exchanged between the Turkish Government and their representatives in European capitals generally took three days in transmission. This caused great inconvenience. The Grand Vizier, who had seen the statement to which I alluded, said that it was an invention. I am not, however, quite satisfied that his explanation is correct as I know that the Turkish Government have received at least one telegram from Izzet Pasha.

3. In this connection, I learn from a good source that Izzet Pasha was at first unwilling to undertake his mission to Europe, since he considered it doubtful whether he would obtain any favourable result. The same source states that the Central Government are by no means in agreement with the national pact, though they are solid with Angora with regard to the necessity for the evacuation of Turkish territory by the Greeks. The Central Government are also stated to be under the impression that the French Government are beginning to feel considerable embarrassment on account of the extreme claims of the Angora Government. Izzet Pasha has, therefore, been instructed to act solely in the name of the Central Government.



4. From a Havas Reuter telegram from London, published in this morning's press, it would appear that Izzet Pasha is concerned to make out that the ideas of the Angora Government are much the same as his own, and that he will get into touch with Yussuf Kemal Bey as soon as the latter arrives in London. Izzet Pasha is reported as having expressed satisfaction with the conversation he had with your Lordship on the 9th instant.

5. In the course of further conversation, the Grand Vizier referred to the reports of a Veniselist movement in the Greek army in Asia Minor to resist the evacuation of Anatolia. He stated that he had heard that 150 Veniselist officers had left Constantinople via Panderma and Smyrna. His Highness seemed apprehensive of the consequences to the country if the evacuation by the Greek army were not regulated and superintended by Allied officers. It would not do, in his opinion, for the Kemalists forces to replace the Greeks too quickly.

6. I listened to the Grand Vizier's remarks on this subject, but did not offer any comment. I then said that it looked as if Mustapha Kemal was more than ever counting on the Soviet Government for support. The Grand Vizier quoted in reply the Turkish proverb which says that: "A drowning man clutches at a serpent." I pointed out that the serpent would probably bite Mustapha Kemal. The Grand Vizier said that he had never been able to tolerate Bolshevik doctrines and had always been apprehensive lest the Nationalists might commit themselves too far with the Bolsheviks.

7. The information which has recently been received at this High Commission points to the growth of Bolshevik influence in Anatolia. The Bolshevik representative at Angora appears to be a man of great energy, who has been negotiating the conclusion of an economic agreement with the Angora Government. The Bolsheviks are making propaganda against the granting of concessions in Anatolia to Western capitalists. In spite of the statements made by M. Méry as reported in my telegram No. 121 of the 27th February, I learn from the British military authorities that the pay of the Kemalists army is in arrears and that this state of things can only be remedied by Bolshevik money. The Kemalists seem also to be having friction with the French regarding payment for arms supplied for the gendarmerie. Everything therefore points at present to close collaboration between Mustapha Kemal and the Bolsheviks.

8. The necessity for this collaboration has caused the Nationalists to relax their severity towards the Communists and to allow the "Yeni Dunia," the organ of the Communists, to resume publication. On the other hand, the Grand Vizier stated to-day that he had seen a certain Muktar Bey on his passage through Constantinople to join Yussuf Kemal Bey's Mission. Muktar Bey had informed the Grand Vizier that, with the exception of some twenty Communists, the National Assembly was loyal to the Sultanate and to the Caliphate.

9. I have kept out of the press the telegram from the Viceroy to His Majesty's Government endorsing the demands of Indian Moslems for the restoration of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople, to Turkey, as I considered that this telegram would lead to undesirable comment at this juncture. I have merely allowed the publication of Mr. Montagu's resignation without any indication of its causes.

10. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 3039/43/44]

No. 62.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 20.)*

(No. 258.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 14, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of an identic note which I recently received from the Turkish Government protesting against certain measures of coercion alleged by them to be contemplated by the Greek authorities with a view to compelling the Moslem populations of the occupied territories to emigrate.

2. Though somewhat vague in character, the allegations of the Turkish Government appeared to me not inherently improbable, and I forwarded copies of this note to His Majesty's Minister at Athens and my representative at Smyrna for such observations as they might have to offer thereon.

3. I beg leave to forward to your Lordship copy of the reply which I have now received from Sir Harry Lamb, whose information generally appears to corroborate the charges of the Turkish Government in this respect.

4. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch and its enclosures by safe opportunity to Mr. Lindley.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

*Izzet Pasha to Sir H. Rumbold.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

*Sublime Porte, le 20 février 1922.*

IL résulte des renseignements dignes de foi qui parviennent à la Sublime Porte que le Gouvernement hellénique envisage l'application, dans les régions occupées, de certaines mesures de coercition, afin de forcer la population musulmane à émigrer.

En conformité d'un projet arrêté à cet effet à Athènes et qui doit entrer en application au printemps prochain, il a été décidé de former des bandes composées de Grecs indigènes dans le but de terroriser la population musulmane; d'augmenter le taux des contributions de guerre prélevées jusqu'ici par les autorités helléniques; déporter les hommes valides, qui seraient employés à des travaux pénibles; restreindre encore plus la faculté, déjà limitée, de voyage, sauf pour ceux qui voudraient quitter définitivement le pays. En outre, la réquisition des denrées alimentaires serait intensifiée. De plus, les mesures prises pour empêcher la circulation de la monnaie turque seraient appliquées avec rigueur et l'échange de cette monnaie à un taux inférieur, contre de la monnaie hellénique imposé. Enfin, les peines administratives seraient augmentées.

D'autre part, il revient à la Sublime Porte que le quartier général hellénique à Smyrne a formé des bandes composées de Grecs des îles ainsi que des régions de Smyrne et d'Aivalik, lesquelles sont appelées à opérer sous le commandement d'officiers de réserve de Macédoine. Ces bandes seraient armées de Mausers du modèle en usage dans l'armée ottomane et habillées autant que possible comme des Turcs.

Ces renseignements démontrent que la Grèce, loin de renoncer à la politique de dévastation et d'extermination qu'elle poursuit dans les régions occupées, en dépit des règles du droit, et de l'humanité, ne vise qu'à achever le dépeuplement et la ruine de ces malheureuses régions.

Persuadé que ces procédés illégaux ne peuvent que rencontrer la réprobation des grandes Puissances alliées, je crois de mon devoir de les dénoncer à votre Excellence, en protestant formellement et en la priant de vouloir bien intervenir auprès de son Gouvernement afin de l'amener à agir pour empêcher la mise en application des mesures dont il s'agit.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

A. IZZET.

Enclosure 2 in No. 62.

*Consul-General Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold.*

(No. 43.)

Sir,

*Smyrna, March 7, 1922.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's despatch No. 26 of the 25th ultimo, transmitting, for my observations, a copy of a note from the Sublime Porte, in which it is alleged that the Hellenic Government contemplate applying, in the area at present in their occupation, certain coercive measures calculated to compel the Mussulman population to emigrate.

2. It is of course very difficult, if not impossible, for anyone not in the confidence of the Greek Government to state positively what they may or may not be actually contemplating at a given moment. That they must inevitably be led to contemplate some such measures as are indicated above was evident to anyone who has considered the meaning and effect of articles 72 and 83 of the Treaty of Sèvres, but, as regards

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the specific statements contained in the Porte's note, I can only offer the following remarks.

3. For many months past I believe that "civil volunteers" have been enrolled and armed in many of the towns of the interior for the avowed purpose of "supplementing the exiguous force of police and gendarmerie and assisting them in their task of maintaining order." I have heard of these volunteers accompanying detachments of troops in their frequent punitive expeditions against villages accused of harbouring Turkish bands. The case of Kara Tepe, which formed the subject of your Excellency's telegram No. 14 of the 26th February and of my despatch No. 37 of the 1st March, is the first instance in which I have heard it stated that they had taken a leading part as bashi-bozouks. In the course of my enquiries in regard to that incident, however, it has come to my knowledge that they are accused (as stated in paragraph 3 of the Porte's note) of forming bogus bands, disguising themselves as Turks or Zeileks, to play the part of *agents provocateurs*. It is alleged by Turks here that the better organisation of these bands formed one of the matters which engaged the attention of M. Romanos during a lengthy visit which he paid to Smyrna during the winter. I do not, of course, wish to be taken as endorsing an accusation in support of which there can necessarily be no evidence. On the other hand, experience acquired in Macedonia unfortunately prevents me from dismissing it as incredible. In any case, I have it on the authority of well-informed Greeks themselves that the organisation of such bands on a large scale is contemplated in the event of a withdrawal, whether forced or voluntary, of their regular army. They would be composed of soldiers recruited in this district, reinforced by a certain number of Cretans, Macedonians or islanders.

4. The subject of requisitioning has been treated separately in various despatches. The burden has naturally fallen most heavily on the Turks, but the Orthodox Rayah has not been unduly spared. Deportations have taken place on a considerable scale, the reason given being usually conspiracy against the established Government, connivance with the Kemalists or complicity in the action of Turkish bands.

5. I do not know to what the Porte alludes when it speaks of "contributions de guerre prélevées jusqu'ici par les autorités helléniques." As I am not aware that any such exist, I cannot say whether it is in contemplation to augment them. Nor do I understand what is meant by the increase of "peines administratives."

6. No attempt is made here, so far as I am aware, to hinder the circulation of Turkish currency or to depreciate forcibly its exchange value. It is, however, conceivable that the military authorities may be imposing such measures in the area which is under exclusively military administration.

7. I attach an extra copy of this despatch in case your Excellency desires to transmit one to His Majesty's Minister at Athens, as I consider it preferable not to send him one through the ordinary post.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

[E 3040/5/44]

No. 63.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 20.)*

(No. 259.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 14, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the following translation of a communication of the "Anatolian Agency," which has been kept out of the local press by the Inter-Allied Press Censorship Commission, giving an account of declarations made to the Grand National Assembly by Jelal Bey, Acting Commissary for Foreign Affairs, respecting the Turkish missions to Europe:—

2. "Angora, March 7.—In reply to questions at yesterday's session of the Grand National Assembly respecting the journey of Yussuf Kemal Bey, Commissary for Foreign Affairs, and respecting his interviews at Constantinople, Jelal Bey, Deputy Commissary for Foreign Affairs, made certain statements. After the fall of the Cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha, whose acts were prejudicial to the country, there came to power the Government of Tewfik Pasha. Izzet Pasha, though lacking in will and sagacity, wished, in virtue of his reputation, to play a part in connection with the life and independence of the country. With his colleagues, he facilitated the enemy's objects, and brought

about a cleavage in the feelings of the country. Izzet Pasha, who did not abstain from efforts to cause the dissolution of the struggle which we had started against the terms of the Treaty of Sévres, visited Anatolia to persuade us to accept that treaty. He explained both verbally and in writing that the Treaty of Sévres could not be modified even in the future, and endeavoured to incline Anatolia to his point of view.

3. "Afterwards, Izzet Pasha's Mission agreed, as a result of discussions at Angora, that our policy was right and that they were in the wrong. They declared in writing, in a document dated the 2nd March, 1921, that they shared our views, and that on their departure they would hand in their resignations and occupy themselves at Constantinople solely with their private affairs. Yet, after being allowed to go free on the strength of this guarantee, they on their arrival at Constantinople resigned merely for the sake of appearances and to give the impression that they were respecting their undertakings. They shortly afterwards entered the Cabinet.

4. "Jelal Bey read the telegram sent by Izzet Pasha to Anatolia on his becoming Minister for Foreign Affairs on the eve of the Greek offensive, as well as the telegram sent in reply by his Excellency Mustapha Kemal Pasha. Izzet Pasha stated in his telegram that he had accepted the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on account of the gravity of the political situation, and on account of the danger which the dispositions of the Allied Powers to aid Greece involved, especially for Constantinople, mentioning that for a few days a calmness had been apparent in European opinion, and that lately there had been a current in our favour. He added, optimistically, that the evacuation of Smyrna had been discussed. In his reply of the 28th/29th June, 1921, Mustapha Kemal Pasha informed him that the position was not in harmony with the undertaking which he had entered into along with Salih Pasha, reminded him of the Angora conversations, and expressed the fear that he had been deceived again. The Greek offensive, which occurred shortly afterwards, showed clearly how erroneous Izzet Pasha's observations were. In view of the constant political changes of the people living in Constantinople in an atmosphere of slavery, tyranny and distress, Yussuf Kemal Bey last week on his passage through Constantinople invited these personages to return to their duty to their country and conscience, and warned them to put themselves in the right and not to interfere with the lawful attitude and activities of the Grand National Assembly. Unfortunately, Yussuf Kemal Bey found himself exposed to a number of intrigues. The best proof of this is Izzet Pasha's visit to Europe.

5. "Another disgusting manoeuvre is Izzet Pasha's wishing to show that this journey is undertaken of his own initiative and after its necessity had been pointed out by foreign diplomatic circles, while it was undertaken only as a result of encouragement given by the Opposition. However, an interview of Yussuf Kemal Bey with a competent personage, alleged to have demonstrated the necessity of this journey, proved that this pretension was not true. This personage could not refrain from expressing his surprise at the conduct of Izzet Pasha and his colleagues.

6. "Jelal Bey concluded his declaration thus:—

"Izzet Pasha is proceeding on his journey across Europe by rail, through territories in Greek occupation, protected by Greek bayonets and perhaps under the Greek flag. Yussuf Kemal Bey is also continuing his journey by sea without touching at the Piræus. This action of certain narrow and greedy politicians of Constantinople, calculated to cause difficulties, cannot possibly prevent us from proceeding resolutely and firmly towards the realisation of our object. We are convinced that, by the grace of God, the blood of the martyrs shed for the realisation of our sacred object will not have been in vain. I desire to declare once more from this seat that we are firmly resolved to reach our final goal, no matter what the sacrifice may be. Though we are exposed to tyranny, and the mothers, who have lost their children, are weeping bitter tears, history will register the end of a narrow, common, wretched, insouciant and soulless group which turns its back upon facts. Of course, the nation will say the last word."

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

High Commissioner.



*Memorandum by Mr. Rendel on Turkish Massacres and Persecutions of Minorities since the Armistice.*

THE conclusion of the armistice with Turkey on the 30th October, 1918, seems to have brought about a temporary cessation of the persecutions of the minorities by the Turks which had gone on all through the war. In the course of those persecutions, it is generally agreed that about 1,500,000 Armenians perished in circumstances of extreme barbarity, and that over 500,000 Greeks were deported, of whom comparatively few survived. The ghastly Armenian persecutions of the early part of the war formed the subject of a British Blue Book as early as 1916, and the almost equally horrible Greek persecutions have been dealt with in several Greek official publications (see particularly the proceedings of the third National Assembly in Athens in April 1921). Information regarding the persecutions of the other Christian bodies has not yet been collected.

2. It is necessary to refer to these pre-armistice persecutions, since there is now a strong tendency to minimise or overlook them, and to regard those which followed the armistice as isolated incidents provoked by the Greek landing at Smyrna and the general Turkish policy of the Allies.

### 1919.

3. After the armistice the Allies, and in particular His Majesty's Government, recognised their moral obligation to do what they could to redress the wrongs suffered by the minorities during the war, independently of what might be done under a final settlement. They principally aimed at securing: (1) the restoration of confiscated property (which entailed repatriation to Turkey of numerous refugees); (2) the recovery of Christian women and children in Moslem hands; and (3) the establishment of the responsibility for the war massacres.

4. During the first few months of 1919, when the military position of the Allies in Turkey was still unimpaired, and before the development of the Nationalist movement, the Turkish authorities co-operated in these objects; but, by September of that year, they had become frankly hostile and obstructive. As a result of Allied efforts, however (1) some property was restored and a number of refugees went back to their homes in Cilicia, &c.; (2) about 90,000 women and orphans were recovered from Moslem hands out of a total of about 170,000; and (3) certain notorious Turks were deported to Malta, whence, however, they were subsequently released.

5. As early as May 1919 reports of renewed persecutions of Armenians and Greeks all over Anatolia and Pontus began to come in.

6. On the 11th September, Lieutenant Slade (H.M.S. "Gardenia") reported that public security all along the Black Sea coast was very bad; that all the brigands had been pardoned by the Turkish Government and allowed to retain their arms; and that 80 per cent. of the gendarmes were recruited from the brigands and devoted "most of their energies to rounding up odd Christians who were still at large."

7. On the 11th November, Admiral de Robeck reported as follows:—

"The relief officers . . . find themselves met with obstructions and hostility . . . The most flagrant cases of injustice to Christians have to be left unredressed . . . the Christians are now bewildered and terrified . . . Every district has its band of brigands now posing as patriots, and even in the vicinity of Constantinople robbery under arms is of daily occurrence, the principal victims being naturally the unprotected Christian villagers. Behind all these elements of disorder stands Mustapha Kemal. . . . The Government cannot, and will not, move a finger to help the Christians. . . . Turks are again taking possession of property restored to their Christian owners through the instrumentality of our relief officers, and a recent report shows that there is a general tendency on the part of the Moslem population, supported by the local authorities, to render it impossible for the Christians to earn their living, and, by boycotting and terrorism, to drive them again from their homes, never to return."

\* The marginal numbers refer to the documents specified in the Annex.

8. On the 24th November a further report from Admiral de Robeck contained the following passage:—

"The methods which the Turks are employing to render life unendurable for their Christian fellow-countrymen are deserving of careful attention. . . . His business is boycotted, his nut crops made dangerous of access and farmed out to Moslems, who repudiate their engagements, and his houses and property retained. It is consequently not a matter for surprise that the Greek and Armenian refugees are again leaving Asia Minor in increasing numbers."

And this statement was borne out and amplified by a detailed report, dated the 29th October, by Captain Perring, R.N. (H.M.S. "Gardenia"), on the situation along the coast from Samsoun to Batoum.

9. On the 23rd December, Admiral de Robeck wrote as follows to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs: "It would appear that the system of persecution of Armenians by the Turks is definite and continuous; that movement is restricted, repair of their houses forbidden, robbery frequent, as well as threats. . . . I am informed that, in spite of all this ill-treatment, the Armenians are proving most long-suffering, and are doing their utmost to prevent the recurrence of any unfortunate incidents." These representations, however, produced no result.

10. During November and December reports of increasing persecutions continued to reach His Majesty's High Commission in growing numbers, but it was not until the following year that the first really large-scale massacres occurred.

### 1920.

11. The first large-scale massacre since the armistice, regarding which we have reliable information, is that which took place at Marash at the end of January. It appears to have been partly due to the fact that the French, who took over the town from the British in November 1919, on the one hand succeeded in giving the Turks the impression that Turkish sovereignty over it was to cease, and on the other attempted to garrison the town with quite inadequate forces, largely consisting of Armenian levies.

12. Marash had a large Armenian population, which included considerable numbers of repatriated refugees and deportees.

13. The most vivid and detailed account of the Marash massacre is contained in the diary of Dr. Crathern, the secretary of the American Y.M.C.A. Mission there. The massacre began on about the 23rd January. According to the British Divisional Intelligence Officer, between 15,000 and 20,000 Armenians perished. Most of the women appear to have been killed with axes. Many of the women and children were subjected to horrible tortures before being killed. Dr. Crathern's description of the scenes of "hellish cruelty" which he witnessed is difficult to forget.

14. On the 22nd March, Admiral de Robeck transmitted a document drawn up by Dr. Kennedy, the representative of the "Lord Mayor's Fund" at Adana, containing the narratives of survivors of further massacres in the Islahieh and Marash districts. He added: "Their story shows that the proceedings lacked none of the ruthless and insensate brutality which hitherto have characterised Turkish outbreaks of massacre."

15. After the events at Marash, the French withdrew from their advanced positions in Cilicia, and, in spite of continued reports regarding the gravity of the situation, proved unable to give any support to the Armenians (consisting largely of repatriated refugees), who were now besieged by the Turks at Hadjin, Sis, Bozanti, and Aintab. The Armenians at Hadjin decided to try to hold on in the hope of being saved by a general settlement, and stood an eight-months' siege with great heroism. The town fell, however, on the 15th October, and, according to the report of a missionary from Adana, written a few days later, the Turks, on entering it, began a systematic destruction of both it and its inhabitants. All buildings were burnt and all fugitives from the flames were shot. The exits of the burning town were commanded by machine guns. After the fire, looking at the town through field-glasses, one could see that "not a house was left standing," and that the "whole ground was covered with dead bodies." The Armenian population of Hadjin at the time of the siege appears to have numbered about 9,000, of whom very few can have escaped.

16. The spring of 1920 also witnessed the outbreak of intensified persecutions



11 against the Greeks. Very numerous reports of these persecutions and atrocities dating back as far as the spring of 1919, and covering almost every district in Asia Minor, have been received from Greek sources, and many are embodied in the minutes of the meetings of the Armenian-Greek Section of the British High Commission at Constantinople, but independent information about them is difficult to obtain, as there were few, if any, European relief workers or officials in the districts most particularly concerned. As early as the 9th February, however, Captain Perring, R.N., had reported that the lack of public security for the Greeks and Armenians in the vilayet of Trebizond was very serious. The following is an extract from his report:—

"A typical case is at Kavarra where a certain Ali Riza Bey carries out a continuous persecution, raids their cattle, burns their houses and makes them (the Christians) work for him without payment of any sort. This man terrorises the village to such an extent that the few local Christians dare not refuse; he is the leader of a well-organised band of brigands. In general, the Greek villagers cannot circulate freely, and are therefore obliged to sell their produce on the spot to Turkish merchants, who are thus able to buy at practically their own prices and realise large profits."

17. Later, the persecutions became worse and were frequently accompanied by actual massacres. It will perhaps be enough, however, to give the following quotations from two documents, the impartiality of which is above question.

28 18. The first is a report dated the 7th October, 1920, from a British officer attached to General Headquarters, British Army of the Black Sea, and deals with the destruction of the famous town of Nicaea (Iznik) by Nationalist bands, full reports regarding which had already been received from the œcumenical Patriarchate:—

"From information in the hands of the Smyrna Division, which is confirmed by a previous report, the whole Greek population of Iznik has been massacred. Apparently the majority of the massacres took place at the end of August—the remainder of the population were killed before the Greeks took the town, i.e., at the end of September. The number of killed is said to be about 130 families, or about 400–500 men, women and children.

"I myself was taken round to some of the places where the remains of the bodies lay. Lack of time prevented me from visiting every scene of the massacres. I was assured, however, by the Greek officers that there were other such places.

"At the foot of the mountains east of Iznik, about 300 yards outside the city wall, is a large cave. In this the burnt and mangled bodies had been thrown, a few odd bodies lay about outside, though it was difficult to judge very accurately owing to the state of decomposition. I should say there were at least 100 dead at this spot alone.

"All the bodies I saw had been mutilated, apparently they had first had their hands and feet cut off, after that they were either burnt alive in the cave or had their throats cut. I clearly recognised the bodies of women and children among them—apart from the mutilated remains, odd bones which lay about proved conclusively that the bodies had been cut up.

"Djemal Bey is said to be responsible for these massacres. Many stories are in circulation regarding his outrages in the town . . .

"The ancient Greek church at Iznik, which dates from 332 A.D. has been thoroughly smashed up, only the walls remaining. The images, carvings, &c., were all broken up, and the church literature taken outside and burnt in a pile. It is said that a number of people were massacred inside the church.

"The Greek soldiers, who have every opportunity of visiting these places, are not unnaturally bitterly enraged about it."

29 19. The second document is the White Paper containing the reports of the Inter-Allied Commissions sent in May 1921 to investigate the alleged Greek atrocities in the Yalova-Gemlek and Ismid areas of March and April of that year. The Yalova Commission particularly mentions the destruction by the Kemalists in the preceding year (1920) of Nicaea, Ortakeui, Elmalik, Fulajik and several Armenian villages in the same district, and the Ismid Commission begins its report with the following statement: "There is no doubt that there have been a large number of atrocities in the Ismid Peninsula, and it appears that those on the part

of the Turks have been more considerable and ferocious than those on the part of the Greeks." The Ismid report further contains the following passage:—

"Attacks on Christians, which had become less numerous since the armistice, increased in numbers and ferocity—more particularly with regard to the Greeks—in March 1920, and even more so in June and July 1920 (when preparations were being made for Greek offensives).

"Turkish bands of a more or less Kemalist persuasion are scouring the entire sanjak of Ismid as far as the environs of Scutari (Pashakeui, 20 kilom. east of Scutari).

"As often as not, these bands are assisted by the Turkish inhabitants of neighbouring villages. A large number of villages have thus been looted or burnt and their decimated population has been obliged to flee.

"There should more particularly be mentioned the names of Yeni-Keui, south of Shileh; about a dozen villages in the region north and north-east of Ada-Bazar, and some twelve villages in the region south of Ada-Bazar, amongst them the large village of Orta-Keui, near Gueiveh (16,000 inhabitants), and several villages south and south-east of Ismid.

"Since July 1920 the Greek military occupation had restricted the operations of Turkish bands to the eastern and south-eastern part of the peninsula, but the region of Karamursal (south of the Gulf of Ismid) still constitutes an impervious Nationalist centre, from which various bands attack Greek villages in the neighbourhood, aided by the population of Turkish villages.

"Excesses committed by enemy bands are often given as a motive or as a pretext for these expeditions.

"The latter became very numerous in the spring of 1921, and extended as far as the southern environs of Ismid, bringing about the destruction of all the Christian villages in this region with the exception of Bagchejik.

"The Greek authorities have submitted a list of thirty-two villages looted or burnt, with more than 12,000 persons massacred, 2,500 missing, and the remainder of the population (more than 15,000) living as refugees at Ismid.

"In view of the numerous witnesses examined by it, the Commission is of the opinion that these facts should be accepted as fundamentally true, notwithstanding a certain amount of exaggeration in the figures."

#### 1921.

20. The persecutions of 1921 were on a larger scale and more atrocious than those of 1920. The area affected is so great, and the atrocities are so varied and continuous, that it is difficult to select special cases for mention. Moreover, the mass of documentary evidence at our disposal is now so enormous that any compression of the information contained in it into suitable limits has become well-nigh impossible.

21. The Armenians suffered very badly in the interior of Cilicia, and the story, as pieced together by a Canadian missionary, of the gradual annihilation in June 1921 of the refugees who had attempted in the previous year to re-establish themselves in the ruins of Zeitoun, is one of the most horrible narratives of this period. 30

22. The massacres at Mersivan at the end of July, which formed the subject of an article in "The Times" of the 26th October, 1921, were apparently due to the 31 notorious Osman Aga, Mayor of Karasund, and a commandant in the Kemalist army, 32 who is also responsible for a large number of the worst atrocities in the Pontine 33 region. The brief "Times" account is confirmed and amplified by a memorandum 34 which was drawn up by the Armenian-Greek Section of the British High Commission 31 at Constantinople and transmitted by Sir H. Rumbold on the 22nd October, and also by a much fuller entirely independent first-hand account written by Mr. Hosford, the 32 American Near East Relief agent in Mersivan, transmitted to us by the United States Embassy on the 30th December last. Mr. Hosford's account, which is extremely detailed and written in a calm and critical spirit, paints a picture of unrelieved horror.

23. It appears that as many of the Christians as possible were gathered into three buildings—the city prison, the French boys' school and a house called "the red house." Those gathered in the red house were mostly young girls, who were all violated. The houses were subsequently set on fire, but after much difficulty most of the occupants were let out. The next day, Mr. Hosford says, Miss Anthony, of the American Near East Relief, was able to watch "the hauling out of wagon-loads of dead bodies and the burying of these bodies in pits across the valley from our house.



She feels very certain that some of those thus buried were not entirely dead." Mr. Hosford summarises the results of the massacre as follows: "In no way was there any distinction in the treatment as between Greeks and Armenians. . . . From a Christian population of 2,000 to 2,500, almost all of the men were killed, many of them our employees and men formerly connected with the college. Women and children were also killed, in all upwards of 700. All Greeks were deported. About 700 Armenians were left in the city, including only 20 or 30 men at most. Every Christian house was looted and 400 houses burnt."

24. All through 1921 atrocities of various kinds and so-called "white massacres" (*i.e.*, boycott, deportations, deaths by starvation in labour gangs, &c.) appear to have gone on. Reports were received of crucifixions of batches of priests, and Mr. Hosford writes: "Repeated tales of the utmost cruelty were borne to us, such as the burning of churches with Greeks inside, the use of priests, with their robes soaked in kerosene, as torches, &c. It is not difficult," he adds, "for an eye-witness of the work of these men in Mersivan to believe such tales, and there is ample supporting evidence of the general truth of the statements."

25. Serious persecutions in the Mardin area, affecting about 30,000 Christians, were also reported by Sir P. Cox. But the worst atrocities undoubtedly took place in the Pontine region against the Greek population of the coast towns.

26. There is no doubt that the Greek ecclesiastical authorities in Constantinople had fostered a Greek national movement in this district, and that the hope of liberation from Turkish rule, whether under the Peace Treaty or through the expected victories of the Greek army in Anatolia, encouraged the ill-informed Greek population of Pontus to take a renewed and dangerous interest in politics. Ostensibly for the purpose of quelling this political movement, which, if the Greeks were as small a minority as the Kemalists claim, can hardly have been a very dangerous one, the Angora authorities resorted to wholesale deportations, continuous persecutions, and frequent massacres.

27. After having executed a large number of notables in the bigger towns, Samsoun, Amasia, &c., they proceeded to the deportation of practically the whole Greek population. In the early autumn the number of deportees was alleged to have reached 35,000. The accounts of these deportations received from Greek and other survivors are as ghastly as any of the accounts of the Armenian atrocities during or after the war. They are nearly all confirmed by the letters of the Near East Relief agents and of other eye-witnesses which we have received from the American Embassy, and through private sources.

28. The Pontus massacre, regarding which we have most data, is that which occurred near Kavak, where, according to Mr. Hopkins's information, some 1,300 Greeks were shot on the 15th or 16th August in about two and a half hours. Further information regarding massacres at Kavak is to be found in the sworn narrative of five Italian survivors transmitted by Mr. Rattigan on the 27th July, in the letter from a survivor to his brother, of which a copy was transmitted by Sir H. Rumbold on the 28th September, in the memorandum by the Armenian-Greek Section of the High Commission transmitted by Sir H. Rumbold on the 22nd October, in a great number of Greek reports received from various quarters, and in Mr. Hosford's narrative, from which extracts have already been quoted. The passage of the latter dealing with the fate of some of the Samsoun deportees is perhaps worth quoting in full:—

"They continued to be sent out in groups of 800 to 1,000, until all Greek men from Samsoun had been deported. They were sent, I believe, in five groups. All of them were robbed, even to the detail of gold teeth, the first at Kavak, 40 miles inland, and the third at Jumbush Khan, about 15 miles from Samsoun. An estimate of 200 killed in each place out of a group of 800 to 1,000 would be very conservative."

(*Note.*—This would make only 800 killed out of the four groups, which is much less than the other estimates.)

"The fifth group was divided at Kavsa, those of military age being sent through Marsevan in the direction of Angora, for work in the labour corps, and those above or below that age being sent in the direction of Malatia. The group which went to Angora has never been heard of. It is possible that they may have escaped across the line."

"The Turks in our employ secured permission for one of these deportees of the fifth group to visit us. He told us not only of the robbing of his own group

but of the killing of many in the first and third groups. His statement substantiated the report of one of our Circassian watchmen, who passed through Kavak the morning after part of the first group was massacred. We received a like report from a Turkish chauffeur employed by the Near East Relief, who had passed through the region also. His report of the third group was substantiated by more detailed reports which I heard later in Samsoun from Americans and from Greeks. The main facts in all of these reports are the same.

"It is significant also that, as far as I could find out from considerable questioning in Samsoun, only about half of the Samsoun deportees have been heard from by their families in Samsoun."

29. On the 26th July, Mr. Fuller of the American Near East Relief met about 3,000 women and children being driven towards the interior by Turkish guards. On the 1st September, Mr. Hopkins of the same organisation met 12,000 being driven southwards between Harpoot and Malatia. They were being robbed and ill-treated by their guards. Mr. Hopkins saw—

"many corpses of Greeks lying by the roadside where they had died from exposure. Many of them were the corpses of women and girls."

About the 1st October he and two other relief workers passed about 10,000 Greeks. He says:—

"I remember one group of about 2,000, being women alone, most of them with no shoes, many carrying babies. . . . A driving cold rain was falling. . . . they had no protection whatever and their only place to sleep was the wet ground."

30. Mr. Hopkins continues:—

"These are conditions and incidents all of which except the last" (the Kavak massacre) "I witnessed. They seem to indicate that the Greeks of Anatolia are suffering the same or a worse fate than did the Armenians in the massacres of the Great War. The deportation of Greeks is not limited to the Black Sea Coast, but is being carried out throughout the whole country governed by the Nationalists. Greek villages are deported entire, the few Turkish or Armenian inhabitants are forced to leave, and the villages are burned. The purpose is unquestionably to destroy all Greeks in that territory and to leave Turkey for the Turks. These deportations are, of course, accompanied by cruelties of every form just as was true in the case of the Armenian deportations five and six years ago."

31. The American Near East Relief, from whom we have other detailed reports on the subject, were forced by the Nationalist authorities to send false telegrams, and were not allowed to relieve the Greeks, and caravans were apparently diverted so that they might not witness what was being done.

32. Colonel Rawlinson, on his journey from Erzeroum to the coast in October 1921 met comparatively few deportees, but the extracts from his diary regarding those whom he did meet are perhaps worth quoting in full:—

"(1.) October 10, 1921. Passed about 200 women (Greeks) in deplorable condition being driven east by about twenty Turkish soldiers."

"(2.) October 12, 1921. Kamsi-Keui is in Turkish military occupation. Most of the inhabitants (they are all Greek there and everywhere in the coast range) have been taken into the interior as slaves, and their property and houses looted and destroyed. Some Greek women, about 200, are still here, confined in an open shed, at the mercy of the Turkish soldiers and the cold."

"(3.) October 13, 1921. Met 100 Greek men (going up the pass to slavery) before we started. Passed about fifty more on road and found about 200 being mustered at Jevslik. Any Greeks (there are only children and old men and women left) who may be working in the fields show abject terror and bolt for the rocks at the sight of our armed Turkish guards. The latter assault and rob any they can catch and break into any house they can get at."

"(4.) October 14, 1921. Passed and counted 194 Greek men going up pass to slavery."

"(5.) Total number of Greek men noted as passing under guard is 500. I have little doubt it was really greater, but I have reason to know the greater



part of the Greek male population (from 15 years to 50) had already gone to replace the Armenian gangs who had all died from neglect and want of food. These Greeks will all die also during the coming winter. The total number of Greek women passed and noted is 400. They are all young and their future fate and present suffering it is impossible adequately to describe."

- 44 33. In regard to the Armenian labour gangs referred to in the last paragraph, it may be noted that Colonel Rawlinson told Sir H. Rumbold last November that, during his captivity, there were about 9,000 Armenians in these gangs in the neighbourhood of Erzeroum, of whom there were only 700 to 750 survivors left by the date of his departure. The latter were then about to be sent back to Erivan under the Treaty of Kars.
- 45 34. Further first-hand evidence of the Turkish atrocities in the Pontine region has lately been obtained from a somewhat unexpected quarter, namely a member of the recent Ukrainian Mission to Angora, by a British official in Russia. This man stated that on the mission's return journey, not far from Samsoun, they came across the remains of some Greeks—old men, women of all ages, and children. The girls had evidently been violated. He added that the Ukrainian mission lodged a protest on the subject, and that the Turkish official at Samsoun was very confused.
- 46 35. In conclusion it may be interesting to quote the opinion on the Nationalist treatment of minorities expressed by Signor Tuozi, the Italian unofficial agent in Angora, to Sir H. Rumbold on the 6th January last, immediately after his departure from Angora. Signor Tuozi stated that the deportations were continuous and that he saw numerous gangs of Christians formed into labour battalions going up into the interior. He regarded the outlook for these gangs as utterly hopeless. In his opinion the Nationalists hold a perfectly simple view of the minorities question. They regard the minorities as having been the cause of unending trouble in the past, and have decided that the best way to prevent the recurrence of this trouble is to put an end to the existence of the minorities. They want Anatolia for the Turks, and Signor Tuozi expressed the opinion that the evacuation of Smyrna and its district by the Greeks would be the death-blow of the minorities in that region. He stated that the Nationalists would be perfectly prepared to subscribe to any arrangements made by the Allies for the protection of minorities, but that whatever these arrangements were, there would be no intention on the part of the Kemalists of ever seeing them fulfilled.

G. W. RENDEL.

March 20, 1922.

#### Annex.

##### *Authority for Statements contained in Memorandum.*

1. Secretary of State's memorandum on the revision of Treaty of Sèvres, December 19, 1921, p. 13 of table. Print 7465A.
2. Mr. Rattigan, Constantinople, No. 535, May 29, 1921, paragraph 2. E 6441/143/44.
3. "The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-1916." "Miscellaneous No. 31 (1916)."
4. "Anti-Greek Persecutions in Turkey, 1908-1921." London, Vellonis, 1921. Transmitted by Greek Legation, November 17, 1921. E 12670/143/44.
5. "Turkey: Annual Report for 1920," paragraph 159.
6. "Turkey: Annual Report for 1920," paragraph 160.
7. Admiral Webb, Constantinople, No. 1676, September 11, 1919. Eastern Vol., Part II, No. 110.
8. Compare Mr. Harmsworth's note on Mr. A. Williams's parliamentary question of December 16, 1921. E 13873/800/44.
9. League of Nations' memorandum, dated August 31, communicated to Foreign Office, September 3, 1921. E 10119/1623/44.
10. "Turkey: Annual Report for 1920," paragraph 160.
11. Admiral Calthorpe, Constantinople, No. 1129, July 1, 1919. Eastern Vol., Part II, No. 69.
12. Admiral de Robeck, Constantinople, No. 2110, November 11, 1919. Eastern Vol., Part II, No. 165.
13. Admiral de Robeck, No. 2203, November 24, 1919. Eastern Vol., Part II, No. 181.

14. Admiral de Robeck, No. 2420, December 27, 1919. E 170747/44/20.
15. Minutes of meetings of Armenian-Greek Section of British High Commission at Constantinople for 1919.
16. Admiral de Robeck, No. 2286, December 4, 1919. Eastern Vol., Part II, No. 193.
17. Admiral de Robeck, No. 316, March 4, 1920. Eastern Vol., Part IV, No. 129.
18. Admiral de Robeck, Tel. No. 184, March 2, 1920. Eastern Vol., Part IV, No. 86.
19. Admiral de Robeck, No. 395, March 22, 1920. Eastern Vol., Part IV, No. 162.
20. Admiral de Robeck, No. 303, March 2, 1920. Eastern Vol., Part IV, No. 126.
21. Lord Derby, Paris, Tel. No. 377, March 29, 1920. Eastern Vol., Part IV, No. 148.
22. Admiral Webb, Constantinople, Tel. No. 413, April 18, 1920. Eastern Vol., Part IV, No. 181.
23. Admiral Webb, Tel. No. 421, April 20, 1920. Eastern Vol., Part IV, No. 188.
24. Mr. Fontana, Beirut, No. 101, November 13, 1920. E 14690/1214/44.
25. Armenians of Mersina to Mr. Malcolm: communicated by Mr. Malcolm. Telegram of November 1, 1920, and Foreign Office telegram to Paris, No. 1198 of November 4, 1920. E 13534/1214/44.
26. Mr. Satow, Beirut, No. 96, July 15, 1921. E 8823/800/44.
27. Admiral de Robeck, No. 295, February 27, 1920. E 1765/1340/44.
28. Admiral de Robeck, No. 1443, October 21, 1920. E 13849/1340/44.
29. "Reports on the Atrocities in the District of Yalova, &c." "Turkey No. 1 (1921)." Cmd. 1478.
30. Sir H. Rumbold, Constantinople, No. 769, August 17, 1921. E 9554/800/44.
31. Sir H. Rumbold, No. 976, October 22, 1921. E 11930/143/44.
32. United States Embassy, No. 346, December 30, 1921. E 14369/143/44 (1921). (This contains numerous and important communications from American relief workers, &c., obtained through the State Department at Washington.)
- 33, 34, 35. See minutes of meetings of Armenian-Greek Section of British High Commission at Constantinople during the year 1921.
36. Sir H. Rumbold, No. 1091, November 30, 1921. E 13333/340/44.
37. Colonial Office, July 9 and September 19, 1921. E 7913 and E 10548/43/93.
38. "Turkey: Annual Report for 1920," paragraph 153.
39. Sir H. Rumbold, No. 949, October 15, 1921. E 11678/143/44.
40. President of Pontine League, Constantinople, to Speaker of House of Commons. Telegram of July 23, 1921. E 8532/143/44. (This telegram gives very detailed statistics by villages, but the source is Greek.)
41. Dr. Kennedy to Sir Eric Drummond, November 20; communicated by Mr. A. Williams, November 29, 1921. E 13345/143/44.
- 41A. Sir H. Rumbold, Tel. No. 749, November 24, 1921. E 12956/143/44.
42. Mr. Rattigan, Constantinople, No. 715, July 27, 1921. E 8784/143/44.
- 42A. Sir H. Rumbold, No. 901, September 28, 1921. E 10967/340/44.
43. War Office, M.I.2, November 23, 1921. E 12880/132/44. (Colonel Rawlinson's diary.)
44. Sir H. Rumbold, Tel. No. 738, November 21, 1921. E 12765/143/44.
45. Mr. Grove, Moscow, to Mr. Gregory, February 17, 1922. E 2345/314/44.
46. Sir H. Rumbold, Tel. No. 13, January 6, 1922. E 320/5/44.

March, 20, 1922.

G. W. R.

[E 2775/900/44]

No. 65.

*Count de Salis to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 22.)*

(No. 40.)

My Lord,

Rome, March 9, 1922.

IN my despatch No. 21 of the 14th February I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of the note addressed to the Cardinal Secretary of State relative to the French protectorate over Catholics in the East. At your Lordship's instruction, I informed the Vatican officially of the agreement concluded at San Remo on the 24th April between Great Britain, France and Italy.

In reply, Cardinal Gasparri has addressed to me a note, copy and translation of

[8975]

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which are herewith enclosed, in which he recapitulates the situation as far as the Holy See is concerned. The French protectorate is founded on the Capitulations between France and the Holy See, and on the order given to the clergy by the Holy See that for the protection of their interests they should address themselves to the French representative. To support the prestige of the protecting Power, certain liturgical privileges were granted as an accessory to the protectorate. Where Turkish domination has ceased, the Capitulations have ceased and consequently the French protectorate and its accessories, unless these should be continued by the Holy See in gratitude for the services rendered in the past. Putting aside for the moment the question of French renunciation of the protectorate, it would follow that in territory still under the Sultan, the protectorate and its accessories still continues. In territory definitely taken away from the Sultan (Bulgaria, Serbia, &c.) it has ceased, unless the Capitulations have been replaced by special agreements between France and the local Power. With the protectorate the liturgical honours also ceased. Finally, in the territory taken away by the Treaty of Sèvres, which has not yet been ratified, the protectorate still continues *de jure*, though *de facto* all that is left of it are the honours, since the governing Power which is in the place of the Sultan could not admit the intervention of the French representative in matters concerning other than French interests. As regards the French renunciation, Cardinal Gasparri goes on to say that if France has really given up the protectorate and the honours, any question about them is definitely settled since it is not admissible that France should claim them from the Holy See while renouncing them as regards other Powers. But, while Great Britain and Italy declare that France has given up both protectorate and honours, France denies that she has done so, and the Holy See, which was not present at San Remo, is not in a position to decide. It is therefore necessary for the British Government to solve the following question: At the meeting of San Remo did France give up the protectorate in the East, including the liturgical honours? If His Majesty's Government will communicate to Cardinal Gasparri the result of the controversy on this point, the Holy See will give the necessary instructions to the authorities of the Catholic Church in the East.

As your Lordship will observe, the earlier part of the note is a recapitulation of the note of the 12th April, 1918 (enclosed in my despatch No 39 of the 22nd April, 1918), which at the same time related the circumstances in which the Vatican had cancelled their original orders to the Custos that the honours at Jerusalem should cease, the French authorities having declared that Lord Allenby accepted the continuation of the honours till the conclusion of peace and that his attitude was approved by the British and Italian Governments.

I have, &c.  
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 65.

Vatican Note of March 6, 1922.

(Translation.)

THE undersigned Cardinal Secretary of State of His Holiness hastens to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 14th February relative to an incident which occurred at Constantinople on the occasion of the funeral solemnities for the August Pontiff Benedict XV, at which the French High Commissioner, in accordance with the instructions of his Government, claimed and obtained a place of distinction as representative of France, protecting Power of Catholics in the East.

Your Excellency states that at the meeting at San Remo of the 24th April, 1920, France renounced her protectorate in the East, it being agreed that none of the three Great Powers present at the meeting, England, France and Italy, would exercise such right of protectorate in future. On behalf of Lord Curzon your Excellency informed the Holy See of that agreement, expressing the hope that the Holy See would give appropriate instructions to all the authorities of the Catholic Church, whereby the repetition of similar regrettable incidents might be avoided.

In reply to this note the undersigned Cardinal thinks it will be opportune if he briefly describes the nature and scope of the French protectorate, and he allows himself the hope that this explanation will not be unwelcome to the British Government.

The French protectorate in the East is the privilege which France has enjoyed of defending, as against the Ottoman authorities, the interests of Catholics of the Latin

rite, and by force of custom also of those of the Oriental rite. Its juridical basis was twofold:—

- (a.) The Capitulations obtained from the Sublime Porte, which had the force of international treaties and which conferred on France the right of protection.
- (b.) The order given by the Holy See to the regular and secular clergy to address themselves for the protection of their interests to the representative of France, in preference even to the representative of their own country. Without that order the right obtained by France through the Capitulations would not have had practical application, inasmuch as many other Powers had similar Capitulations with the Ottoman Empire, and also because each Power, in virtue of the law of nations, can intervene in defence of its own nationals.

In addition the Holy See, in order to keep up the prestige of the protecting Power in the eyes of eastern peoples, had granted to the representatives of France in the East liturgical privileges at certain religious ceremonies in the ecclesiastical year. These liturgical honours were necessary to the protectorate, and were given by the Holy See without the intervention of any Power. The privilege, therefore, of protecting Catholics as against the Ottoman authorities, with the enjoyment as accessory of these liturgical honours, constitutes the French protectorate in the East.

From the foregoing it is clear that once the Turkish domination ceases in any part of the East the Capitulations with France cease also, and with them the French protectorate which was based on them. The liturgical honours, accessory to the protectorate, likewise cease according to the juridical maxim, *accessorium sequitur principale*, unless the Holy See should wish that those honours be continued as a proof of gratitude for the protection afforded to Catholics in times past. It is true that the Ottoman Government in the beginning of the war denounced the Capitulations with various Powers, but such unilateral rupture of an international pact can have no juridical value without the consent of the other contracting party, in the present case France.

Apart from the renunciation by France, about which we shall speak later, we shall, on applying the above-mentioned principles, have the following: In the territories which still *de jure* belong to the Sultan and *de facto* are still under his authority, as, for instance, Constantinople, the French protectorate as well as the liturgical honours still remain. In territories definitely withdrawn both *de jure* and *de facto* from the Sultan's authority, such as Bulgaria, Serbia, &c., the French protectorate has ceased, unless there are particular agreements between France and the local Power taking the place of the Capitulations; and with the protectorate the liturgical honours have also ceased. On the other hand, in the territories taken from Turkey by the Treaty of Sèvres, which is not yet ratified, the protectorate remains *de jure*, or at any rate the liturgical honours remain, since so long as the Treaty of Peace is not ratified the state of war continues juridically, and therefore juridically the principle applies: *durante bello nihil innovetur*.

It has been said above that "the protectorate remains *de jure*, or at least the liturgical honours remain," because, *de facto*, the Power which governs in place of the Sultan will certainly not admit the intervention of the French representative in disputes between non-French subjects and the local authorities; therefore the question is reduced to the liturgical honours alone, and it was, by applying the principles set forth above, that the Holy See decided, as the British Government are aware, the question of the liturgical honours in Jerusalem at the beginning of the occupation.

We now come to the renunciation by France at the conference of San Remo. If France actually renounced either the protectorate or the liturgical honours, placing herself on the same footing as the other Powers, the whole question must be held to be settled, and France could not claim such honours from the Holy See because it would be inadmissible that she should renounce them to other Powers and claim them from the Holy See. While, however, the British Government, as stated in your Excellency's note, and the Italian Government affirm that both the protectorate and the liturgical honours are renounced, the French Government affirm the contrary, and it is impossible for the Holy See, which was not present at the meeting of San Remo, to make any pronouncement in this dispute.

In these circumstances it is necessary that the British Government should settle diplomatically with the French Government the following question: At the meeting



of San Remo did France renounce her protectorate in the East, not excluding the liturgical honours?

If eventually the Government of His Britannic Majesty will be so good as to communicate to the undersigned Cardinal the result of this diplomatic discussion, the Holy See will not fail to give the necessary instructions to the authorities of the Catholic Church in the East.

The undersigned Cardinal avails himself, &c.

P. CARD. GASPARRI.

[E 3274/5/44]

No. 66.

*Minutes of the First Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay at 1.30 P.M., March 22, 1922.—(Received at Foreign Office, March 25.)*

Present:

For France	.....	M. Poincaré. M. de Perretti de la Rocca. M. Bargeton.
For Great Britain	.....	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Mr. R. G. Vansittart. Mr. E. G. Forbes Adam.
For Italy	.....	Signor Schanzer. Marquis Visconti-Venosta. Signor Guariglia.

Interpreter, M. Camerlynck.

There were also present for the discussion of the armistice proposals:—

Marshal Foch.	General Sir C. Harington.
General Gouraud.	Colonel Heywood.
General Weygand.	General Marietti.

M. Poincaré began by asking Lord Curzon to open the proceedings.

*Communications to the Press.*

Lord Curzon said that he wished first to ask M. Poincaré and Signor Schanzer that no communications should be made to the press except such as might be agreed at the end of each meeting.

M. Poincaré and Signor Schanzer both agreed.

*Armistice.*

Lord Curzon then referred to the proposal for an armistice between the belligerents in Asia Minor, which he had already mentioned to his French and Italian colleagues, and as a personal proposal of his own to the two Turkish delegations in London. The moment seemed favourable; there had been no fighting for some time on the line taken up by the two forces at the end of last summer in front of Afiun-Karahissar-Eskishehr. The Greeks had already placed themselves in the hands of the Allies. If the evacuation of Asia Minor, on which, subject to a satisfactory general settlement, there was general agreement, was to be peaceably carried out, there must be first an immediate cessation of hostilities and then a retirement of the Greek forces in successive stages (the Greek press spoke of this taking eight months—the Allied generals at Constantinople seemed to think four to four and a half months would be sufficient). From the Greek, the Turkish and the Allied point of view the proposal was advantageous and the first essential step towards a general peace. The Greeks would require security that in retiring they were not going to be molested. The Turks should realise that they were going to secure the object of their campaign in Asia Minor without any renewal of hostilities and without danger of the country being laid waste by the retiring Greek forces. The only object of the Allies was to be impartial towards Greece and Turkey and to secure a peace as soon as possible. Nothing could be more unfortunate than a renewal of hostilities.

Lord Curzon therefore suggested that an identical telegram should be sent both to Constantinople and Angora and to Athens, and he submitted a draft (see Annex I to these minutes).

Lord Curzon drew particular attention to the armistice clause in his draft, which stipulated that no movement of troops to or from the theatre of war should take place. This would apply to both parties, but was more important to the Turks than to the Greeks. If the Turks refused the armistice terms, the Greeks, feeling that they must eventually evacuate, but uncertain as to the date, might rush their troops to the sea, ship them to Thrace, thus consolidating their position there and possibly threatening Constantinople, should the Allies show signs of retiring. This would be precluded by the clause preventing the movement of troops.

Lord Curzon also raised the question of the period of the armistice. His military advisers had suggested ninety-two days; Lord Curzon thought this was perhaps too long and that six weeks might be sufficient, but he would be particularly glad to hear the views of M. Poincaré and Signor Schanzer on the subject.

M. Poincaré had expressed doubts to him as to whether the Turks would accept the armistice; Lord Curzon was equally doubtful about the Greeks. Much would depend upon the advice given by M. Poincaré to the Turks with whom he was in closer contact than Lord Curzon, and on the advice to be given by Lord Curzon to the Greeks. Lord Curzon put forward the proposal in any case as in his opinion the first essential step towards peace. Without an armistice the work which the Allies were undertaking might be destroyed at any moment.

M. Poincaré said that he had already briefly expressed his point of view to Lord Curzon that morning. He was afraid that the Turks would not accept an armistice proposed by other Powers than Greece. In any case, he feared that the draft in its present form would prove unacceptable, as it contained no guarantee to the Turks that Anatolia was to be evacuated. It was essential that the three countries should not court a refusal, and he therefore suggested that the draft should be amended to cover this particular point.

Signor Schanzer said that he thought M. Poincaré was merely making a distinction between the principle of the armistice and its details. He was prepared to accept the principle, subject to further discussion of details.

Lord Curzon, referring to M. Poincaré's doubts as to the Turkish acceptance of the armistice, pointed out that the Allies should not be guided in their attitude by their respective views as to the response likely to be accorded to their proposal. They had already met with refusals in dealing with this question in the past. They might have more in front of them, but the responsibility for the peace of Europe and of the world rested on their shoulders, and they must take risks in doing what they thought right. If the Greeks accepted the armistice and the Turks refused, the latter would lose in the eyes of the world, and would find the attainment of a satisfactory peace ultimately more difficult in consequence. Lord Curzon was, however, prepared to meet M. Poincaré's criticism regarding the evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks. He would first point out, however, that the Turks already know perfectly well from their conversations with Lord Curzon in London that an armistice was intended to be preliminary to a peaceful evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks. He therefore suggested that something like the following should be inserted in the preamble to the British proposal:—

"In transmitting their proposals to the Governments concerned, the three Ministers make the following proposal with a view to enable them to make recommendations for the peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor."

Such a formula would go a long way to show the main objects of the Allies. He trusted that with that addition M. Poincaré might be able to give his support to the proposal as a whole. Indeed, M. Poincaré had given the British Ambassador in Paris to believe that he favoured the principle of an armistice when first proposed by Lord Curzon. There could be nothing more unfortunate than that this natural and necessary measure should be proposed at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers and that France alone should raise objection to it.

M. Poincaré said that it was quite true that he had told Lord Hardinge not only that he accepted an armistice in principle, but that he would tell the Turkish delegation so semi-officially. He was in agreement with Lord Curzon and Signor



Schanzer on the question of principle; it was only a matter of form. He accepted the addition proposed by Lord Curzon.

Lord Curzon raised the question whether the reference to the evacuation of Asia Minor should be made in the preamble or in the form of a *communication verbale*.

M. Poincaré thought the latter would be difficult of execution, especially in the case of Angora, and that it should be made in writing.

Lord Curzon then proposed the following formula:—

"The Foreign Ministers of the three Great Powers assembled at Paris with a view to re-establish the peace of the Near East and to be in a position to make recommendations for the evacuation of Asia Minor without further destruction of life and property feel it to be their first duty to propose an immediate suspension of hostilities to the Governments concerned.

"The terms of the proposed armistice might be as follows:—" (For the rest of the proposal, see Annex I.)

M. Poincaré suggested a change to the words "with a view to secure the evacuation."

Lord Curzon pointed out that a number of points had to be decided before so definite a statement as to evacuation could be made.

M. Poincaré then suggested that the word "propose" before the words "an immediate suspension of hostilities" should be strengthened, and the words "strongly to recommend" were agreed upon.

M. Poincaré raised an objection to the word "immediate" as likely to "froisser" the extreme nationalists in Turkey.

Lord Curzon pointed out that it was essential to secure an armistice at once; that the formula had already been modified to meet the Angora point of view, and that to forestall delay and bargaining by Turkey the Allies ought to say firmly what they meant to say.

M. Poincaré said that he was only anxious to secure the success of Lord Curzon's proposal. He was afraid that the French Government had not the influence on the Turkish Government which Lord Curzon had suggested at an earlier stage, whatever influence Lord Curzon might be able to bring to bear on the Greeks. He then waived his point.

[The Allied military experts then entered.]

Lord Curzon proposed that the military experts should examine the precise terms of the armistice attached to his proposal, but before they did so it would be necessary to discuss further the duration of the armistice period, as to which his colleagues had not expressed an opinion.

Signor Schanzer suggested that ninety-two days was not long enough.

M. Poincaré raised the question of procedure. It would be necessary, first, to discuss the essential conditions of peace; secondly, to work them out at Constantinople. This would take a long time.

Lord Curzon pointed out that it would not be possible to begin the evacuation of Asia Minor until the Greeks and Turks had agreed to the general conditions upon which it was to take place. The Constantinople Conference which was to elaborate the latter should therefore be held as soon as possible after the present meeting of the three Foreign Ministers.

General Weygand suggested that a long period would in these circumstances be necessary.

M. Poincaré said that it was important not to confuse the period of the armistice and the period of peace conditions. He himself thought that the procedure at Versailles had been a mistake, and that it would have been better to have had an armistice, a preliminary treaty of peace and a final treaty as after the war of 1870. In the present case the period of the armistice should be long enough to enable evacuation to take place during it and before the final treaty was made.

Lord Curzon agreed with M. Poincaré as to the three stages. There should first be an armistice, then preliminary conditions drawn up at Paris upon the acceptance of which by both parties evacuation could begin. These would be elaborated at Constantinople and the final peace treaty completed by a sitting of the Supreme Council.

M. Poincaré and Signor Schanzer agreed.

[The military experts then retired to discuss the terms of the armistice.]

M. Poincaré observed that the telegram should be sent off as soon as possible, as time would have to be given for Mustapha Kemal to obtain the assent of the Grand National Assembly.

#### *Tripartite Agreement and Italy.*

Signor Schanzer asked that he might at this point make a declaration regarding Italy's position. His country, like France and Great Britain, desired peace as soon as possible and a cessation of the Græco-Turkish hostilities, but vital Italian interests were at stake. Italy had been promised the maintenance of the equilibrium between the three Allies in the Mediterranean by article 9 of the Treaty of London 1915. As a consequence, the agreement of S. Jean de Maurienne had been made in 1917 giving Italy a zone in Anatolia, including Smyrna. The Tripartite Agreement of August 1920 had taken the place of the latter and the financial clauses of the Treaty of Sévres (particularly article 239) enabled the Tripartite Agreement to be applied. If the financial clauses were modified—in particular, if the Financial Commission were not given a real control over concessions—Italy, with a new and more independent Turkey, would find herself in a worse economic position in Turkey than before the war. Italy must therefore insist that the Allies should require Turkey to accept such a control over concessions in the new treaty. Just as France insisted on Turkey providing from other revenues for any deficit in the existing revenues assigned to the service of the pre-war debt, and just as British experts are understood to want a financial control over Turkey for the payment of war debts, so Italy must insist on a control over concessions without being intransigent as to its mechanism. The Debt Council might be kept, strengthened and reconstructed, and the Financial Commission as such disappear. Signor Schanzer then proposed a formula (see Annex 3) to take the place of article 239 of the Treaty of Sévres, and asked that the Allies should accept it as a preliminary to any further discussion. Without satisfaction on this vital point he could not defend his Government's position before the Italian Parliament.

M. Poincaré appreciated Signor Schanzer's argument, but thought it would be impossible to reach the desired object of the Conference if at this stage each Ally was to press its own particular national interest. For the rest, Signor Schanzer overrated the extent to which France was benefiting from the Turkish settlement. All the Allies had been disillusioned by the course of events in Turkey. Northern Syria, and in particular Aleppo and Alexandretta, were in desperate straits owing to the war in Cilicia and the Kemalist attitude. In any case, it was necessary to examine the essential question first, especially the stoppage of war in Anatolia. Each Government would reserve its final acceptance of the revised terms as a whole until they were ready for signature.

Signor Schanzer said that the mandates received by France and Great Britain were a real advantage. Italy had no counter-benefit, and Italian public opinion insisted upon the Allies securing such for Italy. They must give her the practical application of economic priority under the Tripartite Agreement in her zone.

Lord Curzon sympathised with Signor Schanzer's position, but the Conference could not invert their order of procedure. He was about to propose that plans for the evacuation of Anatolia should be considered by the military experts, and that the Conference should then proceed to discuss other vital questions in the settlement, e.g., the future administration of Smyrna, the Straits, &c. The question of the precise powers and functions of the Financial Commission would come later, and must be exhaustively considered by experts in the first instance. He would further point out that the Tripartite Agreement, which had been specially designed to satisfy French and Italian commercial interests, was an agreement between the three Powers against competition in each other's zones



(England, as a matter of fact, asked for no zone), not an agreement with Turkey. As a matter of fact, Turkey would not accept the application of the Tripartite Agreement in the way proposed under the Sèvres settlement, and its essence must be obtained in another way. This was first a matter for the experts, who could sit at once while the conference continued, and the Italian case would be taken up at a later stage. Lord Curzon trusted that Signor Schanzer would collaborate on these conditions in the solution of the more vital questions before the conference. For the rest, Lord Curzon entirely agreed with M. Poincaré that neither France nor Great Britain had gained from the Turkish settlement. Both were finding their mandates burdens to which, in the case of the British mandates, Italy was welcome.

M. Poincaré desired to reserve France's attitude towards the question of the Debt Council and the financial clauses for which technical preparation was necessary. Both France and Great Britain, however, were ready to accept the Tripartite Treaty as between the three Powers as in complete force, and to apply it as loyally as possible, but the form of application must be made acceptable to Turkey.

Signor Schanzer urged that the question was not technical but vital for Italy, so could not be deferred. His formula did not touch the sovereignty of Turkey.

M. Poincaré pointed out that the formula made the Financial Commission permanent, because the control was to be permanent. His own idea was that the Debt Council, in any case, should remain intact, and not be merged in the Commission.

Lord Curzon again pointed out that Signor Schanzer was endeavouring to reverse the usual procedure of all previous conferences. He quite realised Signor Schanzer's point that the application of the Tripartite Agreement was of prime political importance to Italy, but its application must in the first place be examined by the experts. Incidentally the formula proposed by Signor Schanzer went much further than the mere application of the Tripartite Agreement. It ought to control the grant of Turkish concessions everywhere, not only in the French and Italian zones. While it was essential that their deliberations should not be suspended while the experts met, Lord Curzon declared himself ready to assure Signor Schanzer that he would do his best to obtain for Italy the substance of the Tripartite Agreement in the new treaty.

Signor Schanzer trusted that Lord Curzon's declaration might be interpreted in the sense that Italy would be satisfied in the way which she desired. For the rest, he did not ask, for the present, more than that his formula should be submitted at once to the experts, although he must make all reservations as to Italy's satisfaction on this point being subordinated to her acceptance of the treaty as a whole.

#### *Evacuation of Anatolia.*

Lord Curzon proposed that the detailed plan, with maps prepared by the Allied Generals at Constantinople, for the evacuation of Anatolia should be at once examined by the Versailles Committee under Marshal Foch. Evacuation would involve acceptance and collaboration by the Greeks and abstention by the Turks. Cordial co-operation of the Allied military authorities and the presence of officers of the three countries would be essential for this difficult task.

#### *Armistice Proposals.*

The Allied military experts returned at this stage, and General Weygand read the armistice proposals as redrafted by the experts (see Annex 3 for final text.)

M. Poincaré and Marshal Foch suggested that the functions of the central commission and sub-commission in article 4 should be extended to look after the local population, and prevent pillage and massacre, &c., in which the Greeks might indulge as a prelude to evacuation.

Lord Curzon pointed out that there were two distinct questions—the armistice on the existing line, with a special commission to see to its execution, and evacuation by slow stages, under the supervision of a new and larger commission, in which perhaps the Armistice Commission might merge. The Armistice Com-

mission should not assume large responsibilities over a wide area. Incidents of the kind feared by Marshal Foch were unlikely in any case to occur.

The conference finally agreed to meet Marshal Foch's points by the addition of a sentence to article 4 (see text as finally agreed upon in Annex 3). After some discussion the word "arbitrage" was accepted instead of "décisions" in article 5 as more palatable to both Turks and Greeks. The text was then accepted.

#### *Question of Communication to Greeks and Turks.*

M. Poincaré suggested that the armistice proposal should be communicated at once to the representatives of the two Turkish Governments and to the Greek Government through their respective official representatives in Paris. None of the Allies had representatives at Angora. France had not sent one as the agreement of October with Angora was in no sense a treaty of peace.

Lord Curzon said that on previous occasions, such as that of a joint communication by the Supreme Council to the Dutch Government regarding the ex-Kaiser of Germany, the President of the conference telegraphed the decision to his Minister in the country, whose Government was being addressed, and instructions were sent to the other two Ministers to make a collective representation.

M. Poincaré pointed out that this was not a meeting of the Supreme Council, but only an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers. There was no formal chairman.

It was finally agreed that the proposal should be signed by the three Foreign Ministers and telegraphed by the French Foreign Office to Athens and to Constantinople. The British and Italian delegations would telegraph the text to their representatives, with instructions to make a joint communication. It was also agreed to communicate the text of the proposal at once to the press.

#### *Smyrna.*

Lord Curzon then raised the question of the future régime at Smyrna after evacuation had taken place. Before discussing possible alternative forms of régime, it was necessary to decide whether Turkey was to be allowed to return to unfettered control over the Smyrna area, or whether some safeguards after the return of Turkish sovereignty would be required. Lord Curzon thought that the former course was unacceptable. The French Government in their proposals of the 27th January had proposed a special régime for the municipality of Smyrna on the lines of Alexandria, but the latter was primarily designed to give representation to the foreign commercial interest. In the case of Smyrna it was not only a question of the interests of merchants in the town, but of the protection of the population of a large locality. There were some 100,000 Greeks in Smyrna, some 40,000 in Aivali, some 60,000 in the Tchesme Peninsula. In the whole Sèvres zone, according to pre-war American figures, there were some 500,000 Greeks. Possibly not all the population had yet been repatriated, but if the Turks returned victorious, what was to be done for this large population and the safety of life and property? Would guarantees for minorities of a general nature, such as Angora was said to be ready to accept, suffice? Lord Curzon thought clearly not. It would be desirable, in his opinion, to establish some special form of safeguard for the area, either on the lines of the Saar Basin Commission, as he had proposed in his note of December last to the French and Italian Governments, but which he was now inclined to consider unsuitable, or possibly a looser régime on Lebanon lines. Perhaps even an entirely new proposal should be examined, e.g., a Turkish vali with a special council on which there would be foreign representation, which the Turks might prefer to that of the local elements alone. In any case, whatever geographical area was selected, Lord Curzon proposed some form of administration, which, while prejudicing Turkish sovereignty as little as possible, would yet afford some real protection to the non-Turkish population. A scheme might be worked out by experts once the principle was accepted. Public opinion in England would find it very difficult to accept the return of this area with only the safeguards of the European minority treaties.

M. Poincaré replied that French public opinion did not want any special favours to be shown to the Greeks. Why should there be one kind of special



régime for them and not for the Kurds, Armenians, &c.? He thought it was impossible to impose any special régime on Turkey if proposed either for the Aidin vilayet or the Sèvres zone. Turks were in a state of violent patriotic exultation, and if any proposal was made touching their sovereignty in Asia it would be rejected. Moreover, it was doubtful if the Greeks of Smyrna were really the enemy of the Turk. They were reported to desire urgently the evacuation of Asia Minor by Greece. If any special administration was to be applied to this area, it was better to restrict it to the smallest possible area—the town of Smyrna.

*Signor Schanzer* agreed with Lord Curzon that something was necessary. While, perhaps, something ought to be done for the whole Sèvres zone, there would be great difficulties with the Turks for such an area as the vilayet and probably for any larger area than the town.

Lord Curzon pointed out that he had never suggested a special régime for the vilayet. It must be remembered that at any rate in the sanjak of Smyrna to-day, possibly in the whole Sèvres zone, the Greeks were in a majority. M. Poincaré's argument against recognising a national majority here was not accepted elsewhere. The Turks based their case for keeping parts of the eastern vilayets and for recovering Thrace and Adrianople on the Turkish majority in each instance. Yussuf Kemal had told Lord Curzon that he was ready to give up any territory where the Armenians were in a majority. Why should there be a different rule for the whole area round Smyrna in which there was a Greek majority?

Lord Curzon thought, however, that the best procedure might be to discuss the question of Smyrna again later in connection with the general question of minorities. For the present he would make no formal proposal. All he would say at the moment was that it was essential to bring in to the greatest possible extent the League of Nations.

M. Poincaré presumed that if Adrianople remained Greek and Smyrna were left to Turkey, the régime to be applied to Smyrna would be applied to Adrianople. Special guarantees would no doubt be required for any compact bodies of Greek or Armenian populations that might be scattered through Asia Minor. As for Smyrna, he still favoured a régime for the town only, but he accepted the general procedure as to further discussion of the question proposed by Lord Curzon.

#### Press.

*Signor Schanzer* reverted to the question of communications to the press. He hoped it might be possible for each delegation to have some latitude in speaking to the press, apart from the agreed communications of the conference.

Both M. Poincaré and Lord Curzon deprecated the suggestion, which would probably only lead to one-sided accounts of the day's proceedings being given out by each delegation.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

#### ANNEX 1.

The Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy:

Being desirous, in order to facilitate negotiations for the re-establishment of peace in the East, to ensure an immediate cessation of hostilities between the Greek and Turkish military forces in Anatolia:

Have agreed to propose the following terms for an armistice to be signed by the commanders of the said Greek and Turkish military forces:—

1. Hostilities will cease at twenty-four hours in the night of \_\_\_\_\_, 1922.
2. Hellenic and Turkish outposts will be withdrawn in accordance with the decisions of local commissions, consisting of representatives of the local Turkish and Greek commanders and Allied officers, wherever there is contact between the two armies, the guiding principle being to break contact as far as possible, in order to avoid incidents occurring between members of the two armies.
3. No movement of troops to or from the theatre of war in Anatolia is to take place.
4. Allied commissions to be appointed to both armies as guarantee to either side that the terms of this armistice are respected.

5. Hostilities will be suspended for a period of ninety-two days, renewable automatically for periods of ninety-two days until such times as a peace treaty shall come into force. Should either party wish to denounce this convention, it will be bound to give notice of its intention to the other party and the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy a clear fortnight before the expiration of one of these periods.

#### ANNEX 2.

Le Gouvernement ottoman devra soumettre à l'avis du Conseil de la Dette, avant promulgation, les contrats des nouvelles concessions ou de prorogation des concessions existantes à accorder en faveur des ressortissants ottomans ou de tout autre.

Le Conseil de la Dette avant d'émettre son avis devra examiner si les conditions de ces contrats sont conformes aux intérêts du Gouvernement ottoman.

Le Conseil afin de pouvoir exercer son mandat aura faculté de se faire représenter auprès des départements compétents par son propre délégué auquel le Gouvernement ottoman fournira toutes les facilités requises pour l'accomplissement de sa tâche.

#### ANNEX 3.

Haut-Commissaire français, Constantinople.

Ministre français, Athènes.

Le 22 mars 1922.

(Pour Constantinople seulement :)

Veuillez vous concerter avec vos collègues britannique et italien pour remettre au Gouvernement ottoman et au représentant du Gouvernement d'Angora à Constantinople :

(Pour Athènes seulement :)

Veuillez vous concerter avec vos collègues britannique et italien pour remettre au Gouvernement hellénique :

(Pour les deux postes :)

Le télégramme suivant, qui est signé par Lord Curzon, par M. Schanzer et par moi :

"Les Ministres des Affaires étrangères des trois grandes Puissances, réunis à Paris en vue de rétablir la paix dans le Proche-Orient et d'être mis à même de faire des propositions pour l'évacuation de l'Asie Mineure, sans nouvelles pertes de vies et de biens, estiment que leur premier devoir est de recommander instamment une suspension immédiate d'hostilités aux Gouvernements intéressés.

"Les conditions de l'armistice proposé seraient les suivantes :

#### "ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.

"Les hostilités cesseront à minuit dans la nuit du \_\_\_\_\_ au \_\_\_\_\_ 1922.

#### "ARTICLE 2.

"Tout en conservant les lignes générales occupées actuellement par le gros de leurs forces, les belligérants devront ramener en arrière leurs éléments avancés, de manière à supprimer tout contact et à ouvrir un intervalle libre de troupes large d'au moins 10 kilom. entre les deux fronts, conformément aux décisions prises par les commissions locales composées de représentants des commandements grec et turc et d'officiers alliés.

#### "ARTICLE 3.

"Pendant la durée de l'armistice, aucun renforcement en personnel ou en matériel ne pourra être opéré dans les armées opposées ; aucun enlèvement d'unités constituées ne pourra être effectué.

#### "ARTICLE 4.

"Des commissions alliées, agissant sous une direction alliée commune, seront attachées à l'une et à l'autre des armées belligérantes.

"Elles auront qualité pour contrôler, dans chacune de ces armées, l'exécution des clauses de l'armistice, et pour régler les incidents qui pourraient se produire



à cette occasion. Elles auront également qualité pour intervenir auprès des autorités occupantes, en vue d'assurer la protection des gens et des biens dans les territoires occupés.

"ARTICLE 5.

"Les commandements en chef hellénique et ottoman s'engagent à accepter à exécuter loyalement l'arbitrage des commissions alliées.

"ARTICLE 6.

"Les hostilités seront suspendues pendant une période de trois mois, renouvelable automatiquement jusqu'à ce que les deux belligérants aient accepté les conditions des préliminaires de paix. Si l'un des belligérants désire ne pas renouveler la présente convention, il devra en faire la notification à l'autre partie aux représentants de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France et de l'Italie quinze jours au moins avant l'expiration de la période d'armistice en cours.

"CURZON. SCHANZER. POINCARÉ."

De concert avec vos collègues, vous demanderez qu'une réponse vous soit adressée dans le délai le plus bref possible.

[E 3302/3302/44]

No. 67.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 27.)*

(No. 283.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 21, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that, although there exist no census returns to show the appalling loss of population sustained by Turkey during the last decade of almost uninterrupted warfare, comparative statistics of salt consumption throw considerable light on the subject, particularly as regards the shrinkage of population within the limits of Turkey's present frontiers. The Turkish salt monopoly returns supply these statistics, save as regards the extensive but thinly populated regions of Mesopotamia, Arabia and Tripoli in Africa, regions detached from the Empire since 1911, the inhabitants of which consumed contraband salt almost exclusively. These latter consequently remain outside any comparison based on monopoly statistics. As for the rest, the statistics do serve as a guide, although only in a roughly approximate way, as will be explained.

2. All salt sold by the monopoly in Turkey, save an insignificant quantity used in small special industries, is consumed by man and beast, and, since it is an article of prime necessity, the demand for it is proportionately constant. Unfortunately there is no separate record of quantities for each of these two categories of consumers. One cannot go very far wrong, however, in assuming that the destruction of both the people and their cattle, their transport and other animals, has during the last decade of heavy campaigning and massacre on the one hand, and intensive requisitioning on the other, proceeded more or less *pari passu*. On the basis of this assumption, the only one at present possible for the purpose of making a comparison, the loss of population incurred between the last pre-war financial year (1910-11) and the last financial year for which statistics are to hand (1919-20) is represented approximately by the following figures of reduced salt consumption:—

	Diminution of Annual Consumption.	
		Per cent.
(a.) Within the present frontiers of the Empire, including disputed provinces (Smyrna and Thrace)—		
103,000 tons in 1919-20 and 153,000 in 1910-11...		33
(b.) Within the entire Empire as it stood in 1910-11 (excluding Mesopotamia, Arabia and African Tripoli) and as it stands to-day—		
103,000 tons in 1919-20 and 235,000 in 1910-11...		56

These figures have been given to me by the Ottoman Public Debt.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

[E 3310/900/44]

No. 66A.

*Count de Salis to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 27.)*

(No. 44.)

My Lord,

Rome, March 18, 1922.

A FEW days ago Cardinal Gasparri, in connection with the question of the French protectorate of Catholics in the East, referred to his note of the 6th March, which was forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 40 of the 9th March; the British and French Governments were not in accord with regard to the nature of the agreement on the subject arrived at in April 1920 at San Remo.

I read to his Eminence the text of the note addressed to M. Poincaré on the 2nd February last by Lord Hardinge. The Cardinal replied that the French Embassy had given him a copy of their reply, but at the moment he could not lay his hand on it. His recollection was that he could not understand M. Poincaré's reasoning.

This morning, as I had received copies of the correspondence from your Lordship, I took an opportunity of mentioning the matter. The note maintained that a French renunciation could only affect the temporal, civil and political privileges; it was not for the French Government to suppress the liturgical honours, which could only be dealt with by the competent ecclesiastical authorities. For this reason the French had been able to admit that the Vatican should not take part in the discussion. Had there been a question of establishing a new order of liturgical ceremonies, it would have been impossible to maintain that the Vatican should not take part in the discussion, and the Holy See, according to Canon 1257, was alone qualified to make modifications in this respect.

On running through the note with him I pointed out to Cardinal Gasparri that this reasoning did not fit with the view constantly maintained by the Holy See that the protectorate and the liturgical honours stood in the relation of principal and accessory, and that if for any reason the principal—the protectorate—disappeared, the accessory—the honours—would *ipso facto* disappear also. There would be need for special discussion with the Vatican about eliminating them. The Cardinal assented, adding that, if the French Government agreed with other Governments that the protectorate should be abolished, they were certainly no longer in a position to claim from the Vatican the fulfilment of any of its conditions. The Cardinal smiled at the effort made by M. Poincaré through an appeal to the Canon Law to support a line of argument which the Cardinal evidently considered to be unsound.

I pointed out to the Cardinal that the communication I had made to him under your Lordship's instructions expressly referred to the protectorate in the East, and not in Palestine alone, while I note that, according to Lord Hardinge's despatch No. 372 of the 12th February, it is laid down in the *procès-verbal* of San Remo that "there will no longer be any question of the protection of the Catholics in the East by one nation or another." The Cardinal repeated what he has already said in his note, that the Holy See would be glad to know the result of the discussion between the two Governments as to what had been settled at San Remo.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.



[E 3290/5/44]

No. 68.

*Minutes of the Second Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay at 10-30 A.M., March 23, 1922.—(Received at Foreign Office, March 27.)*

## Present :

For France	...	...	M. Poincaré.
			M. de Perretti de la Rocca.
			M. Bargeton.
For Great Britain	...	...	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.
			Mr. R. G. Vansittart.
			Mr. E. G. Forbes Adam.
For Italy	...	...	Signor Schanzer.
			Marquis Visconti-Venosta.
			Signor Guariglia.

Interpreter, M. Camerlynck.

*Armistice.*

M. Poincaré read a telegram from General Pellé, which seemed to show that if Lord Curzon's proposal aimed at an armistice on the basis of the *status quo*, the existing situation was much more favourable for the Turks than for the Greeks. It would be better for the Allies to delay the evacuation of Asia Minor, and have time to make the necessary arrangements.

*Evacuation of Asia Minor.*

M. Poincaré said that this telegram did not change the situation; General Gouraud's views were the same as those of General Pellé. M. Poincaré suggested telling the press that the Foreign Ministers had instructed their military authorities to examine the necessary preparations for the evacuation of Asia Minor, and that such evacuation formed part of their programme. They wanted to get the Turks to accept an armistice and peace. If they failed to secure peace, the three countries would be in great difficulties, as the whole question of Islam in Morocco and India would be involved. Even in Morocco the Sultan had a real respect and religious deference for the Sultan of Constantinople. The mere fact of the signature of the Agreement of Angora had had the best effect; as Lord Curzon was aware, he (M. Poincaré) regretted the form of that agreement, but such was the fact. It would be a real disaster for each of the three Powers with such large Moslem interests if they failed to bring the Turks to accept peace.

It was accordingly essential, as General Pellé said, to obtain the acceptance of the armistice by the Turks, and therefore to show that the Allies were preparing for evacuation by the Greeks at once.

Lord Curzon said that General Pellé's telegram was sent in ignorance of the conditions attached to the proposed armistice. A reference to evacuation had been inserted, and therefore the telegram need cause them no alarm. M. Poincaré had spoken of the possibility of a Turkish refusal and of the ill-effects of a failure to make peace. That was true, but we should look at the time-table. Telegrams had been sent to Athens and Constantinople, and from the latter a telegram would go to Angora; consultation with the National Assembly would follow. Assuming that the Foreign Ministers reached an agreement at Paris and invited the Greeks and Turks to consider the Allied proposals at Constantinople, one of two things must happen. If the Turks favoured the Allied proposals, they would not refuse an armistice; if they did refuse an armistice and the Allied proposals, they would be placed in an entirely false position before public opinion everywhere, despite the question of Islam. He (Lord Curzon) therefore did not feel alarmed. M. Poincaré had said rightly that we must give our policy a chance of success. He (Lord Curzon) saw no objection to M. Poincaré's proposal to let the press know that the military authorities were considering a plan prepared by the Allied generals at Constantinople for the progressive and peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks, if evacuation were recommended by the Allied Powers. He would not tell them any more. He



wished to make one further observation. The British Empire was just as much interested in the Islamic world as France. We had to pay attention to the views held in India just as M. Poincaré had to do in the case of Morocco. It was necessary to avoid giving the impression that one Power was more interested than another in Islam. M. Poincaré had referred to the Sultan of Morocco and the Angora Agreement. He (Lord Curzon) had heard from many quarters that French officials in Morocco took credit for special friendship for Islam by reason of the Angora Agreement. This was a great mistake. He (Lord Curzon) had no intention of trying to gain credit for special consideration for Turk or Greek, Moslem or Christian.

*Signor Schanzer* agreed to the proposed communication to the press.

*M. Poincaré* thanked Lord Curzon and *Signor Schanzer*. He added that he wished to emphasise that the Allies were solid and united. He only referred to Morocco because he did not think it was for him to refer to India. As to the alleged action of French officials in Morocco, it was surely only a case of independence and excess of zeal on the part of their agents. Lord Curzon knew how difficult it was to control subordinate agents. In any case, it was in the general interest to preserve calm and order in all the Islamic world, which the Bolsheviks were seeking to trouble, even, for instance, in Tunis. It was, therefore, a vital interest of each Empire to do what they could for the Moslem world. He thanked his colleagues for agreeing to the proposed communication to the press, which should exercise a restraining influence on the Turkish extremists.

*Lord Curzon* proposed the following wording:—

"The military authorities, under the presidency of Marshal Foch, have been invited to-day to consider the conditions for the peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor, in the event of this evacuation being decided upon by the Conference at Paris as part of the general settlement, on the lines prepared by the military advisers in Constantinople."

*M. Poincaré* thought this went too far.

*Lord Curzon* said that at that table they could only agree to the evacuation as part of a general regulation of outstanding questions.

*M. Poincaré* agreed that this went without saying, but it might be supposed that the evacuation was not necessarily to be part of the general settlement. He suggested the words "as part of the general settlement to come." The formula might run: "Les trois Ministres des Affaires Étrangères ont chargé les experts militaires, sous la direction du Maréchal Foch, d'examiner sur la base du plan déjà préparé par les généraux à Constantinople les conditions de l'évacuation pacifique d'Asie Mineure, comme faisant partie du règlement général de l'Asie Mineure à intervenir."

*Lord Curzon* did not like the words "comme faisant partie," and suggested "on the presumption that this will be a feature of the general settlement." He was only anxious not to consent to evacuation by itself; we did not want to increase the chance of the Turks refusing the general terms of peace because evacuation was certain.

*Signor Schanzer* suggested "contemplated as forming part of the general settlement."

*Lord Curzon* suggested that the drafting of the communication should be left until the end.

*M. Poincaré* said that it was not a question of drafting. France would accept no agreement without the evacuation of Asia Minor.

*Lord Curzon* pointed out that *M. Poincaré* went further than this; his formula suggested that the Turks would obtain the evacuation of Asia Minor in any case, apart from the general settlement; they could reject certain points and still get evacuation. He suggested "subject to the acceptance of the other conditions of the general settlement under consideration," instead of "as forming part of the conditions, &c."

It was finally agreed that the formula should run as follows:—

"The three Ministers for Foreign Affairs have invited the military experts, under the presidency of Marshal Foch, to consider, on the basis of the plan already prepared by the military commanders at Constantinople, the conditions for the peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor, subject to the acceptance of the other conditions of the general settlement in course of preparation."

#### Minorities.

*Lord Curzon* then said that yesterday they had discussed the question of the district and town of Smyrna, and agreed to subordinate it to the general settlement of the question of minorities. The Armenian question ought to be reserved for such special treatment as might be found necessary, but it was of course included as well in the general question of minorities. The first question was whether Turkish law really provided for minority representation. In the existing vilayet law there was provision for the representation of local elements, but not for any proportional representation of religious communities or racial minorities. There were thus no safeguards. Again, there were the old provisions in Turkish law for extending ecclesiastical and educational privileges to non-Moslem communities. These provisions were in abeyance during the war, if not abolished altogether in the case of the Armenians. The Treaty of Sèvres restored these privileges, and we ought to insist on this.

Before passing on he would like to remind his colleagues of the extent to which the intervention of the Allies in the present case was necessary. The Turks, when faced with evidence of massacres, took up an attitude of innocence, and maintained that these events were due to acts of hostility or insolence on the part of the victims. This was not the case. He recalled the French evacuation of the outskirts of Cilicia, the massacres of Armenians at Marash and Hajin, of the Greeks at Isnik, of Armenians again at Zeitun and Marsivan and the massacre of Armenian refugees from the Caucasus. Again, Colonel Rawlinson, who had been kept in confinement by the Kemalists for a year and a half, saw with his own eyes on his return journey wholesale deportations of Greeks, the outrage of women and children, and men dying of starvation and exposure. The old Turkish plan of massacre and deportation to get rid of minorities was still in full operation. This was a moral responsibility on all the Allies, and public opinion would not tolerate that they should not try to secure serious and, so far as possible, adequate protection for these unhappy minorities. *Lord Curzon* quoted *Signor Tutozzi's* opinion, given to Sir H. Rumbold after visiting Angora, as to the attitude of the Turks, and their policy of extermination as the only solution of the minorities problem. He referred to the necessity, which was realised when framing the Treaty of Sèvres, of inserting special provisions differing from those of the European Minority Treaties. Article 141 provided for the recovery of persons who had been forcibly converted to Islam. Articles 142 and 144 brought in the League of Nations, and provided for arbitral commissions, composed of one Turk, one representative of the victim's community, and a neutral chairman; and finally, in article 151 it was decided that the Allies and the League should decide what provisions were necessary to execute the minorities provisions. In London in 1921 he, *Lord Curzon*, had also proposed a larger intervention of the League and a special High Commissioner at Constantinople; this proposal had been opposed by *M. Cambon* and *Marquis Imperiali*, and was consequently dropped at the time. But a Commissioner at Constantinople had since been appointed, and a resolution was passed by the Council of the League on the 14th January, 1922, drawing the attention of the Principal Allied Powers to the urgent need of securing the protection of minorities, and expressing the readiness of the Council to collaborate with the Powers in securing this object. He, *Lord Curzon*, would propose to maintain the provisions in this respect of the Treaty of Sèvres and even to go further: he would ask the League to appoint commissioners to visit places where the problem was acute, *e.g.*, Smyrna, Pontus, Angora and Cilicia. He would propose that these Commissioners' powers of supervision should extend to non-Turkish Moslems in Turkey, *e.g.*, Kurds, and to Moslems in detached territories such as Western Thrace. He would not dogmatise about the position or pay of the commissioners—there would be difficult questions in connection with the expenses of maintenance, for the League could hardly defray the cost, and even if it were imposed on Turkey by the Treaty of Peace, it might prove impossible to recover the charge. The best plan, however, would be to invite the Council of the League to appoint individual representatives



to visit or reside in the various localities, where they could associate themselves with prominent local persons, such as the representatives of the Powers, merchants and missionaries, and look after the interests of minorities either continuously or from time to time. These gentlemen would be under the High Commissioner at Constantinople, who had already been appointed, but their reports should be sent direct to the Assembly of the League for its annual consideration, and thus brought before the public opinion of the world. Speaking broadly, his propositions might be summed as follows:—

1. Reassertion of all privileges and guarantees which already find a place in the European Minorities Treaties, the law of Islam, the secular law of Turkey, or the Treaty of Sèvres.
2. The League of Nations to be constituted the special protector of Moslem minorities in Europe and non-Turkish minorities in Turkey.
3. League Commissioners for certain areas.
4. Reports of these League Commissioners to be sent annually to the Assembly of the League.

*Signor Schanzer* said that he shared Lord Curzon's views. It was important that they should show that they interested themselves in the minorities; it was impossible to find real guarantees, and if there was a recurrence of massacres, they would bear a great responsibility. He was in agreement with the general lines of Lord Curzon's proposals, but felt certain doubts as to particular articles of the Treaty of Sèvres, e.g., article 142, which dealt with conversions to Islam; it was not desirable to increase feeling between the minorities. He felt some doubts as to the number of the Commissioners, but this was more a question of detail; in principle, he accepted Lord Curzon's idea of bringing in the League as much as possible. He thought that Commissioners were preferable to Commissions on the ground of cost, which from his experience he regarded as a very important consideration. The mechanism, however, must not be too elaborate, and there must not be too much interference with the Turkish Government. He agreed with the idea of annual reports, which was the most suitable method of interesting the public opinion of the world.

*M. Poincaré* associated himself with the views of Lord Curzon and *Signor Schanzer* as to the necessity of protecting the minorities against the recurrence of massacres, but said that the Greeks had also been at fault. It was true that it had been thought necessary to insert more stringent provisions in the Treaty of Sèvres than in the minority clauses of the other treaties. The great difficulty was, however, to impose anything on the Turks, whose views were known. It would therefore be better first to seek a basis in the European treaties, and then to have recourse to the Treaty of Sèvres.

The Powers had before the war a special position entitling them to look after the minorities in Greece. In 1920 they had abandoned that position, and it had been replaced by the Greek Minority Treaty of the 10th August, 1920, article 1 of which made the protection of minorities a fundamental law of Greece. *M. Poincaré* then read the Greek minority treaty, substituting throughout the word "Turkey" for "Greece."

If the Allies proposed conditions like those in article 141 of the Treaty of Sèvres, they must modify the terms. They were in a difficulty. Mistake after mistake had been committed. They had negotiated too theoretically with Turkey. They were not in a position to apply the terms of the clauses in question. They had not the force to impose any terms they pleased, as they had had in the case of the other treaties. They could not to-day impose terms which it had been impossible to enforce even in 1921. They must face realities. They could not resuscitate the Treaty of Sèvres. They must not give the Angora nationalists the impression that they were to be treated as savages; they must treat them like the inhabitants of an European country.

*Lord Curzon* said that *M. Poincaré* had said very hard things about the Treaty of Sèvres. He would remind them that the present President of the French Republic, *M. Millerand*, shared the responsibility for it. *M. Poincaré* looked at the matter almost entirely from the point of view of the Turks. He had said with much force that the Allies must offer such terms as the Turks would accept. It was said that the Turks ought to be treated like European nations, that this would flatter them, and secure their adhesion to the Allied proposals. To assume such an

attitude, however, was to ignore facts. While the Greeks had been guilty of misdeeds, it was, broadly speaking, true that the Turks had stood for barbarity and savagery for sixty years. It was impossible after past experience to mete out exactly similar treatment to Turks and Europeans. They must, of course, omit from the Treaty of Sèvres clauses that were obsolete or that were needlessly and exasperatingly severe. Articles 142 and 144, for instance, as *Signor Schanzer* had justly pointed out, were now impossible to apply, however possible it might have been to enforce them two years ago. He, *Lord Curzon*, did not desire to commit himself to particulars in regard to proposals for the reassertion of particular guarantees.

*M. Poincaré* had read the excellent clauses of the Greek Minority Treaty. In that treaty, however, the only guarantee for execution was a vague reference to the League of Nations. Turkey was, however, on a different footing. It would be useless merely to substitute the name of Turkey for that of Greece in the Greek Minority Treaty. Much more was required, and this could be found in the framework of a long series of treaties dating from that of Berlin.

For the present, what they had to do was to agree upon broad principles, though they might approach them from a different angle of vision. Later on, a committee of experts might sit as in London in 1920, and might elaborate more detailed clauses for the execution of the general declaration now to be made.

*M. Poincaré* thought there was least agreement about the Treaty of Sèvres. It was not a treaty at all. It was merely a draft, which had been signed, but not ratified. No French Government could uphold the Treaty of Sèvres. The Turkish treaty was at the time relegated to the second rank and was prepared in London under the auspices of the British Government. The French Government in Paris did not know who had made it. Each Power was compelled to make a treaty which would be accepted by its Parliament. French opinion, at any rate, desired that the minorities should be protected effectively, but it wished for something feasible. France would not send a ship or a military force. *Lord Curzon* had said that he, *M. Poincaré*, was thinking of expediency, not justice. This was not so. He only aimed at such justice as was practicable. He merely suggested that they should take the minority clauses of European treaties as a starting point, and elaborate them in detail for Turkey in a practical manner, and one which would permit of application. They might elaborate the League of Nations guarantee, which was vague. Bulgaria and Greece, however, should offer the same guarantees as Turkey. The Powers should arrange for general reciprocity, though he wished to make reservations as to the methods proposed by *Lord Curzon*, which were too cumbersome.

*Lord Curzon* said he wished to add one last word about the Treaty of Sèvres. It was not drawn up by irresponsible people sitting under his, *Lord Curzon's*, presidency in London. France had been represented by her Ambassador and by *M. Berthelot*. Further, the treaty had been gone through and revised line by line and almost word by word at San Remo in the presence of *M. Berthelot* himself. It was not sufficient to leave the League of Nations to work out the guarantees. The conference must make some suggestion to it, and this was the object of his proposal.

*Signor Schanzer* thought that the points of view must be brought closer together before a resolution was put. It was true that the Turks were not on the same level as the European Governments. While he wondered whether they could limit themselves to the European minority clauses, Italian public opinion might accept that with difficulty. He thought there were certain clauses in the Treaty of Sèvres which should be retained. It would be possible to take the Greek treaty and add to it some articles of a temporary character, subject to revision.

*Lord Curzon* offered to prepare a formula, to give effect to his proposals and to submit it in the afternoon.

(At this point the conference adjourned for luncheon.)



*Minutes of the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay, at 3 P.M., March 23, 1922.—(Received at Foreign Office, March 30.)*

## Present:

For France ...	...	M. Poincaré.
		M. Perretti de la Rocca.
For Great Britain ...	...	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.
		Mr. R. G. Vansittart.
		Mr. E. G. Forbes Adam.
For Italy ...	...	Signor Schanzer.
		Marquis Visconti-Venosta.
		Signor Guariglia.

Interpreter, M. Camerlynck.

Lord Curzon said he had drawn up a formula in which he had done his best to meet M. Poincaré's point as to reciprocity as regards minorities in Turkey and Greece respectively. The formula sought to establish the League of Nations' supervision impartially on this basis.

The formula (see Annex I to these minutes) was then read.

Signor Schanzer suggested the addition of the words "by the Powers" after "approved" in article 3. He thought the proposals generally acceptable.

M. Poincaré thought the proposal acceptable to France. The only question was whether it would be acceptable to Turkey and Greece. The Turks were much puffed up, and the Powers could not impose terms on them by force. The more they accentuated their requirements, the greater would their difficulties be. If they did not succeed in their object, they would be all three in a very bad position. It would be difficult, after a refusal of their proposals, to find means to impose them. Taking the articles in detail, M. Poincaré said that the first was satisfactory. He disliked the reference to the Treaty of Sèvres in the second clause.

Lord Curzon said that it must be remembered that the Treaty of Sèvres had been signed by Turkey as well as by the Powers. M. Poincaré's argument was in favour of giving way at every point to the Turks. The latter had always said that they were prepared to give any reasonable guarantee required to safeguard the minorities. If the Powers could devise such guarantees, it seemed in the highest degree improbable that the Turks, after securing the evacuation of Asia Minor and other big concessions, would break away over minorities. He submitted that there was nothing in his formula which could offend anybody. The Powers had not surely reached a point where they could not mention the Treaty of Sèvres. It was quite possible that the minority clauses of that treaty might need to be modified, but much of them was in the minority clauses of the European treaties, which Turkey had already accepted in principle. The Treaty of Sèvres was in existence and they had to revise it. There was really no harm in saying that it was part of the duty of the conference to study the Treaty of Sèvres.

Signor Schanzer suggested that perhaps a general reference might be made to the "different treaties" instead of special reference to the Treaty of Sèvres.

M. Poincaré said that that was what he desired. He feared the action of the extremists at Angora if weapons were placed in their hands. To avoid this he would propose to accept Signor Schanzer's proposal.

Lord Curzon suggested that, to meet M. Poincaré and to avoid the difficulty arising from the non-ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres, reference might be made to the "various treaties which have been drawn up since the Armistice," and (c) could then be suppressed.

M. Poincaré accepted articles 3 and 4. In article 5 he suggested that they should specify the "Governments concerned" and say "the Governments of Greece and Turkey."

This was agreed.

Lord Curzon said he would prefer to modify his own draft by substituting the words "after consultation with" for the words "with the consent of," and to insert this phrase after the words "will be invited to appoint." Both Governments could then give their opinions but not veto the appointment.

M. Poincaré asked, with reference to article 6, who would draw the attention of the League to the matter.

Lord Curzon suggested that a formula should be found for this in the treaty on the lines of other minority treaties.

M. Poincaré feared that the specification of areas might have a bad effect. Moreover, some minorities would be omitted, e.g., the Assyrian Chaldeans in the south-eastern vilayets. If, on the other hand, the south-eastern vilayets were mentioned as well as the eastern, too large an area would be specified.

Lord Curzon urged that these articles were the main protection offered to the Greeks. The bulk of the Treaty of Sèvres was to disappear. The population of Pontus and Smyrna would regard themselves as deserted.

M. Poincaré seemed to regard too exclusively the Turkish point of view. If one had not the courage to describe the areas where the population were to be protected, what safeguard would there be? There was no more offence in mentioning districts in Asia Minor than in Thrace, which the Turks would wish to have mentioned, at any rate Western Thrace, which, it was already agreed, was not to be returned to Turkey. But Lord Curzon would willingly specify the area where the Assyrian Chaldeans were.

M. Poincaré feared the effect of mentioning nearly the whole of Asia Minor, and added that, by reference to Thrace, Turkey would know that she was to lose it.

Lord Curzon could not agree with M. Poincaré. Surely it was better to specify areas than to suggest that the commissions should roam all over Asia Minor. There were minorities everywhere. His proposal was less offensive to the Turks. As regards the mention of Thrace, he did not wish to prejudice or anticipate a decision. They were not going to publish or mention these formulæ until the terms were ready to be handed to the Greeks and Turks. If they decided to give back the whole or part of Eastern Thrace they could specify the area to be affected, or they could mention Western Thrace only.

Signor Schanzer suggested that article 5 was sufficient of itself without mentioning areas. Indeed, Allied liberty of action might be limited thereby.

M. Poincaré agreed. Again, what was to be said regarding Salonica?

Lord Curzon could not share his colleagues' views. Attention must be drawn to such important areas. The word "specially" meant simply "notamment" in French. He would ask his colleagues, as Christians, to agree that they were charged with a duty to the Christian minorities. He was overwhelmed with petitions from everywhere. When a special régime was mentioned for Smyrna, M. Poincaré had said he thought that the minority clauses were the proper place for safeguards for Smyrna. He now wanted to drop all mention of Smyrna. In this case, Lord Curzon would be forced to return to the proposal of a special régime for Smyrna. He did not wish to do this.

M. Poincaré suggested that experts could specify the places. It was not necessary to mention them in a preliminary communication to the Greeks and Turks.

Lord Curzon urged that it really was necessary. It was not proposed that the formula should be given to the press, but should merely be included in the general proposal to be made to the Turks and Greeks. They were going to propose preliminary terms to Turkey and Greece, who would have to accept or refuse. If the former accepted, they could say later that they had not expected such and such an area to be affected.

M. Poincaré suggested that it would be advisable to refer such a resolution as this for elaboration by experts here in Paris.

Lord Curzon thought that the appropriate course was to draw up general formulæ here. The experts would then have to elaborate them at Constantinople.

M. Poincaré said that that was not his point. He was suggesting that it would be better to refer these formulæ to the experts here in Paris.



Lord Curzon said he saw no reason for referring his general formulæ to experts. There was no doubt as to the presence of minorities in the areas specified.

M. Poincaré asked why Salonica and the Aegean Islands could not be included.

Signor Schanzer pointed out that other areas were not excluded by the words of article 6, which only spoke of attention being "specially" drawn.

Lord Curzon pointed out that there could be no parity between Asia Minor and Greece, where the Moslem minority was relatively very small compared with the Christian minorities in Asia Minor.

It was finally agreed to add "Thessaly" after "Thrace."

The formula was then agreed to subject to these corrections (see Annex 2).

Lord Curzon then referred to the question of Armenia. What the Allies must have in mind were the pledges they had given in differing degrees and forms at various times during and since the war. There was also public opinion in America to be considered, where large sections took a deep interest in the Armenian question and, indeed, in the whole question of the Christian minorities in Turkey. He would recall especially to M. Poincaré an Allied conference at which he thought M. Ribot or M. Briand had been present during the war in 1917 to draw up the statement of the Allies' peace terms, among which had been included an independent or autonomous Armenian State. Further, he would remind the conference of the attempt made to find a mandatory for Armenia after the war was over. The Council and Assembly of the League had failed to find any country willing to assume this obligation, just as the Supreme Council had failed. Then the Treaty of Sévres had been drafted, and provided for an independent Armenian State to include territory from the eastern vilayets of Turkey. President Wilson, as an arbitrator, had sketched out the frontiers of this State in the eastern vilayets in the autumn of 1920. The next phase was the London Conference in March 1921, at which the general proposals put forward to the Turks and Greeks had included a provision that territory should be assigned for a national home for Armenians on the eastern frontier of Turkey, the boundaries of which were to be fixed by a special commission appointed by the League of Nations to examine the territory. The pledges given in the case of Armenia had indeed been very serious. Particular reference should be made to the obligations incurred by France and Italy in respect to the special protection of the minorities in their zones under the Tripartite Agreement. In particular, the French Government had, in raising the Légion d'Orient, given some general assurance of their particular regard for the future independence of Armenia.

M. Poincaré would recall that when France evacuated Cilicia under the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement she endeavoured to satisfy her obligations towards the minorities by taking special guarantees from the Turks. So unsatisfactory were these guarantees, however, that the refugees poured out of Cilicia with the retiring troops in order to escape the Kemalist terror, and went to Cyprus and the Syrian ports. There was, of course, another centre than Cilicia where a more compact mass of Armenians was to be found, namely, the State of Russian Armenia. This State was, in fact, now the sovietised republic of Erivan, which, by the Treaty of Kars of 1921, had been restricted to a small territory round the town of that name. It was full of refugees from Turkey who had poured in during the war; a recent telegram spoke of a population of some million and a-half, including 400,000 Turkish refugees. In seeing Yussuf Kemal recently, Lord Curzon had reminded him that, when the question of assigning Turkish territory to an Armenian State had been raised in March 1921 with Bekir Sami, the latter, while admitting that he had no mandate to agree to a solution, was in no way surprised at the proposal, and had promised to recommend it to his Government. Yussuf Kemal seemed less amenable than Bekir Sami, but it was surely a better solution that the Armenians should leave Turkey rather than be massacred, and, if so, it might be preferable to increase the independent Armenian State by some addition of Turkish territory in order to hold a larger population. This was a matter for consideration.

A second centre with a large Armenian population before the war to which a great number of Armenians wished to return was Cilicia. Impartial American pre-war figures had given a minority of about 200,000 Christians, mostly Armenians, for this area. But since the war, and particularly since the evacuation of French troops, this number had been reduced to a few thousands. France had special obligations towards this Christian population, not only because of the Tripartite Agreement, but

owing to her position in Syria, and the assurances of a more formal nature given by her to the Armenians during the war. Surely it was worth while, and in accordance with all Allied obligations, that some special régime should be established here. Turkish sovereignty could be preserved, and the governor might perhaps be appointed in consultation with the League of Nations. The area could be specified later; he would suggest that it might be the vilayet of Adana, with or without the sanjak of Marash, or a small area round the sanjak of Mersina. To this centre France and Great Britain could send any Armenian refugees still on their territories. The rich Armenian communities scattered through the world might well find money for the development of the territory, and make this small Armenian community prosperous and a source of strength. If the idea of an extended Armenian State in the north-eastern corner of Turkey could not be followed up in the present political situation in that area, the Allies should at least endeavour to satisfy their consciences and arrive at an equitable solution by trying to create a special "foyer" for the Armenian race in southern Turkey.

M. Poincaré admitted that Lord Curzon's historical résumé had been rigorously correct, although he could not admit that French obligations were quite so specific as Lord Curzon had suggested.

The practical question now, however, was where were the Armenians really to be found? After the French evacuation of Cilicia not more than a few thousands had remained. It was useless, therefore, to endeavour to do anything for them in this direction. It might be possible, however, to create a national home for them in the eastern vilayets, where they appeared to be more numerous. M. Perretti de la Rocca had information showing that there were some 100,000 Armenians still in these vilayets.

Lord Curzon intervened to remark that Yussuf Kemal had not admitted to him the existence of any such minority at this moment in this territory.

M. Poincaré thought that, so far as Cilicia was concerned, it would be better to leave the Armenian refugees in their present position in the zone round Alexandretta and Aleppo under the French mandate. M. Franklin-Bouillon had tried hard to keep the frontier of Syria more to the north, with a view to include the large territory where the Armenians could settle, but he had failed in his endeavour. Turkey would never now give back Cilicia to the Armenians, if only because of the wealth of this territory. Indeed France, in abandoning so rich a country, had made great sacrifices, in spite of what Signor Schanzer had said the day before. For the rest, M. Poincaré was doubtful whether in fact the Armenians themselves were now looking to Cilicia; he thought that they were more interested in the future of the Erivan State. There remained, however, the question of a national home in the eastern vilayets to be explored.

Signor Schanzer said that he thought it would be difficult after the Treaty of Kars to do anything for the Armenians in the north-eastern corner of Turkey. Nevertheless, the Allied Powers could not abandon the idea of doing something for the Armenians. The question must be further studied. Perhaps in some way the interest and help of the League of Nations might be specifically enlisted for this object. The question should in any case not be closed. When the Russian Government changed it might be possible to treat with the new Government with regard to assisting the Armenians in the north of Turkey.

Lord Curzon felt that M. Poincaré only offered them counsels of despair. M. Poincaré had spoken of the territories where the Armenians were now to be found. Surely that was not a fair test. If this argument were adopted a wholesale expulsion of a large population from a country would put an end for ever to its claim for the recovery of its home. Some 700,000 Turkish Armenian refugees had fled to Russian Armenia during the war. If M. Perretti's estimate of the Armenians now in the eastern vilayets had come from M. Franklin-Bouillon, Lord Curzon doubted the accuracy of the estimate. M. Franklin-Bouillon had been a kind of prisoner at Angora, and had never been in a position to estimate the populations further east. If out of this poor remnant of Armenians in the eastern vilayets the Allies were now solemnly to propose a new State, subject to the whims of Mustapha Kemal, the proposal would be greeted with public derision. There remained the alternative of doing something in Cilicia. M. Poincaré had used the argument that, as France had failed to obtain fair terms for the Armenians in their negotiations with the Kemalists last year, it was not now possible for the Allies to succeed in the same endeavour. Lord Curzon had understood, however, from



M. Briand that the real reason for the departure of the French troops from Cilicia was not the pressure of the Kemalist army, but the expense of maintaining some 80,000 troops in this area. M. Briand had admitted to him that they could not obtain the necessary credits from the Chamber. The whole position was surely now different. The Great Powers were now jointly proposing terms of peace to the enemy, of which the case of Cilicia was only one. There might actually be only 2,000 or 3,000 Armenians in Cilicia now, but the 80,000 Armenian refugees scattered over Syria, at Alexandretta, Beyrout and elsewhere, should also be included in the calculation. Signor Schanzer had been right in saying that the Allies had an obligation to try and restore these people to their homes in Cilicia. M. Poincaré had spoken of the wealth of Cilicia as a reason for the Turks refusing to restore it. He thought that was equally a reason for allowing the Armenians to return and enabling them to use their very great capacities for increasing the richness of the soil. The Allies might fail, but it would be glorious to fail in trying to do something for the Armenians. Mustapha Kemal might refuse the Allied proposal as regards Cilicia, but, if he did, the Allies would at least have done their best and endeavoured to meet their obligations honourably. Whatever proposal was put forward should be made as palatable as possible to Turkey and some responsibility should be given to the League of Nations. As for M. Poincaré's suggestion that the Armenians did not wish to return, Lord Curzon's information from the spokesmen of the large Armenian communities in England, who had perhaps come to regard England as their special protector, was quite to the contrary.

M. Poincaré said he wished to state that France had done her best to keep intact the Sèvres frontier and thus keep under her mandate part of the Cilician plain for the Armenians. M. Briand had sent strict injunctions to M. Franklin-Bouillon, who had done his very best to persuade the Turks to agree. M. Bouillon had failed. The Turks declared that they were now in a different position to that of 1918; a new State had been formed with new aspirations, and they could not cede an integral part—and one of the richest parts—of their country. Lord Curzon had spoken of the three Allies united being able to do more than France alone, but for Turkey the only real question was the actual force on the spot. Neither Italy, nor Great Britain, nor France could send troops to Syria. The three Foreign Ministers could not, by willing it, restore the Armenians to Cilicia. The Turks, if the Allies put forward the proposal, would ask the Allies to come and establish the Armenians in Cilicia themselves. M. Poincaré had not noticed that the Italians had made any suggestion as to establishing the Armenians in the Italian zone. Why should France be required to make this sacrifice of her interests on behalf of the Allies? Why should Cilicia and not another zone elsewhere be selected for the Armenians? If England regarded herself in any way as the protector of the Armenians, why should not England find a refuge for them in her own territories?

Incidentally, M. Poincaré wished to point out that if the League of Nations' commissioners were appointed, as had been proposed, in either the French or the Italian zones under the Tripartite Agreement, it was natural that they should be respectively French or Italian nationals.

Lord Curzon disclaimed any idea of having suggested an Armenian home in Cilicia with a view to prejudice the French interests. Cilicia offered the only alternative for satisfying Armenian aspirations if it was not possible to do anything in the eastern vilayets. He had a letter written from Alexandretta in February which spoke of 20,000 Armenian fugitives there now; something should be done to restore them to their homes.

M. Poincaré had asked him how the Allies could succeed if they had no military force on the spot. Surely the Allies were endeavouring to propose a treaty which would be equitable taken as a whole. Even if none of them could fight in Cilicia, they could try by other means to attain the desired end. For instance, they were going to propose Turkey's entrance into the League of Nations. If the League were given a lead in the matter of Cilicia they could still refuse Turkey's application unless they received in return serious and substantial concessions from Turkey in the matter of Cilicia. The Allies had a grave responsibility before the whole world. Every clause that they were going to put in the treaty was not going to be carried out by the firing of guns. The Allies must endeavour to do their duty by the use of such powers, direct and indirect as they had. It would be well in any case to reflect what was to happen if, say next week, the Allies were to announce their agreed terms and no special mention was made of the Armenians. A formula of some kind must be

found and Lord Curzon would like to try to find one in collaboration with Signor Schanzer, who seemed to share his view.

M. Poincaré said that he too was ready to try to find a formula if he were invited to collaborate; but, as regards Cilicia, France must make every reserve. Why should not the Allies ask the League of Nations to agree to a home in Turkey and leave the choice of the spot to the League? All the Allies were represented on this council.

Lord Curzon said he would like time to consider the matter. He did not himself wish to insist on Cilicia if satisfaction could be found elsewhere.

(The meeting then adjourned for tea.)

#### *Evacuation of Asia Minor.*

On reassembling, Marshal Foch, General Weygand, General Gouraud, General Sir C. Harington, Colonel Heywood and General Marietti were present. The proposals for the evacuation of Asia Minor (see Annex 2) were read by General Weygand.

Lord Curzon expressed satisfaction with them, and was glad that the experts at Paris had found the proposals made by the Allied generals at Constantinople so satisfactory. There was a difficulty in that civil questions and operations had to be decided with Constantinople, while military movements, &c., had to be settled through Angora. He mentioned the point in order that attention might be drawn to this rather difficult question. The same question arose as to the substitution of civil government in the evacuated territory.

M. Poincaré said that, as we approached towards peace, the duality between Angora and Constantinople ought to cease. There was a large measure of agreement between them.

Signor Schanzer raised the question of the incidence of the cost of evacuation. He asked who would bear this expense.

M. Poincaré said that, even if these costs were attributed to the Greeks and the Turks, it would be the Allies who would eventually pay.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the Greeks had, up to a certain date, been carrying out Allied operations, and after that were acting on their own account. So far as these expenses fell on the Allies they would be a charge on Turkey. It would be better to get the evacuation started and to decide the question of payment later. In any case it was perfectly certain that if the costs were attributed to Turkey she would not pay; she never did.

Signor Schanzer asked when the evacuation would begin.

M. Poincaré said that the French Government could not agree to accept the expenses of the evacuation without going to the Chambers. There was a question whether the evacuation should take place after the conclusion of a preliminary peace. If so, it might be possible to put the vote for these expenses and the preliminary peace to the Chambers at the same time.

Lord Curzon said that surely these expenses would be included in the expenses of the occupation of Turkey; these charges were covered by the votes for the cost of the occupation of Turkey, which were to be recovered from Turkey. Officers from Constantinople would be used.

General Gouraud suggested that perhaps Syria could lend officers.

M. Poincaré pointed out to General Gouraud that the Syrian credits were not yet voted. He agreed with Signor Schanzer that it would be better to say that the expenses of the evacuation were to be laid to the charge of the two local Governments.

Lord Curzon suggested that it would be better for the Foreign Ministers to think the matter over and consult their financial experts.

It would be necessary for them all to make declarations to their Parliaments.

The military proposals for the evacuation of Anatolia were then approved, and the military experts then withdrew.



### Minorities.

Lord Curzon wished to refer again to the question of minorities, as to which general agreement had been reached that morning. In addition, there was the question of protection of minorities by a gendarmerie under foreign officers which was generally held to be the most effective form of control. Might not a clause be added to the formula accepted that afternoon as to the principle of placing the gendarmerie under foreign officers?

M. Poincaré thought it useless. The Turks were absolutely *intransigent* on this point. If this point were put forward it would lead to a certain check. Might it not also be rather offensive to the League of Nations? We had invited their intervention, and he, personally, had done it very willingly; the intervention of the League in international affairs should and would grow. He thought the Turks would accept it, and urged Lord Curzon not to press his point.

Lord Curzon thought his point had been misunderstood. He had only spoken of Allied officers attached to the gendarmerie. There were already three or four battalions of gendarmerie with such officers attached, and they were said to be extremely popular. He referred to General Sir Charles Harington's opinion that the Turks welcomed Allied officers organising their gendarmerie. This system was not novel at all; it was already in existence. In Cilicia after the evacuation the French had even proposed a local gendarmerie with French officers, and had assisted them with arms and uniforms. Again, we were proposing, in order to prevent conscription, the recruitment of a large force of gendarmerie representative of all the races with the aid of Allied officers. He did not think the proposal was at all a new one, and in his opinion it would be popular with the Turks.

Signor Schanzer understood that foreign officers were very popular in the gendarmerie. Perhaps since the war, however, this position had changed.

M. Poincaré thought that Lord Curzon and General Harington were very mistaken as to the popularity of the gendarmerie. There had been difficulties in the Straits zone. The British Government had thought that M. Franklin-Bouillon had made a secret agreement about the gendarmerie officers; there were only the public letters, but M. Franklin-Bouillon had been able to ascertain that the Nationalists hated the system of foreign officers in the gendarmerie as savouring of the old régime. They wanted their own control and officers. It was the new Turkish gendarmerie who had kept excellent order during the evacuation of Cilicia. It was possible, however, that this was specially done on that occasion for the sake of effect.

Lord Curzon said that he had made his proposal to make things easier, but as it did not seem acceptable to M. Poincaré, he would not press it in this connection. But he would point out that Colonel Sarrau claimed to be inspector-general of the Turkish gendarmerie in Anatolia. He claimed to be over General Filonneau, the head of the Allied Gendarmerie Commission. He (Lord Curzon) was only too glad to learn that Colonel Sarrau had been making the claim without authority.

M. Poincaré did not accept Lord Curzon's inference as to the situation, but the present question was one of a general system of foreign officers.

Lord Curzon asked what was Colonel Sarrau's position. We had protested against his claim. If there were to be no foreign officers in Asia Minor, what was the colonel's position? Colonel Sarrau calls himself inspector of Ottoman gendarmerie in virtue of an agreement between Paris and Angora.

Signor Schanzer asked the same question.

M. Poincaré thought that this was a question for the three Ministers to settle separately from the general question of peace with Turkey which was now under discussion. The Turks had only accepted French instructors in the gendarmerie schools. He had particularly asked for an explanation from M. Franklin-Bouillon, as he feared that he might have exceeded his instructions and prejudiced the position of France and the Allies.

Lord Curzon pointed out that his reference to Colonel Sarrau was only made in reply to M. Poincaré's remark that no foreign gendarmerie officers would be accepted by the Angora Government.

M. Poincaré said that Colonel Sarrau benefited by an agreement with the Constantinople Government anterior to the present situation. He had not exceeded his

authority; it extended only to the zone under the Turkish Government outside the zone of the Straits.

Lord Curzon asked who had appointed Colonel Sarrau.

M. Poincaré replied that it was the Turkish Government in consequence of an agreement made before the war. In any case it was not a matter for discussion at a conference about the treaty of peace.

### Press Communiqué.

Lord Curzon suggested that the press might be informed that, quite apart from the military arrangements, a considerable time had been spent in discussing clauses for the protection of minorities; an agreement had been reached as to the terms to be proposed in relation to the Greeks and Turks in Asia and Europe, and that there was agreement as to a formula bringing in the League of Nations. The following formula was proposed:—

"The three Foreign Ministers have spent a large part of the afternoon on the consideration of the question of the minorities both in Asia and in Europe, and have arrived at agreement on an *ensemble* of conclusions which will be embodied in the settlement to be proposed to the Turks and Greeks, and in the application of which the League of Nations will be invited to collaborate."

M. Poincaré suggested adding something as to the entry of Turkey into the League.

Lord Curzon suggested that it would be better not to mention this point. It was a matter for the Council and the Assembly of the League. The question of Turkey's fulfilment of the conditions for admission to the League was involved. The Allied Powers had made no such recommendation to the Council about other enemy States, e.g., Bulgaria.

M. Poincaré feared the repercussion on the Turks.

Lord Curzon thought it unnecessary to be so careful about their feelings. We were only concerned in informing the press of our decision.

M. Poincaré feared that there was a real danger lest the Turks, who apparently were already angry about the decision this morning, would be still more difficult after this communiqué. He feared that there was a real danger that the Turks might make war again, and that was why their opinion was more important to the Allies than that of the Greeks.

The above formula was finally approved and the following sentences substituted for the phrase following the word "Greeks":—

"The League of Nations, to which it is thought that the Turks will demand to be admitted as soon as they shall have adhered to the terms of peace, will be invited to collaborate in the application of the measures referred to above."

"The Inter-Allied Military Commission have submitted to the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs, who have approved them, their proposals relative to the evacuation of Asia Minor."

"The three Ministers for Foreign Affairs have opened the discussion of the Armenian question."

(The meeting then adjourned.)

### ANNEX I.

It shall be the duty of the Powers—

1. To secure special guarantees for the protection (a) of the Christian minorities in the Turkish dominions in Asia, (b) of the Moslem minorities in Europe.
2. For this purpose a special study should be made by an inter-Allied committee appointed by the conference of the provisions which are contained: (a) in the minority

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clauses of the European treaties of 1919 and afterwards; (b) in the Turkish law; (c) in the original Treaty of Sèvres.

3. These provisions as finally amended and approved shall be embodied in the articles of the future treaty of peace, and shall be applicable *mutatis mutandis* to all minorities concerned.

4. The League of Nations, to which it is proposed that Turkey will, on the conclusion of peace, be admitted on the same terms as Greece, shall be invited to assume a special responsibility, both for the assurance of these guarantees and for their effective execution.

5. The League of Nations will be invited to appoint, with the consent of the Governments concerned, special commissioners for the supervision of the minority clauses in the new treaty, alike in Europe and in Asia.

6. In Asia Minor the attention of the League will be specially drawn to the need for such commissioners in the following areas: (a) Smyrna; (b) Pontus; (c) Eastern vilayets, (d) Cilicia; and in Europe, Thrace.

7. It shall be the duty of these commissioners, acting under the general supervision of the High Commissioner of the Council of the League at Constantinople, to pay periodic visits to the areas in question, and, in concert with the local authorities, to concert measures for the due protection of minorities, as provided for in the clauses of the treaty.

8. Reports shall be made by these commissioners directly to the Council of the League, and shall be laid before the annual meeting of the Assembly of the League, in order to ensure that the nations who are represented through the assembly shall be in a position to secure the faithful execution of the stipulations to which the League will have given guarantee.

#### ANNEX 2.

It shall be the duty of the Powers:—

1. To secure special guarantees for the protection (a) of the Christian minorities in the Turkish dominions in Asia; (b) of the Moslem minorities in Europe.

2. For this purpose a special study shall be made by an inter-Allied committee appointed by the conference of the provisions which are contained: (a) in the minority clauses of the various treaties which have been drawn up since the armistice; (b) in the Turkish law.

3. These provisions as finally amended and approved by the Powers shall be embodied in the articles of the future treaty of peace and shall be applicable *mutatis mutandis* to all minorities concerned.

4. The League of Nations, to which it is presumed that Turkey will on the conclusion of peace be admitted on the same terms as Greece, shall be invited to assume a special responsibility both for the assurance of these guarantees and for their effective execution.

5. The League of Nations will be invited, after consultation with the Governments of Greece and Turkey, to appoint special commissioners for the supervision of the minority clauses in the new treaty alike in Europe and in Asia.

6. In Asia Minor the attention of the League will be specially drawn to the need for such commissioners in the following areas: (a) Smyrna, (b) Pontus, (c) eastern and south-eastern vilayets, (d) Cilicia; and in Europe, Thessaly and Thrace.

7. It shall be the duty of these commissioners, acting under the general supervision of the High Commissioner of the Council of the League at Constantinople to pay periodic visits to the areas in question, and in concert with the local authorities, to concert measures for the due protection of minorities as provided for in the clauses of the treaty.

8. Reports shall be made by these commissioners directly to the Council of the League and shall be laid before the annual meeting of the Assembly of the League in order to ensure that the nations who are represented through the Assembly shall be in a position to secure the faithful execution of the stipulations to which the League will have given guarantee.

#### Annex 3.

*Mesures à prendre par les Alliés dans l'hypothèse de l'Évacuation de l'Asie Mineure par les Troupes helléniques et de sa Réoccupation par les Troupes turques.*

L'évacuation de l'Asie Mineure par l'armée hellénique est une opération délicate et de longue durée.\*

Pour qu'elle puisse être réalisée sans désordres graves et avec méthode, il est nécessaire:

1. Que les armées hellénique et turque soient réciproquement garanties contre toute reprise, même partielle, des hostilités au cours de leurs mouvements;
2. Que les populations et leurs biens soient garantis contre toutes exactions ou représailles de la part de l'une ou de l'autre des deux armées;
3. Que les opérations soient préparées et réglées suivant un programme général établi à l'avance et dans tous ses détails;
4. Qu'un organe interallié soit chargé d'établir ce programme de concert avec les Hauts-Commandements hellénique et turc, puis d'en diriger et contrôler l'exécution et qu'il soit investi dans ce but, des pouvoirs nécessaires pour régler les incidents qui pourraient se produire à cette occasion.

Le programme envisagé ci-dessus comportera notamment:

1. La réorganisation préalable de l'administration civile du pays et des forces de sécurité locales.
2. Le plan d'évacuation des forces helléniques, réglé par zones successives, en fonction des possibilités de transport, en vue d'éviter toute concentration prématurée des troupes helléniques aux abords des ports d'embarquement.
3. Le plan de réoccupation des forces turques limitant les effectifs destinés à l'occupation de chaque zone, et conjugué avec le plan précédent de manière qu'une bande de terrain libre de troupe soit constamment interposée entre les deux armées pour éviter les contacts.
4. Le plan d'embarquement des forces helléniques.

Pour diriger l'exécution de ce programme général et en assurer le contrôle, l'organe interallié devra disposer des moyens suivants:

Auprès de chacune des deux armées...	Une mission alliée comportant des officiers de contrôle, des hommes de troupe et des moyens de transport et de liaison autom. T.S.F.
Dans la zone à évacuer ...	Une mission alliée destinée, pendant la période envisagée, à participer à la réorganisation et à contrôler l'emploi des forces de sécurité locale, gendarmerie et police.
Dans les ports d'embarquement ...	Forces interalliées destinées à coopérer au maintien de l'ordre et à la police des embarquements. Smyrne: 3 bataillons environ (1 de chaque Puissance). Région Brousse Moudania, Panderma (1½ bataillons).

Des forces navales alliées sous commandement interallié (trois cuirassés ou croiseurs, par exemple), avec quelques bâtiments de patrouille, devront contribuer à la police des opérations en chaque point d'embarquement.

L'ensemble des moyens visés ci-dessus serait à prélever sur les forces militaires et navales dont les Alliés disposent en Orient. Toutefois, un complément d'officiers devra sans doute être fourni par chaque Puissance pour atteindre le total envisagé comme nécessaire (environ 150).

La Commission des Généraux alliés de Constantinople semble qualifiée pour constituer l'organe interallié directeur des évacuations; elle aurait, au moment voulu, à transférer son siège à Smyrne.

\* Cette durée peut être évaluée au minimum de quatre à cinq mois.



C'est à elle qu'incomberait dans ce cas l'étude immédiate et la préparation complète du programme général ci-dessus visé.

De même, la Commission des Amiraux alliés de Constantinople aurait à régler les détails de la coopération navale, d'accord avec la Commission des Généraux.

Si les dispositions qui précèdent étaient adoptées, il y aurait lieu de les notifier pour acceptation aux Gouvernements hellénique et ottoman.

Ces Gouvernements devraient être invités à reconnaître l'autorité de l'organe interallié en matière de direction générale des opérations d'évacuation et à prendre toutes mesures pour que les décisions dudit organe soient strictement exécutées par leurs troupes ou agents de l'Administration civile.

Il y aurait intérêt, à cette occasion, à préciser auxdits Gouvernements :

1. Que les Alliés ne sauraient en aucun cas accepter la responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre lors de l'évacuation, non plus que le contrôle direct de l'Administration civile ;
2. Que, dans chaque zone, ce soin incombera aux autorités grecques jusqu'à l'évacuation ; aux autorités ottomanes, dès le départ des troupes helléniques.

#### ANNEX 4.

Il y a lieu de prévoir que l'évacuation de l'Asie Mineure par les troupes helléniques peut avoir pour conséquence un exode important de la population.

Pour parer aux conséquences de cet exode, des mesures spéciales seraient à prendre :

Ravitaillement.  
Installations matérielles.  
Évacuation éventuelle.\*

L'étude pourrait en être confiée à une commission mixte constituée par les soins de la Commission des Généraux alliés et de la Commission des Amiraux alliés de Constantinople.

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No. 70.

*Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay at 10:30 A.M., March 24, 1922.—(Received at Foreign Office, March 30.)*

#### Present :

For France ...	M. Poincaré. M. de Perretti de la Rocca. M. Bargeton.
For Great Britain ...	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Mr. R. G. Vansittart. Mr. E. G. Forbes Adams.
For Italy ...	Signor Schanzer. Marquess Visconti-Venosta. Signor Guariglia.

Interpreter, M. Camerlynck.

Sir Adam Block and M. des Clozières were present for the financial question.

#### National Home for Armenians.

Lord Curzon recalled that at the last meeting it had been agreed that an opportunity would arise for bringing forward the matter of a national home for the Armenians when the question arose of the admission of Turkey to the League of

\* Cette évacuation semblait devoir être limitée au minimum indispensable.

Nations. What the Allies found at present difficult to achieve, owing to their inability to exert physical force, might then be secured through the influence which the League would be able to bring to bear. He could not accept the responsibility of washing his hands of all concern for the Armenians. The formula which he proposed (see Annex 1) would not, of course, meet their full aspirations. It would be a disillusionment for them, but they had placed their aspirations too high, and had failed to realise the difficulties in the way. His formula was an attempt to discharge the responsibility of the Allies in the only way that was possible, and to hand over the problem of the Armenians to the only body that was likely now to be able to help them effectively.

Signor Schanzer accepted Lord Curzon's proposal.

M. Poincaré considered that the general idea which had been in their minds at yesterday's discussion had been exactly reproduced by Lord Curzon. He thought that in the present circumstances, the only way was to leave it to the League to try and solve this great difficulty. This would meet in the only practical manner to-day the obligation of the Allies. Perhaps, however, the place of the national home should not be specified, but should be left to the League to decide. It was a difficult question, and, moreover, a political question.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the formula particularly did not mention the locality for the home as either Erivan or Kars or Cilicia, but that he had employed a general description. He would, however, be prepared to insert the words "or elsewhere" after the word "Mediterranean," but he would regret to leave the question entirely open.

M. Poincaré replied that the Tripartite Agreement gave France Cilicia as her zone. Both for France and Italy these words were really important politically. The phrase "southerly region" aimed at Cilicia, and the installation of the Armenians in the economic zone of one of the Powers would raise economic questions and cause grave difficulties for that Power.

Lord Curzon said that he regarded the matter from a rather different point of view. He asked himself whether the Armenians could somehow recover the position allotted to them in the eastern vilayets by the Treaty of Sévres, and especially in Cilicia. He would like to recall the past history of the Cilician question. The position was that the British had occupied this area at the end of the war. Later, the French had asked us to evacuate, and in a spirit of loyalty and in spite of the burden and expense which the occupation had cost us, we handed the region over to the French.

Then came the Tripartite Agreement, and we agreed to the French zone with political and financial privileges. In due course the French found themselves forced to abandon Cilicia altogether, and made a separate agreement with Turkey. Whether the French secured concessions there was now no longer dependent upon the treaty, but upon the voluntary action of Turkey, and it was by no means clear that France would recover her position as contemplated by the treaty. Lord Curzon hoped that she would, but if she did she ought also to try and secure something for the Armenians. By the conclusion of the Tripartite Agreement, France obtained a right and an obligation to speak for the Christian population in her zone, and particularly the Armenians, and France would be the stronger in so speaking. Lord Curzon wished particularly, however, not to be drawn into a difficult political discussion, and not to introduce a precise statement in his formula. Nevertheless, it was necessary to say enough in the formula to indicate in general terms where the Armenians were to be made a home. They must state the fact of which they were aware, that the places suitable for such a home were limited in number.

M. Poincaré thought that it was necessary to "ménager" both the Turkish and French interests. It had to be remembered also that French troops were fighting elsewhere when the British were in Cilicia, and he did not wish to discuss the question of which Power did most or distributed its forces best. In any case, events had modified the situation now, and the Powers must keep separate the question of their attitude towards each other in the Tripartite Agreement and their attitude towards the Turks in the Treaty of Sévres. He did not desire, however, to make any modification as regards the obligations and rights of France in her zone.

Lord Curzon intervened to say that he had made no proposal aimed at prejudicing the French position in Cilicia.



M. Poincaré enquired whether some such words as "wherever such a home could be found" could be added after the third paragraph of the formula, and whether the fourth paragraph could then be suppressed.

Signor Schanzer enquired whether the indication which Lord Curzon desired as to the place of the national home had not been given by third paragraph, which really only contemplated two possible places.

Lord Curzon had no objection, in principle, to his proposals being modified. His proposal yesterday, however, that the Allied Governments should arrange in the treaty for a home in the eastern vilayets or in Cilicia, had had to be abandoned, and it was then that he had drawn up the present suggestion as to the League of Nations. He regretted that he had continually to meet proposals for reducing and weakening his own suggestions, and he would therefore deprecate the omission of the fourth paragraph of the formula, but, in deference to what Signor Schanzer and M. Poincaré had said, he would not press his point, and would agree to remove from the fourth paragraph the words from "on the borders" to "Mediterranean."

M. Poincaré expressed his thanks to Lord Curzon. He was occupied by the fear whether or not Turkey would accept the conditions proposed. He did not know what action they should take if the proposals were not accepted. They might be able to make things very difficult for the Turks, but this was doubtful.

The conference accepted the formula as amended (Annex 2).

#### *Evacuation of Anatolia.*

Signor Schanzer read a telegram from the Italian Minister at Athens, who feared that if the Greeks were not permitted to remove units from the front during the whole armistice they might have serious difficulties. The phrase "aucun enlèvement des unités ne peuvent être effectué" in the armistice proposals was too strong. Perhaps the point might be referred to Marshal Foch to explain exactly what the phrase meant.

This was agreed to.

#### *Assyro-Chaldeans.*

M. Poincaré raised the question of the Assyro-Chaldeans. France was interested in them for religious reasons, and Aga Petros had asked France to do something for them. M. Poincaré had told him that England and Italy were equally interested, and would be glad if Lord Curzon and Signor Schanzer would see Aga Petros.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the Assyro-Chaldean question was complicated. There were three or four communities of Assyro-Chaldeans: one in Persia, which left after the murder of Mar Shimun by the Turks, one in Kurdistan (Hakkari), another in Mosul, and one in the Tigris district. It was useless to see the head of one of these sections, as the Aga Petros was, and Lord Curzon enquired whether M. Poincaré would be content with the assurance that Great Britain was equally interested with France in the Assyro-Chaldean question.

M. Poincaré said that he would like to do something, especially for Aga Petros. He wanted to be able to say that he had recommended him and this question to the good offices of Lord Curzon and Signor Schanzer, and, if possible, he would like them to see him.

Lord Curzon and Signor Schanzer said that they would try to arrange this.

#### *Finance.*

Lord Curzon pointed out that the conference would presently, after dealing with Thrace and the Straits, come to the question of finance. The financial experts were in Paris, and he enquired whether it would not be well for them, in the meantime, to consider, not indeed the particular question of article 239 raised by Signor Schanzer, but the general principles of the financial clauses and the future financial administration in Turkey.

M. Poincaré replied that the French experts had their instructions and could begin.

Signor Schanzer pointed out that a political question was raised here. The particular matter which he had brought forward could be taken at once, but the

consideration of the financial clauses generally should be deferred until this question had been dealt with.

M. Poincaré pointed out that the question of the Financial Commission and the Debt Council, &c., was a matter for the experts. They could get together and make general proposals, and the conference could then decide the political question.

Signor Schanzer replied that he would like his question of article 239 taken as soon as possible, but that he would agree to the financial experts beginning their work.

M. Poincaré pointed out that the Italian proposal as regards article 239 raised the question of the rôle and powers of the Financial Commission, and suggested that the experts should give their opinion on this point and on the future of the Debt Council and its relation to the Financial Commission.

Lord Curzon stated that at this stage a discussion was only required of the general principles to be inserted in the proposals to be given to the Turks and Greeks, if possible by Monday next. The experts should avoid entering into the details of the revised Treaty of Sévres.

It was agreed that the financial experts should meet at once and prepare a formula on the above lines.

#### *The Press.*

M. Poincaré referred to the indiscretions of the "Écho de Paris," in which "Pertinax" entered into details of yesterday's discussions about the Armenians and mentioned Lord Curzon's and Signor Schanzer's views as to Cilicia and Erivan. He was enquiring into the matter.

Signor Schanzer said that it was not an Italian indiscretion, and produced official French agency telegrams going into the details of the discussions and the figures and other particulars with regard to the minorities which had been produced by Lord Curzon and M. Poincaré.

Lord Curzon stated that he had no relations with the French press and did not know "Pertinax."

M. Poincaré said that M. Géraud ("Pertinax") was understood to have received information from the British delegation.

Lord Curzon asked whether "Pertinax" could not be summoned to the conference to explain himself.

M. Poincaré said that he had no power to summon him, and that, in any case, journalists refused to disclose their professional secrets.

Lord Curzon pointed out that "Pertinax" had been a continual offender as, for example, at Washington. He hoped that M. Poincaré would do all he could to trace the source of the indiscretion.

M. Basset, of the Havas Agency, then entered.

M. Poincaré asked M. Basset for an explanation of the indiscretion as to the conference discussions about the Armenians.

M. Basset said that he exchanged information with his comrades. There was a pool of information.

M. Poincaré asked him to explain exactly who were his sources of information and their nationality.

M. Basset replied that he could not give precise information on this point. The indiscretion was not a French one, but he could not say more.

M. Poincaré said that if M. Basset did not state where his information was obtained judicial measures might have to be taken.

M. Basset replied that he could not give precise information as to which Allied delegation gave the information.



Lord Curzon pointed out that "Pertinax" had insinuated that he had obtained information from the British Government, and he (Lord Curzon) must press for satisfaction.

M. Poincaré again asked M. Basset for an explanation.

M. Basset replied that he could not give his sources of information; it was a matter of professional secrecy.

(M. Basset then withdrew.)

M. Poincaré said that he would do his best semi-officially to find out what was happening.

Lord Curzon asked whether the judicial enquiry suggested by M. Poincaré could not be pressed. It was doubtful at any rate in English law whether the plea of professional secrecy could be maintained. (There was a recent case where an English doctor was concerned in which a similar position had arisen.) Otherwise, Lord Curzon would have to reserve liberty to publish a full account and to challenge the reproduction of the accusations in the press. M. Basset had practically brought direct charges against the British and Italian delegations and this created an impossible position. If such indiscretions were to be passed unnoticed, how were the Allied discussions to continue?

M. Poincaré agreed generally with Lord Curzon, as he had shown in his cross-examination of M. Basset. He must add, however, that "Pertinax" himself had not been accused of having obtained information from the British or Italian delegations. For the rest, it was not possible for a French judge to obtain professional secrets from journalists. All he could do was to ascertain whether any French administration was at fault. He must remind his colleagues, however, that there were British and Italian journalists here.

Lord Curzon said that he would strongly support all the enquiries which M. Poincaré could make.

(The meeting then adjourned.)

#### ANNEX 1.

##### Armenia.

The three Powers, mindful of the pledges to which they have given public expression on so many occasions to secure some form of autonomous national existence for the Armenian people, and desirous to reconcile the fulfilment of these pledges with the facts of the present situation, make the following proposal:—

It has been decided to invite the League of Nations to assume a special responsibility for the execution of the safeguards which are recommended for the protection of minorities, alike in Europe and in Asia; and it has been presumed that Turkey will, upon the conclusion of peace, be admitted to membership of that body. Such an occasion will, in the opinion of the Powers, furnish the most favourable opportunity for the satisfaction of the claims of the Armenians, who, both in numbers and importance, are in the first rank among these minorities.

The Armenian claims are summed up in the general aspiration that there shall be provided for them in one or other of the areas in Asia Minor, where they have hitherto been found in considerable numbers, a national home.

Whether such a home can preferably be secured on the borders of the eastern vilayets of Turkey in Asia or in the more southerly regions bordering on the Mediterranean depends on conditions—political, economic and social—upon which it is at present impossible definitely to pronounce.

It shall, however, be an object especially commended by the Powers to the League of Nations that they shall at an early date after the conclusion of peace enter into communication with the Turkish Government with a view to the creation of such a national home for the Armenians, and shall endeavour to arrange the conditions under which it may be called into being, and be furnished with adequate guarantees for its future existence.

To this object the three Powers promise every assistance in their power, conscious that the solution by consent of the Armenian problem is equally desirable in the interests of the Armenians, of Turkey and of the peace of the East.

#### ANNEX 2.

##### Armenia.

The three Powers, mindful of the pledges to which they have given public expression on so many occasions, to secure some form of autonomous national existence for the Armenian people, and desirous to reconcile the fulfilment of these pledges with the facts of the present situation, make the following proposal:—

It has been decided to invite the League of Nations to assume a special responsibility for the execution of the safeguards which are recommended for the protection of minorities, alike in Europe and in Asia; and it has been presumed that Turkey will, upon the conclusion of peace, be admitted to membership of that body. Such an occasion will, in the opinion of the Powers, furnish the most favourable opportunity for the satisfaction of the claims of the Armenians, who, both in numbers and importance, are in the first rank among these minorities.

The Armenian claims are summed up in the general aspiration that there shall be provided for them in one or other of the areas in Asia Minor where they have hitherto been found in considerable numbers, a national home.

Where such a home can best be secured depends on conditions, political, economic and social, upon which it is at present impossible definitely to pronounce.

It shall be an object, especially commended by the Powers to the League of Nations, that they shall, at an early date after the conclusion of peace, enter into communication with the Turkish Government with a view to the creation of such a national home for the Armenians, and shall endeavour to arrange the conditions under which it may be called into being, and be furnished with adequate guarantees for its future existence.

To this object the three Powers promise every assistance in their power, conscious that the solution by consent of the Armenian problem is equally desirable in the interests of the Armenians, of Turkey and of the peace of the East.

[E 3340/5/44]

No. 71.

*Pronouncement by the Three Allied Foreign Ministers in Paris, March 27, 1922.—  
(Received in Foreign Office, March 30.)*

(Annex 2 to Minutes of Ninth Meeting.)

THE Foreign Ministers of the Allied Powers, France, Great Britain and Italy, having during five days in succession discussed every aspect of the situation in the Near East, having consulted at each stage the military and financial experts who were summoned for the purpose, and having, further, enjoyed the advantage of communicating beforehand with the representatives both of Turkey and of Greece, have unanimously agreed to the following propositions, which they put forward as the most equitable solution that it is in their power to offer to the Near Eastern problem.

The principles which they have throughout borne in mind, and which are the bases of their proposals, have been:—

1. They desire to re-establish peace between the conflicting armies of Turkey and Greece, but to deal fairly with both parties, and to impose upon neither conditions of discomfiture or defeat.
2. They desire to re-establish the Turkish nation and the Turkish dominion in the areas which may fairly be regarded as their own, with the historic and renowned capital of Constantinople as the centre, and with such powers as may enable them to renew a vigorous and independent national existence.
3. They desire to secure full and fair treatment to the followers of the creed of Islam and to maintain the secular and religious authority of the Sultan of Turkey.
4. They desire to compensate the Greek nation for the great sacrifices which they have accepted during the war in the cause of the Allies, and to leave them free scope for their national and economic progress in the future.
5. They desire to enable both peoples, in regions where they are contiguous or

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where their populations are intermingled, to live in future in conditions of mutual confidence and self-respect.

6. They desire to provide for the protection and security of the various minorities, whether Moslem or Christian, or of other races and creeds who, whether in Europe or Asia, find themselves placed in the midst of larger political or ethnic aggregations.
7. They desire to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict between the Turkish nation and the European Powers with whom it was recently at war.
8. They desire above all in the solution which they propose not to be suspected of partiality to one side or the other, but with firm hands to hold the scales even between the two.

With these ends in view, the first object of the Allied Powers has been to bring about a suspension of hostilities between the confronting armies in Asia Minor, in order to enable the counsels of peace and the prospects of an amicable settlement to prevail. They have therefore proposed the conclusion of an armistice to the Governments of Turkey and Greece, subject to conditions which are scrupulously fair to both parties and which were defined by the military authorities under the presidency of Marshal Foch.

The Hellenic Government has already signified its acceptance of this proposal. The decision of Turkey is awaited.

The proposal of an armistice has been made with the avowed intention of assuring the peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek forces and the restitution of Turkish sovereignty over the whole of that region. The arrangements for this evacuation, as the first step in the general settlement which is now proposed, have simultaneously been elaborated by the military authorities under Marshal Foch, and are capable of being put into execution without delay. It is calculated that the period required for a complete and peaceful withdrawal of the Greek forces will be somewhat over four months.

It will be observed that, in the event of these proposals being accepted by both parties, the recovery of Anatolia by the Turks, which is believed to be their principal national aspiration, will have been attained without any further sacrifice of treasure or life. Correspondingly the retirement of the Greek troops will be effected with honour.

Should this operation be successfully accomplished, the Turkish sovereignty in Asia will exist unimpaired from the Mediterranean to the Straits and the Black Sea, and from the borders of Transcaucasia, Persia and Mesopotamia to the shores of the Ægean.

Accepting the imperative necessity, which is the result both of historical and geographical causes, for the protection of the minorities of alien race or religion who are found, in some cases in large numbers, both in the vilayets of Turkey and in the European possessions of Greece, the Powers have proposed a series of provisions for their full and adequate security, without distinction of race or creed, in both areas. These provisions will be based both upon the stipulations contained in existing treaties or drafts of treaties and in the secular or religious law of the countries concerned. Furthermore, the Powers have decided to invite the League of Nations to collaborate in this object by the appointment of special commissioners to superintend the execution of these provisions in the areas and for the communities who are principally concerned.

The case of the Armenians has called for special consideration by reason of both of the undertakings entered into by the Allied Powers in the course of the war and of the cruel sufferings of that people. Accordingly, the aid of the League of Nations is sought, over and above the protection accorded by the minority provisions to which reference has already been made, in order to obtain for the Armenians the satisfaction of their traditional aspirations for a national home.

The interests of peace and the safety of the future demand that Europe shall never again be exposed to the perils and sacrifices which were imposed upon her in 1914 and the succeeding years by the forcible closure of the Dardanelles. The countless lives that were there poured out, the stupendous efforts that were entailed, must not have been expended in vain. The Turks will be readmitted to the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles under conditions which will provide for the existence of a broad demilitarised zone, in order to obviate the possibility of any hostile military preparations in that quarter. But an Allied force must be placed and must remain in occupation of the Gallipoli peninsula in order to safeguard the free and unimpeded entrance of the Straits. This also will be a demilitarised zone. The Allied garrison will consist of a force sufficient to secure the entrance to the Dardanelles.

The navigation of the Straits will be placed, as already proposed, under the control of an international commission under a Turkish president, on which it is hoped as time passes that all the principal States who are interested in the commerce or navigation of the Straits will be represented.

The demilitarised zone on the Asiatic shore of the Straits will be identical with the existing sanjak of Chanak. No further demilitarisation is proposed on the southern shores of the Marmora, with the exception of the peninsula of Artaki. On the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus the demilitarised zone will be identical with the existing neutral zone. The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, Samothrace and Mitylene, outside the Dardanelles, and all the islands in the Marmora will equally be demilitarised.

Passing to the European shore of the Dardanelles and the Marmora the three Ministers have been confronted with the difficult and anxious problem of the future of Eastern Thrace. On the one hand, they were unable, for the reasons which have already been stated, to accept a solution that would place the Gallipoli peninsula once more in the hands of Turkey. On the other hand, they were met by the complaint that some, at any rate, of the lines of frontier that have hitherto been proposed between the European possessions of Turkey, to the north and west of Constantinople, and the areas in Eastern Thrace in the occupation of the Greeks, afforded insufficient protection to the Turkish capital, which might find itself exposed in the future, either to the military menace of invasion or to the invidious propinquity of a neighbour with whom it had recently been at war.

Such dangers it was obvious would be most effectively removed (a) by the removal to a sufficient distance from Constantinople of the projected frontier; (b) by the effective neutralisation of the areas outside this line. Furthermore, the Ministers were confronted by the incontestable facts of the existing situation. Whether the attribution of Eastern Thrace to the Greeks by the unratified Treaty of Sèvres be or not be held to constitute a valid title, the Greek forces are in effective occupation and the Greek Government is engaged in administering that area, which, moreover, contains and has long contained a considerable and in certain parts a preponderant Greek population. In these circumstances the Ministers were unable to assume the responsibility of requiring from Greece not merely the complete evacuation of Anatolia, to which it must be remembered in passing that Greece was invited in 1919 by the Powers, but the complete evacuation of Eastern Thrace in addition.

Accordingly, bearing in mind the importance of the strategical considerations before referred to, which may be summed up in the desideratum of reasonable security for the capital and the state of Turkey in Europe, the Foreign Ministers of the Powers invited the military authorities to assist them with their expert advice. These authorities recommended the drawing of a line which will run from the neighbourhood of Ganos on the Marmora in a northerly and north-easterly direction to a point on the Bulgarian frontier in the western part of the Stranja mountains. This frontier will leave Rodosto, a Greek town, to the Turks. It will place Baba Eski and Kirk Kilisse on the Greek side of the Turco-Greek frontier. The safety of the frontier is assured by the topographical features of the country, and will be further confirmed by the demilitarisation of almost the entire area of Eastern Thrace both on the Greek and the Turkish sides of the frontier. Thus the Greeks will not be able to threaten Constantinople, and the Turks will not be in a position to attack the Greeks.

The periodical inspection of these and the other demilitarised zones will be undertaken by Allied officers attached to the Allied force on the Gallipoli peninsula, the area of whose occupation will be extended eastwards to Rodosto.

It has been considered whether any special provision should be made for the town of Adrianople, which it has been found impossible to sever from the surrounding territories of Eastern Thrace. Smyrna, which will revert to Turkey, and Adrianople, which will be retained by the Greeks, are in a somewhat analogous position. The Powers will be quite willing to enter into friendly communication with the Turkish and Greek Governments, with a view to the conclusion of a friendly agreement upon conditions which will guarantee a full and fair share to the non-Turkish and the non-Greek elements in the populations in the administration of the two cities, and will further safeguard the religious buildings and institutions of Adrianople.

The three Ministers are not so vain as to suppose that this solution of the Thracian problem will be warmly accepted by either party. The problem admits of no such easy solution. They can only commend it to the public opinion of the world as the proposition which seems to them to be most consistent alike with justice and with the facts of the case.



Passing to Constantinople the three Governments desire to confirm their previously expressed willingness to withdraw altogether the threat that was made at the time of the Treaty of Sèvres to revoke at some future date the retrocession of the capital to the Turks. They confirm the restoration of that city to the full authority of the Government of the Sultan; and they are further willing to engage that the Allied forces, by whom it is at present occupied, shall be altogether withdrawn after the ratification of the future Treaty of Peace.

The Turkish Government will be invited to garrison the city with a larger force than was contemplated in the Treaty of Sèvres.

There remain the questions of the future armed force of the Turkish State, the financial independence which it will enjoy, and the suggested modification or surrender of the capitulatory rights which are enjoyed by foreigners.

Concerning the armed forces of Turkey, the Allied Powers are unable to depart from the principles which it has been found necessary to enforce in the treaties that have been concluded with all the other States recently at war, or to admit the continuance of the system of conscription. They will, however, be prepared to consider with the Turkish Government in an amicable spirit the determination of the period within which the voluntary system of recruiting must be established in that country.

As to the numerical strength of the Turkish forces, it is proposed to allow a very appreciable augmentation of the figures which were contained in the Treaty of Sèvres or were afterwards suggested in London in 1921. The forces now finally proposed are: gendarmerie 45,000, regular army 40,000, or a grand total of 85,000 men, a total which is very markedly in excess of the 50,000 designated in the Treaty of Sèvres.

Should the Turkish Government desire the assistance of foreign officers for the organisation of the above-named force of gendarmerie—a measure which will probably be found to conduce greatly to its efficiency—the Powers will be ready to place them at the disposal of the Turkish Government.

With regard to finance. The financial clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres shall be modified in such a way as to abandon the proposed Financial Commission, while reconciling the principle of Turkish sovereignty with the protection of Allied economic interests and with the amount of control necessary to ensure the payment of Turkish pre-war debts to the Allies and a war indemnity fixed at a sum which Turkey can be reasonably expected to pay. The pre-war Debt Commission shall be maintained and a special Allied Liquidation Commission shall be set up for the above purposes.

In respect of the existing capitulatory system, the three Ministers are anxious to secure to Turkey the largest measure of economic independence consistent with the due protection of the interests of the nationals of their respective countries. For this purpose they are prepared to set up at Constantinople, within three months from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, a commission composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan and of Turkey, to prepare, with the assistance of technical experts representing the other capitulatory Powers, proposals for the revision of the capitulatory régime in fiscal matters.

These proposals shall provide for fiscal equality between foreign and Turkish subjects, while safeguarding the former against excessive taxation and abuses in collection, and for any necessary modification of the customs taxes, with the consent of the Powers concerned.

As regards the Capitulations in judicial matters, the Allied Powers repeat their former offer to set up within the same period a similar commission to prepare a scheme of judicial reform to replace the capitulatory system, which will continue provisionally pending the introduction of the proposed scheme. This commission, on which Turkey will be represented, will be at liberty to recommend either a mixed or a unified judicial system.

Such in broad outline are the main features of the settlement which the Ministers of the three Great Powers, acting on behalf of their Governments, have decided unanimously to recommend. These proposals are now submitted primarily to the judgment of the two parties who are directly involved, but secondarily, and in a not inferior degree, to that of the civilised world. Nor is it necessary to add that the people or the Government by whom they were deliberately rejected, if such a misfortune were to occur, would assume a very grave responsibility before the public opinion of mankind, namely, the responsibility of resuming a struggle which has already wrought sufficient havoc among the peoples of two continents, and the renewal of which can only bring further ruin and destruction in its train, besides leading to a permanent embitterment between the races and creeds of the Near East.

*Near East Conference: Speech by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Lords, March 30, 1922.*

(Full Official Report as revised and approved by Lord Curzon.)

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston:* My Lords, in answering the question which the noble and learned Lord put to me yesterday, and which I asked him to postpone until to-day, I am afraid I may have to place a certain strain upon the patience of your Lordships. But I think you will pardon me in view, on the one hand, of the very great interest which the proceedings in which I recently took part in Paris have excited in all parts of Europe, and, in the second place, because of the very wide extent of ground which it will be my duty to attempt to cover.

The stages by which we have arrived at the present situation in the Near Eastern problem—the recent stages—have been as follows: it was in August 1920 that the Powers signed in Paris the Treaty of Sèvres. That treaty, though signed by all the Powers, including Turkey herself, remained unratified, in the main because of the emergence in Asia Minor of the strong Nationalist movement which is associated with the name of Mustapha Kemal. With a view of terminating the unhappy hostilities still continuing between the Greeks and the Turks, we proposed, and held, a conference in London in March of last year, to which both Greeks and Turks were invited; and to them the Powers there represented made offers with a view to the conclusion of peace. Those offers were, unhappily, not accepted by the two parties concerned, or where they were accepted by one they were rejected by the other.

The next stage occurred in June of last year, when I went to Paris to hold a meeting with representatives of France and Italy, and when we agreed formally to offer mediation to the two belligerent countries. Again, I am sorry to say, our efforts proved futile, the Greek Government at that time being unwilling to place her interests in the hands of the Allies. The conflict in Asia Minor continued. I need not here or now pursue its varying fortunes. Suffice it to say that the Greeks, although successful in their preliminary advance, failed to reach their supposed objective, which was Angora itself. On the other hand, the Turks, though they succeeded in repelling this movement, were unable to push back the Greeks behind the strong military position which they had taken up defended by the line of railway in the heart of Asia Minor.

There the situation has remained ever since. I have long felt, and, indeed, every one of us has felt, that a peaceful settlement of this prolonged conflict was necessary. It was necessary, in the first place, in the interests of Turkey, who, whatever the fortunes of the present state of the war, has been exhausted by seven and a half years of fighting and stands urgently in need of a settlement of her future. It was equally necessary in the interests of Greece, who, though she was invited into Asia Minor by the Powers assembled in Paris in 1919, has undoubtedly, in the prosecution of that campaign, exceeded the limits both of her financial and her physical ability.

It is equally necessary in the interests of the Powers themselves, who have found their authority impaired and their solidarity shaken, or at any rate menaced, by the continuance of this warfare, and, as many here will at once remind me, it is perhaps more especially necessary in the interests of the Mahomedan populations not only of Europe, but of Asia as well. We know the strong feelings that have been excited among our own Moslem fellow-subjects in India, excited by suspicions very often exaggerated and illegitimate and by propaganda which has not erred upon the side of moderation or of truth. And this interest has, I think, been shared by the whole of the civilised world, which is sick of this continuance of war and longs, in Asia as elsewhere, to settle down to normal conditions of tranquillity and of peace.

For a long time I, at any rate, have held the conviction that only by the closest unity between the great Allied Powers themselves could this solution be attained. It could not, in my view, be reached by separate agreements made between Turkey and the Powers individually, still less by allowing the Turks, in pursuit of their familiar tactics, to play off one party against the other, with a view ultimately to coercing the one that was left out and in that way of extracting the terms which they desire. As long ago, therefore, as last autumn, I assumed the responsibility



of suggesting that the first stage in the process of pacification would be a meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the three Allied Powers principally concerned—France, Italy and ourselves—at Paris, to arrive at the basis of this common agreement which I have described as so essential.

Meanwhile, in London, in October last, when the Greek Ministers were here, we succeeded in obtaining from them, after a full and frank discussion, a promise to place their own interests in the hands of the Allies. The suggested conference was to have taken place in Paris immediately following the meeting at Cannes in January. It will be in the remembrance of your Lordships that, firstly owing to the retirement of M. Briand, and afterwards to changes in the Italian Ministry, an interval of unfortunate but inevitable delay occurred, and for these reasons it was not until last week that we were all able to meet at Paris.

We spent five days there in prolonged and certainly laborious, but very friendly, discussion of the problem in all its aspects. The conclusions at which we arrived, which, I believe, are endorsed by the Powers whom we represented, were unanimous in every respect. We ended our proceedings by issuing a declaration or memorandum which contained, in the first place, our proposals, or at any rate a general summary of our proposals, and secondly, a justification of the broad grounds on which they were put forward. It was quite a new procedure in these international conferences, but in making these proposals at Paris, which I am glad that my colleagues accepted, I felt that we had nothing to conceal in anything that we proposed, that the sooner our proposal reached the combatant parties—and we sent them by telegram—the better it would be, and further, that in making them and in soliciting success for them we needed the support of the public opinion of the world. Our declaration was accompanied by a formal invitation to the Turks and the Greeks to meet our High Commissioners in some part of Turkish territory within three weeks of the date of our invitation, in order to discuss in greater detail the proposals which we have ventured to submit. Should this invitation be accepted by them, we shall send to both the Turks and the Greeks the full text of the resolutions which we passed at Paris and which were the basis of the memorandum to which I have referred.

My remarks this afternoon will be confined to a running commentary on that public declaration, with such further explanations as may seem to be required to elucidate the text, and if, at the conclusion of my remarks, it be found in order for any noble Lord to ask me a question about anything that I may have said or about the subject as a whole, I will do my best to give him such information as he may desire.

Our first proposal at Paris was that an armistice should be concluded between the two belligerent parties. I had already had the advantage of conversations here with two representatives of the Turks, the Foreign Minister of the Constantinople Government, Izzet Pasha, who came to London for the purpose, and a representative of the Angora Government, Yussuf Kemal Bey, who occupies the position of Foreign Minister in that organisation, and accordingly, when I went to Paris and renewed this proposal there, I was making a suggestion with which the public was already familiar.

It seemed to me to be necessary that an armistice should be the first stage because, on the one hand, the Greeks, to whom we proposed to submit an invitation to withdraw from their position in Asia Minor, could not be expected to respond to an invitation of that description if they were to be exposed to attack by the Turkish forces when engaged in retirement, and, on the other hand, the Powers themselves could not be expected to undertake and supervise the responsibilities of the withdrawal, if they were liable to be exposed to a recurrence of hostilities while engaged in that task. The conditions of the proposed armistice were drawn up in Paris by the military authorities who were assembled for the purpose, sitting under the presidency of Marshal Foch, and they provided, firstly, for the complete cessation of hostilities between the two parties for a period of three months, to be automatically renewed until the two belligerents had accepted the preliminary conditions of peace, and, secondly, for the attachment of Allied military commissioners to both parties, in order to see that these conditions were faithfully observed.

In sending this proposal for an armistice, which we did by telegraph, both to Greece and to Turkey, we asked for an immediate reply. Greece, as your Lordships will have seen in the press, accepted the armistice. A reply from Turkey, where the difficulties of communication to distant Angora are no doubt greater, has not yet

been received. It will have been observed that this invitation to agree to an armistice was accompanied by an intimation that the armistice would be followed by steps for the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks. We felt it only right that, as that was the policy upon which we were united, the Turks should, at least, have an assurance in advance that this was in contemplation, and whether it was right or wrong to have invited the Greeks in the first instance to Smyrna in 1919—always be it remembered that it was an invitation extended, and a suggestion made, to them rather than an initiative of their own—we believe there to be a general recognition, even in Greece at the present moment, that that occupation can no longer be maintained.

Our next task, supposing the armistice to be accepted, was to draw up the conditions under which the evacuation of Anatolia by Greece will take place. This, again, was clearly a military and not a political question. It had already been exhaustively considered by the Allied Generals at Constantinople, and they had prepared a plan for the purpose. When we came to Paris this plan was submitted to the Committee of Inter-Allied Generals that sits there under the presidency of Marshal Foch, and it was speedily found that both sides—both the military authorities at Constantinople and those in Paris—were agreed as to the essential conditions under which the withdrawal should take place.

These conditions will be published as soon as the armistice is accepted. They provide for the progressive retirement of the Greek forces in Asia Minor, under the supervision of Allied officers, from a succession of zones; that is to say, proceeding from the interior, one zone after another is evacuated, while arrangements are made to take back the troops to the coast. While this is going on steps have to be taken to set up again a Turkish civil administration in the successive zones as they are left free. Further, as you will realise, we have to secure the avoidance of direct contact, which might be fraught with great danger, between the two belligerent armies—the avoidance not only of contact, but, what might be much more serious, of collision between the two belligerent armies. Lastly, when we carry this progressive retirement down to the coast, we have to arrange for the embarkation of the Greek forces from ports either on the Marmora or on the Mediterranean. It was also obviously desirable to provide, as these operations are carried out, for the maintenance of conditions of order and security in the regions evacuated, and to prevent any sudden exodus or flight of the populations in that area, whether such flight be the result of necessity, or of compulsion, or of fear.

The task of closely supervising these arrangements will be undertaken by a Mixed Commission of Allied Generals and Admirals at Constantinople. It is obvious that the operation will be a difficult and prolonged one. The Greeks have, at the moment, in Asia Minor a force estimated at about 180,000 men. Then you can easily imagine the large aggregation of stores, depots, and the like, which attend the operations of such a body of men. It is calculated, accordingly, by the Generals, that the process of evacuation which I have described will, under most favourable conditions, occupy about four and a half months. But if it is successfully carried out with the goodwill and with the acquiescence of both Greeks and Turks, your Lordships will recognise the truth and the purport of what we said in our declaration, namely, that if these proposals are accepted by both parties the recovery of Anatolia by the Turks, which is believed to be their principal national aspiration, will have been attained without any further sacrifice of treasure or life by them. Correspondingly, the retirement of the Greek troops will be effected with honour.

Should this operation be successfully accomplished, the Turkish sovereignty in Asia will exist unimpaired from the Mediterranean on the south to the Straits and the Black Sea in the north, and from the borders of Transcaucasia, Persia and Mesopotamia on the east to the shores of the Ægean.

Assuming the success of these proposals, assuming the recovery by the Turks of the large areas which I have just geographically described, the question that then came immediately under our notice, and which demanded the most serious and anxious consideration, was the steps to be taken for the protection of the minorities left in the regions concerned. And here we must remember that, when you speak of minorities, you have equally to safeguard the interests of minorities left under Turkish rule in Asia, and of Moslem minorities left under Greek rule in Europe. The same measure of protection, in so far as it is required, must obviously be extended to both.

In Asia the minorities whom we had to consider consist in the main of Greeks, Armenians—of both of whom there are, as you know, very large aggregations indeed—Jews, and, in the more easterly portions, Nestorian or Assyrian Christians.



In Europe the minorities consist in the main of Turks—although there are some other minority populations in Greek possessions—in Western Thrace, in Eastern Thrace so far as that is to be conceded to the Greeks, and in Thessaly. Here our desiderata were fourfold. In the first place, we desired to ensure to those minorities the security of all the guarantees that it was found two or three years ago necessary to introduce into the European treaties with enemy Powers for the protection of minorities there; secondly, to secure, notably for the minorities in Asia Minor, the protection of the additional guarantees, very substantial as they were, that were proposed in the unratified Treaty of Sèvres; thirdly, to procure the retention or, where they had been rescinded, the restoration of the old ecclesiastical and educational privileges accorded to minorities in Asia and in other portions of the Turkish dominions under the law of Islam; and, fourthly, to provide any fresh guarantees that might be required, either by the conditions of the minority, or by the circumstances of the place in which they were found. In fact, what we want to do is, instead of trusting to casual provisions here or there, to formulate a new code of international observance, to be drawn up in the first place by an Inter-Allied Conference for future observance by the parties concerned.

Our next step, advancing a stage further, was to contemplate placing the execution of this new code of international law under the general and effective supervision of the League of Nations. And here let me observe, in passing, that among the many justifications for the work of that body, difficult and sometimes truncated as it has been, will be found, not only the general recognition that its work and its functions are indispensable in certain international conditions, but also the recognition, whenever we get to close quarters with questions at Paris or wherever it may be, that the League of Nations is in itself the most effective instrument, and, indeed, in some respects the only instrument, for carrying out the kind of policy to which I am now referring.

Your Lordships will recollect that, under the European treaties, the League of Nations has been generally placed in custody of the minority provisions in the treaties. But since then the League has taken a further step which will render its intervention more effective. It has appointed a High Commissioner at Constantinople, who has just taken up his functions, and who will be able to exercise a general supervision over the work of the League in the Turkish dominions. Accordingly, we proposed, at Paris, to invite the League of Nations, after consultation with Greece and Turkey—always assuming, as we have done, that after peace has been ratified Turkey will apply for admission, and will herself be admitted, to the League of Nations—we propose to invite the League to appoint special commissioners for the supervision of these minority clauses in Europe and in Asia.

We shall draw the special attention of the League to particular areas where these minorities are found to exist, and we shall propose to them that they shall appoint commissioners to pay periodical visits to the areas concerned, and, in conjunction with the local authorities, to concert measures for the fulfilment of the duties which they will have undertaken. We shall also propose that the reports of these commissioners shall be laid annually before the Assembly of the League, so that the nations there represented—and your Lordships know what a wide ambit that phrase covers—will be in a position to secure the faithful execution from year to year of the stipulations to which the League of Nations, if it accepts our invitation, will have given its guarantee. In this way we shall hope to give to the protection of minorities in the future an international sanction, and if Turkey herself is represented, as I have indicated that she will probably desire to be, upon the League, she will be able to see, in so far as she is concerned, while the rest of the Powers will exercise a similar responsibility on their own account, that the conditions are scrupulously observed.

Among the minorities to which I have referred, and whose cases we carefully considered, the one which has attracted the widest attention and sympathy is the Armenian community. That minority—I am speaking of it in relation to the large populations by whom it is surrounded—has always deserved and received special consideration, perhaps more particularly in this country, on account of the long and chequered and melancholy history of the Armenian people, of the cruel sufferings to which they have been subjected, and not less on account of the pledges and assurances which not we alone but the Allied Powers in general at the beginning of the war, and at various stages during the war, have given as regards the desirability of constituting some form, if that were possible, of independent national existence for the Armenian

racas as one of the objects, and it has always been hoped one of the consequences, of the war itself. We at any rate in this country have never forgotten those assurances. At every stage, at every meeting that I have attended, the battle of the Armenians has been fought with strenuous and loyal activity by the representatives of Great Britain, and I am divulging no secret, and making for myself no unreasonable claim, when I say that no more active defender of their interests on those occasions has been found than myself.

In the Treaty of Sèvres it was sought to create an independent Armenian Republic round the nucleus of the small Armenian State, formerly included in the Russian dominions, of Erivan, and to add to that State a number of districts taken from the neighbouring vilayets. At the same time we invited the President of the United States of America, then President Wilson, to give an arbitral decision ascribing to this contemplated State such portions of those Turkish vilayets as he might deem, upon an examination of the case, to be reasonable and fair. He gave his award in December 1920, but, for reasons with which your Lordships are familiar, it has never been found possible to give effect to it. At the London Conference in March last year we proposed to the Turkish representatives, notably to those who came from Angora, that they should recognise the rights of Armenia to a national home on the eastern frontiers of Turkey, and should accept the decision of a Commission appointed by the League of Nations as to the territory to be transferred from Turkey to Armenia.

At the same time, no one can deny that the situation has visibly changed, even during the last twelve months, and that it has changed in this respect in a manner which is detrimental to the fortunes and the chances of the Armenians. This has been due to the events—I will not call them the accidents—of war; and the position at the present moment is this. In the north-eastern provinces of Turkey in Asia, to which I referred just now, the bulk of the Armenians have fled across the border to the little Armenian State of Erivan. There does exist there at this moment a small semi-independent Armenian State in the territory formerly a part of Russia. That State is now under a form of Soviet administration, and the degree to which it may be regarded as an Armenian national focus or centre is a matter upon which I am not in a position to pronounce.

In Cilicia, on the other hand, where there were large numbers of Armenians—though always in a minority of the population—when the French evacuated Cilicia under the terms of the Agreement concluded by M. Franklin-Bouillon, the bulk of the Armenians, not trusting to the tender mercies of the Turks, or to the assurances given to the French by the National Assembly of Angora, poured down in unrestrained numbers from the interior to the sea-coast, taking ship wherever they could at the port of Mersina, and fleeing in a disorganised rabble to Cyprus, Beirut, Alexandretta, and other towns in that part of Syria. There large numbers of these unhappy people are to be found at the present moment in a state of semi-destitution, and only a few thousands, according to our latest information, remain in Cilicia.

I have always felt that, somewhere or other, a place ought to be found where these fugitives could be collected, where perhaps they might be joined by Armenians from other parts of the world now living in exile, and where they could create for themselves a home of political and cultural independence. Whether it will be possible to set up such a home either in the north-eastern areas to which I have referred or in any part of Cilicia, it is impossible for me at this moment to say. Obviously, none of the European Powers is in a position to organise armies, to move troops, or to provoke a renewal of conflict, even in that cause. That can only be effected by agreement. Accordingly, we decided at Paris to invite the co-operation of the League of Nations, over and above the various minority provisions to which I have referred, and of which they are to be asked to take charge, to place themselves in special supervision of this Armenian problem in order to obtain for the people, if that be possible, the satisfaction of their traditional aspirations for this national home.

There is another and also a very powerful—at any rate, a very numerous—Christian minority in Asia Minor to be found at and in the neighbourhood of Smyrna. In the town of Smyrna, in the Cheshme peninsula to the west of Smyrna projecting into the Mediterranean, and the town of Aivali, a little further to the north, a large majority of the inhabitants are Greek, and other Greek populations are to be found scattered along the coast and in the interior. It is quite likely that large numbers of these Greeks may, when the Greek forces retire, decide to retire with them and to proceed to Europe, but it is obvious that with a population of the size to which I referred this cannot be anything but a very partial solution, and there



will be large numbers who desire to remain, either because they are rooted to the soil, or because they are reluctant for other reasons to leave, or because they recognise, with justice, that their commercial or their agricultural interests are bound up in the future destiny of the country.

Undoubtedly, special guarantees will be required, after evacuation has taken place, for the safety of this population, and for their due representation in the future administration of the localities concerned. In the towns to which I have referred means will have to be taken to ensure that they have an adequate voice in the local administration. Here again we propose to invite the co-operation of the League of Nations, which will consider the question in the general treatment of minorities. A certain parallelism will be found to exist between the conditions of Smyrna in Asia and Adrianople in Europe, to which I shall refer a little later. In the one case, the interests of the Greek and, in the other, of the Turkish population have to be provided for, and we shall endeavour to secure that the guarantees that are given to the one community in the one place shall be equally accorded to the other in the other place.

I now pass to the question of the Straits. This is a question which had to be decided, in the main, by military and naval considerations, and in pronouncing upon it we acted upon the unanimous advice of our authorities. The broad considerations which animated us were these. In the first place, the Powers can never again consent to a position in which the mouth of the Straits, which after all is an international channel, should be closed by the attitude or the forces of any individual Power. We recalled the terrible sacrifices that were forced upon us, in particular, the prodigious burdens that were entailed upon our nation far more than any other, by the closure of the Straits; the long protraction of the period of the war which it entailed; and, indeed, broadly speaking, the ruinous and disastrous consequences which it imposed upon the Allies.

There was, therefore, common accord, to which I think general assent will be given here, that Turkey could not, in any rearrangement, be left in command of both shores of the Dardanelles. On the Asiatic side of the Straits the restitution of Turkish sovereignty over Anatolia entails the admission of Turkish civil authority over the area on the southern side of the Channel, but we felt that that admission must not be made the means by which a revived Turkey could, from that position, at any time in the future menace the free entrance to the Dardanelles. Accordingly, while the Turks are left at Chanak, on the Asiatic side of the mouth of the Straits, the demilitarised zone which it is proposed to draw in the interior will be thrown back to the boundaries of the sanjak, a distance of sixty miles or more, so that in that area no Turkish Government will be able at any time to prepare positions which might enable them to command, or even menace, the entrance to the Straits. This demilitarised zone will be visited and inspected from time to time by Allied officers.

I now pass to the European shores of the Straits. Here we have an area in which the Greek population is in a preponderance. Gallipoli is, in the main, a Greek city; but it is a place where the Allied occupying garrison can best be placed, where lie the bones of thousands of our fellow subjects who perished in one of the most heroic ventures of the war, and where their graves are to us in the nature of a most sacred charge. Accordingly, we propose that the European shores of the Straits shall be constituted a zone of Allied military occupation as far as Rodosto on the Marmora. Within that zone the military authority of the Allied Powers, military and aerial, and naval, will be supreme, and to them will be attached Allied officers to inspect the whole of the demilitarised zone. In the opinion of the military authorities, and it was upon their advice that we acted, this will constitute a sufficient guarantee for the safety of the Straits in future against any recurrence of the experience of 1914 to which I have referred.

As regards the navigation of the Straits, the control of the traffic, the organisation of harbour works and other services, the International Straits Commission, as it was proposed under the Treaty of Sèvres, will remain. This will be a body on which all the Great Powers will be represented, as well as America if she cares to join. There will also be represented upon it those States who have local or neighbouring interests, who are concerned, for mercantile or other reasons, in the free passage of the Straits, such as Greece and Roumania; and to this body, when the Treaty has been ratified and they have been admitted to the League of Nations, Turkey, Bulgaria and Russia, if she satisfies those conditions, will one day be admitted. It is proposed, as it was in London a year ago, that the Chairmanship of that body should be placed in the hands of a representative of the Turkish Govern-

ment. I have observed in some organs of the press that because we did not say much about this matter in our Declaration it has been supposed that the International Commission has been dropped or has disappeared. This is not in the least the case. It remains with the full powers and functions as set up in the Treaty of Sèvres.

Let me here add a few words about the demilitarised areas, because they constitute the main guarantee against military danger in the future. The demilitarised area will not be confined to the two sides of the Dardanelles. It will extend to the islands lying outside the mouth of the Dardanelles and commanding its entrance, to the islands inside the Marmora, and to the peninsula of Artaki, the most considerable stretch of land which projects into the Sea of Marmora from the Asiatic shore. When we approach the Bosphorus the demilitarised zone will be extended on the Asiatic side to the area of the peninsula of Ismid, which is now controlled by the Allied forces, and is known as the neutralised zone. On the European side of the Bosphorus and the Marmora the whole of the eastern shore, from Constantinople on the east and the mouth of the Maritza on the west, to the Bulgarian frontier on the north, with a small exception, will be demilitarised and placed under the inspection of Allied officers.

Thus, whether you look at the situation from the Asiatic side or from the European side, our military authorities have provided for us and guaranteed an area of neutralisation where no force can be allowed, which, in their opinion, constitutes a sufficient security both for the Straits and the Bosphorus, and against the resumption of hostilities by either of the two Powers who are now engaged in war in that part of the world.

These arrangements bring me, in a natural geographical sequence, to the question of Constantinople itself and the question of Thrace. It was long ago decided—I think two or more years ago—that Constantinople should be given back after the war to the Turks, both as the seat of the Caliphate and as the natural and historic capital of the Turkish Empire. The Powers at no time have had the desire—for military, quite apart from political, reasons, but for both—to remain in prolonged, still less in perpetual, occupation of that city. A year ago, in London, we offered as part of our terms to evacuate Constantinople when the Treaty of Peace had been ratified. That promise will be fulfilled at as early a date as is practicable after the ratification of the new peace which we now have in view. The Sultan, who will remain in Constantinople, will be allowed to maintain a force, limited in numbers but sufficient for the purpose, in the city of his Government.

On the other hand, in dealing with Thrace—I am now speaking of Eastern Thrace—we were faced with these facts. By the decision of the Powers at Paris the Greeks had been placed in occupation of Eastern Thrace. There their forces are now; they are in effective military occupation and have control of the civil administration of the country. In considerable parts of this area and in several of the towns they have a decided majority of the population. It was felt, therefore, that it would not only be unjust but impracticable to call upon the Greeks to evacuate not merely Anatolia, under the conditions which I have already described, but the whole of Eastern Thrace as well, and apart from the fairness or unfairness of any such attempt, I say that it would be impracticable because were the Greek armies invited to retire from Thrace at the present moment we should be unquestionably confronted with a direct negative from them, and I am not aware of any force in existence which could successfully turn them out. At the same time, we felt that there was a great force in the contention that, if Constantinople were restored to Turkey, it should, as the seat of the future capital of the Turkish dominions, be free from the military menace or the disagreeable situation of a neighbour close at hand with whom it had recently been at war and from whom it is severed at present by many unfortunate antipathies of religion and race.

In the Treaty of Sèvres we had drawn the frontier line on the European side of Constantinople at the military lines of Chatalja, a situation which, as you know, owing to its topographical features, constitutes a real military protection of the capital. This line is, at the closest point to Constantinople, 25 miles distant and, at the furthest point, 70 miles distant. Last summer at Paris I suggested, and, again I brought it before the conference when it recently met in Paris, that this frontier, to meet the objections I have named, should be thrown back to a distance of about 80 miles from Constantinople to a line popularly known as the Midia-Rodosto line.

The problem was, in the main, a military and strategical problem, and accordingly we referred it to the military authorities at Paris last week, our main



*desideratum* being to provide adequate security for the protection of the capital and for the territory left to the Turks in Europe. They unanimously recommended to us a line drawn from a place on the neighbourhood of a place called Ganos on the Marmora to the Bulgarian frontier in the north, on the western side of the mountain massif of Stranja. This is a line, as they assured us, of definite geographical and strategical value. It will leave to Turkey the eastern parts of Eastern Thrace, including the town of Rodosto, the population of which is predominantly Greek, and the trade of which also is largely Greek, and for which, in our arrangement, we shall have to secure special commercial facilities of access to the interior.

On the other hand, it will leave to Greece the whole of the western part of Thrace, including the towns of Baba Eski and Kirk Kilisse, with the railway that joins them, as well as Adrianople, but a special stipulation will be required, as I have already indicated, for the protection of the population, and for the protection of the religious buildings and institutions of Adrianople, somewhat parallel to the conditions that will be required for the Greek populations in Smyrna.

Observe again, that with the exception of a small band around Adrianople in which the Greeks will be allowed to maintain certain forces as a guard against the Bulgarian frontier, the whole of these two areas of Eastern Thrace, Turkish and Greek, will be demilitarised so that neither part can constitute a military danger to the other. Such is the solution that we offer of the Thracian problem. It is a partition. No partition, whether decreed in Silesia or anywhere else, ever excites much enthusiasm. Neither will this; but it is the best solution that in the circumstances we felt we could offer. It appeared to us to be consistent with justice and to bear in mind the stern and incontrovertible facts of the case. It is certainly a much better solution than, before I went to Paris, I was told from every quarter that I could possibly secure.

There remained—and I apologise for keeping your Lordships so long, but I have to cover, with such compression as I can, a really very vast field of study—there remained three questions which we discussed at some length. The first was the future of the armed forces of Turkey. We started by recognising the principle that we could not admit in any case that Turkey, and Turkey alone of the enemy Powers in the recent war, should be permitted to recruit her forces by conscription in the future. Conscription has been forbidden in the treaties to Germany, to Austria, to Hungary and to Bulgaria. It could not, of course, be conceded to Turkey without at once entailing a demand which, logically, it would have been impossible to resist for the revision of all the other treaties in that respect. There were two other reasons. The retention of conscription in Turkey would have perpetuated an injustice to the non-Moslem populations of Turkey in the future, against whom the law of conscription has been wielded with most oppressive effect in the past. Further, it would be a great injustice to the peasant population of Anatolia, who have been constantly called away from their homes and from their fields to take part, entirely against their will, in the military ventures of Turkey in different parts of the East. At the same time, recognising the difficulty that might be found in constituting straight away a volunteer army in Turkey, we said that we should be prepared to consider with the Turkish Government in an amicable spirit a determination of the period within which the voluntary system of recruiting must be established in that country.

As regards the armed forces of Turkey, in the future they will consist partly of gendarmerie and partly of certain special elements for the protection of the frontiers and otherwise. I can best state my case in figures. The Treaty of Sévres provided for a future Turkish force of gendarmerie of 35,000, and special elements 15,000, or a total of 50,000. The London Conference last year increased those figures to: gendarmerie, 45,000; special elements, 30,000; or a total of 75,000. This problem also we referred to the military authorities in Paris last week, and they unanimously recommended a slight increase of these numbers—namely, gendarmerie, 45,000; special elements, 40,000; or a total of 85,000; and they arrived at these figures on a consideration of the forces that had been allowed to other enemy Powers in the treaties following upon the war, in relation to the populations of those countries. Further, they told us that they considered it would be adequate for the protection of the reconstituted Turkey of the future. In the organisation of the gendarmerie no doubt the Turks will find it desirable, and, indeed, necessary, to apply to the Great Powers for the provision of European officers to assist in the organisation and instruction of those forces. Such assistance has already been rendered in the creation of such forces of gendarmerie as now exist in Turkey, and I have no doubt

that application will be made with regard to the larger force to which I have referred, and, if made, it will be willingly granted by the Powers.

There remain only two other subjects. The first is finance. As regards finance, I do not propose, at the tail end of so long a statement as this, to trouble your Lordships by any attempt to enter into details on this very complicated subject, but this I may say—that the financial provisions which we recommended were drawn up by the European financial experts who were summoned from Constantinople for the purpose, and they represented their unanimous advice. These proposals are in the direction of giving to Turkey very considerable control of her finances, subject to the recognition by her of her pre-war debts, and of the payment of charges and indemnities arising directly out of the war. We sum up our provisions in a passage in the public memorandum which I need not trouble your Lordships by quoting. These provisions will, I think, be found to be generous to the Turks. They will give to Turkey that amount of financial independence which will enable her, while discharging her due obligations, to assume responsibility for the regulation of her own finances, and for the development of her indigenous resources in the future.

As regards the Capitulations, which is the third and last subject to which I will refer, and to which European opinion naturally and rightly attaches the greatest importance, we were anxious to secure to Turkey the largest measure of economic independence consistent with the due protection of the nationals of our respective countries. For this purpose we propose to set up in Constantinople, within three months of the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, a commission composed of the representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan and Turkey, to prepare, with the assistance of technical experts representing the other capitulatory Powers, proposals for the revision of the capitulatory régime in fiscal matters. These proposals provide for fiscal equality between foreign and Turkish subjects while safeguarding the former against excessive taxation and abuses in collection, and for any necessary modifications of the customs taxes with the consent of the Powers concerned. As regards the Capitulations in judicial matters, we repeat our offer made before to set up a similar commission to prepare a scheme of judicial reform to replace the capitulatory system, which will continue provisionally pending the introduction of the proposed scheme. This commission will be at liberty to recommend either a mixed or a unified judicial system.

I have now, I think, covered the whole ground, and I am most grateful for your kind attention. I have given, or endeavoured to give, a conspectus of the general lines of the proposed settlement. Those proposals represent, I am glad to say, the main object for which I went to Paris, namely, the unanimous conclusion of the three Great Powers. They appear, so far as I can see, to have been generally approved by public opinion in this and other countries, and to be regarded as on the whole a fair and equitable solution of perhaps the most difficult problem that has confronted any body of men during the last fifty years. I observe that it has been stated somewhere that these proposals are not an ultimatum. That is inherent in the circumstances of the case, but I hope it may not be inferred from the use of that phrase that we are disposed to depart from the broad fundamental outlines of the policy I have sketched, or to embark upon a protracted process of haggling in order that, by breaches in the fabric here and there, the whole structure may eventually be brought to the ground. We have not attained unity in order to see that unity destroyed by encroachments or infractions which will impair the general symmetry of the plan or once again place the Near East in the melting pot.

We all desire peace, but a peace which is just to all parties, and which will prevent the renewal of a struggle which is disastrous to both sides. It is in this spirit that in our declaration we have commended these proposals, firstly, to the fair consideration of the parties principally involved—namely, Turkey and Greece themselves—and, secondly, to the opinion or what I may call the enlightened conscience of the world, which has, I submit, long regarded this dismal and protracted struggle with disquietude and dismay, and which expects all parties, particularly those who have the authority, now to combine to restore to Eastern Europe and the parts of the Near East contiguous to Eastern Europe the necessary conditions of tranquillity and order.

*The Marquess of Salisbury:* My Lords, I do not intend to make a speech. The very important statement to which we have listened requires very much more consideration than can be given to it as we listened to the noble Marquess, in order to enable us profitably to discuss it. I rise only for the purpose of putting a question



arising out of the statement. I gather that a great deal of weight is thrown upon the intervention of the League of Nations in carrying out the arrangements for the protection of various parts of the subject populations in Asiatic Turkey which are contemplated by these proposals. In particular, I understand that the fate of the unfortunate Armenians—about whom I thought the noble Marquess spoke in very proper terms—is to be largely protected by the intervention of the League of Nations. I did not understand that any definite arrangement has been come to by the noble Marquess and those with whom he acted, but that they handed over, as it were, to the League of Nations the protection of the Armenians and their future fate. What I should like to ask is: What procedure is it proposed that the League of Nations should pursue for the purpose of carrying out this obligation or mandate which has been given to them by the Powers at Paris? The League of Nations have, of course, no armed forces at their disposal. They are not, as I understand, in a position to speak with authority, except in so far as they are supported by the action of the Powers which they represent. Of course, the noble Marquess is far more familiar with the Covenant of the League of Nations and its proceedings than I am, but I do not remember any procedure under that covenant by which there is an opportunity of bringing force to bear upon any recalcitrant Power, except after agreement by the Powers concerned.

I hope, of course, with the noble Marquess, that the intervention of the League of Nations may be effective in protecting the Armenians and in providing for their future, but I think it would probably be of great assistance to the League of Nations if they could know what force they had to rely upon in the event of their making a proposal which the Turks would not accept. I observe that in the course of his statement the noble Marquess said that the reason why the Powers themselves had not come to an arrangement about Armenia was that they had no troops at their disposal for the purpose of enforcing such an arrangement. If that be true of the Powers themselves, it appears to me that it would be equally true of the League of Nations, which can act only through these very forces which the Powers themselves say that they do not possess. I say this, not because I do not hope that the League of Nations may be successful, but because it would seem to be better, before hope is indulged in, that the League of Nations, or those who represent it in this country, should have some idea of what they can rely upon before they proceed to act. Of course, it may be that they are expected only to advise the Turks, but I am not quite sure that that will be very effective by itself.

*The Lord Archbishop of Canterbury:* My Lords, I should like to endorse what the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has said. The anxiety with which we have all been awaiting the account which the noble Marquess promised us of the outcome of the proceedings at Paris has, I think, in the minds of many thousands of people, concerned itself chiefly with the question of the protection of minorities. There has been a great deal said to-night which, I think, will be encouraging and satisfactory to many people with regard to the Dardanelles—a region which will have sacred associations for so many thousands of English homes for all time; with regard to conscription; with regard to Constantinople itself, with regard to the Capitulations. Some of these results may be disappointing, but some of them, I think, will be satisfactory.

The noble Marquess has given us with fullness, in a speech remarkable throughout for its lucidity, an account of the difficulties concerning either the settlement of the Armenians in a particular region of Asia Minor, whether it be in Erivan or in Cilicia, or the leaving them scattered here and there where they may have no home which can properly be called their own. I yield to none in my appreciation of the efforts which I am quite certain that the noble Marquess has made throughout all this matter to deal, with the utmost possible care and with the greatest effectiveness which is available, with the extraordinarily difficult problem of the protection of these Christian minorities.

But I could not help feeling, as Lord Salisbury has just said, that we have passed on this matter to the League of Nations without really understanding what that means. The League of Nations is a very large phrase, and means a very large thing, and I believe that, in many departments of the work which lies before it, the League of Nations is going to be a power, not in Europe only, but throughout the world, in years to come. I have advocated it in many places on that ground. But when we are told that this problem, for which we have been seeking a solution, is to be, so far as I can understand, simply referred to the League of Nations to do their best in the matter, I agree with what the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, has just said as to our

extreme anxiety to know by what practical means the League is to give effect to any endeavour that it makes.

We are in this matter, in England, pledged up to the hilt that something practical should be done. It would be quite in vain, and it would be useless and unnecessary here, and, indeed, hardly fair after all that the noble Marquess has done, were we to recapitulate simply the terms in which promises have been made, alike by the Prime Minister and the noble Marquess himself as representing the Foreign Office. We have been told, and the Armenians have been told again and again, that we might count upon this, that when the war was over they should, at all events, not be handed back again to the tender mercies of those who, for hundreds of years, have misused their powers to the extent that they have. I could quote many references, if it were necessary, but it is quite needless to call attention to them to-night. But when we say that this matter is now left to the League of Nations, is it not really a kind of camouflage, a kind of screen to shield those who find it impracticable to fulfil the promises that they have made?—and I do not deny that it may be impracticable.

The League of Nations can, in many respects, act without the need of force of a military or financial sort behind it. But, in this particular matter, if guarantees are to be secured, we want to know how the League of Nations is going to carry them out. What is the kind of guarantees expected? Whatever they are, how is the League of Nations going to secure the fulfilment of these guarantees, any more than the Powers themselves could do so? I suppose it is hardly unfair to say that inadequate help given to a community, settled like the Armenians in Erivan and Cilicia, has the reverse of a good effect, because it serves as an irritant to the Turk, who feels the ineffectiveness of it, and yet finds the inconvenience, the mischief, and, no doubt, the practical harm of the disaffection, which is encouraged by the idea that European power is behind those who are thus disaffected.

Let no one suppose—I am quite certain that the noble Marquess himself will not suppose—that I underrate his own activity, his own perseverance, his own personal enthusiasm in this matter, or, so far as I know, those of the Prime Minister also. The difficulties are enormous, but do not let us be led away to-night by supposing that we have reached what I think the noble Marquess called an equitable solution of this matter by merely stating that it will be left to the League of Nations. I should be very grateful if the noble Marquess were able, for our comfort, to expand for us a little what is meant by the phrase he used and the capacity which it may have of encouraging our hopes in this very difficult, sad and desolating matter.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston:* My Lords, the questions put by the noble Marquess and by the most Rev. Primate seem to me entirely legitimate questions, and I will endeavour to reply to them so far as I can. I would certainly deprecate as a just interpretation, either of my remarks or of the spirit of our proposals in Paris, the idea that we are simply, so to speak, shuffling this question on to the shoulders of the League of Nations, that we are proposing a mere camouflage to disguise our own incapacity. That is not my reading of the case, nor do I think it is a fair interpretation of the situation. When the Powers concluded the minority treaties in Europe, and when the supervision of those treaties was placed in the hands of the League of Nations, I do not remember either that the League of Nations, in accepting the responsibility, or that public opinion said: "Oh, but the League of Nations have no forces with which to carry it out." That is true enough, but the devolution of the responsibility upon their shoulders was, with unanimous consent, accorded at that time and was accepted by them.

I endeavoured in my remarks to point out how widely the situation has developed since those treaties were concluded. I pointed out that the League of Nations now had a special representative in Constantinople. I pointed out that new arrangements were proposed. It is suggested that they should have special commissioners in all the areas in question—I need not name them, although they might be inferred from my speech—areas in Asia, six or seven in number. Those commissioners would sometimes be resident there, would sometimes be visitors there, and would be in contact with the local authorities, both with the minorities and, in the case where the minorities were Christian, with the Turkish authorities. In the East it has been found a hundred times over that the presence of a European officer is the most effective guarantee against anything going on that is wrong.

I further suggested that these officers should report, at such periods as may be determined, to the Council of the League itself, and we made the further suggestion at Paris, which is a new one, that these reports, instead of being confined to the



attention of the Council of the League, should go before the Assembly of the League, where they could be examined, criticised, and reported upon by the large body of the representatives of the nations there collected. Those, my Lords, are all in the nature of guarantees. They are guarantees, in the first place, for local supervision, and, in the second place, for supervision by the public opinion of the world. They will be far more effective, I think, than anything proposed.

Then the most Rev. Primate says to me: "That is all very well, but in the last resort what are the forces—what are the armed forces—behind the League?" The absence of armed forces did not prevent the League of Nations from having handed over to them the decision of the exceedingly vexed and difficult question of Silesia, which the Powers were unable, with their armed forces, to come to an agreement about. It did not prevent the League of Nations from undertaking an examination of that question, from arriving at a decision about it, from declaring that decision to the two parties principally concerned, who were separated from each other by local differences quite as acute as any prevailing in Asia Minor, and it did not prevent that decision from being amicably carried out, as it is being done at the present moment. Then the League of Nations had assigned to it a little time ago the question of the Aland Islands in the Scandinavian waters. That was a question upon which we were told Sweden and Finland were prepared to go to war, and that they were on the verge of hostilities. We referred it to the League of Nations. They had no troops to send there. They had no ships to navigate those waters. They had only the sanction of an absolutely impartial investigation, and the moral support of the public opinion of the world to the decision arrived at. After it had been arrived at, what happened? Both parties, who had been at each other's throats, accepted the decision, and are loyally carrying it out.

Do not suppose that because the League of Nations has no armed forces that, therefore, even its physical influence is small. That is not the case. The influence of the League of Nations is, of course, in the first place moral, but the support of the public opinion of the world is in the nature of a physical sanction, very often more effective than that of arms itself. Let me put to the most Rev. Primate the alternative. If he says the League of Nations, for the reasons he indicated, is rather an ineffective or powerless instrument to carry out its great purposes, what is his alternative? The only other alternative is the use of the armed forces of Europe. Does any man in this House really think that with the fullest desire to secure for the Armenians everything that we have over and over again pledged ourselves to try to secure, France, or Great Britain, or Italy is going to raise battalions here to send them out to Cilicia? Why, the French have just made an agreement in order to get their forces out of Cilicia. Are we to send forces to Erivan? No, everyone knows it is a thing that it is impossible to do. We have to face the conditions of the times. Within those conditions we have to be loyal to our pledges and to do what we can.

The plans that we have devised at Paris, let me remind the most Rev. Primate, are not merely to be notified to the League of Nations, but they are to be embodied in the conditions we are sending to the Greeks and the Turks. They are part of the arrangements we are now proposing. Those arrangements will, I think, if successfully carried out, really give a much greater protection than the noble Marquess and the most Rev. Primate have thought, and what I would urge public opinion to do, instead of seeking the impracticable and the impossible, is to concentrate on giving every possible support and authority that can be given to the League of Nations in accepting the invitation which we are about to address to them.

[E 2775/900/44]

No. 73.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 940.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, April 1, 1922.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 372 of the 12th February, I shall be glad if you will reply on the following lines to the note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the French protectorate over Catholics in the East:—

2. If His Majesty's Government have rightly interpreted this note, the French Government advance four distinct contentions:—

(a.) The decisions of San Remo apply only to Palestine, "France having never renounced, either at San Remo or elsewhere, the rights and prerogatives

which are recognised in her favour by international treaties in the territories submitted to the Sultan."

- (b.) The secretaries' notes of the San Remo Conference had not the value of official minutes, revised and signed by the parties concerned.
- (c.) The San Remo decision juridically does not become valid until the treaty with Turkey enters into force, although as regards Palestine the French Government have not insisted on the maintenance of the *status quo ante* in deference to the exercise of the British mandate.
- (d.) Even in Palestine the decision of San Remo only comprises the renunciation of civil, political and temporal privileges. Liturgical honours will continue to be paid to France as long as the Vatican desires, the Vatican alone being competent to modify existing practice in the matter.

In answer to these contentions I wish to make the following observations:

3. His Majesty's Government must adhere to their conviction that the renunciation of the French protectorate at San Remo applied generally to the East. While the discussion on that occasion arose on the concrete instance of Palestine, that debate took a general turn, and, as will be seen from p. 23 of the French text of the minutes, which purport to reproduce in *oratio recta* the speeches as delivered, and are understood to have been taken in shorthand during delivery, M. Nitti summed up the discussion in the following manner:

"M. Nitti: Je crois qu'au fond nous sommes d'accord sur toutes les questions, mais il est opportun qu'il ne reste aucun malentendu. Il est bien entendu que la déclaration de M. Millerand, c'est-à-dire que le temps des privilèges est définitivement fini, doit être comprise dans ce sens. Il n'y aura plus aucune question de protection des Catholiques en Orient de la part d'une nation ou d'une autre et que les communautés religieuses ne pourront plus réclamer que leurs droits soient protégés plutôt par les représentants d'une Puissance que par ceux d'une autre et qu'il n'y aura pas lieu à aucune réclamation contre les religieux qui ne voudront pas rendre les 'honneurs' à la nation qui les réclame.

"M. Millerand: Je suis d'accord."

The English text of the minutes is not quite so full, and summarises the speeches in *oratio obliqua*, but M. Millerand is recorded as saying that "he was prepared to accept the Italian addition to the article, provided that the opening sentence with regard to the abandonment of the French religious privileges was not formally included in the treaty, but was regarded as a binding pledge." For the rest, the resolution which followed this discussion speaks of the settlement of the question of the religious protectorate of France "earlier in the afternoon by the undertaking given by the French Government that they recognise this protectorate as being at an end." It seems therefore clear to His Majesty's Government that, according to the records of this meeting, the renunciation of the protectorate was general and was not confined to Palestine.

4. With regard to the contention of the French Government as to the validity of the documents containing the renunciation, His Majesty's Government would point out that it was out of deference to M. Millerand's express desire to avoid, for internal political reasons, the actual signing away of the French protectorate that the decision was simply recorded in the minutes of the conference, minutes which had been prepared in accordance with the usual and hitherto unquestioned procedure of the Supreme Council. M. Millerand himself admitted the binding character of the pledge thus given. Had the Allied Powers foreseen that doubt could afterwards be thrown on the decision on the ground that it did not figure in a signed document, they would have been forced, however reluctantly, to insist on the signature of a separate instrument. In point of fact, the insertion in the resolution of the conference (both French and English texts) of a definite undertaking as to the cessation of the French protectorate was not challenged at the time by the French Government, and, as far as His Majesty's Government are aware, has not been challenged since until the receipt of the present French note.

5. For similar reasons His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot admit that the entry into force of the renunciation of the protectorate was in any way bound up with the entry into force of the treaty. As already explained, the renunciation was purposely not recorded in the treaty in deference to M. Millerand's wishes, but in the minutes of the conference and in a phrase which unmistakably proved that it had come to an end from the date of that record. At the same time, while unable to admit the

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juridical basis of the French argument, His Majesty's Government gladly recognise the fact that the French Government have not in fact pressed that argument in the case of Palestine, in a friendly desire not to make difficulties for the exercise of Great Britain's mandate.

6. The French Government make a distinction between the political privileges and the ceremonial and liturgical privileges which follow from the protectorate. Such a distinction seems to His Majesty's Government to be inadmissible and misleading. A ceremonial privilege inevitably denotes, in Eastern minds, a political privilege. His Majesty's Government therefore hold the French recognition of the cessation of their protectorate over Roman Catholics in Palestine and elsewhere to be absolute and complete and to cover all rights and privileges connected with it, and they cannot recognise the right of France to retain a ceremonial or liturgical precedence or other privilege of any kind in the East since the date of France's renunciation of her protectorate at San Remo.

7. In conclusion, His Majesty's Government desire to make it quite clear that they do not wish in any way to diminish the legitimate influence which the French nation has acquired in Turkish territory, through the good works and patient labours of her missionaries and teachers over a long period of time. His Majesty's Government merely desire that the changed situation in the Turkey of to-day and in those territories conquered from Turkey in the recent war should be clearly recognised, and that the explicit renunciation by France of that monopoly and of these privileges, which the French Prime Minister admitted at San Remo as having had their day ("ont vécu") should be implemented throughout the East in the spirit and the letter. For the rest, His Majesty's Government cannot refrain from noting that throughout the negotiations for peace with Turkey no claim has been put forward in practice by France to monopolise the protection of the Roman Catholics or other Christians in Turkey by way of the initiation and application of practical safeguards for their safety. Such protection has been implicitly treated as the equal responsibility of the Allies, and, as such, a responsibility is now under the anxious consideration of the representatives of the three Powers.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 3507/5/44]

No. 74.

*Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay, at 3 P.M., March 24, 1922. — (Received at Foreign Office, April 3.)*

Present :

For France	...	...	M. Poincaré. M. de Perretti de la Rocca. M. Bargeton.
For Great Britain	...	...	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Mr. R. G. Vansittart. Mr. E. G. Forbes Adam.
For Italy	...	...	Signor Schanzer. Marquis Visconti-Venosta. Signor Guariglia.

Interpreter, M. Camerlynck.

Present at the discussion of the question of the demilitarised zone :—

Marshal Foch.	General Sir C. Harington.
General Weygand.	Colonel Heywood.
General Gouraud.	General Marietti.

*Straits.*

Lord Curzon raised the question of the Straits. The Treaty of Sèvres provided for a large demilitarised zone on both sides and at both ends of the Straits. Under that treaty the demilitarised zone consisted of the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles to an approximate depth of 60 miles inland, a strip of about

15 miles deep along the European shore of the Sea of Marmora, the European side of the Bosphorus to a depth of about 50 miles north of Constantinople, on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus the whole Ismid Peninsula, and a strip of about 25 miles along the Asiatic shore of the Sea of Marmora, leaving Brusa outside the zone. The Marmora Islands and various islands in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles in the Aegean Sea are also included.

In March 1921, at the London Conference with the Turks and the Greeks, the proposed demilitarised zone was reduced in favour of both the Turks and the Greeks. On the shores of the Dardanelles the zone was reduced within a line from the Bulair lines to Rodosto, and on the other side to within a line from Tenedos to Karabigha. In the case of the Bosphorus, the demilitarised area was reduced to a zone of 25 kilom. on either side of the Straits. The question which now arose related to the military occupation of the two sides of the Straits. If we were still to exercise some control of the Marmora and Bosphorus while giving up the actual supervision of the two shores of the Bosphorus, we must at least keep open the entrance into the waters of the Marmora through the Dardanelles.

It was vital for Great Britain that Gallipoli should not be returned to the Turks. He must recall that one of the main objects for which the Allies fought the war had been to prevent these waters being closed again by the Turks. Thousands of soldiers of the British army, men from Australia and New Zealand as well as England, had fought and died for this purpose and lay buried there. British public opinion would never tolerate the surrender of Gallipoli to the control of Turkey, and was determined that the freedom of the Straits should be safeguarded. This question was largely a military matter, and while British military opinion favoured generally the maintenance of the concessions as to the width of the demilitarised zones made to Turkey in March 1921, it strongly urged, in the case of the demilitarised zone on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, a return to the Treaty of Sèvres line, or alternatively to the frontier of the Chanak sanjak. This was indispensable for the safety of the Straits if the recognition of Turkish sovereignty throughout Anatolia was to involve the reappearance of the Turks on the Asiatic shore.

As to the garrison of the Straits, he would remind the conference that in their paper of December last the British Government had suggested alternative methods of providing for the garrisoning of the Straits. Marshal Foch's view in 1920 had been that the minimum garrison which would be necessary was three battalions of infantry and two battalions of artillery. The question arose whether this force should be contributed and controlled by the Allies, or whether it should, either now or later, be handed over to the League of Nations. He, Lord Curzon, thought it might not be a bad idea to place the command of the Straits in the hands of an international, instead of an Inter-Allied authority. The League of Nations might be asked either immediately or later to constitute a military body to control the northern shores of the Straits. They would constitute a force and invite the various Powers to contribute their quota and be responsible for the military freedom of the Straits. He wished, however, to make it quite clear that he was not dealing with the waters of the Straits and their supervision. These would be controlled by an entirely separate body—the Straits Commission. On that body, in addition to the Great Powers, Roumania and Greece, it had been agreed that Bulgaria, Turkey, and Russia might, at a later date, be represented. At the moment the only question was that of the military safeguards for the freedom of the Straits and the machinery to be set up for that purpose. These safeguards would be no menace to Turkey. Indeed, the object of the Straits clauses in the Sèvres Treaty was to make Constantinople unassailable by sea and to prevent its being blockaded or attacked unless the League of Nations had sanctioned hostilities in those waters. He would be glad to learn the opinions of his Allied colleagues on the suggestions which he had thrown out.

Signor Schanzer said that he understood the proposal was to leave Gallipoli to Greece, and to maintain the demilitarised zone on both sides of the Dardanelles.

In reply, M. Poincaré suggested that it was possible to have some other control than a Greek one for Gallipoli. For instance, international control by the League of Nations of Gallipoli might be substituted for control by Greece. He agreed, however, that the Conference should examine the questions exposed by Lord Curzon, and he entirely concurred with Lord Curzon as to the necessity of maintaining the freedom of the Straits and as to keeping the Turks out of Gallipoli, but the rest of the problem must be discussed. He understood that the military experts wanted a wider demilitarised zone.



*Marshal Foch* said that this was so. If the Greeks were left in Gallipoli, the Turks would refuse to have the opposite shore demilitarised, and this would not favour the freedom of the Straits.

*M. Poincaré* proposed to discuss the military question first. As he understood it, the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and Mitylene, and the islands in the Sea of Marmora were comprised in the demilitarised zone.

*Marshal Foch* said that it was absolutely necessary to demilitarise these islands. No riverain Power ought to possess full sovereignty over them.

*Lord Curzon* said that he understood the demilitarised zone proposed in London last year, and which included these islands, was generally accepted by *Marshal Foch* and the other experts. There was, however, one point. In March last year it was not settled that the Turks were to be readmitted to full sovereignty over Chanak. If this was now to be done, the British military authorities thought that the demilitarised zone on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles ought to go back from the March 1921 line, a distance of another 40 miles.

*Marshal Foch* thought that there was something in this point, but, on the other hand, Turkey would be allowed no guns or troops in the smaller demilitarised zone of March 1921, which might therefore be sufficient.

*Lord Curzon* explained that he understood the view of the British War Office to be that there would be nothing to prevent the Turks from bombarding the northern shores of the Dardanelles and the Straits from the high ground south of the March 1921 line unless the demilitarised zone extended about 40 miles further back.

*M. Poincaré* said that the same observation would apply to Gallipoli.

*Lord Curzon* feared he had not made himself clear. The proposals of March 1921 contemplated Allied garrisons on both the European and Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles. It was now desired to do all that was possible to conciliate the Turks, and accordingly the Allied forces were to be confined to the Gallipoli side, *i.e.*, the Turks would be back at Chanak, and would not be under any control by Allied troops. In return for this substantial concession to the Turks, we should demand a rather wider zone than that laid down in London in 1921. The British military authorities wanted the limit of the demilitarised zone to be the boundary of the sanjak, which lay between the wider zone laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres and marked on the map, and the narrower zone of the March 1921 proposals.

*M. Poincaré* suggested that if the zone were extended on the Asiatic side beyond the line laid down at London, it would be necessary to do the same on the northern shore. We must do the same thing on both the northern and southern banks.

*Lord Curzon* pointed out that the difference was that the Allied garrison was now to be only on the north side of the Straits and not on the south. Of course, if Gallipoli was to be given back to the Greeks without any control, then corresponding measures would be necessary on both sides. It would not be possible, however, to have a demilitarised belt on both sides without some Allied garrison being present in the neighbourhood.

*M. Poincaré* asked whether the Foreign Ministers were agreed that the Straits Commission should have sovereignty over Gallipoli instead of the Greeks.

*Lord Curzon* pointed out that the question of sovereignty was not raised; at present, the only question was that of military control.

*M. Poincaré* proposed to extend the demilitarised zone on both the north and south shores. The Allied garrison on the north shore would be very small and not strong enough to prevent a Greek attack. The zone ought, therefore, to be extended to the north.

*Lord Curzon* suggested that if there were an Allied garrison in Gallipoli and the sovereignty were Greek, he had no objection to having the same depth (so far as this was geographically possible) for the demilitarised zone on both sides of the Straits, but he would like to hear the opinion of *Marshal Foch* as to placing an Allied garrison on the north side of the Dardanelles only. Would the Straits in that case be safe?

*Marshal Foch* said that with control of the north shore the garrison would be able effectively to demilitarise the northern side, but would not be in a position to look after the territory on the other side of the Straits.

*M. Poincaré* suggested that perhaps the garrison on the northern shore could look after the southern shore by means of aeroplanes.

*Marshal Foch* was uncertain about this. There was the question of expense in addition to that of practicability.

*Lord Curzon* said that it was precisely the difficulty of looking after the southern shore which had made him suggest that the League of Nations should be brought in to supervise both sides. *Marshal Foch's* view supported that proposal. The question was whether the northern shore should be occupied by inter-Allied troops alone, or by forces representing the League of Nations. He preferred the latter for two reasons: (1) It would be more palatable to the Turks; (2) the three Powers were anxious to get their forces away from Gallipoli and the neighbourhood, as their maintenance there was too expensive. The time would come when these expenses could no longer be borne, and then the Allies might lose control over the Dardanelles altogether. For these reasons he had proposed to bring in the League, which was a permanent body.

*M. Poincaré* said that the League had no troops; France had tried for an international force at the Peace Conference, but had failed owing to the opposition of President Wilson. The League would have to come to the Allies for the necessary troops. It might be possible to say that the three Allies would occupy the northern shore until the day when the League of Nations was ready to take over.

*Lord Curzon* did not think that this was a valid objection; the League could apply to other Powers. He quoted the instance of the Saar Basin, where the administration was that of the League, but the troops there were French.

*M. Poincaré* said that the troops in the Saar Basin were not really under the League. They were under the command of France and the League accepted their presence. If the League went round asking its members to contribute to the garrison, Bulgaria, Russia, &c., would all ask to contribute. Further, if the three Allied Powers were in occupation, the United States would accept them as Associated Powers, but would not accept the League of Nations. He feared that the proposal would not achieve the object aimed at, and that the League could not provide a garrison, and would have, in fact, to rely upon the forces of the three Allies.

*Lord Curzon* thought there was much force in this observation, but the United States were removing their troops from the Rhine, and would not want to send them to the Dardanelles. If the three Powers were ready to stay there, well and good, but he wished to look ahead. His prophecy was that in five years or so the Allies would want to take away their troops and would apply to the League. In the meantime, however, he accepted *M. Poincaré's* view.

*Signor Schanzer* said that in Italy public opinion was already preoccupied with the expense involved in garrisoning the Straits. She would have preferred demilitarisation without an Allied garrison and with the intervention of the League.

*Marshal Foch* thought that the proposal might prove feasible if there were no enemy in the neighbourhood, but if there were, the League, which possessed no army, could not help.

*M. Poincaré* said that if a buffer State were set up between Turkey and Greece—a sort of Saar Basin under the League of Nations—then they might have a garrison of Allied troops with League of Nations control. Otherwise it would not be worth while to bring in the League of Nations.

*Lord Curzon* thought it quite impossible to set up a buffer State, and it was better to go back to the original proposal and trust to the Allied garrison. Possibly after an interval of time it would be necessary to apply to the League.

*M. Poincaré* thought that *Marshal Foch* and the experts should consider the question of the demilitarised zone and a buffer State first and give their opinions. He asked whether *Lord Curzon* saw any objection to *Marshal Foch* raising the question of Thrace.



Lord Curzon said that he attached great importance to Marshal Foch's opinion, but the question was in the main political and should not be treated solely as a military one. He would be glad to have, however, what Marshal Foch had to say.

Marshal Foch said that Thrace would be difficult to support by itself if left in the hands of the Greeks. It would be difficult for the latter to hold it against Bulgaria. Again, it would be difficult for the Greeks to hold it against the Turks, and that raised the question of the freedom of the Straits. Thrace, as a whole, raised the question of the demilitarised zones. He feared that if the Greeks remained in Thrace, it would be difficult to demilitarise the Turkish side. He had prepared a paper on the question.

Lord Curzon asked that the political question should first be discussed, and after that the military one.

M. Poincaré agreed to this.

The military experts then withdrew.

Lord Curzon then took up the question of Thrace, and referred to his paper of December 1921. By the Treaty of Sévres the Chatalja lines had been extended so as to include Lake Dercos and the water supply of Constantinople. He understood that the Chatalja lines formed the only effective line of defence, but as the Turks said that the Chatalja line menaced Constantinople, he had suggested the Midia-Rodosto line. In reply, the French Government, in their note of the 27th January, had suggested the line Topmansu-Maritsa-Kuleh-Burgas-Rodosto. This left to the Greeks the whole of the area west of Rodosto and south of the railway up to the borders of Western Thrace. He was therefore surprised to hear the argument that the question of Greek sovereignty for this area was still in dispute. He had thought the question to be dealt with related only to the country east of the French line.

M. Poincaré said that Lord Curzon had correctly explained the position. When the French Government had made their proposal they were not aware that the Turks would not accept this line, or that Marshal Foch had objections on military grounds. An indiscretion at Constantinople relating to the question of the boundaries of Thrace had showed what the Turkish view was. The chief consideration was that the line was dangerous from the point of view of peace. If the Greeks kept Gallipoli, it would be difficult for them to defend Thrace.

M. Poincaré then read Marshal Foch's opinion which was in favour of the Enos-Midia line with Turkey to the south of it and a buffer State to the north. Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey were all mixed up in Thrace, and Adrianople was difficult for anyone of them to hold.

Signor Schanzer thought that the Greek view must be treated with sympathy, but thought they must also consider the question of the Straits, and the position of Constantinople as the home of the Caliphate and the capital of Turkey. We must, therefore, give the Turks real protection over Constantinople, otherwise an impulse might be given to the Kemalist movement. He therefore suggested that the frontier should be pushed in the direction of Uzun Kupreui so as to set the frontier further from Constantinople. If the Greeks were left with everything up to the Rodosto-Midia line, they would be in danger between the Turks and the Bulgars. It would perhaps be desirable to hear the military view.

Lord Curzon said that M. Poincaré's argument placed him in a position of some difficulty. He had thought that the French view was that the frontier should be that laid down in their note of the 27th January, 1921. He thought that frontier a bad one, but was prepared to consider it. It now appeared that the French proposed a line from Enos to Midia, with Turkey south of that line, and a buffer State, under the League of Nations, to the north of it. He took leave to remind M. Poincaré of what he had just said about the League of Nations. What Government was going to be set up? How was the region to maintain itself? (There was only one town of any size.) Where was it to find its Administration and its staff, and under whose mandate would it be? The whole question had been discussed at Paris in 1919, when the future of this entire area, extending to the zone of the Straits and Constantinople, had been under examination. President Wilson had favoured the creation of such an autonomous State, but it was out of the question to ask the League to accept the charge of administering the attenuated area now proposed.

There was another point of view to be considered, namely, that of Greece. We

were going to ask the Greeks to withdraw their army with 80,000 bayonets from Asia Minor, and to give up all claims to Smyrna. The Greeks were our Allies; the Turks were our enemies, and had caused enormous sacrifices to all the Allies. The Greeks really deserved some consideration. Were we really to accept the dictation of Mustapha Kemal? Further, how was it proposed to carry out the proposal? If the Turks possessed military superiority in Asia Minor, the Greeks had it in Thrace. It was all very well to draw the Enos-Midia line, but the Greeks would snap their fingers at it. A good deal had been said of the danger to Constantinople, and that point was worthy of examination. But how was it proposed to turn the Greeks out of Thrace altogether? Outside Constantinople there were only a few Allied troops in the Straits' zone, and we did not want to go to war with Greece.

There was another important aspect of the question. The Allies had tried laboriously since the war to establish a Balkan equilibrium. Would Roumania welcome the proposed solution? Would Bulgaria leave the suggested buffer State alone with the Greeks remaining in Western Thrace, as the French Government still proposed? There would be a Balkan war. Again, they should look at the question of population. M. Poincaré had spoken of not putting the Armenians in places where they were in a minority. The question of population had been argued *ad nauseam*. There was no doubt that before the Balkan wars the Greeks were in a majority in Eastern Thrace (see for instance Kiepert's ethnographical map and other similar maps published in the atlas prepared by the Bulgarian Minister at Berlin), the Turkish figures of 1902 (282,420 Greeks and 261,164 Turks) and of 1894 (258,766 Greeks and 205,125 Turks) and the Greek figures of 1912. He would not rely on the latter; they were not wholly impartial. Then came the Balkan wars in the course of which, as also in the late war, deportations of Greeks by the Turks had taken place on an enormous scale. Since then there had been partly Allied and afterwards Greek occupation; the Greeks had come back and the Turks had either left or been deported, and to-day there was believed to be a Greek majority again in that area. Again, there had hitherto been general agreement that the Greeks must remain at Smyrna, and yet it was now proposed simultaneously to turn them out from there and to put the Turks back on the Northern shore of the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora. If this were the idea, his country and Government would never accept it.

M. Poincaré said that he had already explained why he had now dropped the proposal of the 27th January, 1921. He did not think he could be held to be bound to a particular view. They were all seeking a solution; everything was in a state of flux and they could not be bound to any special solution. In 1912, at the London Conference, the Greeks, the Serbs and the Bulgars all claimed Macedonia and Western Thrace. On grounds of population M. Poincaré thought it useless to settle the question statistically. He had before him a Turkish map showing the population of Eastern Thrace as 900,000 Moslems and also the properties of Moslems. From this it was clear that Thrace was overwhelmingly Turkish.

Lord Curzon intervened to point out that his case had rested upon Turkish official statistics, and not upon propaganda figures.

M. Poincaré thought that not much importance could be attached to figures. The real question was a military one. Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Russia all desired Constantinople, and it was necessary to defend the city against them, otherwise there would be a big war in the East. He remembered M. Veniselos telling him that the Greeks always thought of Constantinople. It was necessary to set up something stable in the East and not something which would lead the Greeks to attack Constantinople. He proposed that they should hear the military authorities.

Lord Curzon said that he was quite ready to hear them, but he must observe that M. Poincaré was advancing a very serious proposition. A year and a half ago at Paris, France had been absolutely ready to agree to Eastern Thrace becoming Greek, and no question of the danger to Constantinople had then been raised. He (Lord Curzon) was unable to understand these sudden changes. He again asked his colleagues to consider what the Greeks would do if they were to propose the Enos-Midia line and the buffer State. The Greeks would rather leave Asia Minor in humiliation than abandon Eastern Thrace. But who was going to turn them out? Great Britain would not assist in the operation. Were France and Italy going to undertake it?

M. Poincaré only wished to say that much had happened since Sévres. Advantages were conceded to M. Veniselos, but the return of Constantine had created



a new situation. He agreed that it was necessary to find a solution which was acceptable to both sides without thinking of coercing either. It was not an easy task.

*Lord Curzon* said that it was not a question of individuals, of kings or premiers, but of peoples. What *M. Poincaré* proposed was to put an end to the aspirations of the Greeks. He (*Lord Curzon*) did not wish to see Greece at Constantinople, and did not think she would get there, but her ambitions lay that way, and it was now proposed at a blow to destroy for ever her aspirations. The result would be that the Greeks would fight on.

*M. Poincaré* pointed out that when two or three people had the same aspirations there was always a difficulty. Russia would come again, so would Bulgaria. Because of the ambitions of these Powers, everybody had been content before the war to have Turkey at Constantinople. Whoever installed himself at Constantinople would have other Powers against him; we must not, therefore, give the Greeks an opportunity to think of obtaining Constantinople.

*Lord Curzon* said that if what *M. Poincaré* had said about the aspirations of Bulgaria to Constantinople was true, did he not think that the proposed buffer State with Adrianople in it would lead to attack by Bulgaria? Would not the buffer State also be open to attack from Turkey and Mustapha Kemal, particularly in his present mood? In order to keep the Greeks from Constantinople the only proposal put forward was to set up a sham buffer State. The buffer State would never be a satisfactory method of defending Constantinople.

*M. Poincaré* agreed that the buffer State might not be the best solution, but it was very difficult to find a good solution in a district with a population so racially mixed. The Conference had, however, to find some means of defending Constantinople.

*Lord Curzon* said that he thought the way to do this was to draw the frontier some way further back from Constantinople than the Chatalja lines, or to create a larger demilitarised zone.

(The Conference then adjourned for a quarter of an hour.)

On resuming, Marshal Foch, General Gouraud, General Weygand, General Sir C. Harington, Colonel Heywood and General Marietti, were present.

#### *Eastern Thrace and the Demilitarised Zone.*

*Marshal Foch*, who was asked to state his views, said that the only possible frontiers in Eastern Thrace were the Chatalja lines, the Midia-Rodosto line, the Enos-Midia or the Maritza. If the frontiers were Enos-Midia or Midia-Rodosto, the Greeks and the Turks would be in contact along comparatively long stretches, and it would be difficult to stop them fighting, or to provide effectively for the demilitarisation of the Straits zone. With Gallipoli under Greek sovereignty and the Greek troops in the proximity, they would always be a danger to an Allied garrison. If Gallipoli were given to Turkey and Greece placed north of the Enos-Midia, the Turks and the Greeks would be in contact at both ends of the Straits, with a possibility of fighting opening at any moment. It was for this reason that he had proposed to separate Greece from Turkey by a buffer State. If, however, political exigencies made it necessary to keep the Greeks in Eastern Thrace, another solution would have to be found, but the difficulty would always remain of the Turks and Greeks coming to blows and a Greek army being stationed somewhere near the gates of Constantinople. He had not yet consulted his Allied colleagues.

*Lord Curzon* said that he would first like to ask one or two questions. *Marshal Foch* had said that it would be difficult to maintain Allied troops in Gallipoli if it were under Greek sovereignty. He (*Lord Curzon*) would ask the Marshal how it would be possible to maintain troops there if the sovereignty were Turkish.

Secondly, *Marshal Foch* had emphasised the danger to Constantinople from a Greek attack. He would ask whether it might not be possible to preclude this danger without actually expelling the Greeks from Eastern Thrace. It must be remembered that Greece, of all countries in the Mediterranean, was most at the mercy of the

Western Powers who had strong navies. If Greece in Thrace was ever a menace or a danger, Allied ships could always be sent to the Piræus and threaten to bombard Athens.

There was another aspect of the question to which he would invite *Marshal Foch's* attention. The Greco-Turkish frontier had been placed at Chatalja, 30 miles from Constantinople, then it had been moved back to Midia-Rodosto (about 80 miles). It was now stated that neither distance was far enough to make Constantinople safe. He (*Lord Curzon*) had understood that Chatalja was a very defensible line, and, in fact, if fortified, nearly impregnable. He was, therefore, anxious to obtain military opinion on this essentially military question, and as to the number of the miles of plain which it was desirable to place between Constantinople and the Turco-Greek frontier. The question of establishing a buffer State, which had been raised by *Marshal Foch*, raised many difficulties by no means of a military nature, and he feared that no solution would be found in that direction. For the rest, he trusted that it would be borne in mind that Greece was, in fact, in occupation of Eastern Thrace, and that if it were decided that she should leave, as the Marshal had suggested, her troops would have to be turned out. How could such action be defended or carried out?

*Marshal Foch* referred to *Lord Curzon's* first question. He thought that the answer was that we were going by the treaty to impose control over the Turks in the Straits area, and we were also going to disarm Turkey. As long as Gallipoli was in Greek hands, it would be difficult to demilitarise the area.

*Lord Curzon* pointed out that there was general agreement already that if Gallipoli were Greek there should be the same extent of demilitarised zone on both sides of the Dardanelles. He said that it was in any case far from certain that we were going to disarm the Turks to any great extent. How was disarmament, in fact, to be carried out? He would recall that the French Government, in their recent proposals, had actually suggested a larger force for Turkey than there was in the Treaty of Sèvres, and the continuance of conscription.

*M. Poincaré* observed that the French Government had modified their view about conscription since their note. The Allies were going by some means or other to secure a certain measure of disarmament of Turkey, but with a common Greek and Turkish frontier there would always be a danger of fighting, and we must try and avoid increasing the Greek appetite in the direction of Constantinople, which it was in the interests of the Allies to defend.

*Marshal Foch* then referred to *Lord Curzon's* second question as to the possibility of restraining the Greeks from attacking Turkey. He pointed out that Chatalja was no longer a military frontier because it was within cannon-shot of Constantinople. The minimum distance of the frontier, from this point of view, would give Midia-Rodosto. He suggested that it might be preferable to put the frontier further back, namely, to Enos-Midia, in order better to defend Constantinople.

*Lord Curzon* enquired whether the alternative lay between Midia-Rodosto and Enos-Midia. Would not the latter line be purely artificial with neither strategic, geographical or ethnographical advantages? Geographically and ethnographically, it would be like the frontier between Canada and the United States. Secondly, the Enos-Midia line would mean giving Gallipoli back to Turkey. He would not pursue that question at the moment as he had already explained the very grave objections to it. But he would ask *Marshal Foch* whether, from the point of view of the danger of allowing the Greeks and Turks to confront each other along a stretch of frontier, the Enos-Midia line, which was twice the length of the Midia-Rodosto line, would not be vastly the more dangerous.

*Marshal Foch* said that he had only given general indications of his views, and that he would like to study the question of how best to find a frontier which would keep the Greeks the proper distance from Constantinople. The difficulty, however, remained, that there could be no cessation of fighting so long as the Greeks and Turks confronted one another. Whatever the frontier were the Allies would remain confronted with this difficulty in endeavouring effectively to demilitarise the northern shores of the Straits waters.



Lord Curzon enquired whether, supposing the Enos-Midia line were accepted and Gallipoli and the northern shores of the Marmora returned to Turkey, the Allied troops would be stationed at Gallipoli and Rodosto, or would the Turks be allowed to take their troops back to the north of the Straits? He was anxious to find out the real military opinion on this point.

Signor Schanzer observed that the Allies had two aims, namely, to protect Constantinople being attacked by the Greeks, and not to leave the northern shores of the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmora in the hands of the Greeks. These two objects must be conciliated.

Marshal Foch thought that the only way of preventing the Turks menacing the freedom of the Straits was to remove the Greeks from that area, but he would like to study the question further.

M. Poincaré enquired whether Lord Curzon would have any objection to the demilitarisation of both sides of the Græco-Turkish frontier under the ægis of the League of Nations.

Lord Curzon said he would have none if means could be found to enable the League of Nations to attain that object.

M. Poincaré thought that it might be possible to arrange this, but the difficulty really was that if the whole of Eastern Thrace was demilitarised, which would be the best solution, Bulgaria, with an army much reduced but still large, would be a threat to Thrace.

At Lord Curzon's request, General Harington explained that he had been responsible as Commander-in-chief of the Allied troops for the defence of Constantinople, and, speaking as a soldier and if he was in the position of Turkey, he would certainly say that the only two military frontiers were the Chatalja lines or the Maritza. As Lord Curzon had said, all other lines between these were based on grounds of expediency rather than strategy. From the military point of view, he did not think that Chatalja was now a good frontier, as it was too close to Constantinople. For the practical purposes of the present discussion, however, the Maritza, as a frontier, was too far from Constantinople. With reference to Lord Curzon's question as to how far the frontier should be pushed back from the Chatalja lines, he thought that the Midia-Rodosto line would be far enough, and it would give the Turks time to defend themselves by pushing troops up from Chatalja or Constantinople.

For the rest, General Harington thought that it was essential that we should be fair to the Greeks, and that it must be remembered that in the last resort we could always keep them under control by pressure from the sea.

Marshal Foch suggested that General Harington, General Marietti and himself should now examine the question of a suitable frontier.

General Marietti stated that he entirely agreed with General Harington's views, but thought that before the military experts examined the question a political decision should be reached and some indication given to them as to the precise frontier desired.

General Gouraud also agreed with the views expressed by General Harington and General Marietti, but he suggested that Lord Curzon's object might best be achieved by a buffer State.

M. Poincaré, in reply to General Gouraud, briefly reviewed the various objections, ethnographical and technical, to a buffer State, which Lord Curzon had already stated.

Lord Curzon said that it was necessary to draw distinctions between a neutral zone and a buffer State. The latter was, in his opinion, impossible for the reasons which he had already given and which M. Poincaré had correctly summarised. He understood that Marshal Foch and the Allied Military Advisers were to examine the question of a neutral zone, but not of a buffer State.

General Gouraud admitted that a neutral zone, which provided for the absence of Greek and Turkish soldiers, would suffice.

Signor Schanzer then suggested that the frontier might run from the Marmora to the Black Sea, and that the neutral zone to be created should be on both sides of the frontier.

Lord Curzon said that he would first like to put one question to Marshal Foch, and that was, What steps were the three Allies to take to force Greece to retire from Eastern Thrace if the buffer State were to be created?

Marshal Foch said that it was impossible for the Allies to force the Greeks to take this step.

M. Poincaré agreed, but said that he would make the same reservation as regards Turkey.

The military advisers then withdrew to consider the question of the frontier and the neutral zone in the sense of the previous discussion.

#### *Communication to the Press.*

The conference agreed on the following communication to the press:—

"The three Ministers for Foreign Affairs have examined the question of Thrace and the Straits, and have heard the views of Marshal Foch, General Gouraud, General Sir C. Harington and General Marietti, to whom they have referred the examination of certain military aspects of the question."

#### *Armenia.*

M. Poincaré read a letter from representatives of the French Armenian community, which corroborated his point of that morning that they really desired a home on the north-eastern confines of Turkey.

Lord Curzon stated that he also had received a letter from representatives of the Armenians now in England, which equally spoke of their aspirations for a home in the south of Asia Minor.

It was decided to make no communication to the press on the question of Armenia, as it would be difficult to avoid questions as to the precise decisions reached, and it was not intended to disclose these until a general communication was made to the Greeks and the Turks.

It was, however, decided to add to the above communiqué the following:—

"At their meeting in the morning, M. Poincaré, Lord Curzon and Signor Schanzer began the study of the financial questions, and have charged their experts to elaborate certain points."

Signor Schanzer raised the question which he had raised that morning, namely, as to the precise meaning of the phrase in the armistice terms proposed to the Greeks and the Turks, from which he had inferred that the Greeks should not be allowed to move any units from their front during the armistice. He understood that Marshal Foch, to whom General Marietti had referred the point, had informed him that he (Signor Schanzer) had correctly interpreted the meaning of this clause.

It was decided to consider the matter further in the morning, as it was uncertain whether the British military adviser had also been consulted.

(The meeting then adjourned.)



*Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay  
at 10.30 A.M., March 25, 1922.—(Received at Foreign Office, April 3.)*

Present:

For France	...	M. Poincaré. M. de Perretti de la Rocca. M. Bargeton.
For Great Britain	...	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Mr. R. G. Vansittart. Mr. E. G. Forbes Adam.
For Italy	...	Signor Schanzer. Marquis Visconti-Venosta. Signor Guariglia.

Interpreter, M. Camerlynck.

Present at the discussion of the question of Eastern Thrace:—

Marshal Foch.	General Sir C. Harington.
General Weygand.	Colonel Heywood.
Colonel Georgues.	General Marietti.

Present at the discussion of the question of Turkish finance:—

Mr. Armitage-Smith.	M. Bexon.
Sir Adam Block.	M. Nogara.
M. des Clozières.	

*Armenia.*

M. Poincaré opened the proceedings by raising the question of procedure in referring the matter of Armenia to the League of Nations, as decided the day before. He suggested that it would be better to refer it specifically to the Council of the League than to the Assembly. It would receive more careful consideration in the former case.

Lord Curzon pointed out that all similar communications made by the Supreme Council previously to the League of Nations had been sent to the Council, and not the Assembly, and that the latter only met once a year. It was therefore in accordance with precedent and expediency to refer the question to the Council.

This was agreed to.

*Finance.*

At the request of M. Poincaré, M. des Clozières read the recommendations of the financial experts (see Annex 1), and explained briefly the system on which the experts had conducted their deliberations, namely, to outline the general principles of a settlement and to avoid, as far as possible, the question of details, on which there might still be differences of opinion when the principles were elaborated into a treaty. The essential thing was that the experts had agreed to a number of concessions to be made to Turkey.

Signor Schanzer said that he accepted the general lines of these proposals, but he desired that the formula (see Annex 2) which was to take the place eventually of article 239 of the Treaty of Sèvres, which had been informally agreed upon by the Allied financial experts, should also be inserted in the financial recommendations. Further, he would like the three Foreign Ministers to agree upon another article which was to be added to the Tripartite Agreement to harmonise with the general financial recommendations, and provide for the contingency of the Liquidation Commission

coming to an end at an early date. He had prepared a formula, which he submitted to the conference (see Annex 3).

Lord Curzon said that he would like, in the first place, to ask the financial experts to give some general idea of how the finances of Turkey were to be managed in future. He understood that the principle of their recommendations was that the Financial Commission of the Treaty of Sèvres was to disappear, and a kind of reparation commission was to be substituted. Under the Treaty of Sèvres the Financial Commission had been given complete control over the revenue and expenditure of Turkey. It was now generally realised that this was impracticable and perhaps unwise. But he trusted that this consideration would not be explicitly mentioned in any communication which was to be made to the Turks. The preamble to the financial recommendations should therefore be omitted from any communication made outside the Conference Chamber. The second point which he wished to put was as to the powers of the new Debt Council. Thirdly, there was the question whether any control was to be exercised over Turkish finances in the revised commission other than that provided by the Debt Council and the Commission of Liquidation. He quite agreed that Signor Schanzer's point as to the clause regarding concessions was important, but it was subordinate to these general considerations.

M. des Clozières explained that the experts had unanimously agreed that it was preferable not to try to impose any large measure of control over Turkish finances, and that, in the circumstances, the Debt Council should be retained as under the decree of Moharrem. The just claims of Allied Nationals, and the expenses of Allied occupation of Turkish territory should, however, be provided for, and this was being done through the Liquidation Commission. Lord Curzon was therefore right in suggesting that no effective control over Turkish finances was being established by the new recommendations.

With reference to Lord Curzon's point regarding the preamble, the experts had only intended this to be an indication of their views to the conference, not to be published outside. For the rest, under their proposals, the Liquidation Commission was only intended to last until the Allied war debt was liquidated. If that happened soon, it would be necessary to provide for the contingency which Signor Schanzer's second proposal (see Annex 3) was intended to meet.

In reply to a further question by Lord Curzon, M. des Clozières said that the sum named by the experts should not prove too large for Turkey to pay. Latitude had been given, however, to that commission to modify the total, if, for instance, the areas remaining to Turkey and devastated during the war did not recover quickly.

M. Poincaré pointed out that it might be necessary, when the clauses were elaborated, to change the words "pounds sterling" to "gold francs."

Lord Curzon enquired whether the experts thought that an early execution of their recommendations, if embodied in the new treaty, was possible as long as two Governments existed in Turkey.

M. des Clozières agreed that unification of the two Governments was essential before the financial clauses could be executed.

Lord Curzon then referred to article 6 of the National Pact, and enquired whether the financial experts thought that, in principle, and from the point of view of that article, their recommendations would prove acceptable to Turkey.

M. des Clozières said that he thought they should prove acceptable to Turkey, and, he added, in reply to an enquiry from Signor Schanzer, that he thought the new formula proposed by the Italian Government regarding concessions (see Annex 2), which provided that the Liquidation Commission should give an opinion on concessions but retain no veto, might also, under certain circumstances, be accepted by Turkey.

The financial recommendations of the Allied experts were adopted.

A discussion then followed on the two articles proposed by Signor Schanzer (see Annexes 2 and 3).

M. Poincaré said that he saw no objection, in principle, to the article to be added to the Tripartite Agreement, as this would not, in any case, be communicated to Turkey.



He thought, however, that the formula proposed for the article regarding concessions in the new treaty should be more attenuated in drafting. For instance, Turkey would never accept the imposition of permanent representatives attached to the department of Turkish Government concerned with concessions.

*Signor Schanzer* pointed out that his formula was considerably weaker than article 239 of the Treaty of Sèvres. With their experience of Turkish administration, it was essential to bind the Turkish Government down in its relations with the commission on the question of concessions.

*M. Poincaré* then raised the question of the number of representatives to be attached to Turkish departments by the Liquidation Commission under *Signor Schanzer's* article.

*Signor Schanzer* explained that it was intended only to appoint one representative who would be responsible for a liaison with all the departments concerned. When the financial clauses were elaborated in the final treaty, it would probably be provided also that the Commission de Liquidation should appoint the controller of the Turkish customs, and perhaps of some other Turkish services, as in the Treaty of Sèvres. There would be good reason for this, because it was proposed that the Turkish Government should, in the new treaty, cede the control over all the customs to the commission. The control was absolutely essential in order to prevent the Turkish Government from appropriating revenues for other purposes, and if there were no delegate attached by the Commission of Liquidation to the Turkish Ministry of Public Works, the Allies would have no say whatever in the matter of concessions, and this was in the interest of neither Turkey nor of the Allies.

*M. Poincaré* pointed out that there was general agreement as to the first paragraph of the formula proposed to take the place of article 239 of the Treaty of Sèvres, but he must maintain that the Allies should not try to impose upon Turkey a permanent control over her public services, which seemed to be suggested by that paragraph.

*Lord Curzon* suggested that there was some misunderstanding as to the intention of the second paragraph. He thought *Signor Schanzer* had intended, not several delegates, but only one delegate, who would act as a liaison with the various departments of the Turkish Government who were concerned with the concessions.

*M. Poincaré* agreed, but thought the point might be met by a redraft, which would attain, in an attenuated form, the object desired by *Signor Schanzer*.

After some discussion the formula was agreed to, subject to the provisos that in the first paragraph of *Signor Schanzer's* article, the words "devra demander" should be substituted for the words "soumettra à," and that in the second paragraph the words "Le Gouvernement ottoman devra en outre donner à la commission et à son représentant toutes les facilités nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de sa mission auprès des administrations intéressées," should be substituted for the words "le Gouvernement ottoman . . . . compétent."

*Signor Schanzer* then read the text of a special agreement which he proposed that the three Foreign Ministers should sign, providing for the continuance of the principles embodied in the Tripartite Agreement, as between the Allies, in the event of the Commission of Liquidation, contemplated in the new treaty, coming to an end (see Annex 3).

*Lord Curzon* said he had no objection, in principle, to signing this agreement, but pointed out that Great Britain, as a matter of fact, had no zone of economic priority, and that only France and Italy stood to benefit by the article. It must also be borne in mind that the Allies had no right and no power to insist upon Turkey granting concessions to one or other of them. The Tripartite was only binding as between the Powers themselves.

Further discussion of the article and its signature was deferred until the afternoon meeting.

#### Thrace.

At this stage the military experts, who had arrived at a decision regarding the frontier in Thrace, entered the room.

*Marshal Foch* explained briefly the frontier between Greece and Turkey in Eastern Thrace, which the Allied military experts recommended in accordance with the

views expressed by the three Foreign Ministers on the previous day. The line which they suggested would start from a point just east of the Gallipoli Peninsula near Ganos and west of Rodosto, and then run north-east of the Maritza to the west of the towns of Baba Eski and Kirk Kilisse to the Bulgarian frontier in the neighbourhood of the Stranja mountain range. Both sides of this frontier would be demilitarised, and in the district round Adrianople itself Greece would be allowed to retain troops in order that she would be able to defend the western half of Eastern Thrace, which she was to retain against Bulgaria. Under this plan Rodosto would become Turkish, and the Greek territory west of the Græco-Turkish frontier would then be separated from its port. This raised an economical question, which the military experts were not competent to decide.

In reply to an enquiry by *Lord Curzon*, he added that it was intended to demilitarise equally the whole of Turkish Eastern Thrace and the whole of Greek Eastern Thrace, except her special area round Adrianople, left as a defence against Bulgaria.

*Lord Curzon* thanked *Marshal Foch* and the military experts for their careful study of this question. He understood the military reasons which had led the experts to choose this line, but he must point out that the surrender to Turkey of Rodosto—which might become valuable as a port and which had been given to Greece under the Treaty of Sèvres—might well cause a grievance to the Greeks, analogous to that already caused to Bulgaria by the loss of Dedeagatch.

The second criticism which he had to make was that the line proposed by *Marshal Foch* left two important towns (Baba Eski and Kirk Kilisse) in Turkish Thrace. He did not think it quite fair, while leaving Greece the area round Adrianople, to take away from them these two important towns with a considerable Greek population.

His third point was that genuine hostility between Bulgaria and Greece, owing to past history in the Balkans, existed, and would probably continue to exist in that part of the world. There was a real danger in the continuous intrigues between Bulgaria and Turkey, both anxious to drive Greece respectively from Western and Eastern Thrace. It seemed to *Lord Curzon*, therefore, that it was essential to reduce the common Turco-Bulgarian frontier as much as possible.

There was a last point to which he would draw attention, and that was the question of railway connection. The transcontinental line from Adrianople to Constantinople would pass from Greek into Turkish territory in the neighbourhood of Baba Eski; but there was no railway connection between Western Thrace and the area between the Maritza River and Rodosto, which was the natural easterly debouchure of this area. If Rodosto were left to Greece, a line would probably soon be built, running from Rodosto to the nearest point on the Adrianople-Constantinople Railway at Muradli. He understood that this could easily be constructed if the funds were forthcoming.

To sum up, he thought that the objections he had raised could be met by leaving Rodosto on the Greek side of the new frontier, and making the latter go east of the towns of Baba Eski and Kirk Kilisse, so as to join the Bulgarian frontier in the Stranja district. Rodosto would be in the demilitarised zone, and no Greek warships would be allowed there under the Straits provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres which, in essentials, would be presumably maintained. Greek administration at Rodosto could, in itself, be no danger to Turkey.

*M. Poincaré* admitted that there was force in *Lord Curzon's* arguments, but thought that the Turco-Bulgarian frontier would not really be long enough, under the present proposal of the military experts, to prove a danger to Greece. If the Greek frontier with Bulgaria were prolonged, as *Lord Curzon* had suggested, Greece might find it disadvantageous to have so long a stretch to defend. For the rest, he did not think that the economic argument regarding the Greek area in Rodosto could be pressed very far. In leaving Adrianople to Greece we were really doing something disagreeable to Turkey, all the more that Adrianople was, in some sense, a holy city. The Allies would find difficulty in imposing the treaty in any case, and must make their proposals as acceptable as possible.

*Lord Curzon* agreed that we had to make our proposals as acceptable as possible to both parties, but the Allies must also bear in mind that the Greeks were now in complete occupation of Eastern and Western Thrace and of the towns which the military experts now proposed to cede to Turkey. She had been given to believe that,



even if the Sèvres frontier were modified, she would receive something like the Midia-Rodosto line. If she were now asked to yield more territory and at the same time were told to evacuate completely Asia Minor, with no special régime for Smyrna, she would probably refuse to make the further concessions demanded by the Allies. The Allies would then find themselves in the position of being unable to enforce their demands on Greece.

M. Poincaré pointed out that, as Lord Curzon had himself said the day before, Greece could be coerced, as a last resort, only by Allied naval pressure at Athens.

Lord Curzon observed that he had used this argument, not in connection with enforcing unjust modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres upon Greece, but in connection with the possibility of a future attack by Greece upon Constantinople after the treaty was in force.

For the rest, he understood that M. Poincaré had admitted that no forcible measures could now be taken by the Allies against either belligerent in so far as enforcing peace terms was concerned. He would now ask Marshal Foch whether a frontier of a less objectionable nature than that which he had sketched above could not be found.

Marshal Foch replied that he did not think the frontier which Lord Curzon had suggested east of Rodosto would be so strong, from a military point of view, as that proposed by the Allied military experts. They had specially looked for high ground, and the new line would lie mostly in flat country and would require troops to defend it. This observation applied to the Rodosto end of the line.

Lord Curzon asked whether it would not be possible, leaving aside for the moment the question of Rodosto, to trace a new line up to the Bulgarian frontier on equally high ground, but more to the east than the military experts had proposed.

Marshal Foch thought that it would be quite possible to do this.

General Marietti agreed, and suggested that the line proposed by the military experts might be switched back from a point on the Constantinople-Adrianople Railway northwards east of Kirk Kilisse to the Bulgarian frontier.

Lord Curzon suggested that the military experts might try and find a solution on the lines which both Marshal Foch and General Marietti seemed to think practicable. As to Rodosto, if it were to remain Turkish, Lord Curzon thought that all facilities on the Adrianople-Constantinople Railway east of the new frontier should be given to Greece to enable her to use the port of Rodosto, and on any line or road which might be made from that railway to the port. Greece should, in fact, be given the special position in that port, which was to be given to Bulgaria at Dedeagatch. He would first, however, like to know whether Rodosto was likely to develop into a port of importance and whether a railway could easily be built to the north of the town.

Colonel Georges and Colonel Heywood, who had personal knowledge of the "terrain," agreed that it was quite possible, and, indeed, perhaps more practicable, to develop a port at Rodosto than at Dedeagatch. The hinterland would enable a railway to be built, but the traffic would not be likely to recoup the cost, and improved road communication would be preferable.

In principle, the frontier proposed by the military experts, with the modifications suggested by Lord Curzon, was then adopted, the military experts being asked to draw up a rough map for the next meeting of the conference in the afternoon.

#### ANNEX 1.

Les circonstances actuelles ne permettent plus l'établissement d'un contrôle effectif sur les finances et l'administration ottomanes. Dans ces conditions, la création d'une commission financière qui ne posséderait que des pouvoirs insuffisants, et ne pourra, par conséquent, exercer qu'une action illusoire doit être abandonnée.

Comme, d'un autre côté, il serait impolitique de proposer des mesures de nature à soulever contre le Traité de Paix le nationalisme turc, les experts soussignés soumettent les propositions suivantes :

1. Il ne sera pas prévu dans le Traité de Paix un contrôle général sur les finances ottomanes.

2. Le décret de Mouharrem, les décrets annexes, ainsi que tous les contrats des emprunts énumérés à l'Annexe 1 des clauses financières sont confirmés.

3. Il sera tenu, cependant, compte des décisions du Traité de Versailles supprimant les fonctions de délégués allemands et autrichiens au conseil de la Dette publique ottomane.

4. Le principe des parts contributives à verser par les provinces détachées de l'Empire ottoman et leur mode de calcul sont maintenus.

5. Pour le règlement des frais d'occupation militaires des Puissances alliées depuis l'armistice jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix et après la mise en vigueur du traité, ainsi que les réclamations des ressortissants alliés pour dommages subis antérieurement à la mise en vigueur du présent traité, il sera créé une Commission de Liquidation composée des représentants des trois principales Puissances alliées, qui aura les attributions plus loin.

6. La Turquie s'engage à verser à cette Commission de Liquidation pendant vingt années une annuité de 5,000,000L.\* Toutefois, pendant les premières années, la commission aura le droit de ne réclamer à la Turquie qu'une somme de 3,000,000L. par an, étant entendu que la différence entre la somme totale due par la Turquie, soit 5,000,000L., et ladite somme de 3,000,000L., sera répartie sur les années suivantes.

7. Pour assurer le paiement de cette annuité, le Gouvernement ottoman devra affecter irrévocablement en garantie les excédents restant libres, des revenus de la douane, de la dîme, et de l'agham, ainsi que la part du Gouvernement dans le produit des concessions existantes ou à créer.

8. La commission déterminera les moyens qu'elle jugera opportuns pour assurer la gestion des revenus donnés en gage.

#### ANNEX 2.

##### *Formula to replace Article 239 of the Treaty of Sèvres.*

Le Gouvernement ottoman soumettra à l'avis de la Commission de Liquidation, avant promulgation, les contrats des nouvelles concessions ou de prorogation des concessions existantes à accorder en faveur de ressortissants ottomans ou de tous autres.

Afin de permettre à la Commission financière d'accomplir la mission en connaissance de cause, le Gouvernement ottoman donnera toutes les facilités requises au représentant que la commission désignera auprès du Département ministériel compétent.

#### ANNEX 3.

##### *Accord particulier.*

(Annexe à l'Accord tripartite.)

Dans le cas où la Commission de Liquidation cesserait de fonctionner et avant la cessation de ses fonctions, les trois principales Puissances alliées se concerteraient sur les mesures à prendre pour assurer par d'autres moyens que ceux prévus au Traité de Paix avec la Turquie l'exécution de l'Accord tripartite en ce qui concerne les concessions réservées à chacune desdites Puissances.

\* Le montant de l'annuité ci-dessus sera partagé entre les trois Puissances conformément à un arrangement à intervenir ultérieurement entre elles sur la base des comptes présentés par chacune d'elles et des réclamations de leurs ressortissants.



*Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay  
at 3 P.M., March 25, 1922.—(Received at Foreign Office, April 3.)*

Present:

For France ... ..	M. Poincaré. M. de Perretti de la Rocca. M. Bargeton.
For Great Britain ... ..	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Mr. R. G. Vansittart. Mr. E. G. Forbes-Adam.
For Italy ... ..	Signor Schanzer. Marquis Visconti-Venosta. Signor Guariglia.

Interpreter, M. Camerlynck.

There were also present for the questions of Eastern Thrace and the demilitarised zones:—

Marshal Foch.	General Sir C. Harington.
General Gouraud.	Colonel Heywood.
General Weygand.	
Colonel Georgues.	General Marietti.

*Greece and the Armistice.*

Lord Curzon informed his colleagues that he had received a telegram from Athens which indicated that the Greek answer to the Allied proposals for an armistice would be favourable.

*Italian proposal for an article to be added to the Tripartite Agreement.*

M. Poincaré referred to the Italian proposal for an article to be added to the Tripartite Agreement (Annex 3 to the Minutes of the Sixth Meeting), and suggested that the wording of the last phrase should run as follows:—

"Les engagements pris par lesdites Puissances les unes vis-à-vis de l'autre, en vertu de l'accord en date du 10 août 1920, dit Accord tripartite."

This wording was adopted, and it was agreed that the article should be signed at once in the form of a special agreement (see Annex 1).

M. Poincaré said that the questions still remaining to be discussed were Thrace, Smyrna, the military clauses, the Capitulations, and the Straits, which was still being examined by the military experts.

*Thrace.*

Lord Curzon explained that since that morning he had made further enquiries relating to the railway from Muradli to Rodosto. In consequence of these enquiries, he was of opinion that it was essential to provide economic facilities for Greece in the port and on any railway or road that might be made to it. It appeared that Rodosto had a trade of 1,000,000*l.* per annum before the war.

*Adrianople.*

M. Poincaré raised the question of Adrianople, and urged the necessity of special safeguards for the Moslem majority there.

Lord Curzon pointed out that when the conference was discussing the future of Smyrna he had raised the question of the necessity of a special régime for the Smyrna area, and M. Poincaré had raised objections to such a proposal. In view of the minority formula which had now been adopted, the necessity for a special régime for Smyrna had diminished, but it was impossible to legislate specially for Adrianople if they were not

to take similar action in the case of Smyrna. For the rest, he had recently received a letter from a British official which gave the present figures of the population of Adrianople as about 23,000 Greeks, 3,000 Moslems and 4,000 Jews, so it was probable that no Moslem majority existed to-day. Moslem rights, in relation both to political matters and to mosques, had been specially safeguarded in the Minorities Treaty with Greece, article 15 of which referred expressly to Adrianople.

M. Poincaré agreed that it was not necessary to do more for Adrianople than for Smyrna, but they might perhaps make it clear in the communication to the Turks that special arrangements were to be made for Adrianople.

Lord Curzon suggested that it might be better to wait until they could elaborate the terms of peace with the Turks and the Greeks. If necessary, the same special régime, *mutatis mutandis*, could then be arranged for both Smyrna and Adrianople.

M. Poincaré agreed, but they must remember that the French Parliament might want to elaborate the provisions of the Greek Minorities Treaty, which was not yet ratified.

Lord Curzon said that he did not wish to exclude this possibility, but he would point out that the Greek Minorities Treaty contained very stringent provisions as to the protection of minorities, especially Moslem minorities, and the question as to how and to what extent the treaty shall be reconsidered must be approached with caution. For the present it was only needful for the Allies to say that they were prepared, if necessary, to make special arrangements for the protection and due representation of the different social and religious elements in Adrianople. This was a slight development of article 15 of the treaty.

The following formula was finally agreed upon:—

"When the Treaty of Peace is drawn up, the three Powers will be ready to secure special protection and adequate representation for the different social and religious elements in the two towns of Adrianople and Smyrna."

*Military Clauses and Conscription.*

Lord Curzon urged that, in spite of the Turkish desire to maintain conscription, the Allies should take a firm line on this subject. In the first place, the abolition of conscription had been forced upon Bulgaria and the other enemy States by the respective treaties of peace. Secondly, conscription had been used in Turkey either as an instrument of oppression to minority communities, as for instance, by forcing Christians into labour gangs, or as a means of extorting heavy bribes as the price of exemption. Thirdly, the abolition of conscription would be in the best interests of the Turkish peasant; there were rich areas in Asia Minor almost deserted of inhabitants, who had been forced into the army. The disappearance of conscription would thus be to the advantage both of the Allies and of Turkey.

M. Poincaré said that, while appreciating the difficulty of imposing the abolition of conscription on Turkey, he had, after discussion with Marshal Foch and his military experts, already yielded to Lord Curzon's reasoning. Any other course would certainly produce difficulties with Bulgaria. The Allies should consider the question of allowing a certain interval of time before the abolition of conscription was to be completed.

Lord Curzon agreed that some interval would be necessary. Another method (of securing Turkey's acceptance) was to increase somewhat the voluntary army which Turkey was permitted to retain. Under the Treaty of Sèvres the total number of men allowed, including all the elements of the army (gendarmerie, &c.) was 50,000. At the discussion in London in March 1921 it had been proposed to increase this number to 75,000, and perhaps some further increase might now be allowed. In both these respects concessions might be made to Turkey, but before deciding, the military experts should be heard. There was, however, one further point about the gendarmerie. Both in the Treaty of Sèvres and at the London Conference of March 1921 the Allies had stipulated for the employment of foreign officers to reorganise the gendarmerie, though, according to the proposals of March 1921, the number of such officers was to be reduced. Yesterday, however, M. Poincaré had spoken as if there need be no foreign officers in the Turkish gendarmerie. Was this really to be the case? If so, it would be very difficult to ensure the protection of minorities.

M. Poincaré said that the Angora Agreement—the negotiation of which was entirely contrary to his, M. Poincaré's, views—provided for foreign instructors in the



Turkish gendarmerie schools, but not for foreign officers in the gendarmerie itself. These provisions might be maintained and Turkey left to ask for foreign officers if she wanted them. It was impossible both to abolish conscription and to impose foreign officers on Turkey.

Lord Curzon wished to refer for the moment to the Angora Agreement. He had not specifically raised the point before, but he must in this connection refer to the exchange of letters between Yussuf Kemal and M. Franklin-Bouillon. The former had said that he desired to have French specialist officers as instructors in the gendarmerie schools, and M. Franklin-Bouillon had acknowledged the letter. He, Lord Curzon, asked whether it was intended to send French alone, or French, Italian and British officers to the gendarmerie schools as instructors. He knew from his own experience that such instructors would really be officers who took the field with the gendarmerie itself, and he asked whether that was what the Allies intended.

M. Poincaré said that M. Franklin-Bouillon had had a difficulty with the French Parliament, and had explained both to that body and to himself that the Turkish Government were only willing to choose foreign officers themselves and only as instructors in the schools. These officers would only be employed for training purposes.

Lord Curzon enquired whether the Angora Agreement meant in fact a monopoly of French gendarmerie officers. It would appear that this was the case, in view of Colonel Sarrau's reference to himself as head of the Turkish gendarmerie in Anatolia. He, Lord Curzon, would like to be clear as to how each Ally was to stand towards the others in this matter. Would each Ally provide officers on an equal basis? Though important, this matter was of less moment than the general question whether or not foreign officers should be provided for the Turkish gendarmerie in the present treaty.

M. Poincaré said that Colonel Sarrau's position was quite independent of the Angora Treaty and was due to an anterior agreement. As regards the exchange of letters between Yussuf Kemal and M. Franklin-Bouillon about the gendarmerie instructors, he assured Lord Curzon and Signor Schanzer that there was nothing in those letters contrary to the pledge given by France to Great Britain and Italy in the Sèvres settlement. The matter would have to be made clear in the final treaty.

Lord Curzon thanked M. Poincaré for this assurance. He desired to point out that Colonel Sarrau's present claim seemed to be an entirely novel one, and he had had difficulties with the Head of the Inter-Allied Gendarmerie Commission and its French president, General Filonneau.

For the rest, he (Lord Curzon) would like to be clear whether or not the Allies were really going to pursue an inter-Allied policy with regard to these officers, and whether they were to be only instructors or really officers.

M. Poincaré assumed that we must pursue a common allied policy, and the Allies, acting together, must secure in the final treaty what France had been promised at Angora.

Lord Curzon said that he understood M. Poincaré to have admitted three general points:—

1. The Angora Agreement had been concluded, so far as the question of the gendarmerie was concerned, without the consent of the French Government.
2. No claim was made by France for any monopoly or privilege of gendarmerie officers or instructors outside the French zone.
3. The question of providing such officers or instructors could only be resolved by a common inter-Allied policy.

He suggested that the Allied military experts should now consider whether article 159 of the Treaty of Sèvres should be retained in the new treaty, together with the general question of the attachment of foreign officers to the Turkish gendarmerie and other elements.

#### *Evacuation of Anatolia.*

[At this stage M. Poincaré read the decision of the military advisers as to the interpretation of the article in the armistice dealing with the removal of troops from the Anatolian front. Their interpretation of it was as follows:—

"Aucune unité tactique pourrait être enlevée pour être envoyée ailleurs."]

#### *Demilitarisation of Eastern Thrace.*

General Weygand read article by article the proposals of the military advisers as to the demilitarisation of Eastern Thrace and the zone of the Straits (see Annex 2). He explained that the article intended to replace article 161 of the Treaty of Sèvres referred only to the demilitarised zone as defined in article 178 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

Lord Curzon enquired whether the reference was to the larger zone of the Treaty of Sèvres or to the smaller zone proposed in London in March 1921.

General Weygand explained that it was neither; it was the zone defined lower down in the proposals of the military advisers.

M. Poincaré said that there was a fault in the drafting; it should read "qui sont ou seront occupés."

Lord Curzon asked why the words "gendarmerie under inter-Allied command" had been left out of paragraph 3 of article 178. He referred to the provision of the Treaty of Sèvres which General Weygand had just read out.

General Weygand explained that they had been left out purposely. The Allies were only to control the effectives and not to command the gendarmerie, since there was to be no Allied force in the zone opposite Gallipoli.

Lord Curzon drew attention to the new concession which had been made to the Turks in the new article 178 (3), namely, the permission to have a Turkish garrison in Constantinople as well as the Sultan's bodyguard, which was the only force to be allowed there under the Treaty of Sèvres. He also wished to draw attention to the necessity of consulting the British Admiralty before the draft was finally inserted in the treaty. He must make full reservations on this point.

Thirdly, he understood that the Allied troops were to be reduced in numbers and stationed only in the Gallipoli Peninsula, but they would have to extend their supervision over the whole demilitarised zone. Would there be any confusion of powers between the Allied garrison of the Straits and any Allied troops left in Constantinople under the military clauses, i.e., under the Commission of Organisation and Control.

M. Poincaré also enquired whether the garrison of the Straits would provide officers for the missions at Constantinople.

General Weygand said that Lord Curzon's understanding of the proposed position was correct. He did not think any confusion of powers would arise, but the question of the position of the Allied officers was a matter to be dealt with in the military clauses of the final treaty.

M. Poincaré then raised the question of the demilitarised zone. He thought that that zone should be the smaller area laid down in the London proposals of March 1921.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the question of the zones, as laid down first in the Treaty of Sèvres and subsequently at London, had been modified by the decision of that morning, which demilitarised the whole of Eastern Thrace.

Signor Schanzer enquired whether the Allied garrison in Gallipoli was to look after the whole of the demilitarised area.

General Weygand said that the answer of the military advisers was in the affirmative, and that the Allied garrison would have a large staff and force.

Lord Curzon said that in that case the position would require careful consideration because, if the numbers of the Straits garrison was to be increased in this way, the Gallipoli Peninsula would not be large enough and the Allied troops might have to go to Constantinople.

M. Poincaré agreed that this was a difficulty. The Allied troops must not go to Constantinople because the Turks would never agree to this. It would perhaps be better to let the troops leave Gallipoli, where, as Lord Curzon had pointed out, it might be difficult to keep them; but to keep them as near as possible opposite Chanak or at Rodosto, or withdraw them to the shores of the Sea of Marmora. He therefore suggested the insertion of the words "et sur la côte nord de la mer de Marmara jusqu'à Rodosto."



Lord Curzon thought that the inspecting officers attached to the Allied garrison of Gallipoli should also have the power to go to Constantinople. Both the Greeks and the Turks would be under the régime of demilitarisation.

M. Poincaré feared that in that case there would be difficulties with the Turks, who would be a continual danger if Turkish pride were offended and if they were compelled to accept permanently Allied officers at Constantinople.

Lord Curzon said that there was no question of keeping the officers permanently at Constantinople; all that was proposed was that they should have the right to go there for purposes of inspection. For the rest, these officers should be entitled to go to Adrianople as well as to Constantinople.

M. Poincaré pointed out that Constantinople was a capital and a Holy City, while Adrianople was not important to Greece nor a Holy City for the Greeks.

Lord Curzon suggested that there were many other places which might be taken into consideration, such as Therapia. It would be better to leave the matter vague.

It was finally decided to accept the proposals of the military advisers with the insertion of the words suggested by M. Poincaré "et sur la côte nord de la mer de Marmara jusqu'à Rodosto inclus."

Lord Curzon raised the question of the words in paragraph 7 of article 178 "suivant la marche de l'exécution du traité." He thought that this was too long a time for the Allied troops to remain in the Constantinople area.

It was decided to change these words to "trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent traité."

With these changes the proposals of the military advisers (see Annex 3 for draft as revised) were adopted.

It was then decided to refer to the military advisers the questions of conscription and of Allied officers for the Turkish gendarmerie.

The military advisers then withdrew.

#### Capitulations.

Lord Curzon explained that his advisers had prepared a short draft covering the question of the modifications in principle of the Capitulatory régime for insertions in the proposals to be made to the Turks and the Greeks. Before reading it, he would observe that the question of the Capitulations must be examined from the fiscal and judicial points of view. All necessary safeguards must be provided if the Capitulations were to be modified from either point of view. He wished to make a proposal which contemplated a large concession to Turkey, but, at the same time, would provide a means for securing the necessary safeguards.

Lord Curzon's proposal (Annex 4) was then read and its consideration adjourned until the next meeting.

Lord Curzon urged that on Monday next it would be desirable to publish to the world a communication giving the terms which the Allies had agreed to propose to the Greeks and the Turks. They would have to see how each side took this communication. One side or the other might be disillusioned, and it was therefore necessary to publish the Allies' own case, giving the reasons for which their proposals had been made and any necessary explanations. If this suggestion were accepted he would undertake to prepare a draft for submission to his colleagues to-morrow. Simultaneously the French Secretary might prepare the covering letter with which the formal proposals of the conference would have to be sent to both Greeks and Turks at the close of these proceedings.

This proposal was agreed to.

#### Press Communiqué.

In conclusion, the press communiqué relating to the Straits and the financial clauses was finally approved.

#### Annex 1.

##### Accord particulier.

Dans le cas où la Commission de Liquidation prévue au nouveau traité avec la Turquie cesserait de fonctionner, et avant la cessation de ses fonctions, les trois

Puissances alliées signataires se concerteraient sur les mesures à prendre pour assurer par d'autres moyens que ceux prévus audit traité le respect des engagements pris par lesdites Puissances les unes vis-à-vis de l'autre, en vertu de l'accord en date du 10 août 1920, dit Accord tripartite.

POINCARÉ.  
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.  
SCHANZER.

Paris, le 25 mars 1922.

#### Annex 2.

##### Propositions des Experts militaires au sujet des Dispositions concernant la Démilitarisation de la Thrace orientale et de la Zone des Détroits.

Ces dispositions sont indiquées ci-dessous sous forme d'articles à insérer dans le traité en remplacement des articles 161, 178, 179 et 180 du Traité de Sèvres :

#### ARTICLE 161.

Dans les territoires de la zone démilitarisée occupés par les Alliés et définie à l'article 178 du présent traité, les forces de gendarmerie helléniques ou ottomanes seront subordonnées au Commandement interallié d'Occupation de ces territoires.

#### ARTICLE 178.

En vue d'éviter les contacts armés entre les forces turques et helléniques, et de garantir d'autre part la liberté des Détroits, les hautes parties contractantes conviennent des dispositions suivantes :

1. Dans le délai de trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent traité, il sera procédé au désarmement et au démantèlement de tous ouvrages, fortifications ou batteries dans une zone comprenant les territoires et îles définis à l'article 179 ci-après. Sont interdites dans ladite zone . . . (sans changement jusqu'à la fin du paragraphe 1 de l'article 178 du Traité de Sèvres).

2. Sans changement.

3. Les territoires et les îles de la zone démilitarisée ne pourront être utilisés militairement, en cas de nécessité, que par les trois Puissances alliées ci-dessus visées agissant conjointement. Cette disposition n'est pas exclusive de l'emploi dans lesdites zones et îles des forces de gendarmerie et de police helléniques ou ottomanes nécessaires pour y maintenir l'ordre, non plus que d'une garnison hellénique que dans l'île de Mitylène, et d'une garnison ottomane à Constantinople en plus de la garde personnelle du Sultan prévue à l'article 152.

Toutefois, les effectifs maximum autorisés par ces forces de gendarmerie et de police et pour ces garnisons seront fixés en considération du service à assurer par le Commandement interallié des troupes d'occupation visées à l'alinéa 5 ci-dessous.

4. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie, agissant conjointement, auront la faculté d'exercer la surveillance sur toute l'étendue de la zone démilitarisée de manière à empêcher qu'aucune action ne puisse être effectuée ou préparée qui, directement ou indirectement, serait susceptible de porter atteinte aux stipulations des alinéas 1, 2 et 3 du présent article.

Cette surveillance sera exercée :

Au point de vue naval, par un stationnaire de chacune desdites Puissances alliées ;

Au point de vue militaire, par un service d'inspection confié à des officiers alliés, et qui sera organisé dans les conditions fixées par le Commandement interallié d'Occupation.

5. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie, agissant conjointement, auront, en outre, la faculté de maintenir dans la presqu'île de Gallipoli telles forces militaires et aériennes qu'elles estimeront nécessaires.

Tout en limitant l'occupation interalliée à la région ci-dessus visée, lesdites Puissances se réservent le droit de l'étendre conjointement à d'autres régions de la zone démilitarisée prévue à l'article 179 dans le cas où les stipulations qui font l'objet du présent article viendraient à être violées.



6. Les forces d'occupation visées ci-dessus pourront, en cas de nécessité, exercer à terre le droit de réquisition, &c. . . . (comme dans le dernier alinéa du texte de l'article 178 du Traité de Sévres).

7. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie retireront leurs forces de Constantinople et la partie de la zone démilitarisée qu'elles doivent évacuer suivant la marche de l'exécution du traité.

#### ARTICLE 179.

La zone prévue à l'article 178 est limitée comme il suit :

##### 1. En Europe :

Côtes de la mer Égée : de Cap Helles à l'embouchure de la Maritza—rives orientales de la Maritza jusqu'à un point situé à 20 kilom. sud d'Andrinople—arc de cercle ayant Andrinople comme centre, avec le même rayon, jusqu'à sa rencontre avec la rivière Pravodia, cours de cette rivière jusqu'à la frontière bulgare—frontière bulgare jusqu'à la mer Noire—côtes de la mer Noire jusqu'au Bosphore (rive ouest).

##### 2. En Asie :

Bosphore (rive est) côtes de la mer Noire jusqu'au cap situé à 18 kilom. et de Shilé—allant de ce cap au cap de Yarindjé (golfe d'Ismid)—côtes de la mer de Marmara au cap d'Yarindjé à l'isthme séparant du continent la presqu'île d'Artaki—ligne traversant cet isthme dans la partie la plus étroite, côtes de la Marmara jusqu'au point où la frontière du sandjak de Tchanak aboutit à la Marmara, frontière du sandjak jusqu'à son débouché dans le golfe d'Adramit.

##### 3. Iles :

Sont comprises dans la zone démilitarisée :

- (a.) Les îles de la mer de Marmara.
- (b.) Les îles de Samothrace, Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos et Mitylène.

#### ARTICLE 180.

Une commission sera constituée dans les quinze jours qui suivront la mise en vigueur du présent traité pour fixer sur place les limites de la partie continentale de la zone démilitarisée prévue à l'article 179. Cette commission sera composée . . . (sans changement jusqu'à la fin de l'article 180).

Le 25 mars 1922.

#### ANNEX 3.

##### *Proposition des Experts militaires au sujet des Dispositions concernant la Démilitarisation de la Thrace orientale et de la Zone des Détroits.*

Ces dispositions sont indiquées ci-dessous sous forme d'articles à insérer dans le traité en remplacement des articles 161, 178, 179 et 180 du Traité de Sévres :

#### ARTICLE 161.

Dans les territoires de la zone démilitarisée qui sont ou seront occupés par les Alliés et définie à l'article 178 du présent traité, les forces de gendarmerie helléniques ou ottomanes seront subordonnées au Commandement interallié d'occupation de ces territoires.

#### ARTICLE 178.

En vue d'éviter les contacts armés entre les forces turques et helléniques, et de garantir d'autre part la liberté des Détroits, les hautes parties contractantes conviennent des dispositions suivantes :

1. Dans le délai de trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent traité, il sera procédé au désarmement et au démantèlement de tous ouvrages, fortifications ou batteries dans une zone comprenant les territoires et îles définis à l'article 179 ci-après.

Sont interdites dans ladite zone . . . . (sans changement jusqu'à la fin du paragraphe 1 de l'article 178 du Traité de Sévres).

2. Sans changement.

3. Les territoires et les îles de la zone démilitarisée ne pourront être utilisés militairement, en cas de nécessité, que par les trois Puissances alliées ci-dessus visées agissant conjointement. Cette disposition n'est pas exclusive de l'emploi dans lesdites zones et îles des forces de gendarmerie et de police helléniques ou ottomanes nécessaires pour y maintenir l'ordre, non plus que d'une garnison hellénique que dans l'île de Mitylène, et d'une garnison ottomane à Constantinople en plus de la garde personnelle du Sultan prévue à l'article 152.

Toutefois, les effectifs maximum autorisés pour ces forces de gendarmerie et de police et pour ces garnisons, seront fixés en considération du service à assurer, par le Commandement interallié des troupes d'occupation visées à l'alinéa 5 ci-dessous.

4. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie, agissant conjointement, auront la faculté d'exercer la surveillance sur toute l'étendue de la zone démilitarisée, de manière à empêcher qu'aucune action puisse être effectuée préparée qui directement, ou indirectement, serait susceptible de porter atteinte aux stipulations des alinéas 1, 2 et 3 du présent article.

Cette surveillance sera exercée :

Au point de vue naval, par un stationnaire de chacune desdites Puissances alliées ;

Au point de vue militaire, par un service d'inspection confié à des officiers alliés, et qui sera organisé dans les conditions fixées par le Commandement interallié d'Occupation.

5. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie, agissant conjointement, auront en outre la faculté de maintenir dans la presqu'île de Gallipoli et sur la côte nord de la mer de Marmara jusqu'à Rodosto inclus telles forces militaires et aériennes qu'elles estimeront nécessaires.

Tout en limitant l'occupation interalliée à la région ci-dessus visée, lesdites Puissances se réservent le droit de l'étendre conjointement à d'autres régions de la zone démilitarisée prévue à l'article 179, dans le cas où les stipulations qui font l'objet du présent article viendraient à être violées.

6. Les forces d'occupation visées ci-dessus, pourront, en cas de nécessité, exercer à terre le droit de réquisition, &c. . . . (comme dans le dernier alinéa du texte de l'article 178 du Traité de Sévres).

7. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie retireront leurs forces de Constantinople et la partie de la zone démilitarisée qu'elles doivent évacuer trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du présent traité.

#### ARTICLE 179.

La zone prévue à l'article 178 est limitée comme il suit :

##### 1. En Europe.

Côtes de la mer Égée : du cap Helles à l'embouchure de la Maritza—rives orientales de la Maritza jusqu'à un point situé à 20 kilom. sud d'Andrinople—arc de cercle ayant Andrinople comme centre, avec le même rayon, jusqu'à sa rencontre avec la rivière Pravodia, cours de cette rivière jusqu'à la frontière bulgare—frontière bulgare jusqu'à la mer Noire—côtes de la mer Noire jusqu'au Bosphore (rive ouest).

##### 2. En Asie.

Bosphore (rive est) côtes de la mer Noire jusqu'au cap situé à 18 kilom. et de Shilé—ligne allant de ce cap au cap de Yarindjé (golfe d'Ismid)—côtes de la mer de Marmara au cap d'Yarindjé à l'isthme séparant du continent la presqu'île d'Artaki—ligne traversant cet isthme dans la partie la plus étroite, côtes de la Marmara jusqu'au point où la frontière du sandjak de Tchanak aboutit à la Marmara, frontière du sandjak jusqu'à son débouché dans le golfe d'Adramit.

##### 3. Iles.

Sont comprises dans la zone démilitarisée :

- (a.) Les îles de la mer de Marmara.
- (b.) Les îles de Samothrace, Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos et Mitylène.

[8975]



## ARTICLE 180.

Une commission sera constituée dans les quinze jours qui suivront la mise en vigueur du présent traité pour fixer sur place les limites de la partie continentale de la zone démilitarisée prévue à l'article 179. Cette commission sera composée . . . (sans changement jusqu'à la fin de l'article 180).

## ANNEX 4.

The Allied Powers desire to secure to Turkey the greatest measure of economic independence compatible with the proper protection of the interests of their nationals. For this purpose they are prepared to set up at Constantinople, within three months from the coming into force of the treaty of peace, a commission composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and of Turkey, to prepare, with the assistance of technical experts representing the other capitulatory Powers, proposals for the revision of the capitulatory régime in fiscal matters.

These proposals shall provide for fiscal equality between foreign and Turkish subjects, while safeguarding the former against excessive taxation and abuses in collection, and for any necessary modification of the customs taxes with the consent of the Powers concerned.

As regards the Capitulations in judicial matters, the Allied Powers repeat their original offer to set up within the same period a similar commission to prepare a scheme of judicial reform to replace the capitulatory system, which will continue pending the introduction of the proposed scheme. This commission, on which Turkey will be represented, will be at liberty to recommend either a mixed or a united judicial system.

[E 3510/5/44]

No. 77.

*Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay at 10 A.M., March 26, 1922.—(Received at Foreign Office, April 3.)*

## Present :

For France	...	...	M. Poincaré.
			M. de Perretti de la Rocca.
			M. Bargeton.
For Great Britain	...	...	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.
			Mr. R. G. Vansittart.
			Mr. E. G. Forbes-Adam.
For Italy	...	...	Signor Schanzer.
			Marquis Visconti-Venosta.
			Signor Guariglia.

Interpreter, M. Camerlynck.

M. Gout was present during the discussion of the Genoa Conference.

There were also present during the discussion of Annex 1 :—

Marshal Foch.	General Sir C. Harington.
General Gouraud.	Colonel Heywood.
General Weygand.	General Marietti.

Admiral Margerie and Commander Ramsay were present for the consideration of Annex 2.

M. Hutchinson and M. Gout were also present for the discussion of Annex 3. The military experts attended.

*Conscription and Gendarmerie.*

Marshal Foch read the recommendations of the military experts (Annex 1).

M. Poincaré pointed out that the first recommendation did not amount to the abolition of conscription.

Lord Curzon reminded the Conference that in the case of Bulgaria and of all the other ex-enemy States the Allies had enforced the complete and immediate abolition of conscription by the Treaty of Peace, as a step towards general disarmament. The Allies should certainly reaffirm the principle, and not insert in the treaty the idea that the abolition of conscription might be postponed, still less any period for such postponement. Perhaps on grounds of expediency it might be necessary to make certain modifications after the entry into force of the treaty, as had been done in the case of Bulgaria, but the principle itself must be insisted on in the treaty. He enquired if Marshal Foch agreed.

Marshal Foch said that he did.

M. Poincaré pointed out that they must also remember the question whether the Turks would accept what was proposed. If they did not accept, what were the Allies to do? They must make every endeavour to bring the Turks into the proposed conference.

Lord Curzon replied that if the Turks refused the most reasonable terms which the Allies were offering as a whole, they would offend the public opinion of the world, but the Allies should certainly not again modify their proposals in consequence. They should affirm the principle of conscription in their offer of general terms.

M. Poincaré said that his observations were of a general nature and he was in agreement as to the principle. They must remember the public opinion of Islam and the world, with special reference to Morocco and India and the position of Mesopotamia and Syria. He was pleading the cause of prudence, not that of Angora, and the Allies should not promise that they would do anything which they were not in a position to enforce.

Signor Schanzer suggested that conscription was a sensitive point for so essentially military a people as the Turks; possibly the Allies might leave the whole question vague.

M. Poincaré thought that perhaps it would be better to find a vague formula such as "il sera étudié à la conférence prochaine la suppression du service obligatoire." They were only considering the main terms of the treaty.

Lord Curzon understood that the National Pact contained a provision for a conscript army. The Turks would demand it, and the Allies would have to reply; the point must therefore be mentioned, and they must stand firm on the question of principle, as they had done in the other Peace Treaties. M. Poincaré's formula left the question too open; it would not do to refer questions of principle to the next conference.

After further discussion the following formula was adopted in substitution for the first recommendation of the military experts :—

"Quant aux forces armées de la Turquie, les Puissances ne voient pas la possibilité d'admettre le maintien de la conscription, qui a été écartée dans tous les traités signés avec les Puissances européennes. Elles sont toutefois disposées à considérer dans un esprit amical la détermination de la période dans laquelle le système de recrutement volontaire devra être admis."

Marshal Foch read the second clause of the recommendations of the military experts (see Annex 1).

Lord Curzon enquired whether under these proposals there was any definite ratio between the size of the Turkish armed forces and that of the population of the country. Such a ratio had been provided for in the case of Austria and the other enemy countries.

General Harington said that old Turkey contained nineteen divisions, of which fifteen were raised from the territory which was to remain Turkish. He had the day before recommended to Marshal Foch the figures contained in the experts' proposals; these figures were based on the idea of fifteen divisions of 2,500 men each, the gendarmerie being based on the old numbers.

General Weygand said that the population of Austria was six millions, and an army of 30,000 men had been allowed, so the ratio in the case of Turkey was about the same as in that of Austria. In the case of Hungary the proportion was also about the same.



Lord Curzon asked how they were to stop conscription if Turkey were allowed to keep an army of this size.

Marshal Foch said that they would have to do it in the same way as in the case of other countries, such as Germany—by the threat of force.

Lord Curzon agreed generally, but pointed out that the case of Turkey was different to-day from that of other countries, since the Allies could not occupy portions of her territory, as they had done in the case of Germany, nor had they yet disarmed her.

The second recommendation of the military experts and the figures proposed for the Turkish forces under the new treaty were then adopted.

The third recommendation of the military advisers (see Annex 1) was then read.

Lord Curzon understood the opinion of his military advisers to be that in practice the Turks would be unable to raise any large or effective force of gendarmerie without the assistance of foreign officers, and that as they were rather to take the place of a local police force scattered over wide areas and were not intended to defend the frontiers, it was right that their numbers should be larger than the other elements.

General Harington said that they could stand behind the other frontier forces in case of emergency, but that they had no technical auxiliary troops and were therefore not on the same basis as the other Turkish forces.

Lord Curzon then referred to the principle of the division of Allied gendarmerie officers in accordance with the zones of the Tripartite Agreement, and enquired whether in fact the adoption of the last paragraph of the recommendation of the military advisers would not mean that the division in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement would be abolished.

M. Poincaré suggested that in any communication to be made to the Turks the question of the proportion of Allied officers in the Turkish gendarmerie should not be emphasised, although for his part he was quite prepared to accept the principle of equal division among the Allies of any officers provided by them to the Turkish gendarmerie.

Lord Curzon thanked M. Poincaré for this assurance, but thought that its application must in practice mean the abolition of article 1 of the Tripartite Agreement.

M. Poincaré said that as far as the imposition of that article on Turkey was concerned he was prepared to abandon it, but he must insist on its maintenance as between the Allies. He was not sure if Lord Curzon meant to ask for gendarmerie posts in all the rest of Turkey outside the two zones, but if so he must make full reservations as regards a British monopoly of gendarmerie officers in Constantinople.

Lord Curzon said that he had not made any such claim, but he had thought it undesirable, in the interests of obtaining the Turkish acceptance of a peace settlement, to revive the principle underlying article 1 of the Tripartite Agreement and to make Turkey think that French and Italian gendarmerie officers were necessarily to be imposed on her in the two zones.

Signor Schanzer said that he accepted the principle of not communicating the Tripartite Agreement to Turkey, but must insist on its maintenance *vis-à-vis* the Allies and the application of article 1. Later this might be modified by Allied agreement.

Lord Curzon again asked his Allied colleagues whether they could not accept the general principle of equal division recommended in the last paragraph of the present report of the military advisers (see Annex 1), which would be sounder from the point of view of Turkey than the Tripartite Agreement.

M. Poincaré repeated that he agreed as to the equal division of Allied officers for the Turkish gendarmerie in the *ensemble* of Turkey, but their distribution should be as far as possible in accordance with the division by zones.

The recommendations of the military advisers (Annex 1) were then adopted, but it was agreed that no reference should be made, in any document conveying the Allied terms to the Turks, to the antepenultimate and last paragraphs of the recommendations.

#### *Demilitarised Zones.*

A recommendation of the Allied naval advisers for the revision of parts of Chapter VIII of the Treaty of Sèvres (maintenance of the freedom of the straits) (see Annex 2) was adopted.

#### *Capitulations.*

The conference proceeded to consider the proposed statement with regard to the Capitulations which had been circulated by Lord Curzon the previous afternoon (see Annex 3).

M. Poincaré stated that he wished to make an observation upon a matter of great importance in the eyes of France which might be considered to be affected by the wording of this draft statement; he referred to the religious protectorates. He was anxious that this most important question should not be settled in advance against France by the first paragraph of the draft. He enquired whether the reference to "the proper protection of the interests of their nationals" would deprive them of all rights in regard to the protection of others than their nationals.

Signor Schanzer said that he also must make all reserves upon this matter. The question to which M. Poincaré referred had been settled at San Remo.

M. Poincaré stated that as he understood it the question had been settled there only for Palestine.

Lord Curzon said that the agreement reached with M. Millerand at San Remo was not in his view confined to Palestine. This question must, however, be reserved, and he had no intention whatever that his present proposal with regard to the Capitulations should be regarded as affecting the question of the protectorate one way or the other.

M. Poincaré suggested that the phrase should be modified to read simply "compatible with existing rights."

Lord Curzon enquired whether the difficulty would be met by the substitution for the words "their nationals" of the words "foreign subjects."

M. Poincaré explained that Turkish subjects of the Catholic faith also came in question. He did not want the matter to be settled in advance against France.

Signor Schanzer said that on the question of the religious protectorates each of them must reserve his point of view, and it should be made clear that the present formula did not relate to this question at all. The present statement dealt with economic and judicial matters, while M. Poincaré's point related to religious matters. It appeared to him that provided the position was rendered perfectly draft before them related only to matters fiscal and judicial ("fiscales et judiciaires").

Lord Curzon said that he had not the slightest desire or intention of raising in these discussions the question of the religious protectorates, upon which there was disagreement between the Governments and on which he thought the Italian Government were of the same opinion as the British.

M. Poincaré replied that he was well aware, of course, that Lord Curzon had not intended to touch this question. He would be satisfied to accept Signor Schanzer's proposal, provided it were made quite clear in the *procès-verbal* that the draft before them related only to matters fiscal and judicial (*fiscales et judiciaires*).

Upon this understanding Lord Curzon's draft was accepted.

#### *Costs of the Armies of Occupation.*

M. Poincaré enquired whether the conference wished to consider at this stage the question of the costs of the armies of occupation. It was a large matter to discuss now.

Lord Curzon pointed out that they wished to finish their immediate work to-day, and suggested that this question should be left over.

This was agreed to.



*Statement of Conclusions reached.*

Lord Curzon informed the conference that he had during the previous night prepared a memorandum setting out in general terms the conclusions which the conference had reached and their reasons for coming to them. He had endeavoured to give a broad, general and fair-minded statement of the terms proposed, with an explanation of each, in a form suitable for publication to the world, so that they might be judged by their work as a whole. He suggested that he should add to this memorandum a note of the results of this morning's discussion, and should bring it before them in the afternoon.

If it were found to be a fair statement, Lord Curzon would suggest that instead of having two documents, one for the press and the other for the Greeks and Turks, his statement, with any modification of wording that might be considered desirable, should be included in the communication to be sent to the latter, as a general declaration of the proposals which they were invited to consider. It could then be published on Tuesday or Wednesday, or whenever the conference chose.

M. Poincaré thought it desirable to make an announcement to the press to-day, if possible, and suggested that they should be given what was being sent to Constantinople.

This point was left over for further discussion.

*Place of Meeting with the Greeks and Turks.*

M. Poincaré pointed out that there remained the question of the place of meeting with the Greeks and Turks.

Lord Curzon suggested that this should be Constantinople. He did so for several reasons. Constantinople was the only place where the two Turkish Governments could meet together with ease, and it was close at hand for them; the High Commissioners, who had become familiar with the problem to be dealt with, were also available there. The only alternatives were London, Paris or Rome, none of which was so convenient for the purpose as Constantinople; and it had to be borne in mind that if the Turks and Greeks should come to one of those capitals and should then refuse the terms, a much more awkward position would be created for the Allies than if the meeting were held in Constantinople.

M. Poincaré feared that the choice of this city might suggest a preference to one Turkish Government over the other, and might divide the Turks, and he suggested that Brusa would be a more satisfactory place of meeting. But perhaps they need not indicate at present what place within the Turkish Empire would be chosen.

It was agreed that the communication should say that the place of meeting would be fixed later.

The conference rose till 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when Lord Curzon's statement of the results of their work would be considered.

ANNEX 1.

*Avis des Experts militaires.*

*Première Question.*—Au bout de combien de temps la suppression du service obligatoire peut-elle être imposée à la Turquie?

Etant données les difficultés actuelles du Gouvernement turc pour assurer le paiement de la solde des troupes et de la gendarmerie, comme aussi les frais élevés qu'entraînera le recrutement par engagement volontaire, il ne paraît pas possible d'indiquer maintenant une date précise à partir de laquelle le recrutement par engagement volontaire peut efficacement être imposé à la Turquie.

C'est seulement lorsque sa situation financière le lui permettra que la Turquie pourra recruter son armée et sa gendarmerie par engagement volontaire.

*Deuxième Question.*—Quels effectifs est-il possible d'accorder à la Turquie pour son armée et sa gendarmerie?

Le Traité de Sèvres a fixé les chiffres de :

35,000 hommes pour la gendarmerie.  
15,000 hommes pour l'armée.

50,000 hommes au total.

A Londres, en mars 1921, on a estimé possible de porter ces chiffres à :

45,000 hommes pour la gendarmerie.  
30,000 hommes pour l'armée.

75,000 hommes au total.

Après un nouvel examen, les chiffres suivants semblent pouvoir être atteints :

45,000 hommes pour la gendarmerie.  
30,000 à 40,000 hommes pour l'armée.

75,000 à 85,000 hommes au total.

L'artillerie de l'armée ne devra comprendre que des canons de montagne et de campagne, à l'exclusion d'artillerie lourde.

La proportion de la cavalerie devra être largement augmentée par rapport à celle qui était prévue dans le Traité de Sèvres; elle pourra comprendre 4,000 hommes pour une armée de 30,000 hommes. La cavalerie devra également entrer pour une très large proportion dans la composition de la gendarmerie.

*Troisième Question.*—Est-il indispensable de placer dans la gendarmerie turque des officiers alliés pour y participer à l'organisation, au commandement et à l'instruction?

L'expérience a montré qu'il serait très désirable, au point de vue des résultats militaires, à obtenir que des officiers alliés soient placés dans les formations de gendarmerie.

Mais on reconnaît qu'il est impossible de l'imposer aux Turcs.

Il semble, en conséquence, que le seul moyen pratique serait pour les Puissances alliées de recommander à la Turquie l'utilisation d'officiers alliés pour l'organisation, le commandement et l'instruction de la gendarmerie, en indiquant que ces officiers seraient au service de la Turquie, selon les pratiques en usage avant 1914.

Il y aurait lieu, en outre, de spécifier que les officiers ainsi employés devraient appartenir en proportion égale aux trois Puissances alliées.

ANNEX 2.

*Propositions des Experts navals au sujet des Dispositions concernant la Démilitarisation navale de la Thrace orientale, des Iles et de la Zone des Détroits.*

1. Au chapitre VIII des Clauses militaires, après le titre "Maintien de la Liberté des Détroits," ajouter en sous-titre: "Dispositions militaires et navales."

2. *Article 178.*—Apporter à nouvelle rédaction de l'article 178 présentée par les experts militaires, les additions ci-après:

(a.) Alinéa 1.—Après les mots: "Il sera procédé au désarmement et au démantèlement de tous ouvrages, fortifications ou batteries dans une zone comprenant les territoires et les îles définis à l'article 179 ci-après," ajouter: "Il sera procédé également dans le même délai à l'enlèvement et à la destruction de tous organes de défense maritime (postes d'écoute sous-marines, tubes lance-torpilles, lignes de mines ou de torpilles, filets ou obstructions de toute nature, projecteurs, . . . &c.) existant sur le littoral ou dans les eaux de la même zone."

Dans l'alinéa suivant: "Sont interdits . . .," remplacer les mots: "La reconstruction de ces ouvrages," par les mots: "La reconstruction de ces ouvrages terrestres et maritimes."

(b.) Alinéa 3.—Remplacer les mots: "Les territoires et les îles de la zone démilitarisés," par: "Les territoires ainsi que les eaux, ports et rades de la zone démilitarisée et des îles qu'elle comprend."

ANNEX 3.

"The Allied Powers desire to secure to Turkey the greatest measure of economic independence compatible with the proper protection of the interests of their nationals. For this purpose they are prepared to set up at Constantinople, within three months from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, a commission composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and of Turkey,



to prepare, with the assistance of technical experts representing the other capitulatory Powers, proposals for the revision of the capitulatory régime in fiscal matters. "These proposals shall provide for fiscal equality between foreign and Turkish subjects, while safeguarding the former against excessive taxation and abuses in collection, and for any necessary modification of the customs taxes, with the consent of the Powers concerned."

"As regards the capitulations in judicial matters, the Allied Powers repeat their original offer to set up within the same period a similar commission to prepare a scheme of judicial reform to replace the capitulatory system, which will continue provisionally pending the introduction of the proposed scheme. This commission, on which Turkey will be represented, will be at liberty to recommend either a mixed or an unified judicial system."

[E 3511/5/44]

No. 78.

*Minutes of the Ninth Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay at 4 P.M., March 26, 1922.—(Received at Foreign Office, April 3.)*

## Present:

For France	...	...	M. Poincaré. M. de Perretti de la Rocca. M. Bargeton. M. Gout.
For Great Britain	...	...	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Mr. R. G. Vansittart. Mr. E. G. Forbes-Adam.
For Italy	...	...	Signor Schanzer. Marquis Visconti-Venosta. Signor Guariglia.

Interpreter, M. Camerlynck.

*Text of Communication to the Greeks and Turks.*

M. Poincaré began by thanking Lord Curzon for the draft communication to the Greek and Turkish Governments, which he had prepared and circulated to the conference before the meeting (see Annex 1). As a whole it corresponded entirely with the French views.

Signor Schanzer said that he also wished to congratulate Lord Curzon on a draft which admirably reflected the general Allied point of view.

M. Camerlynck then read the draft.

M. Poincaré proposed the insertion of the words "summoned for the purpose" after "experts," and the substitution of the words "have examined under all its aspects" for "discussed," and "following proposals" for "conclusions," on p. 1.

These were agreed to.

M. Poincaré said he would like to say something in the preamble as to the terms being subject to the views of the respective Parliaments.

Lord Curzon pointed out that this communication was only the preliminary stage towards the final conclusion of a new Peace Treaty, which would presumably have in any case to be confirmed by the various Parliaments.

Signor Schanzer agreed.

M. Poincaré thought that his point would be met by the use of the words "three foreign Ministers" instead of "Powers" or "Governments" throughout.

After some other drafting alterations had been made, M. Poincaré asked whether some reference should not be made to the phrase "entire independence" of Turkey, which appeared in the National Pact.

Lord Curzon pointed out that this was hardly possible, even if desirable, owing to the servitudes imposed with regard to the Straits.

M. Poincaré proposed to stop at the word "development," and omit the word "national" in paragraph 4. He was afraid Greek ambitions might be roused by such a phrase.

Lord Curzon said that he must insist on the retention of the word "national." This paragraph was intended to emphasise the Allied intention to deal fairly by the Greek nation. The Turks were not the only people who were to be allowed to have national aspirations. He would, however, accept some such phrase as "national and economic progress."

This was agreed to.

It was also agreed to omit the words "without humiliation," on p. 4.

Lord Curzon explained that in the third paragraph on p. 4 he wished particularly to emphasise the retention by Turkey of the whole of Asia Minor in unimpaired sovereignty.

M. Poincaré suggested that it was unwise to imply that the Allies were unable to turn Greece out of Thrace, on p. 7.

Lord Curzon pointed out that Marshal Foch had agreed with him in the discussion on the previous day that this was in fact the case, but he would agree to the change "accordingly," i.e., instead of "in these circumstances" at the beginning of the paragraph on p. 7.

Some discussion followed as to the description of the frontier of Eastern Thrace to be inserted in the draft.

M. Poincaré objected to the precise description given to the proposed line, and the mention of Ganos as the starting point on the coast, and Tsnikigori as the point of termination on the Bulgarian frontier. He said that he had only agreed on the previous day to the line originally proposed by the military advisers (i.e., that running from Hora on the coast through the towns of Baba Eski and Kirk Kilisse, being deflected north of the railway).

Lord Curzon said that he understood from his military advisers that after the principle of pushing the frontier to the eastward of the line originally recommended by the military advisers to the conference, namely, east of Kirk Kilisse and Baba Eski, had been accepted by the conference on the previous day, the military experts had drawn a new line on the map, which, south of the railway, followed the crest north of Ganos instead of the plain north of Hora. Marshal Foch had admitted to him that this was a better strategic frontier, and he was quite prepared to accept the Marshal's ruling on the subject.

M. Poincaré regretted that this was the first time he had seen the new *tracé*, and he would require to study it further with his military advisers.

Lord Curzon said that he would not at the moment argue the point further, though he had no doubt as to the line which had been proposed and accepted, but he was willing to describe the point of departure from the coast as a point "in the neighbourhood of Ganos," and the point where the Bulgarian frontier was reached "as the western part of the Stranja mountains."

This was accepted.

On p. 10 of the draft it was agreed to omit a reference to "the three months from the entry into force of the treaty," and to say "will be altogether withdrawn after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace." In the last paragraph on p. 10 Lord Curzon suggested that it would be better to indicate one figure as the total Turkish force including Turkish gendarmerie, instead of saying "75,000" to "85,000" men as proposed in the second recommendation of the military advisers.

It was agreed to take 85,000 as the total.

Lord Curzon proposed that a paragraph should be inserted giving the main lines of the financial decisions.

After a discussion in which Signor Schanzer asked that some formula should be accepted to cover his proposal, which had already been agreed to, as to consultation between the Liquidation Commission and the Turkish Ministries dealing with concessions, a paragraph drafted by Lord Curzon was inserted and accepted.



Lord Curzon pointed out that his draft specially emphasised the abolition of the Financial Commission.

On p. 14, *M. Poincaré* raised the question of the translation of the word "summarily" before the word "rejected." He proposed to translate it "de parti pris," as the French translation of "summarily" was stronger than the English.

Lord Curzon agreed.

The draft was then accepted (see Annex 2).

Lord Curzon suggested that the whole draft should be sent with a covering letter signed by the three Ministers to the Greeks and Turks, and, at the same time, telegraphed from Paris to Athens, Constantinople and Angora. The covering letter should invite the parties to a conference which might take place at Constantinople in three weeks' time, seeing that the communication was to be made by telegram.

*M. Poincaré* thought that Constantinople, if mentioned in the invitation as the meeting place, might be regarded by Angora as prejudicing their position. He suggested Brusa as a suitable meeting place.

Lord Curzon pointed out that this was still in Greek occupation.

*M. Poincaré* said that he would have an annex to Lord Curzon's note prepared, containing a summary of the resolutions passed by the conference.

It was agreed to meet again at 9.45 P.M. to consider the French translation of Lord Curzon's communication, the text of the covering letter, which would be prepared meanwhile by the French Foreign Office, and the communication to be made to the press.

#### ANNEX 1.

The Foreign Ministers of the Allied Powers of France, Great Britain and Italy, having during five days in succession discussed every aspect of the situation in the Near East, having consulted at each stage the military and financial experts who were summoned to Paris for the purpose, and having further enjoyed the advantage of communicating beforehand with the representatives both of Turkey and of Greece, have unanimously arrived at the following conclusions, which they offer as the most equitable solution that it is in their power to offer of the Near Eastern problem.

The principles which they have throughout borne in mind, and which are the bases of their proposals have been as follows:—

1. They desire to re-establish peace between the conflicting armies of Turkey and Greece, but to deal fairly with both parties, and to impose upon neither conditions of discomfiture or defeat.
2. They desire to re-establish the Turkish nation and the Turkish dominion in the areas which may legitimately be regarded as their own, with the historic and renowned capital of Constantinople as the centre, and with such powers as may enable them to renew a vigorous and independent national existence.
3. They desire to secure full and fair treatment to the followers of the creed of Islam and to maintain the secular and religious authority of the Sultan of Turkey.
4. They desire to compensate the Greek nation for the great sacrifices which they have accepted during the war in the cause of the Allies, and to leave them such scope for their national and economic development as is demanded both by their achievements and by their legitimate aspirations.
5. They desire to enable both peoples, in regions where they are contiguous or where their populations are intermingled, to live in future in conditions of mutual confidence and self-respect.
6. They desire to provide for the protection and security of the various minorities, whether Moslem or Christian, or of other races and creeds, who, whether in Europe or Asia, find themselves placed in the midst of larger political or ethnic aggregations.
7. They desire to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict between the Turkish nation and the European Powers with whom it was recently at war.
8. They desire, above all, to find a solution that shall not be suspected of partiality to one side or the other, but shall endeavour with firm hands to hold the scales even between the two.

With these ends in view, the first object of the Allied Powers has been to bring about a suspension of hostilities between the confronting armies in Asia Minor, in order to enable the counsels of peace and the prospects of an amicable settlement to prevail. They have therefore proposed the conclusion of an armistice to the Governments of Turkey and Greece, subject to conditions which are scrupulously fair to both parties and which are defined by the military authorities under the presidency of Marshal Foch.

The Hellenic Government has without delay signified its acceptance of this proposal. The decision of the Turkish Government is still awaited.

The proposal of an armistice has been made with the avowed intention of assuring the peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek forces and the restitution of Turkish sovereignty over the whole of that region. The arrangements for this evacuation, as the first step in the general settlement which is now proposed, have simultaneously been elaborated by the military authorities under Marshal Foch, and are capable of being put into execution without delay. It is calculated that the period required for a complete and peaceful withdrawal of the Greek forces will be somewhat over four months.

It will be observed that in the event of these proposals being accepted by both parties, the recovery of Anatolia by the Turks, which is believed to be their principal national aspiration, will have been attained without any further sacrifice of treasure or life. Correspondingly, the retirement of the Greek troops will be effected with honour and without humiliation.

Should this operation be successfully accomplished, the Turkish sovereignty in Asia will exist unimpaired from the Mediterranean to the Bosphorus and the Black Sea, and from the borders of Transcaucasia, Persia and Mesopotamia to the Levant.

Accepting the imperative necessity, which is the result both of historical and geographical causes, for the protection of the minorities of alien race or religion who are found, in some cases in large numbers, both in the vilayets of Turkey and in the European possessions of Greece, the Powers have proposed a series of provisions for their full and adequate security, without distinction of race or creed, in both areas. These provisions will be based both upon the stipulations contained in existing treaties or drafts of treaties and in the secular or religious law of the countries concerned. Furthermore, the Powers have decided to invite the League of Nations to collaborate in this object by the appointment of special commissioners to superintend the execution of these provisions in the areas and for the communities who are principally concerned.

The case of the Armenians has called for special consideration by reason both of the undertakings entered into by the Allied Powers in the course of the war and of the cruel sufferings of which that people have been the victims. Accordingly, the aid of the League of Nations is sought, over and above the protection accorded by the minority provisions to which reference had already been made, in order to obtain for the Armenians the satisfaction of their traditional aspirations for a national home.

The interests of peace and the safety of the future demand that Europe shall never again be exposed to the perils and sacrifices which were imposed upon her in 1914 and the succeeding years by the forcible closure of the Dardanelles. The countless lives that were there poured out, the stupendous efforts that were entailed must not have been expended in vain. The Turks will be readmitted to the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles under conditions which will provide for the existence of a broad demilitarised zone, in order to obviate the possibility of any hostile military preparations in that quarter. But an Allied force must be placed and must remain in occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to safeguard the free and unimpeded entrance of the Straits. This also will be a demilitarised zone. The Allied garrison will consist of a force sufficient to secure the entrance to the Dardanelles.

The navigation of the Straits will be placed, as already proposed, under the control of an International Commission under a Turkish president, on which it is hoped as time passes that all the principal States who are interested in the commerce or navigation of the Straits will be represented.

The demilitarised zone on the Asiatic shore of the Straits will extend from on the Mediterranean to on the Marmora. No further demilitarisation is proposed on the southern shores of the Marmora. On the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus the demilitarised zone will extend inland to a line drawn from to The islands of outside the Dardanelles, and of in the Marmora will equally be demilitarised.



Passing to the European shore of the Dardanelles and the Marmora, the Powers have been confronted with the difficult and anxious problem of the future of Eastern Thrace. On the one hand, they were unable, for the reasons which have already been stated, to accept a solution that would place the Gallipoli Peninsula once more in the hands of Turkey. On the other hand, they were met by the complaint that some at any rate of the lines of frontier that have hitherto been proposed between the European possessions of Turkey, to the north and west of Constantinople, and the areas in Eastern Thrace in the occupation of the Greeks afforded insufficient protection to the Turkish capital, which might find itself exposed in the future either to the military menace of invasion or to the invidious propinquity of a neighbour with whom it had recently been at war.

Such dangers it was obvious would be most effectively removed: (a) by the removal to a sufficient distance from Constantinople of the projected frontier; (b) by the effective neutralisation of the areas outside this line. Furthermore, the Powers were confronted by the incontestable facts of the existing situation. Whether the attribution of Eastern Thrace to the Greeks by the unratified Treaty of Sèvres be or not be held to constitute a valid title, the Greek forces are in effective occupation, and the Greek Government is engaged in administering that area, which, moreover, contains, and has long contained, a considerable, and in parts a preponderant, Greek population. In these circumstances, the Powers could not assume the responsibility of requiring from Greece not merely the complete evacuation of Anatolia, to which it must be remembered in passing that Greece was invited in 1919 by the Powers, but the complete evacuation of Eastern Thrace in addition. Such a demand would have been consistent neither with equity nor with practicability. It would have been unjust; and it could not be enforced.

In these circumstances, and bearing in mind the importance of the strategical considerations before referred to, which may be summed up in the desideratum of reasonable security for the capital and the state of Turkey in Europe, the Foreign Ministers of the Powers invited the military authorities under Marshal Foch to assist them with their expert advice. These authorities recommended the drawing of a line which will run from the neighbourhood of Ganos on the Marmora in a northerly and north-easterly direction to a point on the Bulgarian frontier at

This frontier will leave Rodosto, a Greek town, to the Turks. It will place Baba Eski and Kirk Kilisse on the Greek side of the Turco-Greek frontier. The safety of the frontier is assured by the topographical features of the country, and will be further confirmed by the demilitarisation of the entire area of Eastern Thrace both on the Greek and the Turkish sides of the frontier. Thus the Greeks will not be able to threaten Constantinople, and the Turks will not be in a position to attack the Greeks.

The periodical inspection of these and the other demilitarised zones will be undertaken by Allied officers attached to the Allied force on the Gallipoli peninsula, the area of whose occupation will be extended eastwards to Rodosto.

It has been considered whether any special provision should be made for the town of Adrianople, which it has been found impossible to sever from the surrounding territories of Eastern Thrace. Smyrna, which will revert to Turkey, and Adrianople, which will be retained by the Greeks, are in a somewhat analogous position. The Powers will be quite willing to enter into friendly communication with the Turkish and Greek Governments, with a view to the conclusion of a friendly agreement upon conditions which will guarantee a full and fair share to the non-Turkish and the non-Greek elements in the populations in the administration of the two cities and will further safeguard the religious buildings and institutions of Adrianople.

The Powers are not so vain as to suppose that this solution of the Thracian problem will be warmly accepted by either party. The problem admits of no such easy solution. They can only commend it to the public opinion of the world as the proposition which seems to them to be most consistent alike with justice and with the facts of the case.

Passing to Constantinople, the Powers desire to confirm their previously-expressed willingness to withdraw altogether the threat that was made at the time of the Treaty of Sèvres to revoke at some future date the retrocession of the capital to the Turks. They confirm the restoration of that city to the full authority of the Government of the Sultan; and they are further willing to engage that the Allied forces, by whom it is at present occupied, shall be altogether withdrawn with the least possible delay after the ratification of the future Treaty of Peace.

The Turkish Government will be invited to garrison the city with a larger force than was contemplated in the Treaty of Sèvres.

There remain the questions of the future armed forces of the Turkish State, the financial independence which it will enjoy, and the suggested modification or surrender of the capitulatory rights which are enjoyed by foreigners.

Concerning the armed forces of Turkey, the Allied Powers are unable to depart from the principles which it has been found necessary to enforce in the treaties that have been concluded with all the other States recently at war, or to admit the continuance of the system of conscription. They will, however, be prepared to consider with the Turkish Government in an amicable spirit the determination of the period within which the voluntary system of recruiting must be established in that country.

As to the numerical strength of the Turkish forces, it is proposed to allow a very appreciable augmentation of the figures which were contained in the Treaty of Sèvres or were afterwards suggested in London in 1921. The forces now finally proposed are gendarmerie 45,000, regular army 20,000 to 40,000, or a grand total of 75,000 to 85,000 men, a total which is very markedly in excess of the 50,000 designated in the Treaty of Sèvres.

Should the Turkish Government desire the assistance of foreign officers for the organisation of the above-named force of gendarmerie—a measure which will probably be found to conduce greatly to its efficiency—the Powers will be ready to place them at the disposal of the Turkish Government.

In respect of the existing capitulatory system, the Powers are anxious to secure to Turkey the largest measure of economic independence consistent with the due protection of the interests of their nationals. For this purpose, they are prepared to set up at Constantinople, within three months from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, a Commission composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and of Turkey, to prepare, with the assistance of technical experts representing the other Capitulatory Powers, proposals for the revision of the capitulatory régime in fiscal matters.

These proposals shall provide for fiscal equality between foreign and Turkish subjects, while safeguarding the former against excessive taxation and abuses in collection, and for any necessary modification of the customs taxes with the consent of the Powers concerned.

As regards the Capitulations in judicial matters, the Allied Powers repeat their former offer to set up within the same period a similar commission to prepare a scheme of judicial reform to replace the capitulatory system, which will continue provisionally pending the introduction of the proposed scheme. This commission, on which Turkey will be represented, will be at liberty to recommend either a mixed or an unified judicial system.

Such, in broad outline, are the main features of the settlement which the Ministers of the three Great Powers, acting on behalf of their Governments, have decided unanimously to recommend. These proposals are now submitted primarily to the judgment of the two parties who are directly involved, but secondarily, and in a not inferior degree, to that of the civilised world. Nor is it necessary to add that the people or the Government by whom they were rejected, if such a misfortune were to occur, would assume a very grave responsibility before the public opinion of mankind; namely, the responsibility of resuming a struggle which has already wrought sufficient havoc among the peoples of two continents, and the renewal of which can only bring further ruin and destruction in its train, besides leading to a permanent embitterment between the races and creeds of the Near East.

March 27, 1922.

#### ANNEX 2 TO MINUTE 9.

The Foreign Ministers of the Allied Powers of France, Great Britain and Italy, having during five days in succession discussed every aspect of the situation in the Near East, having consulted at each stage the military and financial experts who were summoned for the purpose, and having further enjoyed the advantage of communicating beforehand with the representatives both of Turkey and of Greece, have unanimously agreed to the following propositions which they put forward as the most equitable solution that it is in their power to offer to the Near Eastern problem.



The principles which they have throughout borne in mind and which are the basis of their proposals have been:—

1. They desire to re-establish peace between the conflicting armies of Turkey and Greece, but to deal fairly with both parties and to impose upon neither conditions of discomfiture or defeat.
2. They desire to re-establish the Turkish nation and the Turkish dominion in the areas which may fairly be regarded as their own, with the historic and renowned capital of Constantinople as the centre, and with such powers as may enable them to renew a vigorous and independent national existence.
3. They desire to secure full and fair treatment to the followers of the creed of Islam, and to maintain the secular and religious authority of the Sultan of Turkey.
4. They desire to compensate the Greek nation for the great sacrifices which they have accepted during the war in the cause of the Allies, and to leave them free scope for their national and economic progress in the future.
5. They desire to enable both peoples in regions where they are contiguous or where their populations are intermingled to live in future in conditions of mutual confidence and self-respect.
6. They desire to provide for the protection and security of the various minorities, whether Moslem or Christian or of other races and creeds, who, whether in Europe or Asia, find themselves placed in the midst of larger political or ethnic aggregations.
7. They desire to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict between the Turkish nation and the European Powers with whom it was recently at war.
8. They desire, above all, in the solution which they propose, not to be suspected of partiality for the one side or the other, but with firm hands to hold the scales even between the two.

With these ends in view the first object of the Allied Powers has been to bring about a suspension of hostilities between the confronting armies in Asia Minor in order to enable the counsels of peace and the prospects of an amicable settlement to prevail. They have therefore proposed the conclusion of an armistice to the Governments of Turkey and Greece, subject to conditions which are scrupulously fair to both parties and which were defined by the military authorities under the presidency of Marshal Foch.

The Hellenic Government has already signified its acceptance of this proposal. The decision of Turkey is awaited.

The proposal of an armistice has been made with the avowed intention of assuring the peaceful evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek forces and the restitution of Turkish sovereignty over the whole of that region. The arrangements for this evacuation, as the first step in the general settlement which is now proposed, have simultaneously been elaborated by the military authorities under Marshal Foch and are capable of being put into execution without delay. It is calculated that the period required for a complete and peaceful withdrawal of the Greek forces will be somewhat over four months.

It will be observed that in the event of these proposals being accepted by both parties the recovery of Anatolia by the Turks, which is believed to be their principal national aspiration, will have been attained without any further sacrifice of treasure or life. Correspondingly the retirement of the Greek troops will be effected with honour.

Should this operation be successfully accomplished, the Turkish sovereignty in Asia will exist unimpaired from the Mediterranean to the Straits and the Black Sea and from the borders of Transcaucasia, Persia and Mesopotamia to the shores of the Aegean.

Accepting the imperative necessity, which is the result both of historical and geographical causes, for the protection of the minorities of alien race or religion who are found in some cases in large numbers both in the vilayets of Turkey and in the European possessions of Greece, the Powers have proposed a series of provisions for their full and adequate security without distinction of race or creed in both areas. These provisions will be based both upon the stipulations contained in existing treaties or drafts of treaties and in the secular or religious law of the countries concerned. Furthermore, the Powers have decided to invite the League of Nations to collaborate in this object by the appointment of special Commissioners to

superintend the execution of these provisions in the areas and for the communities who are principally concerned.

The case of the Armenians has called for special consideration by reason both of the undertakings entered into by the Allied Powers in the course of the war and of the cruel sufferings of that people. Accordingly the aid of the League of Nations is sought over and above the protection accorded by the minority provisions to which reference has already been made, in order to obtain for the Armenians the satisfaction of their traditional aspirations for a national home.

The interests of peace and the safety of the future demand that Europe shall never again be exposed to the perils and sacrifices which were imposed upon her in 1914 and the succeeding years by the forcible closure of the Dardanelles. The countless lives that were there poured out, the stupendous efforts that were entailed, must not have been expended in vain. The Turks will be readmitted to the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles under conditions which will provide for the existence of a broad demilitarised zone in order to obviate the possibility of any hostile military preparations in that quarter. But an Allied force must be placed, and must remain, in occupation of the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to safeguard the free and unimpeded entrance of the Straits. This also will be a demilitarised zone. The Allied garrison will consist of a force sufficient to secure the entrance to the Dardanelles.

The navigation of the Straits will be placed, as already proposed, under the control of an International Commission under a Turkish President, on which it is hoped, as time passes, that all the principal States who are interested in the commerce or navigation of the Straits will be represented.

The demilitarised zone on the Asiatic shore of the Straits will be identical with the existing Sanjak of Chanak. No further demilitarisation is proposed on the southern shores of the Marmora with the exception of the Peninsula of Artaki. On the Asiatic shores of the Bosphorus the demilitarised zone will be identical with the existing neutral zone. The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, Samothrace and Mitylene outside the Dardanelles and all the islands in the Marmora will equally be demilitarised.

Passing to the European shore of the Dardanelles and the Marmora, the three Ministers have been confronted with the difficult and anxious problem of the future of Eastern Thrace. On the one hand, they were unable, for the reasons which have already been stated, to accept a solution which would place the Gallipoli Peninsula once more in the hands of Turkey. On the other hand, they were met by the complaint that some at any rate of the lines of frontier that have hitherto been proposed between the European possessions of Turkey to the north and west of Constantinople and the areas in Eastern Thrace in the occupation of the Greeks offer insufficient protection to the Turkish capital, which might find itself exposed in the future either to the military menace of invasion or to the invidious propinquity of a neighbour with whom it had recently been at war.

Such dangers, it was obvious, would be most effectively removed (a) by the removal to a sufficient distance from Constantinople of the projected frontier; (b) by the effective neutralisation of the areas outside this line. Furthermore, the Ministers were confronted by the incontestable facts of the existing situation. Whether the attribution of Eastern Thrace to the Greeks by the unratified Treaty of Sèvres be or be not held to constitute a valid title, the Greek forces are in effective occupation, and the Greek Government is engaged in administering that area, which, moreover, contains, and has long contained, a considerable and, in certain parts, a preponderant Greek population.

In these circumstances the Ministers were unable to assume the responsibility of requiring from Greece not merely the complete evacuation of Anatolia, to which it must be remembered in passing that Greece was invited in 1911 by the Powers, but the complete evacuation of Eastern Thrace in addition.

Accordingly, bearing in mind the importance of the strategical consideration before referred to, which may be summed up in the desideratum of reasonable security for the capital and the State of Turkey in Europe, the Foreign Ministers of the Powers invited the military authorities to assist them with their expert advice. These authorities recommended the drawing of a line which will run from the neighbourhood of Ganos on the Marmora in a northerly and north-easterly direction to a point on the Bulgarian frontier in the western part of the Istranja Mountains. This frontier will leave Rodosto, a Greek town, to the Turks. It will keep Baba Eski and Kirk Kilisse on the Greek side of the Turco-Greek frontier. The safety of the frontier is assured by the topographical features of the country, and will be further



confirmed by the demilitarisation of almost the entire area of Eastern Thrace both on the Greek and on the Turkish sides of the frontier. Thus the Greeks will not be able to threaten Constantinople, and the Turks will not be in a position to attack the Greeks.

The periodical inspection of these and the other demilitarised zones will be undertaken by Allied forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula, the area of whose occupation will be extended eastwards to Rodosto.

It has been considered whether any special provision should be made for the town of Adrianople, which it has been found impossible to sever from the surrounding territories of Eastern Thrace. Smyrna, which will revert to Turkey, and Adrianople, which will be retained by the Greeks, are in a somewhat analogous position. The Powers will be quite willing to enter into friendly communication with the Turkish and Greek Governments, with a view to the conclusion of a friendly agreement upon conditions which will guarantee a fair and full share to the non-Turkish and the non-Greek elements in the populations in the administration of the two cities, and will further safeguard the religious buildings and institutions of Adrianople.

The three Ministers are not so vain as to suppose that this solution of the Thracian problem will be warmly accepted by either party. The problem admits of no such easy solution. They can only recommend it to the public opinion of the world as the proposition which seems to them to be most consistent alike with justice and with the facts of the case.

Passing to Constantinople, the three Governments desire to confirm their previously expressed willingness to withdraw altogether the threat that was made at the time of the Treaty of Sèvres to revoke at some future date the retrocession of the capital to the Turks. They confirm the restoration of that city to the full authority of the Government of the Sultan; and they are further willing to engage that the Allied forces, by whom it is at present occupied, shall be altogether withdrawn after the ratification of the future Treaty of Peace.

The Turkish Government will be invited to garrison the city with a larger force than was contemplated in the Treaty of Sèvres. There remain questions of the future armed forces of the Turkish State, the financial independence which it will enjoy, and the suggested modification or surrender of the capitulatory rights which are enjoyed by foreigners.

Concerning the armed forces of Turkey, the Allied Powers are unable to depart from the principles which it has been found necessary to enforce in the treaties that have been concluded with all the other States recently at war, or to admit the continuance of the system of conscription. They will, however, be prepared to consider with the Turkish Government in an amicable spirit the determination of the period in which the voluntary system of returning must be established in that country.

As to the numerical strength of the Turkish forces, it is proposed to allow a very appreciable augmentation of the figures which were contained in the Treaty of Sèvres or were afterwards suggested in London in 1921. The forces now finally proposed are gendarmerie 45,000; regular army 40,000, or a grand total of 85,000 men—a total which is very markedly in excess of the 50,000 designated in the Treaty of Sèvres.

Should the Turkish Government desire the assistance of foreign officers for the organisation of the above-named force of gendarmerie—a measure which will probably be found to conduce greatly to its efficiency—the Powers will be ready to place them at the disposal of the Turkish Government.

With regard to finance. The financial clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres shall be modified in such a way as to abandon the proposed Financial Commission, while reconciling the principle of Turkish sovereignty with the protection of the Allied economic interests and with the amount of control necessary to ensure the payment of the Turkish pre-war debts to the Allies, and a war indemnity fixed at a sum which Turkey can be reasonably expected to pay. The pre-war Debt Commission shall be maintained, and the special Allied Liquidation Commission shall be set up for the above purposes.

In respect of the existing capitulatory system, the three Ministers are anxious to secure to Turkey the largest measure of economic independence consistent with the due protection of the interests of the nationals of their respective countries. For this purpose they are prepared to set up at Constantinople, within three months from the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace, a commission composed of

representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and of Turkey, to prepare, with the assistance of technical experts representing the other capitulatory Powers, proposals for the revision of the capitulatory régime in fiscal matters.

These proposals shall provide for fiscal equality between foreign and Turkish subjects, while safeguarding the former against excessive taxation and abuses in collection, and for any necessary modification of the customs taxes, with the consent of the Powers concerned.

As regards the Capitulations in judicial matters, the Allied Powers repeat their former offer to set up within the same period a similar commission to prepare a scheme of judicial reform to replace the capitulatory system, which will continue provisionally pending the introduction of the proposed scheme. This commission, on which Turkey will be represented, will be at liberty to recommend either a mixed or a unified judicial system.

Such, in broad outlines, are the main features of the settlement which the Ministers of the three Great Powers, acting on behalf of their Governments, have decided unanimously to recommend. These proposals are now submitted primarily to the judgment of the two parties who are directly involved, but secondarily, and in a not inferior degree, to that of the civilised world.

Nor is it necessary to add that the people or the Government by whom they were deliberately rejected, if such a misfortune were to occur, would assume very grave responsibility before the public opinion of mankind, namely, the responsibility of resuming a struggle which has already wrought sufficient havoc among the peoples of two continents, and the renewal of which can only bring further ruin and destruction in its train, besides leading to a permanent embitterment between the races and creeds of the Near East.

[E 3512/5/44]

No. 79.

*Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay at 9.45 P.M., March 26, 1922.—(Received at Foreign Office, April 3.)*

Present:

For France ... ..	M. Poincaré. M. de Perretti de la Rocca. M. Bargeton. M. Gout.
For Great Britain ... ..	Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. Mr. R. G. Vansittart. Mr. E. G. Forbes Adam. Mr. H. W. Malkin.
For Italy ... ..	Signor Schanzer. Marquis Visconti-Venosta. Signor Guariglia.

Interpreter, M. Camerlynck.

*Press Communiqué.*

Lord Curzon stated that it was doubtful whether it would be possible to send the text of the long communications to the Greeks and Turks to the English press in time for the morning papers the next day. He would prefer that it should not be given to the press until the next day.

M. Poincaré agreed, but suggested that a short résumé should be prepared at once by M. Gout for communication to the press that night.

This was accepted.

*Annex to the Communications to Greek and Turkish Governments.*

M. Poincaré asked if they should now discuss the summary of the conference's resolutions prepared by the French Foreign Office (see Annex 1).

Lord Curzon suggested that it might be sufficient to send the communication which he had drafted without the summary. The latter, as drafted, appeared to cover



much of the ground which was already covered by the former, and the conference would not have time to examine the text fully, since the Italian delegation had to leave almost at once. For the rest, the summary seemed to contain some points, *e.g.*, regarding the detailed plans for the evacuation of Asia Minor, to which no reference should at present be made in any communication to the Turks.

It was agreed that the summary prepared by the French delegation should not be attached to the communication to the Turks and the Greeks, but that the various resolutions accepted by the conference and embodied in it should serve as instructions to the Allied representatives at the forthcoming conference, and might be communicated to the two Powers before the proposed meeting took place.

#### *Covering Letter.*

The text of the letter (see Annex 1) covering the communication to the Greeks and Turks was then approved and agreed by the three Foreign Ministers.

#### *Future Allied Action.*

Lord Curzon raised the question of what action the Allies should take in the unfortunate event of the Kemalists refusing to come to the conference, or demanding further details or a delay before the conference met. He did not think either refusal or difficulties were likely from the side of the Greeks.

M. Poincaré thought that the essential thing was to bring the Turks and Greeks to the proposed conference, and that we should use all means in our power to do this, but without the application of force.

Signor Schanzer agreed.

Lord Curzon pointed out that if the Kemalists refused an armistice, there was always the possibility of Greece evacuating Asia Minor through Brusa and Mudania and occupying Thrace in strength. The danger of the Allies evacuating Constantinople and their place being taken by the Greeks would then be a real menace to the Turks.

M. Poincaré thought that if the Turks refused the armistice, it would be because they expected to cut the Greek forces in two and prevent the disembarkation of either section. He doubted whether Mudania was a port where any large body of troops could be disembarked, but he would have the matter, which was essentially a military one, considered by Marshal Foch's committee.

At Lord Curzon's request, Colonel Heywood, who had local knowledge of the situation on the Greek front, then explained that it would always be possible for the Greeks, with their present forces, to counter-attack via Konia, and thus enable the northern forces to retire via Mudania and Brusa. These forces had for the most part been brought over and reinforced from Thrace via Muradli and Rodosto through Mudania, whence, according to a French staff officer's report, six shiploads of men could be embarked a day. The Turks were believed to be short of transport and had only the Konia section of railway line in South Asia Minor.

Lord Curzon suggested that in any case if this were the situation, the Allies should do what they could to hint to the Turks the consequences which were likely to follow their refusal of an armistice.

M. Poincaré said that he would consider using what influence he had with Naby and Ferid Bey in Paris to bear on this point.

#### *Press Communiqué.*

M. Gout then read the summary of Lord Curzon's communication which he had prepared for the press, and this was agreed to.

As the Italian delegation were forced to leave at this point, the meeting broke up.

#### ANNEX 1.

##### *Draft résumé of Resolutions of the Conference prepared by French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

Les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie, réunis à Paris en vue de rétablir la paix dans le Proche-Orient, sont tombés d'accord

sur les conditions d'un règlement général auquel serait subordonnée l'évacuation pacifique de l'Asie Mineure envisagée dans la proposition d'armistice qu'ils ont télégraphiée le 22 de ce mois aux Gouvernements intéressés.

Pour que l'évacuation de l'Asie Mineure par les troupes helléniques et sa réoccupation par l'armée turque puissent avoir lieu sans effusion de sang et sans dévastations, il est nécessaire que les armées helléniques et turques soient réciproquement garanties contre toute reprise des hostilités même partielle au cours de leurs mouvements; que les populations et leurs biens soient garantis contre toutes exactions ou représailles de la part de l'une ou de l'autre des armées; que les opérations soient préparées et réglées suivant un programme général établi à l'avance et dans tous ses détails; qu'un organe interallié soit chargé d'établir ce programme de concert avec les Hauts-Commandements hellénique et turc, puis d'en diriger et d'en contrôler l'exécution, et qu'ils soient investis à cet effet des pouvoirs nécessaires pour régler les incidents qui pourraient se produire à cette occasion.

Ce programme comportera notamment: (1) la réorganisation préalable de l'administration civile du pays et des forces de sécurité locales; (2) le plan d'évacuation des forces helléniques, réglée par zones successives en jonction des possibilités de transport, en vue d'éviter toute concentration prématurée des troupes helléniques aux abords des ports d'embarquement; (3) le plan de réoccupation des forces turques limitant les effectifs destinés à l'occupation de chaque zone et conjugué avec le plan précédent de manière qu'une bande de terrain libre de troupes soit constamment interposée entre les deux armées pour éviter les contacts; (4) le plan d'embarquement des forces helléniques.

Pour diriger l'exécution de ce programme et en assurer le contrôle, l'organe interallié devra disposer des moyens suivants: (1) auprès de chacune des deux armées, d'une mission alliée comprenant des officiers de contrôle, des hommes de troupe et des moyens de transport et de liaison (automobiles, télégraphie sans fil); (2) dans la zone à évacuer, d'une mission alliée destinée, pendant la période envisagée, à participer à la réorganisation et à contrôler l'emploi des forces de sécurité locales, gendarmerie et police; (3) dans les ports d'embarquement, de forces interalliées destinées à coopérer au maintien de l'ordre et à la police des embarquements (à Smyrne trois bataillons environ, un de chaque Puissance; dans la région de Brousse, à Mudania et à Panderma, un bataillon et demi). Des forces navales alliées, sous commandement interallié, devront contribuer à la police des opérations à chaque point d'embarquement.

Les Gouvernements intéressés sont invités à reconnaître l'autorité, en matière de direction générale des opérations d'évacuation, de l'organe interallié qui installera son siège à Smyrne, et à prendre toutes mesures pour que les décisions de cet organe soient strictement exécutées par leurs troupes ou par les agents de leurs administrations civiles.

Les Alliés ne sauraient en aucun cas accepter la responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre lors de l'évacuation, non plus que le contrôle direct de l'administration civile; dans chaque zone, ce soin incombera aux autorités grecques jusqu'à évacuation, et aux autorités ottomanes dès le départ des troupes helléniques.

Les trois grandes Puissances considèrent qu'elles ont le devoir d'assurer des garanties spéciales pour la protection des minorités chrétiennes dans les possessions turques en Asie, et minorités musulmanes en Europe. A cet effet, une étude spéciale sera faite, par une commission interalliée, nommée par les trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères, des dispositions qui sont contenues dans la législation turque et dans les différents traités rédigés depuis l'armistice. Ces dispositions, après avoir été définitivement amendées et approuvées par les Puissances, seront incorporées dans les articles du futur Traité de Paix et seront applicables, *mutatis mutandis*, à toutes les minorités intéressées. La Société des Nations, dans laquelle il est présumé qu'après la conclusion de la paix la Turquie sera admise dans les mêmes conditions que la Grèce, sera invitée à assumer spécialement la responsabilité, d'une part, d'assurer ces garanties, et, d'autre part, d'en poursuivre l'exécution. La Société des Nations sera invitée à désigner, après consultation des deux Gouvernements intéressés, des commissaires spéciaux chargés de surveiller l'exécution des clauses du nouveau traité relatives aux minorités, aussi bien en Europe qu'en Asie. L'attention de la Société des Nations sera spécialement attirée sur la nécessité de tels commissaires dans les zones suivantes: (1) d'Asie, à Smyrne, dans le Pont, dans les vilayets de l'est et du sud-est, en Cilicie et (2) d'Europe, en Thrace et en Thessalie. Ces commissaires auront pour mission, sous le contrôle général du Haut-Commissaire du Conseil de la Société des Nations à Constantinople, de faire des visites périodiques, dans les zones en question, et de concert avec les autorités



locales, de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour protéger les minorités conformément aux clauses du traité. Lesdits commissaires feront directement des rapports au conseil de la Société des Nations et les soumettront à la réunion annuelle de l'assemblée de la Société, pour permettre aux nations représentées à l'assemblée d'être en mesure d'assurer la fidèle exécution des stipulations pour lesquelles la Société aura accordé sa garantie.

Les trois Puissances, conscientes des engagements qu'elles ont publiquement pris, en tant d'occasions, d'assurer au peuple arménien une existence nationale autonome, et désireuses de mettre en harmonie l'exécution de ces engagements avec la situation de fait actuelle, ont décidé d'inviter la Société des Nations à assumer la responsabilité spéciale de l'exécution des garanties qui sont recommandées pour la protection des minorités, aussi bien en Europe qu'en Asie, étant présumé que la Turquie, après conclusion de la paix, sera admise comme membre de cette Société. Les Puissances estiment qu'il ne pourra se présenter d'occasion plus favorable de donner satisfaction aux demandes des Arméniens, qui, aussi bien en nombre qu'en importance, sont au premier rang de ces minorités. Les demandes des Arméniens se résument dans l'aspiration générale de se voir réserver un foyer national dans l'une ou l'autre des zones de l'Asie Mineure où ils ont jusqu'ici résidé en nombre considérable. Le choix de la région où ce foyer pourra le mieux être assuré dépend de conditions politiques, économiques et sociales sur lesquelles il est actuellement impossible de se prononcer définitivement. Toutefois, les Puissances recommanderont particulièrement à la Société des Nations d'entrer, aussitôt après la conclusion de la paix, en rapports avec le Gouvernement ottoman, à l'effet de créer un tel foyer national pour les Arméniens, et de s'efforcer de déterminer les conditions auxquelles il peut être réalisé et pourvu des garanties nécessaires à son existence future. A cet effet, les trois Puissances promettent de donner toute l'assistance possible, convaincues que la solution amiable du problème arménien est également désirable dans l'intérêt des Arméniens, de la Turquie et de la paix de l'Orient.

Il n'est pas dans l'intention des trois Puissances de prévoir dans le Traité de Paix un contrôle général des finances et de l'administration ottomane. Le décret de Moharrem, les décrets annexes, ainsi que tous les contrats énumérés à l'Annexe 1 des clauses financières du projet de Traité de Sévres sont maintenus.

Il sera tenu, cependant, compte des dispositions des Traités de Versailles et de Saint-Germain supprimant les fonctions des délégués allemand et austro-hongrois au conseil de la Dette publique ottomane.

Le principe de la contribution à la dette publique ottomane des territoires détachés de l'Empire ottoman est maintenu, ainsi que le mode de calcul de cette contribution.

Une commission de liquidation composée de représentants des trois Puissances alliées sera chargée du règlement des dépenses d'occupation militaire des Puissances alliées depuis l'armistice jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix et après cette mise en vigueur, ainsi que des réclamations des ressortissants alliés pour dommages subis antérieurement à cette mise en vigueur.

La Turquie s'engagera à verser à cette Commission de Liquidation, pendant vingt années, une annuité de 5,000,000 l. ou de francs or ou de lire or. Toutefois, pendant les premières années, la commission aura la faculté de ne réclamer à la Turquie qu'une somme de 3,000,000 l. ou de francs or ou de lire or par an, étant entendu que la différence entre le montant total de l'annuité, et cette annuité réduite sera répartie sur les années suivantes.

Pour assurer le paiement de cette annuité, le Gouvernement ottoman devra affecter irrévocablement les excédents restant libres des revenus de la douane, de la dime et de l'agham ainsi que la part du Gouvernement dans les concessions existantes ou à venir.

La Commission de Liquidation déterminera les moyens qu'elle jugera convenables pour assurer la gestion des revenus donnés en gage.

La frontière en Europe entre la Grèce et la Turquie suivra le tracé suivant : elle partira d'un point à choisir à l'ouest de Ganos sur la mer de Marmara pour aboutir à la frontière bulgare à la hauteur de Behvren, laissant en territoire grec les villes de Baba-Eski et de Kirk-Kilissé. Une zone démilitarisée sera constituée, qui comprendra le territoire européen de la Turquie et, en territoire hellénique, une bande de terrains comprise entre la frontière gréco-turque définie ci-dessus et une ligne qui suivra la rive orientale de la Maritza, de son embouchure à un point situé à 20 kilomètres au sud d'Andrinople, un arc de cercle ayant Andrinople pour centre avec le même rayon jusqu'à sa rencontre avec la rivière Pravodia et le cours de cette rivière jusqu'à la frontière bulgare.

Le Gouvernement ottoman accordera toutes facilités pour permettre le développement économique de la ville de Rodosto.

En ce qui concerne les villes d'Andrinople et de Smyrne, il sera inséré dans le Traité de Paix des stipulations assurant la protection et la représentation adéquate des divers éléments ethniques et religieux de ces deux villes. Ces stipulations s'inspireront notamment du projet de traité signé le 10 août 1920 entre la Grèce d'une part, et l'Empire britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon d'autre part.

Dans les territoires de la zone démilitarisée qui sont ou seront occupés par les Alliés et qui sont définis ci-après, les forces de gendarmerie helléniques ou ottomanes seront subordonnées au Commandement interallié d'Occupation de ces territoires.

Cette zone démilitarisée comprend :

#### 1. En Europe :

Côtes de la mer Égée : du Cap Helles à l'embouchure de la Maritza-rive orientale de la Maritza jusqu'à un point situé à 20 kilom. sud d'Andrinople-arc de cercle ayant Andrinople comme centre, avec le même rayon jusqu'à sa rencontre avec la rivière Pravodia, cours de cette rivière jusqu'à la frontière bulgare-frontière bulgare jusqu'à la mer Noire-côtes de la mer Noire jusqu'au Bosphore (rive ouest) ;

#### 2. En Asie :

Bosphore (rive est) côtes de la mer Noire jusqu'au cap situé à 18 kilom. est de Shilé-ligne allant de ce cap au cap de Yarindjé (golfe d'Ismid)-côtes de la mer de Marmara du cap d'Yarindjé à l'isthme séparant du continent la presqu'île d'Artaki-ligne traversant cet isthme dans sa partie la plus étroite, côte de la Marmara jusqu'au point où la frontière du sandjak de Tchanak aboutit sur la Marmara, frontière du sandjak jusqu'à son débouché dans le golfe d'Adramit.

#### 3. Iles :

Sont comprises dans la zone démilitarisée :

- (a) Les îles de la mer de Marmara ;
- (b) Les îles de Samothrace, Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos et Mytilène.

En vue d'éviter les contacts armés entre les forces turques et helléniques, et de garantir d'autre part la liberté des Détroits :

1. Dans le délai de trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du futur traité, il sera procédé au désarmement et au démantèlement de tous ouvrages, fortifications ou batteries dans une zone comprenant les territoires et îles définies ci-dessus.

Sont interdites, dans ladite zone et dans ces îles, la reconstruction de ces ouvrages et la construction d'ouvrages semblables. La France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie auront le droit, dans ladite zone ainsi que dans les îles de Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace et Tenedos, de préparer la mise hors de service des routes et voies ferrées existantes et pouvant être utilisées pour amener rapidement des batteries mobiles, et dont l'établissement y reste interdit.

Dans les îles de Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace et Tenedos, l'établissement de nouvelles routes ou voies ferrées ne pourra être entrepris qu'avec l'autorisation des trois Puissances ci-dessus mentionnées.

2. Les mesures prévues au paragraphe 1, alinéa premier, seront exécutées, par les soins et aux frais de la Grèce et de la Turquie, en ce qui concerne leurs territoires respectifs, et sous le contrôle prévu à l'article 203.

3. Les territoires et les îles de la zone démilitarisée ne pourront être utilisés militairement, en cas de nécessité, que par les trois Puissances alliées ci-dessus visées agissant conjointement. Cette disposition n'est pas exclusive de l'emploi dans lesdites zones et îles des forces de gendarmerie et de police helléniques ou ottomanes nécessaires pour y maintenir l'ordre, non plus que d'une garnison hellénique dans l'île de Mytilène, et d'une garnison ottomane à Constantinople en plus de la garde personnelle du Sultan.

Toutefois, les effectifs maximum autorisés pour ces forces de gendarmerie et de police, et pour ces garnisons, seront fixés en considération du service à assurer, par le Commandement interallié des Troupes d'occupation visées à l'alinéa 3 ci-dessus.

4. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie, agissant conjointement, auront la faculté d'exercer la surveillance sur toute l'étendue de la zone démilitarisée, de manière à empêcher qu'aucune action puisse être effectuée ou préparée qui, directement ou



indirectement, serait susceptible de porter atteinte aux stipulations des alinéas 1, 2 et 3 précédents.

Cette surveillance sera exercée :

Au point de vue naval, par un stationnaire de chacune desdites Puissances alliées ;

Au point de vue militaire, par un service d'inspection confié à des officiers alliés, et qui sera organisé dans les conditions fixées par le Commandement interallié d'Occupation.

5. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie agissant conjointement, auront en outre la faculté de maintenir dans la presqu'île de Gallipoli et sur la côte nord de Marmara, jusqu'à Rodosto inclus, telles forces militaires et aériennes qu'elles estimeraient nécessaires.

Tout en limitant l'occupation interalliée à la région ci-dessus visée, lesdites Puissances se réservent le droit de l'étendre conjointement à d'autres régions de la zone délimitarisée prévue, dans les cas où les stipulations qui font l'objet des présentes dispositions viendraient à être violées.

6. Les forces d'occupation visées ci-dessus, pourront, en cas de nécessité, exercer à terre le droit de réquisition, dans les mêmes conditions que celles prévues par le Règlement annexé à la Convention IV de La Haye 1907, ou toute autre convention qui viendrait à remplacer celle-ci et à laquelle chacune desdites Puissances serait partie. Toutefois, ces réquisitions ne pourront être effectuées que moyennant paiement immédiat.

7. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie retireront leurs forces de Constantinople et de la partie de la zone démilitarisée qu'elles doivent évacuer, suivant la marche de l'exécution du traité.

Une commission sera constituée dans les quinze jours qui suivront la mise en vigueur du futur traité pour fixer sur place les limites de la partie continentale de la zone démilitarisée prévue ci-dessus. Cette commission sera composée de trois membres respectivement nommés par les autorités militaires de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie, et, selon les cas, d'un membre nommé par le Gouvernement hellénique en ce qui concerne la partie de la zone placée sous la souveraineté hellénique, ou d'un membre nommé par le Gouvernement ottoman en ce qui concerne la partie de la zone restant sous la souveraineté ottomane. Les décisions de la commission, qui statuera à la majorité des voix, seront obligatoires pour les parties intéressées.

Les frais de cette commission seront imputés au compte des frais d'occupation de ladite zone.

#### ANNEX 2.

*Text of Covering Letter to be signed by the three Foreign Ministers and sent to the Turkish and Angora Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

M. le Ministre,

Nous, Ministres des Affaires étrangères des trois Puissances alliées, Grande-Bretagne, France et Italie, nous sommes réunis à Paris les 22, 23, 24, 25 et 26 mars, 1922, et nous avons examiné la situation dans le Proche-Orient avec le sincère et ardent désir d'y voir régner à nouveau l'ordre et la paix.

Nous vous communiquons, sous ce pli, un exposé complet des propositions auxquelles nous avons abouti après ce mûr examen, exposé appuyé des raisons qui justifient ces propositions.

Nous proposons enfin que vos représentants se rencontrent dans le moindre délai possible, dans une ville à déterminer mais facilement accessible, et qu'ils examinent en commun les propositions.

Nous sommes disposés, d'ailleurs, à déléguer les Hauts-Commissaires britannique, français et italien à Constantinople, pour assister les représentants des hautes parties intéressées.

Comme il est d'un intérêt général que cette réunion ait lieu le plus tôt possible, nous vous engageons à fixer à trois semaines de la date de la présente lettre le jour d'ouverture de ces conférences.

Agréer, &c.

Son Excellence Izzet Pacha,  
Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Turquie.

[E 3550/5/44]

No. 80.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 3.)*

(No. 305. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 26, 1922.*

DURING a visit which the Grand Vizier paid me to-day he spoke about the proposal for an armistice. He said that the Sultan had been somewhat perturbed by the fact that the question of Thrace had not been settled in principle simultaneously or even before the acceptance in principle of the evacuation of Asia Minor. The Sultan and his Government felt that, had the question of Thrace been settled in principle, the Turks could have begun making preparations for the taking over of the territory to be returned to them in Thrace. There was now danger of the Greeks transferring their army in Asia Minor to Thrace, where the Turks had no forces.

2. I pointed out to the Grand Vizier that everything must have a beginning, and I thought that the Allied Powers had gone a very long way to meet the Turkish wishes by accepting the principle of the evacuation of Asia Minor. After all the evacuation of Asia Minor was one of the main planks in the Kemalist or, indeed, Turkish platforms. The Grand Vizier assented. He then proceeded to discuss Izzet Pasha in terms which were not altogether flattering to the latter.

3. He said that Izzet Pasha was quite unversed in diplomacy and did not seem to be able to take any responsibility on himself. He referred to the Central Government on every conceivable subject. As an instance of Izzet Pasha's want of discernment, the Grand Vizier informed me that he had received a telegram from him yesterday to the effect that he had heard that the Serbs and Roumanians had agreed together to suggest that the Greeks should be given Constantinople and the territory behind it. On the strength of this report Izzet Pasha had requested the Grand Vizier to make urgent representations to the Greek and Roumanian representatives at Constantinople. The Grand Vizier had informed the Sultan of this telegram, and both had been much surprised by its contents. To begin with the Turkish Government were not in official relations with either the Serb or the Roumanian representatives, and the Grand Vizier had pointed out to Izzet Pasha that he could not take action on reports of the nature in question.

4. Discussing the probable attitude of the Angora Government towards the armistice proposal, the Grand Vizier expressed the opinion that the Nationalists would from wilfulness or obstinacy raise objections to that proposal. He had no information to corroborate the news that Yussuf Kemal Bey had left Paris hurriedly for Angora.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 3552/5/44]

No. 81.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 3.)*

(No. 307.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Turkish Government respecting the proposed armistice between Greek and Turkish armies.

*Constantinople, March 28, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 81.

*Tewfik Pasha to Sir H. Rumbold.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

*Sublime Porte, le 26 mars 1922.*

JE, soussigné, Grand Vézir et Ministre *ad interim* des Affaires étrangères de Sa Majesté impériale le Sultan, ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de la note collective du 23 mars courant que les Hauts-Commissaires de Grande-Bretagne, d'Italie et de France

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ont bien voulu me remettre, par ordre de leurs Gouvernements respectifs, au sujet de la conclusion d'un armistice entre les armées turques et hellènes.

En réponse, je m'empresse d'informer votre Excellence que la question de l'armistice entre les deux belligérants n'étant pas uniquement du ressort de la Sublime Porte, la copie de la susdite note a été de suite communiquée à Mustapha Kémal Pacha, conformément au désir exprimé verbalement par votre Excellence et ses collègues. Je me réserve donc de transmettre à votre Excellence une réponse à ce sujet dès que je serais à même de le faire.

Il est à remarquer seulement que la susdite note de votre Excellence annonçant l'évacuation éventuelle par les troupes helléniques des territoires occupés en Asie Mineure ne fait cependant aucune mention de celle de la Thrace, y compris Andrianople, sans laquelle la capitale de l'Empire ne saurait être considérée hors du danger d'une agression future.

Veuillez agréer, &c.  
TEVFIK.

[E 3553/96/65]

No. 82.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 3.)*

(No 308.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, March 29, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 53 of the 16th January last, and previous correspondence relative to the Kurdish question, I have the honour to state that it is reported from a reliable source that the commission of the Great National Assembly, to which had been referred a proposed law concerning the administration of Kurdistan, drawn up by the special commission, recently returned the draft law with the special commission's report to the Assembly. When the matter came up for debate in the Assembly an adverse motion was immediately proposed by Salih Effendi (Erzerum), Yussuf İzzet Pasha (Bolu), Rahib Bey (Amassia), Hakkı Hamid Bey (Sinope) and Selaheddin Bey (Mersina).

2. Yussuf İzzet Pasha, Raghib Bey and Hakkı Hamid Bey were members of the commission which was sent to enquire into the causes of the rebellion of the Koteh Keri Kurds.

3. The motion was accepted by the majority, and it was decided that there should be a secret debate on the 10th February. At the secret sitting, which was held accordingly, there was a large number of Deputies, including almost all the members of the National Defence Party. The number of Deputies opposing the draft law was sixty-four, and as there were a number of Deputies who had not decided which way they would vote, the leader of the Defence of Rights Party had sent an urgent whip to all the members of that party to be present.

4. Salih Effendi opened the debate with a speech in which he argued that the Kurdish question could not be solved by such superficial measures as were embodied in the proposed law, and that although the departments interested wished to hide the true facts, these were not a mystery for the majority. If the agitation led by (Kurd) Mustapha Pasha was to be calmed, those who had been imprisoned on account of the Koteh Keri disorders should be released, and in the interests of the country the recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry should be given practical expression in the law. It was said that Djevad Pasha had taken all the necessary measures, but when the country was at war with the Greeks it would not be easy to deal with the situation in that manner. The rising was due to the tyranny of the Administration and to the attitude of the Angora Government towards the Caliphate. The use of violence would only aggravate the situation. It was nonsense to say that there was no revolt in Kurdistan, for one had no need of a guide when the village could be plainly seen. The movement is being supported by the Emir Feisal and the British, and in the interests of the country the matter should be dealt with without using violence.

5. During Salih Effendi's speech there were constant interruptions from the Deputies belonging to the National Defence Party, but the speech was approved by other Deputies, amongst whom were Lutfi Bey (Malatia), Haidar Bey (Van), Abdul Gafur Bey (Karassi), Emin Pasha (Sivas) and Rassim Bey. Their speeches, however, merely resulted in an increase of the tumult, which led to a protest from the Deputy for Erzerum, Durak Bey, who exclaimed that the Assembly was being turned into an infants' school.

6. In order to put an end to the confusion a number of Deputies put forward a motion to the effect that Salih Effendi's motion should be discussed on a later occasion when further reports had been received from Djevad Pasha.

7. The motion was accepted and the sitting came to an end.

8. The following is a summary of the draft law referred to above:—

- (1.) The Great National Assembly of Turkey, with the object of ensuring the progress of the Turkish nation in accordance with the requirements of civilisation, undertakes to establish an autonomous administration for the Kurdish nation in harmony with their national customs.
- (2.) For the area, the inhabitants of which are in the majority Kurds, a Governor-General may be chosen by the dignitaries of that nation, together with an Assistant Governor-General and an inspector, who may be Turks or Kurds as the Great National Assembly may decide.
- (3.) The Great National Assembly shall also choose a Governor-General who must be an experienced administrator, with an honourable reputation, and respected by all the Kurdish nation.
- (4.) The Governor-General shall be nominated for three years; at the expiration of that period the nomination of the new Governor-General shall be made by (Kurdish) National Assembly, unless the majority of the Kurdish nation should desire the maintenance of the former Governor-General.
- (5.) Although the Great National Assembly may decide whether the Assistant Governor-General shall be a Turk or a Kurd, he shall, nevertheless, be elected directly by the Kurdish National Assembly. The nomination of the Governor-General, the Assistant Governor-General and the inspector must, however, be submitted for the approval of the Angora Government.
- (6.) The Kurdish National Assembly shall be formed in the eastern provinces by elections based upon universal suffrage, and the mandate of each Assembly shall be for three years. The Assembly shall meet on the 1st March each year, and will sit for four months. If, during this period, the Assembly is unable to complete its labours, the period may be prolonged at the request of a clear majority of members and with the approval of the Governor-General.
- (7.) The General Assembly shall have the right to examine the budget of revenue and expenses of the administration of the eastern provinces and to enquire into injustices to which subordinate civil and administrative officials may be exposed. The Assembly may take definite decisions concerning the advancement and the prosperity of the country, and all these decisions shall be communicated to the Angora Government for the information of the Great National Assembly.
- (8.) The Great National Assembly shall decide in all disputes between the Governor-General and the Kurdish Assembly, and both parties must submit to its decision.
- (9.) Pending the settlement of boundaries by a mixed commission, the administrative area of Kurdistan shall consist of the provinces of Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir and the sanjak of Dersim, together with certain cazas and nahies.
- (10.) With regard to the administration of Kurdistan a judicial organisation shall be created in harmony with local usages for special areas. For the time being this organisation shall consist of competent officials, half of whom shall be Turkish and other half Kurdish. Upon retirement of the Turkish officials they may be replaced by Kurds.
- (11.) From the date of the application of this law no taxes shall be imposed either under the form of war contribution or any other form. All fiscal contribution hitherto in vigour shall be abandoned at the discretion of the local administration, and payments of taxes shall be made once a year only. The proportion of net revenue to be paid to the Angora Government shall be settled by a mixed commission consisting of Deputies of the Great National Assembly of Angora and the Kurdish National Assembly.
- (12.) A corps of gendarmerie shall be formed to maintain order in the eastern provinces. The Kurdish Assembly shall elaborate the law governing this body, but the chief administration of the gendarmerie shall be in the hands of high Turkish officials until their services are no longer required.
- (13.) Kurdish officers and soldiers in the Turkish army shall remain in their present service until the conclusion of peace, when those who desire may return to their own country.

[8975]



- (14.) After the conclusion of peace the value of all animals and materials requisitioned both during and after the general war shall be a first charge, and shall be paid within twelve months at the latest.
- (15.) The Turkish language only shall be employed in the Kurdish National Assembly, the service of the Governorate and in the administration of the Government. The Kurdish language, however, may be taught in the schools and the Governor may encourage its use provided that this shall not be made the basis of any future demand for the recognition of the Kurdish language as the official language of the Government.
- (16.) The primary duty of the Kurdish National Assembly shall be to found a university with a law and medical faculty.
- (17.) No tax whatever may be imposed by the Kurdish National Assembly without the approval of the Governor-General and before the Great National Assembly of Angora shall be informed.
- (18.) No concessions of any kind shall be granted without first consulting the Great National Assembly of Angora and securing its consent.

It will be understood from this summary why the draft law was opposed with such energy by the Kurdish Deputies as described above.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 3555/5/44]

No. 83.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 3.)*

(No. 310.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 28, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that the local press has been discussing the proposed armistice between the Greeks and the Turks for the last few days. Comment in the Turkish press is generally unfavourable to the proposal.

2. In the "Vakt," of the 24th March, Ahmed Emin Bey states that, if the Turks laid down their arms now, they would be committing suicide. He regards the proposal as a piece of propaganda calculated to sap their energy.

3. In the "Ileri," Subhi Nuri urges resistance and adherence to the terms of the National Pact.

4. In the "Tevhid-i-Efkia," Velid Bey explains that an armistice is only possible when one of the belligerents admits defeat, and this is not the case with the Turks or Greeks. In spite of desertions the Greek troops are still resisting on their front. He thinks that the Turks should reject the proposal.

5. The "Vakt," of the 25th March, considers the proposed armistice as favourable to the Greeks and prejudicial to the Turks. He would like an armistice, under the terms of which the Greeks would have to evacuate Smyrna and Thrace.

6. The "Ileri" says that the Turks want more than an armistice; they want peace, but on the condition that the Greeks first take their departure. This armistice proposal means leaving the Greeks three months longer in Anatolia and Thrace. The dominant feeling in Angora is that the conclusion of the armistice would be most prejudicial to the interests of Turkey.

7. The "Tevhid-i-Efkia" declares that the proposal has produced a very bad impression in all quarters. It is calculated to give Greece time to improve her position. Anatolia is convinced that she cannot reach an arrangement with Greece except by force of arms. There is not a Mussulman in Anatolia but is determined to have vengeance of Greece. Everyone in Anatolia has sworn to throw the Greeks into the sea. Although not bellicose, the leaders at Angora cannot consent to arrangements likely to weaken the army. On this point Anatolia and Constantinople are agreed. If there is no armistice, the Greeks will be forced eventually to abandon their positions and retire.

8. The "Ileri," of the 27th March, says that this armistice proposal is like the armistice agreement of Mudros. The Turks will never again accept such an armistice. For this armistice proposal to be acceptable to the nation, the occupied territory should first of all be evacuated. Those who wish to bring about peace with Turkey must promise the literal execution of the National Pact. It refers to the hasty

departure of Yussuf Kemal Bey from Paris for Angora, and wonders if he is the bearer of other proposals. If he brings secret proposals from the *Entente* Powers which can be made to harmonise with the National Pact peace in the East is assured.

9. According to the Anatolian agency of the 25th March, the "Hakimiyet-i-Millieh," the organ of the Angora Government, after commenting on the peace proposals and asserting that Turkey, above all other nations, wants peace and would joyfully welcome any peace proposals under which Turkey could attain the terms of the National Pact, concludes:—

"'Once bitten twice shy.' The tenor of the proposals is so vague and the intentions so veiled that one cannot hazard a guess as to what is meant.

"At the beginning the bait of the evacuation of Anatolia is held out to us, but no word can be found about what is to follow the evacuation. The only matters which stand out clearly are that the time limit of the armistice can be extended and that the Allies wish to send a commission to control all movements of the belligerents during the armistice.

"We have never heard of such a preposterous suggestion.

"We are asked to give *carte blanche* control of our forces to the Powers, who have not as yet made known the nature of their demands, and between whom and ourselves is the obstacle of the Sèvres Treaty. They must take us for idiots or children.

"At the least, they might have told us how our territories were to be evacuated and given us a guarantee of national independence; but no, we are to hand over control of our forces and then wait for what it may please them to give us.

"Had the document not been signed by three foreign Ministers and by three High Commissioners it could only be considered as a farce. Such terms as are offered could nowhere be accepted.

"Our nation, which has suffered so much, would not allow a Government who accepted such terms to exist for two minutes.

"The proposals were made to be refused.

"Gounaris, on his return, stated this truth: The terms were intended to make us appear as chauvinistic.

"Those who keep their clear-sightedness can, after reading the document, see the sort of people who retard the making of peace. To resume, it is necessary, if the nation wishes to accept any terms, to—

"(1.) Guarantee the complete evacuation of all occupied territories and to commence it.

"(2.) Any peace terms must conform to the National Pact."

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 3561/5/44]

No. 84.

*Sir H. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 3.)*

(No. 292.)

My Lord,

Rome, March 31, 1922.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 276 of the 24th instant, I have the honour to report that the results of the Paris discussions on the Near Eastern question have been received without any enthusiasm and with some severe criticism.

The fact that the "Allied front" has been re-established, even in appearance, is welcomed by the more serious newspapers, and Signor Schanzer's efforts on behalf of Italy are approved. The "Epoca," for instance, praises the Minister for Foreign Affairs with some warmth, and says that the advantages gained by Italy are evident. The "Stampa" thinks that, in view of all the difficulties in the way, judgment "cannot be substantially unfavourable." The "Stampa" would have preferred that Adrianople should be restored to the Turks, but approves of the internationalisation of the Straits, while admitting grounds for the French fear that internationalisation might mean "Anglicisation."



The "Stampa" and various other papers attribute to Signor Schanzer the credit for finding a possibly practical solution of the Armenian difficulty, and seem inclined to approve the rumour that Italy might be given a mandate over the Armenian national home. The "Stampa" thinks that it may be asked whether the proposed new treaty is not better than several of the other peace treaties already ratified.

The press as a whole finds cause for real satisfaction in the practical cancellation of the Treaty of Sèvres, to which Italian opinion has always been firmly opposed. Several newspapers, however, think that the modifications now proposed are insufficient. The "Paese" thinks that British policy is still too philhellene. The "Giornale d'Italia" believes that only the first steps to a solution have been taken. The "Popolo Romano" is of a similar opinion. The "Mondo" fears that the conditions now offered cannot satisfy the Turks, and complains that the programme traced by Signor Schanzer on behalf of Italy will "pave the road of projects and intentions."

The "Giornale d'Italia" and the "Idea Nazionale" emphasise the failure of the policy which sent the Greeks to Smyrna "to give a lesson to Italy." The "Mattino" enlarges on what it considers a far greater failure, the defeat of Europe by Asia, and paints a gloomy picture of the future for England, France and Italy in the East, while considering that the disaster is "most clamorous for England." The "Idea Nazionale" is equally pessimistic in regard to the "failure" of the three Western Powers to settle the Eastern question in their favour, and the "Idea," too, suggests an Asiatic victory.

The press is critical, but serious opinion here is probably satisfied that the Paris compromise was as much as could be hoped for in view of the past and of the divergence of view still existing to-day.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

[E 4292/5/44]

No. 85.

*Mr. Armitage-Smith to Treasury.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, April 4.)*

Sir,

29, York Terrace, London, April 3, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report as to my proceedings in connection with the duty which the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury have done me the honour to entrust to me of representing them in connection with the revision of the financial clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres.

From a study of the papers referred to me with respect to Turkish finance from the date of the last recension of the financial clauses of the treaty to the present time, I infer that the present objects of His Majesty's Government are twofold, viz.: (1) to avoid, as far as possible, any unnecessary intervention in, or responsibility for, Turkish financial administration; and (2) to recover any sums which can be recovered from Turkey in respect of the heavy charges which have been incurred (chiefly by His Majesty's Government) on account of the military occupation of Turkish territory since the date of the armistice.

It also appeared from these papers that His Majesty's Government were disposed to await an expression of the views of the French and Italian Governments before putting forward any definite proposals for the revision of the financial clauses.

2. Before the conference of the three Foreign Ministers at Paris (21st to 26th March) I attended several days at the Foreign Office for the purpose of unofficial discussion, in particular of draft clauses which had been prepared by the Italian Government and communicated confidentially to the Foreign Office. Further reference will be made to this draft below.

Before describing the results of the Paris Conference it may be convenient to recall the main features of the financial settlement as proposed by the Treaty of Sèvres and the circumstances under which that settlement (mainly the work of the British representatives) was drawn up.

The financial clauses of the treaty aimed at obtaining for the three Powers—France, Great Britain and Italy—a complete and effective control over Turkish finance, with the object of restoring solvency and economic prosperity to Turkey at the earliest moment possible. Seeing that before the war Great Britain (with British possessions) enjoyed a far greater proportion of the foreign trade of Turkey than any other Power, this object was obviously one of considerable economic importance to this country.

The methods by which this object was to be attained were as follows:—

A Financial Commission was to be set up, consisting of representatives of the three Powers, to control not only Turkish revenues but also Turkish expenditure. Not only was the commission to control the revenue administration, through the Turkish inspectorate, which would be placed under its orders, but it was also to have a veto on all expenditure, and no budget was to be presented to the Assembly without the prior concurrence and approval of the commission.

Provision was made in the treaty for the protection of the rights of the holders of the pre-war public debt; of the legitimate claims of the Allied Governments, both in respect of their own losses (cost of military occupation) and of those of their nationals; the admirable administrative machinery of the Council of the Debt was to be preserved, but within a short period the Council was to become merged in the Financial Commission. Thus financial control would be exercised by a small expert body consisting of representatives of the three Powers more directly interested in Turkey, instead of representatives of private bond-holders.

The Financial Commission was also charged with the duty of taking such measures as might seem practicable for restoring, or, at any rate, stabilising, the paper currency issued by the Ottoman Empire during the war.

This scheme was virtually complete before the date of the armistice with Turkey; it was complete in all details when the British delegates went to Paris for the Peace Conference (8th January, 1919), and within three months of the opening of the conference we had overcome the opposition of the French and Italian delegates, whose proposals were designed rather to attain minor objects of national interest than the economic reconstruction of the reduced Turkish Empire.

In the opinion of those best qualified to judge, the scheme was practicable and likely to be received willingly by the Porte had it been presented at once.

But it was not presented until eighteen months later, and in the interval the strong national sentiment of the Anatolian Turk had become organised and embittered; the centre of political influence had shifted from Constantinople to Angora, and the financial section, like other portions of the Treaty of Sèvres, proved unacceptable.

Since the rejection of the treaty by the Anatolian Turks conditions have changed rapidly and for the worse.

The Greek troops, having begun a campaign in Anatolia with the permission of the Allies, continued it against the will of the Allies, and their invasion has proved indecisive.

The ravages of war from which European Turkey had suffered have now been extended to the other continent; national feeling has become exacerbated and a powerful foreign ally has come to the aid of the Government of Angora.

The task of restoring the financial equilibrium to Turkey by inter-Allied control, possible at the date when the Peace Conference opened, is impossible now; control which would have been welcomed then, is now indignantly repudiated; the Allies have lost any power they possessed of imposing control by force, even if they desired to do so, while it is notorious that one at least of the Powers is opposed to exercising any pressure whatever on the Turkish Government.

These, briefly, are the conditions under which the problem had to be reviewed at Paris in March 1922.

In accordance with what I understand to have been the desire of His Majesty's Government, I waited for the French and Italian delegates to put forward their proposals.

As to the Italian proposals, which had been communicated to the Foreign Office confidentially before we went to Paris, and had been discussed there by representatives of the Board of Trade, Foreign Office and Treasury, a separate report has been printed, but it is not necessary to say more of these proposals here except that they were wholly self-contradictory.

Half the clauses provided for some financial control; the other half whittled down the control till it became ineffective or repudiated it altogether. In private conversations Signor Nogara admitted the force of this criticism; his paper was in effect a compromise between two inconsistent views: his own, which faced the realities of the situation, and those of his Government, which have since been abandoned.

The views of the French delegates (M. des Cloières, the French representative on the Council of the Debt, and M. Bexon, Inspecteur des Finances), were produced before a meeting of all the delegates at the Hotel Crillon, in Paris, during the conference.

Briefly, the French scheme was of the same character as the Italian; it still



proposed control, but an incomplete and ineffective control which was open to most of the political objections which may be urged against a real control and was quite useless for the purpose of restoring the finances of the country.

I then proposed the following principles, which, after some discussion, were accepted unanimously by the Committee of Experts and submitted the same day to the Council of Foreign Ministers:—

1. All attempts to control the finances of Turkey, whether by a better administration of revenue or by a regulation of expenditure, should be frankly abandoned.
2. The Powers should confine themselves to obtaining from Turkey—(1) repayment of the pre-war debt; (2) payment of their claims for expenses of military occupation, past and future, and for losses by their nationals.

The first principle involves the entire abolition of the Financial Commission and repudiation of all responsibility for Turkish currency and finance.

The second involves two results, viz.:—

- (a.) The Council of the Debt to be left with its existing constitution (save for the absence of representatives of the enemy Powers, whose ejection is already enacted by the Treaty of Versailles), and with the revenues at present assigned to it.
- (b.) A Liquidation Commission to be set up to save what it can from the wreck for the purpose of satisfying the Allied claims specified above.

Thus there will be two debt-collecting agencies—one governmental, the other private. The Council will remain a body representative of foreign bond-holders; the commission will represent the three Powers primarily concerned. Each will have its own assigned revenues; but their functions will be completely distinct.

Further, it was agreed that the simplest procedure would be to impose on Turkey the heaviest charge which she could bear without bringing the administration to a standstill. (This charge will in any case be far less than the total amount of the Allies' claims.) The charge will take the form of an annuity running for a prescribed number of years.

The three members of the Debt Council present at the committee, viz., Sir Adam Block, M. des Cloisières and Signor Nogara proposed an annuity of 5,000,000*l.* running for twenty years, subject to the qualification that the Liquidation Commission should be empowered to reduce the annuity from 5,000,000*l.* to 3,000,000*l.* per annum if circumstances should in their opinion require.

I should not like to commit myself to the view that the whole of even the smaller annuity will be paid for many years, for the abolition of all effort to control Turkish finance will in my opinion lead to the speedy bankruptcy of that country.

But I saw no sufficient ground for challenging the estimate proposed for the immediate purpose in view.

It was also agreed that any annuities so recovered should be paid to the Liquidation Commission, and should be divided on a percentage basis to be agreed between the Powers.

This scheme, which is strongly urged by the Board of Trade, has the merit of avoiding all contentious questions of priority as between the Allies themselves, for each Ally will be at liberty to divide the proportion which it receives as between costs of military occupation and private claims at its discretion.

It will involve, of course, the examination of the validity and extent of all claims preferred and agreement upon the totals as a preliminary to the assessment of the proportion which each Power is to receive; but this procedure would be inevitable in any case.

It is probably unnecessary to insert in the treaty precise provisions as to the modality of payment. Provided the Turks accept the obligation to pay 5,000,000*l.* or 3,000,000*l.* per annum, the Liquidation Commission might be empowered in general terms to arrange for the issue of bonds to be served by an annuity of the minimum prescribed amount, such bonds being allotted among the Powers on the agreed percentage and assigned by each to the liquidation of public and of private claims as each thinks fit.

The allocation of even a proportion of the bonds, which will, of course, be negotiable, to those claimants whose business undertakings have suffered during the war (such as the Smyrna-Aidin Railway) will afford a certain amount of immediate relief.

It will be time to elaborate details when the main outlines of the Paris settlements have been accepted.

To the extent described above there was complete agreement amongst the delegates, all of whom after discussion realised the uselessness of incomplete control (control over revenue without control over expenditure), and the inexpediency of claiming an appearance of control which would involve responsibility without power. Indeed, three of the delegates had personally experienced the inconvenience of such a system as illustrated by the Provisional Financial Commission of Control which has recently been set up at Constantinople.

The revenues upon which it is proposed to take a charge for securing the liquidation annuity are:—

- (a.) Customs, tithe and "agham" (sheep-tax).
- (b.) Any surplus at the disposal of the Turkish Government on revenues from existing or future concessions.

It is also provided that the Liquidation Commission shall be free to adopt such methods as may seem best to it for securing the proper administration of the hypothecated revenues.

With regard to these two points it is to be observed that (a) gives the Allies a basis for controlling the customs revenue. I understand that it has been the desire of His Majesty's Government to secure the appointment of a British subject as controller of customs. Such an object can presumably be obtained by agreement between the three Powers under this provision without specific mention in the treaty. (b) was inserted at the urgent instance of the Italians.

At the beginning of the conference the Italian Minister (Signor Schanzer) declared that he would be unable to take part in the conference unless the revised treaty provided expressly for the recognition of the pledges given by the Tripartite Agreement.

By this agreement it will be remembered the three Allies recognised a special zone of economic interest for France and Italy respectively in Asia Minor; France and Italy agreed to refrain from infringing on the rights of each other in the respective zones, and Great Britain agreed not to infringe on the rights of either.

After some discussion the Council of Ministers agreed to insert in the treaty an article binding the Turkish Government to ask the advice of the Liquidation Commission prior to the grant of any new concession and to permit the representative of the commission to obtain information on the subject from the competent Departments.

This clause is entirely useless, for it does not give the commission a veto on the grant of any concession, and there is nothing to prevent the Turks granting every concession in both "zones" to, e.g., an American subject. But the Italian Minister made it a question of confidence and the article was accepted.

It is to be supplemented by a note signed by the three Powers reiterating the pledges contained in the Tripartite Agreement in case the Liquidation Commission ceases to exist before the end of the twenty years' period.

It is with reference to this strong desire of the Italians to secure in some manner what they think they obtained from the Tripartite Agreement that the proposal was made to take a charge on concession revenue for the liquidation annuities.

The proposals of the financial experts were accepted by the three Foreign Ministers without comment, save that M. Poincaré expressed a desire that the amount of the annuity should be expressed in other denominations besides sterling.

I submit as an appendix to this memorandum a copy of (1) the statement of principles for the revision of the financial clauses as proposed by the financial delegates and approved by the three Foreign Ministers, (2) the concession clause adopted at the instance of the Italians and (3) the supplementary note to be signed by the Powers.

I propose in a few days to submit (in print) for their Lordships' consideration a revised draft of the financial clauses themselves, indicating in a mass of somewhat complicated and detailed provisions those points which appear of sufficient importance for Ministerial decision.

I have, &c.

SYDNEY A. ARMITAGE-SMITH.



## Enclosure 1 in No. 85.

*Statement of Principles for the Revision of the Financial Clauses.*

LES circonstances actuelles ne permettent plus l'établissement d'un contrôle effectif sur les finances et l'administration ottomanes. Dans ces conditions, la création d'une commission financière, qui ne posséderait que des pouvoirs insuffisants, et ne pourra, par conséquent, exercer qu'une action illusoire, doit être abandonnée.

Comme, d'un autre côté, il serait impolitique de proposer des mesures de nature à soulever contre le Traité de Paix le nationalisme turc, les experts soussignés soumettent les propositions suivantes :

1. Il ne sera pas prévu dans le Traité de Paix un contrôle général sur les finances ottomanes.
2. Le décret de Mouharrem, les décrets annexes, ainsi que tous les contrats des emprunts énumérés à l'Annexe I des clauses financières sont confirmés.
3. Il sera tenu, cependant, compte des décisions du Traité de Versailles supprimant les fonctions de délégués allemands et autrichiens au Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane.
4. Le principe des parts contributives à verser par les provinces détachées de l'Empire ottoman et leur mode de calcul sont maintenus.
5. Pour le règlement des frais d'occupation militaires des Puissances alliées depuis l'armistice jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix et après la mise en vigueur du traité, ainsi que les réclamations des ressortissants alliés avant, pendant et après la guerre, il sera créé une Commission de Liquidation composée des représentants des trois principales Puissances alliées, qui aura les attributions indiquées plus loin.
6. La Turquie s'engage à verser à cette Commission de Liquidation pendant vingt années une annuité de 5,000,000 de livres sterling.\* Toutefois, pendant les premières années, la Commission aura le droit de ne réclamer à la Turquie qu'une somme de 3,000,000 de livres sterling par an, étant entendu que la différence entre la somme totale due par la Turquie, soit 5,000,000 de livres sterling, et ladite somme de 3,000,000 de livres sterling sera répartie sur les années suivantes.
7. Pour assurer le paiement de cette annuité, le Gouvernement ottoman devra affecter irrévocablement en garantie les excédents restant libres, des revenus de la douane, de la dime et de l'agham, ainsi que la part du Gouvernement dans le produit des concessions existantes ou à créer.
8. La commission déterminera les moyens qu'elle jugera opportuns pour assurer la gestion des revenus donnés en gage.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 85.

*Concession Clause adopted at the Instance of the Italian Representatives.*

LE Gouvernement ottoman demandera l'avis de la Commission de Liquidation, avant promulgation, des contrats des nouvelles concessions ou de la prorogation des concessions existantes à accorder en faveur de ressortissants ottomans ou de tous autres.

Afin de permettre à la Commission de Liquidation d'accomplir la mission en connaissance de cause, le Gouvernement ottoman donnera à la commission ou aux représentants toutes les facilités requises au représentant que la commission désignera auprès du Département ministériel compétent.

\* Le montant de l'annuité ci-dessus sera partagé entre les trois Puissances conformément à un arrangement à intervenir ultérieurement entre elles sur la base des comptes présentés par chacune d'elles et des réclamations de leurs ressortissants.

## Enclosure 3 in No. 85.

*Supplementary Note to be signed by the Powers.*

DANS le cas où la Commission de Liquidation cesserait de fonctionner et avant la cessation de ses fonctions, les trois principales Puissances alliées se concerteraient sur les mesures à prendre pour assurer par d'autres moyens que ceux prévus au Traité de Paix avec la Turquie l'exécution de l'Accord tripartite en ce qui concerne les concessions réservées à chacune desdites Puissances.

[E 3632/5/44]

No. 86.

*Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 5.)*

M. POINCARE a fait parvenir à l'Ambassadeur de France un certain nombre de textes sur lesquels les trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères alliés se sont mis d'accord à Paris afin de préciser les conditions dans lesquelles devra se poursuivre leur action en vue du rétablissement de la paix.

Ces textes sont les suivants :

1. Un programme d'évacuation de l'Asie Mineure par les forces helléniques ;
2. Une résolution relative à la protection à assurer aux minorités en Grèce et en Turquie ;
3. Une résolution relative à la création d'un foyer arménien ;
4. Une résolution relative aux frontières de Turquie en Thrace et au régime municipal d'Andrinople et de Smyrne ;
5. Un projet de clauses à insérer dans le Traité de Paix pour la démilitarisation de la Thrace et de la zone des Détroits ;
6. Une résolution relative aux forces armées que la Turquie sera autorisée à conserver ;
7. Une résolution relative aux dispositions financières à insérer dans le Traité de Paix et un projet de rédaction de l'article relatif aux concessions en Turquie ;
8. Une résolution relative à la substitution d'un régime nouveau au régime des Capitulations en matière fiscale et judiciaire.

Quelques-uns de ces documents ont dû subir de très légères modifications nécessaires pour donner à des propositions d'experts la forme de textes adoptés. Sur deux points, cependant, ils ne reproduisent pas intégralement les rédactions adoptées :

Il n'est pas fait mention, dans le texte ci-joint, relatif aux forces armées de la Turquie, de l'égale proportion que les trois Ministres sont convenus d'observer entre les officiers de leur nationalité qui seraient mis à la disposition du Gouvernement ottoman. Cette proportion les intéresse, en effet, exclusivement.

D'autre part, il n'a pas été pris de décision quant au choix de la monnaie dans laquelle seraient fixées les annuités à verser par la Turquie. La somme de £ T. 5,000,000 or proposée par le texte ci-joint équivaut très sensiblement à celle de 5,000,000 L. qui avait été proposée et dont les variations du change rendaient impossible d'établir l'équivalence en francs or et en lire or.

L'Ambassadeur de France a été chargé de soumettre d'urgence ces textes au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté pour les Affaires étrangères et le prier de lui faire connaître son accord le plus tôt possible. Il est en effet indispensable que, aussitôt que les Gouvernements intéressés auraient accepté l'armistice et le principe de la conférence à laquelle ils sont conviés, il puisse leur être donné communication de ces textes qui doivent servir de base à leurs travaux.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 4 avril 1922.



*Resolutions, &c.**1. Programme d'Évacuation de l'Asie Mineure.*

POUR que l'évacuation de l'Asie Mineure par les troupes helléniques et sa réoccupation par l'armée turque puissent avoir lieu sans effusion de sang et sans dévastations, il est nécessaire que les armées helléniques et turques soient réciproquement garanties contre toute reprise des hostilités même partielle au cours de leurs mouvements; que les populations et leurs biens soient garantis contre toutes exactions ou représailles de la part de l'une ou de l'autre des armées; que les opérations soient préparées et réglées suivant un programme général établi à l'avance et dans tous ses détails; qu'un organe interallié soit chargé d'établir ce programme de concert avec les Hauts-Commandements hellénique et turc, puis d'en diriger et d'en contrôler l'exécution et qu'ils soient investis à cet effet des pouvoirs nécessaires pour régler les incidents qui pourraient se produire à cette occasion.

Ce programme comportera notamment: (1) la réorganisation préalable de l'administration civile du pays et des forces de sécurité locales; (2) le plan d'évacuation des forces helléniques, réglée par zones successives en jonction des possibilités de transport, en vue d'éviter toute concentration prématurée des troupes helléniques aux abords des ports d'embarquement; (3) le plan de réoccupation des forces turques, limitant les effectifs destinés à l'occupation de chaque zone et conjugué avec le plan précédent de manière qu'une bande de terrain libre de troupes soit constamment interposée entre les deux armées pour éviter les contacts; (4) le plan d'embarquement des forces helléniques.

Pour diriger l'exécution de ce programme et en assurer le contrôle, l'organe interallié devra disposer des moyens suivants: (1) auprès de chacune des deux armées, d'une mission alliée comprenant des officiers de contrôle, des hommes de troupes et des moyens de transport et de liaison (automobiles, télégraphie sans fil); (2) dans la zone à évacuer, d'une mission alliée destinée, pendant la période envisagée, à participer à la réorganisation et à contrôler l'emploi des forces de sécurité locales, gendarmerie et police; (3) dans les ports d'embarquement, de forces interalliées destinées à coopérer au maintien de l'ordre et à la police des embarquements (à Smyrne, trois bataillons environ, un de chaque Puissance; dans la région de Brousse, à Moudaia et à Panderma, un bataillon et demi). Des forces navales alliées sous commandement interallié devront contribuer à la police des opérations à chaque point d'embarquement.

Les Gouvernements intéressés sont invités à reconnaître l'autorité, en matière de direction générale des opérations d'évacuation, de l'organe interallié qui installera son siège à Smyrne, et à prendre toutes mesures pour que les décisions de cet organe soient strictement exécutées par leurs troupes ou par les agents de leurs administrations civiles.

Les Alliés ne sauraient en aucun cas accepter la responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre lors de l'évacuation, non plus que le contrôle direct de l'administration civile; dans chaque zone, ce soin incombera aux autorités grecques jusqu'à évacuation, et aux autorités ottomanes dès le départ des troupes helléniques.

*2. Minorités.*

Les trois grandes Puissances considèrent qu'elles ont le devoir d'assurer des garanties spéciales pour la protection des minorités chrétiennes dans les possessions turques en Asie, et minorités musulmanes en Europe. A cet effet, une étude spéciale sera faite, par une commission interalliée nommée par les trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères, des dispositions qui sont contenues dans la législation turque et dans les différents traités rédigés depuis l'armistice. Ces dispositions, après avoir été définitivement amendées et approuvées par les Puissances, seront incorporées dans les articles du futur Traité de Paix et seront applicables, *mutatis mutandis*, à toutes les minorités intéressées. La Société des Nations, dans laquelle il est présumé qu'après la conclusion de la paix la Turquie sera admise dans les mêmes conditions que la Grèce, sera invitée à assumer spécialement la responsabilité, d'une part, d'assurer ces garanties et, d'autre part, d'en poursuivre l'exécution. La Société des Nations sera invitée à désigner, après consultation des deux Gouvernements intéressés, des commissaires spéciaux chargés de surveiller l'exécution des clauses du nouveau traité relatives aux minorités, aussi bien en Europe qu'en Asie. L'attention de la Société des Nations sera spécialement attirée sur la nécessité de tels commissaires dans les

zones suivantes: (1) Asie: à Smyrne, dans le Pont, dans les vilayets de l'est et du sud-est, en Cilicie; et (2) Europe: en Thrace et en Thessalie. Ces commissaires auront pour mission, sous le contrôle général du Haut-Commissaire du Conseil de la Société des Nations à Constantinople, de faire des visites périodiques dans les zones en question et, de concert avec les autorités locales, de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour protéger les minorités conformément aux clauses du traité. Lesdits commissaires feront directement des rapports au conseil de la Société des Nations et les soumettront à la réunion annuelle de l'assemblée de la Société, pour permettre aux nations représentées à l'assemblée d'être en mesure d'assurer la fidèle exécution des stipulations pour lesquelles la Société aura accordé sa garantie.

*3. Arménie.*

Les trois Puissances, conscientes des engagements, qu'elles ont publiquement pris en tant d'occasions, d'assurer au peuple arménien une existence nationale autonome, et désireuses de mettre en harmonie l'exécution de ces engagements avec la situation de fait actuelle, ont décidé d'inviter la Société des Nations à assumer la responsabilité spéciale de l'exécution des garanties qui sont recommandées pour la protection des minorités, aussi bien en Europe qu'en Asie, étant présumé que la Turquie, après conclusion de la paix, sera admise comme membre de cette Société. Les Puissances estiment qu'il ne pourra se présenter d'occasion plus favorable de donner satisfaction aux demandes des Arméniens, qui, aussi bien en nombre qu'en importance, sont au premier rang de ces minorités. Les demandes des Arméniens se résument dans l'aspiration générale de se voir réserver un foyer national dans l'une ou l'autre des zones de l'Asie Mineure où ils ont jusqu'ici résidé en nombre considérable. Le choix de la région où ce foyer pourra le mieux être assuré dépend de conditions politiques, économiques et sociales sur lesquelles il est actuellement impossible de se prononcer définitivement. Toutefois, les Puissances recommanderont particulièrement à la Société des Nations d'entrer, aussitôt après la conclusion de la paix, en rapports avec le Gouvernement ottoman, à l'effet de créer un tel foyer national pour les Arméniens, et de s'efforcer de déterminer les conditions auxquelles il peut être réalisé et pourvu des garanties nécessaires à son existence future. A cet effet, les trois Puissances promettent de donner toute l'assistance possible, convaincues que la solution amiable du problème arménien est également désirable dans l'intérêt des Arméniens, de la Turquie et de la paix de l'Orient.

*4. Thrace.*

La frontière en Europe entre la Grèce et la Turquie suivra le tracé suivant: elle partira d'un point à choisir à l'ouest de Canos sur la mer de Marмара, suivra la vallée de l'Ana Su pour aboutir à la frontière bulgare, dans le massif occidental des monts Strandja, laissant en territoire grec les villes de Baba-Eski et de Kirk-Kilissé. Une zone démilitarisée sera constituée, qui comprendra le territoire européen de la Turquie et, en territoire hellénique, l'espace compris entre la frontière gréco-turque définie ci-dessus et une ligne qui suivra la rive orientale de la Maritza, de son embouchure à un point situé à 20 kilom. au sud d'Andrinople, un arc de cercle de même rayon ayant Andrinople pour centre tracé à l'est de la ville jusqu'à sa rencontre avec la rivière Pravodia et le cours de cette rivière jusqu'à la frontière bulgare.

Le Gouvernement ottoman accordera toutes facilités pour permettre le développement économique de la ville de Rodosto.

En ce qui concerne les villes d'Andrinople et de Smyrne, il sera inséré dans le Traité de Paix des stipulations assurant la protection et la représentation adéquate des divers éléments ethniques et religieux de ces deux villes. Ces stipulations s'inspireront notamment du projet de traité signé le 10 août 1920 entre la Grèce d'une part, et l'Empire britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon d'autre part.

*5. Zone démilitarisée.*

Dans ceux des territoires de la zone démilitarisée qui sont ou seront occupés par les Alliés et qui sont définis ci-après, les forces de gendarmerie helléniques ou ottomanes seront subordonnées au commandement interallié d'occupation de ces territoires.

Cette zone démilitarisée comprend:

*1. En Europe:*

Côtes de la mer Égée: du cap Helles à l'embouchure de la Maritza-rives orientales de la Maritza jusqu'à un point situé à 20 kilom. au sud d'Andrinople-arc de cercle



ayant Andrinople comme centre, avec le même rayon jusqu'à sa rencontre avec la rivière Pravodia, cours de cette rivière jusqu'à la frontière bulgare-frontière bulgare jusqu'à la mer Noire côtes de la mer Noire jusqu'au Bosphore (rive ouest).

## 2. En Asie :

Bosphore (rive est) côtes de la mer Noire jusqu'au cap situé à 18 kilom. est de Shilé-ligne allant de ce cap au cap de Yarindjé (golfe d'Ismid)-côtes de la mer de Marmara au cap de Yarindjé, à l'isthme séparant du continent la presqu'île d'Artaki. ligne traversant cet isthme dans sa partie la plus étroite, côte de la Marmara jusqu'au point où la frontière du sandjak de Tchanak aboutit sur la Marmara, frontière du sandjak jusqu'à son débouché dans le golfe d'Adramit.

## 3. Iles :

Sont comprises dans la zone démilitarisée :

- (a.) Les îles de la mer de Marmara ;
- (b.) Les îles de Samothrace, Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos et Mytilène.

En vue d'éviter les contacts armés entre les forces turques et helléniques, et de garantir d'autre part la liberté des Détroits :

1. Dans le délai de trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du futur traité, il sera procédé au désarmement et au démantèlement de tous ouvrages, fortifications ou batteries dans une zone comprenant les territoires et îles définis ci-dessus.

Il sera procédé également dans le même délai à l'enlèvement et à la destruction de tous organes de défense maritime (tubes lance-torpilles, lignes de mines ou de torpilles, filets ou obstructions de toute nature, projecteurs, &c.) existants sur le littoral ou dans les eaux de la même zone.

Sont interdites, dans ladite zone et dans ces îles, la reconstruction de ces ouvrages et la construction d'ouvrages semblables. La France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie auront le droit, dans ladite zone, ainsi que dans les îles de Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace et Tenedos, de préparer la mise hors de service des routes et voies ferrées existantes et pouvant être utilisées pour amener rapidement des batteries mobiles, et dont l'établissement y reste interdit.

Dans les îles de Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace et Tenedos, l'établissement de nouvelles routes ou voies ferrées ne pourra être entrepris qu'avec l'autorisation des trois Puissances ci-dessus mentionnées.

2. Les mesures prévues au paragraphe 1, alinéa premier, seront exécutées, par les soins et aux frais de la Grèce et de la Turquie, en ce qui concerne leurs territoires respectifs et sous le contrôle prévu à l'article .

3. Les territoires ainsi que les eaux, ports et rades de la zone démilitarisée et les îles qu'elle comprend ne pourront être utilisés militairement, en cas de nécessité que par les trois Puissances alliées ci-dessus visées agissant conjointement. Cette disposition n'est pas exclusive de l'emploi dans lesdites zones et îles des forces de gendarmerie et de police helléniques ou ottomanes nécessaires pour y maintenir l'ordre, non plus que d'une garnison hellénique dans l'île de Mytilène, et d'une garnison ottomane à Constantinople en plus de la garde personnelle du Sultan.

Toutefois, les effectifs maximum autorisés pour ces forces de gendarmerie et de police et pour ces garnisons seront fixés en considération du service à assurer, par le commandement interallié des troupes d'occupation visées à l'alinéa 3 ci-dessus.

4. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie agissant conjointement auront la faculté d'exercer la surveillance sur toute l'étendue de la zone démilitarisée, de manière à empêcher qu'aucune action puisse être effectuée ou préparée qui, directement ou indirectement, serait susceptible de porter atteinte aux stipulations des alinéas 1, 2 et 3 précédents.

Cette surveillance sera exercée :

Au point de vue naval, par un stationnaire de chacune desdites Puissances alliées ;

Au point de vue militaire, par un service d'inspection confié à des officiers alliés, et qui sera organisé dans les conditions fixées par le commandement interallié d'occupation.

5. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie, agissant conjointement, auront en outre la faculté de maintenir dans la presqu'île de Gallipoli et sur la côte nord de Marmara, jusqu'à Rodosto inclus, telles forces militaires et aériennes qu'elles estimeront nécessaires.

Tout en limitant l'occupation interalliée à la région ci-dessus visée, lesdites Puissances se réservent le droit de l'étendre conjointement à d'autres régions de la zone démilitarisée prévue, dans le cas où les stipulations qui font l'objet des présentes dispositions viendraient à être violées.

6. Les forces d'occupation visée, ci-dessus, pourront en cas de nécessité, exercer à terre le droit de réquisition dans les mêmes conditions que celles prévues par le règlement annexé à la Convention IV de La Haye 1907, ou toute autre convention qui viendrait à remplacer celle-ci et à laquelle chacune desdites Puissances serait partie. Toutefois, ces réquisitions ne pourront être effectuées que moyennant paiement immédiat.

7. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie retireront leurs forces de Constantinople et de la partie de la zone démilitarisée qu'elles doivent évacuer après la ratification du traité.

Une commission sera constituée dans les quinze jours qui suivront la mise en vigueur du futur traité pour fixer sur place les limites de la partie continentale de la zone démilitarisée prévue ci-dessus. Cette commission sera composée de trois membres respectivement nommés par les autorités militaires de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie, et, selon les cas, d'un membre nommé par le Gouvernement hellénique, en ce qui concerne la partie de la zone placée sous la souveraineté hellénique, ou d'un membre nommé par le Gouvernement ottoman, en ce qui concerne la partie de la zone restant sous la souveraineté ottomane. Les décisions de la commission, qui statuera à la majorité des voix, seront obligatoires pour les parties intéressées.

Les frais de cette commission seront imputés au compte des frais d'occupation de ladite zone.

## 6. Forces armées de la Turquie.

Quant aux forces armées de la Turquie, les Puissances ne voient pas la possibilité d'admettre le maintien de la conscription, qui a été écartée dans tous les traités signés avec les Puissances européennes anciennes belligérantes. Elles sont, toutefois, disposées à étudier dans un esprit amical la détermination de la période dans laquelle le système du recrutement volontaire devra être établi.

Les Puissances alliées recommanderont à la Turquie l'utilisation d'officiers alliés pour l'organisation, le commandement et l'instruction de la gendarmerie, en indiquant que ces officiers seraient au service de la Turquie selon les pratiques en usage avant 1914.

Après un examen approfondi fait par les experts militaires des chiffres qu'il est possible d'indiquer pour les effectifs de l'armée turque, les Puissances admettent que ces effectifs peuvent atteindre les chiffres suivants :

45,000 hommes pour la gendarmerie.

40,000 hommes pour l'armée.

85,000 hommes au total.

## 7. Dispositions financières.

Il n'est pas dans l'intention des trois Puissances de prévoir dans le Traité de Paix un contrôle général des finances et de l'administration ottomane. Le décret de Moharrem, les décrets annexes, ainsi que tous les contrats énumérés à l'Annexe I des clauses financières du projet de Traité de Sèvres sont maintenus.

Il sera tenu cependant compte des dispositions des Traités de Versailles et de Saint-Germain supprimant les fonctions des délégués allemand et austro-hongrois au Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane.

Le principe de la contribution à la Dette publique ottomane des territoires détachés de l'Empire ottoman est maintenu, ainsi que le mode de calcul de cette contribution.

Une Commission de Liquidation composée de représentants des trois Puissances alliées sera chargée du règlement des dépenses d'occupation militaires des Puissances alliées depuis l'armistice jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix et après cette mise en vigueur, ainsi que des réclamations des ressortissants alliés pour dommages subis antérieurement à cette mise en vigueur.

La Turquie s'engagera à verser à cette Commission de Liquidation, pendant vingt années, une annuité de £T. 5,000,000 or. Toutefois, pendant les premières années, la



commission aura la faculté de ne réclamer à la Turquie qu'une somme de £T. 3,000,000 or par an, étant entendu que la différence entre le montant total de l'annuité et cette annuité réduite sera répartie sur les années suivantes.

Pour assurer le paiement de cette annuité, le Gouvernement ottoman devra affecter irrévocablement les excédents restant libres des revenus de la douane, de la dime et de l'agham, ainsi que la part du Gouvernement dans les concessions existantes ou à venir.

La Commission de Liquidation déterminera les moyens qu'elle jugera convenables pour assurer la gestion des revenus donnés en gage.

#### 7 bis. *Clauses financières.*

##### *Projet d'Article relatif aux Concessions.*

Le Gouvernement ottoman communiquera pour avis à la Commission financière, avant promulgation, les contrats des nouvelles concessions ou de prorogation de concessions existantes à accorder en faveur des ressortissants ottomans ou de tous autres.

Le Gouvernement ottoman devra en outre donner à la Commission de Liquidation et à ses représentants toutes les facilités nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de sa mission auprès des administrations intéressées.

#### 8. *Régime des Capitulations.*

Les Puissances alliées désirent assurer à la Turquie toute l'indépendance économique compatible avec une protection convenable des intérêts de leurs nationaux. A cet effet, elles sont disposées à réunir à Constantinople, dans les trois mois de l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix, une commission composée de représentants de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Italie et du Japon d'une part, et de la Turquie d'autre part, pour préparer, avec l'assistance d'experts techniques représentant les autres Puissances à Capitulations, des propositions pour la revision du régime capitulaire en matière fiscale.

Ces propositions stipuleront l'égalité fiscale entre les sujets étrangers et les sujets turcs, tout en protégeant les premiers contre des taxations excessives ou des abus dans le recouvrement, et toute modification des droits de douane qui serait reconnue nécessaire du consentement des Puissances intéressées.

En ce qui regarde les Capitulations en matière judiciaire, les Puissances alliées renouvellent leur offre primitive de réunir dans le même délai une commission semblable pour préparer un projet de réforme judiciaire destiné à remplacer le système capitulaire, qui continuera provisoirement à être appliqué en attendant la mise en vigueur du projet proposé. Cette commission, où la Turquie sera représentée, aura la faculté de recommander soit un système judiciaire mixte, soit un système judiciaire unifié.

[E 4028/5/44]

No. 87.

*Count de Saint-Aulaire to Sir W. Tyrrell.*

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 7 avril 1922.*

Cher Sir William,

SANS faire de l'évacuation immédiate de l'Anatolie par l'armée grecque la condition essentielle de la conclusion de l'armistice, comme le voudrait le Gouvernement d'Angora, il serait possible, ainsi que vous l'indiquait la note que je vous ai remise hier, de procéder à cette évacuation dès que l'ensemble des conditions de paix aurait été accepté et sous réserve de la discussion des points particuliers.

A cet effet, il ne serait du reste pas nécessaire de porter la durée de l'armistice de trois à quatre mois, délai fixé pour l'évacuation de l'Anatolie, puisque cette suspension d'armes se trouve renouvelable automatiquement jusqu'à ce que les deux belligérants aient accepté les préliminaires de paix.

Je vous serais obligé de demander à Lord Curzon s'il n'estime pas qu'il pourrait être répondu dans ce sens au télégramme du Gouvernement d'Angora, dont je crois devoir, à toutes fins utiles, vous envoyer ci-joint un exemplaire.

Veuillez croire, &c.

SAINT-AULAIRE.

Enclosure in No. 87.

*Yussuf Kemal Pasha to French Government.*

(Télégraphique.)

*Angora, le 5 avril 1922.*

J'AI l'honneur de porter à votre haute connaissance que le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie a examiné avec la plus grande attention les propositions relatives à la suspension immédiate des hostilités instamment recommandée comme leur premier devoir par les Ministres des Affaires étrangères des trois grandes Puissances—la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie—réunies à Paris dans le but hautement humanitaire de rétablir la paix dans le Proche-Orient et de faire évacuer les territoires turcs sans nouvelles pertes de vies et de biens. Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie est reconnaissant aux Ministres des Affaires étrangères des trois grandes Puissances pour les efforts qu'ils ont déployés en vue de mettre fin à la guerre d'invasion que l'armée hellénique débarquée à Smyrne poursuit, comme il est connu du monde civilisé, en causant l'effusion du sang de musulmans sans nombre et des dévastations incalculables.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie accepte en principe l'armistice qui a été proposé, avec l'intention déclarée de faire évacuer les territoires turcs.

Cependant, il ne serait consentir à ce que l'armistice crée au profit de l'ennemi la possibilité de reprendre la guerre d'invasion blâmée par le monde entier, avec des forces fraîches, en imposant, d'une part, à la Turquie de nouveaux sacrifices et, d'autre part, en troublant derechef l'ordre et la paix du monde. Comme les grandes Puissances ne l'ignorent pas les raisons qui justifient cette attitude de mon Gouvernement ne font pas défaut; en effet, le Gouvernement du Roi Constantin a répondu aux efforts faits à Londres par les trois grandes Puissances en mars 1921, dans le but de rétablir la paix, en ordonnant à son armée une offensive sans succès. Le Roi Constantin a de même répondu au conseils de paix des Ministres des Affaires étrangères des trois grandes Puissances réunis à Paris pendant le mois de juin de la même année, en débarquant à Smyrne avec des allures de conquérant et en déclenchant une autre offensive stérile qui a coûté tant de vies et de biens.

Devant ces précédents, mon Gouvernement estime comme condition fondamentale de l'armistice qu'il est indispensable de procéder à l'évacuation dès la conclusion de ce dernier. Or, les conditions d'armistice communiquées par la note du 23 mars dernier ne constituent une garantie ni pour l'évacuation, ni contre le renouvellement des hostilités. Par contre, en face de cette dernière éventualité, elles imposeraient à l'armée turque la nécessité de reprendre la défense légitime de la patrie dans des conditions défavorables qui résulteraient nécessairement d'un contrôle prolongé. D'autre part, nous sommes convaincus que les trois grandes Puissances désirent également délivrer un moment plus tôt les musulmans des territoires occupés des atrocités indicibles auxquelles ils sont en butte depuis trois ans, comme ceci est attesté par les enquêtes impartiales des commissions européennes et américaines, atrocités qui ont pris une grande extension et intensité depuis la dernière proposition d'armistice et qui se manifestent par des massacres en masse, par des destructions, incendies, pillages et viols horribles. Mon Gouvernement a la conviction que le fait de procéder à l'évacuation dès la conclusion de l'armistice concorde avec le point de vue des trois grandes Puissances, étant donné que la proposition d'armistice a été faite avec l'intention déclarée d'assurer l'évacuation pacifique de l'Asie Mineure par les forces grecques et la restauration de la souveraineté turque sur l'ensemble de cette région.

Par conséquent, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie propose que la durée de l'armistice soit de quatre mois, qui est le délai fixé pour l'évacuation de l'Anatolie et consent à la prolongation automatique dudit armistice pour une durée supplémentaire de trois mois, au cas où les pourparlers préliminaires de paix ne seraient pas terminés. Quant à la procédure de l'évacuation, mon Gouvernement estime nécessaire que la ligne générale Eski-Cheir-Koutahia-Afioun-Karahissar soit évacuée dans les premiers quinze jours et tous les territoires occupés, y compris Smyrne, dans les quatre mois à partir du commencement de l'armistice.

J'ai l'honneur de déclarer que mon Gouvernement accepterait volontiers que l'évacuation et la reprise des territoires occupés aient lieu sous la surveillance des trois grandes Puissances par les soins des commissions mixtes composées des officiers des Puissances alliées et des représentants des commandements en chef turc le hellénique; que ces commissions aient le pouvoir de régler la reprise par et Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie des localités à évacuer



t de prendre des mesures propres à assurer la sécurité des personnes et des biens durant ces opérations et que les troupes turques n'entrent dans les localités restituées qu'après un délai de quinze jours à partir de leur évacuation. Dans le cas où les points précédents, qui constituent, comme il sera sans doute apprécié dûment par l'opinion publique mondiale, une preuve nouvelle des intentions pacifiques de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, seraient acceptés par les Puissances alliées, mon Gouvernement est prêt à envoyer dans les trois semaines ses délégués dans une ville à déterminer en vue de procéder à l'examen des propositions de paix des trois grandes Puissances.—  
YOUSSEF KEMAL.

[E 3776/5/44]

No. 88.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 10.)*

(No. 326. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 3, 1922.

I TOOK the opportunity of the visit which I paid to the Grand Vizier on the 1st instant, as recorded in my immediately preceding despatch, to ask his Highness how the Turkish Government viewed the settlement which had been proposed by the Allied Foreign Ministers.

The Grand Vizier replied that, whilst a very great step had been made towards the restoration of peace, the decision that the Greeks were to retain Adrianople gravely impaired the value of the proposed settlement in Turkish eyes. I pointed out that one of the points on which both the Central Government and the Nationalists had laid the greatest stress was that the presence of the Greeks on the northern shore of the Sea of Marmora constituted a permanent menace to the safety of Constantinople. It was now proposed to remove this menace, for not only was Rodosto to be handed back to Turkey, but Eastern Thrace on both sides of the proposed frontier was to be demilitarised, whilst the Gallipoli Peninsula was to be occupied by Allied troops.

The Grand Vizier admitted that the proposed demilitarisation of Eastern Thrace would undoubtedly help matters, though it would, on the other hand, make it more difficult for the Turks to cope with komitaji bands which were sure to form on the Greek side of the frontier. He dwelt at length on the danger to peace which the formation of these bands would constitute. I told him I thought he was exaggerating this danger.

As there is good reason to suppose that both the Central and the Angora Governments may look upon the proposed settlement as a basis for discussion in the course of which further concessions of a territorial nature may possibly be obtained, I said that the Allied Governments had gone to the extreme limit in making their present proposals. Moreover, these proposals had been made unanimously by the three Powers, and must be looked on as a whole. There were two parties to the conflict, and the Allies had attempted to do justice to both. They could not give everything to the Turks and leave nothing to the Greeks. I reminded his Highness that the war in Anatolia had reached a deadlock, the only issue from which was a reasonable compromise. I did not believe that the Nationalist army could drive the Greeks out of Asia Minor any more than that the Greek army could achieve a complete victory over Nationalist forces. I asked the Grand Vizier to represent the above considerations to his colleagues when the Cabinet met to examine the proposed settlement.

It is essential that neither the French nor the Italian High Commissioner should show any weakening in their language in the sense of allowing the Turks to suppose that they can secure any further territorial concessions. In this connection, I learn from a good secret source that, at a meeting of the Association of the Turkish Press on the 29th March, the editor of the "Vakit" informed his friends, in confidence, of a personal communication made on the previous day to himself and to the editor of the "Tefhid-Efkari" by the Counsellor of the French Embassy. According to this statement the two editors had been invited to the French Embassy, where they were received by Count Chambrun, who spoke to the following effect:—

"The interests of Turkey oblige you to appear favourable to the general acceptance of the proposals of the conference. Nevertheless, you may criticise and express your opinion against the decisions concerning Turkey. You may insist that the Straits must remain Turkish. According to my personal impres-

sion, if the Turks can insist in the right way ('savent bien insister') a few months longer they will obtain Adrianople also. The army will remain intact and will always be what it is, for I know that there is now a very strong current in favour of the Turks."

Allowance must be made for Turkish inaccuracy or exaggeration in repeating conversations, but if he was at all correctly reported, Count Chambrun's language is very much to be regretted. General Pellé seems, outwardly at all events, very anxious that the Turks should accept the proposed settlement and agree to come to a conference. General Charpy, commanding the French troops here, with whom I had a conversation on the 1st April, made no secret of his hope that the Turks would accept the proposed settlement. He thought that they had nothing to gain by being recalcitrant, and that the unfavourable comments in the Turkish press must be discounted.

It is conceivable, therefore, that in order to get the Turks to come to the proposed conference the French may be holding out to them the possibility of obtaining further concessions.

It is probable, in my opinion, that the Central Government will await some indication from Angora before it gives its views on the proposed settlement and conference. The Turks, both here and at Angora, will naturally be largely guided by events at Athens. Meanwhile, the Soviet agent at Angora is pretty sure to work hard to prevent the Angora Government from accepting either the armistice proposal or the peace settlement.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 3785/5/44]

No. 89.

*M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 10.)*

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 10 avril 1922.*

M. le Marquis,

LE Gouvernement français vient de recevoir la réponse du Gouvernement de Constantinople aux propositions qui lui ont été adressées au nom des Gouvernements britannique, français et italien après la réunion de leurs Ministres des Affaires étrangères qui s'est tenue à Paris du 22 au 26 mars dernier.

J'ai l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-joint, à toutes fins utiles, à votre Seigneurie le texte de la communication ottomane telle qu'elle a été transmise à mon Gouvernement par le Haut-Commissaire français à Constantinople.

Veuillez agréer, &amp;c.

L. DE MONTILLE.

Enclosure in No. 89.

*Izzet Pasha to French High Commissioner, Constantinople.*

M. le Président,

J'AI l'honneur de recevoir la communication que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser conjointement avec leurs Excellences MM. les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie pour me transmettre l'exposé des propositions auxquelles a abouti la réunion tenue à Paris du 22 au 26 mars 1922. Je m'empresse de faire savoir à votre Excellence que la Sublime-Porte apprécie hautement les dispositions bienveillantes témoignées par votre Excellence et ses collègues en faveur du rétablissement de la paix et lui exprime sa vive gratitude. Animée également d'un ardent désir de voir l'ordre et la paix régner à nouveau dans le Proche-Orient, elle est prête à envoyer dans le délai de trois semaines ses délégués à la conférence pour négocier la paix. En ce qui concerne l'armistice, votre Excellence a dû déjà prendre connaissance du point de vue de l'armée à cet égard. Toutefois, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté impériale le Sultan croit devoir demander que les contingents helléniques qui seront retirés du front actuel ni d'autres troupes helléniques ne soient transportés ni concentrés en Thrace. Votre Excellence appréciera sans doute l'importance et la nécessité de cette mesure de précaution. D'autre part, la

[8975]

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Sublime-Porte ne saurait trop insister sur l'opportunité d'assurer l'évacuation avec le plus de célérité possible tant pour rendre aux malheureuses régions occupées la paix et la tranquillité dont elles sont privées depuis trois ans que pour faire cesser les indicibles atrocités et persécutions que la population ne cesse d'endurer. Le Gouvernement impérial aurait été très heureux que la conférence pût se réunir à Constantinople ou dans une autre ville de Turquie, mais je regrette que des raisons d'ordre local m'obligent de prier les trois Puissances alliées de vouloir bien désigner à cet effet une ville dans l'Europe occidentale. Le Gouvernement impérial, dont le seul objectif est d'assurer l'intégrité et la sécurité future de la Turquie, son indépendance politique et économique ainsi que le rétablissement d'une paix juste et durable dans le Proche-Orient, est persuadé que les considérations qu'il aura l'honneur toujours dans un esprit de conservation [sic] d'exposer à cet effet de la prochaine conférence seront examinées dans un large esprit de justice et d'équité et que satisfaction sera donnée à ses droits légitimes.

IZZET PASHA.

[E 3786/5/44]

No. 90.

*M. de Montille to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 10.)*

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 10 avril 1922.*

M. le Marquis,

AUSSITÔT après avoir reçu le memorandum de votre Excellence en date du 7 de ce mois, le Comte de Saint-Aulaire a fait savoir à M. Poincaré que le Gouvernement britannique partageait la manière de voir du Gouvernement français sur la réponse à faire aux questions posées par le représentant d'Angora à Constantinople au sujet de la conclusion de l'armistice gréco-turc.

M. Poincaré a répondu à l'Ambassadeur de France en le priant de soumettre à l'agrément de votre Seigneurie le projet de réponse ci-joint que le Gouvernement français, d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique, se propose de faire remettre au Gouvernement d'Angora par l'entremise des Hauts-Commissaires alliés à Constantinople.

Ce projet de réponse a également été soumis à la Consulta, et je serais reconnaissant à votre Seigneurie de bien vouloir me mettre à même de faire savoir aussi rapidement que possible à M. Poincaré si le texte ci-joint est approuvé par le Gouvernement britannique.

Veuillez agréer, &c.  
L. DE MONTILLE.

Enclosure in No. 90.

*Projet de Texte à remettre au Gouvernement d'Angora.*

LES Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur d'accuser réception au Gouvernement d'Angora de la réponse en date du 5 avril 1922 faite par lui aux propositions de paix établies par les Puissances alliées en vue du rétablissement de la paix en Orient.

Ils sont heureux de prendre acte de l'adhésion de principe donnée par le Gouvernement d'Angora en ce qui concerne l'armistice ainsi que de son acceptation aussi bien des conditions d'évacuation et de la reprise des territoires occupés, que de l'envoi de ses délégués dans une ville à déterminer en vue de procéder à l'examen des propositions de paix.

Toutefois, les Puissances alliées ne croient pas pouvoir accepter une évacuation immédiate de l'Anatolie, dont le Gouvernement d'Angora voudrait faire dépendre la conclusion de l'armistice. Le Gouvernement grec refuserait en effet de souscrire, avant le début des négociations, à une condition de cette sorte; ou s'il acceptait, il serait en fait impossible de l'empêcher de transporter ses troupes en Thrace, pour y recommander éventuellement la guerre.

Mais, désireux de donner dans la plus large mesure possible satisfaction aux demandes du Gouvernement d'Angora, les Gouvernements alliés sont disposés à avancer la date de cette évacuation. Il y serait procédé dès l'acceptation de l'ensemble des conditions de paix et sous réserve de la discussion des points particuliers. Ils estiment, en outre, qu'il ne serait pas nécessaire, ainsi que le suggère dans sa réponse le Gouvernement d'Angora, de modifier la durée de l'armistice, puisque cette suspension d'armes se

trouve renouvelable automatiquement jusqu'à ce que les deux belligérants aient accepté les préliminaires de paix.

Les Puissances alliées estimant avoir donné satisfaction dans une importante mesure à la demande principale du Gouvernement d'Angora, souhaitent vivement qu'il accepte la suspension d'armes dans les conditions ci-dessus indiquées. Elles le prient de lui faire connaître les noms de ses représentants et se réservent d'indiquer ensuite la ville qui sera proposée pour l'établissement des conditions des préliminaires de paix.

Paris, le 9 avril 1922.

[E 3632/5/44]

No. 91.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Count de Saint-Aulaire.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, April 10, 1922.*

IN reply to your note of the 4th April, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have had the various texts agreed upon by the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs in the recent conference in Paris, as enclosed in your note, carefully examined, and that His Majesty's Government accept them, subject to the observations which follow. In order to make these observations clearer, I am transmitting herewith, for the confidential information of the French Government, two copies of the British records of the ten meetings of the Foreign Ministers.\*

2. *Minorities.*—In the eighteenth line it was agreed to substitute "des Gouvernements de la Grèce et de la Turquie" for "les deux Gouvernements intéressés," see p. 3 of the records of the third meeting. This point is merely one of drafting.

3. *Thrace.*—I would draw your attention to p. 2 of the records of the ninth meeting, and to the discussion which then took place regarding the *tracé* of the Turco-Greek frontier in Eastern Thrace. Since M. Poincaré found himself unable on that occasion to accept the frontier following the crest north of Ganos, which I understood to have been agreed upon by Colonel Heywood and Colonel Georges, acting in accordance with Marshal Foch's instructions, it was decided to substitute the more general description given in the Allied note to the Greek and Turkish Governments (see the penultimate paragraph of p. 8 of the record and annexes of the ninth meeting). In these circumstances I cannot see my way now to accept the description of the line suggested as "un point à choisir à l'ouest de Ganos," or the mention of the valley of the Ana Su, and I would suggest that the text of the above-mentioned paragraph of the Allied note should be adopted in their place. The passage in question would then run:—

"Elle partira d'un point à choisir dans le voisinage de Ganos sur la mer de Marmara, et sera tracée dans une direction nord et nord-est pour aboutir à la frontière bulgare dans le massif occidental des monts Strandja, laissant en territoire grec les villes de Baba-Eske et de Kirk-Kilissé et en territoire turc la ville de Rodosto. Une zone . . . ."

With regard to the second paragraph of the proposed text for Thrace, I would prefer that, in accordance with the course of the discussion at the sixth meeting (see p. 5 of the record of that meeting), and at the seventh meeting (see p. 1 of the record of that meeting), greater precision should be given to the economic facilities to be accorded by Turkey at Rodosto. I would propose that the following paragraph should be substituted:—

"The Turkish Government will give to the trade of that part of Eastern Thrace which remains Greek every facility at the port of Rodosto and over the roads and railways built or to be built to that port."

In the last paragraph of the proposed text for Thrace the word "spéciale" should be inserted after the word "protection," in accordance with the resolution actually adopted at the seventh meeting of the foreign Ministers (see p. 2 of the record of that meeting).

4. *Demilitarised zone.*—Paragraph 7 on p. 4 of the proposed French text, as enclosed in your note, should read: "La Grande-Bretagne . . . évacuer trois mois

\* See Nos. 66, 68 to 70 and 74 to 79.



*après la mise en vigueur du traité,"* in accordance with the discussion and decision of the conference recorded on p. 5 of the record of the seventh meeting of the three Foreign Ministers.

5. *Financial clauses.*—In the course of the discussion at the sixth meeting, attention was drawn by M. Poincaré to the question of the currency in which the indemnity should be expressed, but no resolution of the conference was taken as to modifying the currency recommended by the financial advisers, namely pounds sterling. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government could not now agree to Turkish gold pounds being substituted for pounds sterling without further discussion, as, among other things, such a change would mean a reduction in the amount of the indemnity fixed. His Majesty's Government would, therefore, ask that the text recommended by the financial advisers should be left as adopted by the conference on the clear understanding that when the final treaty comes to be drafted, His Majesty's Government would agree to the actual currency of the indemnity being expressed in such a way as to avoid the difficulties regarding the fluctuation of exchange to which your note rightly draws attention and taking into account the corresponding provisions of the other peace treaties.

6. *Draft article regarding concessions.*—The proposed text appears to differ in two respects from that which, according to the British notes, seems actually to have been adopted at the sixth meeting (see p. 3 of the record of that meeting). The first two lines, according to the British notes, read: "*Le Gouvernement ottoman devra demander l'avis de la Commission de Liquidation, avant promulgation, sur les contrats . . .*" In the second paragraph the words "*son représentant*" should be substituted for the words "*ses représentants*."

7. *Armed Forces of Turkey.*—While it was agreed at the eighth meeting (see p. 3 of the record) that no mention should be made in any communication to the Turks of the principle of equal division among the Allies of the Allied officers in the Turkish gendarmerie, His Majesty's Government presume that it is clearly understood that the principle of such division will be binding upon the Allies, even in the event of the Turkish Government seeking to give one ally a monopoly of the provision of such officers, and they would be glad to receive an assurance on this point.

8. Subject to these observations, which I trust M. Poincaré will readily see his way to accept in the light of the explanations and assurances which I have given, I agree to the texts proposed. I presume that the French Government will now communicate the texts, with the modifications suggested above, to the Italian Government. As soon as the latter also have accepted them, I would suggest that identic instructions might be sent to the representatives of the three Allied Governments at Athens and Constantinople to communicate the agreed texts to the Greek and Constantinople and Angora Governments respectively as soon as the three Allied Governments are in agreement that the Greek Government and the two Turkish Governments have accepted the Allied armistice proposals and are prepared to attend the suggested conference.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 4063/5/44]

No. 92.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 18.)*

(No. 352. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 10, 1922.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 200 of the 8th April, I have the honour to state that I visited the Sultan on the afternoon of the 6th April. The interview was arranged through the intermediary of the Grand Vizier. Although the rule hitherto followed by the three High Commissioners of applying simultaneously for audiences, except on such special occasions as their arrival in, or departure from, Constantinople, provided me with a convenient excuse for not visiting the Sultan in the special circumstances in which he asked to see me in January, I have for some time felt that this rule imposed inconvenient restrictions on my intercourse with His Majesty. On this occasion, therefore, I intended to arrange independently to see the Sultan and simply to inform my colleagues that I was doing so. It so happens that the French High Commissioner was apparently of the same mind, for after speaking to the Grand Vizier I found that General Pellé had also arranged an audience, and he

was actually received by the Sultan on the 3rd April. Thus, by a fortunate coincidence, it is the French High Commissioner and not myself who has taken the lead in abandoning the rule mentioned above.

2. The Sultan kept me for close upon two and a-half hours, and was, as usual, very cordial. He followed his usual practice of seeing me alone with Mr. Ryan, who acted as interpreter.

3. The Sultan has recently had a slight indisposition, and he was still suffering from neuralgia. He appears to be otherwise in fairly good health. He is fuller in the face than when I last saw him, and presents a more Turkish appearance. This was emphasised by his occasional gestures when appealing for British support. At moments he almost resembled a worthy Oriental presenting a petition, though he bore himself with his usual dignity.

4. In the course of the preliminary courtesies, His Majesty referred to the desire to see me which he had expressed through Prince Samy Bey in January. He had been anxious, he said, to put forward certain personal considerations before the Allied Foreign Ministers met in Paris, and regretted that he had been denied the opportunity of doing so. It was not, however, absolutely essential, else he might have been more insistent. The object he then had in view would be partly attained by the present interview. Indeed, if I had not myself asked for an audience he would have himself renewed his request that I should visit him.

5. I had already told His Majesty that I had sought an interview because it seemed appropriate to do so in view of the new development in the Eastern question following on the Paris Conference. I now added that I had not lost sight of the invitation which he had addressed to me through Prince Samy Bey, and that I was seizing the first opportunity which had presented itself since that request was made. I said it would be very useful to have a direct statement of His Majesty's personal views.

6. The Sultan said he would speak to me with a frankness which he reserved for his interviews with the representative of Great Britain. He claimed that the event had invariably proved the correctness of what he had said in previous interviews, e.g., with Admiral de Robeck, even when he had said things which at the time excited surprise. By way of preface he stated that the revolutionary military organisation which had set up its authority at Angora was merely a reincarnation of the old Committee of Union and Progress. It had disguised itself under a mask of Nationalism, which enabled it to hoodwink the people by exploiting the feeling produced by the Greek invasion. Ninety per cent. of the population were at heart opposed to the Angora gang, but they were kept under by the repressive methods of men who stuck at nothing and had got everything into their own hands. The ambition of these men was to transfer their authority to Constantinople.

7. His Majesty agreed that the Eastern question had entered on a new phase. His own object, he said, was to end the present devastation. The question in Turkey, however, was not merely one of foreign affairs, but was an internal one. There were two factors, the legitimate Government of Constantinople, of which he was the chief, and the revolutionary organisation at Angora. He and his Government were in the most difficult position. With whom, he asked, was peace going to be made, with the legitimate Government or with the revolutionary organisation?

8. I said that the Allies appreciated the difficulties of the Central Government, but that they themselves were also in a difficult position. They were confronted by a dual system in Turkey. Their hope was that a peace settlement, which would include the evacuation of Asia Minor, would deprive Angora of its *raison d'être*, and that the Allies would find themselves face to face with a single Turkish Government, which would naturally be that of His Majesty. As a proof that we did not disregard the legitimate status of the Constantinople Government I pointed out that the Allied High Commissioners had personally handed the recent peace proposals to the Grand Vizier, and that any suggestion of their handing them in the same way to the Angora agent had been dismissed.

9. The Sultan said he appreciated the value of the distinction which had been made. He insisted, however, that the difficulty of which he had spoken would arise in the course of the settlement to be effected. He and his Government were placed in a false position. They might, for instance, be prepared to make peace on terms which Angora would reject. In that case Angora, having an army and other machinery at its disposal, could render Constantinople powerless to carry out terms which it was prepared to accept, and would expose the lawful Government to the reproach of not carrying out its undertakings. The revolutionaries would brand him and his Govern-



ment as traitors. They were, indeed, already doing this, though without justification. He was indifferent to such charges so long as they were false, but he could not subscribe to peace terms the acceptance of which would appear to justify the accusation. He spoke also of the legal difficulty. His Government could agree to terms for which they were prepared to accept responsibility, but no terms could legally be ratified without the consent of the representatives of the people assembled in Parliament. It was impossible in present circumstances to convene a Parliament. The Angora Assembly was an unlawful body. Would Great Britain, he asked, lend her help to relieve this impossible internal situation? He would go on to tell me his own proposals. Before offering observations I said I should prefer to hear the Sultan's proposals, but in my turn I asked a question. If the lawful Government accepted the terms recently drawn up by the Allies in a spirit of great impartiality, would they not be able to attach to them the 90 per cent. of the population who, His Majesty said, were at heart opposed to the Kemalists?

10. The Sultan said that my question went to the root of the matter. The settlement must be one which Constantinople could offer to the country as satisfying the requirements of the Islamic world and of Turkey. He had a double position as Caliph and Sultan. He admitted that attempts had been made to misuse the Caliphate. His rôle in Islam was that of a great moral authority, not that of a revolutionary focus. As Caliph he must satisfy the Islamic world. As Sultan he could not sacrifice a portion of his people, who were blood brothers of the rest. His Majesty, who had made it increasingly evident that he was leading up to the question of Thrace, then outlined what he said was the only possible basis of a settlement. Turkey must have the Maritza frontier. He would be prepared to see a neutral zone of any extent established round the Straits, and to see it safeguarded, if necessary, by the presence of the Allied troops. Western Thrace should be given a special administration of its own. The cardinal point was that the Greeks must not be established in proximity to Constantinople. At this point the Sultan referred to a very confidential message which he had sent me some time ago through Tewfik Pasha, and of which your Lordship is cognisant. He did not dwell on this, beyond saying that he was prepared for any private arrangement with Great Britain which His Majesty's Government would like either after or before the conclusion of peace.

11. I did not directly answer the Sultan's proposals, but said that the terms now offered secured three great objects, namely, the evacuation of the Smyrna area which the Turks regarded as their homeland, the protection of the Caliphate and the safeguarding of Constantinople against attack. In regard to the last point, I said that the proposed frontier line in Thrace had been drawn up by the best generals in the world, who had been expressly asked to devise a scheme such as would render Constantinople immune from attack.

12. While this was being translated the Sultan interrupted several times. He said that Adrianople was no less a Turkish homeland than the Smyrna area, as 75 per cent. of the population were Moslem and Turkish. He supplemented this later by saying that Adrianople had acquired a quality of sacredness in the eyes of the Moslems. As regards the Caliphate, he expressed gratitude for what had been done. When my observations had been translated in full, he replied more generally. He said my statement represented one point of view, but the view he himself was about to express was that of all Moslems and Turks. The settlement proposed was unnatural, and would produce no peace, but a protracted and unstable armistice. Constantinople would not be safe. The Turks there would live in constant apprehension of attack and would not be able to devote themselves to the necessary task of reorganisation. I had said that the proposed frontier line had been drawn up by first-class generals, but they had been tied by the directions given to them. He doubted whether they had been asked if they themselves believed in their hearts that the Turks could hold their own within such a frontier. The Powers, especially Great Britain, must be prepared to make concessions, which would mean little to them but were vital to Turkey. He appealed to His Majesty's Government to show the same liberality to Turkey as they had shown to Egypt. They had given Egypt her independence subject to safeguards for the waterway of the Canal. Could they not give Turkey independence, subject to safeguards such as he had proposed for the freedom of the Straits? He developed at length the view that he could not abandon a portion of his country the bulk of the population of which was Moslem. It was not like a sacrifice of property, but was like handing over part of one's household to the custody of strangers. There could be no stability, he went on to say, in the Balkans if the Greeks remained in Thrace, even in Western Thrace. Bulgaria would come down upon them, and his own subjects

would be drawn into adventures with the Bulgarians. The Balkans were full of unruly races. The divisions between them were not divisions of religions. Tsarist Russia had invented the fiction that they were, but they were really divisions of race.

13. The Sultan said that a secondary but important point arose in connection with the evacuation of Turkish territories by the Greeks. This was the question of the authority to whom the evacuated territory should be redelivered. That authority should be the Central Government, not the Angora organisation. For that reason Thrace should first be evacuated so that the Central Government should secure support there, preparatory to extending its authority over Asia Minor. Similarly the evacuation of Smyrna should not be carried out in such a manner as to enable the Kemalists to march in from the north, but in a manner which would enable the Central Government to take delivery of the territory as it was evacuated. In this connection he made a passing reference to the question of financial assistance to enable his programme to be carried out.

14. The Sultan now showed signs of fatigue. He said he knew pretty well what answer I should have to return, as I had to defend the view of my Government. His object in bringing me to the Palace was not so much to hear my observations as to explain his own view and to beg me to lay them before the highest authorities. He was speaking not as a diplomat, but with a sincerity born of convictions of the soundness of which he was certain. He spoke as the head of a family and as a spiritual chief. He was not using the language of exaggeration. He spoke in fact like a Turk and not like a Persian, he added humorously.

15. I said I would certainly lay what His Majesty had said before His Majesty's Government, but I begged permission to offer observations on four points before taking leave of him. Firstly, I said the Foreign Ministers had expressly said that they did not hope to satisfy either side fully. I dwelt on the practical difficulty of dispossessing the Greeks both of Thrace and Smyrna. Secondly, I thought it most unlikely that the Powers, after devoting so much trouble to a settlement in the Balkans, would readily allow that settlement to be upset in the future. Thirdly, I could not accept the parallel which His Majesty had drawn between Egypt and Turkey. Great Britain had voluntarily given up the protectorate which she had exercised over Egypt. Moreover, the latter country was not engaged in a war with another country. Fourthly, I observed that the further conference proposed by the three Powers would provide an opportunity for discussing points of detail, though I was careful to add that they did not contemplate any radical change in their recent proposals and referred His Majesty to your Lordship's speech in the House of Lords on the 30th March.

16. The Sultan once more interrupted frequently while these remarks were being translated. He said the Turks and the Greeks were not in the same position. Turkey was asking for something vital. Greece had no essential interest at stake. If their respective positions were compared it would be seen that Turkey had lost two-thirds of her territories while Greece had gained in the same proportion. Referring to my second point, he said that no Turk had confidence in guarantees for the stability of any settlement in the Balkans. He was expressing not his own unbelief, but that of the generality of Turks. They had seen too many guarantees disregarded in the past to have confidence in them now. On my fourth point His Majesty made the somewhat surprising remark that what he asked was only a modification of detail, as it was merely a question of throwing back the frontier for some miles.

17. I have endeavoured in the foregoing paragraphs to give the main lines of my conversation with the Sultan. It is not easy to reproduce it with complete accuracy or in exact order owing to His Majesty's habit of making long speeches, reiterating his points and interrupting the translation as new ideas occurred to him. To complete my account of what passed it is necessary to summarise certain points made here and there in the course of the conversation. He referred over and over again to the difficulty of his personal position. In speaking a second time of his desire to come to some separate agreement with His Majesty's Government, he said he was prepared for anything, but he had no standing ground. He cited the saying of Archimedes and compared himself to a lever without a fulcrum. He referred more than once to the pressure which was being brought to bear on him by the Moslem world generally to stand out for Turkish rights. As I was taking leave he returned to this point and begged me to excuse him if he presented the appearance of being hard pressed. It was because he was under three responsibilities, namely, to Islam, to his country and to God.

18. The Sultan's language about the Angora Government was as bitter as ever. He said that he and his Government, but especially himself, could have no truck with



them. He referred to previous conversations with Admiral de Robeck and myself in which he had defined his attitude towards Angora, and he said it was unalterable. At the same time he showed sensitiveness to the criticism which Angora might level at him. His person, he said, was at stake. It was one of the conditions of tenure of the Caliphate that the incumbent of that office should be approved of by Moslems generally. It might be that his position would be made impossible if he could not satisfy this condition. It was a small matter so far as he, as an individual, was concerned, but he was concerned for the position which he had to uphold.

19. The Sultan referred at least twice to the connection of the Kemalists with the Bolsheviks. He spoke of their perfect readiness to go on fighting, and said that unless terms could be offered which would cut the ground from under their feet, they would maintain the dual system in Turkey and might easily drift from dualism into separatism. At one moment when His Majesty spoke of this determination of the Kemalists to go on fighting, I seized the opportunity of saying that there was much too great a tendency among the nationalist Turks to regard the Greeks as being at the end of their resources. This, I said, was far from being the case. If the Kemalists did go on fighting it was by no means a foregone conclusion that they would have it their own way even in the Smyrna area, and the Greeks had a very strong position in Thrace. The Sultan said he quite appreciated this. His point was not that the Kemalists would have the best of the struggle, but that they would keep on fighting, as many of them were only too eager to do in order not to lose their trade, and there would be no settlement.

20. The Sultan was hardly in his best form at this interview. I came away from it with a feeling of disappointment at finding how little he had been impressed by the outcome of the Paris Conference. In one sense he showed little inclination to face the realities of the situation, as, for instance, in his apparent failure to understand how strongly His Majesty's Government feel about the Gallipoli Peninsula, and how useless it is to persist in the idea of separate arrangements with His Majesty's Government behind the back of the Allies. Nevertheless, he is faced with one great reality, which he fully appreciates. It is that Angora, which menaces his personal position no less than it delays the conclusion of peace in the East, has gone from success to success, and has obtained increasing recognition, and that the Allies, even now that they have agreed on a programme, show no disposition to enforce its acceptance. Like Izzet Pasha in London, he cannot afford to be less patriotic than the Angora leaders, so long as the Angora leaders can hold out to Turkey the hope of securing all she wants. He can afford it all the less when he received from British subjects in India, more Turkish than the Turks, telegrams adjuring him to stick out for the whole of Thrace, for the suzerainty of the Holy Places, and even for a say in the affairs of Arabia generally. Realising how difficult this renders his position, I have ventured to urge in my telegram under reference that the identity of view between the Sultan and the Angora Government on territorial questions should not lead His Majesty's Government to discard the possibility of making use of him, if the attitude of Angora should once more make peace impossible. He remains the natural centre round which reasonable Turks can rally, if and when they are given solid reason to believe that the game of the extremists is played out.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 4064/5/44]

No. 93.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 18.)*

(No. 353.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 10, 1922.

ON the 5th April Hamid Bey handed me the reply of the Angora Government to the note which the three High Commissioners had addressed to that Government on the 23rd ultimo, proposing an armistice. Hamid Bey, who stated that he had only arrived from France that morning, said that he was the bearer of good tidings.

2. I asked him to allow me to go through the note with him, and I took the opportunity of pointing out that the reply of the Angora Government did not at all coincide with the proposal made by the three Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs. I explained that the Angora Government seemed to be under a misapprehension both

with regard to the armistice and to the conditions for the evacuation of Asia Minor. The Greek Government had accepted the armistice proposal as it stood, and, by the terms of the armistice, would be precluded from bringing up fresh forces with which to attack the Turks. Hamid Bey replied that by the expression "fresh forces" the Nationalists meant that the armistice would allow the Greek troops a much needed rest. I said that they had been resting all the winter as there had been no fighting to speak of. Hamid Bey said that the Nationalists knew perfectly well that the Greek army was in a bad case, badly fed and sheltered. I told him that our reports did not corroborate this statement, and that, on the contrary, the Greek army was in good billets.

3. I asked Hamid Bey what he thought of the proposed settlement which the Allied Foreign Ministers had worked out at Paris. He replied that finance was his speciality and that he could only talk about the financial provisions of the proposed settlement. These, he thought, would in practice reinforce the financial control of Turkey, and he explained what he meant by alluding to the stipulation by which foreigners were not to pay excessive taxes. The inference was that, supposing that a tax was imposed on Turks and foreigners and it was considered that the tax was excessive, the Turkish Government would be precluded from taxing its own subjects, for the Allied proposals provided for equality between foreigners and Turks in the matter of taxation. I told him that his illustration was a grotesque exaggeration, but I subsequently ascertained that he had spoken to my colleagues in the same sense.

4. Speaking generally, I pointed out to Hamid Bey that, even judged by the terms of the national pact, the proposed settlement went a very long way to meeting the Nationalists. There were two parties to the conflict and it was not possible to give everything to one, taking everything away from the other.

5. I believe that the Angora Government is probably genuinely apprehensive as to the result of an armistice on its army. It has to face the possibility of desertion on a considerable scale. In case of necessity it would be difficult to lay hands on the deserters. On the other hand, an acceptance of the proposal for the withdrawal of the Greek army from the strategic railway line Eskishehir-Kutahia-Afion Kara-Hissar would place the Nationalists in such a predominant position that there would be no limit to their pretensions.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 4065/5/44]

No. 94.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 18.)*

(No. 354.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 10, 1922.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me on the 8th instant in order to communicate to me the reply of the Constantinople Government both to the armistice proposal and to the solution worked out by the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs at Paris.

2. I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship this reply in original. A copy was forwarded to your Lordship by post on the 9th instant.

3. Your Lordship will observe that, as regards the armistice proposal, the Central Government merely says that you are already acquainted with the point of view of the army in this connection. By the use of the expression the army, the Constantinople Government, of course, refers to the Angora Government.

4. The Constantinople Government dwells on the necessity for bringing about as soon as possible the evacuation of Asia Minor. I took this opportunity of explaining, to the best of my ability, to Izzet Pasha the reasons for which the evacuation of Asia Minor had been alluded to in the preamble of the armistice proposal, and I spoke much in the sense of the second paragraph of the proposed French reply to Angora (see your Lordship's telegram No. 160). I also pointed out to Izzet Pasha that the Greek Government had accepted the armistice proposal as made to it, and that article 3 of the armistice precluded the withdrawal of constituted units from the front. The fears of the Turkish Government with regard to a possible transfer of Greek forces from Asia Minor to Thrace were therefore unfounded.

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5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that the Constantinople Government saw considerable objection to Constantinople as the meeting place of the proposed conference. That Government thought that if the conference were held here it would give rise to a great deal of mischievous and undesirable propaganda, besides which he knew that the Nationalists were greatly opposed to holding the conference in this town. It appears that the Nationalist agent has in fact informed one of my colleagues that the Nationalists could not consent to the conference taking place at Constantinople. As there is no other town in Turkey offering the smallest facilities for a conference, both the Constantinople and Angora Governments contemplate a town in Western Europe.

6. Izzet Pasha stated that the Nationalists were obsessed by two ideas, fear of a Greek attack and the conviction that the Greek army is in a bad way. It was true that these two ideas are self-contradictory, but such was the case, and Izzet Pasha suggested that the three Allied Powers should take this point of view into account in framing their reply to the Angora note of the 5th April. I should mention that this conversation took place before the receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 160, containing the proposed reply of the French Government to Angora.

7. Your Lordship will no doubt already have gathered that the Constantinople Government delayed its reply to the armistice and peace proposals until it was cognisant of the answer from Angora.

8. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 94.

*Izzet Pasha to Sir H. Rumbold.*

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

*Sublime Porte, le 8 avril 1922.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la communication que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser conjointement avec leurs Excellences MM. les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de France et d'Italie pour me transmettre l'exposé des propositions auxquelles a abouti la réunion tenue à Paris du 22 au 26 mars 1922.

Je m'empresse de faire savoir à votre Excellence que la Sublime Porte apprécie hautement les dispositions bienveillantes témoignées par votre Excellence et ses collègues en faveur du rétablissement de la paix et lui en exprime sa vive gratitude.

Animée également d'un ardent désir de voir l'ordre et la paix régner à nouveau dans le Proche-Orient, elle est prête à envoyer dans le délai de trois semaines ses délégués à la conférence pour négocier la paix.

En ce qui concerne l'armistice, votre Excellence a dû déjà prendre connaissance du point de vue de l'armée à cet égard.

Toutefois, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté impériale le Sultan croit devoir demander que les contingents helléniques qui seront retirés du front actuel, ni d'autres troupes helléniques ne soient transportés, ni concentrés en Thrace. Votre Excellence appréciera sans doute l'importance et la nécessité de cette mesure de précaution.

D'autre part, la Sublime Porte ne saurait trop insister sur l'opportunité d'assurer l'évacuation avec le plus de célérité possible, tant pour rendre aux malheureuses régions occupées la paix et la tranquillité dont elles sont privées depuis trois ans, que pour faire cesser les indicibles atrocités et persécutions que la population ne cesse d'endurer.

Le Gouvernement impérial aurait été très heureux que la conférence pût se réunir à Constantinople ou dans une autre ville de Turquie, mais il regrette que des raisons d'ordre local l'obligent de prier les trois Puissances alliées de vouloir bien désigner à cet effet une ville dans l'Europe occidentale.

Le Gouvernement impérial, dont le seul objectif est d'assurer l'intégrité et la sécurité future de la Turquie, son indépendance politique et économique ainsi que le rétablissement d'une paix juste et durable dans le Proche-Orient, est persuadé que les considérations qu'il aura l'honneur, toujours dans un esprit de conservation, d'exposer à cet effet à la prochaine conférence seront examinées dans un large esprit de justice et d'équité, et que satisfaction sera donnée à ses droits légitimes.

Agréez, &c.

A. IZZET.

[E 4068/5/44]

No. 95.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. — (Received April 18.)*

(No. 357. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 11, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 352 of the 10th instant relative to my conversation with the Sultan on the 6th April, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Mr. Ryan recording a conversation with a member of the Sultan's entourage, who from time to time serves as a private channel of communication between His Majesty and this High Commission. This gentleman's visit afforded an opportunity for further impressing on the Sultan considerations which owing to his fatigue he prevented me from developing fully at the actual interview, though I had of course not failed to draw his attention to them in the course of my own observations.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 95.

*Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.*

(Confidential.)

I HAD a long visit yesterday from the Sultan's messenger. He said he came primarily to welcome me on my return and to ask my assistance in a personal matter, but he said that the Sultan was aware of his visit, and he spoke a good deal about what had passed between your Excellency and the Sultan on the 6th April. He said that the Sultan was much preoccupied with the importance of arranging matters so that occupied territory to be evacuated should be handed over to the Central Government, as otherwise the Kemalists would obtain an enormous accession of influence; that he was also very anxious about Thrace and Adrianople; and that he was greatly concerned for his personal position, if the Kemalists ruled the roost in Turkey.

I said that, in fulfilment of your Excellency's promise to the Sultan, you had informed His Majesty's Government of his views by telegraph, and were reporting very fully by despatch. I took the opportunity of rubbing in the following points:—

1. I said there was one consideration which your Excellency had mentioned to the Sultan, but had not been able to develop at length as it came up late in the audience. It was this. The Kemalists were boasting very hard of their ability to finish with the Greeks in Asia Minor, if the war continued. Our own information did not lead us to suppose that the Greeks were at the last gasp, and our conviction was unaltered that, if active hostilities were resumed this year, the broad result would be the same as last year, i.e., the Greeks would neither overrun Anatolia, nor be thrown into the sea, and the only result would be a modification of the military equilibrium. Assuming, however, that the Kemalists were justified and the Greeks were expelled as a warlike operation, what would happen? Whatever their position in Asia Minor, the Greeks were strong in Thrace. If they left Asia Minor otherwise than under a general settlement, no one could object to their transferring their army or part of it to Thrace. They would thereby strengthen their position in Thrace, and the position of the Turks in regard to Thrace would be worse than under the peace proposals, which contemplate the restoration to Turkey of a considerable part of Eastern Thrace.

2. I said that there was too great a tendency to regard the Paris proposals as being simply a basis of discussion. This was true as regards details, but it would be only misleading the Sultan to hold out hopes of a radical alteration of the proposed settlement. No question had been more discussed at Paris than that of Thrace. The Ministers had agreed on a proposal which they knew would not satisfy either party, but which represented an honest effort at an impartial solution. They had said, "We are turning the Greeks out of Asia Minor altogether. We are abandoning the idea of a special régime for the Smyrna area, and are going to rely on general minority safeguards only in that area. We are prepared in addition to ask the Greeks to give up a good deal of Eastern Thrace, but we cannot ask them to give up the whole of it."

3. I said that great efforts were being made to represent the Angora reply to the armistice proposal as an acceptance. To us it looked like a refusal. The whole object of the Powers was to maintain the military *status quo*, while negotiations for a peace



settlement proceeded. They were sincerely anxious to give neither side an advantage. I drew particular attention to one article in their armistice proposal, that which said that bodies of troops should not be moved. One object of this was to prevent the Greeks from transferring forces to Thrace, as they might be tempted to do, knowing that under the settlement they must in any case leave Asia Minor. The answer from Angora aimed at getting a promise that the whole of Asia Minor would be evacuated in four months, whatever happened, and at securing a much stronger military position than they had now within a fortnight, i.e., before coming into conference with the three Powers and the Greeks. I said that this was not a matter which affected the Greeks only. So far as Great Britain was concerned, the Kemalists claimed to be in a state of war with us, not in a state of armistice. We had to consider a temporary position in Constantinople and a permanent position in Iraq. Where should we be under the Angora counter-proposal, if the Greeks completed the evacuation of Asia Minor in the four months, and there were a rupture of the peace negotiations after that period had elapsed?

I pointed out that in this matter the Sultan was really in a middle position. He was very anxious that evacuated territory should be handed over to the Central Government, not to the Kemalists. If the Angora counter-proposal were accepted, the Kemalists would clearly have to be given delivery of the territory. Turkey as a whole would no doubt go into the conference with a strengthened position, but the Sultan's position *vis-à-vis* of Angora would be very much weakened.

4. I impressed on the messenger that the Allies had formulated their decisions without any *arrière-pensée*. They sincerely wished for a general settlement on the basis of their proposals. If their plan for a settlement broke down, the consideration I had mentioned were of very great importance for Turkey.

5. In the course of general remarks on the Sultan's position and His Majesty's Government's attitude, I once more emphasised the fact that, while His Majesty's Government had been unable for a long time to ignore Angora, they stood firm in regarding Constantinople as the seat of legitimate authority.

The Sultan's messenger listened carefully. Before leaving, he said that, if there was one thing of which the Sultan was absolutely convinced and in which he remained unshaken, it was to Great Britain—and Great Britain alone—that Turkey must look for salvation.

*Constantinople April 10, 1922.*

[E 4257/5/44]

No. 96.

*Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 24.)*

(No. 182.)

My Lord,

*Athens, April 6, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report, with reference to my telegram No. 110 of the 29th ultimo and later telegrams on the subject of the Allied peace proposals, that the French Minister received those proposals on the 28th ultimo, and communicated them the same day to the Greek Government. The latter at once circulated them in the Chamber, which adjourned until the 31st ultimo to consider them. This adjournment was subsequently extended to the 1st April.

The Greek press was unanimous in denouncing the proposals in unmeasured terms. The "Athenaiki" went so far as to print an enormous headline, consisting of the one word "Skata," the only translation of which is an old English word of four letters in habitual use in our public schools and universities. The word was applied to the Allies; and the fact that as much as 10 drachmas are said to have been paid for a single number of this journal was cited by other newspapers as proof positive that the term of opprobrium was not only deserved, but had the sanction of an enlightened democracy. I cannot help thinking that a paper in England which had the effrontery to print such a headline would also rapidly have been sold out, quite apart from the rest of its contents.

Subsequent reflection did not abate the hostility of the press, and, for the first time since I have been here, articles hostile to Great Britain appeared. We were accused of having secured for ourselves Mesopotamia and Palestine, which were inhabited by Moslems, and left the Christian population of Turkey to their fate. Quotations appeared from earlier declarations of British and Allied statesmen

[E 4147/900/44]

No. 95A.

*Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 20.)*

(No. 350.)

My Lord,

*Rome, April 16, 1922.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 306 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to report that the following semi-official communiqué appeared in this morning's newspapers on the subject of the French protectorate in the Holy Places:—

"With regard to the recent discussions on the question of the French protectorate in the Levant, we are in a position to affirm that this question was raised anew at the Near Eastern Conference in Paris last March, where were discussed the commissions to be created to deal with the problems arising out of the abolition of the Capitulations. M. Poincaré stated that the French protectorate existed, confirming once more the French point of view, to the effect that the protectorate is only abolished as far as Palestine is concerned. M. Schanzer thereupon stated that the problem existed no longer, since at San Remo M. Millerand had announced the abolition of the French protectorate not only in Palestine but in all the Levant.

"This decision was energetically reaffirmed by Lord Curzon, who declared that he was present at the San Remo sitting at which this decision was adopted, and stated that upon that occasion it was clearly and explicitly declared that the abolition affected the whole of the Levant. M. Poincaré took note of these declarations.

"These declarations should be borne in mind at the present moment, if only to show that at San Remo the question was internationally and completely settled. There accordingly remains only the question of the ceremonial honours due to the French representatives in the Levant, as regards which the Holy See will have to issue instructions to the Catholic authorities; all the more so as it is now the case that both private persons and religious communities have recourse to their own national representatives for the safeguarding of their interests in the Levant."

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

P.S.—Since writing the above despatch a further article has appeared in the "Messaggero" in which it is stated that the writer is authorised to announce that the article quoted above as a semi-official announcement has in fact no official character whatever. The "Messaggero" makes this statement with satisfaction as it considers the acknowledgment of the French right to ceremonial honours to be most detrimental to Italian prestige. As, however, the article appeared in all the newspapers as a semi-official statement, it seems likely that the Italian authorities originally intended it to be so, but finding that they had miscalculated its effect on public opinion have now changed their mind.

R. G.



denouncing the Turk and all his works, and holding up the liberation of the Christian inhabitants of Turkey as one of the objects of the war. The fact that the Allied proposals appeared to place the Turks and Greeks on the same footing as regards their treatment of minorities was felt to be a burning injustice and a gratuitous insult offered to a former ally in order to curry favour with an enemy. It was pointed out with comprehensible bitterness that several hundred thousand Moslems had lived peaceably in Greece during the period when the Turks were massacring the Christian races wholesale in Turkey, and that, at this very moment, the future policy of Greece depended largely on the manner in which the thirty-five Turkish Deputies would vote in the Athens Parliament.

In the general abuse of the peace proposals party recriminations were not long in reasserting themselves. The Royalist press naturally laid the whole blame for the present state of affairs on the shoulders of M. Veniselos, whose policy of adventure had taxed Greece beyond her strength. The Veniselist papers retorted with comparing the position of Greece towards her allies during the Veniselos régime and now. M. Gounaris had been guilty of criminal folly in not negotiating when invited by the Powers to do so last year in March and again in June.

The publication here of your Lordship's speech in the House of Lords helped to calm the press, and, as the days passed and no answer to the armistice proposal came from Turkey, the clamour died down in the belief that Turkey would refuse and the peace proposals would fall to the ground. For it is a remarkable phenomenon that, although Greece has been at war for the best part of ten years and is completely exhausted financially, the nation, as a whole, would, even now, continue the war rather than accept a peace which is felt to be a betrayal of the unredeemed Greeks in the face of the proved military superiority of the Greek army. I do not think it is doubtful that there would be a genuine popular outburst of joy were it announced to-morrow that the peace negotiations had been definitely dropped; and I am convinced that, in that event, the Greek forces would, with the moral backing of a Great Power, be still capable of a prolonged and serious effort.

Having dealt with the popular aspect of this question, it may be of interest to report its treatment in the Assembly. In face of the violent and general abuse of the peace proposals, I thought it would be well to attempt to explain to some of the more important members of the Chamber the exaggerations of which the press had been guilty, and the very real advantages which a peace on the basis proposed could bring to Greece. I therefore invited General Danglis, the Veniselist leader, M. Boussios, the Macedonian Deputy, and M. Stratos, at one time Prime Minister, to come and see me on the 30th ultimo. They were good enough to come at different times, and I asked them to look at the situation as a whole. The war was ruining Greece and must be ended. The present proposals, although they did not give Greece all she wanted, were the best which the Allies believed, the Turks would accept; therefore they were the best which it was any use proposing. They would, if accepted by the Turks, which was not at all certain, assure to Greece a territory far more extensive than any Greek could have hoped for ten years ago, and large enough to absorb all the energies of the country for many years to come. I recognised that the question of the unredeemed Greeks was one that must be solved in accordance with the principles of justice; and I had no doubt that the League of Nations would find means to protect them efficaciously.

General Danglis and M. Stratos both agreed that Greece needed peace above all else, but they did not conceal their feeling that the terms offered were unjust and afforded inadequate guarantees for the safety of the Christian population in Asia Minor. They blamed the Greek Government for the manner in which Greek affairs had been managed since 1920. M. Boussios, who had had experience of Turkish government as a Deputy in Macedonia, was more bellicose, and declared roundly that, greatly as Greece desired peace, he would prefer to see her continue the war rather than leave the unredeemed Greeks unprotected, as they were by the proposals. The old Ottoman Empire was a heterogeneous State in which the non-Turkish elements were so important that they could secure some protection by combining. The new Turkey would be practically a homogeneous State in which the small minorities which did exist would be completely at the mercy of the Turks. As regards Thrace, if it were demilitarised the Bulgarians could overrun it when they thought fit.

On the morning of the 1st April M. Gounaris met the party leaders, including the Veniselists, and explained to them the situation with the object of avoiding a discussion in the Chamber which might prejudice the national interests. The Chamber met in the afternoon, and a number of protests, which flow in continually from the communities of



Thrace and Asia Minor, were read. M. Stratos opened the debate by declaring that, while he had no wish to ask for any information which might embarrass the Government, enough had been made public to justify a discussion as to the fitness of the Government to continue to direct the affairs of the country. Was it true that the Government had accepted the mediation of the Powers and communicated to His Majesty's Government an expression of their views? Was it true that your Lordship had declared in the House of Lords that the Greek Government had placed themselves unreservedly in the hands of the Powers? Had they accepted unreservedly or with reservations, and, if the latter, with what reservations? If they had accepted unreservedly, the Assembly should withdraw its confidence from them. There should be no delay.

M. Gounaris replied that the Government could not give an account of their actions at the present critical stage; to do so would be ruinous, and if another Government came in they would be in the same position. If M. Stratos desired to move a vote of censure on general grounds, let him do so.

M. Stratos replied that, if M. Gounaris's view prevailed, the Assembly was superfluous and had lost its right of criticising policy. It had authorised the Government to negotiate with the Treaty of Sèvres as representing the minimum claims of Greece. The British Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated that, instead of doing this, M. Gounaris had placed the Greek case unreservedly in the hands of the Powers. Was this true? M. Gounaris answered that he would not reply until the proper time came.

M. Boussios charged the Government with having accepted the peace proposals; to which M. Baltazzi replied that the armistice alone had been accepted. Would M. Boussios have refused it? The latter replied that he certainly would. If he were in power he would invite the King to return to the front. M. Stratos again returned to the charge and criticised the management of the campaign by the Government. Now M. Gounaris had acknowledged the necessity of evacuating Asia Minor. M. Gounaris denied that he had done any such thing, and again refused to say whether he had placed the Greek case unreservedly in the hands of the Powers or not.

A Thracian Deputy followed with an attack on the Government for not maintaining the alliance with the Powers. After he had been howled down, General Danglis read a very long declaration on behalf of the Venisclists to the effect that the decisions of the Powers had produced astonishment and constituted a unique example of the indifference of diplomacy to the fate of a Christian population. Greece had, at the bidding of the Allies, liberated the populations of Thrace and Asia Minor only to be forced to put them back under the yoke. The Government had allowed the country to be isolated diplomatically and financially and was not even properly represented in London or Paris, though eminent men had offered their services. In spite of this isolation, the Government had continued the campaign in Asia Minor and the Greek armies had been victorious. Mr. Lloyd George had officially stated that victorious Greece deserved more than what was granted by the Treaty of Sèvres; yet the Government had not seized the opportunity to accept Allied intervention. From that moment the Government was responsible for all that followed. They had failed to keep the army supplied with men and munitions and had had to withdraw after a victorious advance. The army had given the Government victories, but the Government had given the country a diplomatic defeat culminating in the present Allied proposals. After incurring the displeasure of the Allies, they had been forced to place the Greek case unreservedly in their hands. The Liberal Party called on the Government to perform a patriotic duty and make way for a more competent Government which might yet save the country. The Liberal Party appealed to the Chamber to overthrow the Government and thus enable the nation to extricate itself from the dangers into which the Government had led it.

In reply to this declaration, M. Gounaris accused the Liberals of intriguing against their country. He had exhausted every means to bridge the gulf between the parties, but had received no help from the Liberals. These observations were followed by an uproar, and the Liberals left the Chamber in a body. After they had gone M. Gounaris explained that he was not accusing the Liberals in the Chamber, but those abroad.

The vote of confidence was then taken, and resulted in the Government's securing 163 votes to 52, the rest abstaining from voting.

The above account will, I hope, have given a fair idea of the feeling in the country and the Chamber regarding the peace proposals. The attitude of the Government is less easy to define. In the first place, they are of course bound by their action in placing the Greek case in the hands of the Powers. M. Baltazzi acknowledged that this consideration was paramount in his mind when accepting the armistice, but

neither he nor the Prime Minister have referred to it when talking of the peace proposals, and it is significant that M. Gounaris resolutely refused to admit it in the Chamber. I do not attach undue importance to this last fact, which was evidently dictated by tactical motives and probably saved the Government from a defeat. Nor have I, up to now, pressed the point that the Government were not, as a matter of fact, free agents, because the time does not seem to me to have come to do so. The Turks have not yet replied even to the armistice proposals, and the Greeks seem justified in marking time until they do so.

I have, however, called the attention of the Government to the attitude of the press and to the harm that has been done by not sufficiently preparing the public for sacrifices that have long appeared to me inevitable. Both M. Gounaris and M. Baltazzi replied that they had not themselves expected the proposals to be so unfavourable to Greece. They knew the friendly sentiments of His Majesty's Government and were acquainted with the lines of the settlement which your Lordship would try to obtain, and they had expected that the Allied proposals would coincide with your Lordship's views much more closely than had proved to be the case. I have used all the arguments at my disposal, as reported in my telegram, to present these proposals in the most favourable light, and I have little doubt that the Greek Government would accept them if they were able to disregard public opinion. If, however, they attempt to do this, the result will be their defeat in the Chamber and the formation of a Government pledged to continue the war at all costs.

The point on which public opinion is undoubtedly most moved is the fate of the Greek population in Asia Minor, and I much fear that no Greek Government will be able to begin evacuation before they can persuade the public here that this population can remain secure in their homes after the Greek troops have left. In this connection I would venture to remind your Lordship of the depth to which public opinion in England was stirred at the time of the Jameson raid by the telegrams announcing, quite untruly, that the lives of British women and children were in danger at Johannesburg. It was then a question of a few hundreds exposed to a very problematical danger. It is now a question of hundreds of thousands exposed to a peril which the experience of the last eight years has proved to be a terrible one. If one also considers that there is a large Greek army now protecting this population, and confident that it can continue to do so for a long time to come, the difficulties of the situation will be apparent. I know that your Lordship realises the position as well as anyone, but I have thought it right once again to refer to what is, in my opinion, the great difficulty in restoring peace in the East.

As regards Thrace, I do not believe that the Government will have any great difficulty in carrying through the Allied proposals. After all, these proposals give to Greece the better part of the province, and the common Turco-Bulgarian frontier is not a question upon which Greek public opinion is likely to become very excited. The Greek Government have certainly tried to interest the Serbian and Roumanian Governments in this matter, but, unless these two agree to make common cause, which at present appears unlikely, I do not anticipate that we shall hear much more of the question.

I have, &c.  
F. O. LINDLEY.

[E 4231/53/44]

No. 97.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 24.)*

(No. 373.)  
My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 18, 1922.*

ON receipt of your telegram No. 173 of the 15th April, relative to the question of the chief dragoman visiting the Greek Patriarch at Easter, I at once placed myself in communication with my French colleague. I had already learnt that the Italian High Commissioner had received instructions from Rome upholding his point of view.

2. While communications were passing with the French High Commission, General Pellé received a telegram from Paris giving him discretion to send his dragoman to the Patriarch, but only if all three High Commissioners agreed on this course. As the Italian High Commissioner still adhered to his view, General Pellé expressed regret that he could not on these instructions authorise the visit.

3. I thereupon instructed Mr. Ryan to pay the visit, but to take steps to make it

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perfectly clear that I refused to be drawn into personal relations with the Patriarch. I enclose a memorandum by Mr. Ryan describing the precautions taken and recording what passed at the interview.

4. I may mention that, although I received your telegram on Easter Sunday morning, I delayed the visit until Monday in order to give my colleagues every opportunity of coming into line. I greatly regret that my French colleague did not see his way to do so, but I anticipate that he will later on find means to bring about contact between his chief dragoman and the Patriarch, especially as the chief dragoman, M. Cuinet, knew the Patriarch personally in Athens.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 97.

*Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.*

I PAID the usual Easter visit to the Greek Patriarch yesterday, Easter Monday, after informing my French and Italian colleagues that your Excellency had authorised me to do so, in view of the instructions in Foreign Office telegram No. 173 of the 15th April.

Before paying the visit I sent for M. Musurus and told him that the question of the Easter visit had arisen in very delicate circumstances. I said we were anxious to avoid the very exaggerated interpretation which would be put upon the omission of this traditional courtesy on this occasion, but that, on the other hand, I had been authorised to pay it only on condition that it would in no way compromise the attitude which the High Commissioner had taken up since the Patriarch's arrival. I said it must be distinctly understood that, if I paid the visit, the Patriarch must not make it an occasion for reopening the question of an exchange of personal visits between him and the High Commissioner, and that he must equally not do anything in the nature of sending delegates to convey his thanks. M. Musurus undertook to explain this to the Patriarch before I called.

I also arranged that no reference to the visit should be made in the local press.

In presenting your Excellency's congratulations to the Patriarch I used words emphasising the fact that they were addressed to the Patriarchate and the Greek Church. The Patriarch, in a carefully worded expression of thanks, referred to the interest shown by Great Britain in the oppressed Greeks. I took the opportunity of dwelling on the ardour with which Lord Curzon had upheld at Paris the necessity of obtaining real guarantees for the minorities. On the other hand, I spoke of the anxiety inspired by the movement of resistance which appeared to be contemplated in Smyrna. I referred to my conversations with M. Musurus on this subject, in the second of which I had had occasion to convey a message of disapproval from His Majesty's Government. I pointed out how short-lived such a movement must be, and how dangerous in its consequences to the interests of minorities, whose position would be largely affected by the attitude of the Turkish authorities, no matter how solid might be the guarantees obtained by the Powers. I said that the Patriarch's name had been mixed up in the matter, doubtless by people who wished to misrepresent him. My object was not to endorse what was being said about him, but to urge him to use his great authority to discountenance dangerous activities.

The Patriarch said that the Powers at Paris had made the mistake of treating the issue as one between Turkey and Greece, whereas the really important thing was the position of the Greeks in Turkey. He discounted the value of any guarantees. They had availed nothing in Cilicia, where the population had fled. The same thing would happen in Asia Minor. If the Greek army left, the Christian population would be found trooping after them to the coast. He quoted an appeal he had had from Panderma, in which the people said that their choice lay not between life and death, but between different kinds of death. He said that he himself was the most moderate man in his circle. The feeling that the situation of the Greeks would be hopeless and intolerable was universal, extending even to the Greeks in Constantinople. It might not correspond with eventual realities, but it was a question of psychology which had to be reckoned with. Turkey was triumphing, and was triumphing in her worst manifestation, namely, Kemalism. It would be a different matter if peace were being made with the Sultan, the representative of traditional authority, instead of with the



[E 4263/900/44]

No. 97A.

*Count de Salis to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 24.)*

(No. 64.)

My Lord,

Rome, April 21, 1922.

GENERAL GOURAUD, the French High Commissioner for Syria, was received last week in audience by the Pope. Afterwards, as is usual, he visited the Cardinal Secretary of State, and, later, the French Ambassador gave a luncheon in his honour, at which Cardinal Gasparri was present.

The visit has aroused considerable interest and given rise to speculation in the press in connection with the French claim to the protectorate of Catholics in the East.

It was noticed that General Gouraud was wearing the Grand Cordon of the Order of St. Gregory the Great, conferred upon him by Benedict XV as a mark of his benevolent attitude towards Catholics in Syria. The "Idea Nazionale," commenting on the visit, contrasted the friendly relations existing between the French authorities in Syria and the Patriarch with those between the British authorities in Palestine and Mgr. Barlassina, and described the British policy of Zionism and favour shown to the Orthodox Greeks as being partly responsible for the leanings of the Vatican towards France.

In the course of the audience, which was a lengthy one, the question of the French protectorate must have been discussed, and the paper drew the conclusion that the Vatican supported the French claim to the detriment of Italy as well as of Great Britain.

This article has been followed by an apparently inspired *démenti* from the pen of Mgr. Pucci. He endeavours to calm the nervousness and, discussing the protectorate, points out that the Vatican have adopted an entirely correct and logical attitude. By maintaining, in so far as they are concerned, the *status quo* until the question has been settled one way or the other by the three Governments, as to what was agreed to at San Remo, they are taking the only possible course—one which can in no way be taken to imply a new step prejudicial to Italy.

I have, &c.  
(For the Minister).  
CECIL DORMER.

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most evil elements in the country. If the Greeks had to deal with the Sultan they could win through, as he stood for something which they knew and with which they could deal.

I said the Patriarch exaggerated in saying that the Foreign Ministers had taken the narrow view of regarding the issue as one between Greece and Turkey. It was true that that was the most immediate issue, but they had not disregarded the wider issue between Turkey and the Allies. The question of the minorities formed part of that wider issue. The evacuation of Asia Minor had become necessary. Had the Allies thought only of the Græco-Turkish issue they might have solved it more easily by disregarding the interests of the minorities. If Great Britain cared only for her own interests she might have disinterested herself in the minorities. We saw, however, in the question of the minorities a question of honour and humanity—above all, a question of honour—and I repeated that Lord Curzon had exerted himself to the utmost to provide real safeguards. The Patriarch had spoken of a psychological state, which might not correspond with eventual realities. That was where men of character and intelligence came in. If they shared the excited feeling of the populace, they had only to follow. If they saw that that feeling did not correspond with their own estimate of eventual realities, their rôle was to counteract it, as I had urged him to do. I said I was interested in what he had said about the Sultan, as I was myself convinced that there would be no stability in this country until the Sultan's authority was restored. If, however, he meant to say, "Re-establish the Sultan's authority first and then make peace with him," what practical means was there of proceeding in that order?

The Patriarch admitted the difficulty. He said that if the Greeks had been allowed to go to Angora last year the object would have been achieved. I said that the Sultan's authority could not rest on Greek bayonets. I supposed he meant that we should have given the Greeks material support to finish the campaign. We had not in any other sense prevented them from going to Angora. The Patriarch, who had rather pointedly said that the Allied attitude should not be determined by the existence of a particular régime in Greece, assented to this. I then said that the Turks also had their psychology, that the Greeks might have got to Angora, but would not have overrun Asia Minor, and that if the Sultan's cause were associated with that of the Greeks he would be damned in the eyes of all Turks, even the most moderate.

We did not carry the conversation further, as I did not want to prolong my visit unduly.

The Patriarch expresses himself with much force and directness. He certainly gives the impression of a strong personality, but he did not sound like a man who would easily be carried away by his feelings. His command of French is unusually good for a Greek prelate, but he is not quite as fluent as I had been led to expect, and one sees that he occasionally has some difficulty in finding appropriate words.

April 18, 1922.

[E 4371/5/44]

No. 98.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to M. de Martino.*

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 27, 1922.

YOU have been good enough to communicate to me verbally, on instructions from M. Schanzer, the intelligence that an agreement has now been signed between the Italian and the Turkish Governments in virtue of which the latter grant to the former certain concessions for railways, public works and mines, the precise character of which is not yet specified. I learn that these concessions have been offered as a free gift by the Constantinople Government, and M. Schanzer assures me that there have been no dealings with Angora in this matter. It is stated that the agreement does not provide for any set-off or counter-concession by the Italian Government, nor for any understanding which can fetter or limit their political action. M. Schanzer surmises, indeed, that the Turkish Government may expect thus to guarantee themselves against Italian hostility, but that this is merely their desire, while it is the firm intention of the Italian Government to take no step opposed to the policy of the Allies, and especially of His Majesty's Government. In this spirit M. Schanzer declares that he had in the past kept me loyally informed of what was passing and would continue to do so in the future. He reminds me that he had acquainted me with the Turkish offer

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at Paris, and your Excellency yourself mentioned it to me at the same time. I am further assured that the Italian Government entertain no illusions as to the value of the concessions now gratuitously offered to them by the Turks; but that they distrust the benefits secured to them by the Tripartite Agreement and those economic guarantees which, on the strong insistence of M. Schanzer, were included last month in the Paris recommendations. Accordingly they have felt unable to refuse the Turkish offer and have signed the agreement.

2. I note that you will shortly communicate to me the text of this document, and, in view of the message of M. Schanzer, communicated to me by you, I doubt not that on examining it I shall find that it impinges on no specific British interest. I desire, however, to submit without delay some observations of a more general nature on this remarkable and, as it appears to me, unfortunate proceeding.

3. I recall that at Paris M. Schanzer informed me not of the Turkish offer, but of the fact that certain proposals had been made. I also recollect your mentioning the matter to me in a sentence before I left for Paris, and my reply to you advising extreme caution. From that date to the present moment I have received from you no information whatever as to the course of the negotiations proceeding. I did indeed learn from British representatives abroad that they were believed to be taking place, and I did not fail a few days ago to warn you again in writing. I can only regret that my representations should have remained so entirely ineffective, and I feel unable to admit that His Majesty's Government have been treated with the frankness they might have expected from the loyalty which is claimed by the Italian Government for its acts and intentions.

4. It appears to me to be wholly immaterial that the Italian Government should have negotiated at Constantinople alone and not at Angora. It is well known that the aims of the two Turkish parties are substantially identical, and that what is gained or lost by the one is gained or lost by the other also. It is also tolerably certain that Izzet Pasha would not venture to conclude any agreement of more than passing importance without the cognizance of the Angora authorities. Furthermore, I have received reliable information that the latter are perfectly well aware of, if they have not actually participated in, the negotiations. In any case, the evil effects of this agreement will inevitably extend to the negotiations in which the Allies will be presently involved with the Turkish Nationalists.

5. I fully accept M. Schanzer's assurance that the obligations of this agreement are only unilateral, i.e., on the Turkish and not on the Italian Government. I fear, however, that the public opinion of Europe and Asia, based on a long familiarity with the processes and objects of Oriental diplomacy, will not derive much consolation from this assurance. It is not the practice even of Western Governments to give away valuable concessions gratuitously to foreign interests; still less has any Turkish Government ever been suspected of such innocent generosity. M. Schanzer has, indeed, in his message to me, indicated himself with clear insight the motives and thoughts which have inspired Izzet Pasha in concluding the agreement. The result can hardly, in fact, be other than this. Though the Italian representatives in the forthcoming conference will be bound by no formal text to any Turkish view, they will inevitably find themselves fettered by the moral difficulties of a position in which loyalty to their Allies will drag them in one direction and the expectations or the reproaches of the Turks in the other. I cannot conceive, therefore, that the signature of this agreement can have any other result than to render the Turkish authorities more unwilling to accept the very moderate and equitable terms which the three Allies decided at Paris only last month to press upon them. In so far as M. Schanzer's action prejudices—as it undoubtedly must prejudice—the prospects of an early peace in the Near East, it appears to be inconsistent with a due regard for the interests not merely of Great Britain, but of the Allies as a whole.

6. In spite of past disappointments, I had hoped that on the basis of the Paris terms the three Allies would thenceforward present a united front to Turkey; that they would renounce petty and selfish gains in order to secure the common good; and I still cherish the profound conviction that only by such conduct can that success be obtained. For advantages, the illusory nature of which M. Schanzer recognises quite clearly, the prospect of achieving that success has been deliberately jeopardised. The agreement which M. Schanzer has signed may differ in form and in detail from that which was concluded last year by his predecessor in office, but in its principle it is no less objectionable. For once more we have the spectacle, which no one has condemned more strongly in conversation with me than you and the Italian Foreign Minister, of one of the three Great Powers separating itself from the remainder in order to negotiate

a clandestine agreement with the Turks behind the back of the others. In these circumstances, I am compelled to present to you the strongest protest of His Majesty's Government against the transaction which you have reported to me.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 4425/27/44]

No. 99.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 1.)*

(No. 381.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 24, 1922.*

THE local press announced a few days ago several appointments by the Angora Government to administrative posts. They include the appointment of Sabit Bey as Vali of Erzeroum, Abdul-Halik Bey as Vali of Konia, and Muammer Bey as Mutessarif of Caesarea.

2. These three appointments illustrate significantly the temper of the Angora Government. Sabit Bey was Vali of Kharput from 1914 to February 1916. Abdul-Halik was Vali of Bitlis from March 1914 to September 1915. Muammer Bey was Vali of Sivas from 1913 to February 1916. Each acquired notoriety as a ferocious exponent of the policy of deporting and massacring Christians. Each was arrested after the armistice, and they were all three in due course deported to Malta. Their full records will be found in the files relative to the Malta deportees. Their appointment at the present juncture to high administrative posts is of a piece with the election of the notorious Feizi Bey of Diarbekir to a post in the Angora Cabinet to replace Raouf Bey, the resignation of whom, together with other members of the Angora Government, I reported in my despatch No. 95 of the 24th January.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

*High Commissioner.*

[E 4427/53/44]

No. 100.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 1.)*

(No. 385.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, April 25, 1922.*

WITH reference to previous despatches relative to the situation at the Greek Patriarchate and the election of Mgr. Meletios to the Patriarchal See, I have the honour to state that considerable efforts have been made recently to restore harmony between the two factions into which the Greek episcopacy split over the election, which was of course merely the culminating episode in a purely political struggle between Constantinists and Veniselsists. Mgr. Meletios would appear to have realised that the continuance of the struggle can only be detrimental to the cause of Hellenism generally as against the Turks.

2. Shortly before Easter, it looked as though an agreement, or at least a truce, would be concluded between the Patriarch and the seven Bishops who seceded from the Holy Synod at the time of the election. It became known that negotiations were proceeding, and, while the Patriarchate was at pains to deny that there was any question of the Patriarch's definitely recognising the present régime in Greece, it was obvious that his attitude towards the Athens Government must necessarily enter into the question. The position a week before Easter is described in the enclosed cutting from the "Bosphore," an inspired paper, of the 8th April.

3. Matters appear to have taken a less favourable turn for the advocates of reunion since that date. The dissidents appear to have fought shy of the Patriarchate since the draft protocol was drawn up, except for two of their number, one of whom is reported to have made his submission to the Patriarch, while the other is said to have paid him a friendly visit, though without making submission. The others are said to take exception to the provision that the Council of Bishops, which was to be free to review the election proceedings, should be held after the convocation of a national assembly, on the ground that the latter would never consent to allow the validity of the election to be called in question.



4. The present position is that the dissident Bishops are striving to collect a Council of Bishops of their own way of thinking in Constantinople on the 3rd May, while the constituted bodies of the Patriarchate took a decision on the 20th April, giving the dissidents until the 25th April to reconsider their recalcitrant attitude.

5. The main interest of this question at the present time is in its effect on the situation in Southern Asia Minor. If the Patriarch can bring the dissident Bishops into line, and establish some sort of a *modus vivendi* with the Athens Government, he will obviously be in a much better position to influence the situation in the Smyrna area in accordance with his own views. From this point of view a rapprochement is not altogether to be desired, as the Patriarch is generally supposed to favour the Micrasiatic movement of resistance to evacuation, and, if he threw himself into it with the full weight of his authority after effecting a composition with the Constantinists, the movement would greatly gain in strength. Your Lordship will have observed that in his conversation with Mr. Ryan on the 17th April (see my despatch No. 373 of the 18th April), while professing himself the most moderate of men, he said nothing to dissociate himself definitely from the Micrasiatic movement.

6. In this connection I enclose a précis of reports from very secret sources on the activities of the Patriarch, the National Defence Organisation here, and General Papoulas in regard to the Micrasiatic movement. I regard these reports with a good deal of suspicion, but they are at least useful as indicating the trend of rumour and opinion in Veniselist circles here, from which the compilers of the reports ultimately derive most of their information.

7. The Patriarch has been seeking to consolidate his position in other directions also. The Patriarch of Antioch is said to have recognised him and to have sent a letter of congratulations. The Patriarch of Jerusalem is said to have decided to act similarly, though no formal letter has been received from him. The Patriarch of Alexandria still stands out. Mgr. Germanos, the Bishop of Amassia, one of the leading Veniselist prelates, and himself, it will be remembered, a candidate for the Patriarchal throne, has just returned from a mission to Belgrade to seal the definite recognition of the separate Church of Yugoslavia, under a Patriarch of its own. This means that the head of that Church will also support the Patriarch of Constantinople.

8. I believe the Patriarch to be really waiting on events, and to be concentrating his attention for the present on an effort to strengthen his position all round, reserving the question of how he will use his influence in the long run. There are indications that he is not indifferent even to the possibility of working with the Sultan, should that prove to be the best way of protecting the interests of his flock when things settle down in the Near East.

9. Meanwhile the "Orthodox Turk" movement in Anatolia continues to attract a good deal of attention. Rumours have been put about to the effect that the Bolsheviks have been taking a hand in this game, and have agreed to put the Orthodox Church in Russia under the authority of the new Patriarchate to be established at Caesarea. This is extremely unlikely, and in any case no reliable news has been received of the definite establishment of the separate Church in Anatolia. Angora appears to be going extremely slow with the business really, and to be content to use the "Orthodox Turk" movement for what little it is worth for current political purposes, without taking any definite decision as to the ecclesiastical organisation of the "Orthodox Turks" in the future.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 100.

*Précis of Secret Report.*

RECENT reports from secret sources indicate that efforts have been made during the last month to readjust the position of the Greek National Defence Organisation in Constantinople so as to enable it to work in with the local anti-evacuation movement at Smyrna. The Patriarchate and Colonel Kondilis are represented as playing the leading rôles in this matter. The efforts at readjustment turn on (1) the question of relations between the Veniselist organisation here and the Athens Government, (2) the question of the attitude of the Athens Government towards the Micrasiatic movement, and (3) the question of providing a basis on which the numerous Veniselist officers in Constantinople can join up for service in Asia Minor.

The secret reports indicate that an attempt is being made to reconcile differences of opinion in the National Defence Organisation here, to co-ordinate its activities with those of similar organisations elsewhere, and to place the whole National Defence machine at the disposal of the Patriarch. They further indicate that negotiations were on foot between the organisation here and the Athens authorities in March, but that towards the end of March the Athens Government were unwilling to commit themselves to support the Micrasiatic movement, and made some half-hearted attempt to supersede General Papoulas by a General who could be trusted to carry out the instructions of the Government in the event of evacuation being decided on. General Papoulas himself is represented as having definitely thrown himself into the Micrasiatic movement after his last visit to Athens. The reports credit the Patriarch with playing an important part in conjunction with the General in promoting the movement, and in making preparations for the proclamation of an independent local Government in case of need. It is even suggested that, if such a Government should be proclaimed, the Patriarch would himself proceed to Smyrna in order to give his support, and that the treasure of the Greek churches would be made available to finance the movement. The Patriarch and Kondilis are said to have drawn up a plan of action which is based on discussions between Mgr. Meletios and M. Veniselos in the United States of America, and which has been submitted to Papoulas.

Lastly, the reports indicate that great progress has been made with arrangements to enable the Veniselist officers in Constantinople to return to active service in the Asia Minor army. In this matter the leading rôle is attributed to Kondilis. The influence of Generals Joannou, Zimbrakakis and Mazarakis is said to have declined. The plan is said to be that the Veniselist officers should return to the front, Kondilis remaining in Constantinople to round up deserters from the rank and file, of whom there are said to be some 5,000 in Constantinople.

Enclosure 2 in No. 100.

*Extract from the "Bosphore" of April 8, 1922.*

#### L'ÉGLISE DU PHANAR ET LA NATION GRECQUE.

LES deux corps constitués du Patriarcat œcuménique, réunis avant-hier, pour prendre connaissance du projet d'accord concernant la réconciliation au sein de la grande Église, désunie à la suite de l'attitude des métropolités dissidents dans la question de l'élection patriarcale, ont longuement discuté les conditions de base de cet accord.

Celles-ci sont au nombre de trois :

1. Abstention du Patriarcat de toute activité tendant à renverser par la violence le régime actuel hellénique.
2. Aide active au renforcement du front, soit morale, soit matérielle, sans considération de nuance politique.
3. Convocation, après la réunion de l'assemblée nationale locale, d'un conseil où la discussion sur l'élection patriarcale et les actes s'y rapportant ne sera pas exclue.

Les délibérations, qui furent longues, ont abouti à faire l'unanimité sur la nécessité d'une entente et sur la réserve aussi qu'il y avait lieu de s'étonner qu'on ait pu jamais imputer au Patriarcat du Phanar une action tendant à renverser le régime politique en Grèce.

Les deux corps constitués ont, en conséquence, décidé qu'une délégation composée du Métropolitite de Nicée et de M. Fermanoglou se rendrait, hier, auprès du Haut-Commissaire de Grèce à l'effet de protester contre les imputations dont le Patriarcat fut victime et de transmettre en même temps les vœux et les souhaits de la grande Église à l'occasion de la fête nationale.

Le communiqué suivant a été publié par le Patriarcat :

"Des questions soumises aux deux corps constitués, à la suite du rapport de M. A. Joannidi, celles se rapportant au régime politique en Grèce et à l'armée nationale ont été repoussées comme provenant de la part de prélats et se mêlant à une question religieuse. A la faveur cependant de la discussion y relative, il a



été décidé de donner à ce sujet, par écrit et par délégation spéciale, les assurances dues à l'autorité représentant à Constantinople l'État et l'armée grecs.

"Les deux corps constitués, n'admettant pas la moindre discussion quant à la solidité de l'élection patriarcale, ont entendu sa Sainteté Méléti IV déclarer qu'il n'empêchera pas de discuter une proposition émanant d'un ou de prélats du grand Synode au sujet de la dernière élection patriarcale.

"Le conseil approuve qu'il soit fait part aux intéressés du vif désir de sa Sainteté et des deux corps constitués de voir au plus tôt rétablie au sein de l'Eglise la concorde nécessaire et indispensable pour le salut de la nation."

[E 4429/27/44]

No. 101.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 1.)*

(No. 389.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 25, 1922.

I TOOK the opportunity of a visit which I paid to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 22nd instant to point out the bad impression which had been produced on my mind by the appointment to various responsible posts under the Angora Government of men whose record in connection with Armenian massacres was known to be bad. (Please see my despatch No. 381 of the 24th instant.) I said that these appointments were a significant indication of the frame of mind of the Nationalist Government.

2. Izzet Pasha agreed that the action of the Angora Government was a mistake. He said that he had reason to believe that Muammer Bey's record was a bad one. On my enquiry as to what he knew of this individual, he replied that he had never heard anything to his credit. On the other hand, Izzet Pasha said, he thought Sabit Bey had been maligned. But if the Angora Government had made mistakes, the Constantinople Government was also to blame. He explained that he was alluding to the Damad Ferid Cabinet. Whilst he had been Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha had ordered the execution of four persons on the charge of conspiring against him. This procedure was calculated to make the Turks suppose that there would be a return to a despotic form of Government in Turkey.

3. Izzet Pasha then complained of the manner in which certain organs of the Constantinople press often speak slightly of the Central Government. He thought that the Allied censors should suppress these offensive passages. I replied that the British censor was not to blame. I have reason to know that the French censor, presumably in accordance with the policy of French subservience to Angora, has allowed such articles to appear in the past. I shall do my best to remedy this very natural grievance on the part of the Constantinople Government.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 4430/5/44]

No. 102.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 1.)*

(No. 390.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 25, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the reply of the Angora Government to the note which the Allied Governments addressed to that Government on the 15th instant. This reply was handed to me by the Nationalist agent, Hamid Bey, on the 23rd instant, and I had the honour to send your Lordship a full summary of it in my telegram No. 219 of the 23rd instant.

2. My telegrams Nos. 220, 222, 224 and 225 contain the observations on the note from the Angora Government which I have considered it desirable to submit to your Lordship, and the present despatch supplements those telegrams.

3. It was to be foreseen that the Angora Government would be placed in a difficulty by the demand formulated by the Allied Governments that the Nationalists should accept the body of the peace conditions subject to the discussion of particular points before the evacuation of Asia Minor could commence. In its answer, the Angora Government maintains its previous request that the evacuation of Asia Minor should immediately follow on the conclusion of the armistice, and proposes in terms the precise significance of which is not quite clear a preliminary conference at Ismid in order to see whether it is possible to find a *terrain d'entente* which would permit of subsequent peace negotiations.

4. The principal impression produced by the perusal of the enclosed note is that it is mainly in the nature of propaganda. The first portion of the note is an attempt to distort the intentions of the Allies with regard to the evacuation of Asia Minor. The alleged ruthless proceedings of the Greek army in Asia Minor are quoted as a reason for a speedy evacuation of the territory occupied by that army. The Angora Government even goes so far as to accuse the Greeks of massacre and the burning of villages in the Sokia region, which has only just been evacuated by the Italians. There is nothing either in the reports received from Smyrna by my Italian colleague or by myself to show that the Greeks have committed any excesses in occupying the Sokia district, and it is not materially possible that, when the Angora note was despatched, the Nationalists could have had cognisance of the state of the district in question. I consider, therefore, that their statement under this head is purely imaginary.

5. The omission in the note from Angora of all reference to the intention of the Allied Powers to safeguard the Caliphate is significant, as also is the passage to the effect that the Turkish people should not be deprived, owing to their being a Moslem nation, of rights which are naturally recognised in the case of Christian peoples. This is mischievous propaganda which should be countered in any reply which the Allied Governments return to the present note.

6. The Angora Government reaffirms the statement, so often heard here, that, of all the defeated nations, Turkey is the one which has suffered most. This does not take account of the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Empire has completely disappeared. Further on the note states that, as the bulk of the peace conditions only interests the Great Powers, there is no reason why those Powers should maintain a Greek army of invasion in Anatolia in order to restrict the right of discussion of the Angora Government. This statement is perhaps the most inaccurate one in the whole note.

7. Finally, the note proposes a preliminary meeting at Ismid between plenipotentiaries of the Angora Government and plenipotentiaries of the Allies to elucidate the different points of view.

8. In handing me the note, Hamid Bey explained that, if this proposal were accepted, Mustapha Kemal would himself go to Ismid, as, in his capacity as a kind of head of the State, Mustapha Kemal would have power to take decisions on the spot without reference to Angora. It would therefore be desirable that the Allied delegates should have similar powers.

9. I have impressed on my colleagues that these statements indicate that Mustapha Kemal has in view something more than the elucidation of "particular points." His proposal is in line with the statement made in the note, that the bulk of the peace conditions only concerned the Allied Governments, a statement to which the Italian High Commissioner had taken great exception. I expressed the view that an acceptance of the proposal to go to Ismid would be dangerous and would be exploited by the Nationalists to the detriment of the Allies, the Greeks and the Central Government. I reminded my colleagues that Mustapha Kemal was well acquainted with the main lines of the proposed settlement, and that he would hardly put himself out to go to Ismid in order to discuss secondary issues. Hamid Bey had said that if the proposal to go to Ismid were not accepted Mustapha Kemal would be unable to go to any other locality outside Anatolia, as he would not leave the national soil. As my colleagues themselves were of the opinion that it would be undignified for the Allied High Commissioners to go to Ismid, or indeed to any place of that kind indicated by the Nationalists, I saw no point in the proposed preliminary conference.

10. On the other hand, my colleagues and I are agreed that it would be unwise to close the door to further discussion. We are also inclined to think that the Nationalists do not desire to terminate discussions. The Kemalist army appears to be weary of fighting, the Nationalists have their eyes on the Genoa Conference, and are probably reluctant to take a plunge in any direction before they know how the position of the Russians is likely to be affected by the Genoa Conference.

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11. I have only indicated two considerations which must be present in the minds of the Nationalists, though there are no doubt others.

12. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 102.

*Hamid Bey to Sir H. Rumbold.*

Excellence,

*Constantinople, le 23 avril 1922.*

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre ci-inclus à votre Excellence et avec prière de faire parvenir à destination la note responsive que son Excellence Youssouf Kémal Bey, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie, vient d'adresser par mon intermédiaire à son Excellence Lord Curzon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

A. HAMID.

Enclosure 2 in No. 102.

*Hamid Bey to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.*

*Angora, le 22 avril 1922.*

LE Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie a l'honneur d'accuser réception aux Gouvernements de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie de la réponse collective en date du 15 avril 1922, faite par eux à sa note du 5 du même mois.

Se basant sur les déclarations de leurs Excellences les Ministres des Affaires étrangères des trois Puissances relatives à leur sincère et ardent désir de voir régner à nouveau l'ordre et la paix dans le Proche-Orient, et sur le fait que l'armistice a été proposé uniquement dans l'intention d'assurer l'évacuation pacifique de l'Asie Mineure, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie avait estimé que la simultanéité de l'évacuation avec l'armistice eût été plus conforme aux conséquences logiques des buts poursuivis. Il avait donc cru, dans sa note responsive du 5 avril 1922, s'être conformé au point de vue des Puissances alliées qui se proposent d'exclure toute possibilité du renouvellement des hostilités. En effet, lorsque, dans leur note du 22 mars 1922 au sujet de l'armistice, leurs Excellences les Ministres des Affaires étrangères des trois Puissances recommandaient instamment la suspension immédiate des hostilités, ils déclaraient avoir en vue de rétablir la paix dans le Proche-Orient et d'être mis à même de faire des propositions pour l'évacuation de l'Asie Mineure, sans nouvelles pertes de vies et de biens. De même, il est spécifié dans la note du 26 mars 1922 relative aux conditions de paix que l'armistice a été proposé avec l'intention déclarée d'assurer l'évacuation pacifique de l'Asie Mineure par les forces grecques et la restauration de la souveraineté turque sur l'ensemble de cette région. De plus, son Excellence Lord Curzon, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, avait déclaré, le 30 mars 1922, à la Chambre des Lords que l'invitation à accepter un armistice était accompagnée par l'intimation du fait que l'armistice serait suivi par des mesures pour l'évacuation de l'Asie Mineure par les forces grecques. Le peuple turc, prenant en considération cette série de déclarations, espérait qu'il serait procédé à l'évacuation sans délai de l'Anatolie simultanément avec l'armistice. Or, il a été constaté avec regret que, dans leur dernière communication du 15 avril 1922, les Puissances alliées ont déclaré ne pouvoir accepter une évacuation immédiate accompagnant l'armistice et subordonné cette évacuation à l'acceptation de l'ensemble des conditions de paix.

Mon Gouvernement veut s'abstenir de discuter ici le fait que les Puissances alliées ont invoqué comme motifs de cette remise de l'évacuation le refus probable du Gouvernement hellénique de souscrire avant le début des négociations à une condition de cette sorte et le renouvellement éventuel de la guerre en Thrace, actes qui, s'ils se produisaient, impliqueraient de la part du Gouvernement une opposition effective au sincère et ardent désir de paix des grandes Puissances et attireraient sur lui le blâme et la réprobation universels. Dans tous les cas, les motifs précités prouvent combien le point de vue turc au sujet de l'évacuation est conforme aux intérêts de la paix ainsi

qu'à la justice et à l'équité. Cependant, mon Gouvernement sent la nécessité d'insister sur le fait que dans les territoires occupés, autrefois si riches et si prospères, l'armée hellénique ajoute tous les jours de nouveaux incendies et de nouvelles dévastations aux crimes qu'elle a déjà perpétrés et augmente par de nouvelles victimes le nombre de musulmans innocents massacrés. Les atrocités, telles que les massacres des populations et l'incendie des villages, commises ces derniers jours par les Grecs surtout dans la région de Sokia, dernièrement évacuée par les Italiens, sont une nouvelle preuve de nos affirmations. Les ruines amoncelées sur les territoires turcs et les indicibles atrocités perpétrées sur la population musulmane, autrefois si aisée, depuis l'occupation grecque sont attestées par les témoignages unanimes de tous les étrangers neutres, y compris les délégués des Croix-Rouges qui ont visité les régions envahies.

Mon Gouvernement ne veut pas croire que les Puissances alliées, dont les efforts humanitaires tendant à la protection des minorités chrétiennes sont connus, puissent consentir à abandonner encore un certain temps à leur triste sort les majorités musulmanes gémissant sous l'occupation hellénique et rester simples spectatrices de leurs souffrances.

C'est dans cet espoir que mon Gouvernement fait appel aux sentiments dont sont animés leurs Excellences les Ministres des Affaires étrangères des Puissances alliées et les prie instamment de délivrer un moment plus tôt nos frères musulmans innocents et malheureux de l'administration cruelle et insupportable de l'ennemi en faisant, selon leurs propres intentions, suivre l'armistice d'une évacuation immédiate.

Mon Gouvernement nourrit le ferme espoir que les Puissances alliées admettront facilement combien le peuple turc, mû par la volonté de délivrer un moment plus tôt ses compatriotes du joug cruel de l'ennemi, est excusable de ne pouvoir consentir à ce que l'évacuation soit subordonnée à l'acceptation de l'ensemble des conditions de paix.

J'avais eu précédemment l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance qu'en cas d'acceptation de son point de vue relatif à l'évacuation, mon Gouvernement serait prêt, conformément à l'invitation contenue dans la note du 26 mars 1922, à envoyer ses délégués en vue d'étudier les conditions de paix. Toutefois, parmi les conditions proposées se trouvent des points qui sont en contradiction avec les principes que les Ministres des Affaires étrangères des Puissances alliées ont eu constamment présent à l'esprit et sur lesquels se fondent leurs propositions, ainsi qu'avec les assurances suivantes données officiellement et publiquement en 1918 par M. le Président du Conseil de Grande-Bretagne: "Nous ne faisons pas la guerre pour dépouiller la Turquie de sa capitale et des régions riches et renommées de l'Asie Mineure et de la Thrace qui sont turques en race d'une façon prédominante." Cependant, les principes contenus dans la note du 26 mars, et visant à rétablir la nation et la puissance turques dans les territoires qui peuvent être considérés comme leur appartenant avec les pouvoirs qui permettent à la Turquie de reprendre une existence nationale vigoureuse et indépendante, et assurer aux musulmans le régime le plus équitable, &c., ne diffèrent pas des buts pour l'obtention desquels le peuple turc s'est imposé tant de sacrifices, mon Gouvernement ne veut pas perdre l'espoir de voir adapter aux principes précédemment énoncés les conditions de paix qui ne s'y ajustent pas et par suite d'arriver à réaliser un accord sur l'ensemble des conditions proposées.

Mon Gouvernement se permet de répéter encore une fois que le peuple turc ne désire rien autre chose que de vivre indépendant et d'être en sécurité sur les territoires lui appartenant, de se débarrasser de chaînes politiques, judiciaires et économiques entravant son libre essor et de ne pas être privé, par le seul fait d'être un peuple musulman, des droits que l'on reconnaît tout naturellement aux peuples chrétiens.

Parmi les Etats vaincus, la Turquie a été éprouvée le plus durement pour sa participation à la guerre générale par la perte de vastes pays de l'étendue de plusieurs royaumes. Dans ces conditions, et alors que les buts légitimes et modestes du peuple turc sont admis en principe par les Puissances alliées, mon Gouvernement estime que la subordination de l'évacuation à l'acceptation de l'ensemble des conditions de paix aura pour seuls résultats de permettre à l'ennemi, durant les mois qui s'écouleront pour établir les conditions de paix, de se mettre en état de reprendre les hostilités, ainsi que de fournir à l'envahisseur l'occasion d'attenter, d'une façon continuelle et toujours sur une échelle plus grande, à la vie et à l'honneur et aux biens des musulmans se trouvant dans les territoires dont l'attribution à la Turquie n'est contestée par personne.

D'ailleurs, la plus grande partie des conditions de paix proposées intéressant uniquement les grandes Puissances alliées, mon Gouvernement est convaincu qu'elles n'ont pas besoin de maintenir en Anatolie une armée grecque d'invasion afin de restreindre son droit de discussion. A ce sujet, je crois devoir ajouter que les



Puissances alliées ont laissé mon Gouvernement dans l'incertitude en ne précisant pas quels sont les points qu'elles considèrent comme particuliers dans l'ensemble des conditions proposées. En effet, ce mode de classification des conditions de paix, en se prêtant à diverses interprétations, selon les différents points de vue, présenterait des inconvénients et donnerait lieu à discussion; or, toutes ces discussions auront pour résultat de prolonger les souffrances de l'occupation imposée à la population musulmans.

Se basant sur ces considérations et tout en remerciant leurs Excellences les Ministres des Affaires étrangères des Puissances alliées pour les déclarations comme quoi satisfaction aurait été donnée dans une importante mesure à sa demande principale concernant l'évacuation, le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie se voit obligé d'insister sur son point de vue relatif à la nécessité de commencer l'évacuation simultanément avec l'armistice.

Néanmoins, je m'empresse de vous faire connaître, au nom de mon Gouvernement, qu'afin d'éviter toutes pertes de temps que nécessiterait un échange de correspondance, et de déterminer par des négociations verbales la question de savoir si en réalité les différents points de vue mis en avant dans le but d'arriver à la paix sans nouvelles pertes de vies et de biens sont conciliables ou non, et de pouvoir s'entendre de vive voix sur les points qui ont besoin d'être élucidés, nos délégués plénipotentiaires sont prêts à se rencontrer à Ismid, à une date à fixer, avec les délégués plénipotentiaires des Puissances alliées, en vue d'ouvrir, en premier lieu, des pourparlers préparatoires et à procéder de suite aux négociations de paix dans le cas où l'on pourrait trouver un terrain d'entente.

Au cas où cette proposition serait agréée par votre Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier, au nom de mon Gouvernement, de vouloir bien m'en informer, afin que nous puissions vous faire parvenir les noms de nos délégués.

YOUSSEUF KEMAL,

Ministre des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement  
de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

[E 4432/5/44]

No. 103.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 1.)*

(No. 391.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 26, 1922.

ONE of the most striking features of the situation in this country during the past few weeks has been the hostility of Angora towards the Constantinople Government. The Grand National Assembly has of course, since its inception, claimed in theory to be the sole Government of Turkey, but, up to a short time ago, care was taken not to push this theory to its logical extreme. The new attitude dates from the moment when the Constantinople Government decided to send Izzet Pasha to London and Paris. This, as your Lordship is aware, was greatly resented in Angora as an attempt to cut the ground from under Yussuf Kemal Bey, and the resentment was all the greater as the belief appears to be entertained at Angora that Izzet Pasha has gone against the Nationalist leaders there and is working for an understanding with Great Britain.

2. The reply of the Constantinople Government to the Paris proposals gave a fresh impetus to the new movement of hostility to the Constantinople Government. The reference to Angora's answer as being the reply of "the army" was greeted with a scream of indignation, and, though it was well known that the Angora Government were unwilling to come to a conference at Constantinople, the rejection of that place by the Central Government was also made a ground of attack. The word went out from Angora that the statesmen of Constantinople were unwilling to see a conference held in the capital simply because they feared that if delegates of the Angora Government came here they would be welcomed by the whole population as representing the only real Government of Turkey.

3. It may be said that Angora now has a two-fold programme, and wishes not only to impose the National Pact on the Allies, but also to force the Allies into the position of treating with the Kemalist Government alone. France is regarded, and rightly, as an asset in securing both parts of this programme. Italy, though to a less extent, is also regarded as favourable. Great Britain is considered the only serious obstacle to

the realisation of the double object, and is thought to be still supporting the Greeks, even to the extent of secretly encouraging the Micrasiatic movement.

4. It is sometimes maintained in foreign circles that the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks would deprive the Angora Government of its *raison d'être*, and that once the evacuation took place it would be easy enough to obtain a satisfactory settlement from an united Turkey. The only ground for hoping this is that there is undoubtedly dissension at Angora, and there are undoubtedly elements of some importance in the Grand National Assembly, who would welcome a return to the traditional order of things, in which the Sultan-Caliph would be the sovereign of a Constitutional State. Mustapha Kemal and his associates, however, are not of this mind. They wish to recover Constantinople, but they wish to exercise the same power in the whole of the future Turkey that they now exercise in Anatolia, and to deprive the Sultan of all temporal authority. For them the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks is a step towards the realisation of their larger programme as defined at the beginning of the preceding paragraph.

5. I have before me reports of speeches by members of the Angora Government which bear out the above appreciation. One of these is a report by the Commissioner of Finance on the financial and economic bearing of the Allied proposals. He is said to have taken exception to the maintenance of the Public Debt and the proposed Liquidation Commission, and to have gone on to deal in the following terms with the question of the Capitulations.

6. "We feel that the most important consideration in regard to the future peace is that which concerns our economic independence, and I state without hesitation that this part of the Allied peace proposals is totally unacceptable, for it involves no serious engagements towards us and only consists of empty words. What is granted with one hand is at the same time withdrawn with the other. The principal basis of our economic independence is the right and the power to impose taxes like any other nation. Although the peace conditions appear to acknowledge this right, in reality it is denied by the statement 'in order to protect foreign subjects against all abuses in the collection of taxes and against unreasonable impositions.' Similarly, the establishment of customs dues in conformity with the economic and financial necessities and interests of a country is the legitimate right of every Government, and the peace proposals appear to grant us this right, but it is nevertheless denied us by the statement 'no alteration of customs dues may be made except with the consent of the Governments interested.'"

7. The Commissioner of Finance apparently qualified his statement by saying that a settlement of the financial question might be possible and that certain undertakings might be given in regard to special taxation, but he insisted that there must be no restraint on Turkey's economic freedom and nothing which would infringe her political independence.

8. The following extracts from a speech reported to have been delivered by Mustapha Kemal himself at the beginning of April illustrate the double aim of the Angora Government:—

9. "The Central Government knows very well that Angora represents the whole nation; consequently, even if preparations are made for direct negotiations with the Greeks, the dignatories of Stambul certainly realise that such negotiations, without the consent of Angora, can have no possible result. Even in the event of there being such negotiations, the dignatories of Stambul likewise realise that the conference could not assemble in Constantinople, but in some other place where there would be no interference from Angora. That is the reason why the Sublime Porte in the reply handed to the Powers stated that Constantinople would not be an opportune place of meeting for a second peace conference. In the event of our proposal being favourably received, and provided the Greeks can be made to accept the conditions, a conference will be held three weeks later at a place designated by Angora, such as Ismid, Ineboli or Trebizond; the Sublime Porte is doubtless aware of this also.

"Therefore, what Angora declares and desires will be carried out. We have forced those who signed the Treaty of Sévres to lick away their signatures. It is we who have created this situation, and in these circumstances what have we to fear?"

10. With regard to the encouragement given by France and Italy to the Nationalists, Yussuf Kemal Bey is alleged to have stated at a secret sitting of the Grand National Assembly immediately after his return from Paris that he had



obtained promises from M. Poincaré and M. Schanzer to the effect that Eastern Thrace would be restored to Turkey and that the Straits question would be settled in accordance with the National Pact, and that the two Ministers had asked in return that the armistice should be accepted without reserve. I cannot be certain that Yussuf Kemal went so far, and, if he did, I hesitate to believe that either M. Poincaré or M. Schanzer would have given him any assurances of so definite a kind. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that France and Italy are regarded in Angora, and with some reason, as being only too ready to modify the Paris proposals in a sense favourable to Turkey and that Great Britain alone blocks the way.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 4457/5/44]

No. 104.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 1.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

War Office, April 29, 1922.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a telegram, dated the 26th April, 1922, from Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Harington on the subject of the control of ports during the armistice in Anatolia.

2. I am to say that the Council are of opinion that the only really effective way of preventing reinforcements and material reaching the belligerents during the armistice would be to organise an efficient control at all the ports mentioned by General Harington. The port of Mersina is especially important, because large consignments of arms and ammunition are landed here *en route* to the Kemalists from France. As the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston is no doubt aware, definite information on this subject is obtained from very secret sources, which also indicate that the French Government may be directly concerned in this arms traffic.

3. The Council, however, consider that, if control is to be established at all, this must be done in a manner which will be equally fair to both Greeks and Turks, and that wholehearted co-operation between the members of all the Allied commissions will be essential. So far as the Greeks are concerned it seems probable that little difficulty would be experienced, as the loyal co-operation of our allies could be assured in helping to prevent the passage of reinforcements or war material to the Greek army. But it is open to question whether the control at Turkish ports could be as effectively carried out and whether loyal co-operation would be forthcoming. In these circumstances the Council would be glad to know Lord Curzon's views on the political aspect of the matter.

4. I am to add that the Council agree with General Harington that if control of the ports is to be included in the scheme, then Mersina should be controlled; and that if it is considered impracticable to control the Turkish ports, then no control should be established at Greek ports.

5. It will be observed that there is no reference to the port of Trebizond in General Harington's telegram, nor to the overland routes from the Caucasus whence supplies from Russia are received by the Kemalists. Any control in the Caucasus is out of the question, but the control of Trebizond should be considered with the other ports.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Admiralty.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure in No. 104.

General Harington to War Office.

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, April 26, 1922.

REFERENCE Annex 3 (armistice scheme) to first meeting of Foreign Ministers, held on 22nd March at Quai d'Orsay, which forms basis of study of military command here for armistice arrangements, it appears that during armistice no reinforcements in material are to be allowed to reach either belligerent army. The Allied scheme here, as so far drafted, embraces Allied control on Turkish ports of Ineboli and Adalia and

Greek ports of Smyrna and Mudania, but it seems to be equally necessary that Allied control should be installed at Turkish port of Mersina, which is in direct railway communication with Turkish front line and for Turks is comparable in importance to Smyrna to Greeks. Railway is now working efficiently between Mersina and Turkish front. I am mentioning this matter to Allied generals, and have asked Allied admirals whether they are prepared to participate. I desire your views on this matter, as question will undoubtedly raise important issue. It would, however, appear only equitable that controls at Turkish and Greek ports should be similar, and if to impose controls at former is considered impracticable it is a matter for consideration whether there should be none installed at latter.

[E 4466/5/44]

No. 105.

Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 1073.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré, dated the 1st May, respecting the attitude of the Allies towards the reply of the Angora Government.

Paris, May 1, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 105.

M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,  
Paris, le 1<sup>er</sup> mai 1922.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

PAR sa note en date du 26 avril, votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire savoir que le Gouvernement britannique, estimant peu désirable d'entamer une discussion qu'il juge sans issue avec le Gouvernement d'Angora, proposait de faire remettre par les trois Hauts-Commissaires alliés au représentant de ce Gouvernement à Constantinople une réponse catégorique à sa dernière note. Votre Excellence ajoutait qu'en ce qui concerne le siège de la conférence, le choix d'Ismid était, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement britannique, peu opportun, celui de Therapia lui paraissant préférable.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence qu'en communiquant à l'Ambassadeur de la République à Londres le texte de la dernière réponse du Gouvernement d'Angora, je le priais, dès le 25 avril, de faire remarquer à Lord Curzon qu'à mon avis, si les réserves formulées par le Gouvernement d'Angora n'étaient pas de nature à nous donner toute satisfaction, du moins le ton général de sa communication manifestait clairement le désir d'arriver à une entente. J'ajoutais que, dans ces conditions, j'estimais qu'il convenait de profiter de ces dispositions et d'accepter le principe de la réunion envisagée par le Gouvernement d'Angora.

Je considère qu'avant de demander au Gouvernement d'Angora une réponse définitive, il y aurait grand intérêt à se prêter "aux pourparlers préparatoires" qu'il souhaite. Il ne serait pas impossible, en effet, qu'une entrevue directe de délégués alliés avec Moustapha Kémal, dont la présence serait très probable si ces conférences avaient lieu à Ismid, fit faire un pas décisif à la cause de la paix.

Ces conversations pourraient éclairer le Gouvernement d'Angora sur certains points qu'il paraît ne pas avoir exactement compris ou qui ne sont pas visés dans les conditions générales de la paix; elles ne lui laisseraient également aucun doute sur les sentiments et les intentions véritables des Alliés à son égard. Elles devraient, d'ailleurs, avoir comme conclusion logique une réponse définitive du Gouvernement d'Angora, en ce qui concerne les propositions de paix.

Ces entretiens avec les représentants du Gouvernement d'Angora présenteraient encore un autre avantage. En prolongeant la période des négociations, ils rendraient plus difficile, pour des peuples fatigués par la guerre, la reprise des hostilités. Par contre, une mise en demeure immédiate adressée au Gouvernement d'Angora pourrait fournir aux éléments extrêmes de l'Assemblée nationale un prétexte pour réclamer et justifier aux yeux des populations une reprise de la lutte. Le Gouvernement français ne saurait, pour sa part, assumer la responsabilité d'avoir, par une attitude qui



paraîtrait peu conciliante, laissé échapper une occasion de ramener la paix en Orient.

Le Gouvernement de la République serait reconnaissant au Gouvernement britannique de lui faire savoir s'il est disposé à accepter la procédure ci-dessus indiquée, qui lui semble la plus favorable au rétablissement de la paix—principal objectif des Gouvernements alliés.

Veuillez agréer, &c.  
POINCARÉ.

[E 4694/5/44]

No. 106.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 399.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the reply of the Sublime Porte to the Allied proposals for peace.

*Constantinople, April 30, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 106.

*Izzet Pasha to Sir H. Rumbold.*

LA Sublime Porte exprime sa gratitude aux Gouvernements français, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie pour le désir qu'ils manifestent de donner satisfaction au Gouvernement impérial ottoman en avançant la date de l'évacuation des régions occupées. Elle puise dans cette déclaration la conviction que la volonté des Puissances alliées est de faire cesser sans retard les atrocités commises par les Grecs, atrocités dont les Puissances ont acquis la certitude par les rapports tant des délégués de la Croix-Rouge que de leurs propres délégués chargés de faire les enquêtes nécessaires. En demandant l'évacuation, qui doit assurer la fin de telles atrocités et d'une situation contraire au droit des gens, le Gouvernement impérial ne peut donc pas avoir le sentiment de solliciter une faveur pour laquelle une compensation soit due. Sa requête paraît strictement conforme aux principes d'humanité les plus universellement reconnus. Il peut dès lors avoir confiance dans l'accueil que les Puissances alliées voudront bien faire, après nouvel examen, à sa demande d'évacuation prompte des régions occupées par un mandataire qui paraît être certainement sorti des limites de son mandat.

La confiance de la Sublime Porte dans sa demande d'évacuation est d'autant plus justifiée qu'elle est prête, conformément au désir exprimé par les Puissances alliées dans leur note du 19 avril, à accepter dans leur ensemble les conditions de paix proposées le 26 mars "sous réserve de la discussion des points particuliers."

La Sublime Porte, en effet, accède au premier principe sur lequel les Puissances alliées déclarent fonder leurs propositions du 26 mars : le rétablissement d'une paix équitable entre la Turquie et la Grèce en n'imposant à aucune d'elles les conditions qui suivraient une défaite. Lors de la discussion des préliminaires de paix, elle montrera que la juste application de ce premier principe ne peut pas imposer à la Turquie une nouvelle amputation territoriale par la cession d'une partie de la Thrace orientale.

Le Gouvernement impérial exprime sa reconnaissance aux Puissances alliées pour le second principe sur lequel elles ont voulu fonder leurs propositions du 26 mars : le rétablissement de la nation et de la puissance turques dans les territoires qui peuvent être considérés comme leur appartenant, avec Constantinople pour centre, et de façon à permettre à la Turquie de "reprenre une existence nationale vigoureuse et indépendante."

Confiante dans l'appréciation juste et éclairée des Puissances alliées, la Sublime Porte est persuadée que dans la discussion de l'application de ce principe elle n'aura pas de peine à démontrer que la cession d'une portion quelconque de la Thrace orientale, au mépris du principe des nationalités et du droit de sécurité de l'État ottoman, serait en opposition absolue avec le principe posé, auquel la Turquie ne croit pas pouvoir renoncer. Toutes les questions relatives aux finances de l'Empire ottoman, à son organisation judiciaire, à ses forces de terre et de mer, aux réparations et indemnités, sont étroitement liées à celles de la reconstitution d'une Turquie vigoureuse

et indépendante. La discussion de tous ces cas particuliers ne peut pas être abordée ici et reste réservée pour la conférence proposée par les Puissances alliées.

Le troisième principe sur lequel les Puissances alliées déclarent vouloir fonder leurs propositions de paix est la garantie pour les musulmans du régime le plus équitable et le maintien de l'autorité, tant séculière que religieuse, de Sa Majesté impériale le Sultan.

La Sublime Porte est particulièrement heureuse de l'affirmation solennelle de ce grand principe, qui doit assurer aux musulmans le maintien de titres et prérogatives séculaires, l'application d'un régime d'égalité et le respect, vis-à-vis d'eux aussi, des règles fondamentales proclamées par les Puissances alliées dans le Pacte mondial de la Société des Nations. Rien ne pouvait lui donner plus de confiance sur les résultats qu'elle peut attendre d'un examen impartial, éclairé et désintéressé des observations qu'elle aura l'honneur de soumettre à la conférence pour assurer la réalisation de ce principe.

Le quatrième principe indiqué dans les propositions du 26 mars est la nécessité d'une compensation à donner à la Grèce "pour les grands services qu'elle a acceptés pendant la guerre pour la cause des Alliés."

Quelle que soit l'étendue des sacrifices que la Grèce aurait consentis en faveur des Alliés, la Sublime Porte pense que, si la justice veut que ces sacrifices soient récompensés, cette même justice ne saurait exiger que ce soit au détriment de l'intégrité territoriale de la Turquie, que la Grèce a attaquée postérieurement à l'armistice de 1918.

Le cinquième principe affirmé par les Puissances alliées, à la base de leurs propositions du 26 mars, est la nécessité de mettre le peuple turc et le peuple grec, "dans les régions où ils sont en contact comme dans celles où leurs populations sont mélangées, en mesure de vivre à l'avenir dans des conditions de confiance réciproque et de dignité."

Le Gouvernement impérial ne peut que souscrire avec empressement à ce principe, dont il désire ardemment la pleine réalisation. Il sera heureux de pouvoir apporter aux Puissances alliées, à la Conférence de la Paix, sa plus sincère et loyale collaboration à l'accomplissement de cette condition essentielle d'une paix solide et durable que compromettrait gravement toute injustice, toute atteinte à la sécurité de la Turquie, toute menace à son droit de conservation.

La protection des minorités forme le sixième principe mis par les Puissances alliées à la base de leurs propositions.

La Sublime Porte adhère complètement à ce principe, qui doit assurer à chacun sa liberté de conscience et le respect de sa dignité humaine. La Turquie l'admet pour son territoire et le considère comme un devoir général et réciproque des États. Dans la discussion des moyens propres à assurer cette protection, le Gouvernement impérial demandera simplement d'éviter que, par une fausse conception d'un principe juste, on ne crée des ferment de troubles ou de dissidences. La protection des minorités ne doit pas être une incitation à la révolte. Elle ne doit pas faire négliger la protection due aux majorités contre les auteurs de désordres et de guerres civiles. Elle ne doit pas dégénérer en une tyrannie exercée par une minorité contre la majorité, majorité sans laquelle aucune organisation sociale ne peut se développer dans l'ordre et dans la paix.

La nécessité de "prévenir le retour d'un conflit armé entre la nation turque et les Puissances européennes avec lesquelles elle a été récemment en guerre" est le septième principe placé par les Puissances alliées à la base de leurs propositions du 26 mars. Elles en ont déduit la démilitarisation de certaines zones et l'institution d'une commission internationale chargée de la surveillance des Détroits.

La Sublime Porte admet soit le principe de la démilitarisation des zones strictement nécessaires à la sécurité recherchée, soit la liberté de navigation sur les Détroits et leur ouverture aux navires de toutes les nations sous des garanties internationales. Mais les mesures prévues paraissent dépasser le but proposé sans, d'ailleurs, assurer la sécurité de Constantinople.

C'est dans l'esprit le plus libéral que le Gouvernement impérial est prêt à discuter le régime qui garantirait de la façon la plus complète et la plus sûre la liberté de navigation pour tous les États sur un pied de parfaite égalité, ainsi que la sécurité nécessaire tant à la Turquie qu'à l'ensemble des Puissances maritimes.

Les déclarations qui précèdent montrent l'accord du Gouvernement impérial avec les principes essentiels proposés par les Puissances alliées comme base des préliminaires de paix. Rien dès lors ne paraît faire obstacle à l'ouverture immédiate de ceux-ci et à l'évacuation sans délai des régions occupées.



Dans l'examen en commun des conditions de paix, examen proposé par les Puissances alliées dans leur communication du 26 mars, la Sublime Porte peut donner l'assurance aux Puissances alliées qu'elle n'apportera aucun parti pris. Avec les Gouvernements des Puissances alliées, elle a le souci de ne rien demander qui puisse heurter le jugement éclairé du monde civilisé. Dans le ferme désir d'instaurer avec les Puissances alliées un régime de paix durable, elle acceptera tout ce que la justice commande.

En conséquence, le Gouvernement impérial à l'honneur de prier les Puissances alliées de vouloir bien lui faire connaître, le plus tôt possible, la date et le lieu de réunion de la conférence afin qu'il puisse désigner et y envoyer ses délégués.

A. IZZET.

*Sublime Porte, le 29 avril 1922.*

[E 4756/3873/44]

No. 107.

*Mr. Hodgson to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 260. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Moscow, May 1, 1922.*

IN my telegram No. 95 of to-day's date I reported that Ali Fouad Pasha, Ambassador of Angora in Moscow, has asked for his passports as the result of a conflict which had arisen with the Soviet Government out of the discovery in the apartments of an officer attached to the Embassy of certain correspondence of an incriminating character.

What the nature of this correspondence was I am unable to state definitely. According to one informant—a Russian officer employed in the Commissariat for War—it was in the form of orders for the guidance of an officer in the Russian army of the Caucasus. According to information from another source it consisted of documents relating to mobilisation in Russia.

It would seem that the Turkish officer in whose apartments the correspondence was found was sharing accommodation with a Russian officer, and that a perquisition was made on the premises by the orders of the Soviet Government. As a result of the perquisition both were arrested, but the Turkish officer was liberated on the demand of Ali Fouad. His release was, however, made subject to his being expelled from the country.

Ali Fouad refused this demand, and said that the perquisition constituted a gross violation of the diplomatic privileges of the Embassy, and demanded the unconditional surrender of the officer implicated. Failing to obtain satisfaction, he announced his intention to leave Moscow, and asked for his own passport and those of his staff to be visé immediately. According to my information the Soviet Government has acceded to this request.

This incident is the culminating point of a series of misunderstandings between Moscow and Angora. It would even appear that the Angoran Ambassador has been preparing for some time for an eventual rupture, for he has been cutting down his domestic staff, replacing the Russians by Tartars, and has countermanded furniture which he had ordered for his house. The curtailment of expenditure is, on the other hand, attributed by some to the cessation of the subsidy which, it is said, he has received from the Soviet Government.

Signs of tension between the two Governments first became apparent at the time of the signature of the Kars Treaty (14th October, 1921). The Angora Government then took the view that, as the three Transcaucasian Republics were independent, a separate treaty should be signed with each. The Moscow Government, represented by Ganetsky, who was sent hurriedly to Kars to take charge of the negotiations, insisted that the three republics should sign together. The view of the Moscow Government in this instance prevailed.

The signature of the Franco-Angoran Treaty was the second cause of variance. I am not acquainted with the details of the discussion which ensued, but it was terminated by a note published in the Bolshevik press on the 26th November last, in which Ali Fouad declared that the agreement contained "not one thesis, not one point, which could in any way whatsoever shake or contradict the spirit or the letter of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Friendship."

The protestations of sincerity in which Ali Fouad abounded on this occasion did not produce the desired impression. The Soviet Government continued to regard with distrust the actions of Angora, and in the course of a conversation which I had with Litvinof towards the end of last year he alluded with customary cynicism to the fragility of the unnatural friendship of Angora and Moscow.

A further incident occurred, as I am informed, some two months ago. A man of the name of Sidi Chouad, an Angora courier, was arrested by the Bolsheviks and found to be carrying a letter from the Angora Government to Enver Pasha. The discovery led to a violent discussion between Chicherin and Ali Fouad, in the course of which the former reminded the Ambassador that the extermination of the Turkish Communist delegation at Trebizond and stated that, in the opinion of the Bolsheviks, the Angora Government was no less obnoxious than any other.

I alluded in my despatch No. 203 of the 10th April to the displeasure to which Ali Fouad gave expression in the matter of the presence in Moscow of Halil Pasha. Whether his protest is sincere is doubtful, for there are indications that the antagonism between the two parties is not so deep as Ali Fouad's expression of hostility would indicate.

Ali Fouad has never attempted to conceal his dislike for Communism and his openly expressed contempt for the Bolshevik administration. In the course of conversation he has spoken to me of his surprise that Western Europe should have dealings with the Moscow Government. He found it reasonable that the Turks, being an Eastern people, should establish relations with the Bolsheviks, but could not believe that European nations could find anything in common with them.

I have, &c.

R. M. HODGSON.

[E 4696/2233/44]

No. 108.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 401.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 1, 1922.*

ACCORDING to recent reports from Ineboli, Fahreddin Pasha left that place on the 12th April to take up the post of Kemalist representative in Afghanistan. He is stated to have been accompanied by Sami Munir Bey and by Mehmed Effendi, Counsellor of the Afghan Embassy at Angora.

2. Shortly after the departure of Fahreddin Pasha, Ghalib Pasha also passed through Ineboli to take up the post of representative in Bokhara, accompanied by Revshen Eshref Bey.

3. Hamdullah Subhi Bey is also reported to be about to leave, if he has not already left, for Turkestan on a mission of investigation.

4. Fahreddin Pasha is one of the deportees repatriated last year from Malta. He will be remembered as having held out at Medina for some time after the Turkish armistice. His defence of Medina will doubtless be made use of for propaganda purposes to recommend him to the Moslems of Central Asia.

5. Hamdullah Subhi Bey is well known as one of the fierier members of the Grand National Assembly. He was at one time a member of the Angora Cabinet, but resigned last autumn when there were signs of dissension in the Angora Government.

6. It is hardly necessary to draw your Lordship's attention to the significance of these efforts to realise in practice the Kemalist ideal of forming the Moslem States of Asia into a block under hegemony. The following passage from a speech delivered by Ghalib Pasha on his passage through Castamuni, and reported in the "Achik Seviz" newspaper of that place on the 16th April, is, however, worth reproducing:—

"We Orientals divide the world into two parts, which are separated by a line commencing at the Baltic Sea and extending to the Indian Ocean. Eastern peoples have realised from the events of the general war and the tyranny of Western nations where their interests lie. If a comparison is made between what we lost during the war and what we have gained since the armistice, it will readily be understood that we have reaped great advantages. The Islamic world is becoming more and more active, and there is no doubt that all our claims will be acknowledged and fulfilled."

[8975]

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7. It will be observed that Ghalib Pasha's line is drawn so as to include Russia among the nations of the East. The Bolsheviks sometimes realise that they are playing with fire in Central Asia, but they are still giving considerable backing to the efforts of Angora to create a loose confederation of Moslem States.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 4700/5/44]

No. 109.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 408.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 1, 1922.

INFORMATION regarding the internal political situation at Angora continues to be extremely meagre. Such reports as I have received since the beginning of the year support the impression which I had formed towards the end of 1921 that there were three principal parties, namely, the supporters of Mustapha Kemal, the partisans of Enver, and those who favoured a reconciliation with the Sultan. It has unfortunately been impossible to assess the relative strength of these elements. The Sultan's party has given no indication, so far as can be judged from here, of making its opposition to Mustapha Kemal effectively felt. The partisans of Enver are said to be still active, but, since the Bolsheviks more or less threw him over in favour of a rapprochement with Mustapha Kemal, a good deal less has been heard of them. Mustapha Kemal has undoubtedly a good deal of opposition to contend with, and he is said to be unpopular with a large number of officers in the army, but he, nevertheless, appears to dominate the situation. It is significant that some, if not all, of the Ministers whose resignations caused some little sensation towards the end of last year have been reabsorbed into the Kemalist machine. Thus Reouf Bey became Vice-President of the Grand National Assembly on the 1st March, Jelal Bey was made Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during Yussuf Kemal's absence in Europe and Hamdullah Subhi Bey has been entrusted with some sort of a mission in Turkestan.

2. Two recent pieces of news deserve some little attention. The first is a telegram from Angora of the 27th April reproducing a statement by Fethi Bey, Commissioner for the Interior, regarding the attitude of the Government towards Unionists now in foreign countries. He is reported to have said: "The doors of the country have never been closed to those of its children who are not opposed to the national struggle. For Unionists also these doors are always open. There is no obstacle in the way of their returning to Anatolia. A great many Unionist leaders have already come to Anatolia. They have met with no opposition. Consequently the doors of the country are open to the others as well." This statement derives all the more significance from the fact that a good many of the Unionists now in Europe are in Germany, and that it was made just after the news of the assassination of Behaeddin Shakir and Djemal Azmi Beys in Berlin.

3. The other piece of news referred to above is that of the resignation of three members of the Angora Cabinet—Hassan Fehmi Bey, Commissioner for Finance; Sirri Bey, Commissioner for Economic Affairs; and Mustapha Fehmi Effendi, Commissioner for Religious Affairs. There is also an unconfirmed report of the resignation of Kiazim Pasha, Commissioner for National Defence. The exact reasons for the three resignations definitely reported, and for the alleged threat of Kiazim Pasha to resign, are not known. They doubtless indicate political unrest, but none of the three commissioners has played any important rôle so far as I am aware, and I fear the Nationalist papers here are justified in treating the resignations as unimportant from the point of view of foreign policy.

4. There is in fact no indication that any important section of politicians at Angora are disposed to weaken on the national pact. The Kemalists appear to have inherited the capacity of the Committee of Union and Progress for sinking differences whenever it is necessary for the accomplishment of their main purpose. As at present advised, I do not consider that it would be safe to found any hope of an early collapse of Turkish resistance to the latest Allied peace terms on internal dissension at Angora.

5. Looking at the situation from the point of view of foreign policy alone, the politicians at Angora appear to divide into those who favour a "Russian orientation" and a "Western orientation" respectively. Just now those who favour the Russian

orientation appear to be more than ever in the ascendant. No opportunity is lost of advertising the closeness of the relations between the Angora Government and the Soviet Republics. The Russian representative, Aralof, and the Azerbaijan representative, Abilof, are much in evidence. They have been taken to the front, and, whatever impression they may have formed there, they have allowed glowing appreciations of the admirable state of the army to be published in their name. Bekir Samy Bey, who is said to stand for the Western orientation, has once more been disavowed. It has been categorically announced from Angora that his present journey to Europe is a private one, and that he has no mission.

6. I may mention as bearing on the question of the relations between the Angora Government and the Soviets, a secret report to the effect that Yussuf Kemal informed the Foreign Affairs Commission that the reply of Angora to the Allied armistice proposal had been shown to Aralof before transmission. He is stated to have added that this did not indicate Russian control of Angora policy, but was merely a matter of friendly collaboration.

7. In what precedes I have attempted to give a connected view of the internal situation at Angora. The question of the military situation is a distinct one, which I have dealt with to some extent in my despatch No. 409 of the 2nd May, 1922. Your Lordship will see by that despatch that I consider the balance as between Greeks and Turks to have altered in favour of the former. At the same time it must be remembered that Anatolia, as a social and economic organism, is of a low type, more capable of standing internal strain than in the case of an European country; that important military operations can be carried on with armies smaller in proportion to the man power of the country even in its depleted state than in Europe; and that until an actual breaking point is reached the attitude of the rank and file counts for less than that of the officers, who have nothing to gain by a cessation of hostilities. While, therefore, in my despatch No. 409 I have given due weight to the reports which reach me of an increase in the number of desertions in the Kemalist army, of eagerness on the part of the troops to see an armistice concluded, and of differences of opinion among the military leaders, I would warn your Lordship against assuming too readily that the Kemalist fighting machine has entered on a stage of disintegration. Mustapha Kemal has shown throughout the last three years a great capacity for pulling his movement together at critical moments. The sound conclusion appears to me to be that, if military operations of a serious kind should be resumed, neither Greek nor Turk is assured of success, and the result of a campaign this summer, while uncertain as regards its effect on the military equilibrium, would almost certainly be as inconclusive as that of last year.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 4701/27/44]

No. 110.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 409.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 2, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a memorandum by Mr. Hole recording a conversation he has had at Smyrna with a member of the National Defence Committee. In forwarding me this memorandum privately Sir Harry Lamb states that he himself has had conversations with other members of the committee, some of whom went further than M. Pavlidhis, whilst others did not go so far. Sir Harry Lamb states that the enclosed memorandum represents the more moderate opinions of the intelligent commercial classes.

2. The programme of the National Defence Committee opens up a disquieting prospect and, if carried out without hindrance, would ruin Asia Minor for a generation. Sir Harry Lamb considers that everything depends on complete solidarity amongst the three Allied Powers. He is of opinion that if the Greek Government were convinced that the Allies were agreed as to the evacuation of Asia Minor, Athens would swallow the evacuation, the army would obey orders and the National Defence Committee would recognise its inability to carry on a struggle against the whole world. Major Johnson does not agree with this view. He believes that the Greek army would now disobey orders to evacuate, even if it knew that the orders were meant to be obeyed.



3. The situation in Asia Minor has, I think, recently altered to the advantage of the Greeks. The latter have acquired the wherewithal to continue the campaign, and they know that the rich Greek communities abroad are ready to come forward with funds to help the Mikrasiatic movement. I am informed that the occupation of the Sokia district was effected very smoothly, and that it has considerably encouraged the Greeks.

4. On the other hand, reliable information points to the fact that Mustapha Kemal is having considerable difficulty with the Great National Assembly, which is becoming more and more insubordinate. An agitation was recently commenced against Kiazim Pasha, Commissioner for National Defence, Sirri Bey, Commissioner for Public Works, and other members of the Angora Government, who are in favour of a continuation of hostilities. Mustapha Kemal is stated to be acting in complete agreement with Aralof, the Soviet envoy in Angora, but Ismet Pasha is reported to be in favour of peace because he has not complete confidence in the army under his command. Recent reports show that the Kemalists are suffering from desertions and that the troops are by no means anxious for a continuation of hostilities.

5. All is not well with Angora, and this probably explains why the Nationalist Government, whilst returning irritating and evasive replies to the Allied notes, is careful not to break off negotiations. The Nationalists are closely watching proceedings at Genoa, and, should *de jure* recognition of Soviet Russia emerge from the Genoa Conference, the relations between Soviet Russia and Angora may well be modified to the disadvantage of the Nationalists.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 110.

Memorandum by Mr. Hole.

I HAD this morning a long conversation with M. Nicholas Pavlidhis, grain merchant of good standing, and one of the members of the National Defence Committee. I have summarised his remarks, which are interesting as the first concrete exposition of the programme of his committee that I have met with.

2. The movement is primarily Mikrasiatic as distinct from Hellenic; its supporters are drawn from Asia Minor and the islands; its policy implies defiance as much of the Athens Government as of the Allies, although it is evident that the committee relies on the connivance of the Greek Government in the initial stages of its action. Nevertheless the committee has come to the conclusion that a Hellenic occupation does not afford a satisfactory solution of the problem. First of all, they are of opinion that they, as Mikrasiates, will enlist the sympathies of certain classes of (old) Turks, who would, however, just prefer Kemalists to a foreign invader, and secondly, because they themselves are disinclined to submit to a Hellenic administration, which is apt to subordinate local welfare to the embellishment of Athens. It is a long standing complaint of the islands and the "redeemed" provinces that their revenues are never devoted to schemes of local development, and that the administration is entrusted to the unsympathetic hands of officials exclusively recruited in old Greece. Even deeper-rooted is the secular distrust between State and State which has distinguished Greek history since the earliest days whose latest manifestation is the marked political cleavage between Old and New Greece.

3. If the Greek administration is unwelcome to the Christian population of Asia Minor a Kemalist administration is unthinkable. The triumphant return to Smyrna of a Turkish Nationalist Government, conscious of having circumvented and humiliated a combination of great European Powers, could not fail to be intolerable; and the immediate and inevitable consequence of a pan-Turk policy, applied by a Turkish military organisation, would be the exodus of every Greek from Asia Minor. It is, indeed, not improbable that even Europeans would experience great difficulty in maintaining themselves at Smyrna. With the example of Cilicia before their eyes it is not unnatural that the National Defence Committee is not disposed to be content with paper guarantees.

4. Legitimate apprehensions of Kemalist misgovernment, on the one hand, and the Hellenic policy of evacuation, on the other, leave no alternative to independent action. M. Pavlidhis made no excursions into academic questions as to the hereditary

rights of the Greeks or the moral responsibilities of European Governments; the National Defence Committee base their organisation on the foundations of the crudest human necessity. Hellenic evacuation and consequent Kemalist occupation under whatever guarantees mean financial ruin and grave personal danger to the Christian population; the only remedy is armed resistance, with or without the assistance of Europe.

5. The territory it is proposed to hold would fall within a line through Panderma, Alashehir, Ortakja, south of the Meander Valley to Scala Nova. It is militarily far more compact and defensible than the present occupied area, and is roughly the ground which General Nider proposed to hold with 80,000 men.

6. The forces for the defence of this area would be furnished by the following contingents: 35,000 Mikrasiates, 25,000 Cretans and 10,000 islanders at present serving in the army; 10,000 gendarmerie (mainly Mikrasiatic), and an estimated 20,000 men to be raised by a careful "combing out" of Smyrna. This would furnish 100,000 men between 19 and 32 years of age, of whom more than half have seen long service. They would be officered by 3,400 officers who have signed a protocol pledging themselves not to leave Smyrna.

7. In addition to these troops a reserve contingent, estimated at 25,000 strong, will be raised by mobilising all ages from 32 to 45. This measure has already been partially applied in the interior where foreign diplomatic interference is less to be apprehended and has given encouraging results. M. Pavlidhis quoted the cases of Vourla, which furnished 2,560 men, Magnesia with 3,000, Adramyt with 800, and a small township like Balia which has given the surprisingly large number of 308. These men are already undergoing military training.

8. The Armenian community has also promised a division.

9. The funds necessary for keeping this force on a war footing will be raised in the following manner:—

- (a.) By mobilising the Turkish element with an exemption tax of £ T. 600—approximately 90l.—a resource methodically exploited by the Turk.
- (b.) By doubling the tithes at present collected by the Dette publique: Of the 12½ per cent. now collected, 8 per cent. is remitted to Constantinople and the Turkish Government retained 4½; 25 per cent. would now be collected and 17 per cent. retained.
- (c.) By applying certain "luxury" taxes: This is expected to yield a far less important amount.

The National Defence Committee would be careful not to interfere with the custom houses as being certain to raise a storm of protest.

10. Contributions from Greek communities abroad are also estimated to provide a large lump sum. Constantinople has offered £ T. 20,000,000 and the United States 10,000,000 dollars. This would be in the nature of a loan.

11. The National Defence Committee is not inclined to entrust the command to General Papoulas, who is a puppet of King Constantine and has been blowing hot and cold since his declaration a few weeks ago. A leader should not, however, be hard to find, and many more capable and popular generals than Papoulas are available.

12. It is apparent that this scheme imposes a heavy burden on an already hard-driven population, and the new contributions in men and money will undoubtedly sorely tax the resources of the inhabitants of the area to be defended. The National Defence Committee are the first to admit this but argue with great point that the only alternative open to the Mikrasiatic population is to abandon everything and emigrate, life under an unrestrained Kemal administration being out of the question. They are themselves fully convinced that the people are with them.

13. In spite of all official warnings to the contrary, the National Defence Committee is convinced that His Majesty's Government is with them in spirit, and rely on them to prevent a blockade of Smyrna, the danger of which they admit is their chief apprehension. M. Pavlidhis pointed out that the autonomy of this district would greatly facilitate a British administration of the Straits, and concluded that the Mikrasiatic population desired nothing better than to place themselves under the British aegis. The committee appears to count largely on the intervention of M. Veniselos who is expected very shortly in London.

Smyrna, April 27, 1922.



[E 4702/5/44]

No. 111.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 410. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 1, 1922.

IN amplification of my telegram No. 236 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that on receipt of your Lordship's telegram No. 186 I called on the Italian High Commissioner. I informed Marquis Garroni of the communication which the Italian Ambassador in London had made to your Lordship, and of the view which you took of the agreement entered into between the Turkish Government and the Italian High Commission here.

2. The Italian High Commissioner was visibly disturbed by this communication. Before giving me an account of the transaction in question and of its history, he affirmed very vehemently and categorically both that the Angora Government was entirely ignorant of it and that the Italian Government had not promised any return whatever for the economic advantages promised to it by the Turkish Government.

3. The Italian High Commissioner then went on to say that as far back as Count Svorza's time here there had been pourparlers between the Italian High Commission and the Turkish Government with a view to securing railway, mining and other concessions for Italy in the Adalia district. These pourparlers had dragged on until they had ended quite recently in the receipt by him of a note from the Constantinople Government expressing the readiness of that Government to grant Italian firms, formed with Italian capital, the right to "study" railway concessions, &c., in the Adalia district. Marquis Garroni laid great stress on the word "study." He added that if the firms in question did not avail themselves of the right within a specified period the right would lapse. Moreover, it was made clear that the present Turkish Cabinet could not bind its successor, and that, if a succeeding Turkish Cabinet disapproved of the concessions now granted to Italy, it would be at liberty to annul those concessions.

4. The Italian High Commissioner pointed out that this understanding, coupled with the fact that the Constantinople Government was not in control of the Adalia district, really made the Turkish note a "scrap of paper."

5. I had anticipated that my Italian colleague would defend the transaction on the ground that Italy had got nothing out of the war with Turkey, whereas her Allies had obtained mandates in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria. The Italian High Commissioner did, in fact, take this line. He stated in confidence that he had disapproved of the agreement which Count Svorza had made with the Nationalists in London at the time of the March conference last year, and which had been subsequently repudiated by the Angora Government. He said that that agreement had features which made it objectionable from his point of view. He went on to say that he did not consider that M. Schanzer had been very successful at the recent conference in Paris in connection with the draft article regarding concessions. He maintained that it would be difficult to uphold this article in the face, for instance, of an eventual American demand for concessions in Asia Minor. When, therefore, the Turkish Government had signified its willingness to address him the recent note promising concessions to Italian firms in the Adalia district, he did not see why he should reject the proposal. The Italian Government would be able to produce this note in the Chamber and satisfy Italian public opinion that Italy had not come empty-handed out of the war with Turkey.

6. On my remarking that the action of the Turkish Government could not have been spontaneous, Marquis Garroni admitted that he had intimated to that Government that it was time that the long drawn-out pourparlers should terminate in a manner satisfactory to the Italian Government. I said that it was inconceivable to me that the Turkish Government should make even a nominal offer for concessions without some *quid pro quo*. The Turks evidently aimed at enlisting the goodwill of Italy during the negotiations for a Near Eastern settlement, and hoped to create a good atmosphere. Whilst admitting that the Turkish Government might, indeed, wish to create a good atmosphere, he strenuously denied that the Italian Government had given any undertaking of any sort in return for the Turkish note. Finally, the Italian High Commissioner promised to communicate the note to me as soon as he could lay hands on it.

7. It does not seem to me probable that there has been collusion between the

Central and Angora Governments in this matter. The latter would certainly resent action on the part of the Central Government which it would consider an unwarrantable interference.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

May 2, 1922.

P.S.—The Italian High Commissioner called on me this morning and read to me the originals of the notes exchanged between the Turkish Government and himself, recording the agreement for the grant of concessions to Italian firms in the Adalia district. I had certainly understood from my Italian colleague, from the conversation reported in the body of this despatch, that there had been merely a note from the Turkish Government. Marquis Garroni also read me the preamble of the agreement, but not the agreement itself, which, he said, was only destined to come into force after the ratification of peace with Turkey. The note which he read me from the Turkish Government corresponds to the verbal account he had already given me. He again laid stress on the necessity for providing the Italian Government with some document which would enable it, in case of necessity, to show that Italy had got something out of the war with Turkey.

H. R.

[E 4704/5/44]

No. 112.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 412.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 2, 1922.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had been unable to deliver to me in person on the 29th April the reply of the Turkish Government to the note of the Allies of the 19th ultimo, called to-day to enquire what I thought of that reply.

2. I said that whilst the Turkish Government stated that it was ready to accept the body of the peace conditions, subject to the discussion of particular points, it had proceeded to discuss each one of the principles laid down in the preamble to the Paris declaration, reserving Turkey's right to show that the Allies' definite proposals on practically every particular point are inconsistent with those principles. In fact the Turkish Government had given with one hand and taken away with the other. I recognised that the answer of the Turkish Government was courteous in form, whereas that of Angora was rude. Both answers were, however, unsatisfactory.

3. Izzet Pasha said that it had not been possible for the Constantinople Government to confine itself to the statement that it accepted the body of the peace conditions. Such a statement would have laid it open to a charge of treachery. I said that it had been clear to me that in framing its reply to the Allied note of the 19th April, the Constantinople Government had been obliged to take the Angora Government into account. Izzet Pasha admitted this readily. We then discussed certain passages of the note, in particular those referring to Eastern Thrace and the Straits. I said that I wished to clear away any misconception there might be in the mind of the Turkish Government with regard to the main lines of the proposed peace settlement. His Majesty's Government did not, I was sure, intend to permit of any considerable modifications of the main points of the settlement, though there might be modifications of detail. Thus, for instance, the answer of the Constantinople Government took exception to the cession of any portion of Eastern Thrace, but there was no intention of handing Adrianople back to Turkey.

4. As regards the Straits, we did not intend to allow Turkey to have both shores of the Dardanelles. Izzet Pasha said that the recovery of the northern shore of the Straits had almost become a question of honour for Turkey. I replied that, with the memory of the Gallipoli campaign fresh in our minds, it was not only a question of honour but one of safety for the Allies that Turkey should never again be able to close the Straits. Izzet Pasha said that there could be no question of this. The Turks were ready to agree to any measures necessary for the freedom of navigation of the Straits, but the retention by Greece of the Gallipoli Peninsula constituted a menace to Constantinople. I replied that I could not agree. The Gallipoli Peninsula was to be occupied by an inter-Allied force and the whole of Eastern Thrace was to be



demilitarised. What harm could the Greeks do? I added that events changed very rapidly in present times. If and when peace was concluded, the present duality in the Government of Turkey would presumably disappear, and Nationalist officials would come to Constantinople. The spirit prevailing at Angora was not very reassuring; the Nationalists were xenophobe, and, if the Gallipoli Peninsula were restored to Turkey, the Turks might well, one day in the future, when they thought circumstances were favourable to them, try to make trouble for us in connection with the Straits.

5. Izzet Pasha then said that he was sure that it would be possible to come to a settlement with Turkey if once the conference met and the Allies conceded to Turkey certain vital matters. Although I asked him what these were, he did not specify what he meant with any precision. I said that the assembly of a conference depended mainly on Angora, and that the perusal of the replies hitherto received from Angora was not very reassuring.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
*High Commissioner.*

[E 4755/5/44]

No. 113.

*Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 390.)

My Lord,

Rome, May 4, 1922.

I RECEIVED your Lordship's telegram No. 130 of the 28th ultimo, informing me of the Turkish-Italian Agreement signed in Constantinople, with regret rather than surprise, although the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me no indication whatsoever at two interviews which I had with him shortly before he left for Genoa that anything of the kind was in the air. But I have formed the conviction that the question of the tripartite agreement, as bearing on the vital necessity of raw materials to Italy, has become a kind of obsession with the Italian Government, for they appear to regard it as the only tangible advantage which Italy has secured from the war, and that there are no lengths to which they would not go in order to make sure of the supposed advantages which it offers them.

In the absence of Signor Facta, Signor Schanzer and the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Genoa and Rapallo, there has been no one in Rome with whom I could usefully discuss the matter, but last night I received an urgent message from the Secretary-General stating that he had returned from Rapallo and desired to see me this morning on the question of the agreement.

I found Signor Contarini greatly perturbed over the articles which had appeared on the subject in the British press, the statement by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons and the comments which the Italian papers were offering. He opened the conversation by stating that in his personal opinion the Italian Government had made a serious mistake in signing this agreement without first keeping His Majesty's Government fully informed. The whole matter had been put through during his own absence at Rapallo; he had known nothing about it and had not been consulted. Otherwise, he would certainly have advised against the step. I said that this was interesting, but that presumably Signor Schanzer had authorised the signature. Signor Contarini replied that such was the case, but that Signor Schanzer had his hands so full at Genoa that he had not attached sufficient importance to the matter, and had, moreover, considered himself covered by the conversation on the subject of the Italian negotiations with Turkey which he had had with your Lordship in Paris. While deploring that the agreement had been concluded without our being consulted, Signor Contarini urged that far too much importance had been attached by the press to the incident. I had brought with me a copy of your Lordship's note of the 27th April to the Italian Ambassador, which had reached me by bag this morning, and I at once gave this to Signor Contarini to read, saying that it would show the views of His Majesty's Government. He had not yet received the document from Chevalier de Martino, and I subsequently furnished him with a copy of it. After reading it, Signor Contarini was more perturbed than ever. He added that Signor Schanzer was equally upset, and had been telephoning to him this morning urging that the whole affair was a terrible misunderstanding.

Signor Contarini said that he had already admitted that the signature of the agreement without our knowledge had been a great mistake. He must also confess

that he agreed with your Lordship that, in so far as the public effect went, it did not much matter whether it had been negotiated at Constantinople alone or at Angora. He also entirely agreed with your Lordship's statement that the only hope of enforcing the Allied terms upon Turkey was that the three Allies should present a united front. Having granted this much, he must demur to the idea that Italy was under any obligation whatsoever towards France, which had negotiated a separate agreement with Angora, thereby making her peace with the Turks on her own terms. But with Great Britain it was a different matter. There was, however, no parallel between the Franklin-Bouillon agreement and the present Turco-Italian arrangement. He repeated what Chevalier de Martino had told your Lordship as to the latter being unilateral and containing concessions from the Turks without any set-off on the Italian side. The new agreement was practically the same although it did not go quite so far as a draft treaty submitted to Signor Schanzer in Paris by Izzet Pasha and then withdrawn. He understood that Signor Schanzer had spoken to your Lordship on the subject. The Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs had not yet received the text of the agreement, but telegraphic instructions had been sent to their Ambassador at Constantinople to communicate its terms at once to the British High Commissioner, who would, no doubt, forward them to your Lordship. I asked if I could be furnished with a summary of the agreement, but Signor Contarini, after consulting the head of the Political Department, said that he was not sure of its exact terms. He would, however, show me the draft offer made by Izzet Pasha. The new agreement, equally with Izzet Pasha's draft, was accompanied by a Turkish note stating explicitly that only the Government which signed it, that is to say, the existing Government at Constantinople, would be bound by it. Izzet Pasha's draft did not appear to me to amount to more than that the Turkish Government undertook to give their favourable consideration to applications for concessions in the area secured to Italy under the tripartite agreement for Italian firms recommended by the Italian Government. Mention was made of the Heraclea mines and of certain railway projects. The Italian Ambassador at Constantinople had reported the renewal of the Turkish offer, though in a slightly attenuated form, and had recommended that he should be authorised to sign the agreement. Signor Contarini showed me the draft of Signor Schanzer's reply, authorising the Ambassador to sign it for "what it was worth."

Signor Contarini said that, as I must see, the agreement was practically valueless. It only bound the Constantinople Government and was couched in terms of extreme vagueness. If the Italian Government had made a mistake in their methods, His Majesty's Government were mistaken in substance, for we were attaching an altogether undue importance to the incident. He regretted that Signor Schanzer had said nothing to me about the negotiations; he himself could not have done so, as he had not been kept informed, but it was extremely painful to Signor Schanzer to feel that at a moment when he was daily shoulder to shoulder with Mr. Lloyd George at Genoa and was acting in the closest co-operation with him, the Italian Government should be accused of going behind our backs and of action which amounted to treachery.

I said that I need not recapitulate the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject, as they were clearly expressed in the note from your Lordship to Chevalier de Martino, which he had just read. Upon myself personally the incident had created a painful impression. I knew that on a previous occasion Count Sforza, when Foreign Minister, had earned our resentment by negotiating a separate agreement with the Turks, but during my association with the Marquis della Torretta the attitude of the Italian Government both on the questions of relations with Afghanistan and of the Tuoizzi Mission to Angora had been frank and loyal and had won the appreciation of His Majesty's Government. It looked as if Signor Schanzer desired to revert to the earlier methods. Signor Contarini strongly demurred. I added that in one respect I could cordially agree with him and that was that the present agreement appeared to have no value whatever. Why, then, had the Italian Government thought it worth while to earn our distrust and to prejudice the solidarity of the Allies in their united front to Turkey for advantages of so illusory a character? It further appeared to me incredible that the Turks should offer concessions without some *quid pro quo* and it looked as if something was still being kept back.

Signor Contarini said that the whole affair was due to Italian anxiety to reap the benefits of the tripartite agreement. The Italian Government had been well satisfied with the attitude of their Allies on this subject at the meeting in Paris. They felt, however, that this would not ensure to them the advantages of the agreement. It was a matter on which Italian public opinion was acutely sensitive and alive, and the Italian



Government had desired to show that they were not neglecting the question, but were doing all they could. It was, indeed, a move made for internal political reasons, although in his own opinion the agreement was practically valueless. In the course of further conversation I elicited from him that the Turks had offered the agreement for the following reason. It was to be understood, although no actual undertaking had been given, that as under the new agreement the Italians would obtain direct from the Turks all the economic and commercial advantages figuring under the tripartite agreement, they would therefore be able to drop the latter and not to insist upon their claims under it. Such an inducement did not appear to me convincing, but when Turks are engaged in negotiations, and the same may be said of Italians, it is not always easy to determine what factors will appeal to them.

Finally, Signor Contarini enquired anxiously whether some action could not be taken to end or mitigate the present misunderstanding and to prevent press polemics in which the British papers would take one side and the Italian papers the other to the detriment of our mutual relations. But he had no suggestion to make beyond that of a joint communiqué to the press, nor had I any consoling proposal to offer. I promised to communicate at once to your Lordship all that Signor Contarini had said to me. In the meantime, the Italian Government have issued a semi-official press communiqué which I have already telegraphed to your Lordship. It endeavours, with some economy of truth, to place the Italian action in the best light possible under the circumstances.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

[E 4821/27/44]

No. 114.

*Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 9.)*

(No. 209.)

My Lord,

*Athens, April 25, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of Colonel Hoare Nairne's despatch No. 2, Secret, of the 24th April, on the present military situation in Asia Minor.

I have, &c.

F. O. LINDLEY.

Enclosure in No. 114.

*Colonel Hoare Nairne to Mr. Lindley.*

(Secret.)

Sir,

*Athens, April 24, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to submit some remarks on the present military situation, which are based chiefly on conversations with General Pallis, Chief of the Staff of the Greek Army of Asia Minor, who has been in Athens on leave during the last three weeks.

#### 1. *The Military Situation of the Army in Asia Minor.*

General Pallis said the *moral* generally is still high. When the Greek troops first arrived at their present line from the River Sakaria they were annoyed and depressed to find that not only foreign nations, but even their compatriots in Athens, regarded them as a beaten army, and the bad weather and lack of shelter did not help to raise their *moral*. But hard work and its visible results in security and shelter kept them going, and the evidence, given by the battle of Afium Karahissar in October, of their continued power to beat the Turk restored their spirits and their confidence in their leaders and themselves. He recognised that there had been danger of a deterioration of discipline, and consequently of *moral*, by the reawakening of political differences during the inaction of the winter; but he claimed that the commanders and staffs had minimised the evil effects by allowing political discussions within limited bounds, while sternly repressing propaganda.

General Pallis does not believe that the Turks could now turn the Greeks out of their present positions by military action. The means of movement and supply would oblige the Turks to make their main effort in the southern part of the theatre of war.

[E 4670/900/44]

No. 113A.

*Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 8.)*

(No. 1111.)

My Lord,

*Paris, May 6, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, with reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 940 of the 1st April regarding the French protectorate over the Catholics in the Near East, that I received a visit from the Italian Ambassador to-day, who stated that he had been instructed to address a note to the French Government on the lines of your Lordship's despatch under reference (of which he had a copy), and that he intended to carry out these instructions without delay.

Count Sforza asked therefore that he might be given a copy of the note which I sent to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in accordance with your Lordship's instructions (please see my despatch No. 862 of the 5th April), and I am accordingly providing his Excellency with one.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.



He considers that any attempt of the Turks to make an attack in force across the lower Maeander valley against the Greeks' communications would only mean their thrusting their neck into a noose. So the Afium Karahissar area must remain the danger point and General Pallis considers that the improved defensive organisation of the Greeks would more than compensate the Turkish accession of strength since last autumn. Moreover, he believes the Turkish *moral* to be inferior to the Greek.

This appreciation of the situation was given me by General Pallis before the Italian evacuation of the lower Maeander valley had begun, but I gather that his views have not since been modified.

## 2. *The Political Tendencies of the Army in Asia Minor.*

General Pallis personally did not attach much importance to the "Smyrna (or Constantinople) movement," and evidently had a poor opinion of the organising powers of its promoters. He agrees with most people who know General Joannou in regarding him with a sort of amused affection and in tolerating his follies for his high gallantry and character; but he knows he is no organiser. Colonel Kondyles he regards as a low-bred filibuster of mediocre capability.

General Pallis said that he thought there was a considerable, but not universal, body of opinion in the army strongly opposed to leaving Asia Minor, and that he regarded this as worthy of far more consideration than the national defence movement. In reply to questions, he said that a minority only entertained a blank opposition to leaving Asia Minor on any conditions or at any cost. Most thinking soldiers recognised that, having failed to win decisive victory last year, Greece could only finally crush Kemal by two means, which the Allies would not allow them to use: first, the right to occupy Constantinople, and, secondly, the right of blockade. In these circumstances the eventual evacuation of Asia Minor, except possibly a small zone at Smyrna, was a military necessity; and the bulk of the military opinion against evacuation was based on a conviction that the guarantees designed for the safety of the Christian inhabitants, not to speak of friendly Turks in the occupied zones, were quite inadequate. He laid stress on the necessity of making the guarantees appear convincing, not only to the people of Europe, but to the most ignorant and helpless of the Christians in Asia Minor; for, if once the tide of emigration began to flow westward, the refugees would have to suffer dreadful hardships and would bring suffering in their train. There is land in Macedonia, but neither shelter nor the means of cultivating the ground, nor time nor money to provide them, exist.

I asked General Pallis what nature or degree of guarantee he considered the dissentients had in their mind as being adequate, and he replied that most of the army believed that the autonomy of at least the Sèvres Treaty zone under a Christian Governor would be necessary for the safety of the Christian population. I then asked him if he would give me his own opinion on the definite point, even in the face of guarantees which the troops might regard as inadequate: If the Greek Government gave the order to evacuate Asia Minor, would the army obey? General Pallis considered for a couple of seconds in silence, and then answered "Yes." This conversation took place before General Papoulas issued his "order of the day" at Smyrna. General Papoulas was in Athens, and I think left for Smyrna the next day.

## 5. *The Evacuation of the Maeander Valley by the Italians.*

Enquiries at the Ministry of War as to Greek intentions in the area evacuated by the Italians only elicited the answer that the army commander in Asia Minor had a free hand and would be guided by circumstances, and that the Ministry of War did not know what he would do until he was doing it. Two days ago, after hearing of the occupation of the Gumush Dag by Greek troops, Major Dragoumis, of the 2nd Bureau of the Greek General Staff in Athens, told me that the Greeks would probably occupy with posts all the high ground from the Gumush Dag to the mouth of the River Maeander.

In the afternoon of the same day I visited General Pallis, who, on the day we first heard of the Italian evacuation, had told me that he did not know what would be done, as the possible Italian evacuation had not been discussed while he was in Asia Minor; but he thought that, in view of the projected evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek army, General Papoulas would not commit himself to any movement of troops beyond what might be absolutely necessary for the security of the land of the Greek communications. He now told me that he did not see any necessity to push troops farther south and south-east of the Gumush Dag than the Sokia-Scala Nuova road; that the withdrawal of the Italians from the actual valley of the Maeander would not



expose the Greek communications to any additional risk in that direction, and that he thought General Papoulas would avoid putting troops into the valley, which was full of malaria. As regards the valley, I agree with his view; but I think anxiety to isolate Scala Nuova from Kemalist bands and influence may induce General Papoulas to complete his cordon to the sea at Cape Papas.

#### 6. *The Combat at Savran.*

An unofficial telegram from Smyrna to the Greek press describes a combat which took place at Savran, south-west of Afium Karahissar, on the 14th April, as a severe Turkish defeat, and mentions 400 Turkish corpses left on the battlefield. The telegram states that this account had been "communicated." General Pallis had a report on this combat from one of his subordinate officers of the General Staff in Asia Minor who was in Athens on the 21st April. The attack was made with stronger force and greater resolution than the Turks have developed at any time since last autumn. At first the Greeks thought it might be the beginning of a general engagement, but soon found it was only a fighting reconnaissance and repulsed it with the troops of the 4th division, which were in the line. The Greeks estimated the Turkish strength at one regiment of infantry with some cavalry, supported by artillery, all drawn from local forces. General Pallis had not heard any estimate of Turkish losses, and regarded 400 dead as an absurdly large proportion of the numbers engaged. He said the telegram was evidently only journalistic enterprise or political propaganda.

7. General Pallis has recently been described to me, on good but secondhand authority, as a weak man who will say what he thinks one wants to hear. General Paraskevopoulos, late commander-in-chief of the Greek army, when still smarting under his dismissal by the Government, installed General Pallis as Chief of the General Staff in Asia Minor, recommended him to me as an exceptionally good officer and a straight man, who tries to keep politics out of soldiering. No doubt he is a good Greek too, and puts his own country's and army's deeds and intentions in the best light, but he has seemed to me, throughout the eighteen months I have known him, to fit General Paraskevopoulos's estimate of him.

I have, &c.

E. S. HOARE NAIRNE, Colonel,  
Military Attaché.

[E 4824/5/44]

No. 115.

*Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 9.)*

(No. 219.)

My Lord,

Athens, April 29, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that I called to-day on the Greek Prime Minister, who returned three days ago from Genoa. M. Gounaris stated that he had had no opportunity of discussing the Eastern question during his stay in Italy.

I then asked his Excellency what was the truth regarding his interview, reported in the press, with three representatives of the Asia Minor Greeks who had come to Athens. M. Gounaris replied that the delegation had come to offer the services of the Asia Minor Greeks to the Greek authorities. They disclaimed any intention of taking part in an autonomous movement, but believed that the Greek forces could be considerably strengthened both in men and money by the better organisation of the local Greek resources. He had explained the situation to them, and had told them that there was no question of the Powers forcing the Greeks to evacuate. Evacuation was part of the proposals put forward for a general settlement, and would be considered as such.

It is quite probable that in order to keep them quiet M. Gounaris went further with the delegation than he admitted to me, and represented evacuation as being an unlikely development. In order to illustrate the attitude of the press on this subject, I cannot do better than transmit to your Lordship a French summary of the articles which appeared yesterday in the principal Athens papers.\* The same sort of articles appear daily, and I have merely chosen this summary as the latest. It will be observed

\* Not printed.

that the Veniselist papers are, on the whole, the most violent against the peace proposals of the Powers.

I regret that, an opportunity of sending despatches safely having arisen suddenly, I have no time to have the summary copied.

I have, &c.

F. O. LINDLEY.

[E 4853/5/44]

No. 116.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 1405.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 10, 1922.

IT is now six weeks since the conference between the Foreign Ministers of France, Italy, and Great Britain separated at Paris after agreeing upon a number of definite proposals for the termination of hostilities between the Greeks and the Turks, for the final conclusion of peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey, and for the settlement of the most important aspects of the Near Eastern question. These proposals, which it is unnecessary to recapitulate here, were communicated by telegram to the Governments concerned and an early reply was requested. The Greek Government immediately accepted the first suggestion of the Powers, viz. the conclusion of the armistice. No further reply from them has been received. In the case of the Turkish answer the situation has been complicated by the facts (1) that there are two Turkish Governments in existence whose replies had to be received; (2) that the replies, though nominally distinct, were compelled by the force of circumstances to be more or less interdependent, the Constantinople Government not being likely or willing to return any answer which would not be in general consonance with the views entertained at Angora; (3) that each of these two Governments, in true Oriental fashion, welcomed the opportunity either to dispute about the precise meaning of the terms submitted to them, or to reopen the entire discussion which it was the object of the proposals to close, or to manœuvre for position in the Conference which had been suggested. It is not necessary for the purposes of the present argument to analyse with any closeness the replies of the Constantinople Government since, as M. Poincaré has remarked, they do not differ sensibly from that of the Angora Turks.

The reply of the latter has assumed a double form. Its first edition was contained in the note of the 5th April in which the Angora Government advanced the claim *inter alia* that evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek troops must be proceeded with as soon as an Armistice had been concluded, and in particular that the evacuation of the advanced strategic position held by the Greeks upon the railway Eskishehr-Afium Karahissar must be effected within fifteen days—no regard whatever being paid to the fundamental considerations which underlay the proposal of the Powers, viz. that the Armistice had been proposed in order to allow for the discussion of peace preliminaries; that evacuation could only begin after the expiration of the Armistice; and that evacuation was only one, although doubtless the most important, of the conditions upon which the Allied Foreign Ministers had agreed, at Paris, for the settlement of the entire problem.

A reply to these pretensions drafted by the French Government was accepted without demur by the British and Italian Governments, in which the three Powers, in their anxiety for conciliation, expressed their willingness to agree to evacuation as soon as the body of the peace conditions proposed by them had been accepted.

The second and more detailed reply of the Angora Government was contained in a note dated the 22nd April, which was even more obviously intended for purposes both of propaganda and procrastination. In this reply, the Angora Authorities entered into a long and partisan disquisition about massacres in Asia Minor; definitely rejected the idea of evacuation subject to the acceptance of the *ensemble* of the peace conditions; insisted on the commencement of evacuation simultaneously with the acceptance of an Armistice; demanded to know what precisely were the special points which had been reserved for discussion outside the aforementioned *ensemble*; and ended by saying that Angora delegates would be ready to meet plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers at Ismid for preliminary negotiations—the information being subsequently added that Mustapha Kemal would be willing to attend such a Conference in person, and that it was desirable for the Allied plenipotentiaries to have full powers to take decisions without reference to their Governments. This communication appeared to His Majesty's Government to raise three questions:



(1) the attitude and policy of the Angora Government, to be deduced from the Note as a whole, (2) the nature of the Conference suggested at Ismid, (3) the selection of Ismid as the place of meeting.

His Majesty's Government did not hastily form an opinion upon any of these issues, being anxious to lose no opportunity that might point to an honourable exit from the present deplorable *impasse*; nor did they fail to receive from their High Commissioner at Constantinople full advice upon every one of these points.

This examination and advice rendered it impossible for His Majesty's Government to form any other conclusion than that the Angora Government definitely refused to accept any of the fundamental conditions underlying the policy of the Allied Powers, that they intended at the suggested Conference to reopen any and every question, and that their reply was in reality only a tactical manoeuvre to drive the Allies into a position where the responsibility for the breakdown of negotiations could be thrown upon the latter.

It is more particularly necessary in this context to examine the proposal for the Conference at Ismid. His Majesty's Government would welcome the opportunity of meeting Mustapha Kemal at a Conference table, just as they have welcomed the opportunities recently afforded to them in London of discussing matters with Izzet Pasha and Yusef Kemal Bey. But a moment's scrutiny will reveal that the meeting as suggested is to be of a very one-sided and compromising character.

It is to be held at Ismid, *i.e.* in the part of Turkey which is under Nationalist influence. It is not, like the Conference suggested by the Powers, to be a meeting at which their High Commissioners at Constantinople will meet representatives of both Turkish Governments and of the Greek Government in order to discuss with them the conditions of peace. Far from this the High Commissioners are to be summoned to meet the head of the Angora Government alone. It is clear that the Constantinople Government is not to be admitted, that the Greeks are equally to be excluded, and that the High Commissioners are to be placed in a position where they must either accept the terms submitted to them by Mustapha Kemal, or, having neither the authority nor the willingness to accept them, return to Constantinople with the onus of failure upon their shoulders.

As regards the suggestion of Ismid itself, His Majesty's Government have at different times declared their willingness to agree either to Constantinople or Therapia as the site of the Conference proposed at Paris. They would not object to Prinkipo or Moda, or to any suitable place in Western Europe. But the suggestion of Ismid as the place of meeting for a Conference to which two of the principal parties, *viz.* Constantinople and Greece were not even to be admitted, appeared to them to surpass the limits of what they could reasonably or properly concede.

In these circumstances I suggested on the 25th April the terms of a draft reply to the Angora Government which might be sent by the Allied Powers, and in which the principles upon which the Foreign Ministers had agreed at Paris and since, were reaffirmed, and Therapia was suggested as the most convenient place of meeting.

The reply of the Italian Government to this proposal has not yet been received, although I learn by telegram from Constantinople that it has the approval of the Italian High Commissioner. On the other hand I have received from M. Poincaré an expression of the view of the French Government to the effect that the general tone of the Angora reply manifests a clear desire to arrive at an understanding, that it is desirable to accept the proposed meeting at Ismid, and that if conversations are opened there, it will be more difficult for hostilities to be resumed. He is not willing, therefore, to accept the terms of my proposed reply to the Angora Note.

It is difficult for His Majesty's Government to believe that in making these proposals the French Government can have fully considered the nature of the suggestion as I have above explained it. Do they realise that the Angora Note definitely refuses acceptance of the Paris Peace proposals as a prior and essential condition of evacuation, and thereby, for the second time, rejects the Allied offer? If the Allied Governments are to surrender to the Angora demand for a preliminary Conference before acceptance of the armistice and peace conditions, why should not a similar demand be made by Athens and by Constantinople, and how could it logically be refused?

Do the French Government really consider it desirable at this juncture to interpolate another stage never contemplated at Paris, and certain to have been rejected had it been then proposed, in which one of the Parties concerned is to have a conference all to himself, certain to have no other result than to postpone the Conference proposed by common consent at Paris, and doomed in all probability to end in a *hasco* which would not only be humiliating, but disastrous?

If Mustapha Kemal desires any explanation as to the intentions of the Allies or the meaning of their terms, let him depute any representative whom he pleases to Constantinople, where the High Commissioners will be ready to give him the fullest explanations, or better still, let him either propose or acquiesce in the selection of some spot where the Conference, as originally proposed, can be held without further delay.

In inviting the serious attention of the French Government to these considerations, His Majesty's Government are compelled to point out that the responsibility for further delay in carrying out the Paris proposals is a burden which none of the Allies should be willing to bear. The sands are running out. In the interval that has elapsed since Paris, the situation, particularly if it be viewed from the Greek side, and the possibility of Greek resistance to the demands of the Allies, becomes daily not more, but less favourable. Equally is there a danger, confirmed by all the reports that have been received, of an even closer understanding and more active military co-operation between the Angora and Soviet Governments—a situation that cannot be any more beneficial to French than to British interests in the Middle East. If the Powers represented at Paris were sincere in their proposals, and if they meant by every means in their power to secure their acceptance by Greece and Turkey, there can be no excuse for these protracted delays with their attendant perils. Rather should the allied policy be one of adhering to the plan there prepared, and making a further, even if it be a final, effort to extract a definite acceptance or refusal of it from Angora, Constantinople and Athens alike.

His Majesty's Government would view with profound regret the abandonment of this plan, to which so much labour was devoted, and they are slow to believe that the French Government can have any such intention. It is in this spirit that I am now addressing them in the hope that the common allied action which has here been urged may be resumed, in the general sense of the proposals which I have previously made.

Should this be found impossible, His Majesty's Government will have to deal with the matter in a different and independent way; and the prelude to any such action on their part will of necessity be the publication of the entire correspondence on the matter that has passed between the Allied Governments and the Governments of Athens, Angora and Constantinople.

They would greatly prefer, however, that the three Governments should once more unite in the communication of an identic note to the Governments of Athens and Constantinople, intimating that a definite reply to their proposals must now be made, and that there can be no further delay in summoning a Conference of the character agreed upon at Paris.

His Majesty's Government will be grateful if, in view of the urgency of the matter, they may be favoured with an early reply to this communication.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 4925/5/44]

No. 117.

Memorandum by Sir E. Crowe.

I SPOKE to the French Ambassador to-day on the subject of M. Poincaré's note of the 1st May, concerning the negotiations for the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. He had not, I gathered, seen M. Poincaré's note, and was in some ways astonished at some of the points in it to which I drew his attention. I reproduced at some length the full line of argument of Lord Curzon's reply in the form of his despatch to Lord Hardinge which is now on the way to Paris. I finally dwelt more particularly on the necessity of not giving way to Mustapha Kemal on the question of his proposal for a meeting with the Allied High Commissioners at Ismid, and on the importance of joint action between the Allies in demanding a definite and early reply to the proposals agreed upon between the three Foreign Secretaries at Paris.

Count de Saint-Aulaire said he was not of course in a position to forecast what view M. Poincaré would take when our note reached him. He himself was disposed altogether to agree with Lord Curzon's objection to the Ismid meeting, at least if it were to be held under the conditions indicated, and he promised to urge upon M. Poincaré the necessity of reconsidering the matter. On the other hand, he said he shared M. Poincaré's conviction that the one thing to be aimed at now was to get

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the Turks to accept the armistice, and he felt sure that the whole object of M. Poincaré's suggestion was to arrive at this provisional solution, being persuaded that once the parties had laid down their arms it would be next to impossible to get them to take up arms again. He added that he was not at all certain that it would not be well worth while to meet the Turks so far as to let the Greek evacuation of Anatolia follow immediately after arriving at an understanding with Angora on the armistice, and without waiting for the latter's formal acceptance of the general plan of settlement elaborated in Paris. For this would certainly lead to a formal concentration of Greek troops in Thrace, threatening Constantinople, and although the Allies would not allow the Greeks to give definite effect to such a threat, yet it might well suffice to induce Angora to show a more reasonable attitude in dealing with Allied conditions for a general settlement.

I replied that I thought this might prove to be an exceedingly dangerous experiment. There was nothing in the attitude hitherto observed by Mustapha Kemal which seemed to me to warrant any expectation that, having succeeded in getting rid of the Greeks from Anatolia, he would abate one jot of the Nationalist claims in other direction. Apart from this, I saw two great difficulties: first, that it seemed most unlikely that the Greeks on their part would agree to evacuate before receiving an assurance that the counterpart in the proposed general settlement would be realised. The second objection was in regard to the situation which might arise in Constantinople in the event, foreshadowed by Count de Saint-Aulaire, of a Greek concentration *en masse* in Thrace, faced by an unyielding Government at Constantinople and at Angora. In such a situation, was it not likely that the Allied Governments would be called upon themselves to intervene militarily and navally in order to maintain the position at Constantinople and the Straits, and was such a prospect likely to be viewed favourably at this moment, either in England or in France?

At any rate, I said that Lord Curzon seemed to me to be on very strong ground in urging that, before taking any further steps in the direction of concessions to Mustapha Kemal, the Allies should make a determined effort to bring about a solution on the terms which had after so much difficulty and patience been settled between them in Paris.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, May 11, 1922.

[E 4951/5/44]

No. 118.

*Signor Schanzer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 13.)*

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Genoa, May 8, 1922.

THE King's Ambassador in London has communicated to me the note which your Excellency addressed to him on the 27th April to protest against the agreement, of an economic character, which has been concluded between the Italian Government and the Turkish Government of Constantinople.

In view of the contents, and of the tone of your Excellency's note, I think it opportune in the first place briefly to recapitulate the considerations which I outlined before when I discussed this question at the last meeting of the three Allied Foreign Ministers at Paris last March, in order to show clearly what is the present position of Italy in the Near East, and what are the principles by which the political action of the King's Government must naturally be inspired in order to safeguard, as its duty is, Italian interests, without, however, wishing to injure in any way those of the Allies.

Going back to the first inter-Allied agreement regarding the Eastern settlement, it may be noted that by article 9 of the Pact of London of the 26th April, 1915, France and England recognised in principle that Italy is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and that, in the event of the total or partial disappearance of Turkey in Asia, she would be entitled to obtain a fair share of the Mediterranean region centring round the Province of Adalia. The same article added that the interests of Italy would be equally taken into consideration should the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire be maintained or if any modifications should be introduced in regard to the zones of interest of the Powers.

The Franco-British agreements of the 9th and 16th May, 1916, further laid down, without the participation of Italy, the new settlement which was to be effected

in regard to the Arab countries, and they provided for the French and British zones of economic priority in the States which were to be created in Syria and Mesopotamia and for the zones of direct, or indirect, French and British administration.

It was not until August 1917 that, by the Treaty of Saint-Jean de Maurienne, Italy succeeded in obtaining the recognition of her right to take a part in the contemplated Eastern settlement, and that she was assigned a zone in Asia Minor which, as is well known, included Smyrna and its hinterland. It is particularly important to emphasise that, by article 8 of the aforesaid treaty, it was understood that if, when peace was concluded, the advantages provided for in the agreements between the Allied Powers in regard to the attribution to each of the latter of a portion of the Ottoman Empire could not be secured in their entirety for one or more of these Powers, the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean would be equitably considered, in accordance with article 9 of the Pact of London of the 26th April, 1915, in any settlement or modification of the status of the provinces of the Turkish Empire which might be brought about as a consequence of the war.

In spite of this, the Treaty of Sèvres of the 10th August, 1920, which had been preceded by the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, attributed the city and zone of Smyrna to Greece, thus modifying the position in which the rights of Italy had been recognised by the Treaty of Saint-Jean de Maurienne.

In connection with the new Eastern settlement which was established by the Treaty of Sèvres, the so-called Tripartite Agreement was drawn up between the Allies at San Remo. By this agreement, conditions of economic priority for Italian enterprise and expansion were guaranteed in a certain specified zone of Asia Minor. The guarantees for the practical efficacy of this agreement were not, however, contained in the provisions of the agreement itself (which was nothing more than a negative act by which the Allies mutually disinterested themselves in certain spheres), but in the clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres, which established Allied controls and provided for Allied co-operation in various matters, and, in so far as concessions were concerned, in the financial clauses of that treaty.

With the rise and development of the Turkish Nationalist movement, however, Turkish opposition to any diminution, even of a purely economic or financial character, in the exercise of sovereign rights in the territory which might be left to the Ottoman Empire, hardened and took definite shape.

And thus Italy, who had witnessed the gradual disappearance of the advantages which had been guaranteed to her in the Near East on the basis of the recognition of her rights and interests as a great, and as a wholly Mediterranean Power, which had been sanctioned by the Treaty of London of 1915, found herself, on the eve of the Paris Conference of last March not only faced with the necessity, which had for that matter already been generally recognised, of restoring to Turkey the exercise of her full sovereign rights in Anatolia, and with the determined opposition of Turkey to any friendly application of the Tripartite Agreement, but also faced with the possibility that even the financial clauses of the Treaty of Sèvres, which formed the last guarantee of that agreement, might have to be profoundly modified in order to induce the Turkish Government to accept a peaceful settlement.

In these circumstances, I thought it opportune to make a special preliminary point, in the discussions regarding the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, of the absolute necessity for Italy to assure her own interests in Anatolia, and to safeguard in that region, even if it must be in an inadequate measure, that balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean which has been so seriously upset to our disadvantage.

And it is for that reason that I particularly begged the Allies to consider before any other question the manner in which the position of Italy could be set right, so that the King's Government should not be put in a position of complete disadvantage, where it would be impossible for it to discuss in a calm and disinterested way the solution of the Eastern problem. The result of my firm insistence was the renewed declaration of the Allies that they would loyally carry out the obligations which they had assumed under the Tripartite Agreement, and the undertaking to insert in the new Treaty of Peace with Turkey a clause by which concessions which might have been given by the Turkish Government should be submitted to the examination of a special commission, so that the interested Governments, and therefore Italy, should at least have had previous warning, in order that they might be able to guarantee in some way their own interests.

Without wishing to diminish the value of the conclusions arrived at by the Paris meeting on this question, the fact remains that the Allied Governments could not have excused themselves in any way from declaring as always valid the obligations



undertaken under the Tripartite Agreement without breaking faith with that treaty, and without completely denying to Italy those small advantages which were definitely laid down by the Pact of London.

On the other hand, the proviso to be inserted in the future Peace Treaty with Turkey is evidently indeterminate and elastic, and cannot be considered as a proper guarantee, but only as the minimum of what it has been compulsory to consent to in order not to remain absolutely unprovided with some means to attempt a practical application of the Tripartite Agreement.

Finally, the Italian Government had to consider the eventuality that the Turkish Government might, at her convenience, elude the efficacy of the agreement in question by refusing to Italy any economic concessions in her zone of priority. Against this passive attitude on the part of Turkey any obligations of the Allies would be in vain and the agreement would have remained a dead letter for all practical purposes.

The Turkish Government of Constantinople, however, at this moment made a spontaneous offer eventually to take into consideration various requests for concessions which had been presented by Italian financial groups. The concessions in question are situated almost exclusively in our zone of economic priority and none in zones reserved to others.

In the condition in which Italy found herself it would have been absurd and inconceivable for a Government conscious of the importance of the interests of its own country to let this offer slide. But I wished loyally to inform the Allies at Paris and apprise them that negotiations had begun on the basis of the Turkish offer, without, however, implicating any political undertaking on the part of the Italian Government.

I cannot, however, hide my surprise at the expressions contained in your Excellency's note, expressions which directly contrast with the intentions and with the conduct followed by the Italian Government on this occasion. It is absolutely impossible for me to recognise that we on our part have been lacking in frankness towards the British Government when your Excellency was informed by me personally at Paris of the negotiations in question.

The British Government cannot believe that the Italian Government did not regard it as its duty towards Italian interests, so inadequately safeguarded in the East, to take advantage of these negotiations to improve even in a slight measure a condition of affairs which had been brought about certainly by no fault of hers.

For that reason when your Excellency replied by recommending me to use prudence in the negotiations, I assumed you perfectly understood the position in which we found ourselves, and that you only wanted to prevent any eventual injury to Allied interests, which these negotiations might create.

No such injury has been done as your Excellency will have been able to ascertain from the original text of the agreement come to with the Government of Constantinople, which has been given to the British representative by the High Commissioner in Constantinople.

On the other hand, the Italian Government is under no illusions as regards the promises contained in the agreement offered by the present Constantinople Government. In reality they have no definite practical value, but represent a hope for the future completion of the guarantees agreed upon with the Allies, a completion which will be indispensable for us to obtain anything from Turkey, if the Tripartite Agreement is not to be reduced to an act of merely historical importance, and if, moreover, the small advantages obtained by Italy in the East are not to become a purely abstract stipulation.

It is from this point of view that your Lordship ought to consider the question in order that you may be convinced, as I thought you already were, of the entire legality of the action of the Italian Government and of the absence of anything resulting therefrom which might be prejudicial to the common interests of the Allies.

The agreement in question is merely a unilateral engagement on the part of the Turkish Government and the political action of the Italian Government is not involved in any way. To the objection that the Turkish Government could offer nothing in exchange, the answer is simple. The Ottoman Government have proposed and propose one thing only: to secure for themselves by the manifestation of good intentions in the question of concessions a more tractable attitude on the part of the Italian Government concerning the definitive formulation of the financial stipulations of the Peace Treaty. If public opinion will not believe this, I venture to observe that such incredulity is due rather to the untimely press polemics, which could easily have been avoided if the British Government themselves had not com-

plained against the Italian Government without considering the absolute loyalty of our political action and the urgent necessity underlying it.

I can assure your Lordship that the Italian representatives in the forthcoming conference cannot consider themselves morally engaged by agreements which do not definitively bind their Government. The Italian representatives in the examination of Eastern questions will, as hitherto, bear that spirit of impartiality and clear conception of real issues which, together with the necessity of defending the interests of their own country, is the requisite essential in order that equitable and permanent solutions may be reached.

Finally, as regards the reference in your Lordship's note to the ignoring of your written warning, I must observe that the letter to which your Lordship alludes reached me at the same time as the notification of the signature of the agreement reached at Constantinople on the 17th April last, and which I caused to be communicated to you at once by the Ambassador in London, promising at the same time to transmit to your Lordship the full text.

Even if that letter had reached me in time it could not have prevented the Italian Government from pursuing the only possible means of remedying to some extent the damage which has occurred to Italian interests in the East.

Your Lordship concludes by urging the necessity of united Allied front in the further negotiations for the restoration of peace in the Levant. I, for my part, entirely agree to this request, as I am, and have always been, convinced that one of the chief reasons for the failure of the attempts made at pacification is to be found in the lack of understanding and cohesion between the Allies, who are sometimes swayed by their own points of view of the Eastern situation and of the events which have taken place there.

While I sincerely trust that a better understanding will prevail in the further negotiations, I cannot but observe that an indispensable condition of the realisation of such an understanding is that each of the Allies should take into benevolent consideration the essential interests of the others.

I have, &c.  
SCHANZER.

[E 5009/27/44]

No. 119.

*Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 15.)*

(No. 224.)

My Lord,

*Athens, April 29, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of Colonel Hoare Nairne's despatch No. 3 of the 29th April, reporting on the Greek Army of Asia Minor.

I have, &c.  
F. O. LINDLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 119.

*Colonel Hoare Nairne to Mr. Lindley.*

Sir,

*Athens, April 29, 1922.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 2 of the 24th of this month and with reference to an alleged extract from the "Times" published as a telegram from London in the "Progrès" to-day indicating "serious reasons to believe that the Greek army of Asia Minor will probably form a separate Government in Ionia on the same bases as have served for the formation of the Angora Government," I have the honour to draw attention to a letter from General Papoulas published in the Athenian press on the 26th April, a copy of which is attached to this despatch.

General Papoulas's categorical statements that neither he nor the army will act contrary to the orders of the Government bear out the statements previously made to me by General Pallis. The close co-operation between the commander of the army of Asia Minor and the Government is further confirmed by the facts that General Papoulas arrived in Athens from Smyrna yesterday, and at once had a long conversation with the Minister of War, and that an hour later the Council of Ministers held a meeting, which M. Sterghiades attended.



The indications here, then, all point to the co-operation of the army with the Government and against insubordinate action by any large body of troops or important commanders; but, not having seen the army in Asia Minor since June 1921, I cannot estimate the present *moral* or temper of the troops from personal contact with them.

If my conclusions gathered here are right, the army will leave the responsibility for whatever may happen in Asia Minor to the Government by conforming with its orders. So the question remaining is what orders the Government will give or will find itself strong enough to give. The reassembly of the Chamber the day after to-morrow will probably give some clue to the answer.

I believe that the question whether the Greek Government will try to set up in Smyrna a separate Government, on the Angora or Fiume plan, is now a common subject of discussion in Athens. A few days ago, as I reported to you, a young officer, who is employed in the Ministry of War as one of the Minister's personal assistants, spoke to me of the possibility of such a step being taken. As regards the military aspect of any such plan, the Greeks have in the army of Asia Minor the strongest military organisation they have ever possessed, and they will naturally be tempted to use it; but, if they reflect, they cannot ignore the inexorable facts, that the army which failed to achieve decisive victory last year cannot hope even to attempt to force it now unless strongly reinforced, and that Greece has not funds, nor any visible prospect of funds, sufficient to provide for a general mobilisation or for the only other alternative to evacuation—a prolonged defensive campaign. This view was fully recognised by General Pallis in a recent conversation with me.

In the meantime reports, which earn credence by their persistence and uniformity, indicate that deserters and absentee reservists are being vigorously collected; and that both they and considerable reserves of ammunition and of stores are being sent to Asia Minor. This action, however, is a natural precaution in view of the proposed armistice and of the veto on moving men or material after its conclusion.

I have, &c.

E. S. HOARE NAIRNE, Colonel,  
Military Attaché.

Enclosure 2 in No. 119.

*Extract from Athenian Newspapers of April 13/26, 1922.*

THE Press Bureau has communicated the following letter from General Papoulas addressed to the newspapers of Athens:—

"I am indignant to learn that a number of reports have recently been spread by people who bear me a grudge for measures which I have taken concerning them in the performance of my duty.

"These reports tend to represent me as acting on my own initiative, contrary to the orders of the responsible Government.

"These rumours are being exploited politically by interested persons.

"Consequently, in order to put an end to these malicious efforts, I find myself obliged formally to declare that, conscious of my duty, I have not embarked, nor is it possible that I should embark, on any action without the consent or the order of the responsible Government.

"I have clearly emphasised to the delegations of patriotic organisations who have presented themselves to me that, faithful and devoted to its country and its King, the army carries out, and will carry out and obey, the orders of the State.

"PAPOULAS, General,  
"Commander of the Army of Asia Minor."

[E 4980/19/44]

No. 120.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 15.)*

(No. 415.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 3, 1922

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a communication addressed to each of the Allied High Commissioners individually by Yussuf Kemal

Bey, drawing the attention of the Allied Governments to the atrocities stated to have been committed by the Greek authorities and troops in occupied territory. This communication was handed to me personally to-day by Hamid Bey, the Nationalist agent.

2. After reading this communication through, I stated to Hamid Bey that, if the facts as related were true, they were very regrettable. I pointed out, however, that I had received no reports from Smyrna confirming the statement that the reoccupation of the Sokia district by the Greek forces had been attended by massacres and excesses. On the contrary, such information as I had received from Smyrna pointed to the fact that the reoccupation of the district in question had been effected very smoothly. On the other hand, a report from Athens stated that the Turks had driven off hundreds of Greek hostages—men, women and boy scouts—from Sokia immediately after the Italian evacuation. Hamid Bey interposed with the remark that the boy scouts were no doubt of military age. I replied that I could not accept this defence.

3. I then alluded to a telegram which had appeared in the local press to the effect that the Greek Government was taking measures to protest against the accusation of massacres and excesses brought against the Greek authorities by the Nationalists. I said that as long as a state of hostilities continued in Asia Minor, and having regard to the bitter feelings prevailing between the two belligerents, there would continue to be charges and counter-charges of atrocities.

4. I took this opportunity of telling Hamid Bey perfectly frankly that the mention of atrocities did not come well from the Nationalist Government. I had received authentic information from reliable witnesses of the terrible excesses and massacres committed by the Turks in the Pontine region, and in particular at Marsovan, where the notorious Osman Agha, Mayor of Kerasund, a ruffian of the worst description, was apparently allowed to ill-treat the Christian population as he pleased. Hamid Bey enquired whether the names of the alleged victims of these excesses could be furnished. I replied that the massacres had been on a wholesale scale and that it was not possible to give the names of all the victims. No doubt there had originally been some sort of a revolutionary movement in the Pontine district, but that did not excuse massacres and deportations of women and girls. I also quoted the evidence of Colonel Rawlinson as to the gangs of Greeks whom he had met going up from the coast into the interior. In talking to Hamid Bey in this manner I had in mind your Lordship's despatch No. 151 of the 13th February, though I took care not to indicate the origin of the reports enclosed in that despatch.

5. The Italian High Commissioner has spoken to Hamid Bey in exactly the same sense. Marquis Garroni stated that he had received a visit from an eyewitness of the atrocities at Kerasund. On Hamid Bey attempting to palliate these atrocities on the ground that the Nationalist Government had had to cope with a revolutionary movement and had only dealt severely with the men, my Italian colleague remarked that he preferred to believe the statement made to him by the eyewitness in question rather than that of Hamid Bey.

6. Finally, I informed Hamid Bey that I should forward the communication he had left with me to the proper quarter. As some of the charges of excesses contained in the enclosed communication relate to the Smyrna and Sokia districts, I am forwarding a copy of it to Sir Harry Lamb for such observations as he may have to offer. I am also forwarding a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 120.

*Yussuf Kemal Bey to Sir H. Rumbold.*

*Angora, le 30 avril 1922.*

LE Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie se voit obligé d'attirer encore une fois l'attention des Gouvernements français, britannique et italien sur les atrocités commises par les autorités et les troupes helléniques en territoire occupé, atrocités qui se sont multipliées depuis la dernière Conférence de Paris.

Ainsi, en mars dernier, le village de Férendjé, dans le nahié de Torbali, a été mis à sac par les Grecs, qui ont en même temps assassiné un notable nommé Ahmed Agha et



promené sa tête plantée au bout d'une pique dans tous les villages environnants. Plus tard les Hellènes ont incendié cette localité. La population qui tâchait de s'enfuir fut en grande partie massacrée à coup de fusil. Ceux qui survécurent à cette tuerie furent jetés dans les flammes et brûlés vifs.

Dans la localité de Chamlar, près de Smyrne, douze bouchers musulmans furent assassinés, leurs bestiaux enlevés et leurs cadavres abandonnés en pleine rue.

Les bandes grecques dépendant des organisations dites nationales commettent journellement sur la population musulmane des atrocités sans nombre et travaillent fiévreusement à faire disparaître, soit par le massacre, soit par l'exode en masse provoqué par la terreur, l'élément musulman des régions occupées.

Le Comité révolutionnaire arménien Dachnaksoution a décidé de collaborer à cette œuvre et délégué à Smyrne le Général Torcoum, célèbre pour les massacres qu'il perpétra sur la population musulmane de nos provinces orientales, après la retraite des armées russes, en 1917.

Cet individu, qui, durant la guerre balkanique, servait comme lieutenant dans l'armée bulgare et provoqua en duel l'illustre écrivain français Pierre Loti pour ses articles en faveur de la Turquie, déclara aux journalistes, dès son arrivée à Smyrne, être venu afin d'assurer la collaboration effective des révolutionnaires arméniens et des Grecs contre les Turcs.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie veut espérer que les grandes Puissances ne permettront pas que les crimes commis par les Dachnaks dans nos provinces de l'est, crimes décrits par tant d'officiers russes et par le général américain Harbord qui visita ses régions après l'armistice de 1918, se renouvellent de nos jours en Anatolie occidentale.

En attendant que les comités arméniens entrent en action sur une vaste échelle, des bandes grecques et arméniennes, constituées par les organisations mentionnées et soutenues tant par le Patriarcat oecuménique de Constantinople que par le Généralissime hellénique Papoulas, continuent leurs forfaits. Le soir du 1<sup>er</sup> avril dernier, une de ces bandes, de l'effectif d'un bataillon, cerna le quartier musulman de Ménémén avec le concours de troupes régulières. Toutes les maisons furent mises à sac, les femmes et les jeunes filles violées et beaucoup d'hommes assassinés. Les mêmes faits se répétèrent les jours suivants dans les villages environnants, sous le prétexte de chercher des armes cachées.

Le moulin de Médjidié, près de Djiğerman, fut assailli par une de ces bandes, forte de dix hommes, son propriétaire, un riche musulman nommé Ali Kehya, assassiné, sa femme complètement déshabillée et violemment battue et sa fortune, composée de £ T. 10,000 en billets et de 400 pièces d'or, volée.

Au début du mois d'avril, de nombreux crimes furent commis à Boudja, près de Smyrne, et entre autres quatre jeunes filles musulmanes furent violées, puis massacrées.

Des faits analogues se répétèrent dans la localité d'Avram, près d'Alachéhîr. Le 15 avril, le village de Djévizî, au sud de Seyd-Gazi, fut incendié par les Grecs. La région de Seuké, à peine évacuée par les Italiens, fut envahie par les Hellènes avant d'avoir été réoccupée par les troupes turques. Dès la matinée du 20 courant, les Grecs entrèrent dans le village de Dikikeuy, près de Seuké et l'incendièrent. Des bandes montées grecques, se dirigeant de Moseli vers Inekpazari, avancèrent en poussant devant elles la population musulmane de l'endroit afin d'empêcher nos troupes de faire feu, pillèrent les villages et se retirèrent en emmenant tout le bétail des paysans, après avoir massacré, sans distinction d'âge ni de sexe, ceux qui n'eurent pas le temps de se sauver. Beaucoup de musulmans poursuivis par ces bandes se sont noyés dans le Méandre.

En protestant avec énergie contre tous ces faits, qui constituent une infime partie des atrocités grecques de ces derniers temps—la plupart des crimes commis restent cachés, grâce à l'étroite surveillance des autorités publiques sur tous ceux qui pourraient témoigner contre ces agissements—le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie prie encore une fois les Gouvernements français, britannique et italien de vouloir bien user de toute leur influence auprès du Gouvernement hellénique pour que ces atrocités cessent et que ces bandes nouvellement formées ou en formation soient dissoutes.

YOUSSEF KEMAL,

Ministère des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement  
de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie.

[E 5011/5/44]

N<sup>o</sup>. 121.

Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 235.)

My Lord,

Athens, May 6, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that the refusal of the Kemalists to accept the armistice or to meet the Greeks at a conference has, for the time being, extricated the Prime Minister from his most pressing parliamentary difficulty. He has been able to evade making any public pronouncement regarding his willingness to accept the Allied peace proposals on the plea that the Kemalists reply has created a new situation.

In my telegram No. 168 of the 4th instant I expressed a suspicion that the Greek Government had some move in contemplation which might come as an unpleasant surprise. I have not yet been able to obtain any confirmation of this suspicion, and it may be that Government circles are merely elated by their hopes of a more favourable settlement and by the successes they have had in occupying the Meander valley without difficulty and in securing control of the Asia Minor defence movement, which at one time appeared to be likely to constitute a serious danger to the existing régime in Greece.

The doings of the Asia Minor delegates, whose visit to Athens was reported in my telegram No. 166 of the 1st instant, have been the subject of numerous articles in the press, and it is significant that, in spite of all three being known Veniselists, they were received on the 5th instant by King Constantine. It is perhaps more significant that such a violently Veniselist paper as the "Patris" reports the audience in terms which are sympathetic to the Sovereign.

The above incident is the most striking of several which have occurred lately, tending to show that Greeks of both parties recognise the extreme gravity of the national position, and are ready to bury the hatchet as regards the question of the security of the unredeemed Greeks. This development will not make the Greek Government more easy to deal with, but it should reduce the danger of the Asia Minor Greeks resisting a settlement which that Government have accepted.

In conversation the other day the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to the present situation as one that could not be allowed to continue indefinitely. If the Powers were unable to bring about a settlement, M. Baltazzi hinted that the Greek Government must try to find a solution themselves. I have no idea what line any future Greek proposals might take, but they certainly would not include the complete evacuation of Asia Minor nor the abandonment of so much of Thrace as is assigned to Turkey by the Allied proposals. I opine that the Greeks would try to find some line in Asia Minor which, while protecting the bulk of the Christian population, would be cheaper to hold than the present extended positions. An easily defensible line might also be found in Thrace, and the Greeks might then hope to wear down the Kemalists. It is true that such a development would offer serious dangers to Greece, and the more chauvinistic organs of the press have, during the last few days, revived the idea of imposing peace on Turkey by occupying Constantinople. I do not believe that, so long as the Allies occupy that capital, there is any danger of the Greek Government's entertaining such an idea.

Although the two Greek parties appear to have rallied to the defence of the interests of the unredeemed Greeks, it must not be supposed that party polemics on other questions have ceased or that the Opposition leaders have renounced the hope of drawing Ministerial salaries in the near future. The taxation proposals of the Government, which are of a really drastic nature, have naturally caused a good deal of restlessness amongst the electorate, and M. Stratos proposes to marshal all the forces of the Opposition in an attack on the financial policy of the Government on the 8th instant. Rumours have been current of numerous defections amongst the Government supporters, but M. Gounaris informed me two days ago that he was not nervous regarding the outcome of Monday's debate. Should he be placed in a minority, as is not impossible, there is no reason to suppose that M. Stratos will be any better able to form an alternative Government now than he was two months ago. It is always possible, however, that some bargain may be struck at the last moment.

I have, &c.

F. O. LINDLEY.



[E 5012/19/44]

No. 122.

*Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 15.)*

(No. 238.)

My Lord,

Athens, May 6, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a note from the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, respecting massacres, incendiarism and pillage alleged to have been committed by Greek troops in Asia Minor.

I have, &amp;c.

F. O. LINDLEY.

Enclosure in No. 122.

*Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Lindley*

M. le Représentant,

Athènes, le 22 avril/5 mai 1922.

LE Gouvernement royal ayant pris connaissance avec stupéfaction des passages des notes adressées aux Puissances alliées par le Gouvernement d'Angora en date des 5 et 22 avril dernier, ayant trait aux soi-disant massacres, incendies et pillages commis par les troupes grecques en Asie Mineure, croit devoir protester énergiquement contre ces allégations calomnieuses.

Il croit devoir s'élever avec indignation contre cette campagne tendancieuse ayant comme but de renverser les rôles et les responsabilités et de masquer les atrocités inouïes perpétrées par la Turquie durant toute la guerre et dans le passé.

Le Gouvernement turc, tant le Gouvernement du Sultan Abdoul-Hamid que celui des jeunes Turcs ou le Gouvernement kémaliste, a, à maintes reprises, non seulement en état de guerre mais aussi en pleine paix, donné des ordres de déportations en masse et de massacres sur une grande échelle, contre les Grecs et les Arméniens, dont la Thrace, les provinces d'Ionie, le Pont, l'Arménie, et d'autres provinces ont été le théâtre et qui, universellement connus, ont révolté la conscience de l'humanité tout entière.

Les Puissances alliées elles-mêmes, dans les notes adressées à la délégation ottomane durant la Conférence de la Paix, ont constaté et justement flétri les atrocités commises par la Turquie contre ses propres ressortissants.

Récemment encore, des milliers de Grecs du Pont ont péri, massacrés par ordre du Gouvernement d'Angora, et les horreurs commises par ses agents en Anatolie contre les chrétiens ont égalé ses exploits antérieurs.

En septembre dernier, l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations, après le rapport d'une commission qui avait fait une enquête sur place, prenait des mesures contre les déportations et les emprisonnements de milliers de chrétiens par les autorités ottomanes.

Aujourd'hui encore, d'après les dépositions des témoins oculaires, les populations helléniques qui vivent sous l'autorité du Gouvernement terroriste d'Angora sont dans une situation lamentable, la population mâle ayant été pour la plupart déportée, tandis que les femmes et les enfants, restés dans leurs foyers, se trouvent dans un état complet d'énervement.

Prétendre aujourd'hui qu'il faudrait procéder à la protection des Turcs contre les chrétiens, c'est renverser les rôles et instituer un procès de tendance en demandant de protéger les bourreaux contre leurs victimes.

Le Gouvernement hellénique ne croit pas superflu d'attirer l'attention des Puissances alliées sur les périls qui pourraient surgir de cette campagne mensongère qui tend à soulever le monde musulman contre les Puissances occidentales et les chrétiens d'Orient.

Il est à noter, en dernier lieu, que la lettre du Gouvernement d'Angora qui dénonce les prétendus méfaits commis par les troupes helléniques, lors de l'occupation de la vallée du Méandre, évacuée par les troupes italiennes, est datée du 23 avril. Or, cette évacuation n'a commencé que la veille, c'est-à-dire le 21 avril.

Il est, tout au moins, surprenant que l'armée grecque a eu le temps de procéder à l'occupation de ces territoires, d'y commettre ces horribles crimes, et que ces nouvelles soient parvenues jusqu'à Angora et enregistrées dans la note kémaliste dans l'espace d'un seul jour.

Veuillez agréer, &amp;c.

BALTAZZI.

[E 4990/19/44]

No. 123.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 15.)*

(No. 428.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 9, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a communication emanating from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Angora Government which has been addressed to the Allied High Commissioners by the vice-president of the Ottoman Red Crescent, and which deals with an alleged renewal of atrocities by Greek troops in the zone of their occupation.

2. In discussing this communication with my colleagues, together with that which formed the subject of my despatch No. 415 of the 3rd May, I expressed the opinion that the charges preferred by the Angora authorities were of too vague a nature to call for representations to the Greek High Commissioner.

3. I have therefore in both cases confined my action to the transmission of these complaints to your Lordship and to His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna.

4. I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representative at Athens.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 123.

*Note communicated by Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

LES informations parvenues récemment au Ministère des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie établissent que les troupes hellènes ont recommencé ces temps derniers la destruction systématique de ce qui reste de villages turcs dans leur zone d'occupation en se servant de l'incendie et des massacres comme un moyen d'anéantir la population paisible. La recrudescence des atrocités, commises depuis le début de leur occupation par les mêmes troupes, est attestée par les témoignages des habitants de la région de Guemlik et du littoral de Marmara qui ont cherché refuge à Constantinople.

Ces pratiques inhumaines, que ne saurait expliquer aucune nécessité de guerre présente, ainsi que l'époque où elle se produisent, dénotent précisément l'état d'esprit de leurs auteurs. Le Gouvernement hellène et ses agents militaires veulent désormais ne laisser subsister après eux qu'un monceau de ruines.

Des témoignages irrécusables et impartiaux avaient déjà fait justice des procédés de guerre en honneur chez l'armée hellène et ses chefs, qui, à présent, ont hâte de mener à bout, tout autant que les circonstances le permettront, leur plan de destructions.

Le Gouvernement de la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie a le devoir de protester formellement contre ces nouveaux agissements.

Encouragé qu'il est par les efforts généreux déployés dans maintes circonstances par leurs Excellences MM. les Hauts-Commissaires des trois grandes Puissances alliées en vue de limiter les souffrances des malheureuses populations turques gémissant sous un joug rien moins qu'humain, il s'empresse de faire appel une nouvelle fois à leurs sentiments humanitaires pour faire arrêter ces nouvelles violences.

Il les remercie pour tout ce qu'ils vont faire dans ce même but.

A. HAMID.

Constantinople, le 29 avril 1922.

[E 4993/48/44]

No. 124.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 15.)*

(No. 431.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 9, 1922.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to your Lordship's telegrams Nos. 197 and 198 of the 5th instant, to transmit to you herewith copy of the identic note to the

[8975]

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Turkish Government therein referred to, in which the Allied High Commissioners protested against the erection of tanks by the Standard Oil Company at Kurutcheshmé and at Scutari, in the proximity of the Selimieh barracks.

2. The question of the danger to public safety of these depots was raised in an acute form as the result of the recent conflagration at the Standard Oil Company's workshops at Selvi Burnu. A number of articles were published, more particularly in the "Stamboul," drawing attention to the risk of fire therefrom, and the inhabitants of Kurutcheshmé themselves petitioned the Grand Vizier on the subject. In the course of a visit which the 2nd dragoman of this High Commission had occasion to make to the prefect of the city, Mr. Matthews was informed by Zia Bey that some time ago permission had been illegally granted by a former prefect for the construction of these depots, which were destined to hold small quantities of petrol, but that the Council of Ministers had now decided that this permission should be withdrawn by the vilayet, which was alone competent in such matters.

3. Moreover, in the course of a visit of inspection to some coal depots in the neighbourhood, M. Picard, the French representative on the Advisory Trade Committee, who was accompanied by Colonel Woods, was impressed by the unsuitability of the locality chosen for the erection of the Standard Oil Company's tanks at Selimieh. M. Picard reported in this sense to the Allied High Commissioners, and I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith a copy of his memorandum to that effect.

4. It will be observed from that memorandum that the American delegate on the Advisory Trade Committee was warned on the 3rd April last of the danger constituted by the existence of an oil reservoir at Kurutcheshmé.

5. M. Picard's memorandum was discussed at a High Commissioners' meeting on the 7th April, at which, in view of the admitted danger resulting from the use of a reservoir in an inflammable quarter of the town and at a crowded part of the Bosphorus, it was decided to address the identic note to the Turkish Government to which the United States High Commissioner takes exception. Care was, however, taken to communicate a copy of that note to Admiral Bristol on the same day on which it was despatched to the Sublime Porte.

6. The Allied High Commissioners, as ultimately in practice responsible for the administration of this city, did not in fact consider it either compatible with that responsibility to allow the matter to remain in suspense or consonant with their position to permit oil companies, of their own volition and without the sanction of the recognised authority, to erect depots of this nature. As is indicated, however, in M. Picard's memorandum, the United States High Commissioner, if not actually consulted as to the tenor of the note to the Sublime Porte, was aware of the objections of the Allied High Commissioners to these tanks. Nor is this only true as regards the more recent development of this question. Your Lordship will observe, from a reference to the memorandum drawn up by Mr. Henderson and enclosed in my despatch No. 188 of the 21st February last, that as far back as November 1920 the attention of Admiral Bristol was drawn to the doubtful propriety of the erection of such installations within the zone of authority of the future Straits Commission.

7. Admiral Bristol, beyond referring that warning to his Government, would appear to have treated it otherwise as a dead letter. Even if he were inclined to contest the competence of the Allied High Commissioners to decide where American companies should or should not construct oil reservoirs at Constantinople, he could scarcely maintain that their construction is not a concern of the military authorities responsible for the security of the area under their occupation.

8. In these circumstances I cannot consider that any discourtesy has been shown to Admiral Bristol in not first submitting to him the draft of the note which the Allied High Commissioners addressed to the Turkish Government, or that there has been in this respect any departure from the rule of previous consultation with the United States High Commissioner in matters affecting American interests.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 124.

*Identic Note to Turkish Government.*

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie soussignés ont l'honneur d'appeler l'attention de la Sublime Porte sur la construction entreprise à Kouroutchesmé d'un réservoir de pétrole.

Indépendamment des réserves de principe déjà formulées par les soussignés dans leurs notes du 19 novembre 1920, du 27 avril et du 30 juin 1921, il y a lieu d'observer que la nouvelle installation qui fait l'objet de la présente note paraît établie dans des conditions particulièrement dangereuses. Ce réservoir en effet se trouve installé à peu de distance de l'agglomération principale de Constantinople presque en bordure du Bosphore, en un point où stationnent de nombreux bâtiments; afin, il est établi à très peu de distance du mur de clôture de la propriété où il se trouve et à très faible distance d'autres dépôts construits dans cette même propriété.

Il existe, d'autre part, à proximité de cette même propriété des entrepôts pour marchandises générales qui touchent eux-mêmes à des maisons d'habitations.

L'existence d'un tel réservoir est de nature à rendre complètement inutilisables des terrains non encore bâtis à proximité du côté sud.

D'après les renseignements recueillis, l'autorisation de construire ce réservoir aurait été donnée par une autorité qui n'a pas qualité pour le faire.

Les soussignés ne peuvent qu'insister auprès de la Sublime Porte pour que l'utilisation de ce réservoir soit interdite et pour que sa construction ne soit pas poursuivie.

La présente décision est d'ailleurs applicable à d'autres réservoirs qui, d'après des renseignements reçus également par les soussignés, sont en construction à Sélimié.

*Constantinople, le 15 avril 1922.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 124.

*M. Picard to Allied High Commissioners.*

J'AI l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que m'étant rendu samedi dernier à Kouroutchesmé avec M. le Colonel Wood, mon collègue au Comité interallié du Charbon, pour examiner sur place les dépôts de charbon installés dans cette localité, nous avons constaté que la compagnie Standard Oil construisait, dans l'enceinte où elle a déjà établi des dépôts pour pétrole en bidons, un réservoir pour pétrole en vrac, d'une contenance approximative de 1,000 à 1,500 mètres cubes.

Nous estimons, mon collègue et moi, que l'existence d'un pareil réservoir, dans la banlieue de Constantinople, à proximité du Bosphore constitue un danger sérieux, et nous avons avisé notre collègue américain au Comité consultatif du Commerce—lors de notre première réunion du 3 courant, tenue le matin—que nous rendrions compte de nos constatations à nos Hauts-Commissaires respectifs.

Mr. Shaw a constaté d'ailleurs les inconvénients pouvant résulter de la mise en service du réservoir.

Par contre, un ingénieur de la Standard Oil convoqué à la deuxième séance tenue l'après-midi du 3 courant, pour être consulté au sujet de la loi à l'étude sur les matières inflammables, admet que les réservoirs de cette nature devraient être établis au moins à 50 mètres des clôtures de la parcelle dans laquelle ils sont construits. Or, dans le cas qui nous occupe, cette distance n'atteint que quelques mètres du côté sud et reste bien au-dessous de 50 mètres du côté nord.

[E 4994/53/44]

No. 125.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 15.)*

(No. 432.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 9, 1922.*

In my despatch No. 413 of the 3rd May, I referred to the impression created by a visit of the Patriarch Meletios to the parish of Tatavla on the Pera side of the Golden Horn. It now appears that he is carrying out a series of such visitations.

2. On the 24th April, Mgr. Meletios paid a State visit to the important suburb of Kadikeui on the Asiatic side. According to a report furnished by the Allied police



officer there, he spoke for forty-five minutes at the local Cathedral, and dealt entirely with political subjects. He spoke of the necessity for a united Christian front against the Turks; referred to a protest against the restoration of Smyrna to Moslem rule, which is said to have been addressed to the Pope by Catholics in Smyrna; contrasted the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine by the French with the proposal that the Greeks should give up what was hers by promise and by conquest; and said that even if the Athens Government ordered withdrawal, the Greek troops would not obey.

3. On the 7th May, the Patriarch paid a similar visit to the Church of Saint Nicolas in Galata to attend a mass for the repose of the souls of the victims of persecution in the Pontus region. Here again he appears to have delivered a political speech, though I have received no detailed report of it as yet.

4. These proceedings of Mgr. Meletios are exceedingly dangerous at a time like the present. Their undesirability is enhanced by the fact that it is now Ramazan, and definite attempts are being made on the Turkish side to inflame Moslem fanaticism here in the capital. Both sides are assuming an attitude which might easily menace public order. Indeed, General Harington has written to me officially regarding the ill-advisedness of the Patriarch's performance at Kadiköy.

5. I am causing an intimation to be conveyed to Mgr. Meletios to the effect that if he enjoys liberty of action here, it is due to the presence of an Allied force of occupation, and that he owes it to the Allied authorities not to abuse that liberty. It would, I fear, be useless to address any direct threat to him for he is a determined man; but I am letting it be understood that if he and others cannot see their way to use common prudence in their public acts and utterances, the Allied authorities may be compelled to take measures to ensure that public order is not threatened.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
*High Commissioner.*

[E 5039/5/44]

No. 126.

*Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 16.)*

(No. 1177.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from M. Poincaré, dated the 15th May, respecting the attitude of the Allied Governments towards the reply of the Angora Government.

*Paris, May 15, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 126.

*M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.*

*Ministère des Affaires étrangères,  
Paris, le 15 mai 1922.*

M. le Chargé d'Affaires.

VOUS avez bien voulu, le 12 de ce mois, me communiquer une lettre du principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté exposant les appréhensions que cause au Gouvernement britannique le retard subi par l'action entreprise par les Gouvernements alliés, en vue de hâter le rétablissement de la paix en Orient. Après avoir rappelé les différentes communications échangées par les Gouvernements de Grèce et de Turquie depuis la réunion des trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères, après avoir constaté que les délais survenus étaient dus en partie au souci du Gouvernement de Constantinople de faire concorder son attitude avec celle du Gouvernement d'Angora, son Excellence le Marquis Curzon examine principalement la dernière réponse du Gouvernement d'Angora en date du 22 avril. Cette réponse ne pouvait assurément pas être considérée comme satisfaisante dans son ensemble. Cependant, comme conclusion, le Gouvernement d'Angora déclarait être prêt à envoyer ses délégués à une réunion des plénipotentiaires alliés qui se tiendrait à Ismid.

Son Excellence Lord Hardinge m'a fait savoir, le 26 avril, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté estimait inutile de prolonger une discussion avec le Gouvernement d'Angora et proposait qu'une note catégorique lui fût adressée. Le 1<sup>er</sup> mai, j'ai fait connaître à Lord Hardinge les inconvénients qu'aurait, à mon avis, une mise en

[E 4959/900/44]

No. 125A.

*Sir M. Cheetham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 15.)*

(No. 1163.)

My Lord,

*Paris, May 13, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1111 of the 6th May regarding the French claim to a protectorate over the Catholics in the Near East, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of the note addressed on the 11th May to the French Government by the Italian Ambassador with which his Excellency has been so good as to furnish me.

I have, &c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Italian Ambassador to French Government.*

M. le Président,

*Paris, le 11 mai 1922.*

A L'OCCASION de la mort du Pape Benoît XV, ainsi que de l'élection du nouveau Souverain Pontife, le délégué apostolique à Constantinople, ayant décidé de célébrer des cérémonies religieuses solennelles, pria les représentants des Puissances d'y assister.

Les Hauts-Commissaires italien et britannique, ayant été informés que le Haut-Commissaire français aurait eu, à titre de protecteur des intérêts catholiques, une place privilégiée, décidèrent, à leur regret, de ne pas assister auxdites cérémonies.

Le Gouvernement italien a approuvé la ligne de conduite de M. le Marquis Garroni. Mon Gouvernement estime, et m'a chargé d'en informer votre Excellence, que la France a, du fait des déclarations échangées à la Conférence de San-Remo, le 24 avril 1920, et consignées dans les procès-verbaux de ladite conférence, renoncé à la protection des catholiques en Orient—protection que, d'ailleurs, le Gouvernement italien n'avait jamais reconnue.

Mon Gouvernement estime, en effet, que les déclarations faites par M. Millerand à San-Remo, tout en ayant été prononcées à l'occasion de la discussion sur la Palestine, ne s'appliquent pas moins à tout l'Orient, vu le caractère général de la discussion, et notamment la déclaration de M. Nitti (p. 23 du Procès-verbal No. 12 de la Conférence de San-Remo), avec laquelle M. Millerand se déclara d'accord.

La Conférence de la Paix et les conférences qui ont suivi ont constamment appliqué la règle suivant laquelle les notes et les procès-verbaux, après communication aux différentes délégations, font pleine foi, et que les décisions y inscrites, ainsi que toutes déclarations, constituent un engagement solennel entre les Puissances alliées.

On ne saurait donc contester la pleine validité de la déclaration de M. Millerand, qui donna à ses mots une signification bien précise et générale.

J'ai, pourtant, l'honneur de prier votre Excellence si, comme j'estime, une étude de la question et des textes lui fera reconnaître le bien-fondé du point de vue du Cabinet de Rome, de vouloir bien donner communication au Saint-Siège de la renonciation du Gouvernement français, afin que les missions catholiques en Orient soient informées qu'elles ne sont pas tenues à rendre les "honneurs" aux représentants de la France, vu que ces "honneurs" sont l'expression extérieure de la protection dont on ne comprendrait pas la fin sans la cessation contemporaine des "honneurs." Il serait utile, pour éviter des froissements, qu'une communication analogue fût faite aux autorités françaises intéressées.

Je remercie à l'avance votre Excellence de la réponse qu'elle voudra bien me faire parvenir, dès que possible, pour me permettre de faire connaître à mon Gouvernement les dispositions qui auront été prises à ce sujet.

Veillez, &c.

[Unsigned]



demeure immédiate adressée aux Turcs et j'insistais sur l'intérêt, pour les Alliés et pour la cause de la paix, de ne pas se refuser à la réunion proposée.

De la lettre de Lord Curzon que vous venez de me communiquer, il paraît résulter que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a, sur certains points importants, donné à la réponse du Gouvernement d'Angora une signification sensiblement différente de celle qu'elle a aux yeux du Gouvernement français.

Je suis heureux que la réponse de Lord Curzon à ma lettre du 1<sup>er</sup> mai permette d'éclaircir une situation qui risquait, en se prolongeant, d'interrompre la progression de nos efforts communs pour rétablir la paix en Orient.

Il a paru au principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté que la réunion que Youssouf Kémal avait en vue était une réunion à laquelle, avec les plénipotentiaires alliés, seul le Gouvernement d'Angora participerait et d'où seraient exclus les Gouvernements de Constantinople et d'Athènes. Il a considéré qu'une telle proposition était inacceptable. J'ajoute que, si une semblable exclusion avait été demandée, le Gouvernement français aurait également trouvé inadmissible la proposition de Youssouf Kémal.

Mais la réponse du Gouvernement d'Angora et notamment sa conclusion n'impliquent aucunement que les représentants des Gouvernements de Constantinople et d'Athènes ne participeraient pas à la réunion projetée. Bien au contraire, le Gouvernement de Constantinople, dont Lord Curzon a si justement noté le souci de régler son attitude sur celle d'Angora, n'aurait pas, à la fin de sa réponse du 29 avril, demandé à envoyer le plus tôt possible ses délégués à la conférence si leur présence était exclue par le Gouvernement d'Angora. En ce qui concerne l'envoi des délégués helléniques, il appartient au Gouvernement d'Athènes de faire connaître ses intentions et il y aurait, sans doute, lieu de les lui demander. La réunion projetée doit comprendre des délégués des trois Gouvernements d'Athènes, de Constantinople et d'Angora conformément à la procédure convenue par les Ministres anglais, français et italien récemment réunis à Paris.

Il n'est, en effet, aucunement dans la pensée du Gouvernement français de s'écarter de cette procédure et il considère que la conclusion des préliminaires de paix ne doit résulter que d'une réunion à laquelle participeront les trois Gouvernements intéressés et qui aura pour base de ses travaux les propositions que les Alliés ont formulées à la suite des réunions de Paris. Avec le Gouvernement britannique, il a constaté que la réponse d'Angora, comme d'ailleurs celle de Constantinople, n'était pas satisfaisante; il doit constater également que le Gouvernement hellénique n'a encore, si ce n'est sur la proposition d'armistice, donné aucune réponse. Mais il a pensé que les Alliés ne pouvaient refuser de se prêter aux "pourparlers préparatoires" désirés par le Gouvernement d'Angora. Ces "pourparlers" seraient engagés dès le début de la conférence projetée, aussi bien avec les Grecs qu'avec les Turcs, pour amener les uns et les autres à accepter formellement les propositions des Alliés. Grâce à des contacts directs avec les diverses parties, cette acceptation, que les échanges de notes ne paraissent pas pouvoir procurer, serait sans doute obtenue. Une fois cette acceptation acquise, la conférence pourrait, conformément au programme convenu entre les Alliés, continuer ses travaux pour aboutir à la conclusion des préliminaires de paix.

Ainsi, le Gouvernement français ne propose aucunement d'introduire dans la procédure convenue un nouveau stade de négociations. Il estime même qu'il n'y aurait pas lieu de se prêter à l'envoi à Constantinople par Moustapha Kémal d'un représentant chargé de demander aux Hauts-Commissaires des informations complémentaires sur les propositions de paix des Alliés. Une semblable mission pourrait, en effet, paraître comme une action séparée avec une seule des parties intéressées et contraire à la procédure adoptée.

Comme le principal Secrétaire d'État, je considère qu'il y a danger à laisser le temps s'écouler sans que se manifeste une progression des efforts des Alliés, progression qui contribue actuellement pour une large part à éviter une reprise des hostilités.

En ce qui concerne le lieu où se tiendrait la conférence, il est à considérer que la ville d'Ismid, étant sur les territoires occupés par le Gouvernement d'Angora, présente des inconvénients analogues à ceux qu'aurait le voisinage immédiat de Constantinople et qu'il serait préférable de ne réunir les délégués sur le territoire d'aucun des belligérants. D'autre part, il y aurait intérêt à choisir un point d'où les communications télégraphiques seraient aisées avec les diverses capitales et notamment avec Angora, qui est d'accès particulièrement difficile. Il est plus important encore que Moustapha Kémal, avec qui un contact direct serait utile, ne soit pas empêché de venir à la conférence par la crainte de s'éloigner d'Anatolie et reste en mesure, tout en étant présent à cette réunion, de contenir les éléments extrémistes d'Angora, de maintenir



son autorité sur ses troupes et d'assurer ainsi l'observation des décisions que la conférence serait amenée à prendre et notamment l'exécution de l'armistice et de l'évacuation. Pour ces raisons, le Gouvernement français propose que la réunion ait lieu à bord d'un bâtiment de guerre allié se tenant dans la rade d'Ismid, bâtiment qu'il est prêt à mettre à la disposition des Gouvernements alliés.

Le Gouvernement français qui, comme le Gouvernement britannique, est pénétré de l'idée que l'unité d'action des Gouvernements alliés est plus que jamais nécessaire, a l'honneur de proposer au Gouvernement britannique l'envoi aux Gouvernements de Constantinople et d'Angora, comme à celui d'Athènes, d'une note identique où ces Gouvernements seront invités à nommer sans retard leurs délégués, qui devront se rendre à l'endroit désigné pour la conférence. Cette procédure est la seule qui, tenant compte des difficultés présentes, peut permettre d'espérer un règlement pacifique du conflit gréco-turc. Elle constitue une dernière tentative de conciliation, que le souci, pour les Gouvernements alliés, de ne pas assumer la responsabilité d'une rupture les oblige moralement à effectuer.

Je suis persuadé qu'une mise en demeure adressée aux États belligérants ne saurait être accueillie par eux et marquerait une reprise immédiate des hostilités.

Le Gouvernement de la République ne voudrait pas envisager la responsabilité de laisser échapper une dernière occasion de rétablir la paix en Orient.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de faire part de mon sentiment au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, et j'attacherais du prix à savoir, le plus tôt possible, si, comme je l'espère, il veut bien le partager.

Agréé, &c.  
POINCARÉ.

[E 5244/48/44]

No. 127.

*Sir A. Geddes to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 22.)*

(No. 547. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Washington, May 11, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 387 of the 29th March last concerning the attitude of the American High Commissioner at Constantinople and his complaints of Allied discrimination against American interests. At my request, Mr. Craigie first discussed this matter informally, but fully, with Mr. Dullas, the new head of the Near Eastern Division of the State Department, who has just returned to Washington after a year of service as first secretary of the American High Commission at Constantinople. When the way had been thus prepared, I took the opportunity to mention the matter to the Secretary of State, and drew attention to the fact that the frequent divergencies of view between the American High Commissioner and his colleagues were adding to the heavy burden of responsibility which already rested upon the shoulders of the Allied High Commissioners. The Secretary of State at once sent for Mr. Dullas, and the conversation was mainly carried on between that officer and myself, the Secretary of State being in the main a passive listener.

As a result of these discussions, I have gained the impression that the Secretary of State has personally a limited knowledge of the situation in Constantinople, and has left the supervision of American affairs there to subordinates, and that, possibly because of difficulties arising from Admiral Bristol's naval status, they have left him to conduct affairs in his own way and largely at his own discretion; and, at the same time, that Admiral Bristol, while not primarily desiring to create trouble for his colleagues, has been persuaded that American interests, and especially American commercial interests, would suffer were he not to exercise the utmost vigilance, and to arrest what he considers the tendency of the Allied High Commissioners to use the existing situation for the furtherance of their national interests. Apparently, too, whenever Admiral Bristol does not quite understand what is being done, he assumes that American interests are being sacrificed, and is prepared to accept as corroborative evidence any statement by any person, provided it impugns the motives of one or other of the High Commissioners. It seems clear that, in the mind of the American High Commission, suspicion of the French and Italian Commissions is more fully developed than is their suspicion of our motives, though they evidently have a greater fear of our traders' capacity. In the more reasonable American view the main difficulty throughout has been one of procedure. The absence of sufficient personal contact between the American

High Commissioner and his colleagues has, in this opinion, lead to the writing of a great number of notes in regard to questions which might more easily have been settled by verbal discussion.

One solution of this particular difficulty, which I gather would be agreeable to the State Department, would be that Admiral Bristol should be invited to attend meetings of the High Commissioners at which questions relating to American interests are likely to come up. Mr. Hughes naturally would not put forward such a proposal as from the American Government, but he appeared to concur in the opinion of Mr. Dullas that, if the Allied High Commissioners thought fit to issue such invitations, a great deal of misunderstanding and a large amount of note writing might thereby be avoided. It is, of course, impossible for me to judge at this distance whether such a suggestion is likely to find favour with Sir Horace Rumbold and his colleagues. I recognise, indeed, that there may be very valid reasons for not acting upon it. On general grounds, however, and as part of our existing policy towards this country, it would seem sound policy to interest American representatives, as observers or in any other capacity, in councils and conferences convened for the purpose of discussing matters in which American interests are either directly or indirectly involved.

As regards the last paragraph of Sir Horace Rumbold's despatch, it may perhaps be worth mentioning that, according to Mr. Dullas, the policy of the High Commission is to inform Americans who desire to proceed to the interior for the purpose of extracting concessions from the Kemalist Government that, if they get into difficulties, they cannot expect assistance from the American Government which has no representative at Angora. In other words, the American High Commission is taking no active steps to encourage Americans to seek concessions in the existing state of things, though they do not actually discourage them from embarking upon such enterprises. Moreover, Mr. Dullas pointed out that while no doubt Great Britain is abiding by the self-denying ordinance which precludes Allied subjects from acquiring concessions during the armistice period, this has by no means been the case so far as French and Italian interests are concerned. He added that, so far as he himself was concerned, he had no knowledge that such an ordinance or understanding existed.

At the close of our discussion the Secretary of State assured me that he would write privately to Admiral Bristol and inform him that he was most anxious that the best possible relations should be maintained with the High Commissioners of the Allied Governments, and that nothing should be done unnecessarily to increase the burden already resting upon their shoulders.

Finally, I think it may safely be assumed that among the sowers of suspicion in Admiral Bristol's mind have been agents of the Standard Oil Company. How far these agents have been directed to create anti-British sentiment because of the real or supposed interests of the company, and how far anti-British persons have been able to use the Standard Oil organisation for their own ends, I have never been able accurately to decide. At present Mr. Bedford's propaganda machine is being held back from anti-British activity for reasons which it is unnecessary here to discuss. This appears to me to provide an opportunity for placing the relations with Admiral Bristol on a more pleasant footing.

I have, &c.  
A. C. GEDDES.

[E 5201/5/44]

No. 128.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 22.)*

(No. 437.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 11, 1922.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 425, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the notes exchanged between Izzet Pasha and Marquis Garroni with reference to the recent agreement concluded between the Italian Government and the Constantinople Government, as well as a copy of the agreement itself.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.



Enclosure 1 in No. 128.

*Izzet Pasha to Italian High Commissioner.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Sublime Porte, le 15 avril 1922.

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre, ci-joint, à votre Excellence le projet d'accord relatif à l'établissement et à l'exploitation par des groupes italiens de certaines entreprises d'utilité publique en Asie Mineure (ports, voies ferrées, mines, &c.).

Ainsi que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de le déclarer verbalement à votre Excellence, l'accord en question entrera en vigueur au moment de la signature par le Cabinet actuel du Traité de Paix à intervenir entre les grandes Puissances de l'Entente et la Turquie.

Cependant, si le présent Cabinet devait se retirer avant la susdite signature, celui qui lui succédera aura le droit, s'il le jugera opportun, de dénoncer le présent accord.

En priant votre Excellence de bien vouloir me confirmer qu'elle est d'accord sur le contenu de la présente, je saisis, &c.

A. IZZET.

Enclosure 2 in No. 128.

*Italian High Commissioner to Izzet Pasha.*

Altesse,

Constantinople, le 15 avril 1922.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Altesse a bien voulu m'adresser, le 15 avril 1922, pour me transmettre l'accord relatif à l'établissement et à l'exploitation par des groupes italiens de certaines entreprises d'utilité publique en Asie Mineure (ports, voies ferrées, mines, &c.).

En réponse, je m'empresse de confirmer à votre Altesse que je suis d'accord avec elle sur le contenu de la susdite note.

Il est donc bien entendu que l'accord en question entrera en vigueur au moment de la signature par le Cabinet actuel du Traité de Paix à intervenir entre les grandes Puissances de l'Entente et la Turquie; et que, si, cependant, le présent Cabinet devait se retirer avant la susdite signature, celui qui lui succédera aura le droit, s'il le juge opportun, de dénoncer le présent accord.

Je saisis, &amp;c.

GARRONI.

Enclosure 3 in No 128.

*Agreement.*

LES hautes parties soussignées, son Excellence M. le Marquis Garroni, Haut-Commissaire de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie, d'une part, pour le Gouvernement italien; son Altesse Izzet Pacha, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Sa Majesté impériale le Sultan, d'autre part, pour le Gouvernement ottoman;

Considérant:

Qu'une étroite collaboration économique entre les deux pays méditerranéens ne saurait être que d'un commun avantage;

Qu'elles désirent en général faciliter et assurer par tous les moyens le développement normal des relations économiques entre leurs ressortissants respectifs;

Que le Gouvernement ottoman désire mettre en valeur et développer les ressources du pays, assurer l'exploitation rationnelle de ses richesses naturelles, faciliter les moyens de transport par la construction de chemins de fer, ports, quais, &c.;

Que le Gouvernement italien, de son côté, désire faciliter l'exécution du programme économique du Gouvernement ottoman, afin d'intensifier les relations commerciales et industrielles entre l'Italie et la Turquie;

Ont arrêté et convenu ce qui suit:

1. Le Gouvernement impérial ottoman s'engage à prendre en considération les demandes de concession qui lui seront présentées par des groupes industriels ou financiers, recommandés par le Gouvernement italien, pour les constructions et exploitations des entreprises d'utilité publique ci-après:

(a.) L'exploitation conformément aux lois et règlements en vigueur ou à promulguer de toutes les couches ou mines de charbon se trouvant dans le périmètre du

bassin houiller dit d'Héraclée, dont le plan est annexé à la présente,\* et pour lesquelles des concessions ou droits d'exploitation n'ont pas encore été accordés ou dont les concessions ou droits se trouvent être annulés ou périmés par suite des dispositions légales en vigueur ou qui ont fait retour à l'État également en conformité des mêmes dispositions.

(b.) L'autorisation de créer une centrale électrique dans le bassin d'Héraclée et de transporter l'énergie électrique jusqu'à Constantinople avec droit de distribution sur le parcours sans préjudice des droits de concession existants.

(c.) L'autorisation pour l'étude, dans le but de la construction et de l'exploitation des voies ferrées suivantes:

(1.) De Kutahya à Brousse (et éventuellement le rachat de ligne Brousse-Moudania);

(2.) De Konia au lac de Bay Chéhir à Adalia;

(3.) D'Adalia à Bourdour et à Afion-Kara-Hissar;

(4.) Éregli-Bolou;

(5.) D'Ermenek à Selefke;

(6.) Éregli-Césaré-Sivas.

(d.) L'autorisation pour procéder à l'étude, dans le but de la construction et de l'exploitation des ports, jetées et entrepôts à Adalia, Moudania et à Selefke.

(e.) L'autorisation pour l'étude des travaux nécessaires à la navigation et à l'irrigation de la vallée du Méandre.

(f.) La concession de l'exploitation des mines de plomb argentifères de Boulgar-Dagh.

2. Les groupes précités devront, dans l'intervalle de cinq années à partir de la date de la ratification par la Turquie du Traité de Paix à intervenir entre elle et les États de l'Entente, avoir terminé et présenté au Département compétent les études préliminaires que les entreprises ci-haut mentionnées comportent, ainsi que les propositions contenant les conditions dans lesquelles ils en assumeraient la construction et l'exploitation.

Les entreprises dont les études n'auraient pas été présentées dans le délai précité ne bénéficieront pas du présent accord.

3. Le Gouvernement ottoman se réserve le droit d'examiner et modifier les propositions qui lui seront soumises. Si une entente n'intervient pas entre le Gouvernement ottoman et les groupes tant sur la totalité desdites propositions que pour quelques-unes d'entre elles, les groupes devront mettre à la disposition du Gouvernement les études concernant les propositions non agréées. Dans ce cas, les frais relatifs à ces études établis en commun accord leur seront remboursés par le Gouvernement. Si un accord n'intervient pas pour ces frais, ceux-ci seront fixés par voie d'arbitrage.

4. Dans le cas prévu à l'article qui précède, si le Gouvernement se décide à accorder, ultérieurement et jusqu'à concurrence de cinq années à partir de la date du refus, l'une quelconque de ces concessions aux étrangers, il devra, à conditions égales, donner aux groupes italiens un droit de préférence en leur communiquant les conditions auxquelles il est disposé à accorder ces concessions et en leur donnant un délai de trois mois pour se prononcer.

Une fois le délai précité de cinq années couru, le Gouvernement ottoman est délié de tout engagement et libre d'accorder les concessions à tels groupes qu'il lui plaira. Il est bien entendu que si le Gouvernement ottoman décide la construction et l'exploitation des concessions dont il s'agit par ses propres moyens ou bien par les capitaux ottomans, sans recourir à des capitalistes étrangers, le droit de préférence prévu à l'alinéa précédent ne saura jouer.

5. Dans les sociétés ottomanes à constituer par les groupes italiens qui auront obtenu une concession, il sera réservé aux groupes ottomans, recommandés par le Gouvernement ottoman, une part de 50 pour cent du capital à souscrire. Le montant du capital sera fixé, pour chacune des concessions, entre le Gouvernement et le groupe concessionnaire.

N.B.—Dans le cas où la réalisation des entreprises mentionnées dans le présent accord empiéterait sur des droits précédemment reconnus, le Gouvernement ottoman décline toute responsabilité quant à l'exécution des engagements ci-haut mentionnés et sera dispensé du paiement de tout dommage ou indemnité de ce chef.

A. IZZET.  
GARRONI.

Sublime Porte, le 15 avril 1922.

\* Not reproduced.



[E 5204/27/44]

No. 129.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 22.)*

(No. 442.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 78 from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna respecting the Mikrasiatic movement in Asia Minor.

*Constantinople, May 13, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 129.

*Consul-General Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold.*

(No. 78.)

Sir,

*Smyrna, May 1, 1922.*

WITH reference to Mr. Vice-Consul Hole's memorandum on the objects and resources of the Mikrasiatic National Defence Committee, which I have had the honour of transmitting to your Excellency separately, I would venture to offer the following observations:—

2. In my despatch No. 67 of the 6th ultimo I remarked that "few competent observers believe that the army as a whole would disobey an order to withdraw." As your Excellency is probably aware, one of the most competent observers is fairly convinced that it would, and I hesitate to set my opinion against his, more especially as the lapse of time is in favour of its being confirmed by events.

3. My own view, however, remains that all this national defence propaganda with its menace of armed revolt and resistance to the last breath was, in its origin, a sort of smoke-screen of bluff, designed to mystify the Allies and induce them once more to modify their decisions. I am still inclined to believe that a clear and definite order to withdraw, unaccompanied by any intimation that it was not intended to be obeyed, would be accepted by the superior officers and carried out by the bulk of their command. I believe that such an order could be provoked if the Greek Government and King were thoroughly convinced that the Allied Governments were completely and unanimously sincere in their desire to see it carried out, and prepared, in case of necessity, to enforce it. The most rabid of the National Defence Committee cannot fail to recognise that they would be helpless in the face of an Allied blockade.

4. Unfortunately it is impossible to inculcate a conviction that the Allies are so unanimously agreed, and the strength of the defence movement, both in the army and amongst the civilian population, is daily increasing. The smoothness with which the occupation of the Sokia area has recently been effected is regarded as a success, the significance of which cannot fail to be observed at Angora, and it will no doubt have considerably encouraged the Greeks.

5. As things are to-day, therefore, I am more than ever convinced that a peaceful evacuation of Anatolia cannot be hoped for, in the absence of a strong covering force of Allied troops.

6. As regards the first four paragraphs of Mr. Hole's memorandum, I have no comment to make. They seem to constitute a representation of the essential facts of the situation, of which it would be difficult to challenge the correctness.

7. Paragraph 5 deals with a matter of detail, which is of course of the highest importance, but into which it is at present perhaps unnecessary to enter. The extreme advocates of Mikrasiatic autonomy, of whom the Archbishop Chrysostomos is one of the foremost spokesmen, claim a far more extended line, stretching from Ismidt to Adalia. There is much to be said in favour of such a line, if it were intended to form a really autonomous State in which the two elements, Christian and Mussulman, were to participate on an equal footing. For the purposes of the national defence organisation, fighting with its back to the sea, it seems to me already somewhat too far extended. A line from the Gulf of Adramydt through Soma to Alashehir would probably be the longest that they could hope to defend.

8. The estimates of Mr. Hole's informant (to whose name it would naturally be desirable to give the least possible publicity) as regards both the numbers of men that could be raised and the amount of financial assistance that could be relied upon, appears

to me to err somewhat in the direction of optimism. I have, however, little doubt that considerable contributions will be forthcoming from Greek colonies abroad, and both questions have been most carefully studied by expert sub-committees.

9. A copy of this despatch and of the memorandum under reference is being forwarded to His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Athens.

I have, &amp;c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

[E 5206/3873/44]

No. 130.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 22.)*

(No. 444.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 15, 1922.*

THE Japanese High Commissioner called on me on the 13th instant and informed me that he had information to the effect that the Soviet Government had intimated to the Angora Government that the latter must not come to any agreement with the three Allied Powers. The Soviet Government further stated that if the Angora Government were to come to terms with the Allied Powers, the Soviet Government, for its part, would cancel the Treaty of Kars. I asked the Japanese High Commissioner whether he considered his information reliable, but he was not explicit on this point.

2. There have been reports that the National Assembly at Angora has lately held some secret sessions, at which the future orientation of Nationalist policy was discussed. The question was as to whether the Nationalists were to go in for an Asiatic policy or still attempt to come to terms with the Western Powers. Having regard to the foregoing, the information given me by the Japanese High Commissioner is not without interest.

3. The Japanese High Commissioner then said that he understood that at the proposed conference between the Greeks and Turks, with the participation of the three Allied High Commissioners, a treaty would be worked out to replace the Treaty of Sèvres. As Japan was one of the signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres, he assumed that she would be represented at the conference in question. I pointed out that Japan was not the only country besides the principal Allied Powers which had signed the Treaty of Sèvres, and that I had never heard any suggestion that the Japanese representative should assist at the proposed conference between the Greeks and Turks.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

*High Commissioner*

[E 5207/5/44]

No. 131.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 22.)*

(No. 446.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 16, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 408 of the 1st May, I have the honour to state that, while the internal political situation at Angora is still exceedingly obscure, there are certain further indications that the Grand National Assembly is no longer an united body or a docile instrument in the hands of Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

2. Mustapha Kemal was recently confirmed by the Assembly in his office of commander-in-chief of the army for a further period of three months from the 5th May. There would appear to have been some opposition, however, as the necessary law was passed by a majority vote, not unanimously.

3. An even more significant symptom of uneasiness is the great delay which has occurred in filling two of the Cabinet posts vacated by the resignations mentioned in paragraph 3 of my despatch under reference. The Commissionership of Finance was filled without difficulty on the 24th April by the election of Hassan Fehmi Bey, previously Vice-President of the Assembly. The other two vacancies which occurred about the same time were filled only about the 11th May. The more important of the two was the Commissionership of Economic Affairs. The former incumbent, Sirri Bey, was vigorously interpellated on or about the 25th April, and a vote of confidence was asked for. Sirri Bey obtained a majority, but as there was no quorum the vote was



invalid. A second vote some days later resulted in a tie. A third gave a very small majority against Sirri Bey.

4. Mustapha Kemal then submitted three candidates for the post in accordance with the usual practice, but on a vote being taken it proved impossible to elect a commissioner owing to the very large number of abstentions. The matter stood over, and it was only after ten days or so that the post was filled by the election of Hassan Bey, who three weeks ago vacated the Commissionership of Finance.

5. A similar delay occurred in the election of Abdullah Azmi Effendi to the vacant Commissionership of Religious Affairs, but I have no special information regarding this case.

6. The probable meaning of these incidents is that Mustapha Kemal is still able to impose his will on the Assembly, but has increasing difficulty in doing so. There is nothing in them to alter my previously expressed conviction that, whatever dissensions may exist at Angora, the bulk of the Assembly remain faithful to the National Pact, that the partisans of a "Russian orientation" of foreign policy are still in the ascendant, and that Mustapha Kemal himself has no immediate intention of breaking with the Bolsheviks.

7. This situation might conceivably be altered by the outcome of the Genoa Conference, which Turkish politicians are following with close attention. If the result of Genoa should be to divide Great Britain and France acutely as regards their respective attitudes towards Russia, the partisans of the Western orientation might secure acceptance of their policy in the shape of an understanding not with the Allies as a whole, but with France and possibly Italy as well, notwithstanding the present cooling off in the relations between Angora and Rome. Such an understanding with France or with France and Italy would produce a situation rich in possibilities of further surprises, for the Bolsheviks would be unlikely easily to relax their hold on Anatolia, and they are said to have a network of small organising centres in the eastern vilayets.

8. While these speculative possibilities are worth bearing in mind, I feel that great caution should be used in accepting the view, to which some observers of the situation incline, that there is already a radical alteration in the relations between Angora and Moscow. Even if France broke loose from Great Britain and carried Italy with her, so far as the Eastern question is concerned, a complete understanding between these two countries and the Kemalist Government would not be so very easy of realisation, despite all the efforts of Ferid Bey in Paris, Hamid Bey here, and Jelaluddin Arif Bey in Italy, to facilitate it. In the meanwhile Mustapha Kemal is not likely to throw over the substance of an alliance with Moscow for the uncertain prospect of an understanding with two only of the three Western Powers.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 5211/557/44]

No. 132.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 22.)*

(No. 453.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 17, 1922.

A CONSIDERABLE flutter was caused in Constantinople on the 11th May by the announcement that Javid Bey, former Minister of Finance, had on the previous day been elected Turkish delegate on the Public Debt Council to replace Hussein Javid Bey, whose term of office had expired. It was rumoured shortly before that Javid Bey intended to return to Constantinople, but it was not generally known that he was a candidate for this particular post.

2. The election was held in the usual way at the prefecture of the city. Fourteen bondholders took part in it. They held among them 241 votes, of which 240 were cast for Javid Bey. One newspaper, which is evidently not friendly to him, lays stress on the fact that the majority of bondholders participating in the election were shareholders of the Ottoman Bank, and mentions that only four of them were Moslems, the others being Greeks, Armenians and Jews.

3. There appears to be no doubt that the election was engineered by French financial interests, including those concerned in the Ottoman Bank and the Tobacco Régie.

4. It is too soon to say what, if any, political significance attaches to this incident.

As your Lordship is aware, Javid Bey was a leading light in the Committee of Union and Progress, and was a member of the Turkish Government immediately before and during the war. Soon after the armistice he was marked down for arrest by or at the instance of the Allied authorities, but he made good his escape from Constantinople. He has spent most of the time since his escape in Switzerland, where he has been intimately connected with Turkish propaganda. While in Switzerland he successfully revived his old relations with French financiers, and has more than once been in France. He was in Paris at the time of the recent Near East Conference.

5. The local press states that Javid Bey has been informed of his election, and is expected to arrive very shortly in Constantinople. Sir Adam Block, however, considers it unlikely that he will return in the immediate future. His information confirms the view that Javid Bey owes his election to French financial support, and tends to show that an arrangement exists between Javid and Hussein Javid Bey whereby the latter will share the salary.

6. Although Javid Bey has worked hard in the Turkish interest in Europe, there is no reason to suppose that he is particularly well regarded in Angora. If his election to the Public Debt Council has any present political importance, it is probably in connection with the renewal of activity on the part of the old guard of the Union and Progress Party. According to one theory this renewal of activity is the result of an agreement between the Union and Progress leaders still abroad and the Angora Government. According to another, an attempt is being made to revive the Committee of Union and Progress in its old form with a view to giving that body control of the situation in Turkey as a whole, both Anatolia and Constantinople. I am unable on my present information to judge between these two theories, but I am following as closely as possible the new development.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 5383/19/44]

No. 133.

*Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 25.)*

COMME suite à sa communication du 6 mai dernier, l'Ambassadeur de France a l'honneur de signaler à son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères que le Gouvernement d'Angora a de nouveau protesté auprès du Haut-Commissaire français à Constantinople contre des atrocités qui auraient été commises par des bandes grecques ou arméniennes contre les populations musulmanes de la région de Smyrne.

D'après le rapport de Youssef Kemal au Général Pellé, le village de Ferendje, dans le nahié de Torbali, aurait été mis à sac par les Grecs, ainsi que la localité de Chamlar, près de Smyrne. Le Comité révolutionnaire arménien Dachnak aurait décidé de déléguer à Smyrne le Général Torcoum, célèbre par les massacres qu'il perpétra sur les populations musulmanes après la retraite des armées russes en 1917. En attendant que les Comités arméniens entrent en action sur une vaste échelle, des bandes grecques ne cesseraient d'opérer. L'une d'elles aurait cerné le quartier musulman de Menemen avec le concours des troupes régulières grecques; toutes les maisons auraient été mises à sac. Des faits analogues se seraient produits dans la localité d'Avram, près d'Alachehir, de Sey-Gazi, de Seuké, &c.

Ces allégations n'ont pu être vérifiées par les autorités françaises. Toutefois, le Ministre des Affaires étrangères à Paris estime qu'au moment où les Turcs et les Grecs s'opposent mutuellement des faits de ce genre, il y aurait lieu pour le moins s'ils sont reconnus exacts, d'en faire état dans la protestation que, suivant la suggestion du Gouvernement français les Ministres alliés devraient adresser au Gouvernement hellénique.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 24 mai 1922.



*Mr. Lindley to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 29.)*

(No. 255.)

My Lord,

*Athens, May 20, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the statement made by Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on the 18th instant was reproduced in every newspaper in Athens, accompanied by the most favourable comments. It is evidently believed by the public (there is no Government at the present time), that the impression made in England by the latest Turkish atrocities may be the precursor of a more active policy on the part of Great Britain, without which no one here believes in the possibility of settling the Eastern question in a satisfactory manner.

In these circumstances it may be useful to take stock over more of the general situation. No doubt your Lordship is kept fully informed of the military prospects in Asia Minor. To me, who have no recent information on the subject, it was of particular interest to hear to-day the views of Colonel Giordano, the Italian Staff Officer, who has been for a long time in Smyrna. He declared that the Kemalists were incapable of any serious military enterprise, but that the Greeks were not in a position to round them up. It was, in fact, a case of stale-mate, and would continue to be so until the financial exhaustion of the Greeks caused a change to their disadvantage. This is the view that has prevailed for some time in well-informed circles and seems good enough to accept and work on.

It seems equally well-established that the Kemalists, in spite of their military weakness, will be contented with nothing less than the National Pact, which they expect to secure by exhausting the Greeks and wearying His Majesty's Government.

The recent forced loan has put the Greek Government in funds for a certain number of months; but the late Minister of Finance said to me a few days ago, almost with tears in his eyes, that this unexpected windfall was just sufficient to effect the demobilisation of the Greek army, for which purpose it ought certainly to be used. Once it was exhausted, there was no possibility of Greece raising another penny, and the issue of uncovered paper would achieve the ruin of the country.

The question is whether the period, during which the Greek army can still be counted upon as a serious factor, is to be utilised to make a determined effort to effect a settlement, or whether matters are to be allowed to drift until both Greece and Asia Minor are irretrievably ruined. I submit, with the greatest respect, that unless we are prepared to put serious pressure upon the Kemalists, the latter eventuality is inevitable, and that, in any case, there is no time to be lost if it is to be avoided. It will not be long now before the situation gets completely out of hand, and we shall become the prey to the same kind of blind forces which rendered unavailing the despairing efforts to preserve peace during the last few days before the great war.

The Paris peace proposals appear to have definitely broken down before the obstinacy of the Kemalists on the one hand and the failure of the minority clauses to satisfy those principally concerned, that they will be adequately protected. Some new proposals must be found to take their place, and it would appear that the recently demonstrated intention of the Kemalists to destroy the Christian population of Asia Minor, offers a suitable opportunity to put them forward.

I venture, therefore, to suggest that a final effort be made to obtain the co-operation of France and Italy in intimating to the Kemalists that, unless they are ready to accept the revised terms, which should include autonomy for the Smyrna zone, the Turkish ports will be blockaded, and the Greek forces will receive such support as we find it convenient to afford them. These forces might then be withdrawn to the Sevres zone in Asia Minor, which would be placed under an autonomous administration. Should France refuse her co-operation, His Majesty's Government, who are far more vitally interested in the Eastern question than any other Power, should then act alone, or with Italy, and such of the Balkan States as are interested.

If it is not found possible to take a strong line with the Kemalists, I submit that, in fairness to the Greeks, we should inform the Greek Government confidentially without delay that His Majesty's Government are not in a position to intervene further in the Eastern question. This will give them the chance of choosing, before their money is quite exhausted, between evacuating Asia Minor and leaving the Christian population to its fate, and continuing the struggle without hope of support.

I have, &c.

F. O. LINDLEY.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 29.)*

(No. 462.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 22, 1922.*

FOLLOWING upon the recent conference in Paris between your Lordship and the Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Allied High Commissioners directed their representatives on the Juridical Commission to study certain articles of the Treaty of Sèvres in the light of their local experience, with a view to formulating recommendations for submission to the Allied Governments of such modifications as they consider should be incorporated in the new treaty which will eventually be framed.

2. I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith, copies of the minutes embodying the views of the Juridical Commission, and to express my concurrence in its recommendations.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 135.

*Note by Mr. Waugh.*

THE minutes of the Juridical Commission of the 3rd, 6th, 8th, 10th and 13th May, 1922, contain recommendations resulting from Juridical Commission's examination of the Treaty of Sèvres in the light of the recent conference in Paris, as recorded in the resolutions annexed to the minutes of that conference.

The following are the most important points noted:—

*Article 128.* Recognition of foreign nationality acquired by Ottoman subjects is unreasonable. Every Ottoman Greek would become a Hellenic subject in Turkey.

*Article 136.* "Capitulatory Powers" to be consulted on judicial reform should be read as Powers which enjoyed Capitulation rights before the war. See article 261.

*Article 144.* Rights of foreign creditors of Armenians plundered should be protected.

*Article 261.* Extension of Capitulations to new States should be qualified so that they should raise no pretension to a voice in the discussion of judicial reform in Turkey.

Following paragraph should be added:—

"En conséquence, aucune loi ni règlement promulgué en violation des droits capitulaires ne pourra être appliqué aux ressortissants alliés à moins d'être expressément accepté par les Puissances alliées."

*Article 300.* The indemnity must be expressly extended to cover the period of the armistice.

*Article 302.* Allied traders resident in Turkey should be given the benefit of payment of debts due to them at pre-war rate of exchange.

This can be achieved by modifying the French text as follows:—

Replace "existent d'une part entre le Gouvernement ottoman ou ses ressortissants" in line 3 by "Dues par le Gouvernement ottoman ou ses ressortissants."

Suppress the words from "ni résidant" in line 7 to "industrie en Turquie" in line 9.

Foreign Office has written to High Commissioner (despatch No. 230 of the 6th March, 1922) that they intend to press this modification, which my French and Italian colleagues oppose in the supposed interest of their banks.

*Article 307.* Revision of judgments, including those in real property actions pronounced against Allies during war and armistice which the High Commissioners refused all through the armistice to recognise, should be confided to Mixed Judicial Commission now that the Arbitral Commission of the League of Nations, contemplated in article 287, is washed out.

*Article 308.* If the Turks object to this article, as they certainly will, the concession may be made to them of giving jurisdiction to the Mixed Judicial Commission.

[8975]

2 x



Articles 310, 316, 317, 417. Important to maintain.

Article 426. Add paragraph as follows:—

"Cet article s'applique notamment aux arrêts, jugements et condamnations prononcées par les conseils de guerre et tribunaux militaires alliés auxquelles le Gouvernement ottoman déclare reconnaître la valeur de chose jugée."

Some provision should be inserted in the treaty to assure to Allied companies the right to carry on their business, and to Allied schools the right to work in Turkey.

A. T. WAUGH.

May 16, 1922.

Enclosure 2 in No. 135.

Minutes of Inter-Allied Juridical Commission.

(Extracts.)

SÉANCE DU 3 MAI 1922.

## II.—Étude du Traité de Sèvres.

M. CILLIÈRE rappelle à la commission que les Hauts-Commissaires ont reconnu l'intérêt dans les circonstances actuelles, en vue d'une revision partielle du Traité de Sèvres, d'un nouvel examen des articles de ce traité concernant les questions juridiques et qu'ils ont chargé la commission de procéder à un échange de vues à ce sujet. Il propose de commencer cette étude, qui exigera plusieurs conférences de la commission. Cette proposition est approuvée et la commission commence la lecture des articles du traité susceptibles de retenir son attention.

Mention sera faite au procès-verbal seulement des questions donnant lieu à des observations.

### Article 49.—Régime des Détroits.

Mr. Waugh rappelle cette question. Il s'agit du jugement des infractions au régime des détroits.

M. Cillière fait observer que les questions qui pourraient se poser à ce propos dépendent du régime qui sera définitivement adopté pour les détroits. Il semble donc préférable d'en ajourner la discussion. La commission approuve ce point de vue. En principe elle ne fait d'ailleurs pas d'objections au maintien de cet article. Si des objections sont soulevées, elles le seront sans doute du côté ottoman.

### Article 123.—Nationalité.

Cet article prévoit que les ressortissants ottomans établis sur les territoires cédés deviendront de plein droit ressortissants de l'État qui acquiert le territoire.

M. Cillière constate que dans cet article il n'est pas question des individus originaires des territoires cédés résidant et continuant à résider en Turquie hors des territoires cédés. Dans le silence du traité à cet égard on ne peut que conclure au maintien de leur nationalité ottomane. Or, beaucoup de Syriens, d'Albanais ou de Mésopotamiens restés à Constantinople croient qu'ils auraient droit après la paix et sans changement de résidence à la nationalité syrienne, albanaise ou mésopotamienne. E. réalité, dans le silence du traité, ils restent Ottomans.

La commission décide d'attirer l'attention des Hauts-Commissaires sur ce point, à titre d'ailleurs de simple constatation, cette situation étant conforme aux principes généraux du droit international.

### Article 128.—Nationalité.

Par cet article, la Turquie s'engage à reconnaître la nationalité de tous ses sujets qui auraient acquis ou qui acquerraient une nouvelle nationalité alliée, conformément à la loi des pays alliés. M. Cillière attire l'attention sur les conséquences de cet article au point de vue ottoman. La commission partage ce point de vue et estime que la Sublime Porte et, à plus forte raison, le Gouvernement d'Angora s'opposeraient énergiquement à cette disposition qui peu à peu amènerait la disparition des rayas en Turquie. M. Galli fait observer que si cet article était maintenu il n'y aurait plus de minorités en Turquie.

La commission ne peut en ce qui la concerne que signaler le caractère excessif de

cet article, qui soulèvera certainement l'opposition très vive et très légitime des délégués ottomans.

### Article 129.

Il prévoit que les juifs établis en Palestine prendront de plein droit la nationalité palestinienne. Cet article, s'il est pris à la lettre, aurait pour conséquence qu'un juif antérieurement Français ou Italien, établi en Palestine, deviendrait Palestinien. La commission ne peut que signaler cette conséquence.

### Article 136.

La commission, en raison de l'importance de cet article, décide d'en ajourner la discussion.

### Article 144.—Protection des Minorités.

Il prévoit un certain nombre de commissions arbitrales nommées par le Conseil de la Société des Nations pour aviser à la réparation des dommages causés aux chrétiens.

M. Cillière rappelle à la commission qu'elle a déjà formulé des observations et présenté des propositions concernant l'application des articles 142 et 144, propositions et observations que les Hauts-Commissaires ont transmises avec avis favorable aux Gouvernements alliés. Depuis cette époque, le Gouvernement d'Angora a protesté contre les dispositions du Traité de Sèvres concernant les minorités. De deux choses l'une, ou ces dispositions seront supprimées ou elles seront maintenues, et dans ce dernier cas la commission a déjà formulé son avis. Il ne semble pas qu'il y ait lieu, dans ces conditions, d'examiner de nouveau la question. La commission se range à ce point de vue. Toutefois, M. Galli estime qu'il y a lieu de rappeler aux Gouvernements alliés la situation de leurs ressortissants qui ont subi des pertes du fait des mesures appliquées contre les Arméniens.

M. Cillière rappelle que les Hauts-Commissaires ont déjà entretenu les Gouvernements alliés de cette question, dont le Traité de Sèvres ne s'est pas occupé. Il y a eu là, pour de nombreux ressortissants alliés, des dommages indirects mais certains, dont il serait juste qu'ils pussent être remboursés.

La commission est d'accord pour estimer que cette question très importante devrait être prévue dans le traité. Les Arméniens qui ont été massacrés et dont les biens ont été confisqués étaient souvent les représentants de maisons alliées et leur devaient quelquefois des sommes importantes.

M. Cillière propose de retenir cette question pour l'examiner plus à fond. Il semble qu'elle devra être séparée de celle des dommages de guerre ordinaires. Il signale à ce propos que les Gouvernements alliés viennent d'admettre que la Turquie n'aurait à payer qu'une somme globale, ce qui exclurait le paiement direct par le Gouvernement ottoman de tel ou tel dommage particulier.

Mr. Waugh donne lecture à ce propos du procès-verbal de la Conférence de Paris prévoyant la somme globale qui devra être payée par les Turcs et l'institution d'une commission de liquidation.

Revenant à la question des dommages indirects subis par les négociants alliés par suite du massacre et de la liquidation des biens de leurs représentants arméniens, et laissant de côté pour le moment les dommages de guerre dont elle s'occupera au chapitre des réparations, la commission, sur l'avis de M. Galli, décide d'étudier l'attribution aux créanciers alliés d'un droit de suite sur les biens de leurs débiteurs massacrés. M. Cillière observe que ce droit de suite même serait peu efficace, car, dans la plupart des cas, les biens auront disparu et auront été liquidés à bas prix. M. Galli fait observer qu'on ne peut admettre cependant que le Gouvernement ottoman soit tenu de rembourser les créances alliées de certains débiteurs pouvant être insolubles au moment de leur mort. Il faudrait que le réclamant prouve qu'il restait à ce moment de quoi satisfaire sa créance.

Après un échange de vues, la commission décide de se reporter à la note adressée précédemment aux Gouvernements alliés sur cette question, qu'elle examinera alors de nouveau.

### Articles 226 à 230.—Sanctions.

Ces articles prévoient le jugement des coupables de guerre par les tribunaux alliés.

La commission constate que ces questions dépassent sa compétence et affectent un caractère plus politique que juridique. Vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne des clauses identiques n'ont pas été appliquées.



SÉANCE DU 6 MAI 1922.

II.—*Traité de Sèvres.*

La commission, reprenant l'étude du Traité de Sèvres, commence par l'examen des clauses financières.

*Articles 231 et suivants.*

L'article 231 établit la responsabilité de la Turquie pour tous les dommages résultant de son entrée en guerre, mais, constatant en même temps l'impossibilité où elle se trouve d'acquitter la totalité du montant des dommages en raison de sa situation financière, il ne laissait à sa charge que les dépenses causées par l'occupation interalliée et la réparation des dommages infligés aux particuliers.

M. Cillière fait observer qu'un pas de plus vient d'être fait puisque la dette de la Turquie a été réduite à une somme forfaitaire. Il semble en résulter que chaque Puissance alliée devra indemniser directement ses nationaux. A la demande de ses collègues, il donne les indications sur la procédure suivie jusqu'à ce jour par le Haut-Commissariat de France à l'égard des réclamations pour dommages de guerre. Le Haut-Commissariat a reçu des centaines de réclamations dont le montant s'élève à des sommes considérables. Ces réclamations n'ont pas fait l'objet d'un examen à fond, qui est naturellement réservé à la future Commission arbitrale. Le Haut-Commissariat s'est borné à veiller, autant qu'il l'a pu, à ce que les demandes soient clairement exprimées et appuyées d'indications de nature à permettre leur vérification, le moment venu. Pendant quelque temps, a fonctionné une Commission de Récupération, qui a restitué aux Français leurs immeubles réquisitionnés en procédant à des constatations ainsi qu'à des évaluations d'après les renseignements à sa connaissance et les déclarations des requérants.

M. Cillière expose ensuite qu'en France, une loi du 18 avril 1919 a défini les dommages de guerre subis en France et en Algérie et en a établi le mode de réparation. Le Gouvernement français a admis aussi le principe de la réparation des dommages de guerre subis par les Français à l'étranger. Il a même étudié un projet de loi ouvrant un crédit pour avances aux Français victimes de ces sortes de dommages. Mais l'affaire n'a pas encore eu de suites.

Du côté italien, M. Galli rappelle que, lors de la guerre de Lybie, aucune mesure n'a été prise à proprement parler pour la réparation des dommages de guerre. On s'est borné à donner des secours aux sinistrés.

De son côté, Mr. Waugh déclare que le Gouvernement anglais s'est borné jusqu'à présent à transmettre au Gouvernement allemand les réclamations de dommages de guerre contre la Turquie. M. Cillière déclare que le Gouvernement français a transmis aussi ces réclamations au Gouvernement allemand en ce basant sur le Traité de Versailles.

Après un échange de vues, la commission ne peut que constater la nécessité de remanier, à la suite des nouvelles décisions des Gouvernements alliés, les articles du Traité de Sèvres concernant les réparations et elle émet le vœu que les mesures adoptées permettent la réparation aussi complète que possible des dommages de guerre considérables subis en Turquie par les ressortissants alliés.

*Clauses économiques.—Relations commerciales.**Article 261.*

Cet article prévoit le rétablissement des privilèges capitulaires au profit des Puissances alliées qui en bénéficiaient directement ou indirectement avant le 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914, et étend ce bénéfice à celles qui n'en jouissaient pas avant cette date. Cette mesure, trop libérale peut-être, en faveur de ces dernières Puissances augmentera beaucoup les difficultés de la future réforme judiciaire, puisqu'aux termes de l'article 136, les Puissances capitulaires alliées ou neutres devront être consultées pour cette réforme. Cet article vise-t-il les nouvelles Puissances capitulaires ?

Mr. Waugh donne lecture des dernières propositions faites à ce sujet par les Premiers Ministres des Gouvernements alliés dans leur récente réunion à Paris. On n'y envisage que les anciennes Puissances capitulaires. Malgré tout, la commission pense qu'il y aurait inconvénient à établir en faveur de toutes les Puissances alliées les privilèges capitulaires sans limiter et préciser cette attribution. Elle se réserve d'examiner de nouveau la question.

*Article 262.—Postes étrangères.*

Cet article prévoit le rétablissement des bureaux de postes en faveur des Puissances qui les possédaient avant la guerre. La commission constate la sagesse de cette mesure ainsi limitée.

*Articles 266 et 267.—Marques de Commerce.*

Ces deux articles édictent un certain nombre de mesures destinées à protéger les produits alliés contre la concurrence déloyale.

La commission réserve cet article pour un examen plus approfondi avec la loi turque que M. Galli se procurera en même temps qu'une loi ottomane récente sur la propriété littéraire.

*Article 269 et suivants.—Conventions internationales.*

Ces articles énumèrent limitativement les conventions internationales qui sont remises en vigueur.

*Article 274.*

Donne à chacune des Puissances alliées le droit de notifier à la Porte les conventions bilatérales avec la Turquie qu'elles désireraient faire revivre.

La commission estime qu'il n'y a rien à changer à ces divers articles.

*Article 277.*

Par cet article, les Puissances alliées font table rase de tous les traités et conventions conclus entre la Russie et la Turquie. Il en est de même des traités entre la Turquie et la Roumanie, après le 15 août 1916. Ces articles ont surtout un caractère politique. Ils sont complétés par l'article 433, qui reconnaît à la Russie la faculté d'accéder au traité dès qu'elle fera partie de la Société des Nations. Pas d'observations à faire.

*Propriété littéraire, industrielle et artistique.*

La commission décide d'examiner ces articles en même temps que la loi turque sur les marques de fabrique.

*Droits et Intérêts.*

Ces articles sont très importants, mais ils devraient être entièrement modifiés par les récentes décisions des Gouvernements alliés.

*Article 287.*

Cet article impose la restitution de leurs biens aux ressortissants alliés. Il devra dans la forme subir d'importantes modifications par suite des récentes décisions des Puissances alliées, en ce qui concerne notamment la Commission arbitrale qui devait être désignée par le Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Le dernier paragraphe appelle une observation. M. Galli fait remarquer que ce paragraphe établit la non-responsabilité du Gouvernement ottoman pour tous les dommages causés aux biens, droits et intérêts depuis le 30 octobre 1918 en territoire soumis à l'occupation effective des Puissances alliées, et détachés de la Turquie par le traité. Ne peut-on pas en conclure, par un raisonnement à contrario qu'il a lieu de le tenir pour responsable des dommages causés en Anatolie par les événements actuels. La question est d'ailleurs plutôt théorique que d'un intérêt pratique, puisque la Turquie n'aura désormais à payer qu'une somme forfaitaire.

Mr. Waugh expose alors que, d'après les renseignements reçus par le Haut-Commissariat britannique concernant les décisions de la réunion à Paris, la Turquie devrait payer 5,000,000 l. par an pendant vingt ans à une commission de liquidation.

*Article 295 et suivants.*

Ces articles prévoient la liquidation des biens des États ex-ennemis et de leurs ressortissants. M. Cillière signale que l'on a laissé au Gouvernement ottoman le soin de procéder à cette liquidation, ce qui est un peu en contradiction avec les principes capitulaires. Mais c'est une réplique des dispositions adoptées dans les traités conclus avec les autres Puissances ennemies. Il est nécessaire à ce titre et il y a lieu de le maintenir.



## Article 302.

Cet article prévoit le remboursement de leurs dettes au taux du change d'avant-guerre aux ressortissants alliés qui ne résidaient pas en Turquie et qui n'y exerçaient pas une industrie.

Mr. Waugh est d'avis qu'il y aurait lieu de supprimer cette réserve et d'étendre le bénéfice du change d'avant-guerre aux ressortissants alliés même résidant en Turquie. C'est, dit-il, l'appréciation du Gouvernement anglais qui fera une proposition à ce sujet.

M. Cilliére et M. Galli font ressortir que ce serait modifier le principe admis jusqu'à présent par les Puissances alliées en ce qui concerne les modifications économiques subies en pays ennemis par les personnes qui y résident, en ce qui concerne notamment le cours forcé, et remettre en question toutes les opérations effectuées jusqu'à ce jour entre ressortissants alliés et ottomans, établissements financiers et particuliers et opérations auxquelles les Puissances alliées n'ont apporté aucun obstacle depuis l'armistice.

Mr. Waugh objecte qu'il est inadmissible que des commerçants dont on a réquisitionné les marchandises soient remboursés en papier.

M. Cilliére et M. Galli croient que la question est différente et qu'il n'est pas question d'accepter ainsi les évaluations des Turcs. Une commission appréciera la valeur réelle des marchandises et en ordonnera le remboursement à cette valeur, calculée au taux du jour du paiement. Mais si on admettait la solution à laquelle il vient d'être fait allusion, ce serait un bouleversement économique qui aurait les plus graves répercussions.

## Article 300.

Cet article interdit à la Turquie toute action ou réclamation contre les Gouvernements alliés ou les Puissances alliées en raison d'actes ou de mesures de guerre.

Mr. Waugh donne lecture d'une lettre du Général Harington exposant la nécessité de prendre dans le futur traité des dispositions pour protéger les officiers alliés contre des réclamations concernant leurs actes à Constantinople pendant l'armistice et contre les procès qui pourraient leur être intentés par exemple par des Turcs.

Après un échange de vues, la commission estime qu'il y a lieu de retenir les suggestions du Général Harington et d'ajouter les mots "et d'armistice" après les mots "mesures exceptionnelles de guerre," à la fin de l'article 300, pour étendre à la période d'armistice les dispositions de cet article qui concernent seulement la période de guerre.

## Article 307.—Contrats, Prescriptions et Jugements.

Cet article prescrit la revision des jugements rendus pendant la guerre contre les ressortissants alliés. La partie lésée pourra demander une indemnité à la Commission arbitrale.

Cet article devra être remanié puisqu'il faut envisager la disparition de la Commission arbitrale. Mr. Waugh estime qu'en tout cas il faudrait maintenir la revision des jugements par une Commission arbitrale.

M. Cilliére rappelle que les Hauts-Commissaires ont saisi autrefois les Gouvernements alliés de cette question très importante de la revision des jugements ottomans rendus pendant la guerre contre les Alliés. Il donne lecture de la lettre adressée à ce sujet au Gouvernement français le 17 janvier 1920 transmettant des propositions identiques des Hauts-Commissaires aux Gouvernements alliés. Il donne également lecture de ces propositions dont la commission constate l'importance et qui pourraient être reprises si la Commission arbitrale vient décidément à être supprimée.

La Commission reviendra sur cette question.

## Article 308.

Cet article prévoit que toutes les questions relatives à des contrats conclus avant la mise en vigueur du traité entre des ressortissants alliés et des Ottomans seront jugées par les tribunaux alliés à l'exclusion des tribunaux ottomans.

La commission estime que le Gouvernement ottoman s'élèvera énergiquement contre cette disposition qui s'étend non seulement aux Puissances capitulaires, mais à toutes les Puissances alliées et même aux nouveaux États détachés de l'Empire ottoman. Elle se réserve de revenir sur cette question.

## Article 309.

A propos de l'article 309, Mr. Waugh donne lecture d'une lettre du Général Harington demandant qu'on insère dans le traité une disposition prévoyant l'exécution des peines prononcées par les tribunaux alliés.

M. Cilliére reconnaît le bien-fondé de cette observation, mais rappelle que les Hauts-Commissaires ont déjà signalé cette nécessité aux Gouvernements alliés au moment où la juridiction pénale militaire interalliée a été établie.

La commission examinera plus complètement la question à une prochaine séance.

## Annexe, Article 2.

Cet article établit que les contrats conclus restent en vigueur, sauf au cas où leur exécution entraînerait pour une des parties un préjudice trop considérable. Dans ce cas la Commission arbitrale pourra allouer à la partie lésée une indemnité à titre de réparation.

La commission estime que le jugement de ces affaires devrait si possible être confié à la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire au cas où disparaîtrait la Commission arbitrale.

## Annexe, Article 4.—Gage.

Cet article autorise la vente des gages effectuée par un créancier de bonne foi même s'il n'a pu donner avis au propriétaire et s'il a pris seulement "les soins et précautions raisonnables." La commission estime que cet article sous sa forme actuelle pourrait permettre des abus. Elle pense qu'il y aurait intérêt à le supprimer en raison de la grande extension des prêts sur gages en Turquie, et des facilités que cet article peut laisser à un créancier gagiste malhonnête, qui pourra toujours prétendre avoir été dans l'impossibilité de recourir à un jugement avant de vendre son gage.

## SÉANCE DU 8 MAI 1922.

## VI.—Traité de Sévres.

## Question des Minorités.

Mr. Waugh communique à la commission, d'après les renseignements reçus du Foreign Office par le Haut-Commissariat britannique, les indications suivantes sur les décisions adoptées à Paris concernant la protection des minorités :

Il a été décidé à la Conférence de Paris d'insérer dans le futur traité avec la Turquie les dispositions concernant les minorités contenues dans le traité avec la Grèce, le 10 août 1920. Il a été prévu également la constitution d'une commission interalliée pour assurer des garanties spéciales aux populations chrétiennes d'Asie et musulmanes d'Europe. Cette commission établira des dispositions sur la base des traités conclus après la guerre. Ces mesures devront être approuvées par les Puissances alliées. La Société des Nations s'assurera de leur exécution et pourra dans ce but exiger des délégués à Smyrne et dans certaines autres villes.

## Clauses financières.

Mr. Waugh continue l'exposé des décisions de la Conférence de Paris.

D'après les décisions de Paris, la Dette publique serait maintenue. Une commission de liquidation serait constituée à laquelle les Turcs devraient verser 5,000,000 l. par an et affecter certains revenus tels que les excédents des douanes, &c.

Une commission serait constituée pour la revision des Capitulations fiscales. Elle établira l'égalité financière entre les Turcs et les étrangers, mais veillera à éviter des taxations exagérées. Une commission sera également nommée pour étudier la réforme des Capitulations judiciaires et la Turquie y sera représentée. Le décret de Mouharem sera maintenu. Les délégués allemands et autrichiens à la Dette publique seront supprimés. Les pays détachés de l'Empire ottoman contribueront à la Dette publique.

## Article 144.

Revenant à la protection des minorités et à l'article 144 du Traité de Sévres, la commission constate que cet article prévoit dans de certaines conditions la restitution



ou l'attribution des propriétés liquidées en application de la loi sur les emvali metrouké.

La commission laisse de côté la question générale des réparations à accorder aux chrétiens ottomans victimes de la loi emvali metrouké dont elle s'est déjà occupée et qui d'ailleurs se présente dans des conditions nouvelles. Elle s'occupe spécialement dans la présente réunion des dommages causés aux commerçants alliés, créanciers des Arméniens massacrés, et dont les biens ont été liquidés.

Lecture est donnée de la note adressée le 5 janvier par les Hauts-Commissaires aux Gouvernements alliés au sujet de la loi des emvali metrouké.

La commission a déjà admis l'institution d'un droit de suite accordé au créancier allié sur les biens de son débiteur et quand ces biens ont été liquidés sur le Gouvernement ottoman.

M. Cillière suggère que le droit de suite des créanciers des Arméniens massacrés s'exerce contre le Gouvernement ottoman en laissant à celui-ci la charge de la preuve dans le cas où le commerçant arménien aurait été insolvable au moment de la liquidation de ses biens.

On donnerait ainsi plus de force au droit des créanciers, tout en évitant l'objection de M. Galli que le Gouvernement ne devrait pas être tenu des sommes qui ne l'auraient pu être normalement.

M. Galli rappelle le procès-verbal de la commission du 17 octobre 1921 où cette question a déjà été examinée à propos d'un cas particulier posé par le Crédit lyonnais, ainsi que le procès-verbal de la réunion des Hauts-Commissaires du 20 octobre 1921. Les Hauts-Commissaires avaient décidé d'exposer cette situation aux Gouvernements alliés, mais la note n'a jamais été faite. Il conviendrait maintenant d'attirer leur attention sur cette importante question.

#### *Sociétés et Concessions.*

##### *Article 310.*

Cet article prévoit le renouvellement des contrats conclus entre l'État ottoman et les particuliers ou sociétés étrangers.

La commission estime qu'il y a lieu de maintenir cet article en tenant compte des modifications nouvelles et en particulier à la disposition de la Commission financière.

##### *Article 316.*

Cet article prévoit la possibilité pour les sociétés contrôlées par des ressortissants alliés de passer leurs droits à une autre société de nationalité alliée.

La commission pense qu'il y aurait grand intérêt à maintenir cet article.

##### *Article 317.*

Cet article définit le terme de "ressortissants alliés."

La commission estime qu'il doit être maintenu sous réserve d'une modification à la fin de l'article (paragraphe IV) en raison de la disparition de la commission financière.

Mr. Waugh demande si cet article prévoit que les ressortissants de pays de protectorat détachés de la Turquie pourront venir fonder des sociétés à Constantinople au même titre que des Français. M. Cillière et M. Galli croient que cet article vise seulement les anciens pays de protectorat des Puissances alliées, comme la Tunisie. Si les Puissances désirent qu'il en soit autrement elles devraient l'exprimer explicitement.

La Commission pense qu'il y aurait intérêt à maintenir cet article.

##### *Article 417.—Clauses diverses.*

Cet article a pour but de protéger les États alliés contre les réclamations turques, mais non des particuliers et des officiers alliés. A propos de ceux-ci, M. Cillière relit l'article 300 avec les additions proposées par la commission. Celle-ci estime que la question est résolue par cette modification. Il n'y a donc qu'à maintenir dans la forme actuelle l'article 417.

##### *Article 418.*

Par cet article la Turquie reconnaît toutes les décisions rendues par les juridictions alliées concernant des marchandises ou navires turcs.

La commission estime que le mot "recommandation" employé ici est trop faible et devrait être remplacé par le texte suivant :

"Les mesures qui seront reconnues justes et nécessaires par les Puissances alliées."

##### *Article 426.*

Cet article oblige la Turquie à reconnaître les jugements rendus en Turquie par des juridictions alliées et à en assurer l'exécution. La commission croit que cet article suffirait pour obliger les Turcs à reconnaître la juridiction militaire pénale interalliée. Mais, comme cette disposition avait été insérée dans le Traité de Sévres avant l'institution de la juridiction dont il s'agit, elle pense qu'il est préférable de préciser cette obligation explicitement, par exemple par l'adjonction suivante :

"Cette disposition s'appliquera notamment aux jugements et arrêts rendus par les Conseils de Guerre et Tribunaux militaires interalliés ainsi qu'aux condamnations prononcées par eux pendant la période ci-dessus indiquée."

#### *Sociétés alliées et à capitaux alliés en Turquie.*

La commission revient ensuite à l'examen des conditions dans lesquelles fonctionnent en Turquie les sociétés alliées ou à capitaux alliés.

M. Cillière donne lecture à ce sujet d'une lettre adressée le 21 février 1920 par le Haut-Commissariat de France au Ministère des Affaires étrangères français, ainsi que de la note collective qui y était annexée et qui avait pour objet de signaler la nécessité d'insérer dans le futur Traité de Paix un article obligeant les Turcs à reconnaître aux sociétés alliées ou à capitaux alliés et aux commerçants la faculté d'employer la langue de leur choix dans leurs écritures et à avoir à leur service des employés de toute nationalité.

La commission pense que cet article pourrait être inséré aux clauses diverses, entre l'article 419 et 420 et pourrait être ainsi conçu :

"Les commerçants alliés ainsi que les sociétés alliées ou à capitaux alliés jouiront en Turquie du droit de tenir leurs écritures et leur comptabilité dans la langue de leur choix et d'employer à leur service du personnel de toute nationalité. La Turquie s'engage à modifier dans ce sens toutes les dispositions législatives contraires qui auraient pu être prises par elles."

#### *Droits des Ressortissants alliés dans les Successions ottomanes.*

M. Cillière donne également lecture d'une lettre adressée le 16 octobre 1919 par le Haut-Commissariat de France au Ministère des Affaires étrangères français pour signaler la situation des femmes ottomanes ayant épousé des étrangers et que la loi ottomane prive de leurs droits successoraux. Il rappelle que les Hauts-Commissaires avaient jugé nécessaire de profiter de la conclusion du futur Traité de Paix pour mettre fin à cette injuste situation et d'insérer dans le futur Traité de Paix un article ainsi conçu :

"Les ressortissants alliés dont la législation admet les ressortissants ottomans à prendre part à la succession au même titre que les nationaux jouiront en Turquie des mêmes droits dans la succession de leurs parents ottomans."

En posant la question sur le terrain de la réciprocité on prévient sans doute les objections des délégués ottomans et, en fait, le bénéfice en serait assuré à tous les Alliés.

#### *Écoles alliées en Turquie.*

La commission décide ensuite d'examiner la situation des écoles alliées de Turquie par rapport à la loi turque sur les écoles étrangères qui a été promulguée pendant la guerre. M. Galli signale la nécessité d'étudier attentivement cette loi, dont les dispositions sont tout à fait inacceptables. Il se procurera la traduction de la loi dont il s'agit. La commission ajourne l'examen de cette question à sa prochaine réunion, qui est fixée au 9 courant.



SÉANCE DU 10 MAI 1922.

IV.—*Traité de Sèvres.**Écoles alliées en Turquie.*

M. Galli donne lecture de la loi turque du 20 août 1331 sur les écoles étrangères.

*Article 1<sup>er</sup>.*

(Pour toute école la reconnaissance de l'État est nécessaire.)

*Article 2.*

Cet article interdit aux communautés, associations et sociétés étrangères d'ouvrir une école.

*Article 3.*

Porte que les particuliers étrangers ne pourront ouvrir une école que s'il y a suffisamment d'habitants de leur nationalité pour en justifier la création. En outre, la réciprocité est en jeu.

La commission constate que ces dispositions violent tous les privilèges établis des étrangers et sont absolument inacceptables. Elle estime qu'il y aurait lieu d'insérer dans le traité, par exemple aux clauses diverses, après l'article 419, un article constatant que les communautés, associations et sociétés alliées pourront ouvrir des écoles en Turquie dans les mêmes conditions qu'avant la guerre; que les ressortissants alliés auront le même droit dans les mêmes conditions et qu'ils pourront exercer librement l'enseignement comme, d'ailleurs, toute profession ou industrie; que le Gouvernement turc s'engage, dans les six mois qui suivront la mise en vigueur du traité, à conformer sa législation à cette clause du traité.

Néanmoins, la commission estime que les Turcs peuvent légitimement demander certaines garanties comme l'enseignement du turc ou l'application de certaines mesures concernant la salubrité publique.

L'étude de cette question délicate pourrait être confiée à une commission alliée, où figureraient des délégués ottomans.

*Propriété industrielle, littéraire et artistique.*

M. Galli donne lecture de la loi turque sur les droits d'auteur. M. Cillière fait observer que cette question, ainsi que celle des marques de fabrique, a fait l'objet de dispositions établies par les Puissances alliées vis-à-vis de toutes les Puissances ennemies et qu'il y a là tout un système juridique arrêté par les Puissances alliées qui ne peut sans doute être modifié. Il croit que la seule question qui importe en l'espèce est celle de la juridiction à laquelle seront attribuées les affaires en matière de contrefaçon. Il fait à ce propos un exposé de la loi ottomane sur les marques de commerce et de fabrique et donne lecture de certaines notes personnelles recueillies par lui sur cette question depuis que cette loi a été promulguée et pendant une vingtaine d'années. Les difficultés principales venaient de la prétention de l'autorité ottomane de faire juger les affaires, soit en matière pénale, soit en matière civile, par les tribunaux purement ottomans et sans l'assistance du drogman, ce qui, en fait, supprimait à peu près pour les étrangers le bénéfice de la loi sur les marques de fabrique et de commerce. Il ne semble pas que depuis lors la situation se soit modifiée. Les Gouvernements alliés ont probablement entendu édicter une législation uniforme dans tous les traités et ne voudront pas admettre qu'elle soit modifiée.

La commission approuvant cette manière de voir estime qu'il y a lieu de rappeler aux Gouvernements alliés qu'ils n'ont pas accepté les lois turques sur cette question qui violent les privilèges capitulaires et qu'il faudrait en conséquence ajouter aux clauses actuelles du traité un article les mettant en conformité avec le régime judiciaire qui sera adopté après la guerre.

M. Cillière pense qu'il serait nécessaire de stipuler que dès l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix, les affaires correctionnelles mixtes en matière de marques de fabrique ou de commerce seront jugées avec les garanties capitulaires et par conséquent avec l'assistance du drogman allié. Quant aux actions en dommages-intérêts, il serait opportun de les déférer actuellement à la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire.

Quand la réforme judiciaire sera établie, il serait utile de déférer toutes ces affaires, même entre Ottomans et étrangers d'une même nationalité à une seule et même juridiction, afin d'établir en cette matière si importante une unité de jurisprudence. La future juridiction mixte sera toute désignée pour en connaître.

*Articles 266 et 267.*

En résumé, la commission s'accorde à penser qu'il y aurait lieu de maintenir ces articles qui protègent les personnes alliées contre la concurrence déloyale en les mettant d'accord avec les observations précédentes. Elle pense également que quand la réforme judiciaire sera un fait accompli, c'est devant la Commission judiciaire mixte que ces affaires devraient être portées. Elles devraient l'être dans tous les cas, même si l'affaire concernait uniquement des Ottomans. Il est nécessaire, en effet, qu'il y ait sur ces points une juridiction uniforme. Comme régime de transition, il faudrait confier les jugements des affaires où seraient intéressés des sujets alliés, soit au Tidjaret, avec les garanties capitulaires, soit à la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire actuelle, si elle était maintenue, de façon à éviter les difficultés qui se présentaient avant la guerre. Les pénalités seront appliquées par les tribunaux correctionnels ottomans avec l'assistance du drogman et la question des dommages portée devant la Commission judiciaire mixte.

*Article 134.—Réforme judiciaire et Capitulations.*

Cet article prévoit la nomination d'une commission de quatre membres, nommés par l'Italie, l'Angleterre, la France et le Japon pour étudier la réforme judiciaire, avec le concours d'experts techniques des autres Puissances capitulaires. Faut-il entendre par les mots: "autres Puissances capitulaires" les anciennes Puissances capitulaires alliées seules, ou toutes celles auxquelles le bénéfice des Capitulations est accordé par l'article 261? La commission estime qu'il ne faut appeler à cette discussion que les Puissances alliées ou neutres qui jouissaient du bénéfice des Capitulations avant la guerre. A l'heure actuelle, les Puissances de la "petite Entente" et la Pologne font des difficultés pour venir devant la Commission judiciaire mixte telle qu'elle est constituée et émettent la prétention d'y être représentées par des juges de leur nationalité. Il y aurait lieu de remplacer les mots: "les autres Puissances capitulaires" par les mots: "les autres Puissances capitulaires d'avant-guerre, alliées ou neutres" et au troisième paragraphe les mots: "les personnes intéressées" par "les personnes ci-dessus spécifiées."

*Article 261.*

Conformément à l'avis ci-dessus émis par la commission, Mr. Waugh propose de supprimer la fin de l'article 261 ainsi conçu: "Le bénéfice en sera étendu à celles qui n'en jouissaient pas au 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914."

La commission croit que les Turcs s'opposeraient énergiquement à cette extension et que celle-ci est contraire au véritable intérêt des principales Puissances alliées. Si cependant celles-ci croyaient devoir maintenir cette disposition, il faudrait spécifier que ce régime serait provisoire seulement jusqu'à la mise en vigueur de la réforme judiciaire et sans qu'elle puisse constituer un droit acquis par les Puissances alliées dont il s'agit.

*Les États-Unis et le futur Traité.*

M. Cillière déclare alors avoir reçu la visite de Mr. Ravndal, consul général des États-Unis, délégué par l'Amiral Bristol pour le représenter à la Commission juridique quand se présenteront des questions susceptibles de toucher à un intérêt américain. Dans la conversation qu'ils ont eue tous deux sur le régime judiciaire à instituer en Turquie après la paix, Mr. Ravndal a paru être d'accord sur l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à établir, même en matière pénale, une juridiction mixte. Il a à cette occasion suggéré l'intérêt qu'il aurait à être tenu au courant des dispositions des Hauts-Commissaires alliés pour la révision du Traité de Sèvres. M. Cillière demande à ses collègues s'ils croient pouvoir satisfaire à cette demande. La commission estime que les Hauts-Commissaires seuls pourraient prendre une décision à ce sujet, mais elle ne croit pas qu'il soit opportun de mêler les Américains à la révision d'un traité duquel les États-Unis ne sont pas partie.



SÉANCE DU 13 MAI 1922.

II.—*Traité de Sévres.*

## Article 307.

Mr. Waugh fait observer que, d'après le procès-verbal du 6 mai, il avait été décidé de revenir sur cet article qui prévoit la revision des jugements rendus pendant la guerre contre des Alliés par des tribunaux ottomans. La Commission arbitrale prévue par l'article 287 devant être supprimée et remplacée par une commission de liquidation qui ne semble pas avoir des pouvoirs judiciaires, il propose qu'au cas où la Commission arbitrale serait supprimée, elle soit remplacée par la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire. La commission se range à cet avis. Elle estime qu'au cas où la Commission de Liquidation n'aurait pas les pouvoirs judiciaires, la solution la meilleure serait de confier la revision des jugements à la Commission judiciaire mixte provisoire. Toutefois, au cas où cette disposition serait jugée impossible, les Hauts-Commissaires jugeraient sans doute opportun de rappeler aux Gouvernements alliés les propositions antérieures qu'ils leur ont adressées sur ce sujet d'après l'avis de la Commission juridique.

Article 261.—*Rétablissement des Capitulations*

Mr. Waugh expose qu'il y aurait peut-être lieu de prescrire par une disposition générale la caducité des lois turques promulguées pendant la guerre, comme la loi sur les écoles, et jugées inadmissibles par les Alliés.

La commission constate que les garanties capitulaires suffisent à écarter l'application des lois aux sujets alliés si les Capitulations sont remises en vigueur en tant qu'elles demeurent applicables. Elle reconnaît, toutefois, qu'il y aurait avantage à le spécifier d'une manière précise en ajoutant à la fin de l'article 261 un paragraphe ainsi conçu : "En conséquence, aucune loi ou règlement promulgué en violation des garanties capitulaires ne pourra être appliqué aux ressortissants alliés à moins d'avoir été expressément accepté par les Puissances alliées."

[E 5486/19/44]

No. 136.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 465.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 23, 1922.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 241, I have the honour to report that the local press during the last two days has referred to a telegram reported to have been sent by Miss Billings, described as the head of the American Near East Relief Agency at Angora, to the effect that the reports of massacres of Christians by the Kemalists at Kharput are devoid of foundation. It is not clear to whom this telegram was addressed, and I learn from Dr. Kennedy, who is in close touch with the American Near East Relief Association, that the telegram was not received by the headquarters of that association here. It is conjectured that Miss Billings may have telegraphed to Admiral Bristol over the head of the American Near East Relief. However that may be, I am informed confidentially that the American Near East Relief have a poor opinion of Miss Billings's reliability.

2. It is to be observed that Miss Billings's telegram alludes to massacres of Christians, whereas the charges brought against the Turks are for deportations.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 5488/19/44]

No. 137.

Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 469.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 23, 1922.

THE news of the strong line taken by His Majesty's Government in the matter of the persecution of Christians in Asia Minor, reported by the American Near East relief workers expelled from Kharput, has naturally created a sensation in Constantinople. While allowing full publicity to be given to official statements and genuine news reports on the subject, I have sought as far as possible to prevent the matter from becoming a subject of violent controversy in the press pending the outcome of

His Majesty's Government's proposal for a joint enquiry. The French authorities were at first inclined to allow greater latitude to the Turkish press than seemed to me advisable, but on my pointing out that it would in that case be necessary to allow the Greek press to retort, and that newspaper polemic of a violent kind would only envenom the situation, General Pellé acquiesced in my views. In reporting on the impression created by Mr. Chamberlain's statements, I have in mind not only what has appeared in the press but what has been suppressed.

2. The Turkish Nationalist papers generally abound in denials that any atrocities have taken place, or could take place, in a country so well ordered as Anatolia. This is qualified by the admission that it has been necessary to deport certain Greeks, whose activities have been a definite source of danger to the Kemalist army. The allegations of the Americans from Kharput are set down to the vindictiveness of persons who quarrelled with the local authorities there, and who were legitimately expelled. Major Yowell is described as having bawled his allegations round Constantinople, and having failed to induce responsible Americans, including the official heads of the Near East Relief Organisation, or anyone else to take them seriously until he succeeded in making Mr. Graves, the "Times" correspondent, the instrument of his revenge. An appeal is made to the testimony of other Americans now in Asia Minor, and capital has been made especially out of a telegram from a Near East relief lady-worker at Angora denying that there has been any massacre at Kharput, or that anything unusual has happened there.

3. The papers are not slow to suggest that His Majesty's Government have lent a willing ear to calumnious accusations against the Kemalists for purely political purposes, with the object of embroiling the situation and damning Turkish nationalism in the eyes of the world. Reference is made to alleged efforts in the past by the Tsarist Russian Government and by Mr. Gladstone to exploit a purely artificial minorities question to the detriment of Turkey. The French are getting the whole credit of the proposal that any investigation which is held should extend to Greek atrocities in Greek occupied territory also. The Pan-Islamist "Tevhid-i-Efkâr," in its issue of the 20th May, seizes the opportunity of contrasting the attitude of the French Government with that of Great Britain. Publicity is given to a Havas telegram relative to an article in the "Temps" asking why the Greeks have not been punished for their misdeeds at Smyrna, Ismid and Ghemlik. In general, every effort is made to advertise real or alleged Greek atrocities, to which Europeans, now so ready to condemn Turkey on the strength of a single biased statement, have remained culpably indifferent.

4. The attitude of the Turkish press towards the proposal for investigation by a mixed commission varies a good deal. Some writers insist that Angora has nothing to conceal, and will welcome enquiry provided it is properly conducted, and provided the same treatment is given to Turks and Greeks. Some resent the proposal, as involving an illegitimate interference with Turkey's internal affairs. One paper, the "Wakt," whose editor is a Salonica Crypto Jew, formerly a student in the United States, points out that Turkey is at war with three of the Powers concerned, and suggests that, if any enquiry at all is necessary, it should be carried out by Americans only.

5. Local Greek circles are naturally delighted at the effect produced by the revelations in the "Times." The Greek Patriarch asked me to receive a delegation of the Holy Synod to thank me for the part I had played. I caused Mgr. Meletios to be informed that I could not receive such a delegation, but the "Bosphore" of the 20th May nevertheless announces that on the 18th March the Holy Synod adopted a resolution expressing gratitude for the action the British Government had taken.

6. I enclose a copy of the telegram from the "Agence d'Anatolie" which has been stopped by the military telegraph censorship.\* It gives a very good idea of how people generally at Angora regard the situation produced by the "Times" revelations. The Kemalist Government will doubtless refrain from taking up any official position, until they are confronted with a formal demand to receive the proposed Commission of Enquiry.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

P.S.—Since drafting the above despatch I have a translation of another telegram from Angora reproducing an article in the "Hakimiet-i-Millie." I enclose also a copy

\* Not printed.



of this document.\* The translation is evidently faulty in parts. It is the most violent utterance on the subject which has yet come to my notice. It has been suppressed by the military telegraphic censorship.

H. R.

[E 5489/19/44]

No. 138.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 29.)*

(No. 471.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Sir H. Lamb dated the 16th May, respecting Greek atrocities.

*Constantinople, May 23, 1922.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 138.

*Consul-General Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold.*

(No. 85.)

Sir,

*Smyrna, May 16, 1922.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's despatch No. 64 of the 4th May, transmitting for my observations a copy of a communication received from Yussuf Kemal Bey in regard to atrocities alleged to have been committed by the Greeks in occupied territory.

2. As your Excellency is aware, nothing is more difficult than to verify statements of this nature by any means short of a personal enquiry made by oneself or a trustworthy European agent on the spot.

3. I think, however, that it may safely be said that the statements contained in the present memorandum of Yussuf Kemal Bey are inaccurate and exaggerated, though there can be no doubt that a considerable number of Turkish villages have been burned and many villagers killed in the course both of the regular military operations and of the pursuit of bands. Whether or not there has always been sufficient justification for such destruction is a matter on which it is impossible to express a definite opinion with the scanty information in our possession.

4. I have no information at all in regard to the specific instance of Ferendje mentioned in the second paragraph of the memorandum, but I consider that the statements should be accepted with reserve.

5. Yussuf Kemal Bey was perhaps unwise in citing cases from localities quite so close to Smyrna as Boudja. The latter village, as your Excellency is perhaps aware, is practically a suburb of this city, from which it is distant only about 5 miles by rail, and it is the habitual residence of a considerable number of British and other European families.

6. It is almost inconceivable that an outrage, such as that described in paragraph 10 of the memorandum, should have taken place there at the beginning of April and not have come to our ears by the middle of May.

7. The same remark would appear to apply to the incident reported in paragraph 3, since the only spot which I can hear of, at all corresponding to the description therein given, is a small pinewood, more commonly known as "tehamia," situated on the outskirts of the same suburb of Boudja and forming the object of a popular evening stroll for its inhabitants. It is, however, difficult to understand for what purpose twelve Mussulman butchers should have assembled there.

8. Paragraph 11 seems to me to contain an element of self-contradiction, as well as of exaggeration. I quite understand the annoyance caused at Angora by the fact that the Greeks should have "invaded" the Sokia district, on its evacuation by the Italians, "before it had been reoccupied by the Turkish troops," but surely the admission that they had done so disposes of the subsequent accusation that they "drove the population of Moussali and Inekbazar before them to protect themselves from the fire" of those same troops, who had not yet appeared upon the scene.

9. I believe it is quite true that the Mussulman villages of Moussali, Inekbazar

\* Not printed.

and Gumushkeui were burned and some inhabitants of the latter village killed by the advancing columns of the Greeks, whose excuse is that they were fired on by that portion of the population which fled at their approach. A Mussulman shrine, of some local importance, situated on the top of the ridge between Sokia and Scala Nuova, was desecrated and no doubt many other acts of destruction committed during the advance, but I have been assured by trustworthy British witnesses, who accompanied or closely followed the occupying force, that they saw not only no indication of unnecessary bloodshed, but even remarkably little looting in that area.

10. As regards the statements in paragraph 5 of the memorandum, I believe there is no doubt that the Armenians here have promised their co-operation to the National Defence Committee and I have heard that special corps of police or civic guards have been formed from amongst them in some of the northern districts. The General whose name is mentioned has been here for some little time and has also paid one or two visits to Athens. I understand that he met at first with a somewhat cool reception, seeing that, although he has the reputation of a brave man and a good soldier, he is regarded as something of an adventurer and does not carry much weight amongst his compatriots. His collaboration, however, now appears to have been accepted by the committee.

11. I take this opportunity of enclosing a translation of a paragraph, which appeared in a local Greek newspaper of yesterday's date, in regard to the arming and training of the civilian population—a matter which is allied to the subject of your Excellency's despatch under reply, though it does not arise directly out of it. The "Politophylakion" or "Civic Guard" exists in all the principal towns throughout the northern position of the occupied area, but apparently the system is as yet less thoroughly developed in the south.

12. A copy of this despatch and its enclosure is being transmitted to His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Athens.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 138.

*The "Garde civile" of Magnesia.*

A CORRESPONDENT writes to us from Magnesia:—

"Yesterday afternoon there took place at Bozkeui the concentration of the Civic Guard of Magnesia and also of the corps of hand-grenade throwers which is under formation and who received from special office-instructors lessons in the use and methods of throwing of hand-grenades, using both dummies and live bombs. Similar concentrations took place at Khoroskeui and Mouradie, where the civic guard carried out martial exercises in fighting order and with great success.

"At 4 P.M. the G.O.C. Northern Sector, Major-General Petmezas, accompanied by his Staff and by the Military Governor of Magnesia and his Staff, paid visits to the above-mentioned places of assembly and, after inspecting the different corps and following their exercises, expressed himself as fully satisfied with the zeal and application of the men in training."

[E 5692/19/44]

No. 139.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 6.)*

(No. 490. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, May 30, 1922.*

IN amplification of my telegram No. 259 of the 27th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of two letters\* addressed by Dr. Gibbons to the "Boston Christian Science Monitor," describing the position at Trebizond. Dr. Gibbons explained that these letters, which are dated the 20th and 21st instant, have not had time to reach the paper to which they are addressed, and that whilst I was at liberty to take copies of them and to forward them to your Lordship, he felt bound to ask that their publication should be held over until they had appeared in the "Boston Christian Science Monitor," or else, if published, that they should be described as contributions to that paper.

\* Not printed.



2. Your Lordship will notice that in the first of these letters Dr. Gibbons alludes somewhat bitterly to the attitude of the American High Commission in Constantinople towards reports of Nationalist excesses. In conversation with me, Dr. Gibbons enlarged on this theme. He stated that on his return from his visit to the Afion-Kara-Hissar and Aidin district he had had an interview with Admiral Bristol at the latter's request. The interview was unsatisfactory, in that the American High Commissioner had ultimately refused to listen to stories of Nationalist excesses. I had already heard from a good source that Admiral Bristol's attitude, especially in regard to the reports of Major Yowell and Dr. Ward, had antagonised a large section of the American community at Constantinople.

3. One section of the American community, however, has not been slow to endeavour to make out that the British authorities are exploiting these alleged Kemalist excesses in order to injure American commercial prospects in Asia Minor. This explains the reason for which Mr. Gillespie, commercial secretary at the American High Commission, aided and abetted by Mr. Rue, correspondent of the "Chicago Tribune," in attempting to discredit Major Yowell's and Dr. Ward's statements. Dr. Gibbons informed me that before he left Trebizond for Constantinople the Near East Relief Association's agent at that port begged him not to say anything about the arrests and imprisonment of Greek boys between 11 and 14 which were then taking place. The agent had even sent a telegram to headquarters at Constantinople urging silence on Dr. Gibbons's part.

4. In connection with the question of the reports of deportations in Asia Minor, I have the honour to enclose herewith a pamphlet which was sent me anonymously yesterday,\* purporting to be an explanation furnished by the Anatolian News Agency in connection with Major Yowell's allegations. I regret that I cannot supply other copies of this pamphlet. There is no doubt from what I hear that the publication of Major Yowell's and Dr. Ward's reports, and the painful interest which they have aroused in England, have greatly impressed the Angora authorities.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 5694/27/44]

No. 140.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour. — (Received June 6.)*

(No. 493.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 30, 1922.

DR. GIBBONS, whose impressions of a visit to Trebizond I have reported separately (see my telegram No. 260 of the 27th May and my despatch No. 490 of the 30th May), has also placed at my disposal a series of four letters addressed to his newspaper, the "Christian Science Monitor," of Boston, between the 23rd April and the 8th May, regarding his experiences on a visit to the Greek front in Asia Minor.

2. These letters, written from Afion Kara Hissar, Kutahia and Broussa, record impressions derived from conversations with Greek officers, Turkish officials and notables and a certain number of Turks of an inferior class, as well as from personal observation. These impressions may be summarised as follows:—

3. The Turkish notables are bitterly hostile to the Kemalists, whose policy they regard as ruinous. They praise the Greeks, and have no desire to see them leave. The mayor of Afion Kara Hissar went so far as to tell Dr. Gibbons that the Turks, who must have peace if their race is not to disappear, would prefer to attain it by an understanding with Greece, rather than by placing themselves under the protection of one of the Great Powers, these being the only alternatives. He gave as his reasons for this (1) that the Powers have always exploited the country and have stood with the corrupt governing class of Constantinople; and (2) that the Greeks, being Orientals, have the same customs as the Turks and share their mentality.

4. The non-Turkish Moslem elements, especially the Circassians, are as hostile to Turkish rule as are the Christians. The Circassians, who sought asylum in this country when Russia invaded the Caucasus, have realised their mistake. They are now heart and soul with the Greeks.

5. The bulk of the Turkish population have suffered no less than the other elements from Young Turk and Kemalist misrule. They have no feeling for "country" in the Occidental sense. They will do anything for the Sultan, but they are bitterly

\* Not printed.

opposed to Mustafa Kemal, because of his repressive methods, and because their one desire is to return to a quiet and peaceful life. Desertions from the Kemalist army across the Greek lines have been numerous, the deserters being mostly people from occupied territory. Turkish civilians have also crossed the lines seeking asylum from Kemalist oppression. Kemalism is a minority movement, and means the rule of a gang just as much as the rule of Abdul Hamid's entourage or the Committee of Union and Progress. Western Turcophiles who support Angora are mistaken in their ideas, for it is the Turkish peasant who is the victim of the Kemalists.

6. Lastly, Dr. Gibbons writes very glowingly of the Greek military position. The Greeks hold a strong line, with excellent lines of communication in the rear, are well found in every way, and are far better, as regards *moral*, than Dr. Gibbons expected to find them. He is positive that nothing short of physical compulsion will induce the army to leave Asia Minor. The Micrasiatic movement is a strong force, and the army will obey the organisers of that movement, not the Athens Government, should the latter be disposed to yield.

7. Dr. Gibbons has shown me, in addition to his own letters, documents in Turkish and Greek, collected during his journey, containing resolutions of public meetings, speeches, &c., in support of the view that the Turks in Greek occupied territory are perfectly contented, and view with horror the prospect of the Kemalists replacing the Greeks. They included the telegram from the anti-Kemalist organisation at Broussa to the Genoa Conference, a translation of which I enclosed in my despatch No. 448 of the 16th May, 1922. This is a fair sample of the whole.

8. While it is interesting to have these impressions first hand from an educated observer who has actually traversed the country, I feel that statements regarding the attitude of the Turks should be received with great caution. The more conspicuous of the Turks whom Dr. Gibbons interviewed are persons who have become identified with the Greeks. They are probably quite sincere in their dislike of the prospect of the Kemalists taking the country over, for it would almost certainly go hard with many of them. Thus they have a personal interest in not seeing the Greeks leave too quickly, but it is difficult to believe them equally sincere in their professions of a desire to see the Greeks permanently installed. Dr. Gibbons's account of the feeling of the bulk of the Turkish population is doubtless correct. They are ground down under the Kemalists in Nationalist territory, and they have no interest in political developments apart from their effect on their immediate material interests. They have a traditional regard for the Sultan, but they are through all vicissitudes submissive instruments in the hands of whatever authority they see invested with real power over their persons and property.

9. I take this opportunity of enclosing two copies each of a letter and enclosure from General Harington regarding anti-Kemalist activity in the Konia region.\* I have authorised Mr. Ryan to interview the persons referred to in General Harington's letter without appearing to run after them or to encourage them. They have not yet responded to cautious intimation that they will be received if they call at the High Commission. It is for this reason that these documents have not hitherto been forwarded to your Lordship. I enclose them now as they are germane to the present subject. I regret that time does not admit of further copies being made in time for the King's messenger who will carry this despatch.

10. I shall probably have occasion to address your Lordship later on the subject of the appeal from Konia, and a similar appeal which has been addressed to me direct by a considerable number of Turks professing to voice the anti-Kemalist sentiments of large sections of the population here and in Asia Minor. For the moment all I need say is that, while such appeals prove the existence of elements definitely opposed to Kemalism, and more especially of elements who eagerly desire to see the Sultan come into his own, it would be unwise to found on them any hope of seeing the power of Angora broken by a strong and united popular movement of opposition to it. In present circumstances the anti-Kemalist organisers do not dispose of the means of working up such a movement without some external backing. For the time being they are powerless. They would be a useful factor if in time the intransigence of the Kemalists should force the Allies or His Majesty's Government to take active measures to compass the destruction of the Angora Government and to re-establish the Sultan's authority.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner.

\* Not printed.



[E 5039/5/44]

No. 141.

*The Earl of Balfour to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 1720.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 7, 1922.

I HAVE to request you to communicate the enclosed memorandum to M. Poincaré in reply to his note of the 15th May, forwarded in your despatch No. 1177 of the 15th May.

I am, &c.  
BALFOUR.

Enclosure in No. 141.

*Memorandum.*

HIS Majesty's Government have devoted considerable time to a most careful examination of the proposal contained in the French Government's note of the 15th May, and sincerely regret that they are unable to accept it. M. Poincaré's arguments have not prevailed against their previously stated objections to deferring to the demand of the Angora Government.

2. It cannot be disputed that the proposed conference at or off Ismid constitutes a radical departure in favour of the Turks from the plan agreed upon at the Paris Conference, violating both the letter and the spirit of the Allied offer.

The French Government will agree that this offer involved three separate and distinct stages: (a) conclusion of an armistice; (b) unequivocal acceptance of the body of the peace conditions, of which the evacuation of Smyrna formed an essential part; and (c) the meeting in conference of delegates representing Great Britain, France and Italy as well as Greece, the Sultan and Angora, to discuss those conditions, with the view of reducing them to treaty form, such discussion permitting possible modifications of special points of detail but no concession of principle. The present position is that the Greek Government have accepted the armistice but not the conditions, while the Turkish Governments of Constantinople and Angora have accepted nothing, but have returned evasive, if not defiant, answers, clearly calculated to frustrate a settlement on the terms proposed and to create delay. The essential conditions of the conference contemplated by the Paris scheme remain thus unfulfilled, and the preliminary conference demanded by Angora, and now advocated by the French Government, would therefore involve the practical rejection of a plan which, after protracted and most difficult negotiations, the three Allied Governments had adopted by a definite and unanimous agreement.

3. The French Government therefore, aware as they must be that His Majesty's Government regard the Paris Agreement as definite and binding on the Allies, will readily understand that His Majesty's Government are not a little astonished at what appears at first sight to be a readiness on the part of the French Government to accept the breach of that agreement implied in the Angora proposal.

4. His Majesty's Government are quite unable to share M. Poincaré's optimistic conviction that direct contact at Ismid would result in the acceptance of the Allied offer by all three parties concerned, nor can they assent to the view that a refusal to agree to a preliminary conference, which is much more likely to furnish the occasion for obstructive discussion than to promote international agreement, can render the Allied Governments in any way whatever responsible for the Turkish rejection of those terms and the consequent breakdown of the efforts towards peace. If the Paris offer is refused either by the Greek or the Turkish Governments, the responsibility rests entirely with them.

5. To uphold the Paris scheme seems to His Majesty's Government of supreme importance. Nothing has occurred since that scheme was agreed upon to alter the situation, unless it be the deliberate attempt to exterminate the Greek population in Asia Minor recently brought to light by impartial witnesses. This disastrous policy renders it more than ever necessary to insist effectively on the protection of racial and religious minorities—an end which is likely now to prove exceedingly difficult of accomplishment unless the measures contemplated under the Paris scheme are materially strengthened, and which in any case cannot be attained unless the Allies act in the face of Turkish, and perhaps of Greek, opposition with evident unanimity. It is, in part at least, because this unanimity has neither made itself felt by the

belligerents nor been obvious to all the world that the negotiations arising out of the Treaty of Sévres have been allowed to drag on till the delay has become something of a diplomatic scandal, and all Mahomedan lands bordering on the Eastern Mediterranean are kept in a state of permanent unrest. His Majesty's Government are confident that the French Government will agree with them in desiring that this unhappy state of things should be brought to a speedy close.

6. As things are at present, the immediate alternatives seem reduced to two:—

- (a.) A further communication to the three Governments of Greece, Constantinople and Angora on the lines definitely agreed upon at Paris, reiterating the Allied offer and demanding a definite acceptance or refusal of it within a given period; or
- (b.) Liquidation of the Paris plan and publication of the entire correspondence that has passed, on the one hand, between the Allied and the three belligerent Governments, and, on the other, between the Allied Governments themselves.

7. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that M. Poincaré, recognising the force of their arguments, will accept the former alternative. Should he unfortunately find himself unable to do so, they feel satisfied that public opinion, at least in Great Britain, will absolve them from all responsibility for the failure of the plan resulting from the labours of the Paris Conference in March last and all the disastrous consequences which such failure must inevitably entail on the hard-pressed regions of the Near and Middle East, no less than on the Allied nations themselves.

Foreign Office, June 7, 1922.

[E 5812/27/44]

No. 142.

*Director of Military Operations to Foreign Office.—(Received June 9.)*

THE Director of Military Operations and Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward a report of an interview between the Greek High Commissioner at Smyrna and the British liaison officer at Greek headquarters.

Major-General Sir William Thwaites thinks that this report may be of interest to Sir Eyre Crowe.

War Office, June 8, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 142.

*Report on Greek Attitude towards Evacuation.*

(Secret.)

THE following is a résumé of an interview given to Major Johnston by M. Sterghiades, May 5, 1922:—

M. Sterghiades had seen General Pallis and had urged on him the necessity of returning to headquarters at Smyrna, for in the High Commissioner's estimation the Chief of Staff was the man with the soundest opinion as to the general direction of the Greek army. General Pallis, however, had been forced to remain in Athens on account of the many technical questions which were cropping up at the War Ministry and which he alone was competent to answer. He was, however, coming back shortly.

The Græco-Turkish military situation appeared to be more or less at a standstill. From information at his private disposal and unconnected with the Military Intelligence at Greek General Headquarters, M. Sterghiades was of the opinion that the Turkish army was not contemplating a general attack, but that Mustapha Kemal was waiting upon political developments. Moreover, the Turkish army was at present somewhat below strength owing not only to the fact that many of the men who have been given leave during the winter had failed to return, but also because it was necessary for the army to give men leave now for the cultivation of the crops on which the Nationalist army was to a large extent dependent.

The Greek political situation was bad, but not worse than it had been for a long time. The cause of this was the disunited front of the three Powers, England, France and Italy.

[8975]

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Presumably in the last conference at Paris the decision given by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of these three countries had been based on the desire of their Governments to bring about peace in the Near East, which pacification was as essential for the welfare of Greece as for any other nation. The three Powers, however, had lost the solidarity of real alliance by which, in the days after the armistice, they had imposed their will on a nation which future historians might proclaim to be the greatest the world had known. On account of this unity Germany had accepted every demand imposed upon her, for she saw against her the decided front of the Allies. She had given up her colonies, Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, Danzig and part of Silesia; agreed to the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, which had in reality been a living limb of the German Empire; had accepted the disintegration of her naval and mercantile fleets; and had not refused to pay an almost impossible war indemnity.

Unfortunately this solidarity had ceased to exist, and the day of a settlement of the Near East problem was consequently still far off.

In answer to the question "Will the Greek army evacuate Asia Minor?" M. Sterghiades replied as follows:—

"Certainly, and with a great sense of relief, but with these two reservations: Firstly, Greece must have a sure guarantee that her army of 200,000 men in Asia Minor would leave the country without any molestation on the part of Mustapha Kemal's forces; and secondly, that the security of the lives and property of the Christian inhabitants in the zone now occupied by the Greek army in Asia Minor must be assured.

"He would be an imbecile who would rely on the word of the Turk that these two conditions would be adhered to. In the first minor treaty made by the French with Mustapha Kemal the garrison of Marash had been taken prisoners the moment the effectives of the French forces in that area had been reduced in accordance with the terms of the treaty, and from all accounts the treatment of the French battalion had not been of the best. What could Greek troops or the Christian population of Asia Minor expect if the army evacuated without real guarantees for its security?"

While at Athens M. Sterghiades had had conversations with all the Allied Ministers, and had asked each of them if adequate guarantees could be given for the two reservations he mentioned. The answer in each case had been that it was impossible to give the guarantees asked for. He had then pointed out that at the 1922 Paris Conference it was the Allies themselves who had recommended the security of the Greek army in its retirement and the protection of the Christians in Asia Minor, and it was therefore the responsibility of the Allies to see that these guarantees were provided, and if they were not, an evacuation was impracticable, and therefore impossible.

The British Minister had asked M. Sterghiades what he suggested as a way out of the difficulty, and the Greek High Commissioner had given him the broad outline of a possible plan, pointing out that the difficulty of the realisation of the Allied wishes in the matter arose not from the Greek side, but from the Turkish.

His solution was this:—

- (a.) Three Allied divisions should separate the Greek and Turkish armies to prevent the latter from molesting the Greek army in its withdrawal.
- (b.) Some régime should be constituted in a zone about Smyrna which would enable the Christian population to live there in peace.
- (c.) Neither Greek nor Turkish troops should be allowed in this zone, whose security would be maintained by a mixed gendarmerie.

With regard to (c) above, the precedent of Crete was analogous, for until Turkish troops had left the island there never was any real security for the Christian population, but once the troops were gone the whole island quietened down at once.

The régime for the zone at (b) above must be such as to ensure the safety of the Christian population, not only for the moment, but for an indefinite future as well.

#### National Defence Movement.

M. Sterghiades disapproved entirely of this in so far as it implied a separatist movement, for the chance of such a movement achieving any measure of success was infinitesimally small. In his opinion it was nothing but madness.

On account of his views on the subject he was by no means popular amongst his compatriots. One Greek newspaper had even referred to him as a second "Caillaux."

This was of small importance to him, as he was determined if possible to save the country from such imbecility.

A national defence movement, without mutual action with the State and the army, could do little against the Nationalist army. Once the Greek regular army left the country Mustapha Kemal would have a most enjoyable task in destroying completely an irregular national defence army.

What was more important still was that, although at present the Great Powers were comparatively neutral, Italy and France were only waiting for some such pretext as an insurrectional movement to step in and destroy Greece. He had, in fact, unrefutable proof that this movement was being strongly, albeit surreptitiously, instigated by the Italians with this end in view, and doubtless they would soon bring the French in with them.

That a few thousands of their subjects were in danger from a Greek irregular army would be sufficient ground for the Italians and French to land troops on the quay at Smyrna, and the Greek army at the front would then virtually be prisoners.

In reality the national defence in Asia Minor was no new organisation. It had existed for five centuries (here he told Major Johnston he would be very frank with him), and, working clandestinely under the guise of promoting schools, churches and clubs for the Greek population, its end in view had always been ultimate mastery over the Turks. The achievement of this end had been realised to a large extent when Greek troops occupied a zone in Asia Minor, but with the proposals of evacuation of the Greek army this organisation saw its hopes shattered. The result was a sudden effervescence caused by mixed feelings of fear and anger which revealed the secret organisation for the first time.

He could well understand these feelings, but taking everything into consideration he disapproved of the movement, for it was not a practical concern and consisted mainly of literature and rhetoric.

If the inhabitants of Asia Minor and the Greeks throughout the world wished to help Greece they could do three things:—

1. Volunteer for the army.
2. Subscribe money for carrying on the campaign in Asia Minor.
3. See that the families of soldiers at the front were looked after.

The other day an individual, by the name of Lambros, had asked to see M. Sterghiades, and during the conversation the man had stated that M. Veniselos was in favour of the movement. At this M. Sterghiades became very enraged and menaced the man with a stick, saying: "Do you think that if M. Veniselos wished me to know he was in favour of this movement he would inform So-and-so, who would inform someone else, who would inform you, Lambros, to tell me, Sterghiades?" (M. Sterghiades worked himself up into such a rage telling Major Johnston this that Major Johnston is of the opinion that he not only menaced the man, but beat him.)

Actually M. Veniselos disapproved of the movement and had sent three telegrams expressing his views.

The first was to the effect that he disapproved of the movement.

The second said that if the movement ever became concrete its only hope of salvation was to get the High Commissioner to lead it, for only through him could the movement have the least chance of success.

The third stated that if M. Sterghiades refused to lead this movement it must definitely be abandoned, for without him it could only end in calamity and ruin.

M. Sterghiades went on to say that he had formed his opinion about the movement before he had heard what M. Veniselos thought of it. In the first place, nothing whatsoever should be done which might effect the *moral* of the army, and any separatist movement was bound to lower it. Again, there was the question of finance. The National Defence Committee talked of taxing the whole population in the occupied area and altering the impositions on the Public Debt funds, &c.

This was sheer folly. He himself had tried with the High Commissioners at Constantinople to obtain the legitimate super-tax paid by consumers on petrol and oil coming into the country. This tax, before the Greek occupation, went to the Constantinople Government, but since that time it had gone into the pockets of the oil companies. Over a year ago M. Sterghiades had decided to use force in the matter. The immediate result was that Admiral Bristol arrived at Smyrna in his yacht and informed the High Commissioner that if he could use force so could the American Government, and M. Sterghiades realised he was in a strait-jacket and struggled no more.



Disunited as the Great Powers and the neutrals were on all other questions, they became the most solid allies against the common enemy Greece the moment that the Capitulations at Smyrna were affected.

Changing the subject, M. Sterghiades did not think any conference would take place in the neighbourhood of Constantinople and then touched lightly on his favourite theme.

Now was the time for England and France, the two nations most concerned, to realise that the psychological moment had arrived for the hard-and-fast separation of Islamism and Turkism. When he talked to people he was always considered as talking from a Greek standpoint. That was not the case, and he was now talking merely as a well-read man who had thought long on the subject.

The way to bring about the separation was to remove the caliphate to an Arab country. Up to the sixteenth century the caliphate was run on Semitic lines and depended from a tribe. It was a purely religious power such as that of the Pope and had no secular authority.

This condition could be reverted to now, and in the next generation the Moslem world would take it for granted. He did not think there would be great trouble in India or Egypt if this happened.

Whenever England or France had used a firm hand in our Moslem countries (even in religious questions such as that of the Mahdi) the Moslem people had accepted our decisions, and not only had the effect been felt in the one country immediately concerned, but throughout the Moslem world. On the other hand, every concession made by the British or the French to the Moslems had created further trouble. The Oriental did not understand concessions; he understood force.

This was the reason why Germany would always have such a hold on Turkey. The Turk was naturally brutal. The German was not naturally brutal, but he studied brutality or hardness as a cold, calculating science, and this created in the Turkish mind a sense of affinity and consideration for the Germans.

Again, whether Germany and Russia combine in the next war or are enemies, Turkey will be on the German side. If there is a German-Russian war Turkey will remember her long-standing hatred for Russia and join Germany for the sake of self-protection. If the two countries are allied, Turkey will have to come in on their side to avoid future ill-treatment at the hands of Russia.

The more importance there was attached to the Sultan of Turkey as head of the Moslem world, therefore, the more dangerous it was for Great Britain and France, for the influence of the religious head at Constantinople directed by a nation hostile to the British and French could do a vast amount of harm to their Moslem interests abroad.

Reverting to the National Defence Committee, M. Sterghiades stated that there was no real direction to the movement, and it was a question of small-minded men leading small followings in various directions.

He then made a statement which struck Major Johnston as being of great importance.

He was a man who said what he thought and spoke openly. If he did not wish to discuss a subject he held his tongue. He had spoken to me quite frankly and given me his opinions.

Nevertheless, he was no super-man who had the control of the evolution of all nations. Politics changed daily in all countries, and only at very infrequent periods did a nation's policy stabilise. His business was to adapt his policy to all these evolutions, and it was therefore impossible to say what he would think of the situation at any future point of time.

Having written this down, there is nothing really in it but the remarks which were made in connection with the National Defence Committee, and the impression Major Johnston received when M. Sterghiades was speaking was that he did not consider it quite impossible that one day he himself might be at the head of the movement.

Major Johnston then told the High Commission that he was going to Constantinople for a few days, and M. Sterghiades repeated his remarks about the guarantees necessary before any evacuation could take place, and then, smiling, said: "And as these guarantees cannot be given, we will not evacuate."

As Major Johnston was leaving he explained the Turkish movement at Brusa as being a slight outbreak in a fresh part of the body of the eczema from which Turkey was suffering, and said he had given his orders on the matter to his local representative.

[E 5887/27/44]

No. 143.

*Mr. Lindley to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 12.)*

(No. 279.)

My Lord,

Athens, June 1, 1922.

I OBSERVED in the interesting report of the 15th May furnished by Major Johnston to General Harington, of which a copy was sent to the military attaché to this Legation, that M. Sterghiades had some weeks ago a violent altercation with M. Lambros, of the National Defence Committee at Smyrna. This altercation had an interesting sequel, when M. Lambros applied recently to the Greek High Commissioner for a visa to visit Western Europe in the interests of the defence movement. I have no information as to whether the interview was accompanied by personal violence, but it ended in the High Commissioner's telling M. Lambros that, so far from receiving the desired visa, he would be deported forthwith to the Island of Naxos.

M. Lambros was accordingly placed on board ship, but unfortunately there was no direct sailing from Smyrna to Naxos, and his vessel put into Piræus, where M. Lambros disembarked and came up to Athens. The papers were full of this incident, and I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday what the Government intended to do. M. Baltazzi replied that M. Lambros was a worthless agitator, but, there being no martial law in Greece, the Government could not force him to proceed to Naxos. He would, therefore, have to be allowed to stay at Athens.

There is no doubt that the strong line taken by M. Sterghiades, both towards the national defence movement and towards the Greek military authorities in Asia Minor, has made him many enemies in Greece. The papers have lately been full of abuse of the High Commissioner, who is denounced by some of the Veniselist press as a renegade and by other journals as a traitor to the cause of Hellenism. In my opinion, he is almost the only man of strong character and high political integrity at present occupying an important post in Greece, and he is the greatest moral asset possessed by the Greek Government and the Crown.

The resignation of General Papoulas, Commander-in-chief in Asia Minor, reported in my telegram No. 202 of to-day's date, is a further sign of the struggle which M. Sterghiades is carrying on. The General is known to have been sitting firmly on the fence regarding the defence movement in general and its relation to Venisellism in particular; and it is an open secret that the Greek civil and military authorities in Asia Minor have been hotly engaged in the struggle, which seems inevitable in the circumstances prevailing in occupied territory. In Lord Cromer's time in Egypt this struggle was particularly severe, though it ended with the complete victory of the civil power. It is to be hoped, in the general interest, that the retirement of General Papoulas marks a stage in a similar victory for M. Sterghiades.

Another reason put forward for General Papoulas's retirement is that he addressed a particularly warm telegram to M. Stratos during that gentleman's one day's tenure of office. It is asserted, I believe with some truth, that this telegram caused great offence in Gounarist circles, and that the preponderant party determined to show that they were still masters of the situation, even though M. Stratos had joined the Government.

Other signs are not wanting to show that the newly formed Cabinet is already in difficulties. One Minister has, indeed, already resigned: M. Argyros, the Statist Minister of Agriculture, having declared his disapproval of the agrarian policy of the Government. A much more serious divergence of views regarding the Crown threatens to break up the Government altogether. The press organs of M. Stratos have for several days been laying stress on the necessity of tackling the question of the recognition of King Constantine. The recalcitrant Powers should be asked plainly what their instructions were in this matter, and the Greek Government would then be able to choose their line of action. The implication would appear to be that, if the Powers announce that they will not recognise King Constantine, the Greek Government should ask the King to abdicate. I know that the Minister for Foreign Affairs disapproves of raising the question of recognition at all, and his views are shared by the other Gounarist Ministers. If M. Stratos continues to press the matter, another Cabinet crisis appears inevitable, and this time the whole country may be involved.

It is hoped that the above description will have given some idea of the political atmosphere at present prevailing. It is in this atmosphere that the deadlock concerning the Paris peace proposals is forcing the Greeks to consider how they can solve the "national question" themselves. Both the country and the Government are, I believe,



gradually becoming convinced that the present position cannot be allowed to drag on much longer, and that there is little prospect of the Powers exerting any great influence on the issue. This is the tone of the press, the more extreme organs of which are again talking of finishing the war by the occupation of Constantinople. I have no reason to suppose that any such folly is contemplated by the Government, who are simply at their wits' ends between the necessity of putting an end to military expenditure and the political impossibility of leaving the Greek population of Asia Minor to their fate. In connection with the latter subject, I have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs made an important statement in the Chamber last night. After referring to the fixed intention of the Kemalists to finish, once and for all, with the Christian minorities, and after eulogising the words of the Pope on this subject at the Eucharistic Congress, M. Baltazzi asked whether, in face of what had happened, it was possible to leave Christian populations under Turkish rule. Every Power which, like Greece, had taken part in the great war, was morally bound not to abandon the Christians of the East to the knife of Kemal. The proposed enquiry into the Kemalist outrages offered the hope that the Powers would recognise their obligation and put an end to a state of affairs which dishonoured the civilised world. As a result of Kemalist calumnies, a similar commission had been proposed for the territory occupied by the Greeks in Asia Minor. The Greek Government were ready to open wide the doors to such a commission, knowing that it would find nothing to the discredit of the Greek Administration.

I have, &c.

F. O. LINDLEY.

[E 5899/19/44]

No. 144.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 12.)*

(No. 498.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum of conversation between Mr. Knox and certain members of the Near East Relief on the 31st May, 1922.

*Constantinople, June 2, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 144.

*Memorandum.*

DR. KENNEDY called this morning with Mr. Hawes, Miss Phelps and Miss Wood, all of the Near East Relief, who had just returned from Anatolia, the two former from Sivas and the last (referred to in our telegram No. 262) from Malatia, travelling via Samsoun.

They fully confirm Major Yowell's and Dr. Ward's reports, and all are convinced that the present deportations mean the complete extermination of the Greeks in Anatolia. They kept no records of the numbers of deportees, but affirm that a conservative estimate places those passing Sivas at a minimum of 70,000, a large proportion of these being women and children. They were clothed in verminous rags and ravaged by small-pox, typhus and dysentery. Both ladies had contracted typhus during their work with the refugees. The men are to a great extent formed into labour gangs to work on the roads without shelter. So long as their health holds out they receive a loaf of bread daily. Miss Phelps showed me a specimen of this bread which apparently consists of straw and dirt.

Conditions both at Sivas and Malatia were somewhat better in the spring than during the winter months, as the deportees suffered less from exposure, and typhus somewhat abated. They were, however, still very bad. Miss Phelps and Mr. Hawes, on leaving Sivas on the 12th May, met some 200 women and children being driven southward in a state of utter exhaustion. They learned next day from an American relief worker, who overtook them, that twelve out of these 200 had fallen dead on the 10 miles of road into Sivas. On their way towards the coast they passed bodies, numbers of fresh graves and some women and children who had straggled behind the convoys dying by the roadside.

All the Greek villages in the tobacco area around Samsoun are abandoned. In Samsoun itself there are fourteen Greek men left, who for one reason or another have enjoyed immunity, but the great majority of women and children still remain.

Every night men of the Greek bands who have fled to the hills and are starving there attempt to enter the town in search of food; they are always fired on by the garrison, and often prolonged fights take place in the outskirts of the town.

Miss Phelps, who was in Anatolia during the war and saw something of the Armenian deportations, affirmed that those of the Greeks at present taking place are exactly similar, except that they are not accompanied to the same extent by massacre, and that they have a more apparent military object. The result, however, is the same, if not worse, in that the exiles are driven on until they die. It is believed that only a negligible proportion of the deportees can have survived the journey to Bitlis. They knew of no case of actual massacre beyond those of Kavak and Marsivan.

All three of these relief workers struck me as impartial. They had incessantly heard and appreciated the Turkish case. They appear to have no doubt that organisations directed against the Turks existed among the Pontine Greeks; they realise that some military measures were imposed against a potentially hostile population in what had been made a war zone by the action of the Greek fleet, and they quote the still evident fact that a large number of Turkish troops are immobilised at a distance from the front by the activities of the Greek "chetés" in the hills. Nevertheless, they are horrified at the action of the Turks. Miss Phelps, indeed, admitted that she had left Angora last autumn with a firm belief, which she owed to the atmosphere of courteous propaganda prevailing there, that Mustapha Kemal's Government would bring about a regeneration of Turkey. On arriving at Sivas she was rapidly disillusioned. She also told me how Miss Allen, the well-known American relief worker, came from Angora to Sivas full of enthusiasm for the Turkish cause. After a visit to Harput she returned to Sivas with an attack of typhus from which she died. Before losing consciousness she spoke to Miss Phelps and Mr. Hawes with the greatest horror of what she had seen on the roads, and emphatically recanted her belief in the Turks.

I took an opportunity to ask their opinion as to the prospects of a mission of enquiry, and how far it could be hoodwinked. They were not encouraging. They felt that they themselves, who had lived long in the country with unusual opportunities of ascertaining what was happening, had not learned half the truth. Beyond the obvious difficulties of obtaining evidence without assured protection, they thought that, with the long warning that would be necessary, the Turks would have ample time to cover up their tracks, and that a commission would find little concrete evidence beyond deserted villages and graves, and in all probability bring away a thoroughly inadequate idea of what had passed.

Miss Wood, who confirms her statements to Dr. Gibbons (reported in our telegram No. 262), is leaving the Near East Relief; she is willing that any use should be made of her name. Miss Phelps and Mr. Hawes, both of whom expect to return to Anatolia, would not wish their names mentioned unless considered absolutely necessary.

*May 31, 1922.*

[E 5906/5/44]

No. 145.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 12.)*

(No. 511. Confidential.)

My Lord.

*Constantinople, June 6, 1922.*

THE French High Commissioner recently called on me and said that I had no doubt heard of the forthcoming despatch to Angora of Colonel Mougin in connection with the execution of certain provisions of the Franco-Kemalist Agreement of last autumn. I replied that I was aware that Colonel Mougin had just passed through Constantinople on his way to Beirut.

2. General Pellé said that he had impressed on Colonel Mougin the necessity of not going outside the scope of his mission, which consisted of settling certain details relating to the frontier between Syria and Turkey, and of coming to an agreement with regard to the customs régime which was to prevail between the two territories in question. Should the Kemalist authorities wish to broach other subjects, Colonel Mougin was to reply that he was not authorised to discuss these subjects, but would refer for instructions. General Pellé added that it would be useful for the French to receive first-hand reports of what was going on at Angora.

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3. It was apparent to me in the course of the interview that General Pellé was not at all favourable to Colonel Mougin's mission, as he felt that it would be difficult for that officer to serve two masters in the shape of General Gouraud and General Pellé himself, whilst he probably rather dislikes the participation of General Gouraud, whether involuntarily or not, in matters which he, General Pellé, considers as coming within his own sphere of action.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 5907/5/44]

No. 146.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 12.)*

(No. 512.)  
My Lord,

Constantinople, June 6, 1922.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 406 of the 2nd instant, to transmit to your Lordship herewith a brief account of a meeting of the Allied Mixed Committee which was held on the 27th ultimo under the presidency of General Franks to study the various refugee problems which may arise in the event of the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek forces.

I have, &c.  
HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 146.

*Account of Meeting of an Allied Mixed Committee on Refugee Problems.*

THE refugee problem in Asia Minor can be divided in three main considerations:—

- (a.) Numbers of the population liable to take part in the exodus.
- (b.) Measures which might be taken to prevent an exodus.
- (c.) Measures to be taken if an exodus cannot be prevented.

An Allied Mixed Committee formed to study these questions met on the 27th ultimo under the presidency of Major-General Franks, on behalf of British headquarters, and attended by Colonel Roche and Colonel Rolletto as French and Italian military representatives, and by the Comte de Chambrun, Marquis de Soragna and Mr. Henderson as delegates of the three High Commissioners.

As regards (a) the figures compiled at the British and French headquarters of the total Christian population of the Greek occupied area differed somewhat the French figures giving 580,000, the British about 650,000, distributed approximately as follows:—

Smyrna	...	...	...	...	350,000
Broussa	...	...	...	...	136,000
Balikessar	...	...	...	...	120,000
Kutaya, Afium-Karahissar and Eskishehir	...	...	...	...	44,000

For the purposes of calculation therefore it was agreed that, in the event of a universal exodus, some 600,000 persons might participate in it. The figure is, of course, an extreme one, and was accepted by the committee as such.

As regards (b), the measures which might be taken to prevent an exodus *en masse*, the committee adopted the following resolutions:—

- (i.) That the Turkish army as an army should not be permitted to enter the evacuated regions.
- (ii.) That the nucleus of the gendarmerie under Allied officers should be sufficiently organised before the departure of the Greek army.
- (iii.) That the League of Nations should be invited to assist in devising a definite scheme for the protection of minorities, and to despatch its commissioners to the spot before the evacuation commenced.
- (iv.) That nothing should be done to encourage the population to look for the assistance of the Allies in facilitating their flight.

In connection with this latter point, it was observed that though a certain number of evacuations would be unavoidable it might be desirable to let it be known that only persons and not private property (live-stock, household goods, &c.) would be evacuated.

To these resolutions may be added a reciprocal declaration by both belligerents of a general amnesty, as suggested in Sir H. Rumbold's despatch No. 406.

The committee was unable to make any suggestions except of the most general character as regards question (c), viz., the measures to be taken in the event of an evacuation, partial or general, taking place. The points considered in this respect were:—

1. The selection of areas of concentration.

The neighbourhoods of Smyrna, Panderma and Moudania were regarded by the committee as most suitable for the concentration of refugees from the point of view of facilities not only for embarkation but also for protection since Allied warships could lie off those harbours.

2. Accommodation and supply in those areas.

This question, as well as that of the responsibility for the expenses which might be incurred in the various measures adopted, was reserved for discussion until further details should be forthcoming.

3. Protection of these concentration camps.

In principle it was agreed that the Allied forces, naval and military, should be employed for this purpose.

4. Destination of persons evacuated.

It was decided that in principle this could only be Greece since no other would accept refugees. It was also held that a recognition of this fact might induce the Greek authorities themselves to discourage any exaggerated form of exodus.

5. By what means the evacuation should be effected.

It was agreed that not less than one ship would be required for the evacuation of each 1,000 refugees. The example was quoted of the Russian evacuation from the Crimea when 142 vessels were employed to bring about 140,000 refugees to Constantinople under conditions of very great hardship.

[E 5874/5/44]

No. 147.

*Lord Hardinge to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 12.)*

(No. 1385.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note to M. Poincaré, dated the 10th June, 1922, respecting the attitude of His Majesty's Government to the proposal contained in the Angora note.

Paris, June 10, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 147.

*Lord Hardinge to M. Poincaré.*

M. le Président du Conseil,

Paris, June 10, 1922.

SIR MILNE CHEETHAM did not fail to transmit to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs copy of the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to him on the 15th May last on the subject of the proposal contained in the Angora note of the 22nd April for a meeting at Ismidt of plenipotentiaries of the Allies and representatives of the Government of Angora.

I have now the honour, under instructions from Lord Balfour, to transmit to your Excellency herewith a memorandum\* in which the views held by His Majesty's Government are further elaborated, and in which the hope is expressed that the French Government will be able to see their way to agreeing to a further note being addressed to the three Governments of Greece, Constantinople and Angora on the lines settled at the recent meeting of Foreign Ministers.

I have, &c.  
HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

\* See No. 141.



*Lieutenant-Colonel Rawlinson to Mr. Oliphant.—(Received June 14.)*

Dear Mr. Oliphant,

*Willesden Paddocks, Cricklewood, June 11, 1922.*

IN accordance with our conversation of Friday last I send you, enclosed, a general review of the present situation at Constantinople, which is deduced from my own previous experience of the chief personalities and interests in those parts, checked this last week by conversations with the prominent men of all nationalities, including Nationalists.

I send it, please, with great deference, in case it may be of interest or possibly serve as confirmation or otherwise of other information.

Yours sincerely,  
A. RAWLINSON.

Enclosure in No. 148.

*Note on the Situation at Constantinople, June 3, 1922.*

THE following estimate of the actual position at Constantinople and its future possibilities is formed from considerable personal experience of the principal personalities, checked within the last week by conversations with prominent men of all nationalities on the spot.

1. The Nationalist Government at Angora have no intention of moderating their terms, for the following reasons:—

(a.) They consider that their policy, up to the present, has met with considerable success.

(b.) Though many of them feel the stress of continued mobilisation and war conditions, yet those in control, supported by the whole military caste, consider that the presence of the enemy in the field consolidates and strengthens the Nationalist Party and the military power throughout Anatolia, and that peace and evacuation might bring serious internal troubles and dissensions of which they are much in dread at the present time.

(c.) They have no fear of the success of any Greek offensive in the west—and in the Pontine coast districts, at any rate, have been, and still are, reaping a rich harvest of plunder from the Greek population there, whom they have deported or are otherwise destroying.

(d.) They have the strongest conviction that whereas their propaganda campaign in India, Egypt, Iraq, &c., and their separate dealings with the various Allies have and are causing serious trouble, yet they themselves are in no way suffering in the same manner or degree, and that therefore the longer the present situation continues the greater will be the advantages they may expect in the end to secure.

(e.) They are experiencing no trouble in obtaining arms and munitions, and are still, at any rate in the east, receiving substantial subsidies in Russian gold—the Eastern army of Kiazim Karabekir is entirely paid in Russian gold—this fact from my own personal observation at Erzerum up to November 1921.

2. On the subject of the Allied commission proposed to be sent into the Pontine districts (Trebizond or Samsun)—

(a.) It is hardly to be expected that Angora will accept any such commission, and in view of the technical state of war existing, such a refusal could be justified.

(b.) Its acceptance could only be expected in event of the Angora Government being satisfied that they would reap advantages therefrom.

(c.) Such acceptance, therefore, would mean that the ground and the witnesses would have been prepared, and that evidence satisfactory to them would be forthcoming, which it would be impossible for such a commission to refuse although it might be known to be fabricated.

Such evidence would then be available not only in refutation of the present reports, but also in all the future similar cases which are certain to recur.

(d.) There is no possible doubt not one-tenth part of the atrocities and generally barbarous treatment of the Pontine Greeks (Rhums) in the eastern vilayets have yet

come to light, and it is probable that definite and reliable details of them (in amplification of, and subsequent to, my own observations) will never be forthcoming, for obvious reasons.

(e.) The only really definite fact which could be at once substantiated, by the reliable evidence of those lately familiar with the country and its inhabitants, is—

The prosperous and populous condition of the country twelve and eighteen months ago and its present state of desolation.

This, coupled with the fact of the scale upon which deportation has been carried out whilst all emigration has been stopped, is as effective evidence as could be desired of the "treatment of minorities" as understood and practised by the Turks.

This, be it remembered, is nothing new, and may be expected to recur as long as and as often as the opportunity occurs and such minorities remain available.

3. *Possible Solutions.*—(a.) It is accepted on all hands that any employment of such force, either by the Allies jointly or otherwise, as would be adequate to ensure the safety of minorities is not to be at present expected.

(b.) The alternative of convincing the Angora Government that their true interests lie in conforming with the customs and prejudices of civilised communities may, and doubtless will, eventually prevail, and a measure of control be obtained by this means, i.e., by the affording or withholding the technical and financial assistance for developments in Anatolia which the Angora Government now greatly desire to obtain, and which will become more and more indispensable.

This eventual solution, which, in view of the undeveloped mineral wealth alone is a very real and practical one, is, however, probably premature at present.

(c.) The hope is held in certain quarters that if terms were put forward conditional upon the acceptance throughout the country of the Sultan's Government and a return to the *status quo ante* this might result in the break up of the Angora power.

This experiment, however, to have any real chance of success would call for a considerable propaganda campaign in Anatolia itself, by which much time would be lost, and any such idea is even then in all probability foredoomed to failure.

(d.) All circumstances seem to point to the probable early evacuation of Constantinople as the next development to be expected, and that such is sure to be the eventual policy of the British Government, and would of necessity be followed by or be simultaneous with evacuation by the French and Italians.

In such event the situation will undergo very radical modification.

(e.) It is on all hands assumed that no evacuation of Constantinople would be contemplated by the Allies which did not provide for the retention of the Gallipoli peninsula.

(f.) The unanswerable argument to be advanced being the sanctity of the graves there, which sentiment would appeal to both Christian and Moslem.

4. The salient points of the position on the evacuation of Constantinople by the Allies and the retention of the Gallipoli peninsula are:—

(a.) Any such evacuation would now be immediately followed step by step by a Greek occupation, which would be wholeheartedly supported by the wealthier class of the population, and by all those desirous of "law, order and prosperity" in Constantinople itself.

(b.) It is assumed that such a policy would be opposed by the French, who, however, would be obliged to conform with it, as would the Italians also with probably better grace.

(c.) The Greek community in Constantinople and throughout Greece generally would welcome such a solution and would strain every nerve to seize such an advantage. This it would appear they are now in a position to do, and might expect at any rate for a time to be able to retain.

(d.) The Turks generally, and especially the Angora Government, would be vitally opposed to such an evacuation, though they would be hard put to put forward any adequate ground for such opposition.

5. From the point of view of British interests only, the following results would appear to be wholly favourable:—

(a.) The difference between the occupation of vital portions of the Gallipoli Peninsula and the present occupation of Constantinople would effect a considerable saving of expense.



(b.) The effect of the evacuation throughout all Islam would be entirely favourable to British interests, and the Turk would thus be deprived of the most effective weapon in his arsenal.

(c.) The control of the waterway to the Black Sea would be equally well assured at Gallipoli as at Constantinople, and the sea communication would even be simplified.

(d.) The town of Constantinople at all times lies at the mercy of any maritime Power occupying the Dardanelles.

(e.) The suggestion of such an evacuation might not be without its effect in other fields.

(f.) Though it may be assumed that the other Allies (notably the French) would also occupy portions of the peninsula—yet in event of future complications the deciding factor in the exercising of the control of the Dardanelles in future must always be the control of the sea outside, and the occupation would be permanent.

Should this position materialise it is impossible not to appreciate the importance of the permanent advantage which would be so gained for the Empire.

A. RAWLINSON.

June 11, 1922.

[E 5992/27/44]

No. 149.

*Director of Military Operations to Foreign Office.*—(Received June 14.)

(Secret.)

THE Director of Military Operations and Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward, for his information, copies of three reports from Major M. A. B. Johnston, M.C., British military representative at Smyrna.

Major-General Sir William Thwaites would particularly draw the attention of Sir Eyre Crowe to the latter half of the report headed "Situation in Greek Occupied Areas (Thrace)," giving the views of General Pallis, the Chief of the Staff of the Greek army in Anatolia. The opinions therein expressed seem to be of particular significance.

War Office, June 13, 1922.

Enclosure 1 in No. 149.

*Report on Situation in Greek Occupied Areas (Anatolia).*

(Views of General Pallis.)

(Secret.)

ACCORDING to General Pallis's personal opinion on the subject, that part of Asia Minor which is now occupied by the Greek troops will at some future date have imposed upon it one of the three following conditions:—

(a.) A total evacuation by Greek troops and the complete reoccupation of the area by Turkish troops. This condition is, to him, unthinkable, and presupposes that the whole of the Christian and anti-Kemalist population of the area will have been evacuated with the Greek army.

(b.) The withdrawal of the Greek army to a more restricted zone which will be given to Greece. Here the army will stop, and not only guard the frontier on a war footing, but will also maintain security and order in the allotted zone.

(c.) An evacuation of the Greek army from Asia Minor, but no reoccupation by Turkish troops of a certain given zone. This zone might be—

(i.) The Smyrna enclave; roughly, the Sèvres Treaty zone.

(ii.) An area west of the line Panderma-Akhissar-Alashehr-Nazli Sealanova.

(iii.) An area west of and including Brusa and Ushak.

(ii) and (iii) will exclude the Dardanelles zone, but will adjoin it.

2. In his opinion, the most likely condition is as given at (c). The zone will be an autonomous State, nominally under the Sultan, but governing itself under the supervision of the League of Nations, who will appoint the Governor and make arrangements for its good administration. In this solution it is taken for granted that Mustapha Kemal is prepared to play the game (a doubtful promise), but without assuming that some real mutual agreement has been come to it is useless discussing a peaceful administration; otherwise the autonomous State will always be threatened by war.

3. In this administration the essential factor will be a gendarmerie.

4. At the present time, under the Greek occupation, there exist between 3,000 and 4,000 gendarmes directly under the Greek High Commissioner, and under the Military Governor of Smyrna about 1,500 men, who are called gendarmes, but who in reality are troops, having had no special training in gendarmerie work before they arrived as recruits in Asia Minor in order to free the 1st L. of C. regiment for the front. These men cannot be compared to the civil gendarmerie, who are greatly superior in training and experience.

5. The most important consideration in the formation of the gendarmerie is to insist on the very first moment of its organisation that it is a gendarmerie for the autonomous "Mikrasiatic" State. There will therefore be no difference made between Moslems and Christians in the gendarmerie. The main obstacle to achieving this will be the lack in some cases of a common language, but this can to a large extent be surmounted by the intermixing of the Moslems and Christians during their training while the Greek army is evacuating.

(We have this difficulty in some of our Welsh regiments and also in Indian battalions; and the Greeks too in Macedonia recruited Bulgarophone Greeks and found that the difficulty could be overcome.)

6. In General Pallis's opinion M. Sterghiades's gendarmerie is very good. Both the officers and men have much experience and have gained the confidence both of the Moslem and the Christian population. Moreover, originally this gendarmerie was specially chosen by M. Sterghiades and in the last three years has had any unsuitable officer or man replaced. In forming a gendarmerie for the autonomous zone, therefore, General Pallis thinks that this gendarmerie should be used as a nucleus.

The strength of the gendarmerie to be aimed at for the three zones at paragraph 1 is—

Sub-paragraph (c.)	(i.)	8,000;
"	(c.)	(ii.) 12,000; and
"	(c.)	(iii.) 20,000 respectively.

7. We have therefore a nucleus of about 4,000 Greek gendarmes from Greece, Crete and the islands. To obtain the rest, there are the following sources which can be tapped:—

(a.) Moslems (Turks).

(i.) Who were gendarmes under the Turkish rule.

(ii.) In the area who have had military training.

(b.) Asia Minor Christians, of which there are 20,000 in the Greek army at the present time. At least 5,000 of these can be made into good gendarmes.

(c.) Moslems (non-Turks).

*Yuruks:* These are probably the best of the non-Turkish Moslems, being in reality a nomad race of shepherds who have now settled down in villages. They are not very intelligent, but honest and law-abiding.

*Circassians:* Intelligent, but passionate; with strong supervision, however, they would make good gendarmes.

Other and smaller sections of the Moslem population might give a small number of recruits for gendarmerie.

(d.) Armenians: There are not a large number of these and General Pallis think their monetary instincts might lead to trouble.

In any case men should be chosen from the villages and not from towns where they are of inferior physique and morality.

8. As the population of the zone allotted to the autonomous State will be divided approximately into one half Christians and one half Moslems, the proportion to aim at for each religion in the gendarmerie will also be 50 per cent.



This, however, will be hard to achieve at the start, when there will probably be a preponderance of Christians who will be already trained and easy to find.

Later on by degrees the proportion will be adjusted, all the gendarmerie from Greece and the islands will be dispensed with, and the Asia Minor State gendarmerie will consist of Christian and Moslem inhabitants of that State, who should mutually have its welfare in their minds.

9. The strength of training required for the newly-formed gendarmerie should be—

- (a.) For men already trained as soldiers, three to six months.
- (b.) For recruits, one year.
- (c.) For officers, eight months to one and a half years, according to their experience.

For training the men, depôts should be formed under the supervision of trained officers and non-commissioned officers. For the officers, a school should be started where Moslem and Christian cadets will carry out their training together.

10. Ultimately the officers should be of the country, except in the case of senior officers, whose work would be the co-ordination and higher organisation of the units. At the start, however, the officers of the Greek gendarmerie as at present installed will be employed together with any good Moslem gendarmerie officers available. The foreign officers could be of any European nationality, with the exception, according to General Pallis, of Italians and Frenchmen, who would not inspire confidence in the hearts of the Christians, and who would always have their special propaganda to spread.

11. There has always been a ruling in Greece that gendarmes, and even civil functionaries, whose houses are in one district are sent to work in a part of the country away from their homes. The reason for this is that in villages the family bond exerts no small influence, and it is considered that there would be a risk of favouritism and injustice if men had authority in the neighbourhood of their own families. In Asia Minor, too, with its bad communications and differences of races, this method could be easily practised, and the men could be distributed in units so that they worked away from their homes and would have no family influence around them to harm their sense of duty.

12. Then comes the important question as to whether Christians and Moslems will work together. In this connection one can take the good example of the Circassian troops fighting at present with the Greek army. They get on very well with the Greeks, and even after a short time many have picked up Greek; and, in general, Moslems and Christians work together in this country and in the towns and can live on friendly terms, but they must both be given security. In fact, once the menace of a victorious Kemal entering this area and taking reprisals on everyone who has obeyed the law of the governing administration is at an end, this scheme will not only be quite feasible, but will give the best results.

Enclosure 2 in No. 149.

*Report on Situation in Greek Occupied Areas.*

(Views of M. Sterghiades.)

(Secret.)

ON the 22nd May Major Johnston took Major Stover to see M. Sterghiades, whom he had not yet met, although M. Sterghiades said he often heard of him from the military authorities.

As the visits to Smyrna of the "Iron Duke," "Ajax" and "Calypso" have started the fashion for large but inferior Allied ships to come to Smyrna harbour, Major Johnston opened the conversation by mentioning how pleasant it was to see the harbour so popular. M. Sterghiades said the French admiral had visited him yesterday, and he had had a very long conversation with him on the present situation.

From what the admiral said M. Sterghiades could see that the French policy in the Near East remained the same as it had been for the last three years, and he was sure that in the future no nation would regret the French policy more than France herself.

Two begin with it was based on two false premises:—

Firstly, that Turkey could be revived (which in M. Sterghiades's opinion was impossible).

Secondly, if and when revived, she would be useful to France (which M. Sterghiades ventured to consider more doubtful still).

It was always the habit of defeated nations to stick together and hope in the future to overthrow their conquerors. For this reason Germany, what was left of Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey and Russia (although Russia's defeat was of a different kind) would continue to have an alliance at all events of sympathy, and the latest political developments made it seem clear that these nations thought it was possible to reverse the victory of the great war.

M. Sterghiades could see no chance of a settlement here in the near future. He had been present in Crete during the presence of Turkish troops there, and he knew that there could be no peace until the troops had left. Before that it was one long revolution in the island. Once, however, the Turkish troops went, security and order were established automatically, and it was extraordinary to see how the island had changed for the better in a short space of time. It was true that there were European detachments of British, French, Italians and Russians on the islands (the Germans and Austrians did not remain), but these did not have to stay long on the island before they saw the country had become orderly and it was unnecessary for them to be there any longer. The fact remained that where Turkish troops existed there could be no progress.

Any such withdrawal would give Mustapha Kemal a new area for his taxing and recruiting activities, and in addition would raise the moral of the Turkish troops, who would consider it the beginning of the Greek evacuation. The outside world immediately would choose to see in any such withdrawal a sign of weakness on the part of Greece.

The present line held was strong and held lateral railway communication.

It was true that if the men came back the shortened line might be held by 100,000 men instead of 200,000 men, but this advantage did not outweigh the disadvantages, especially as the men were willing, if not very enthusiastic, to remain on.

There was no fortified line that corresponded with the Sèvres Treaty zone. He had advocated this two years ago and had even got French officers of the French Military Mission at Athens to work at it, but these had wasted their time and done nothing. From the start he had been in favour of retiring to some such line after each military advance, and he thought that had this been done the Allies would have been more favourably disposed to Greece at this moment.

Again M. Sterghiades condemned the Sakaria operations and said they had been undertaken against his advice for Mustapha Kemal and his army could not be defeated on account of the extent of the country behind them. He had seen Mustapha Kemal quite close to Smyrna. This Mustapha Kemal possessed a small tent which he pitched on some spot or other and, if he was made to go away or he thought fit to change his place of abode, he merely packed up his tent and, with the help of his two donkeys, he moved.

Mustapha Kemal was merely an adventurer and he behaved as such. He had no fixed policy; now he leagued himself with the Italians; now the French, then the Russians and Germans. It was true he and the Turks hated the British, but there was everything to show that they hated the French and the Italians as well. All the Angora Government could do was to profit by the quarrels of the Allies and use every opportunity that might arise as time went on.

M. Sterghiades, too, talked of a blockade and a threat to Constantinople as being the only way of coming to an agreement with Mustapha Kemal, and he, too, cited the case of the French and Italian ships for which the Greek Government had to pay a fine of 32,000,000 drachmas. The High Commissioner became almost speechless with rage at the thought of it.

Referring to the subject of an autonomous State in Asia Minor, the High Commissioner said that one of the most important measures to be provided for was that of the currency. As the autonomous State (this should always be talked of as the "special régime in Asia Minor" so as not to offend the susceptibilities of the Moslem world which might dislike the phrase autonomous State) would be nominally under the suzerainty of the Sultan, the currency would be naturally in liras and piastres, but the relation between the finance of the special régime and the rest of Turkey must end there. It would be impossible to run the new State efficiently if the currency were dependent on the vagaries of the exchange at Constantinople. In addition, the paper currency must be backed by gold. When he first arrived in Asia Minor he had tried to get a group of French financiers to interest themselves in this matter, but although they appeared to approve in word of the High Commissioner's plans for the venture, they had refrained from committing themselves to it in deed.

Major Johnston informed M. Sterghiades that the Greek High Commissioner at [8975]



Constantinople had asked him to convey his salutations to M. Sterghiades, and that he was absolutely in agreement with him on the subject of the national defence movement. M. Sterghiades said he was pleased and that no thinking man could have any other opinion.

As time went on all this civil militia would disappear. For the moment he was allowing it to continue, as it gave the inhabitants of Asia Minor an outlet for their patriotic feelings and also a sense of security that something was being done for them. The only way of helping was for the civilian population of Asia Minor to join the army, not to form useless militias.

M. Sterghiades then had to go and return the French admiral's call.

Enclosure 3 in No. 149.

*Report on Situation in Greek Occupied Areas (Thrace).*

(Views of General Pallis.)

WITH regard to the question of the Greek troops guarding the Thracian-Turkish frontier not having gone back 5,000 yards, the Greek Chief of Staff informed me that the forces in Thrace depend from Athens, and that therefore it would be better for H.Q., A.F.O., to arrange the matter through the British military attaché at Athens directly with the Athens General Staff.

General Pallis stated that he was not even aware that this withdrawal on both sides had been asked for.

2. From this the conversation turned to the Græco-Turkish-Bulgarian frontier as proposed by the last Paris Conference. General Pallis maintained that, from a purely military point of view, the guarding of the Greek frontier would be very difficult, and, in the event of war by Greece against Bulgaria allied to Turkey, it would be impossible to retain the Adrianople-Gallipoli zone.

As far as he knew, Greece was to be prevented from keeping troops in the Eastern Thracian area except to guard the Bulgarian frontier north-west of Adrianople. West again of this part of the frontier, the line followed the Tokatjik Dag and Kartal Dag, at the latter of which a Bulgarian force descending from the north could isolate any Greek forces east of that point.

Again, the Ganos-Istranja line was of very great extent and would need more troops than Greece had available to guard it efficiently. The fact that its flanks were on mountain ranges was of small advantage in comparison to the disadvantage of its length.

Were the line to be the Chatalja line, this could be held by a small Greek force against large Turkish forces, and, in the event of war with Turkey and Bulgaria, the Greeks could hold the Turks at Chatalja, defeat the Bulgarians and then come back to fight the Turks; and during any such campaign the Dardanelles would be open so far as holding the European shore alone could keep them open.

With the present proposals, however, Greece could not be sure of holding on to the Dardanelles, because, as mentioned above, it would be necessary to move all her troops from Eastern Thrace to prevent them from being pinched in from the east, north and west.

He said he thought it was Marshal Foch who had proposed the line of the eastern frontier and asked me if I knew, so I informed him that the present frontier was a compromise between a line further east advocated by the British and one further west advocated by other Allies.

General Pallis then said that, with small Powers like the Balkan States, it was the length of the frontiers that made wars possible and, in fact, brought them on. Somebody's cow would stroll across the boundary-line, a patrol on the other side would shoot it; this would bring about an exchange of shots between opposing patrols, and a few incidents such as this could easily inflame the two nations into going to war.

Changing the conversation, General Pallis reminded me of what he had said to me at Eskişehir last summer after the first big advance—that so long as British troops (or even Allied troops under British command) remained at Constantinople, Greece would be content.

The general situation now, however, was very different to what it had been at that time, and the Greek General Staff (and he thought the Greek Government was of

the same opinion) considered that there were only two ways left of bringing about a decision on the Near East question:—

- (a.) By enforcing a blockade by the Greek navy.
- (b.) By taking Constantinople from the European side.

As regards (a), this was not yet permitted by the Allies—in fact, so much so that the Greeks were not even allowed to make use of their navy to search ships, although this was a recognised war measure. (Vide the example of the French and Italian ships which admittedly were carrying war material for the use of Kemal's army, but the retention of which cost the Greek Government 32,000,000 drachmas.)

This method, however, would take a long time to bring about a decision.

The taking of Constantinople, on the other hand, would bring about an instant change in the situation, and the Chief of Staff considered that there was little doubt that Constantinople could be taken.

Of the two divisions in Thrace, probably only one and a half would be necessary for the task. Even if Mustapha Kemal himself were not affected by the fall of Constantinople, the Moslem world in general would be greatly impressed by the fact, and the Turkish nation would assuredly impose its will on Mustapha Kemal to come to some reasonable terms with Greece.

This, however, was not the most important point in connection with the taking of Constantinople. The effect on Greece and all Greeks throughout the world would be absolutely electrical. Moral, patriotism and self-sacrifice would show themselves as never before, and the Allies could count on Greece performing unheard-of tasks.

(Colonel Sarryanis, too, in a conversation I had with him, said that, under the present conditions, there was no reason why the situation should not go on for ever, and, in his opinion, there was only one way of ending it, which was to take Constantinople and the Ismid Peninsula and hold a line across the latter; evacuate all Christians from Asia Minor to Thrace, Greece and the islands; evacuate the army, fighting a rear-guard action and destroying the country; and then say to the Greek people: "We know you have had great sufferings to undergo and sacrifices to make. We have deceived you over Asia Minor, but it was beyond our powers to remain there. The Greek nation is, however, once more in possession of 'The City'; and the answer of the Greek people would be: "To have retaken the city is worth all the sacrifices we have made and will be called upon to make in the future.")

This question of Constantinople has assumed additional importance for the Allies, because it seemed more or less certain that Allied troops would evacuate it in the near future, and, with the Turkish alliance with Russia and Germany, it was difficult to say who would be in possession of the Bosphorus in a few years to come.

[E 6126/19/44]

No. 150.

*Sir A. Geddes to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 19.)*

(No. 667.)

Sir,

Washington, June 9, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, herewith, a copy of the reply of Mr. Hughes to the proposal to institute a joint committee of investigation into the reports for the renewal of the deportation of Christians by the Turkish authorities at Angora and the alleged atrocities connected therewith.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

R. L. CRAIGIE.

Enclosure in No. 150.

*Mr. Hughes to Sir A. Geddes.*

Excellency,

Department of State, Washington, June 3, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 15th May last, referring to reports of the renewal of the deportation of Christians by the Turkish authorities at Angora, and the alleged atrocities connected therewith, and

[8975]

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communicating the proposal of His Britannic Majesty's Government that the British, French, Italian and American Governments should at once depute carefully selected officers to proceed to such places in Anatolia as might best enable them to conduct an appropriate investigation.

In your Excellency's subsequent memorandum of the 19th May you indicate that the Turkish deportations and outrages might lead to retaliatory action in territory held by the Greek forces, and suggest that this Government should join in requesting the authorities functioning in Greece to permit the despatch of officers to regions under Greek occupation.

The situation of the Christian minorities in Turkey has enlisted to a marked degree the sympathies of the American people, and it has been noted with deep concern that the work of benevolent and educational institutions in Turkey has steadily been hampered, that the rights which American citizens have long enjoyed in Turkey in common with the nationals of other Powers have often been disregarded and the property rights and interests of Americans and other foreigners placed in jeopardy.

In view of the humanitarian considerations which are involved and of the desire of this Government to have adequate information through a thorough and impartial investigation of the actual conditions prevailing in Anatolia, in order that this Government may determine its future policy in relation to the authorities concerned, the President is prepared to designate an officer or officers to take part in the proposed enquiry.

In taking this course, I should make clear to your Excellency my understanding that the proposed action is limited in scope to an enquiry to obtain accurate data as to the situation in Anatolia for the information of the Governments participating therein, and I should advise you that this Government assumes no further obligation and enters into no commitment.

This Government suggests that, in order to expedite the enquiry, officers should be designated by the respective Governments to institute enquiries and concurrently in the districts respectively under Greek and Turkish occupation, and that these two commissions, upon the completion of their investigation, should unite in a comprehensive report.

As I have not been advised of the reply which the French and Italian Governments may have made to the British proposal, I shall await further information before communicating with the American representatives in Constantinople and Athens regarding the designation of officers or the sending of such communications to the local Greek and Turkish authorities, as may be necessary to open the way for the proposed investigation.

Accept, &c.

CHARLES E. HUGHES.

[E 6140/48/44]

No. 151.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 19.)*

(No. 521.)

My Lord,

*Yeniköy, June 10, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 431 of the 9th ultimo, to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a further note which my Allied colleagues and I have received from the United States High Commissioner contesting the right of the three Allied High Commissioners to prevent the utilisation of the Standard Oil Company's installations at Kourouchesme and Selimieh, and declining to admit any justification for the note addressed by them to the Turkish Government on the subject.

2. The uncompromising tone of Admiral Bristol's communication raises a point of principle. Generally speaking, the Allied High Commissioners, as the civilian authorities of a town under Allied military occupation, have on more than one occasion contended that they are ultimately responsible for the proper administration of this city, and that they can, if it be considered expedient, modify local administrative regulations in the interests of the forces of occupation or the population in general. If this be admitted, the safety of the city and its preservation from the risk of fire is a responsibility of which they cannot divest themselves.

3. I note from the terms of the letter addressed to Mr. Post Wheeler and enclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 530 of the 26th ultimo that this standpoint has been upheld by the Foreign Office in its correspondence with the United States Embassy in London on the subject of inflammable liquids. I am most grateful for the support thus

afforded me. At the same time there is, so far as I am aware, no exact precedent for the exact situation which exists at Constantinople to-day, and I should feel myself on surer ground if I could be informed of the considered views of your Lordship's legal advisers, in the light of international law, on this aspect of the position of the Allied High Commissioners. Admiral Bristol's reply constitutes a complete denial of this moral obligation, and I would regret to have to submit to it.

4. At the same time an awkward conflict might arise if the Allied High Commissioners were categorically to insist, with the logical effects which such insistence may involve, on the standpoint hitherto adopted by them and on the rigid adoption of the action which they have recommended to the Turkish Government in the matter of these two oil depots. It is in this connection not impossible that their advice may be tacitly disregarded by the Turkish authorities and their regulations openly avoided by the Standard Oil Company with the connivance or approval of the United States High Commissioner.

5. I fully recognise in the present instance the undesirability of arriving at such an *impasse* or in general of raising, where they can be avoided, controversial questions likely still further to complicate a situation which is admittedly so abnormal.

6. Having regard therefore to this consideration, Admiral Bristol's note has been referred to the Advisory Trade Committee, which is at present engaged in elaborating a new law for the storage of inflammable liquids in order that the question of these oil depots may be taken into account in framing the relevant articles of that law.

7. At the same time my French and Italian colleagues and I have expressed to Admiral Bristol our willingness to consent to the maintenance of the Kourouchesme and Selimieh installations, provided that the arrangements thereat are modified in such manner as to conform with the technical provisions of the law above mentioned.

8. I have the honour to enclose a copy of the joint communication which we have addressed to Admiral Bristol in this sense.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 151.

*Admiral Bristol to Sir H. Rumbold.*

Excellency,

*Constantinople, May 23, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the Allied High Commissioners' collective note of the 15th April, in which there is enclosed a copy of a communication addressed by them under date of the 15th April to the Sublime Porte. This latter communication points out the serious fire menace which, in the judgment of the Allied High Commissioners, is created by certain installations of the Standard Oil Company at Kourouchesme and Selimieh, and accordingly invites the Turkish authorities to take at once the necessary steps to prevent the utilisation of the installations in question, as well as any further construction work upon them.

In reply, I desire to point out to your Excellency that the Kourouchesme and Selimieh installations are being erected in accordance with Turkish law and regulations, and by virtue of the necessary permits secured from the competent authorities. These permits have been shown to me, and I have been unable to discover any good reason for questioning their authenticity or legal character. The installations in question, furthermore, embody the most modern ideas of fire-proof construction, and I am not aware that any reasonable precaution against fire has been omitted. Since this question, for some reason unknown to me, was never formally submitted to the examination of the Advisory Trade Commission, I am not informed regarding the considerations upon which the Allied High Commissioners have predicated their action. I feel confident, therefore, that my words will not be misinterpreted when I declare that I am unable to acquiesce in the action which has been taken with respect to the Kourouchesme and Selimieh installations, and that I cannot admit its justification either as to substance or as to form.

I take, &c.

MARK L. BRISTOL,

*United States High Commissioner.*



Enclosure 2 in No. 151.

*Allied High Commissioners to Admiral Bristol.*

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie soussignés ont l'honneur d'accuser réception de la lettre que son Excellence l'Amiral Bristol a bien voulu leur adresser, le 23 mai dernier, au sujet des réservoirs à pétrole construits par la Standard Oil Company à Kouroutchesmé et à Sélimié.

Les soussignés, qui sous le régime de l'occupation militaire, se considèrent comme effectivement responsables de la sécurité à Constantinople, estiment qu'à ce titre il leur appartient de prendre des dispositions en vue de prévenir les incendies. Conséquemment, au cas où les lois et règlements de l'État ottoman sur la matière s'avèreraient insuffisants, ils seraient en droit de les compléter par telles mesures particulières ou générales qui leur apparaîtraient comme indispensables.

C'est dans cet esprit que les Hauts-Commissaires ont cru de leur devoir d'appeler l'attention de la Sublime Porte sur les inconvénients—signalés du reste par les habitants de ces localités eux-mêmes—que présentent les tanks à pétrole construits par la Standard Oil Company à Kouroutchesmé et à Sélimié et ont demandé au Comité consultatif du Commerce d'en tenir compte dans l'élaboration du nouveau projet de loi concernant l'emmagasinage des liquides inflammables. Cette étude, presque terminée maintenant, a été faite avec le concours de Mr. Shaw, membre américain du comité, et de Mr. Aggiman, ingénieur de la Standard Oil.

Des dispositions du texte adopté par la commission à l'unanimité (sauf une réserve du représentant des États-Unis, relative à un point autre que celui dont il s'agit ici), il résulte implicitement que les installations de la Standard Oil sont situées dans les emplacements où, normalement, il ne devrait exister aucune construction de ce genre. Ces installations pourront toutefois subsister, en vertu d'une mesure d'exception, à condition de recevoir les modifications reconnues nécessaires pour qu'elles satisfassent aux prescriptions techniques stipulées par la loi.

C'est cette solution que les soussignés, dans un esprit de conciliation, sont prêts à accepter, étant bien entendu que la Standard Oil prendra toutes dispositions utiles, en vue de se conformer à la loi, avant que les réservoirs soient mis en service.

PELLÉ.  
HORACE RUMBOLD  
GARRONI.

[E 6136/5/44]

No. 152.

*Lord Hardinge to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 19.)*

(No. 1437.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 17, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a copy of a note which I have received to-day from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in reply to the memorandum which I was instructed to communicate to the French Government, giving the views of His Majesty's Government as to the meeting of a conference for the settlement of peace conditions between the Governments of Angora, Constantinople and Athens. I am happy to remark that this is the first communication which I have received for some time from the French Government couched in more diplomatic and friendly terms than those notes which I have received during the past few weeks.

When I saw the Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, I asked him what really were the views of the French Government as to the best manner of settling this question, with a view to ensuring peace between Turkey and Greece. M. Peretti at once replied that the whole question appeared to him to be one of form and procedure. The first alternative proposed in Lord Curzon's memorandum took the form of an ultimatum which it was practically certain would not be accepted by the three Governments, while the second alternative meant failure and publication of failure to the world. The French Government believed the terms proposed by the conference in Paris to be just and equitable, and that there would in the end be no difficulty in imposing them upon the three Governments concerned. At the present moment no one of the three Governments is willing to accept the conditions. Each of them wished to discuss them. At the same time the French Government are

convinced that all three Governments are keenly desirous of peace. Colonel Mougin, who has been sent by General Gouraud to Angora to settle certain frontier questions between Turkey and Syria, has reported to the French Foreign Office that at Angora they are keenly desirous of peace, and that although they may bluff they will not in the end be so intractable as might be imagined. The French Government had received similar reports from Athens and Constantinople. They are therefore of opinion that if a meeting of all three Governments, together with the representatives of the three Great Powers, is convened at Ismidt, Constantinople or anywhere else, it would be practically certain that the conference would be crowned with success. The action that the French Government meditate is that the three Powers presenting an united front should dictate at the conference table the conditions of peace to the representatives of the three Governments, stating their conviction that they are both equitable and just, and that, while maintaining them as the basis of the treaty to be concluded, they are ready to discuss them and to explain their fairness and justice. If, after discussion, one of the three Governments concerned should refuse to accept the peace conditions, they would then be told by the representatives of the three Great Powers that they would be held responsible before Europe and the world for the continuation of the war, and M. Peretti expressed his conviction that no one of the three Governments involved would dare to undertake such a serious responsibility. In any case, he added, if the action of the three Great Powers was to fail under such circumstances, it would be no worse than the rejection of the ultimatum by one or other of the three interested Governments.

It appears to me that there is some force in the argument of the French Government, and that the mode of procedure that they suggest presents a better chance of arriving at a peaceful solution in the Near East than either of the two alternatives proposed in the memorandum that I was instructed to communicate to the Quai d'Orsay, since it presents an opportunity for persuasion and conviction through argument, which after all is the chief use of diplomacy.

I have, &amp;c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

[Enclosure in No 152.]

*M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.**Ministère des Affaires étrangères,**Paris, le 16 juin 1922.*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

EN me faisant savoir, par une lettre du 10 juin, que Sir Milne Cheetham avait fait parvenir au Gouvernement britannique ma communication du 15 mai, relative à la réunion, dans les conditions proposées par les Gouvernements d'Angora et de Constantinople, de la conférence envisagée à Paris par Lord Curzon, votre Excellence a bien voulu me transmettre un mémorandum exposant les vues du Gouvernement britannique sur cette question.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté exprime tout d'abord son sincère regret de ne pouvoir se ranger à l'opinion du Gouvernement français. Il considère que les "pourparlers préparatoires," qui auraient lieu actuellement entre les Hauts-Commissaires alliés et les représentants des Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople, constitueraient une violation, dans leur lettre et dans leur esprit, des décisions prises à la Conférence de Paris. Il marque le peu de confiance qu'il a dans l'efficacité de ces pourparlers. Il estime que si les Grecs et les Turcs repoussent les propositions de paix qui leur sont faites, ce sont eux et non les Alliés qui porteront la responsabilité de la continuation de la lutte. Il indique que les Alliés se trouvent en présence de l'alternative suivante :

Ou envoyer une nouvelle communication aux Gouvernements d'Angora, d'Athènes et de Constantinople pour exiger, dans un délai donné, l'acceptation ou le refus des propositions des Alliés ;

Ou procéder à la liquidation du plan arrêté à la Conférence de Paris et à la publication de la correspondance complète échangée, d'une part, entre les Gouvernements alliés et les Gouvernements belligérants, d'autre part, entre les Gouvernements alliés eux-mêmes.



Il exprime, enfin, l'espoir que le Gouvernement français consentira à accepter l'une de ces deux solutions.

Le Gouvernement de la République croit que la première des solutions proposées aboutirait à un refus des trois Gouvernements d'Angora, de Constantinople et d'Athènes, refus qui marquerait l'échec définitif des efforts poursuivis pour arriver à rétablir la paix en Orient. Il faut noter, en effet, qu'aucun de ces trois Gouvernements n'a accepté jusqu'ici les conditions générales de paix présentées, d'un commun accord, par les Alliés.

Le Gouvernement de la République n'a pas proposé de modifier les conditions générales que les Gouvernements alliés avaient considéré à Paris comme pouvant être suggérées aux belligérants, mais il est convaincu, en raison des renseignements qui lui arrivent de toutes parts, qu'il existe chez les adversaires un grand désir de paix, et qu'on ne doit pas désespérer de les amener, dans la conférence projetée, à accepter ces conditions. Il sera difficile aux Turcs et aux Grecs de s'y refuser sans assumer la responsabilité de la continuation de la guerre, qui pourrait être rejetée sur les Alliés, s'ils exigeaient purement et simplement, sous une forme qui équivaldrait en fait à un ultimatum, l'acceptation pure et simple desdites conditions.

La seconde solution envisagée par le Gouvernement britannique : prononcer, dès maintenant, la faillite de l'œuvre des Gouvernements alliés et procéder à la publication de la correspondance échangée, d'une part, entre les Gouvernements alliés et les Gouvernements belligérants, d'autre part, entre les Gouvernements alliés entre eux, aboutirait immédiatement au même résultat et laisserait également échapper une occasion de rétablir la paix.

Si le Gouvernement britannique insistait pour cette seconde solution, qui ne paraît pas plus souhaitable au Gouvernement de la République que la première, il faudrait, pour permettre à l'opinion publique de se prononcer, en pleine connaissance de cause, sur les responsabilités encourues, que la publication des documents fût complète et comprît tous les procès-verbaux de la conférence des trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères à Paris. Le Gouvernement de la République ne pourrait consentir à une publication partielle.

Avant de déclarer vaine l'œuvre de cette réunion, il conviendrait, à mon sens, de ne pas se laisser décourager par un premier échec et de faire de nouveaux efforts pour que cette œuvre porte ses fruits.

Le Gouvernement britannique s'indigne, avec raison, de la continuation des massacres en Asie Mineure. Il en rend responsables les Turcs seuls, comme s'il était certain que ceux qui sont à la charge des Grecs étaient moins nombreux et moins barbares ; les enquêtes prévues pourront seules fixer d'une manière précise à cet égard. Le récent bombardement de Samsoun, ville ouverte, vient de faire de nombreuses victimes dans la population civile et de causer d'importants dégâts aux établissements étrangers ; il devra être également l'objet d'une enquête suivie de sanctions. Ne semble-t-il pas que, seule, la paix en Orient, avec les garanties envisagées par les Puissances, pourrait arrêter le cours de ces atrocités ?

Le Gouvernement français insiste donc pour qu'un dernier effort soit tenté en vue d'amener les adversaires à accepter les conditions générales de paix élaborées à Paris. Il est persuadé qu'un nouvel examen de la question convaincra le Gouvernement britannique de la possibilité de faire un dernier effort, que justifie pleinement la nécessité d'éviter les conséquences désastreuses d'une continuation des hostilités.

Je vous serais reconnaissant d'exposer ces considérations à Lord Balfour et de me faire part de sa réponse définitive.

Veuillez agréer, &c.  
R. POINCARÉ.

[E 6167/557/44]

No. 153.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 20.)*

(No. 534.)  
My Lord,

*Constantinople, June 13, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a letter from Sir Adam Block, enclosing copies of a report on the activities of the Provisional Financial Commission of Control during the Turkish financial year 1921-22.\*

2. The report is of interest, though most of the information contained therein has

\* Not printed.

already been transmitted to your Lordship in my annual report for Turkey for 1921 (please see my despatch No. 426 of the 8th May).

3. In the antepenultimate paragraph of his covering letter Sir Adam Block refers to the creation of certain inter-Allied commissions whereby "the Turkish Government is deprived of certain sources of revenue, taxes, fines," &c. These are in particular the inter-Allied police and captains of the port commissions. In view of the situation of Constantinople as a town under military occupation, it would scarcely be possible or expedient to modify existing arrangements in this respect. They will probably continue until normal conditions are restored here.

4. I willingly endorse Sir Adam Block's reference to the efforts of the Financial Commission and its staff to cope with the embarrassments of the financial situation here and to assist in overcoming the objections of the Turkish Government itself to having its house set in order for it.

5. In Part V of the report, however, the Financial Commission is inclined, I think, to exaggerate, at the expense of this High Commission, the importance of its own intervention.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 153.

*Sir A. Block to Sir H. Rumbold,*

(No. 36.)  
Sir,

*Provisional Financial Commission of Control,  
Constantinople, June 3, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith copy of a report of the proceedings of the Provisional Financial Commission of Control during the year 1921-22,\* that is to say, for the period from the 1st March, 1921, to the 28th February, 1922.

The report speaks for itself and shows the penury of the Turkish Treasury, but I would venture to make the following observations :—

The work entailed upon the Financial Commission has been exceedingly heavy. The control exercised is no real control at all. The French meaning of the word "control" is the one that should be adopted, since the Financial Commission's mandate was merely to supervise or check the operations of the Turkish Ministry of Finance and not to control them in the English sense of the word.

At times, owing to exceptional circumstances and to the personal influence of the members of the commission, it has been able to overstep the limits of its mandate, always to the advantage of the Turkish Government, but the latter has nevertheless, as a general rule, shown persistent opposition to any intervention in the financial administration, which is looked upon as a violation of the sovereign rights of the country.

This dissidence of views has rendered the task of the Financial Commission not only more laborious, but also more unpleasant than it need have been. It has required much tact to avoid an open conflict, and, as your Excellency will remember, Ministers of Finance have succeeded one another somewhat rapidly owing to their unwillingness to co-operate with the Financial Commission.

The Financial Commission, by the nature of things, has not always found itself in complete agreement with the foreign High Commissions and Legations as well as with the military and naval authorities, regarding the strict application to foreigners of Ottoman fiscal regulations, but on the whole, owing to your Excellency's support and that of your French and Italian colleagues, the work has progressed fairly satisfactorily.

Without wishing to attribute exaggerated merit to the Financial Commission, I venture to think that the commission and the staff have never spared themselves in their desire to direct their efforts to a successful issue.

I think it right to mention that, owing to the creation of certain inter-Allied commissions, no doubt necessary under the circumstances, the Turkish Government is deprived of certain sources of revenue, taxes, fines, &c., and is not always able to ascertain in what manner and on what basis these sums are encashed, or the manner in which the proceeds are expended. They certainly do not come to the State, and are subject to no control on the part of the Financial Commission.

\* Not printed.

[8975]



In conclusion, I beg to repeat, what, I think, you yourself once stated, that the Allies, acting through the Provisional Financial Commission of Control, have during the last eighteen months averted the total collapse of the Turkish Administration, which otherwise would have taken place long before now, and whatever the Turkish Government may say, it is a fact that if the crazy machine has been kept going at all it is due, in large part, to the efforts of the High Commissioners.

I beg to thank you for the support you have always given me.

I have, &c.

ADAM BLOCK.

[E 6168/557/44]

No. 154.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 20.)*

(No. 535.)

*Yeniköy, June 12, 1922.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a letter from the Provisional Financial Commission of Control describing the situation of the Turkish Treasury for the month of June. The deficit at the end of this month is put at £ T. 780,000, and the letter states that the extraordinary receipts which have hitherto allowed the Treasury to meet its pressing difficulties are now exhausted. The Provisional Financial Commission of Control therefore considers that there must be a return to the system in force up to March, namely, that the priority payments should be made on the 1st and 15th of each month, and the remaining salaries paid every twenty days, as the resources at the disposal of the Treasury permit. Your Lordship will recollect that in my despatch No. 306 of the 27th March last, I had the honour to report that the High Commissioners had accepted a modification of the system of priority payments introduced by the former Minister of Finance.

2. My Allied colleagues and I considered the enclosed letter from the Provisional Financial Commission of Control at our weekly meeting on the 9th instant, and decided to approve the suggestions put forward by Sir Adam Block. The Provisional Financial Commission of Control is being informed accordingly.

3. I received this morning a visit from the Finance Minister, whom I had not yet had an opportunity of meeting. He came to talk about the precarious situation of the Turkish Treasury, and the object of his visit was to enlist my support in obtaining advances sufficient to tide him over the next few months, so as to enable him during that period to prepare proposals which would establish an equilibrium for the future in the Turkish budget. I had been prepared for some such *démarche* on the part of the Minister of Finance. My colleagues and I are well aware of the penury of the Turkish Treasury, and have already had a preliminary exchange of views as to the best way of meeting the crisis. We are unanimous in considering that the Turkish Government must get rid of the horde of useless and unnecessary officials whose salaries are a heavy charge on the budget. I therefore told the Minister of Finance that one of the first steps was to get rid of superfluous officials, of which I understood there were a great number. He agreed that certain branches of the Turkish Administration were now superfluous, but whenever peace came the whole machinery of the State would be necessary. He therefore proposed to give a large number of superfluous officials leave for two years on reduced pay. I said that other countries had been obliged to take the bull by the horns and make drastic reductions in the staffs of Government Departments. The Turkish Government should do likewise. The Minister of Finance then said that great discontent would be aroused if officials were got rid of in a wholesale fashion. I enquired what was the monthly saving he expected to effect under the head of reduction of salaries. He replied that, although he had not completed the study of the question, he estimated a saving of £ T. 200,000 a month.

4. Tewfik Bey then developed his suggestions for obtaining an advance to tide over the next few months. He pointed out that the value of the unsold stocks belonging to the Turkish Government, on which that Government had originally obtained two advances of £ T. 800,000 and £ T. 1,200,000 respectively, was put at £ T. 400,000 by the Commission of the Debt. Although he thought this valuation too low, he accepted this figure for the sake of argument. He reminded me that the sum of £ T. 252,000 gold had been pledged as additional security for the advances made on the stocks. This gold was worth over £ T. 1,700,000 paper to-day. He suggested, therefore, that the Debt Commission, to which a sum of £ T. 1,063,000 was still due on account of the advance of £ T. 1,200,000 made on the stocks, might, after taking into

account the figure of £ T. 400,000, representing the value of the stocks remaining unsold, deduct from the £ T. 1,700,000, being the proceeds of the sale of gold, an amount sufficient to make up the figure still due to the debt, and either hand the balance over to the Turkish Government or make a corresponding advance on it. He estimated this balance at something like £ T. 1,000,000. This suggestion forms the subject of an identic note just received from the Turkish Government, which I am forwarding to the Provisional Financial Commission of Control for their observations, after which it will be discussed by the Allied High Commissioners.

5. The Minister of Finance then alluded to a sum of £ T. 193,000 gold, which is likewise deposited here and which, he contends, is the property of the Turkish Government. He thought that this gold might either be sold or that the Turkish Government might obtain an advance on it. I shall refer this suggestion equally to the Provisional Financial Commission of Control.

6. Finally, the Minister of Finance suggested that the Council of the Debt should hand over to the Turkish Government the money hitherto encashed by the Council to pay the coupons of the internal loan raised during the war.

7. My colleagues and I propose to discuss the financial situation thoroughly at an early date with the Provisional Financial Commission of Control.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
*High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 154.

*Sir A. Block to Sir H. Rumbold.*

*Commission provisoire de Contrôle,*

*Constantinople, le 3 juin 1922.*

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

JE me fais un devoir de vous faire savoir que la situation du Trésor pour le mois de juin s'établit comme suit, d'après les prévisions de la Commission provisoire de Contrôle :

Recettes :	£ T.	£ T.
Douanes ... ..	1,050,000	
Vilayet ... ..	400,000	
Eastern Telegraph ...	40,000	
Divers ... ..	50,000	
		1,540,000
Dépenses :		
Remboursement avance D.P.O. ...	350,000	
Arriérés priorités à régler le 15 juin ...	320,000	
Frais ... ..	400,000	
Traitements totaux de juin ...	1,250,000	
		2,320,000
Déficit prévu pour fin juin ... ..		780,000

Ce dernier chiffre mérite d'autant plus de retenir l'attention que toutes les ressources extraordinaires (avances ou autres) qui ont permis jusqu'ici au Trésor de parer à des difficultés pressantes sont aujourd'hui épuisées. Il est donc certain que le Ministère des Finances ne sera pas désormais en état de payer régulièrement, à la fin de chaque mois, la totalité des traitements réduits comme il l'avait décidé au mois de mars dernier.

Dans ces conditions, la Commission provisoire de Contrôle estime que le seul moyen d'empêcher la crise actuelle de revêtir un caractère plus aigu résiderait dans le retour à la règle appliquée jusqu'au mois de mars dernier, et consistant à régler les traitements de priorité le 1<sup>er</sup> et le 15 de chaque mois et les autres appointements, les disponibilités du Trésor le permettant, tous les vingt jours.

La Commission pense que dans le cas où votre Excellence partagerait cette manière de voir, elle voudrait bien en saisir la Sublime Porte pour la faire mettre en pratique.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Président,  
ADAM BLOCK.



[E 6169/48/44]

No. 155.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 20.)*

(No. 536. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Yenikuy, June 12, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 560, Confidential, of the 1st instant, forwarding copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington concerning the attitude of the American High Commissioner at Constantinople.

2. I venture to think that, in the second paragraph of his despatch, Sir Auckland Geddes has formed a very correct appreciation of Admiral Bristol's attitude and of the motives by which he has been actuated. On the other hand, the American view with regard to the procedure as between Admiral Bristol and the Allied High Commissioners here is not quite correct. The correspondence between the Allied High Commissioners and Admiral Bristol has been, in the main, confined to questions relating to the consumption taxes and storage of oil. The notes on these two questions have not been numerous, and indeed there has been no correspondence with regard to the consumption taxes for some time past. Admiral Bristol of course receives the circulars which the Allied High Commissioners from time to time address to their colleagues on questions of an economic or administrative character.

3. I very much doubt whether I could induce my colleagues to accept the suggestion that Admiral Bristol should be invited to attend the meetings of the High Commissioners at which questions relating to American interests were likely to come up. I do not think that his attendance at our meetings would conduce to the prompt despatch of business. On the other hand, I am in entire agreement with the expediency of interesting American representatives in conferences at which American interests may be discussed, and it was with this object in view that I induced my colleagues, about a year ago, to revive American representation on the Advisory Trade Committee. All questions affecting American interests are dealt with by this committee, on which Admiral Bristol has a representative. This arrangement has, on the whole, worked satisfactorily. Admiral Bristol expressly disclaims all interest in the political subjects discussed by the Allied High Commissioners. I do not think that questions such as the storage of oil could be suitably thrashed out at a High Commissioners' conference at which Admiral Bristol was present, and I consider that this question, which is the only big issue at present between the Allied High Commissioners and Admiral Bristol, is more properly dealt with by exchanges of notes, which, however, do not preclude personal discussion. Indeed, this High Commission is in continuous touch with the American High Commission through the Counsellor of Embassy and the American First Secretary.

4. I recently had a conversation with Admiral Bristol with regard to the oil question, and we went over the whole ground together. I pointed out to him that, whatever might be their motives in adopting the standpoint which they had adopted, the Allied High Commissioners had not used their position here to further their national interests in this or any other matter. No Allied interests were at present concerned in the oil question, and the measures we had adopted were devised in the interests of the population of Constantinople generally. I am hopeful that the new law with regard to the storage of inflammable liquids, which is practically ready, will soon be promulgated, and that this troublesome question will disappear. I think there is little doubt that Admiral Bristol's attitude in connection with the oil question has been largely influenced by the Standard Oil Company.

5. I would add that on two or three recent occasions Admiral Bristol has gone out of his way to show courtesy in helping this High Commission. I may mention that he was very helpful in connection with the incident when a British ship, the "Datchet," was fired on by the forts at Odessa. Then, again, Admiral Bristol allowed Mr. Childs, who is charged with the duty of repatriating Russian refugees from Egypt, &c., to take a passage in an American destroyer to Alexandria. My personal relations with Admiral Bristol are excellent.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
*High Commissioner.*

[E 6170/5/44]

No. 156.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 20.)*

(No. 537.)

My Lord,

*Yenikuy, June 13, 1922.*

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me yesterday to enquire as to the present position of the negotiations for a peace settlement in the Near East. He pointed out that it was now about five weeks since the Turkish Government had sent a note on the subject to the Allied High Commissions. I referred Izzet Pasha to the answer given by Mr. Harmsworth in the House of Commons on the 25th May in answer to questions on the subject by General Townshend and Mr. Aubrey Herbert. I gave Izzet Pasha the substance of Mr. Harmsworth's reply, showing that His Majesty's Government would prefer to obtain a definite acceptance or refusal of their offer from the three Governments concerned.

2. I pointed out that if the Near East settlement had been hung up the fault lay mainly at the door of the Angora Government. That Government had proposed a preliminary meeting at Ismid from which the representatives of the Constantinople and Greek Governments were apparently to be excluded. This proposal had never commended itself to me, nor did I believe that His Majesty's Government was in favour of it. Izzet Pasha enquired why we had not already objected to this proposal. I suggested that Beicos would be a suitable place for a meeting to which all the parties concerned could come.

3. Izzet Pasha told me that when he had been in Paris recently he had asked the Kemalist representatives why the Angora Government had not launched an attack against the Greeks, seeing that the Kemalists were always proclaiming that their army could and would drive the latter out of Asia Minor. He went on to say that the Kemalists had made a great mistake in not accepting a regular armistice which would have prevented incidents such as the recent bombardment of Samsoun by a Greek squadron. As it was, a state of armistice practically existed on the front at the present moment.

4. We then discussed the attitude of the Angora Government towards the Committee of Union and Progress. Izzet Pasha said that the attacks made on himself by the Angora Government at the time he had gone to London and Paris had recoiled on the head of Mustapha Kemal. Many people in Anatolia knew him (Izzet Pasha) very well, and resented the attacks on him. These had had the effect of weakening Mustapha Kemal's position, and, in order to strengthen it, the latter was now endeavouring to get support from the adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress.

I have, &amp;c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
*High Commissioner.*

[E 6173/3873/44]

No. 157.

*Sir H. Graham to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 20.)*

(No. 555. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Rome, June 16, 1922.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 475, Very Confidential, of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I have to-day received a confidential note from the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, according to a telegram from the Italian Ambassador at Constantinople of the 2nd instant, there is absolutely nothing to confirm the rumour of the conclusion of a military offensive and defensive treaty between the Angora and the Soviet Governments. Marquis Garroni adds that the impression he has got at Constantinople is that relations between the Kemalists and Moscow have been rendered more difficult since the Genoa Conference, which has diminished the isolation of the Soviet Government.

I have, &amp;c.

R. GRAHAM.



*Text of Resolutions, etc., of Paris Near Eastern Conference of March 1922, as Finally Agreed upon between French and British Governments.*

### 1. Programme d'Evacuation de l'Asie Mineure.

POUR que l'évacuation de l'Asie Mineure par les troupes helléniques et sa réoccupation par l'armée turque puissent avoir lieu sans effusion de sang et sans dévastations, il est nécessaire que les armées helléniques et turques soient réciproquement garanties contre toute reprise des hostilités même partielle au cours de leurs mouvements; que les populations et leurs biens soient garantis contre toutes exactions ou représailles de la part de l'une ou de l'autre des armées; que les opérations soient préparées et réglées suivant un programme général établi à l'avance et dans tous ses détails; qu'un organe interallié soit chargé d'établir ce programme de concert avec les Hauts-Commandements hellénique et turc, puis d'en diriger et d'en contrôler l'exécution et qu'ils soient investis à cet effet des pouvoirs nécessaires pour régler les incidents qui pourraient se produire à cette occasion.

Ce programme comportera notamment: (1) la réorganisation préalable de l'administration civile du pays et des forces de sécurité locales; (2) le plan d'évacuation des forces helléniques, réglée par zones successives en jonction des possibilités de transport, en vue d'éviter toute concentration prématurée des troupes helléniques aux abords des ports d'embarquement; (3) le plan de réoccupation des forces turques, limitant les effectifs destinés à l'occupation de chaque zone et conjugué avec le plan précédent de manière qu'une bande de terrain libre de troupes soit constamment interposée entre les deux armées pour éviter les contacts; (4) le plan d'embarquement des forces helléniques.

Pour diriger l'exécution de ce programme et en assurer le contrôle, l'organe interallié devra disposer des moyens suivants: (1) auprès de chacune des deux armées, d'une mission alliée comprenant des officiers de contrôle, des hommes de troupes et des moyens de transport et de liaison (automobiles, télégraphie sans fil); (2) dans la zone à évacuer, d'une mission alliée destinée, pendant la période envisagée, à participer à la réorganisation et à contrôler l'emploi des forces de sécurité locales, gendarmerie et police; (3) dans les ports d'embarquement, de forces interalliées destinées à coopérer au maintien de l'ordre et à la police des embarquements (à Smyrne, trois bataillons environ, un de chaque Puissance; dans la région de Brousse, à Moudaia et à Panderma, un bataillon et demi). Des forces navales alliées sous commandement interallié devront contribuer à la police des opérations à chaque point d'embarquement.\*

Les Gouvernements intéressés sont invités à reconnaître l'autorité, en matière de direction générale des opérations d'évacuation, de l'organe interallié qui installera son siège à Smyrne, et à prendre toutes mesures pour que les décisions de cet organe soient strictement exécutées par leurs troupes ou par les agents de leurs administrations civiles.

Les Alliés ne sauraient en aucun cas accepter la responsabilité du maintien de l'ordre lors de l'évacuation, non plus que le contrôle direct de l'administration civile; dans chaque zone, ce soin incombera aux autorités grecques jusqu'à évacuation, et aux autorités ottomanes dès le départ des troupes helléniques.

### 2. Minorités.

Les trois grandes Puissances considèrent qu'elles ont le devoir d'assurer des garanties spéciales pour la protection des minorités chrétiennes dans les possessions turques en Asie, et minorités musulmanes en Europe. A cet effet, une étude spéciale sera faite, par une commission interalliée nommée par les trois Ministres des Affaires étrangères, des dispositions qui sont contenues dans la législation turque et dans les différents traités rédigés depuis l'armistice. Ces dispositions, après avoir été définitivement amendées et approuvées par les Puissances, seront incorporées dans les articles du futur Traité de Paix et seront applicables, *mutatis mutandis*, à toutes les minorités intéressées. La Société des Nations, dans laquelle il est présumé qu'après

\* The British version contains five paragraphs showing that the "organe interallié" is the committee of Allied generals at Constantinople acting, where necessary, in concert with the committee of Allied admirals. The French Government has been asked for an assurance that it adheres to the substance of these five paragraphs.

la conclusion de la Paix la Turquie sera admise dans les mêmes conditions que la Grèce, sera invitée à assumer spécialement la responsabilité, d'une part, d'assurer ces garanties et, d'autre part, d'en poursuivre l'exécution. La Société des Nations sera invitée à désigner, après consultation des Gouvernements de la Grèce et de la Turquie, des commissaires spéciaux chargés de surveiller l'exécution des clauses du nouveau traité relatives aux minorités, aussi bien en Europe qu'en Asie. L'attention de la Société des Nations sera spécialement attirée sur la nécessité de tels commissaires dans les zones suivantes: (1) Asie: à Smyrne, dans le Pont, dans les vilayets de l'est et du sud-est, en Cilicie; et (2) Europe: en Thrace et en Thessalie. Ces commissaires auront pour mission, sous le contrôle général du Haut-Commissaire du Conseil de la Société des Nations à Constantinople, de faire des visites périodiques dans les zones en question et, de concert avec les autorités locales, de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour protéger les minorités conformément aux clauses du traité. Lesdits commissaires feront directement des rapports au conseil de la Société des Nations et les soumettront à la réunion annuelle de l'assemblée de la Société, pour permettre aux nations représentées à l'assemblée d'être en mesure d'assurer la fidèle exécution des stipulations pour lesquelles la Société aura accordé sa garantie.

### 3. Arménie.

Les trois Puissances, conscientes des engagements, qu'elles ont publiquement pris en tant d'occasions, d'assurer au peuple arménien une existence nationale autonome, et désireuses de mettre en harmonie l'exécution de ces engagements avec la situation de fait actuelle, ont décidé d'inviter la Société des Nations à assumer la responsabilité spéciale de l'exécution des garanties qui sont recommandées pour la protection des minorités, aussi bien en Europe qu'en Asie, étant présumé que la Turquie, après conclusion de la paix, sera admise comme membre de cette Société. Les Puissances estiment qu'il ne pourra se présenter d'occasion plus favorable de donner satisfaction aux demandes des Arméniens, qui, aussi bien en nombre qu'en importance, sont au premier rang de ces minorités. Les demandes des Arméniens se résument dans l'aspiration générale de se voir réserver un foyer national dans l'une ou l'autre des zones de l'Asie Mineure où ils ont jusqu'ici résidé en nombre considérable. Le choix de la région où ce foyer pourra le mieux être assuré dépend de conditions politiques, économiques et sociales sur lesquelles il est actuellement impossible de se prononcer définitivement. Toutefois, les Puissances recommanderont particulièrement à la Société des Nations d'entrer, aussitôt après la conclusion de la paix, en rapports avec le Gouvernement ottoman, à l'effet de créer un tel foyer national pour les Arméniens, et de s'efforcer de déterminer les conditions auxquelles il peut être réalisé et pourvu des garanties nécessaires à son existence future. A cet effet, les trois Puissances promettent de donner toute l'assistance possible, convaincues que la solution amiable du problème arménien est également désirable dans l'intérêt des Arméniens, de la Turquie et de la paix de l'Orient.

### 4. Thrace.

La frontière en Europe entre la Grèce et la Turquie suivra le tracé suivant: elle partira d'un point à choisir dans le voisinage de Ganos sur la mer de Marmara, et sera tracée dans une direction nord et nord-est pour aboutir à la frontière bulgare, dans le massif occidental des monts Strandja, laissant en territoire grec les villes de Baba-Eski et de Kirk-Kilissé et en territoire turc la ville de Rodosto. Une zone démilitarisée sera constituée, qui comprendra le territoire européen de la Turquie et, en territoire hellénique, l'espace compris entre la frontière gréco-turque définie ci-dessus et une ligne qui suivra la rive orientale de la Maritza, de son embouchure à un point situé à 20 kilom. au sud d'Andrinople, un arc de cercle de même rayon ayant Andrinople pour centre tracé à l'est de la ville jusqu'à sa rencontre avec la rivière Pravodia et le cours de cette rivière jusqu'à la frontière bulgare.

Le Gouvernement ottoman accordera au commerce de la partie de la Thrace orientale demeurant grecque toutes facilités dans le port de Rodosto et sur les routes et chemins de fer construits et à construire vers ce port.

En ce qui concerne les villes d'Andrinople et de Smyrne, il sera inséré dans le Traité de Paix des stipulations assurant la protection spéciale et la représentation adéquate des divers éléments ethniques et religieux de ces deux villes. Ces stipulations s'inspireront notamment du projet de traité signé le 10 août 1920 entre la Grèce d'une part, et l'Empire britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon d'autre part.



### 5. Zone démilitarisée.

Dans ceux des territoires de la zone démilitarisée qui sont ou seront occupés par les Alliés et qui sont définis ci-après, les forces de gendarmerie helléniques ou ottomanes seront subordonnées au commandement interallié d'occupation de ces territoires.

Cette zone démilitarisée comprend :

#### 1. En Europe :

Côtes de la mer Egée : du cap Helles à l'embouchure de la Maritza-rives orientales de la Maritza jusqu'à un point situé à 20 kilom. au sud d'Andrinople-arc de cercle ayant Andrinople comme centre, avec le même rayon jusqu'à sa rencontre avec la rivière Pravodia, cours de cette rivière jusqu'à la frontière bulgare-frontière bulgare jusqu'à la mer Noire-côtes de la mer Noire jusqu'au Bosphore (rive ouest).

#### 2. En Asie :

Bosphore (rive est)-côtes de la mer Noire jusqu'au cap situé à 18 kilom. est de Shilé-ligne allant de ce cap au cap de Yarindjé (golfe d'Ismid)-côtes de la mer de Marmara au cap de Yarindjé, à l'isthme séparant du continent la presqu'île d'Artaki, ligne traversant cet isthme dans sa partie la plus étroite, côte de la Marmara jusqu'au point où la frontière du sandjak de Tchanak aboutit sur la Marmara, frontière du sandjak jusqu'à son débouché dans le golfe d'Adramit.

#### 3. Iles :

Sont comprises dans la zone démilitarisée :

- (a.) Les îles de la mer de Marmara;
- (b.) Les îles de Samothrace, Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos et Mytilène.

En vue d'éviter les contacts armés entre les forces turques et helléniques, et de garantir d'autre part la liberté des Détroits :

1. Dans le délai de trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du futur traité, il sera procédé au désarmement et au démantèlement de tous ouvrages, fortifications ou batteries dans une zone comprenant les territoires et îles définis ci-dessus.

Il sera procédé également dans le même délai à l'enlèvement et à la destruction de tous organes de défense maritime (tubes lance-torpilles, lignes de mines ou de torpilles, filets ou obstructions de toute nature, projecteurs, &c.) existants sur le littoral ou dans les eaux de la même zone.

Sont interdites, dans ladite zone et dans ces îles, la reconstruction de ces ouvrages et la construction d'ouvrages semblables. La France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie auront le droit, dans ladite zone, ainsi que dans les îles de Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace et Tenedos, de préparer la mise hors de service des routes et voies ferrées existantes et pouvant être utilisées pour amener rapidement des batteries mobiles, et dont l'établissement y reste interdit.

Dans les îles de Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace et Tenedos, l'établissement de nouvelles routes ou voies ferrées ne pourra être entrepris qu'avec l'autorisation des trois Puissances ci-dessus mentionnées.

2. Les mesures prévues au paragraphe 1, alinéa premier, seront exécutées, par les soins et aux frais de la Grèce et de la Turquie, en ce qui concerne leurs territoires respectifs et sous le contrôle prévu à l'article

3. Les territoires ainsi que les eaux, ports et rades de la zone démilitarisée et les îles qu'elle comprend ne pourront être utilisés militairement en cas de nécessité que par les trois Puissances alliées ci-dessus visées agissant conjointement. Cette disposition n'est pas exclusive de l'emploi dans lesdites zones et îles des forces de gendarmerie et de police helléniques ou ottomanes nécessaires pour y maintenir l'ordre, non plus que d'une garnison hellénique dans l'île de Mytilène, et d'une garnison ottomane à Constantinople en plus de la garde personnelle du Sultan.

Toutefois, les effectifs maximum autorisés pour ces forces de gendarmerie et de police et pour ces garnisons seront fixés en considération du service à assurer, par le commandement interallié des troupes d'occupation visées à l'alinéa 3 ci-dessus.

4. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie agissant conjointement auront la faculté d'exercer la surveillance sur toute l'étendue de la zone démilitarisée, de manière à empêcher qu'aucune action puisse être effectuée ou préparée qui, directement ou indirectement, serait susceptible de porter atteinte aux stipulations des alinéas 1, 2 et 3 précédents.

Cette surveillance sera exercée :

Au point de vue naval, par un stationnaire de chacune desdites Puissances alliées;

Au point de vue militaire, par un service d'inspection confié à des officiers alliés, et qui sera organisé dans les conditions fixées par le commandement interallié d'occupation.

5. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie, agissant conjointement, auront en outre la faculté de maintenir dans la presqu'île de Gallipoli et sur la côte nord de Marmara, jusqu'à Rodosto inclus, telles forces militaires et aériennes qu'elles estimeraient nécessaires.

Tout en limitant l'occupation interalliée à la région ci-dessus visée, lesdites Puissances se réservent le droit de l'étendre conjointement à d'autres régions de la zone démilitarisée prévue, dans le cas où les stipulations qui font l'objet des présentes dispositions viendraient à être violées.

6. Les forces d'occupation visées, ci-dessus, pourront en cas de nécessité exercer à terre le droit de réquisition dans les mêmes conditions que celles prévues par le règlement annexé à la Convention IV de La Haye 1907, ou toute autre convention qui viendrait à remplacer celle-ci et à laquelle chacune desdites Puissances serait partie. Toutefois, ces réquisitions ne pourront être effectuées que moyennant paiement immédiat.

7. La Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Italie retireront leurs troupes de Constantinople et de la partie de la zone démilitarisée qu'elles doivent évacuer trois mois à partir de la mise en vigueur du traité.

Une commission sera constituée dans les quinze jours qui suivront la mise en vigueur du futur traité pour fixer sur place les limites de la partie continentale de la zone démilitarisée prévue ci-dessus. Cette commission sera composée de trois membres respectivement nommés par les autorités militaires de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie, et, selon les cas, d'un membre nommé par le Gouvernement hellénique, en ce qui concerne la partie de la zone placée sous la souveraineté hellénique, ou d'un membre nommé par le Gouvernement ottoman, en ce qui concerne la partie de la zone restant sous la souveraineté ottomane. Les décisions de la commission, qui statuera à la majorité des voix, seront obligatoires pour les parties intéressées.

Les frais de cette commission seront imputés au compte des frais d'occupation de ladite zone.

### 6. Forces armées de la Turquie.

Quant aux forces armées de la Turquie, les Puissances ne voient pas la possibilité d'admettre le maintien de la conscription, qui a été écartée dans tous les traités signés avec les Puissances européennes anciennes belligérantes. Elles sont, toutefois, disposées à étudier dans un esprit amical la détermination de la période dans laquelle le système du recrutement volontaire devra être établi.

Les Puissances alliées recommanderont à la Turquie l'utilisation d'officiers alliés pour l'organisation, le commandement et l'instruction de la gendarmerie, en indiquant que ces officiers seraient au service de la Turquie selon les pratiques en usage avant 1914.

Après un examen approfondi fait par les experts militaires des chiffres qu'il est possible d'indiquer pour les effectifs de l'armée turque, les Puissances admettent que ces effectifs peuvent atteindre les chiffres suivants :

45,000 hommes pour la gendarmerie.  
40,000 hommes pour l'armée.

85,000 hommes au total.

### 7. Dispositions financières.

Il n'est pas dans l'intention des trois Puissances de prévoir dans le Traité de Paix un contrôle général des finances et de l'administration ottomane. Le décret de Moharrem, les décrets annexes, ainsi que tous les contrats énumérés à l'Annexe I des clauses financières du projet de Traité de Sèvres sont maintenus.

Il sera tenu cependant compte des dispositions des Traités de Versailles et de Saint-Germain supprimant les fonctions des délégués allemand et austro-hongrois au Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane.



Le principe de la contribution à la Dette publique ottomane des territoires détachés de l'Empire ottoman est maintenu, ainsi que le mode de calcul de cette contribution.

Une Commission de Liquidation composée de représentants des trois Puissances alliées sera chargée du règlement des dépenses d'occupation militaires des Puissances alliées depuis l'armistice jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du Traité de Paix et après cette mise en vigueur, ainsi que des réclamations des ressortissants alliés pour dommages subis antérieurement à cette mise en vigueur.

La Turquie s'engagera à verser à cette Commission de Liquidation, pendant vingt années, une annuité de cinq millions de livres sterling à exprimer en une monnaie indépendante des fluctuations du change. Toutefois, pendant les premières années, la commission aura la faculté de ne réclamer à la Turquie qu'une somme de trois millions de livres sterling exprimés dans la même monnaie or par an, étant entendu que la différence entre le montant total de l'annuité et cette annuité réduite sera répartie sur les années suivantes.

Pour assurer le paiement de cette annuité, le Gouvernement ottoman devra affecter irrévocablement les excédents restant libres des revenus de la douane, de la dime et de l'agham, ainsi que la part du Gouvernement dans les concessions existantes ou à venir.

La Commission de Liquidation déterminera les moyens qu'elle jugera convenables pour assurer la gestion des revenus donnés en gage.

#### 7 bis. *Clauses financières.\**

##### *Projet d'Article relatif aux Concessions.*

Le Gouvernement ottoman devra demander l'avis de la Commission financière, avant promulgation, sur les contrats des nouvelles concessions ou de prorogation de concessions existantes à accorder en faveur des ressortissants ottomans ou de tous autres.

Le Gouvernement ottoman devra en outre donner à la Commission de Liquidation et à son représentant toutes les facilités nécessaires pour l'accomplissement de sa mission auprès des administrations intéressées.

#### 8. *Régime des Capitulations.*

Les Puissances alliées désirent assurer à la Turquie toute l'indépendance économique compatible avec une protection convenable des intérêts de leurs nationaux. A cet effet, elles sont disposées à réunir à Constantinople, dans les trois mois de l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix, une commission composée de représentants de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, de l'Italie et du Japon d'une part, et de la Turquie d'autre part, pour préparer, avec l'assistance d'experts techniques représentant les autres Puissances à Capitulations, des propositions pour la revision du régime capitulaire en matière fiscale.

Ces propositions stipuleront l'égalité fiscale entre les sujets étrangers et les sujets turcs, tout en protégeant les premiers contre des taxations excessives ou des abus dans le recouvrement, et toute modification des droits de douane qui serait reconnue nécessaire du consentement des Puissances intéressées.

En ce qui regarde les Capitulations en matière judiciaire, les Puissances alliées renouvellent leur offre primitive de réunir dans le même délai une commission semblable pour préparer un projet de réforme judiciaire destiné à remplacer le système capitulaire, qui continuera provisoirement à être appliqué en attendant la mise en vigueur du projet proposé. Cette commission, où la Turquie sera représentée, aura la faculté de recommander soit un système judiciaire mixte, soit un système judiciaire unifié.

[F 6293/5/44]

No. 159.

*Sir L. Worthington-Evans to the Earl of Balfour. (Received June 24.)*

Dear Lord Balfour,

War Office, June 22, 1922.

I ENCLOSE a report by Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington, the Allied Commander-in-chief at Constantinople, on the position there as he sees it to-day.

\* Not for communication to Turkey.

It is almost inevitable that much of it should have a political colour, but as it generally represents views in which I concur, I think it right to forward it for your consideration prior to the resumption of negotiations with the French.

Yours sincerely,

L. WORTHINGTON-EVANS.

Enclosure in No. 159.

*Lieutenant-General Sir C. Harington to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.*

(Very Secret.)

Sir,

*General Headquarters, Constantinople, June 3, 1922.*

IN view of the uncertainty of the situation here at present with regard to the Near East problem, it may be useful to you if I give you my views on the same from my position as General Officer Commanding-in-chief.

2. When I left London, after attending the conference in Paris, I had great hopes that a common basis had been agreed upon between the Allies which would lead to an early settlement. My hopes, however, show little sign of realisation.

3. Three things are quite evident:—

- (i.) Mustapha Kemal and his followers are more obstinate than ever, and will agree to no reasonable terms.
- (ii.) Our Allies are not loyal to the Paris proposals.
- (iii.) The Greek army will not evacuate until terms which they consider fair to Greece are granted, and until adequate safeguards are provided for minorities. (This claim has, of course, been greatly strengthened by the recent atrocities.)

4. The present position is a complete deadlock. On the one side you have England wishing for a settlement on terms fair and just to both sides and advocating an early conference with the Allies, and with Constantinople, Athens and Angora Governments, on the basis of the Paris proposals, with the option of further discussion on points of detail. On the other, you have a flat refusal by Angora, added to which the French are prepared to submit to Mustapha's dictation to attend a conference in the Nationalist area, and which, under cloak of the term "special points," would reopen the whole question. The Italians would probably agree to any solution which would gain concessions for them. The Greeks are merely watching events.

5. From the military point of view there is also deadlock. Neither side wishes to renew operations on a large scale. It is improbable that either side can force a decision. The Greek army has been brought together by the threat of evacuation and by fear of what would happen to the minorities. It has received reinforcements, and is reported to have sufficient money to keep it in the field for another year. It knows the Kemalist army cannot drive it back, and it is not foolish enough to embark on another indecisive struggle. The Kemalist army cannot attack with any hope of success; it also does not want to. It is receiving material support from Russia, and also through the assistance of our Allies. The Kemalist army has not improved, and it is probable that a large majority are tired of war. The solution of the problem will not, in my opinion, be brought about by force of arms in Anatolia.

6. The rôle and usefulness of the Allied forces of occupation must next be considered. As a military force they really fulfil no military purpose. They are too weak and immobile to resist any serious opposition, such as a serious attack by the Kemalists via Ismid on Constantinople, or by the Greeks from Thrace on Constantinople. The latter is unlikely for political reasons, at any rate for the present, and in such an eventuality the Allied navies could assist by threat to Athens and Smyrna. The former, however, is always a possibility and a most serious consideration, because it is unlikely that the French, even if ordered, would take part in any operations against the Kemalists. The Italian force is so weak that it need not be considered. The Allied force under my command is, therefore, an Allied force in name only.

7. It serves, however, to show that we are in occupation of Constantinople and the Straits, and I think the peaceful state of the city is due largely to the presence of the Allied forces and to the Allied police. M. Poincaré stated at the conference in Paris that the presence of British and Allied officers in the streets of Constanti-



nople was exceedingly irritating to the Turks. I do not agree with this. In short, the Turks dislike us all, but, in my opinion, they dislike the British less than the others, as they consider that we are more just. In addition, we bring more money into the city and we support everything, and, what is more, we pay for everything.

8. I think the British force has done very well here, and I also think British prestige in and around Constantinople stands very high to-day. That, however, is not a military reason for retention.

9. It is, at the same time, a very important matter *vis-à-vis* both the Turks and the Allies. Our position here must not be lowered. It has been built up slowly and surely by the dignified demeanour and behaviour of the British naval and military forces and by the straightforward work of the civil and military officials. The position of the British High Commissioner as senior High Commissioner is a strong one, and, in a lesser degree, my position as Allied Commander-in-chief commands a certain amount of respect.

10. At the same time, though it will be admitted that we have made enormous reductions and savings, yet we still form a serious item of expense, costing—according to a statement I saw in the House recently—220,000*l.* a month. Although theoretically recoverable from Turkey, it must be a matter of doubt whether this money ever will be recovered. Our organisation includes highly-paid officers in proportion to the size of the force, which is much scattered. In addition to my position and the Allied staff, there is the General Officer Commanding British Corps of Occupation and staff, and there are several senior officers employed on various sub-commissions—gendarmerie, disarmament and special elements, Allied police, &c. They are employed on useful work, and work which will be of great value if an agreement is reached. If, however, there is no chance of an agreement, then it is for your consideration whether or not the Allied command and Inter-Allied Mission of Control and Organisation, together with the sub-commissions of gendarmerie, disarmament and special elements should not be abolished or suspended, and the British force reduced to one or two battalions just to show the flag and form an escort to the Embassy and protection to the Sultan. From a military point of view, I recommend it, as I know that the limited number of British troops we have here are required for guarding our own possessions. As I have frequently pointed out, this is a bad station for troops separated, as they are, from their families. It might be advantageous to station the small force mentioned above at Gallipoli and leave only the Allied police here for the time being. The question is largely affected by what the French would do. I am sure Marshal Foch would recommend a French reduction also, in fact, withdrawal. Personally, I think an agreement could be reached to reduce or withdraw simultaneously, which would be the best solution.

11. It is, of course, more than possible that, if the French agreed to withdraw or reduce their troops, they would find a loophole for delay or for transferring part of their force into a foreign legion, or some means of leaving officers and troops, to make certain of their claims to the gendarmerie and other interests, and would make much favour with Angora on the score that they had succeeded in getting the British out, &c. I think their elation would be short-lived. They would be extremely unpopular as the only Power of occupation left in Constantinople, and if the Greeks ever threatened Constantinople, they would be powerless by themselves. I think they would also be glad to get rid of this commitment.

12. There are other reasons for withdrawal or reduction. The state of armistice has gone on too long. I am constantly forced to point out that a state of armistice still exists, and that I claim certain rights as the Military Governor in occupation. I am constantly reminded, on the other hand, by the Allied High Commissioners that they are the supreme authority, and administer the city. I have never recognised this. The French and Italian High Commissioners never cease to attempt to belittle my position, with the result that it grows increasingly difficult to carry on. The French and Italian generals are directly under their High Commissioners, so cannot speak freely, and always give their opinions under reserve.

13. Frankly speaking, I do not think there is now room for two sets of machinery, viz., the High Commissions and the Allied command. I recognise to the full the support that has been given to me by the British Government and by the British High Commissioner. The difficulty is that the other two Powers do not recognise my authority under martial law. They claim to be the *de facto* Government of Turkey.

14. From a military point of view, there would be little danger in reducing or withdrawing the troops. It is possible that the various secret societies would become more active, and it is certain that the remains of the material in those Turkish depots

under charge of the Allies would go to Angora. I have sent you, under my C.R.A.F./No. 2476/T/2 a record of what we know to have been sent already from the depots here through French, Italian and Turkish sources. This table speaks for itself.

15. Of course, it must be recognised that withdrawal will mean loss of much valuable and secret information unless the Foreign Office arrange for it. I give the British High Commissioner a copy of all intelligence I get, and I think this information is valuable to him and to His Majesty's Government.

16. If you refer to my memorandum dated the 25th May, 1921, which was attached to the paper put forward by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Secretary of State for War in C.P. 2981 to the Cabinet, you will find that I have been consistent in my opinion throughout. It is that you are not getting value for the money you are expending on this force unless a settlement is imminent, which, I regret to say, does not appear to me to be the case. As a purely military proposition, we are too weak to enforce our will, and we are too strong merely to show the flag.

17. I am fully aware of what this recommendation means to me and to the officers with me, but I cannot conscientiously recommend the retention of this force and these commissions as a military necessity in view of the present urgent need of economy, and I think His Majesty's Government would be well advised to come to an agreement with the Allied Governments to withdraw their forces except, perhaps, for a small detachment, which could be withdrawn by ship in case of danger, and entrust the administration to the Allied High Commissioners. At present, they have no power to enforce their will, as, under martial law, the control of the forces of the military and police is in my hands, and I have never departed from this point of view.

18. In this paper I have attempted to give you the picture as viewed from the military and political aspect. I attach two appendices, A and B,\* which have been written by Colonel Gribbon and Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwall respectively. I have received them since I wrote the above, but as they set forth some very powerful arguments in support of what I have said above, and are, in addition, extremely able papers, I feel sure you will like to have them. It is true that they touch on points outside the strict scope of this command, but the problem is so far-reaching that it is impossible to study it otherwise.

I have, &c.

C. H. HARRINGTON, *Commanding-in-chief,  
The Allied Forces of Occupation (Turkey).*

[E 6319/27/44]

No. 160.

*Director of Military Operations to Foreign Office.—(Received June 25.)*

THE Director of Military Operations and Intelligence presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward, for his information, a copy of a report from General Headquarters, Constantinople, giving the views of Major Strover, D.S.O., R.A., as to the Micro-Asiatic movement in Anatolia.

Major-General Sir William Thwaites thinks this report contains some details which may be new to Sir Eyre Crowe.

*War Office, June 24, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 160.

*Report on the Political Situation in Asia Minor.*

(Secret.)

THE following report on the political situation in Asia Minor is the impression of Major Strover, D.S.O., R.A., British military representative, Smyrna, who was present at the conversation between M. Sterghiades and Major M. A. B. Johnston, M.C., R.A. :—

After hearing M. Sterghiades's balanced ideas on the whole question of Asia Minor, one can understand, what was by no means clear to me before, the real object of the National Defence League in Asia Minor. Seeing that the Athens Government has

\* Not enclosed.



lost the confidence of the Allies, and that the only alternatives offered to the Asia Minor anti-Kemalists are death or evacuation, the league proposes a complete separation from Greece, and the formation of a State for Micro-Asiatics, in which Christians, Circassians and other anti-Kemalists who desire can remain safe. On the lines visualised by M. Sterghiades this new country could be trusted honestly to mean to keep within her boundaries, and not to cause trouble by trying to nibble off bits of their neighbours' land. If evacuation is ordered, the people are determined to remain and protect themselves, and for this purpose they are making uniforms and purchasing arms and ammunition out of their own subscribed funds. Alone, of course, they will be quite insufficient to keep away the Nationalist troops, and all they can hope is to be able to police the interior, and thereby release fighting troops to go to the front.

During some months a circular has been passed round to ascertain whether officers would desire to remain in Asia Minor to hold a frontier in case the army were ordered to evacuate. The circular was sent to strong Veniselists at first, but when a large number of signatures had been obtained it was sent to officers of other political persuasions. In the end I am told that every officer has been shown the circular, and that 90 per cent. have signed in favour of remaining. Although little faith is placed in the powers of persuasion of the vast number of officers recently promoted from the ranks, it is generally thought that the older officers can persuade their men to remain if they remain themselves. So the position appears to be that in the area Brusa-Panderma-Soma-Manissa-Simav there are some 20,000 men formed into 48 battalions and 14 regiments. Cloth, boots, rifles and ammunition are being bought by the villages, and the women are making uniforms at a rapid rate. Sundays are devoted to drill and musketry, and day and night patrols are furnished for the security of the countryside. Eventually it is hoped to make this into a more mobile fighting force.

Pending the completion of training and the completion of the discussion of terms of settlement, a large number of officers and probably a large number of men will remain in the country to keep off the Nationalists, and to organise resistance in the same way as Mustapha Kemal has done. The great difficulty foreseen is the money question, and I am informed that large subscriptions are expected from American, English and Egyptian residents from Greece. In Asia Minor jewellery and all sorts of valuables are being sold to obtain the greatest possible amount of money. All this sounds very magnificent. At Manissa I watched the women making very good uniforms in the local public hall. In the same town I saw a parade of all the men who had uniforms, and it included 500 infantry and 70 cavalry. The uniforms were good; boots are of every possible description; rifles are mostly Martini; men are of all ages from 16 to 55, and of all grades of society, from the roughest peasant to the banker and the schoolmaster. The horses are provided by the cavalrymen, who ride quite well enough. At Khoroskeui and Hamidie I saw about 800 men in civil clothes of every description learning the elements of infantry work under instruction of Greek regular n.c.o.'s and officers. At Kirkagatch I saw the civil guard going out to their night posts, and by day they picketed the road to ensure my safe passage. I heard no complaint from the Turks that these men took advantage of their arms and ammunition to revenge themselves, and I think I would have heard it had it been so.

I think eventually this force will be quite useful for internal security, but at Kirkagatch they are very frightened of the Turk. Asia Minor only provides recruits of ages up to 23, while Greece gives men up to 30 years of age. There is a great deal of desertion amongst the Asia Minor Greeks, and the deserters have taken to the hills and become brigands. If they were really enthusiastic about the defence of their country, the front line should be the only possible place for them.

There is tremendous pro-British propaganda everywhere, and on the least excuse a Union Jack is produced. I think a great many people have lost heart on account of the isolation of Greece, and the knowledge that she has no friends. If the country were backed morally and financially by England, the men would fight with enthusiasm. Nothing in the attitude of the Greek Government appears to justify backing it, however. The Greek Government is now sitting on the fence. It suspects all this movement is a separation of Asia Minor as an attempt at revolution against the King. It wants to withdraw from Asia Minor, but it does not want to be out of a good thing if the separated country makes good. The present question therefore is a separate Asia Minor country under the protection of Greece, which seems to stultify the whole proposition. Revolution is ripe, but will not break out so long as the front is threatened by the Nationalists. After the failures last year at Eskishehr and the Sakaria River, revolution was seriously discussed. On each occasion it was realised that such a thing was impossible so long as the Nationalists were strong. When revolution comes it will

simply mean that the King is told to confine himself to his European possessions, and not to interfere if a number of his troops remain in Asia Minor.

I have met two of the leaders of this national defence movement during the last few days—Dr. Aghiropoulos and Dr. Siyottis. The former is rather a picturesque figure, tall, square, long curly white hair and somewhat Jewish nose. I think he is posing as a second d'Annunzio. He has a great flow of speech, but bases many of his remarks on statements which are not facts. He has not the strength of character nor the necessary self-confidence to carry him through a big undertaking, but he informed me that he represented the opinion of 700,000 people. He has visited all the Ministers in Athens, all the foreign Legations, consuls, &c., to express his views, and he has been received by King Constantine. Until the eve of departure he appears to have had little result, but at the last moment M. Gounaris went back on all he had said before, and told him to rest assured that the Greek army would never leave Asia Minor. Dr. Aghiropoulos told me that it was proposed to offer amnesty to all Greek deserters in Asia Minor at the present moment, provided they surrendered themselves within a certain period. Any brigands and deserters after the limit of time would be forbidden and denied all religious rights.

Dr. Aghiropoulos either has not thought out the problem completely or is not working in the same straight lines as M. Sterghiades. As warning he stated that if the Greeks were forced to retire from Asia Minor they would pay no debts, but would collect all the money they could before departure. Dr. Siyottis is an old man of learned appearance with no posing and no nonsense. He seems to have very sound and honest opinions, and is prepared to abide by M. Sterghiades's decision in all things. He belongs to Constantinople, and seems to call frequently at Smyrna to establish liaison; he is the sort of man to work behind the scenes rather than as figurehead. He said he could raise a revolution in any given three days in Smyrna if he chose, but the time was not favourable at present.

Most of what he told me has already been included in this report. Two points are of interest:—

1. He stated that if a separate State were formed, everyone, including Moslems, would be forced to join the army, except that Moslems might be allowed to buy themselves out.
2. He proposed imposing taxes far heavier than any ordinary Government would dare to impose on a country.

As one of the great causes of content among Moslems with the Greek occupation is their immunity from military service, (1) may produce trouble.

Dr. Siyottis informed me that the war cost the Greek Government 120 million drachmas per diem for maintenance, and if expenditure on fighting were included, the total average per diem would be about 200 million drachmas. After the payment of urgent creditors, the cutting of bank-notes had only produced 500 millions at the outside, and possibly only 150 millions.

[E 6344/5/44]

No. 161.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 26.)*

(No. 552. Confidential.)

My Lord,

*Yenikeuy, June 19, 1922.*

I HAVE referred in my despatches Nos. 509 and 533 to the visit of M. Claude Farrère to Constantinople. The local press has contained a daily account of the entertainments organised in honour of that personage. These have been so numerous as to border on the grotesque, and I understand privately that the French High Commission itself desires nothing better than that M. Farrère should leave Constantinople as soon as possible. M. Farrère has now gone to Ismid, where he has had an interview with Mustapha Kemal.

2. The French community here recently organised a visit to the Dardanelles. The French High Commissioner, the two French generals and the admiral commanding the French squadron in these waters took part in this visit. The Japanese High Commissioner was likewise present, as were one or two British officers. On this occasion General Pellé made a speech, an extract from which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship in my despatch No. 546. I understand privately that



General Pellé likewise said that "France was exerting herself to procure a just and honourable peace for Turkey." General Fillonneau alluded to the Turks as "the enemies of yesterday and the allies of to-morrow"—an expression which caused some surprise. It was subsequently toned down in the press to read "the friends of to-morrow." Considerable attention was paid to the Japanese High Commissioner on this occasion.

3. I have been struck of late by the attitude of the French High Commissioner at the conferences which my Italian colleague and I have held with him to discuss questions relating to the proposed commissions of enquiry and to the Near East settlement generally. General Pellé's attitude, both with regard to the last note from Angora and to the proposed commissions of enquiry, has differed from that of my Italian colleague and myself, and it is clear that General Pellé is reluctant to acquiesce in action which may be unwelcome to the Nationalists.

4. I am somewhat puzzled by the general French attitude with regard to the Angora Government. That Government has recently passed a measure dealing with the property belonging to Armenians or Ottoman Greeks who left Cilicia when that province was evacuated by the French forces. This measure is of a confiscatory character and has produced a very unfavourable impression on my colleagues and on myself. It has already led to vigorous protests from the Armenian Patriarch, and has been referred by the Allied High Commissioners to the Juridical Commission. As soon as that body has reported, the Allied High Commissioners will meet to discuss the action to be taken. In speaking of it the French High Commissioner went so far as to allude to the Kemalists as "insupportables."

5. Thus the French have a practical illustration of Kemalist bad faith in regard to various matters connected with Cilicia. They cannot help disliking the intimacy prevailing between Angora and Moscow, nor can they be under any illusion as to the likelihood that the Kemalists may stir up trouble for them in Syria. In spite of all this, they appear so obsessed by the fear of ferment in the Mussulman populations controlled by them as to be inclined to push subserviency to Angora to undue lengths.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 6345/557/44]

No. 162.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 26.)*

(No. 553.)

My Lord,

*Yenikeuy, June 20, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 535 of the 12th June, to inform your Lordship that I called a meeting of the Allied High Commissioners and Provisional Financial Commission of Control on the 15th instant to discuss the question of the financial situation of the Turkish Government and the suggestions made to me by the Minister of Finance as to the sources which might be employed for the provision of an advance to enable the Treasury to tide over for the next few months.

2. In general, my Allied colleagues and I were unanimously of opinion that it was useless to attempt to find temporary remedies for these recurring financial crises of the Turkish Government. Last year this system had been possible, as money had been forthcoming, thanks to a succession of extraordinary and non-recurrent windfalls (payments by the Eastern Telegraph Company, Régie, &c.) which had opportunely presented themselves. This system might even be continued, however uncommendable it be, if there were any prospect of similar providential windfalls occurring again this year. But there is no such prospect, or at least none of windfalls sufficiently great to make any appreciable difference. There is not even the expectation of any early peace to encourage the attempt to discover temporary palliatives.

3. In these circumstances the High Commissioners agreed that another endeavour must be made fundamentally to reorganise the financial administration. This can be done in two ways: by a serious study and strict enforcement of economies and by the increase in various manners of the existing sources of revenues.

4. The most obvious methods of enforcing economies is by the wholesale retirement of the pre-war officials whose duties have become practically nil since the restriction of the effective authority of the Central Government to the town and vilayet of Constantinople. Such a course will inevitably be unpopular, will be resisted to the utmost by the

Government, and may even lead to disorder. The present revenue is, however, sufficient to defray the priority payments, and pressure can be brought to bear by requesting the Provisional Financial Commission of Control to sanction none but priority payments until these supernumerary officials have been placed on half-pay pensions.

5. The existing source of revenues can be augmented in several ways; *inter alia*, by raising, if necessary, the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* customs duties to 15 per cent., by suppressing certain external custom-houses and in general by the application of severe measures for repressing the corruption which is rife throughout the customs administration; and by the levy of a higher landed property tax, which could be increased without undue hardship.

6. The High Commissioners have consequently requested the Provisional Financial Commission of Control to draw up comprehensive recommendations in this sense. As soon as they shall have been received, a further attempt will be made to induce the Turkish Government to accept them. There is faint likelihood of that acceptance being obtained willingly. The Turks are traditionally incapable of appreciating their own interests. There are other considerations which carry greater weight with them. And, in addition, at the present time the Turks of Constantinople fear the reprobation which any truckling to foreign control will certainly call forth from Angora. Yet, without control, no reforms can be effective.

7. It must therefore be anticipated that the utmost pressure will be required to achieve even a modicum of result. The position is also complicated by the fact that the Allies, in general, and the Provisional Financial Commission of Control, in particular, have not the machinery and staff at their disposal to exercise forcibly the real control which can alone produce concrete results. Moreover, some time must necessarily elapse before any scheme for the reorganisation of the financial services can be drawn up and put into force.

8. I shall forward to your Lordship, in due course, the minutes of our discussion of the 12th instant of which this despatch gives merely the general outline, and shall keep you informed of the proposals which the Provisional Financial Commission of Control is to put forward and of the action which the High Commissioners may decide to adopt thereon.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 6348/27/44]

No. 163.

*Sir H. Rumbold to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 26.)*

(No. 556.)

My Lord,

*Constantinople, June 20, 1922.*

IT was announced in the local press a couple of weeks ago that preparations were being made at Ismid for the reception of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, and it was even rumoured that he had already arrived at Ada Bazar. These reports proved at the time to be baseless. Hamid Bey, the Kemalist representative here, contradicted them flatly in conversation with Mr. Ryan.

2. On Wednesday, the 14th instant, however, Mustapha Kemal Pasha did actually arrive at Ada Bazar, and he came on to Ismid a day or two later.

3. While at Ada Bazar, Mustapha Kemal gave an interview to a correspondent of the "Wakt," who had gone post haste to meet him. The pasha said that his object was to inspect the Ismid front, which he had been unable to visit previously, and that he had found everything satisfactory. Questioned regarding the Pontus atrocities, he said that the Greeks had been removed for military reasons from certain areas, and that such measures would necessarily be taken so long as the war continued. Asked whether the Greek fleet would continue its piratical operations in the Black Sea, he said that last year the Greeks had bombarded Inebolu, and this year they had bombarded Samsoun. The Nationalists had reckoned with such eventualities beforehand. They produced no result, except to strengthen the national resolve.

4. The correspondent observed that Ali Fuad Pasha's departure from Moscow had been interpreted unfavourably in certain quarters. Mustapha Kemal replied that there was no ground for this. Relations with Russia were excellent.

5. The Pasha said that there was no intention of altering the fundamental law,

[8975]



but that the draft law on the duties and competency of commissioners was now ready, and would shortly be laid before the Assembly. As your Lordship is aware, the question of Cabinet responsibility became a burning one in Angora towards the end of last year, and served as a peg on which to hang a strong attack on Mustapha Kemal's position.

6. There can be little doubt that Mustapha Kemal's visit to the Ada Bazar and Ismid area is due mainly to military considerations. Apprehension was felt a short time ago in Turkish circles lest the Greeks should be contemplating forward action in the direction of Constantinople or Ismid, or both. Still more recently there has been a good deal of talk (though principally in Greek circles, so far as I can gather) of an intended Kemalist offensive. The most definite reason given for Mustapha Kemal's journey is, however, the anxiety caused at Angora by an armed anti-Kemalist movement in the neighbourhood of Bolu. That such a movement exists no longer admits of doubt. I have not hitherto reported on it owing to the difficulty of obtaining accurate information and estimating the importance of the movement.

7. It would now appear that various discontented elements have combined in a kind of revolt in the district in question, and that this revolt has attained sufficient proportions to necessitate the despatch of loyal forces to repress it. A certain colonel, Shevket Bey, formerly a deportee in Malta, who was after his return placed in command of a unit of the Kemalist army, is said to have put himself at the head of the malcontents. The Greeks are also alleged to have a finger in the pie. According to some accounts, Shevket Bey is acting in the Enverist interest. According to others, the movement is connected with the recent re-entry into activity of the old gang of the Committee of Union and Progress. Yet another theory is that it is an attempt to put into effect the scheme for the establishment of a local anti-Kemalist Government under Greek auspices in Western Asia Minor.

8. The truth probably is that the movement such as it is has brought together desperate elements. The insurgents are said to number 2,000 or 3,000, but I doubt whether it will prove to be beyond the power of the Angora authorities to repress the revolt fairly quickly in the same way in which they have got the better of other local movements, notably in the Konia region. At the same time, the present movement derives a special importance from the fact that it appears to contain a Turkish military element; from its having occurred in an area close both to Constantinople and to the Greek front; and from the existence in the area of large numbers of Circassians, who for various reasons, including their past association with Ferid Pasha's Government and later on with the Greeks, are compromised in the eyes of the Kemalists.

9. M. Claude Farrère left for Ismid on the 18th June to visit Mustapha Kemal Pasha. He was sent there in a French destroyer, and was accompanied by Hamid Bey, the Kemalist representative here.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,  
High Commissioner.

[E 6327/19/44]

No. 164.

*Sir M. Cheetham to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 26.)*

(No. 1483.)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note from M. Poincaré, dated the 24th June, respecting proposed commissions for the investigation of Turkish and Greek atrocities in Asia Minor.

Paris, June 25, 1922.

Enclosure in No. 164.

*M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.*

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,  
Paris, le 24 juin 1922.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

VOTRE Excellence a bien voulu me faire savoir, à la date du 15 de ce mois, qu'elle avait transmis au principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté ma note du 3 juin, relative à

l'envoi de commissions pour faire une enquête sur les atrocités imputables aux Turcs et aux Grecs en Asie Mineure. Votre Excellence m'a informé en même temps de l'acceptation par le Gouvernement britannique des propositions du Gouvernement français en ce qui concerne cette enquête. Lord Balfour considère, lui aussi, qu'elle ne devrait porter que sur des faits ne remontant pas au delà d'une année. Cette période comprendrait les douze mois précédant la date de la Commission d'Enquête internationale, étant entendu qu'elle ne pourrait en tout cas commencer plus tard que le 1<sup>er</sup> juillet 1921.

Votre Excellence ajoute que le Gouvernement anglais maintient son objection en ce qui concerne les faits qui ont déjà été l'objet d'un examen par une commission d'enquête et qui ne devraient pas donner lieu à une enquête nouvelle. En ce qui concerne les sanctions, le Gouvernement britannique fait observer que le Gouvernement des États-Unis n'a accepté de prendre part à l'enquête que si celle-ci doit se borner à l'obtention de renseignements précis, destinés à l'information des Gouvernements intéressés. Dans ces conditions, les sanctions devraient être prises, si toutefois il semble possible d'en prendre quelque-une, par les trois Gouvernements alliés, après réception et examen des rapports des commissions d'enquête. Enfin, au sujet de la composition de ces commissions d'enquête, le Gouvernement anglais propose de laisser la nomination de ses membres à la décision des Hauts-Commissaires alliés à Constantinople, qui se concerteraient à ce sujet.

Le Gouvernement français est heureux de constater que, sur la plupart des points envisagés, il est d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique.

Il considère que la période sur laquelle portera l'enquête devrait commencer, non point une année avant la date de la nomination de la commission internationale, mais bien une année avant la date de la note française qui contient cette proposition, c'est-à-dire le 3 juin 1921.

Il pense, comme le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, qu'il n'y a pas lieu de soumettre à l'examen d'une nouvelle commission les faits qui ont déjà été l'objet d'une enquête, tels que les faits de violence qui ont marqué l'évacuation d'Ismid par les Grecs au mois de juin 1921. Mais il fait remarquer que, si les Hauts-Commissaires à Constantinople possèdent les documents relatifs aux opérations de la commission d'enquête envoyée à Ismid, lors de ces événements, il conviendrait d'établir sur ces faits un rapport d'ensemble qui n'a pas encore été rédigé.

En ce qui concerne les sanctions, le Gouvernement français estime, comme le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, qu'elles devraient être prises par les trois Gouvernements alliés quand ils auront reçu et examiné les rapports des commissions d'enquête. Mais il se demande, au cas où aucune sanction ne pourrait être envisagée, s'il serait bien utile de procéder à de telles enquêtes.

Enfin, il est d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique pour laisser aux Hauts-Commissaires alliés à Constantinople le soin de choisir les membres de la commission internationale.

Sous réserve de ces observations, je donne au Haut-Commissaire français à Constantinople l'instruction de se concerter avec ses collègues alliés en vue de désigner les membres de la commission d'enquête.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

R. POINCARÉ.

[E 7219/6453/65]

No. 165.

*Note communicated by M. Schanzer to Foreign Office, June 27, 1922.*

BIEN que dans la réunion de Paris de mars dernier les Alliés—par une nouvelle rédaction de l'article 239 du Traité de Sèvres et par la signature d'un accord relatif à l'accord tripartite—soient tombés d'accord sur quelques moyens aptes à donner une certaine efficacité pratique à l'accord tripartite, il n'est pas douteux que ces moyens, même s'il était possible de les appliquer réellement, ne représentent pas des garanties sérieuses pour la réalisation du tripartite.

La nouvelle formule de l'article 239, en effet, donne à la Commission de Liquidation à instituer en Turquie le droit d'exprimer un avis sur l'attribution des concessions de la part du Gouvernement ottoman, mais cet avis n'aurait pas un caractère obligatoire pour ledit Gouvernement.

Et il faut prévoir aussi l'éventualité que la Turquie refusait d'une façon générale de donner des concessions dans la zone d'Asie Mineure attribuée à la priorité économique italienne.

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On ne peut pas oublier, d'autre part, que l'accord tripartite avait une valeur bien différente lorsqu'il se basait sur une situation politique de la Turquie telle qu'on pouvait l'envisager à l'époque du Traité de Sévres, tandis que les événements politiques ont depuis complètement changé cette situation.

Cependant, à l'heure actuelle, l'Italie ne se trouve pas seulement dans l'impossibilité de réaliser (au moins pour le moment) les avantages qui lui ont été attribués par le tripartite, mais en vertu d'un article de cet accord (article 6) elle est tenue à reconnaître aux Puissances mandataires, dans les pays détachés de l'ancien Empire ottoman, les droits et les privilèges qu'elle ne peut pas se réserver pratiquement en Asie Mineure.

L'Italie, en d'autres mots, devrait dès maintenant se désintéresser—en certaines limites—économiquement des régions de mandat, tandis qu'elle n'aurait pas le moyen de voir pratiquement appliqué dans sa zone de priorité l'engagement analogue que les Alliés ont pris envers elle.

Cet état de choses impose pourtant au Gouvernement italien de chercher quelque façon de rétablir en faveur de l'Italie l'équilibre de la Méditerranée orientale troublé à la suite des difficultés d'application de l'accord tripartite, qui représentait dans cet équilibre une certaine réalisation des droits et intérêts italiens visés par l'article 9 du Pacte de Londres de 1915.

Le Gouvernement italien demande donc au Gouvernement anglais que, tout en restant non changé pour toute éventualité future ce qui dans les rapports de l'Italie et des Alliés a trait à l'accord tripartite, le Gouvernement britannique consente à ne pas se prévaloir des dispositions de l'article 6 précité relativement aux territoires de mandat de la Palestine et de la Mésopotamie de façon à ne pas entraver les initiatives italiennes dans ces régions.

En vue d'assurer, en outre, des conditions favorables à l'activité italienne en Palestine et en Mésopotamie, le Gouvernement italien serait très désireux que le Gouvernement britannique s'engage à admettre avec une bienveillance spéciale et naturellement en subordination aux principes généraux du Covenant de la Société des Nations, la participation du travail italien aux travaux publics à exécuter dans les susdits territoires de mandat. Et cela, en particulier, par l'association du capital italien au capital anglais et au capital sioniste, et en assurant la protection de la main-d'œuvre italienne qui serait employée en tenant compte des attitudes spéciales dont elle a déjà fait preuve en Orient pour l'exécution des travaux publics tels que ports, chemins de fer, services hydro-électriques, &c.

Les deux Gouvernements pourraient s'engager dès maintenant à stipuler sur la base des principes exposés des accords réglant les moyens de collaboration anglo-italienne dans les travaux publics de Palestine et Mésopotamie moyennant la fixation d'une certaine quantité de main-d'œuvre italienne à y employer, et la stipulation des dispositions nécessaires pour la protection du travail.

Le Gouvernement italien, comme conséquence de ce qui précède, s'engagerait à donner son consentement aux projets de mandat pour la Palestine et la Mésopotamie présentés par le Gouvernement britannique à la Société des Nations à la condition seulement que les modifications suivantes soient apportées aux textes de ces projets :

#### *Palestine.*

1. L'article 7 du projet de mandat devrait être rédigé de façon à garantir que la loi sur la nationalité prévue par ce même article ne portera aucune atteinte aux droits et intérêts des Italiens habitant actuellement le pays, ni des autres qui s'y fixeront ensuite pour des motifs de travail ou de caractère religieux.

2. Quant à l'article 9, le Gouvernement italien désire qu'un système de justice mixte appliqué par des magistrats mixtes soit institué en Palestine analogiquement à ce qui a été fait en Egypte. Un certain nombre de places dans la magistrature mixte devrait être réservé aux Italiens en relations avec l'importance des intérêts italiens en Palestine.

3. La rédaction actuelle de l'article 2 semble pouvoir se prêter à établir quelque sorte de monopole en faveur des éléments sionistes à travers la collaboration de l'Administration de la Palestine avec l'agence israélienne. Le Gouvernement italien désire que cet article soit convenablement modifié de façon à éliminer toute possibilité de contradiction avec les propositions ci-dessus formulées relativement à la participation de l'activité italienne en Palestine et à sa collaboration avec l'activité britannique et sioniste.

4. L'article 15 reconnaît "le droit pour chaque communauté de maintenir ses propres écoles pour ses propres membres et dans sa propre langue." On pourrait interpréter cette diction dans le sens que seulement des écoles pour certaines catégories

d'élèves et exclusivement dans les langues de chacune de ces catégories seront permises en Palestine, ce qui pourrait entraîner la suppression de toutes les écoles actuelles des ordres religieux.

Le Gouvernement italien demande que ces dispositions soient modifiées dans le but, non seulement de garantir le maintien des écoles déjà existantes, mais d'établir aussi liberté complète d'ouverture de nouvelles écoles, soit appartenant aux communautés religieuses, soit de tout autre genre.

5. L'article 16 établit que, pour motifs d'ordre public et de bon gouvernement, le mandataire pourra exercer le contrôle sur toutes les institutions religieuses et philanthropiques existantes en Palestine. Le Gouvernement italien demande, dans l'intérêt des communautés religieuses, que les cas d'intervention dans les affaires intérieures de ces institutions soient mieux déterminés et le plus possible restreints.

6. La dernière partie de l'article 18 a déjà reçu application par l'accord douanier franco-anglais concernant les territoires de Syrie et Palestine avant que la Société des Nations ait discuté les projets de mandat. Si la Société des Nations approuvait le principe sur la base duquel ledit accord a été conclu, le Gouvernement italien désirerait vivement de stipuler avec le Gouvernement britannique un accord spécial analogue pour le traitement douanier des marchandises provenant ou adressées aux îles de la mer Égée qui resteront sous la souveraineté italienne et si et lorsque il sera possible à la zone de priorité économique italienne en Asie Mineure.

Le Gouvernement italien avait formulé d'autres observations sur les articles 8, 25, 27, 28 du projet de mandat pour la Palestine, mais, à la suite de la communication faite par le Foreign Office à l'Ambassade d'Italie à Londres par sa note du 23 juin courant, il se déclare pleinement satisfait des modifications apportées par le Gouvernement britannique aux articles susdits.

Le Gouvernement italien désire, toutefois :

(1.) Recevoir, lui aussi, l'assurance contenue dans le projet de traité anglo-américain pour la Palestine (annexé à la note du 20 juin courant du Foreign Office à l'Ambassade d'Italie à Londres) que "rien ne sera fait dans l'administration de la Palestine qui puisse porter atteinte aux droits civils ou religieux des communautés non juives dans cette région."

(2.) Que les missions religieuses italiennes, leurs écoles et les institutions philanthropiques italiennes pourront continuer à jouir des privilèges dérivant des Capitulations, qui exemptent ces institutions des taxes spécialement foncières et douanières. Cette demande est naturellement subordonnée à l'octroi des privilèges analogues aux missions religieuses et institutions d'autres nations.

Le Gouvernement italien reste, enfin, dans l'attente de connaître les modifications qui, d'après la réserve contenue dans la note précitée du Foreign Office, seront apportées à l'article 14 du projet de mandat.

Il manifestera alors son point de vue à ce propos.

#### *Mésopotamie.*

Le Gouvernement italien a confiance que le Gouvernement britannique voudra modifier les articles 5, 18, 20 du projet de mandat pour la Mésopotamie analogiquement aux modifications apportées aux articles correspondant 8, 27 et 28 du projet pour la Palestine.

Analogiquement, d'ailleurs, aux modifications proposées par le présent mémorandum pour les articles 9, 15, 16 et 18 du projet pour la Palestine, le Gouvernement italien présente des propositions identiques pour les articles 6, 8, 10, 11 du projet de mandat pour la Mésopotamie.

Quant à l'article 15 de ce dernier projet, le Gouvernement italien se rapporte à ce qui a été exposé ci-dessus relativement à la participation du travail italien à l'exécution des travaux publics en Palestine et à la collaboration éventuelle des initiatives italiennes avec les initiatives anglaises.

Les accords que le Gouvernement britannique se propose de stipuler sur la base de cet article avec le Gouvernement de Mésopotamie devraient tenir compte des ententes éventuelles anglo-italiennes.

Quant à l'article 16 concernant l'éventualité d'autonomie locale pour les zones en prévalence kurdes, le Gouvernement italien doit faire remarquer que, au cas où la Société des Nations consentait à admettre un régime spécial pour ces zones, le projet relatif de systématisation administrative devrait être soumis préalablement à la Société des Nations, car il serait inadmissible que les zones kurdes soient soustraites au mandat.



D'autre part, comme le Gouvernement italien ne doit négliger aucune tentative pour essayer d'obtenir aussi quelque avantage pratique dans la zone d'Asie Mineure réservée par l'accord tripartite à l'activité économique italienne, le Gouvernement royal désirerait vivement de stipuler avec le Gouvernement britannique un engagement spécial dans le but d'appuyer à l'avenir auprès du Gouvernement turc les demandes de concessions économiques que le Gouvernement italien ou les groupes financiers italiens pourront présenter au Gouvernement ottoman pour réaliser en quelque façon, même partielle, la priorité italienne dans ladite zone. En conséquence de cet engagement particulier anglo-italien, on pourrait stipuler d'autres accords entre les deux pays dans le but d'éliminer les différences d'intérêt économique qui pourront se vérifier à l'avenir entre les initiatives italiennes pour le développement de l'Anatolie et les entreprises britanniques dans la zone de Smyrne. Ces accords devraient avoir principalement pour objet les conditions du trafic et les questions des chemins de fer reliant la zone italienne à la zone de Smyrne.

Le Gouvernement italien désirerait, en outre, vivement la possibilité d'un accord anglo-italien en vue d'obtenir et d'effectuer l'exploitation des pétroles dans les vilayets nord orientaux de la Turquie. Cet accord devrait être en relation avec la lettre sur les pétroles adressée à Gênes par Mr. Lloyd George et M. Schanzer.

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### CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE AND SYRIA, MESOPOTAMIA AND ARABIA.

[E 397/78/65]

No. 166.

*Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 11.)*

(No. 89.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 9th January, respecting the Palestine mandate.

*Paris, January 10, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 166.

*Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

M. l'Ambassadeur,

*Paris, le 9 janvier 1922.*

VOTRE Excellence a bien voulu me communiquer, le 29 décembre dernier, une lettre en date du même jour par laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a exposé au Gouvernement des États-Unis les raisons pour lesquelles il estimait devoir, en raison de la situation spéciale de la Palestine, demander à la Société des Nations d'approuver, dès sa prochaine session, les termes du mandat relatif à ce pays, en attendant que l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie permette d'en demander la consécration définitive.

En exprimant les regrets du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté de n'avoir pu, en raison de l'urgence et des conditions particulières à la Palestine, consulter préalablement le Gouvernement de la République, votre Excellence me donnait l'assurance que son Gouvernement se concerterait avec le Gouvernement français en vue de la réponse à adresser au Gouvernement des États-Unis au sujet des mandats pour la Syrie et la Mésopotamie—mandats qui ont à répondre à des situations entièrement comparables alors que la situation de la Palestine se trouve sensiblement différente.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté exprimait le vœu que le représentant du Gouvernement français au Conseil de la Société des Nations recevrait l'instruction de soutenir la proposition du représentant du Gouvernement britannique relative au mandat pour la Palestine.

J'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français s'associe entièrement—comme il l'a, d'ailleurs, déjà fait à propos des mandats (B)—aux assurances données au Gouvernement des États-Unis tant au sujet de l'égalité de traitement réservée aux ressortissants et aux sociétés américaines en raison de la participation des États-Unis à la guerre qu'au sujet des moyens d'assurer cette égalité indépendamment du fait que les États-Unis sont demeurés en dehors de la Société des Nations.

En ce qui concerne les modifications que, pour donner satisfaction au désir des États-Unis, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté est disposé à apporter sur certains points au mandat pour la Palestine, le Gouvernement français doit présenter les observations suivantes :

1. Ainsi que le fait remarquer le memorandum américain du mois d'août 1920, le projet de mandat pour la Syrie dispose à son article 5 que les tribunaux consulaires étrangers seront maintenus jusqu'à la mise en vigueur du régime judiciaire nouveau prévu aux articles suivants. Cette disposition ne se retrouve pas dans les articles correspondants des mandats pour la Palestine et pour la Mésopotamie. Le Gouvernement des États-Unis demande que cette disposition soit également introduite dans ces derniers mandats.

Le Gouvernement français est disposé à soutenir le Gouvernement britannique en vue de la fermeture immédiate des tribunaux consulaires en Palestine sous la condition que la réserve figurant au seul mandat pour la Syrie sera également supprimée et n'y figurera pas plus que dans les mandats pour la Palestine et pour la Mésopotamie.

Quant au rétablissement des Capitulations, au cas où le régime des mandats



prendrait fin, le Gouvernement français est d'accord pour donner satisfaction au Gouvernement américain en introduisant dans les mandats une stipulation à cet effet.

2. En ce qui concerne l'égalité économique et les objections élevées par le Gouvernement américain contre la situation spéciale réservée à l'organisation sioniste, le Gouvernement français est disposé à soutenir le point de vue du Gouvernement britannique, étant entendu que les ressortissants et sociétés français bénéficieront en Palestine des mêmes droits et avantages qui seraient reconnus aux ressortissants et sociétés américains.

3. Pour ce qui est des établissements scolaires et charitables, le Gouvernement français prend acte volontiers de l'assurance donnée au Gouvernement américain que l'article 9 de la Convention franco-anglaise du 23 décembre 1920 ne doit pas, dans l'intention du Gouvernement britannique, faire obstacle au développement de ces œuvres. Le Gouvernement français n'entend pas se dégager de l'obligation réciproque que chacun des deux contractants a pris dans cet article de ne pas ouvrir d'écoles nouvelles dans les territoires soumis au mandat de l'autre Gouvernement contractant. Cependant, pour le cas où serait reconnu aux États-Unis—et sans doute à leur suite à l'Italie, à l'Espagne et aux autres États—le droit d'ouvrir de nouvelles écoles en Palestine et en Mésopotamie, le Gouvernement français doit faire observer qu'il ne pourrait admettre que ce droit lui fût refusé à lui seul. Il a accepté de ne pas ouvrir de nouvelles écoles en Palestine et en Mésopotamie dans la pensée que les tiers accepteraient une même limitation de leur activité, et il présume que telle était également la pensée du Gouvernement britannique en acceptant de ne pas ouvrir de nouvelles écoles en Syrie et au Liban. Il considère, par suite, que, si le droit d'ouvrir de nouvelles écoles en Palestine et en Mésopotamie était reconnu à de tierces Puissances, l'article 9 de la convention du 23 décembre 1920 ne ferait pas obstacle au bénéfice, pour chacun des deux contractants, du traitement accordé à celle de ces tierces Puissances qui serait la plus favorisée.

Sous réserve de ces observations, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français est prêt à inviter son représentant au Conseil de la Société des Nations à donner tout son appui au représentant dans ce conseil du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

E. DE LA PARETTI DE LA ROCCA.

[E 700/78/65]

No. 167.

*Draft Treaty with the King of Irak, January 10, 1922.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, January 12.)*

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate.

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India.

His Majesty the King of Irak.

Whereas on the 23rd August, 1921, his said Majesty the Emir Feisul Ibn Hussein was by vote of the people elected to be King of Irak; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has recognised the said Feisul Ibn Hussein as King of Irak and responsible for the government of the country; and

Whereas His Majesty the King of Irak considers that it is to the interest of Irak, and will conduce to its rapid advancement, that he should conclude a treaty with His Britannic Majesty on the basis of alliance.

For this purpose the high contracting parties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

Sir Percy Zachariah Cox, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., His Majesty's High Commissioner and consul-general at Bagdad;

His Majesty the King of Irak:

His Highness Saiyid Sir Abdurrahman, G.B.E., Naqib-al-Ashraf, Bagdad;

who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

1. His Britannic Majesty undertakes, subject to the other provisions of this treaty, to provide advice and assistance to Irak during the period of the present treaty. His Britannic Majesty shall be represented in Irak by a High Commissioner and consul-general assisted by the necessary staff.

2. His Majesty the King of Irak undertakes that for the period of the present treaty no gazetted official of other than Irak nationality shall be appointed by the Irak Government without the concurrence of His Britannic Majesty. A separate agreement shall regulate the numbers and conditions of employment of British officials so appointed.

3. His Majesty the King of Irak agrees to frame for submission to the representatives of the people of Irak and to give effect to an organic law which shall be in conformity with the provisions of the present treaty, and shall take account of the rights, interests and wishes of all populations inhabiting Irak. This organic law shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals. It shall provide that no discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Irak on the ground of race, religion or language, and shall secure that the right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language (while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Government of Irak may impose) shall not be denied or impaired. It shall prescribe the constitutional procedure, whether legislative or executive, by which decisions will be taken on all matters of importance, including those involving questions of fiscal, financial and military policy.

4. Without prejudice to the provisions of article 18 of this treaty, His Majesty the King of Irak agrees to be guided by the advice of His Britannic Majesty, tendered through the High Commissioner, on all such matters of importance as relate to the fiscal and financial policy of the Irak Government so long as that Government is under financial obligations to the Government of His Britannic Majesty; and on all such other matters of importance as affect the interests of His Britannic Majesty, for the whole period of the treaty.

5. His Majesty the King of Irak may appoint an agent to represent him in London. Elsewhere His Britannic Majesty undertakes the protection of Irak nationals abroad. His Majesty the King of Irak will himself issue exequaturs to representatives of foreign Powers in Irak after His Britannic Majesty has agreed to their appointment.

6. His Britannic Majesty undertakes to use his good offices to secure the admission of Irak to membership of the League of Nations as soon as possible.

7. His Britannic Majesty undertakes to provide such support and assistance to the armed forces of His Majesty the King of Irak as may from time to time be agreed upon by the high contracting parties. A separate agreement regulating the extent and conditions of such support and assistance shall be concluded between the high contracting parties and communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

8. No territory in Irak shall be ceded or leased to or in any way placed under the control of any foreign Power; this shall not prevent His Majesty the King of Irak from making such arrangements as may be necessary for the accommodation of foreign representatives and for the fulfilment of the provisions of the preceding articles.

9. His Majesty the King of Irak undertakes that in judicial matters he will accept and give effect to such reasonable safeguards for the interests of foreigners as His Britannic Majesty may consider that the abrogation of the immunities and privileges which they enjoyed under the régime of the Capitulations necessitates.

10. The high contracting parties agree to conclude such separate agreements as may be necessary to secure the execution of any treaties, agreements or undertakings which His Britannic Majesty is under obligation to see carried out in respect of Irak. His Majesty the King of Irak undertakes to bring in the legislation necessary to ensure the execution of these agreements. Such agreements shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

11. There shall be no discrimination in Irak against the nationals of any State member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under the laws of such State) as compared with British nationals or those of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Nor shall there be any discrimination in Irak against goods originating in or destined for any of the said



States. There shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across Irak territory.

12. No measure shall be taken in Irak to obstruct or interfere with missionary enterprise or to discriminate against any missionary on the ground of his religious belief or nationality, provided that such enterprise is not prejudicial to public order and good government.

13. His Majesty the King of Irak undertakes to co-operate in so far as social, religious and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

14. His Majesty the King of Irak undertakes to secure the enactment within twelve months of the coming into force of this treaty and to ensure the execution of a law of antiquities based on the contents of article 421 of Part XIII of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. This law shall replace the former Ottoman law of antiquities, and shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of archaeological research to the nationals of all States members of the League of Nations.

15. A separate agreement shall regulate the financial relations between the high contracting parties. It shall provide on the one hand for the transfer by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Government of Irak of such works of public utility as may be agreed upon and for the rendering by His Britannic Majesty's Government of such financial assistance as may from time to time be considered necessary for Irak, and on the other hand for the progressive liquidation by the Government of Irak of all liabilities incurred. Such agreement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

16. So far as is consistent with his international obligations, His Britannic Majesty undertakes to place no obstacle in the way of the association of Irak for customs or other purposes with such Arab States as may desire it.

17. This treaty shall come into force from the date of ratification by His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty King Feisul, and shall remain in force for twenty years. The year before the expiration of that period the high contracting parties will consult together as to the modifications which experience has shown to be desirable. If such negotiations have not been concluded within the space of one year the points at issue shall be submitted to arbitration, and pending the result of such arbitration the provisions of the present treaty shall remain in force.

Nothing shall prevent the high contracting parties from reviewing from time to time the provisions of this treaty and those of the separate agreements arising out of articles 7, 10 and 15, with a view to any revision which may seem desirable in the circumstances then existing. Any modification which may be agreed upon by the high contracting parties shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

18. Any difference that may arise between the high contracting parties as to the interpretation of the provisions of this treaty may be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Should there be any discrepancy between the English and Arabic texts of this treaty, the English shall be taken as the authoritative version.

[E 397/78/65]

No. 168.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

[By Bag.]

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, January 12, 1922.*

YOUR despatch No. 89 of 10th January: United States and Palestine mandate.

In order to ensure French support on Council of the League, should United States Government waive their objections to Palestine mandate before the conclusion of meeting of council at Geneva, please thank French Government at once for their attitude, and say that His Majesty's Government hereby give them fullest assurances on the three points raised in their note of 9th January.

[E 548/248/91]

No. 169.

*Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 15.)*

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, January 15, 1922.*

FOLLOWING from King Hussein for His Majesty's Government:—

"My respect for equal rights and their fulfilment compels me to request His Majesty's Government to postpone final decision about articles of Lawrence Treaty till my son Abdullah reaches you and pending perusal of my letters, which he brings with supplementary information and explanations given to him by me."

[E 656/656/91]

No. 170.

*Vice-Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 18, 1922.)*

(No. 103. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, December 31, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 11th to 31st December, 1921.

Copies of this despatch and report have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Simla.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH,

*Acting British Agent and Consul.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 170.

*Jeddah Report, December 11 to 31, 1921.*

(Secret.)

MAJOR W. E. MARSHALL, M.C., R.A.M.C., left Jeddah for Port Soudan on Christmas Day, proceeding thence on leave of absence to the United Kingdom.

The British vice-consul returned on the 15th December from leave of absence in the United Kingdom.

*Visit of Emir Ali.*

The Emir Ali, accompanied by Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, arrived from Mecca on the 24th December to bid farewell in the King's name to the British agent. The usual visits were exchanged.

In the course of conversation, his Highness referred with especial earnestness to his father's anxiety at the possible results of Ibn Saud's successes at Hail and Jauf. He mentioned that a certain Sheikh Farhan-el-Aida of Kheibar, who had recently seen Ibn Saud, had written to the commandant of Kheibar, Ali Abul Assam, informing him that the Wahhabis were "first going to Syria and would then turn their attention to the Haram," and warning him to get out of Kheibar soon, since he was "not stronger than Ibn Rashid." The Kheibar garrison consists of 300 soldiers and 400 gendarmerie, with 2 machine guns and 1 field gun. The Emir Ali proposes to send 100 soldiers more to the place.

He appeared to view the possibility of a successful Wahhabi enterprise in Syria with a regret no less sincere than his own apprehension at an eventual fulfilment of the second half of the alleged programme. He spoke at some length of the historic attraction and importance of Damascus and of the prestige and power for influence in the Arab, and, indeed, in the whole Moslem world, enjoyed by its possessor.

He believed that the tribal traditions of the Shammar would prove too strong for proselytisers from Nejd, and prophesied an early revolt against the new régime in Jauf and Hail.

*Mecca.*

The party left Jeddah for Mecca on the 26th December.

Dr. Munir-ud-Din, the Indian vice-consul, visited Mecca from the 18th to 21st December in order to fulfil certain religious obligations and, at the same time, to pay

[8975]

3 F 2



his respects to the King. Every courtesy was shown him by His Majesty and by the Emirs Ali and Zeid.

The road between Jeddah and Mecca is patrolled by about 500 Arab irregulars.

Bread is sold by the municipality of Mecca at 5 halalas a loaf (4 halalas = 1 Turkish piastre) the Government issuing flour to bakers and paying them a fixed wage. The bakers offered to bake for sale at 4 halalas a loaf, but this the Government have refused. Bakers are forbidden, under heavy penalty, to bake on their own account or to sell at a price below the Government tariff.

The Government are active in recruiting for the army, but volunteers cannot be forthcoming in satisfactory numbers, since Takrunis (Hausas, Felatas and other Central African tribesmen) are being impressed for military service.

The King, in conversation with Dr. Munir-ud-Din, referred to the complication of vested interests in any scheme for a Jeddah-Mecca railway. He proposed to compensate the 70,000 camel men plying between Mecca and Jeddah by establishing them in agriculture. The royal estimate of their numbers and the magnificent simplicity of the solution are alike characteristic.

His Majesty insisted that Dr. Munir-ud-Din should return from Mecca to Jeddah by car, and he therefore travelled down with Ali Rida Pasha-el-Rekaby, whose arrival was referred to in the last report. The car broke down, and Ali Rida Pasha improved the hours of waiting with suggestive comments on Arab affairs. After touching on the urgent need of a Jeddah-Mecca railway, the excellence of the Hashimite troops and the success of this year's pilgrimage, he proceeded to deplore the opposition in India to King Hussein, with particular reference to the Khalifate question. He expressed the opinion that influence might well be brought to bear on Indian pilgrims and others by the Indian vice-consul, who was in a position to represent the essential wrongness of a Khalifate held by any outside the prophetic dynasty. Dr. Munir-ud-Din has no Arabic, and this somewhat surprising definition of his duties was conveyed to him through an interpreter.

It is certain that in these remarks King Hussein's master-motive finds reflection. Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib referred pointedly to the King's ambitions in this direction in private conversation on the 26th December, and suggested that the incessant requests for aeroplanes, tanks, armoured cars and the like were probably inspired less by a desire to impress Nejd than by a hope that pilgrims, and, through them, the Moslem world may be persuaded of King Hussein's material qualifications to command the faithful. His territorial ambitions, his very great personal interest in the pilgrims this year, and his jealousy of Mustapha Kemal's successes are but aspects of the same desire. He is convinced that, given material power and, with it, the prestige indispensable to the public propagation of a claim, his claim would prove acceptable to a majority. He is little likely either to abandon it or to discontinue his efforts to obtain the solid advantages preliminarily essential. His frequent public disclaimers of personal ambition have only the value of propaganda. Publicly to commit himself is, as things at present stand, impolitic.

So far as his relations with His Majesty's Government are concerned, he still appears to be more amicably disposed to Great Britain than to other foreign Powers; but even that sentiment is relative, and he finds continual difficulty in giving proof of it without compromising what must always be for him the main issue: his position and his prestige in the Moslem world. Hence constant dilemma and consequent intractability. For his inclination, where alternatives present themselves to him, is not towards the facts we ask him to face, but towards the dream he desires to realise.

#### *Routes to Medina.*

The Yambo-Medina road is closed for transport purposes, being occupied by Ahamda tribesmen, with whom the Subh are said to be co-operating. An Ahamda caravan was recently looted by Juheinas near Yambo gate, and a party of Ahamdas in Yambo itself robbed of a large sum of money. The Juheina looting party is said to have acted on instructions from Mecca.

The King has now ordered all goods for Medina to be transported by way of Rabegh, but the Rabegh-Medina road is hardly more secure than that from Yambo. The export of goods from Yambo to the interior is prohibited, presumably in the hope of starving the Ahamdas into submission.

Travellers by dhow from Jeddah to Rabegh take a man from that part of the coast as a "khawi," and ensure themselves the cover of his wing in the event of piratical attacks on the dhow by his friends. The fee paid is 120 Turkish piastres. Similar conductors from the Masruh or Beni Salem branches of the Harb must be engaged before the traveller ventures from Rabegh to Medina.

#### *Foreign Commercial Enterprise.*

I travelled from Suez to Jeddah (11th-15th December) with M. Tullio Pastori, whose activities were referred to in Rome despatch No. 810 of the 21st October last. He was tolerably communicative, but his statements can only be reported for what they are worth.

He volunteered the information that he had had his passport vized in Egypt for Port Soudan and had booked his passage on to that place, as he did not wish it to be known in Egypt that he was going to Jeddah. He only stayed in Jeddah three days and then proceeded to Massawa by Italian steamer.

He has approached the Hashimite Government at various times for different concessions—aeroplanes, motor transport between Jeddah and Mecca; also water condensing, with a plant carried by his little steamer the "Mascotte" (now lying at Massawa), and capable of yielding from 30 to 40 tons daily. This water he proposed to sell to the Government at 11. per ton. The "Mascotte" could have lain either in Jeddah or Yambo harbour, as pilgrimage pressure dictated. The offer was refused by the King.

In 1919 he offered the King a fleet of eight motor-cars and a 30 per cent. share in the profits of a motor transport system between Jeddah and Mecca. The cars were to be run as a Mahommedan concern by an Italian agent in Jeddah. This offer also was refused by the King, and Pastori has now made over all his rights in this matter to Messrs. Khandwani, of Jeddah, who, as reported in my despatch No. 1, Overseas Trade, of the 11th April last, are his chief rivals for this mechanical transport concession.

The Caudron and Farman aeroplanes referred to in Jeddah Report for the period ending the 10th September last were purchased by Pastori in Italy for 201. apiece and sold to King Hussein for 2,5001. gold for the six. Pastori got a wiggling from the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs for his share in this transaction, but he excused himself to them on the ground that Great Britain had sent aeroplanes and a pilot (Captain Brooke) to King Hussein before he himself began competing, and that, in any case, aeroplanes of the Caudron and Farman types are militarily valueless.

During Pastori's absence from Jeddah, his partner, Avv. Amedeo, received payment from the King for these aeroplanes, on the understanding that he would proceed to provide the King with a minting machine. Amedeo has left Jeddah, and Pastori has lost all trace of him—also of the money.

Pastori said that the King had ordered twenty aeroplanes from Schumacher, and was also trying to purchase 2,000 aeroplanes bombs.

In this context I was informed on the 26th December by Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib that in fact Schumacher had written offering to sell the King twenty aeroplanes, and that the King had refused, while thanking him for his offer. The King had, however, asked Schumacher to send him some pilots and mechanics.

Schumacher is a German-Swiss, well known during the war to the intelligence authorities in Cairo. His entry into Hedjaz affairs probably dates from the visit to this country of Baron Pfyffer, his compatriot and personal friend, mentioned in Major Marshall's despatch No. 35 of the 30th April last.

Pastori referred, in the course of conversation, to the oil possibilities north of El Wajh, to a seam of coal of almost the same calorific power as Natal coal (700 calories V. 640), but with an admixture of sulphur, running from 80 miles inland of Mocha to the sea, and to the prospect of a profitable motor transport concession between Maan and Akaba. He describes himself as a mineralogist and crystallographer; he is, in fact, an adventurer, with considerable faith in his own capabilities. He spoke of having, by representations to the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and propaganda in the Italian press before the war, thwarted a British group who were in treaty to build a Berbera-Harrar railway to exploit Central Abyssinia. Abyssinia was, under this arrangement, to receive Berbera and another Somali port. Whatever truth there may or may not be in this story, his relation of it to me suggests that excess of scruple is not likely to characterise Italian competitive methods in the Red Sea.

#### *General.*

(a.) The Director-General of Customs, Jeddah, now collects 3 Turkish piastres per package landed at Jeddah over and above the ordinary customs dues. This supplementary charge is said to be for the formation of a fund to provide for the cleaning and lighting of the streets of Jeddah.

(b.) The French representative returned from Mecca on the 18th December. His attitude towards the local Government is markedly more friendly than it was. When some thirty Arab irregulars were killed by hail and floods earlier in the month, he both



wrote and called officially on the local authorities to express his condolences. This change of attitude has been the subject of public comment.

(c.) The King has sent to this agency to see and return a copy of a newspaper, "Esh Sharq" ("The East"), of Buenos Aires, No. 2 of the 27th November, containing the usual criticisms of himself as a traitor to the cause of Arab unity and Islam. The writer, however, describes King Hussein as father of the Arabs, and adds that the hopes of all are set upon him rather than on his sons. I should not be surprised to discover that much of this pseudo-hostile stuff published in South American and Syrian newspapers is written by the King himself and distributed from Mecca.

#### Current Rumours.

(a.) The rumour is strongly current in Mecca that the King has signed a treaty with Mustapha Kemal, and that a delegation under the leadership of Izzet Pasha, described as Minister of War of the Angora Government, is very shortly visiting Mecca. Crowds flocked to the Haram on Friday the 16th instant in festive expectation of a reference in the Khatba to Sultan Mohiuddin as Khaliph, but no such evidence of the truth of the rumour was, of course, forthcoming. Transport for the delegation is supposed to have been arranged on a French steamer.

(b.) A leading mutawwif in Mecca said that the King was spending 5,000l. per diem among the tribes and on irregular gendarmerie.

(c.) Many people in Mecca believe that the King is on the point of abdicating, and that the Emir Ali will then succeed him. This is probably a hope rather than a conviction.

(d.) Sayed Mohammed-a-Sagoff, Sheikh-us-Saada, referred to in Jeddah Report for the period ending the 10th July and in the 13th Aden news letter dated the 1st November last, is said to be a prisoner in the Yemen, but opinions differ as to whether the Idrisi or the Imam is responsible for his imprisonment.

#### Press. ("Al Qibla.")

No. 541 reports that certain Syrian fugitives have been enrolled in the Hashimite army and police, and contains an official proclamation in which the Government disclaim all responsibility for the Bedouin attacks on Persian and Indian pilgrims on the Medina road, since these pilgrims are stated to have taken a route other than that prescribed by the Government. The Government deplore the suggestion that they desire to entice pilgrims to the Hedjaz for the material benefit of Hedjazis.

No. 544 has an official proclamation in reply to enquiries alleged to have been received from Arab notables about the rumoured capture by Wahhabis of towns in the Hedjaz. The rumour is categorically denied, and extracts from King Hussein's famous letter to Sir H. McMahon are served up again, with omission of any hostile reference to Turkey. The Government anticipate critical developments owing to the payment by Great Britain of a subsidy to Ibn Saud, but the article closes with deprecation of the idea of a war with Ibn Saud, since such conflict would only lead to the shedding of Moslem blood.

No. 545 announces the grant to Ali Rida Pasha-el-Rekaby of the first class of the Order of Al Nahda.

No. 546 gives prominence to an article from the "Lisan-al-Arab" of Jerusalem (No. 113), discussing Ibn Saud's capture of Hail, in which the Jerusalem editor prophesies that Taraba and Khurma will soon meet with a similar fate, and recommends King Hussein to abandon the pacific policy hitherto observed, and to assemble a powerful army, capable not only of protecting the frontiers of the Hedjaz, but of restoring peace and order throughout the peninsula by compelling the like of Ibn Saud to lie low. All Arab officers are called on to volunteer in this army.

The editor of "Al Qibla" invites "Ibrahim,"—presumably the editor of the "Lisan-al-Arab"—to comment on the proclamation in No. 544 of "Al Qibla" quoted above.

In this issue "patriotic fellow-countrymen" are invited to subscribe for shares in the "Industrial Enterprise Company." The board formed to collect subscriptions is represented in Mecca by the Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs and in Jeddah by the Chamber of Commerce.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 170.

#### Shipping Intelligence to December 31, 1921.

The following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th and 31st December, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Cargo, discharged.
Dakahlieh	British	Port Soudan	Suez	Dec. 11	Dec. 12	Packages, 988
Mansourah	"	Suez	Port Soudan	" 15	" 15	487
Massana	Italian	Massana	Suez	" 17	" 18	3,470
Asmara	"	Suez	Massana	" 19	" 19	492
Mansourah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 21	" 22	725
Dakahlieh	"	Suez	Port Soudan	" 25	" 25	1,837
Massana	Italian	Suez	Massana	" 26	" 26	698
Dakahlieh	British	Port Soudan	"	" 31	"	1,442

[E 700/78/65]

No. 171.

#### Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 19, 1922.

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to state that he has had under consideration the draft despatch which Mr. Secretary Churchill proposes to address to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Bagdad, together with the revised draft (henceforth to be called the draft of the 10th January) of the treaty with King Feisal.

2. Lord Curzon is prepared to concur in the terms of both documents, subject to the following observations regarding article 10 of the draft of the 10th January. The reason for his Lordship's criticism of this article is his doubt whether in its present form it is adequate to safeguard the position of His Majesty's Government *vis-à-vis* of the League of Nations, though he is fully alive to the difficulty in which Mr. Churchill finds himself owing to the rapid march of events in Irak and the complete failure hitherto experienced to make any progress at Geneva. In view, however, of the essential need of making some progress in the matter, Lord Curzon considers that, while article 10 of the treaty in its present form is undoubtedly one which entails some risk for His Majesty's Government, it should be accepted. Unless the matter be carefully handled, it is to be anticipated that objection will be raised at Geneva, and that the council of that body is not likely to acquiesce in the treaty as a satisfactory fulfilment of our relations under the mandate with King Feisal should the Secretariat of the League report adversely upon it.

3. To avoid any possible difficulty from this source Lord Curzon therefore suggests, for Mr. Churchill's consideration, the desirability of delegating some senior member of Mr. Churchill's department to proceed to Geneva to discuss the draft with the head of the Mandates Section of the Secretariat of the League and to secure, if possible, an assurance that the treaty will be reported on as acceptable. In view of the fact that His Majesty's Government might at any moment say that if the Council of the League make difficulties for Great Britain in Mesopotamia Great Britain will refuse the mandate altogether and leave the League to face the chaos which would ensue as the result, Lord Curzon does not consider that the difficulties to be encountered at Geneva would be insuperable. Should Mr. Churchill decide to adopt this course, Lord Curzon will be happy to instruct Mr. Forbes Adam to accompany Mr. Churchill's delegate to Geneva for the purpose of explaining the matter to the Secretariat of the League.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.



[E 761/248/91]

No. 172.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah).*

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, January 24, 1922.*

FOLLOWING message, dated the 23rd December, has been telegraphed by King Hussein to Prime Minister:—

"To safeguard the interests which we consider to be our principal capital in this world against threatening vicissitudes, I thought it to be advisable to delegate my son Abdullah to have the honour of interviewing His Majesty the King and your Excellency as well, such doing prove the predominating motive of loyalty to principles. If your Excellency approve of this, kindly notify Abdullah direct and myself through the ordinary channels."

Hussein's wishes had also been communicated by the Emir Abdullah through Colonel Lawrence, but visit of former while treaty remains unratified would only encourage Hussein's hope of securing eleventh-hour modifications.

You should let it be known that revision of treaty is out of the question, and it must be accepted or rejected as it stands.

If Hussein, however, after ratifying treaty has further points to urge, he might take opportunity of Abdullah's visit, which must at present be regarded as postponed, to commission him to make desired representations to His Majesty's Government.

[E 726/726/89]

No. 173.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Count de Saint-Aulaire.*

Your Excellency.

*Foreign Office, January 26, 1922.*

IN continuation of my note of the 1st September on the subject of the recognition as British-protected persons of Egyptians resident in Syria, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I learn from His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner for Egypt that the Egyptian Government are not disposed to welcome the proposal that Syrians established in Egypt should be regarded as French-protected persons.

2. In existing circumstances, His Majesty's Government would not feel justified in urging the Egyptian Government to surrender their sovereignty over Syrians, who constitute a considerable section of the population of Egypt, until such Syrians had renounced Egyptian allegiance under the terms of an Egyptian nationality law or under the Treaty of Sèvres when it has come into force.

I have, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1120/113/91]

No. 174.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received January 31.)*

My Lord.

*Craigmount, Perth, January 30, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith the Pilgrimage Report for 1921. The report of the officer commanding the Indian Pilgrimage Hospital and a report on Medina by Inspector Said Hassan are attached.

I would like copies of these reports to be sent to Jeddah and to Egypt, Palestine, Khartoum, Aden, India, Iraq and Singapore.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul at Jeddah.

Enclosure 1 in No. 174.

## PILGRIMAGE REPORT, 1921.

## 1.—Pilgrimage.

ACCORDING to our disembarkation returns 57,255 pilgrims came to Jeddah for the 1921 pilgrimage. This is 1,329 less than the number disembarked here in 1920. The following is a list of the places where they embarked and the number disembarked:—

Straits Settlements	...	...	10,702
Dutch East Indies	...	...	21,423
India	...	...	12,065
Soudan	...	...	4,623
Egypt	...	...	3,957
Basra	...	...	4,320
Massowa	...	...	106
Mombasa	...	...	49
Lagos (Emir of Katsina and staff)	...	...	10
Total	...	...	57,255

The Arab returns show a total of 60,786, made up by nationalities as follows:—

Javanese (includes all Malays)	...	...	35,171
Indians	...	...	11,633
Soudanese	...	...	5,719
Egyptians	...	...	3,789
Persians and Mesopotamians	...	...	3,988
From Massowa	...	...	425
From Zanzibar	...	...	49
Yemeni	...	...	12
Total	...	...	60,786

Pilgrimage day was the 13th August, and the Id on the 14th, 15th and 16th. During the pilgrimage the weather was entirely favourable, and there was very little sickness and few deaths. All the ancient ceremonials were carried out with great pomp and splendour. The public security, on the road between Jeddah and Mecca, in Mecca, and between Mecca and Arafat was very good, and all the pilgrims who did the pilgrimage without going to Medina were highly pleased, and proclaimed it a most successful pilgrimage. King Hussein took a great personal interest in the pilgrims, was always ready to receive them and hear complaints and was frequently heard exhorting the camelmén to carry the guests of God safely and well.

The Javanese and Singapore pilgrims arrived early and went to Medina before the Hadj. All the caravans went and returned safely, and up to the time of the Hadj public security between Mecca and Medina (via Rabegh) was good, and few unfavourable reports were received. The majority of the Indian pilgrims, the Egyptians, the Persians and the Mesopotamians went to Medina after the Hadj. The majority of these suffered such hardships and injustices that one is forced to the conclusion that the Hashimite Government had lost all control of the situation, and what would otherwise have been a very successful pilgrimage was marred by the experiences of these unfortunate caravans.

This trouble appears to have been caused by two things:—

1. In previous years the Persian pilgrims were carried by the Dahawir tribe (Beni-Salem) at a higher rate than the others. King Hussein, who this year was very kind to the Shia pilgrims, gave them to the Auf tribe, with the result that the Dahawir tribe surrounded Medina, kept the Persians therein and even fired on them when entering and leaving Medina.
2. Some mismanagement in the payment of Akhawa, which is a special tax collected from the inland Persians and paid to various tribes around



Medina. It would appear that some of this was misappropriated by the mutawiffs and mekawims because the Bedouin visited the various caravans looking out the number of Persians in each caravan.

The pilgrims are entirely at the mercy of these mutawiffs and mekawims. These stop the caravan and demand money either to placate robbers or on some other excuse, and threaten to leave the pilgrims stranded unless the money is paid. As the pilgrims are in a strange and barbarous country this threat is usually sufficient.

There is no doubt that a certain number of pilgrims were killed. Hassan Ibn Abdul Khalik, of Bagdad, said his mother was killed by a bullet just outside Medina, and Ali-el-Hadji Hassan Shahit, the Reis of the Belediyah of Kut-el-Amara, said that, in his opinion, sixty persons were killed between Mecca and Medina and three between Medina and Yembo. I also personally saw Takruri (West African) pilgrims who had been wounded by bullets, knives and sticks.

The Persian consul in Jeddah, M. Hussein Khan, was so angry at the treatment of the Persian pilgrims that he sent a memorandum to all the foreign consulates informing them that the Persian pilgrims had all been plundered.

The Hashimite Government in "El Kibla," No. 541 of the 8th December, 1921, admitted that certain attacks had occurred, but stated that they did not hold themselves responsible for these, and that no pilgrims had appealed to them on that account. They point out that all the pilgrims that took the road laid down by Government arrived at Jeddah safely. This latter statement, with the exception of the Takruris mentioned above, is true, but it does not explain who gave the orders for the last caravans to return via Yembo. It is probable, however, that the pilgrims themselves did not insist on going by that route.

## 2.—Public Health.

The health of the pilgrimage throughout was good and the death-rate low. Some of the Javanese caravans, who went to Medina before the Hadj, suffered a good deal from the heat, and a considerable number died. With the exception of an outbreak of smallpox and a few cases of typhoid fever, no infectious disease occurred.

Smallpox broke out in Mecca some time in August. The disease was widespread in and around Mecca, but the cases were, for the most part, mild and the mortality low. Only eight cases occurred in Jeddah, the first two on the 22nd September and the last on the 2nd October. Four of these cases were pilgrims. The disease is still present in Mecca, and cases are still coming in from the country east and south of Mecca. It will be necessary, therefore, to have all pilgrims for next year's Hadj carefully revaccinated, and I have already telegraphed to Singapore to this effect.

Reports received show that the medical arrangements of the Hashimite Government were totally inadequate, their hospitals insufficiently staffed and badly equipped, and with a deplorable and inexcusable lack of ordinary medicines. The Arab Government, in opposition to the Indian Pilgrimage Hospital, opened a hospital beside it, but it never received any patients, and there were no medicines and no personnel, except one medical officer, who borrowed a thermometer and a hypodermic syringe from the Indian Hospital. This doctor, a capable and well-informed Egyptian, refused to stay with the Arab Government and left the country soon after the pilgrimage.

I have received the following report on the sanitary conditions in Mecca:—

"The sanitary state of the town is deplorable and very sad. The hospitals are in such a state that they should not be called hospitals but stables. The orderlies are incompetent and not even capable of giving medicines to the sick. There is no order. The dispensary resembles a grocer's shop. The pharmacist is incapable, and cannot now read or write because of cataract. Cases of smallpox are in the same hospital as those suffering from ordinary diseases. In one hospital there is no castor oil and practically no medicines."

After the pilgrimage, Dr. Mohamed Hussein returned to the Hedjaz, and the King put him in charge of the medical arrangements in Mecca during the absence of Dr. Nedim, who has gone on leave to Syria. Already, I understand, conditions have greatly improved. He has engaged sanitary men for the different quarters in Mecca, and put an inspector in charge of each quarter. He has arranged a separate building for cases of smallpox, and is bringing order and discipline into the hospitals.

The conditions in Medina are described in Inspector Said Hassan's report, and in the report by Captain Salamatullah, M.C., I.M.S., both of which are attached to this report.

## 3.—Shipping.

The shipping arrangements for the Javanese pilgrims were excellent. The pilgrims came early and visited Medina before the Hadj. Immediately after the Hadj there was a steady stream of Blue Funnel and Dutch boats arriving daily, or every second day, at Jeddah to take the pilgrims to their homes, and by the end of September all except a few stragglers had gone. When one remembers that more than 30,000 of the pilgrims embarked on these boats, and that the whole were embarked without fuss and without difficulty, except for unavoidable delays due to the local quarantine authorities, it says a good deal to the credit of the Javanese Government, the shipping companies and the local shipping agent.

The shipping arrangements for the Indian pilgrims, on the other hand, were not altogether satisfactory. Here we have two shipping companies competing with each other: the Mogul and Arab steamers, run by Turner, Morrison and Co., of Bombay, and the Shustari Line, run by the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company, Bombay. The former carry return ticket holders and the latter single ticket holders. Turner, Morrison and Co. employ two local shipping agents, Hadji Zeinal Ali Riza for the Mogul Line and Gellatley, Hankey and Co. for the Arab Line. It is when the pilgrims are returning that the evil of this competition becomes apparent, and the consideration of the pilgrims becomes secondary.

Hadji Abdulla Ali Riza, who is the head of the firm of Zeinal Ali Riza, is Kaimakam of Jeddah. He is a man of charming personality and an efficient kaimakam, but there seems no doubt that he abuses his official position for the sake of business. In order to fight the other company the single fare to Bombay was reduced to 45 rupees, and the Mogul steamers, "Akbar," "Nairung," "Shuja" and "Nurani," for all of which Hadji Zeinal Ali Riza is agent, carried 300, 400, 700 and 200 single ticket holders respectively. The majority of the mutawiffs send the pilgrims first to the office of Hadji Zeinal Ali Riza, and, as many of them cannot read, they are unable to say whether the ticket received is for the boat they asked or for a later boat.

The most glaring case of non-co-operation between the two local agents of Turner, Morrison and Co. occurred when both the "Koweit" and the "Nurani" were booking pilgrims for Bombay. The "Koweit," of which Messrs. Gellatley, Hankey and Co. are the agents, arrived in Jeddah on the 1st August, and the "Nurani" arrived with cargo on the 24th August. The latter was discharged with the greatest possible speed and at once booked up. I sent for the representative of Hadji Zeinal Ali Riza and explained that the "Koweit," which carried 400 more pilgrims than the "Nurani," could carry all the "Nurani" pilgrims plus the 300 booked for the "Koweit," and that, as both boats belonged to Turner, Morrison and Co., this should be done. I also wired Turner, Morrison and Co., but the "Nurani" left on the 31st August, seven days after her arrival, and the 300 pilgrims booked for the "Koweit," the majority of whom were return ticket holders, had to wait for the return of the Medina pilgrims. The "Koweit" left on the 1st October after a stay of two months in Jeddah.

The steamship "Sultania," of the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company (local agents, Messrs. Khandwani and Co.), arrived here on the 16th August, and left on the 31st. She has accommodation for about 1,400 pilgrims, and yet she was only able to book 492.

Another shipping arrangement, which was very unpopular with pilgrims, and about which I received many complaints, was the shipping arrangements for the return of the Medina pilgrims from Yembo. There were three ships then in Jeddah harbour: the "Dara," the "Akbar" and the "Jeddah." In this case the agents co-operated, and the "Dara" was sent to bring all the pilgrims. She arrived in Yembo on the 12th October, and found there a good many Indian pilgrims waiting for passage. Unfortunately, many of the pilgrims were delayed *en route*, the Persians being extremely late in leaving Medina. In the meantime, the steamship "Mansourah" arrived at Yembo from Suez, and about 600 Indian pilgrims booked tickets on her for Jeddah. For some reason these passages were all cancelled, and the passage money returned, and all the pilgrims, about 3,200 in number, came on the "Dara." The pilgrims complained of overcrowding and lack of water, but for such a short distance—about eighteen hours' sailing—I think the previous complaint can be ruled out.



On two occasions the destination of the Indian boats was changed. The steamship "Koweit" (agents, Messrs. Gellatley, Hankey and Co.) was originally destined for the Persian Gulf, and later changed to Bombay; and the steamship "Homayun" (agents, Hadji Zeinal Ali Riza) took her place for the Persian Gulf. The steamship "Jeddah" (Gellatley, Hankey and Co.) was also on her second trip destined for the Persian Gulf, and the steamship "Akbar" (agents, Hadji Zeinal Ali Riza) took her place, and the "Jeddah" went to Bombay.

The shipping arrangements for the Egyptian pilgrims appear to be inadequate, and necessitate an unnecessary stay of the pilgrims in the quarantine camp at Tor. Only two steamers were used for the pilgrimage, and these did each two journeys to Jeddah and two from Jeddah. On the return journey they put down the first pilgrims at Tor, return to Jeddah for the second batch, and on arrival at Tor take the first pilgrims to Suez. Otherwise, the Egyptian pilgrimage is well organised, and Yousbashi Mahmoud Hilmi, the officer sent to arrange the disembarkation and the embarkation of the Egyptian pilgrims, did his work extremely well.

#### 4.—Quarantine.

This year we did not interfere with the local quarantine authorities, and the Arab Government in the majority of cases sent the pilgrims to the quarantine islands for twenty-four hours, even though all pilgrim boats arrived from Kamaran with a clean bill of health. The Jeddah quarantine authorities follow no definite rule, but if a boat arrived with no deaths during the voyage the pilgrims were allowed to disembark at once. The state of the quarantine islands at Jeddah remains the same and no improvements have been made. The pilgrims, for the most part, were sent to Wasta, where there is no disinfecting plant and no proper hospital.

The pilgrims, on return, paid 5 piastres for a medical certificate of health. This was done purely to obtain revenue, as the majority of the pilgrims received the certificate from their mutawiffs and were not medically inspected.

There was the same difficulty this year as last with non-Egyptian pilgrims from the north—Algerians, Tunisians, and Syrians. These all come to the pilgrimage via Egypt, but they are unable to return owing to the edict that non-Egyptian pilgrims, on their return journey, are not allowed to disembark in Egypt. The numbers are so small, approximately fifty Algerians and Tunisians and 200 Syrians, that the action of the Egyptian Government in every year trying to enforce this rule is difficult to understand. Even after we have obtained permission for them to travel by the ordinary Khedivial boats, these are only able to carry the small number of pilgrims allowed to non-pilgrim boats, and the pilgrims are quarantined at Tor and have to wait for ten days for another boat. The whole passenger traffic to the north from the Hedjaz is disorganised. The Khedivial Steamship Company do not, of course, wish their ships to be quarantined, and must strictly obey all regulations.

The Dutch consul left Jeddah by the Khedivial boat of the 1st November, more than two months after the pilgrimage and after Tor had been closed, and he wrote to me as follows:—

"I thought it necessary to tell you that the quarantine measures in Suez seem to me to be beyond measure severe. Think, that we arrived the sixth day after our departure from Jeddah. Of course, no cases of disease occurred on board, but, nevertheless, all deck passengers from Jeddah, because of the mere fact that they were coming from there, were picked out and ordered to go ten days in quarantine at Moses Wells. Among them were some merchants going to Constantinople. They complained to me, but, of course, I could not help them . . . should there be no way to convince the authorities here to change this method next year."

This is the opinion shared by everyone in Jeddah. The Arabs ask me why a country, in which plague has become endemic, should be so strict about quarantining people from a country free from plague and cholera, and why, if quarantine is an effective safeguard, there should be so much difficulty about allowing non-Egyptian pilgrims to land in Egypt.

The pilgrim ships from the East all called at Kamaran on their way to Jeddah, and there, were submitted to the quarantine measures laid down in the convention. It was unfortunate that Kamaran was not open when the first pilgrim boat arrived from the Dutch East Indies, but I am glad to say that arrangements have been made to keep Kamaran open the whole year round, and this will not occur again. Boats returning to India and the Persian Gulf called at Kamaran on their return journey for medical inspection; boats for Singapore and the Dutch East Indies went direct.

#### 5.—Indian Pilgrimage Hospital.

Soon after my arrival in Jeddah I wrote to King Hussein asking for his consent to an Indian pilgrimage hospital working at Jeddah, as during the previous pilgrimage. King Hussein objected, and I wired to India to stop it, but the hospital had already left, and so the King gave an unwilling consent. The hospital arrived on the 5th June, and occupied the same building as last year. Soon after their arrival I had a stormy interview with King Hussein, who did not wish them to work unless he considered it necessary. I would not agree to this. I said I would send them back to India if he gave me written authority to justify such action, but that otherwise they would do the work they had come to do—look after sick Indian pilgrims. The hospital opened, and at once became extremely popular, even though throughout their stay in Jeddah there was marked opposition and obstruction by the Arab Government, acting under orders from King Hussein. The guards at the gates had orders not to allow people to pass who were going to the hospital, and the hospital cars were not allowed to enter Jeddah unless going to the British agency. These orders relaxed occasionally from time to time, and the sympathy of all the notables of Jeddah, who realised the futility of the Arab hospital, was with us in the matter.

In spite of all this obstruction, the hospital was an unqualified success and a splendid example of efficiency and good organisation. No case of crime was brought before me, there appeared to be complete harmony among the staff and loyalty to their commanding officer, of whose work I cannot speak too highly. All patients, Europeans and pilgrims, were well looked after and well treated. The work of this hospital makes me hope that in the future some permanent hospital of such a nature may be arranged in Jeddah. The work of the hospital is fully described in the report of the commanding officer, Captain M. Salamatullah, M.C., I.M.S.

As it was impossible to send the hospital or part of the hospital as such to the pilgrimage, I told Captain Salamatullah to take any of the Mahomedan personnel who wished to go, to take a certain amount of medicine and equipment, and to be ready to co-operate with the Arab authorities in the event of an outbreak of infectious disease. All returned to Jeddah after the Hadj, and the hospital left with the last pilgrim boat, the steamship "Nairung," on the 20th November. When the caravans returned from Medina a large number of destitute pilgrims began to collect in Jeddah, so I asked Captain Salamatullah to issue rations to these destitutes from the surplus hospital rations. This was done most efficiently, and rations for 300 destitutes were also sent on the steamship "Jeddah" for the voyage to Bombay.

The hospital equipment has been left in Jeddah and stored in a room in the barracks. This room is locked and the key kept in the British agency. There is, unfortunately, no chance that King Hussein will allow the hospital to work next year, and it is a debatable point whether it would be better to send the equipment back to India or to keep it in Jeddah for future use.

#### 6.—Recommendations.

##### 1.—Indian Pilgrimage.

It seems useless to reiterate the necessity for compulsory return tickets for the Indian pilgrims. This has been emphasised in each pilgrimage report, and every year we have a larger number of destitute Indian pilgrims. This year we sent back 500 destitute Indian pilgrims, at 65 rupees per pilgrim, at the expense of the Indian Government, and issued rations to the value of approximately 7,000 rupees. This is not to be wondered at when one knows that in one boat alone nearly 100 single-ticket holders arrived in Jeddah without enough money to pay their boat hire ashore, and these pilgrims must have begged their way throughout the pilgrimage and then been repatriated by the Government of India.

The Government of India proposes to deal with the question by the institution of a relief fund, to be administered by the British agent at Jeddah, with a local committee of Indians. I am entirely opposed to this scheme. It will encourage rather than diminish destitution, will discourage the proper pride of independence which each pilgrim, who is loyal to his religion, ought to have, and it is not fair to the Arab authorities. One feels very keenly the low prestige of the Indian pilgrim in the Hedjaz.

If compulsory return tickets, with food, were issued there would be no destitutes to send back each year, as each pilgrim would have the wherewithal to take him back to India, and it would be a simple matter to feed any poor pilgrims



waiting for a boat. I would suggest, further, that the return tickets be deposited at the British agency and called for on return. This would prevent the sale of return tickets to Persians and others, and would enable us, to a certain extent, to control the shipping arrangements for returning pilgrims. It would mean the addition of two Indian clerks to the staff of the agency during the pilgrimage season, but I would rather do it with my present staff, working at higher pressure, than continue to work with the unsatisfactory conditions which prevail at present. All the pilgrims from the Dutch East Indies and the Malay Peninsula are given return tickets with food, and the result is that there is no destitution, no competition between the shipping companies, and the pilgrimage is becoming each year more popular. I think it is only fair to us, to whom the Arab Government look for the care and protection of Indian pilgrims, that the Indian Government should try this scheme for a period of five years before deciding on the institution of a relief fund. A relief fund could be used in India to enable the poorer pilgrims to do the Hadj in greater comfort, but should not be used in Jeddah for the repatriation of destitute pilgrims.

## II.—Northern Pilgrimage.

Some arrangement must be made to clear up the present state of chaos regarding pilgrims and passengers for the north. Two things should, in my opinion, be kept in view:—

- (a.) Everything should be done to encourage northern pilgrims to come to the pilgrimage, and all facilities should be made for their transshipment.
- (b.) The ordinary passenger traffic from the Hedjaz to Suez and Port Soudan should not be interfered with.

As explained under another heading, the only pilgrim ships from the north are the two Khedivial boats for the use of the Egyptian and Palestinian pilgrims. These are full, and any other pilgrims must travel on the ordinary Khedivial or Italian boats to Suez. These, so as not to be pilgrim boats, can only carry deck passengers to the number of 1 per cent. of their tonnage, and the result is that the majority of these pilgrims must make a very long stay in Jeddah. If the Egyptian Government are going to insist that non-Egyptian pilgrims are not to be allowed to disembark in Egypt, then they ought to notify the authorities in Syria, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco that no pilgrims will be allowed to come to the pilgrimage via Egypt. It does not appear to me to be fair to allow them to come via Egypt and then to leave them stranded in Jeddah.

With the present shipping arrangements, the quarantine at Tor is excessive. At least seven days must elapse before a ship can return to Jeddah, embark pilgrims and return to Tor, and usually nine days are necessary. I trust that during the forthcoming pilgrimage more shipping facilities will be made for the pilgrims from the north.

## III.—Indian Pilgrimage Hospital.

In view of the strong opposition of King Hussein to this hospital, there is no prospect that it will be allowed to come to Jeddah during the forthcoming pilgrimage. There only remains the British dispensary, now under the charge of Dr. Munir-ud-Din, the Indian vice-consul. This is only suitable for the treatment of out-patients, and lack of proper hospital accommodations will be greatly missed. As the Indian vice-consul will be at the pilgrimage, it would be a help if the Indian Government would send one additional medical officer for the pilgrimage season. A certain amount of laboratory equipment sufficient for the bacteriological diagnosis of cholera and for the isolation and identification of dysentery bacilli would be a great asset. At present we possess a microscope and sufficient stains for ordinary routine work. What one should keep in view is the establishment of a permanent Indian Moslem hospital in a building in Jeddah, and if prominent Indian Moslems were to bring pressure to bear on King Hussein he might eventually agree. This hospital must be a Moslem hospital, and must have no direct connection with the Indian Government or with the British agency.

## IV.—British Agency Personnel.

I regret to say that the Indian Government proposes recalling to India in March, Inspector Said Hassan, the Indian police inspector, and not to replace him. This will be a great loss to us. Inspector Hassan is so well-known all over the

Hedjaz, knows so much about the pilgrimage, and has always done his work so well and efficiently, that I must protest against his withdrawal. The Indian vice-consul's time is fully occupied with medical work, and we require someone to devote all his time to Indian pilgrimage work.

## V.—Shipping.

It would be advisable that some arrangement be come to by the shipping companies for the return journey of Indian and Persian Gulf pilgrims, so that, as far as possible, pilgrims are sent back in the order of their arrival in Jeddah after the Hadj. Failing this, an official sent by the Indian Government to arrange the embarkation of the Indian pilgrims, as is done by the Egyptian Government, appears to be the best solution. If return tickets are made compulsory, and these are deposited in the British agency, it would be a simple matter, with the co-operation of the shipping agents, to detail the pilgrims for the steamers as they collect their tickets.

In conclusion, I beg to draw attention to the excellent work of the staff of the British agency and of the Indian Pilgrimage Hospital during the pilgrimage of 1921. Of the former, Mr. J. F. Borrodell, who acted as pro-consul during the absence on leave of the British consul, Mr. D. Lambie, and Inspector Said Hassan deserve particular mention for the high standard of their work. Captain Salamatullah, M.C., I.M.S., the officer commanding the Indian Pilgrimage Hospital, did most excellent work and is worthy of the highest praise. He is a man of great personal courage, a great favourite with everyone. The hospital was excellently run, and I think his choice as officer in command of the hospital was most appropriate. All his staff worked well, and I was particularly impressed by the excellent work of sub-assistant surgeon S. E. Puram.

I also wish to express our thanks to Mr. Khandwani, the local agent for the Persian Gulf Steam Navigation Company, and Mr. Namazi, of Bombay, for carrying a certain number of destitute Indian pilgrims free of charge.

Enclosure 2 in No. 174.

*Report by Captain M. Salamatullah.*

IN consultation with the Secretaries of State, the Government of India decided to despatch personnel and supplementary equipment to reopen the hospital for pilgrims sent to Jeddah last year. I was detailed for command of the hospital, and was ordered to report to the surgeon-general, Bombay. I accordingly arrived in Poona on the 11th April, and received orders to recruit the staff. Owing to financial stringency, the strength of the personnel was reduced to about one-third of the last year, thus the staff comprised one I.M.S. officer, two senior assistant surgeons, and forty-three other ranks. No lady doctor was procurable at the pay sanctioned. Sufficient time was spent on the recruitment and, as was emphasised by the Government, no pains were spared to secure the right type of men only. This preliminary labour afterwards proved to be of immense value to me, and was a great asset in the smooth and successful running of the hospital.

As regards rations and additional medical stores, I made arrangements that they should all accompany the hospital, instead of following it as they did last year. In this I was successful.

Having made all preparations, the hospital started from Poona on the 16th May and sailed the next day on the steamship "Jeddah."

After a lengthy voyage, via Karachi, we disembarked in Jeddah on the 5th June—two months and ten days before the pilgrimage. The arrival was sufficiently early to get established and be ready to afford comfort and cure to the sick and needy.

Jeddah is a small seaport with a population of about 25,000. It has a picturesque view from the sea. Everybody, inclusive of Europeans and consuls, lives inside the city wall: the only buildings outside being the headquarters of the Arab army and four Turkish barracks.

The hospital was accommodated in the middle two of these barracks just as was done last year. We set to work to establish the hospital as early as possible, and within two days of our landing the first indoor patient was admitted. Most of the equipment was lying in the British agency, and part of it was shifted to



the hospital premises. There was found to be no list of the equipment. As a matter of fact, last year the equipment was sent by instalments; some of it arrived after the hospital had returned to India, and Major Marshall had proceeded to the Soudan, hence there was no responsible person on the spot to take charge and make a list of the stuff that arrived.

There was plenty of open space by the side of the hospital buildings, and in this the outdoor department was opened under canvas. The camp was nicely laid down, and the beautifully arranged tentage elicited praise from the visitors and people of Jeddah.

The institution soon began to be popular, and within a few weeks we were attracting patients from distant places in the Hedjaz. At this time there were five other hospitals in Jeddah: three belonged to the different consulates, the British, Dutch and Italian, and two to the Arabs. All these medical institutions were of old standing, and were conveniently situated, some being right in the middle of the town, while we were located about a mile from the heart of the city, and separated from it by a sandy tract without road or trees. Comparisons are always odious, but all the same, I am proud to say that our hospital, with all the disadvantages, soon superseded other medical institutions. It was very gratifying to see old men and women and children flocking to the hospital every morning. Some on camels, others on donkeys, and the rest tottering on their legs, in the hot July sun, came in quest of cure and treatment. Within a month of our arrival in Jeddah the hospital was in full swing, and the daily outdoor number had gone up to 280. This may be regarded as an achievement in a country like the Hedjaz, where the people have not as yet realised the value of European medicine. The total number of outdoor patients treated was 8,368. The hospital was open day and night, and although the other hospitals closed on Fridays, we did not observe even a partial holiday on Sundays.

The growing popularity of the hospital made the Arab authorities envious. They began to put obstacles in our way: this took the shape of a rival hospital within a few yards from ours, *i.e.*, in the next Turkish building. His Majesty the King came over in person to honour the opening ceremony, after which he sent for me and assured me of his good wishes for our hospital. He said that we were all brethren, and hence there could be no question of an Arab and an Indian hospital, and as we were all striving for the same aim and object, there could be no rivalry between the two institutions. We must all work for the amelioration of the afflicted and ailing.

But this Arab hospital was never equipped, and not a drop of medicine was supplied for the use of patients. The only day that a physician came there was on the day of the opening ceremony, and the only patient treated therein was this physician himself, who got the medicines from our hospital.

The next steps the Arabs took was to ask for the transfer of Arab patients from our hospital. According to orders, I handed over two Arab patients to the party which came to receive them: but both the patients refused to leave the comfort of our hospital. They were, however, forcibly removed.

At the beginning of August the people of Jeddah began to proceed on the Hadj, and no pilgrims were left in Jeddah. On the 7th August the Mahomedan personnel also left for Mecca with necessary medical and specially cholera equipment. The Hindu staff, however, carried on the indoor department of the hospital in Jeddah.

#### *The Hadj.*

After staying in Mecca for two days, I took the party to Arafat—the place where the actual Hadj ceremony is held. This is a vast plain bordered by low hills. There is no manner of shelter, and there are no houses or huts. On the 10th of Zil-Hadj (lunar month of the Mahomedans) it suddenly springs into a city of canvas. The heat in this plain is intense, and sunstroke takes a heavy toll from the pilgrims. Last year, in the space of a few hours, 600 lives were lost on this altar. Luckily, however, this year the weather was excellent, and the maximum temperature under shade did not exceed 107° F. There were, therefore, practically no deaths here this year.

The water supply of Arafat is from an aqueduct called Nahal-i-Zubeda. It is closed, but has wide windows and apertures for the outlet of water. Men are seen jumping into these openings for a bath and swim; the women are noticed to wash their clothes, while the camels and donkeys drink from the same source, and

the waste water all returns to the canal. It is difficult to imagine circumstances more favourable for the propagation of any water-borne disease, *i.e.*, cholera, dysentery and diarrhoea, &c.

From Arafat the party returned to Muna via Muzalafah. Here one has to stay for three days. There are plenty of houses, but the bulk of the pilgrims live in tents. The chief thing done is the sacrifice of animals to commemorate the willingly proffered sacrifice of his son by Abraham. Thousands upon thousands of camels and sheep are sacrificed here every year, but yet there is no organisation of any kind. If the hides of these animals are kept intact it can be a source of great financial help to the country.

The offals of these animals are scattered all over, and there is no satisfactory latrine arrangements. The whole camp is strewn with night soil and refuse. Flies, of course, abound, and the stink is unbearable. A D.A.D.M.S. (sanitation) would not have an enviable job here. It is surprising how in these ideal circumstances an epidemic does not break out every year. This could be attributed only to the powerful rays of the tropical sun, which is providential in killing disease germs.

This year there have been some attempts at scavenging, and some carts were seen plying in the streets removing filth and refuse. The weather also kept very fine. There was a nice cool breeze on the first two days, but on the last day the temperature suddenly went up to 115° F., and there were some deaths, but nothing compared to the last year.

I distributed the medicines which I had taken with me, and the hospital party was kept in readiness in case of any outbreak; but, luckily, there was no epidemic, and we returned immediately to Jeddah to prepare the hospital for the reception of any rush of sick pilgrims. To meet this emergency more tents were pitched and the accommodation increased.

At first there were plenty of boats standing in the harbour, so the pilgrims were cleared as soon as they arrived in Jeddah, but in the beginning of September, owing to the upsetting of shipping arrangements, many pilgrims were stranded and rendered destitute. Hence, the hospital, under orders of the British agent, took upon itself the responsibility of feeding these unfortunate pilgrims. Dry rations were issued daily, at first to some hundred pilgrims, but the number soon multiplied, and after a caravan from Medina had arrived, the daily number rose to 420. The plight of these destitutes could better be imagined than described. They were all in rags, and their faces told the tale of starvation and privation. The only ray of hope they had was in the British agent, and they always availed themselves of the easy access to the agency. Major Marshall was all sympathy for these unfortunate ones and did his best to alleviate their sufferings and hardships.

The hospital continued to feed the destitutes from the 9th September to the 13th October. After this the hospital rationed 300 pilgrims for their voyage on the steamship "Jeddah." This almost exhausted the hospital supplies, but afterwards, when we returned by the steamship "Nairung," we had some 200 pilgrims (destitute) on board. I arranged with the captain to supplement my rations, and so we were able to feed them till the day of landing in Bombay. This service which the hospital performed is worthy of note.

The work of the hospital was carried on, specially in the indoor department. Two hundred patients of different nationalities were treated, as is shown in the accompanying table.

The chief diseases treated in the indoor were malaria, dysentery and surgical ailments. The in-patients belonged to all grades of society. Not only naval and air force officers were treated, but one English lady was admitted, and they all testified to the high standard of comfort and efficiency that obtained in the hospital. Later on the hospital had the privilege of the stay of one Indian knight for about a fortnight.

The results of the treatment of in-patients were very encouraging: death rate diminished from 56 per cent. of the last year to 7 per cent. this year.

In the out-door, 8,365 patients were treated as compared to 1,025 last year. The chief diseases treated in this department were eye and ear cases, septic ulcers, malaria, diarrhoea and dysentery. By far the greater number of out-patients were local Arabs or domiciled Indians.

I am gratified to say that the hospital did valuable surgical work. The people had great faith in the operative work of the hospital. Those who used to go to Port Soudan and elsewhere for surgical treatment began to come to us, and thus we



established a reputation which could favourably be compared to the position and prestige that an English hospital holds in this part of the world. Including minor operations, 172 operations of various kinds were done. There is plenty of "stone in the bladder" in the Hedjaz, and as we had no instruments for litholapaxy, supra pubic operations were done in all cases, and the result was gratifying. One man of the late ruling family of Mecca (descendant of an earlier Shereef of Mecca) was operated on a few days before our departure from the Hedjaz, and as this proved successful he informed me that in Mecca nearly two score of patients (stone and others) were anxious to be operated in the hospital, but they were too late.

On the 12th October Captain Pinder, in charge of the British agency dispensary, proceeded to England for demobilisation, and from that date until the departure of the hospital from the Hedjaz we carried on the work of the British agency dispensary as well.

In the middle of October, with the kind permission of the British agent, I went to Medina. This proved to be of great value to me to understand real Bedouin life and to examine the medical and sanitary arrangements of the second important town of the Hedjaz. The roads, especially the approaches to Medina, are full of risks and dangers, and some of the tribes *en route* do not recognise the authority of the Shereef. These tribes levy their own taxes on caravans passing through their territory.

Medina itself is a delightful spot with plenty of fertile land and date palm plantations. The people are more polite and hospitable than elsewhere in the Hedjaz. Life and property are unsafe, and the town is nowadays passing through great hardships on account of the ravages of war and shortage of food supply.

There does not seem to be much in the way of medical and sanitary arrangements. The town itself is fairly clean, but the suburb is in a very neglected condition. The stink, which emanates from the refuse heaps surrounding the town, is simply awful. There are two hospitals, the one civil and the other military, but neither can be said to possess any drugs worth the name. Both the doctors are unqualified, one of them was a compounder in pre-Arab days. Even in my short stay of five days in Medina people used to flock to me for treatment. I had taken as many medicines as one riding camel could allow, these I distributed. Some of them wanted surgical help, but that was impossible in the short time at our disposal. One well equipped dispensary in charge of a qualified medical man could do immense good to the suffering humanity in the Northern Hedjaz.

I must now refer, in passing, to the finances of the hospital. I have already explained the reasons of increased expenditure. The life of the hospital was prolonged from six to about eight months. In addition, the hospital supplied rations to several hundred paupers for several weeks. Apart from this it must be remembered that the Hedjaz is a very expensive place, not only is everything imported, but even water is not a free gift of God. We must thank the Shereefian Government for the supply of water worth about 4,000 rupees.

Nor was the lighter side of life neglected. The men were encouraged to have sports and football. This afforded recreation to the men in the evening, and they took a keen interest in it. Occasionally matches and tournaments were held. One football match was played against a team raised by the British agency, and was attended by the Emir Zeid, youngest son of the Shereef, and a few of the local notables. A hospital tournament was held to which the gentry of Jeddah were invited. The King sent his band, and Major Marshall gave away the prizes. These sports had a good moral effect on the Hedjazis, and indicated the supremacy of the physique of even down-country Indians over the native Arabs.

Speaking once more of the popularity of our hospital, I may say that although the Hashimite Government did not recognise our hospital, yet it is a fact that both the officers and men of the Arab army and police frequented the hospital. Even the Ministers of the King availed of our medicines, and both the Military and Civil Governors of Jeddah freely used our hospital.

The discipline maintained in the hospital was of high efficiency. Though the hospital stayed in Arabia for five months and a half, not a single untoward accident happened. The crimes amongst the ranks were few and far between, and it was not necessary to administer a single day's imprisonment to any Indian. In fact a healthy spirit prevailed which showed itself in the way of concerts and musical entertainments. It is pleasing to note that not only the Hindu and Mahomedan males, but even females dined from one kitchen without any friction.

By the middle of November most of the pilgrims had left. The last caravan had returned from Medina, and the people who stay in Mecca for Muharrum and Milad-

ud-Nabi (Prophet's birthday) had collected in Jeddah. Some 200 destitutes, Persians and Hadramauts, were also present. Thus the hospital left with them in the last pilgrim ship—steamship "Nairung"—on the 20th November. Almost all the remnants of pilgrims were repatriated by this boat.

Before I finish I should describe the shipping arrangements of the pilgrims, and offer any suggestions I may have as regards the improvement of the medical arrangements in the Hedjaz.

#### *Pilgrim Ships.*

The shipping arrangements stand in need of great improvement. The Hadj now falls in the month of August, and the pilgrims have to travel during the hot weather, made worse by the onset of the monsoon. There is no ice or cold drink to be had by the ordinary pilgrims even on payment. The quantity of ice (4 to 6 tons) carried by these boats is very limited. It would be a great help if arrangements could be made to store more ice and to sell it to the pilgrims. The quantity of water sanctioned in the Pilgrims Ships' Act is 1 gallon per head. In some ships it is recognised that this quantity is insufficient, and they make a liberal issue of 2 gallons. I am fully alive to the limited water-carrying capacity of some of these boats, but I should recommend that in the hot months, especially in the fasting month of Ramadan, at least 1½ gallons of water be sanctioned.

As regards the medical arrangements on these boats, I fully concur with the following remarks of my predecessor, Captain Ahmed:—

"The arrangements for treating the sick Hadjis on board are not very satisfactory . . . . The patients who are admitted into ships' hospitals do not get proper food."

Rules 56 and 57 under the Pilgrims Ships' Act lay down the supply of medical stores and surgical appliances to be provided, but the list requires revision. I have seen the letter No. 398 from the port health officer, Bombay, to the surgeon-general, and I agree with the former that the quantity of medical comforts is sufficient, but the same could not be said of drugs and surgical appliances. I have worked as a medical officer on one of these boats, and I had to supplement the drugs from my own stores.

There is no arrangement to supply ordinary diet to sick pilgrims, and in some there are no latrines provided in the ship's hospital.

Although the Pilgrims Ships' Act distinctly lays down separate set of latrines for males and females, I have seen first-class ladies and gentlemen using the same latrine. The quantity of disinfectant is also sparingly used.

As regards shipping arrangements in Jeddah, I would suggest that shipping control should be vested in the British agent. He should be empowered to advise and control the movements of the boats.

#### *Suggestions as regards Medical Arrangements in the Hedjaz.*

In the present state of affairs in the Hedjaz an Indian hospital is not tolerated by the Arab Government, and unless our policy changes it is no use forcing a hospital on the King. But something must be done to protect our British subjects, who form an important foreign element in the country. The Arab hospitals are not worth the name, and according to their own saying, it is as well for a patient who goes to the Arab hospital to go to the Arab cemetery. At present there is not a single qualified doctor in the country, and several who enjoy the dignified epithet are simply compounders of the pre-Arab days. What are called the Arab hospitals are just old hospital buildings with a few drugs in them. Even a medicine like Epsom salts and calomel are not to be found there.

In the light of these things, what is there to protect our subjects in any epidemic? I am of the opinion that the dispensary attached to the British agency should be enlarged so that it has an annexe of about a dozen beds with an operation room and a small laboratory. The importance of Jeddah has greatly increased since the war; this is also indicated by the fact that we keep an agency there instead of a consulate. Hence it is no longer possible for an assistant-surgeon to cope with the medical and consular work. We should appoint an I.M.S. officer for this post as had been done in places like Hodeida. This is all the more important during the pilgrim season.

Before the war doctors of different nationalities used to accompany the pilgrims,



Egyptians, Persians and Javanese doctors generally. This may not be allowed by the present Government, but I am told, from a reliable source, that in the event of any change in the rule, the successor would be much pleased to have an Indian hospital in the country.

My proposal of having an I.M.S. officer and to enlarge the British agency dispensary in Jeddah would not be objected to, even by the present authorities of the Hedjaz. Any increased expenditure due to a larger staff would be more than compensated by the comfort our pilgrims would receive thereby.

In the end I wish to put on record the great services rendered to the hospital by the British agent, Major Marshall. I am highly indebted to his indefatigable and enthusiastic help, and his skilful guidance. His sympathetic and courteous treatment has earned the love and admiration of all those who have been privileged to work under him.

One could not conclude this report without a personal note of grateful acknowledgment of the ever ready and ungrudging assistance extended to me by all ranks of the hospital. Without their willing co-operation and untiring zeal it would have been impossible for the hospital to achieve the success it did. The services of the superior staff generally, and Sub-Assistant-Surgeon S. E. Puram, sub-charge of the hospital, specially, are worthy of note and acknowledgment.

M. SALAMATULLAH, *Captain, I.M.S.*  
*Officer Commanding Indian Pilgrims Hospital.*

Aden, November 24, 1921.

#### INDOOR and Outdoor Patients Treated in the Hospital.

	Indoor Patients.	Outdoor Patients.	Percentage of Deaths in the Indoor.
1920 .. .. .	96	1,025	56 per cent.
1921 .. .. .	200	8,368	7 ..

#### NATIONALITIES of Indoor Patients.

Nationality.	Number of Patients Treated.
1. Indian ... ..	142
2. Arab ... ..	43
3. Bukharas ... ..	1
4. British ... ..	4
5. Armenian ... ..	1
6. African ... ..	3
7. Somali ... ..	1
8. Greek ... ..	3
9. Egyptian ... ..	2
Total ... ..	200

M. SALAMATULLAH, *Captain, I.M.S.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 174.

*Indian Health Officer, Jeddah, to the British Agent, Jeddah.*

Sir, Jeddah, December 18, 1921.  
I BEG to put up the following report on Medina for your perusal:—

#### Population.

The present population of Medina is estimated to be between 9,000 and 10,000 souls. This number includes the military and other Government employees living in Medina now.

#### Sanitation (A).

Inside the city walls the roads were fairly clean. There are no dustbins or urinals in the city, and thus filth is sometimes seen lying on the roads and people are seen making water and even easing themselves with impunity.

Outside the city walls it was all filth, and full carcasses of camels, donkeys and other animals were seen lying rotting and stinking bad. Rubbish carts from inside are taken out and emptied just under the walls.

#### Sanitation (B).

There has been no epidemic in Medina for some time. There are two hospitals in the city: one is called the civil and the other the military hospital. Both of these hospitals are practically devoid of any medicines, and thus are of no use to the residents. The people for their every day necessities very badly require medical aid. Any medical man found amongst the pilgrims is harassed by the people to prescribe for them and give them any medicines he has got with him.

#### Police.

There are two sections of this force. One for the city in general and the other exclusively for the Haram. Both sections are very poorly clad and lack discipline. The pay, which is not at all lucrative, is not paid to them regularly. They get a month's salary every fourth or fifth month, and to keep themselves they naturally have to resort to other means, fair or foul. They are mostly utilised for orderly duties. Those of the Haram are meant to keep peace within the Haram, and to disallow begging there; but they themselves are not slow in begging from the pilgrims. Most of the Haram police are from the Takruni tribe.

#### Army.

The present strength is about 200 men and officers. The rest of the army has been brought to Mecca by Emir Ali. These people also do not get their pay regularly, and there have been instances in which they have looted shops in the city. I have never seen such shabbily dressed officers and men as at Medina.

#### Present Form of Government, Officers and their Sphere of Action.

The present form of government is that there is an acting Emir, El-Saari Ahmad-bin-Mansur, in place of his Highness Emir Ali, and he is supposed to be the highest authority. Then comes the Kaïmmakam, El-Sharif Shahat. He ranks next to the Emir, but seems to be independent of him, as he does whatever he likes, sometimes even against the orders of the Emir. The third authority to be obeyed is the officer commanding the garrison, and he works quite independent of the other two. Thus there is no consolidated Government and the people do not know whom to obey and whom not. There have been cases when a person had been sent to jail by one officer and set free by the other without any reference to the former.

#### The Holy Haram.

The building of the Holy Haram is surrounded on all sides by houses. On the western side some of the houses have been pulled down. I was told that these houses were demolished by the Turks as they wanted to extend the Haram limits, but could not do so as they were engaged in the great war. Inside the Haram all, except the courtyard, is paved with stones and spread over with locally-made mats. It used to have nice carpets all over, but these carpets have all disappeared now. Some say they have been taken away by the Turks, others say that they have been utilised by the Arabs for their own use. I saw a number of old and torn carpets piled up in the north-western corner of the Haram, which, I am told, were spread when the pilgrims were here. Inside the Haram the walls and the columns are all dirty and full of dust, especially the ceilings, where there are so many cobwebs hanging. The walls and the columns are clean only up to the height they are touched by human hands. The brass bases of some of the columns are all tarnished, and seem not to have been polished for months. The carved brass door of the Prophet's tomb is sparkling bright.

#### Financial State of the Residents.

The residents, with a few exceptions, are all without sufficient money to keep themselves. The majority are reduced to begging, and one cannot say whether a



gaily dressed person he meets in the streets is a beggar or not, because persons whom no one can take as beggars in the end prove to be beggars. The shopkeepers are keeping shops, but they are almost empty of merchandise. The necessities of every-day use are not easy to be had, and those that can be had should be bought at very high prices.

Persons who are in a better position are keeping themselves on highly-reduced expenses, and doing as best as they could on the lowest possible scale of expense.

#### *The Indians.*

The number of Indians living in Medina before the war, I am told, was near about 2,000 persons, but it has now come down to about 100 souls, including women and children. Almost all the Indians are in a very poor state. Some have got petty shops, others are living on the charity of others or on petty jobs. When the residents of Medina were turned out by Fakhri during the war and sent to Syria and other northern countries they suffered a lot, and the same was the case with the Indians. Many lives were lost, and those that survived were mostly repatriated to India by the British Government, and so only a few have come back to Medina or Mecca.

#### *Political State in General.*

The people of Medina do not seem to be very keen about politics at the present moment. They are not in touch with the outside world, as the means are very limited for communication; but, as a whole, they consider the "Nahda" detrimental to their interests. The reason, as far as I could find out, is that the residents had been getting handsome sums of money from the Turks as pays or in the shape of charity, the merchants were well supplied with merchandise, and everything was going on well; therefore, the people were happy and were passing a peaceful life without any anxieties or difficulties. After the "Nahda," all sorts of such things, they say, have disappeared, and they have been put to all sorts of troubles. Even for the turning out of the residents from Medina they lay the blame on the "Nahda," and say that if the "Nahda" had not taken place the Turks would not have been obliged to send out the residents. I am of opinion that the people of Medina care more for money than for anything else, and because they, at present, are not so well off as they were in the past, they, therefore, curse the "Nahda."

While I was talking to a gentleman, he said that "he who marries the mother becomes the father of her children." "But," he added, "the father should consider over the needs of the children and treat them with fatherly affection, otherwise he should expect no love from the children." The gentleman was of opinion that independence is only good for countries which are self-supporting. As regards the Hedjaz, he said that the country was not ready to get independence, but as independence has been thrust upon it it was the duty of the Government to make it self-supporting, which, he said, could not be done without foreign help for some time. He said that the present attitude of the Government was such that it would hinder the progress of the country for an unlimited time, because all sorts of foreign help is denied and no foreigners are allowed to improve the country. He was, of course, averse to non-Moslems entering into the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

He said that it is no use denying that the Hashimite Government is not subsidised by the British now that the whole world knows of it, and it is for the Hashimite Government to make the best use of the help of Great Britain in improving the country instead of vainly trying to make the world believe that the Hashimite Government can stand on its own feet without foreign support and is quite independent.

#### *Public Safety in and Outside the City.*

Public safety inside the city comes to nothing. Just after sunset all shops are closed, and the doors of the houses are securely shut. Few people attend the Asha prayers in the Haram, and the city presents a deserted aspect. There have been several cases of house-thefts, which, in the past, was a thing almost unknown. The people set to watch have themselves not been slow to take the advantage of the opportunity whenever they could get it.

An Indian merchant who has been living in Medina for a long time was attacked by the Bedouins at night in his house and got a sword cut in the thigh; some of his

belongings were also taken away by the thieves, but the police have never been able to find out the culprits. I was informed that solitary persons found in the streets are sometimes relieved of their cash if they happen to have any at the time.

Public safety outside the city can be well imagined. People cannot go out in daytime, not to mention their going out at night. The police and the army are considered to be quite powerless to deal with the robbers who are always lurking about the city walls, especially when the pilgrims are there. Pilgrims could not visit the tomb of Svedna Hamza, which is about 2 miles outside the city, and those who had had the courage to go out were robbed or at least clubbed by the Bedouins for daring to come out. None of the pilgrims could dare to go to "Kuba," which is also about 2 miles from the city, as the way is zig-zag and passes through date-palm groves, and is, therefore, considered to be more dangerous than the one leading to Syedna Hamza.

The Turks had constructed a wide and straight road to "Kuba" by cutting down trees and clearing the jungle, but it has now been discontinued as the Bedouins have blocked it in several places by erecting stone walls or digging deep ditches in the middle of the road. If this road was in order the pilgrims could be easily watched by two sentries, one at the Kuba Gate, Medina, and the other at "Kuba" itself.

#### *Railway.*

The railway station at Medina is an incomplete stone building, and it appears that something grand was anticipated to be erected. It seems to be empty now as I did not see anyone there and the building is also in a neglected condition.

I saw four quite big engines, three on the rails and one off the rails. It appears they are not looked after by anybody, because they are very dirty and showed signs that they have not been used for some time. They look very powerful machines. I also saw some passenger cars and goods waggons, but they too were in a very neglected condition. I had the opportunity of seeing the railway line up to a distance of about 4 miles, and found that it had been very securely laid. The sleepers are not of wood as usual, but are made of iron. A small sum of money and the services of a few men who know the art are required to bring the line in a working condition.

#### *Agriculture.*

From the vegetation and date-palm groves outside the city it appears that the land is arable. In former times, I am told, a good crop of wheat and other food-stuffs used to be harvested. People went on leaving agriculture, and now only a few things are grown. The Turks, I consider, are to be blamed for this because they never did anything to encourage agriculture. Plenty of water for agriculture can be procured if suitable arrangements are made.

If some experimental farms are made by the Government and agriculture encouraged the people may also become cultivators, and thus the needs of the city would be supplied to some extent.

#### *Pilgrims, and how they are dealt with.*

On arrival at Medina the pilgrims are not free to choose their own muzawwir as they can do regarding their mutawwif at Mecca. The districts of India have been distributed amongst the muzawwirs, and pilgrims coming from those districts have to go to these muzawwirs and leave the company of their other friends with whom they have been travelling. Sometimes a servant, who happens to be the resident of a district other than the master, has to go to another muzawwir and the master to another. In such cases the pilgrims have to reconcile the muzawwirs, by paying something, to let the master and the servant come together. The muzawwirs at Medina are not so impolite and strict as are the mutawwifs at Mecca, otherwise great difficulties would have arisen. The Javanese pilgrims have no fixed muzawwirs and so it is at the option of their mutawwif (travelling with the pilgrims) to whom they will go. The mutawwif usually takes his party to the muzawwir who will charge him the least and give him and his party full comfort. The fees for the muzawwirs are not fixed as they are at Mecca, and therefore it rests with the pilgrims how much they pay. Owing to this the muzawwirs try to make as much money as they can from the pilgrims in whatever way possible. Generally the pilgrims are not allowed to stay in Medina for more than three days. All complaints made by the pilgrims against the camel-men of their maltreatment on the way are not heard by the authorities at Medina, and the camel-men are given full liberty to do with the



pilgrims as they like. This year the pilgrims who visited Medina after the Hady were put to great troubles, especially the Persians. They were made to stay in Medina for a very long time as the camel-men were not willing to bring them back unless the pilgrims have paid money demanded by the Bedouins and the camel-men. The pilgrims suffered great pecuniary losses owing to their forced stay at Medina, and were then taken to Yembo instead of being brought to Jeddah as was agreed upon at the time of their departure from Mecca, and for which the pilgrims had already paid.

#### *Yembo-Medina Road.*

The Yembo-Medina road is not safe, and the pilgrim caravans which visited Medina before the Hady had to go from Mecca or Jeddah and come back to Mecca by land. The last pilgrim caravan, after the Hady, had to come back to Jeddah via Yembo. The pilgrims took as long as ten days to reach Yembo, which is considered to be only five days' journey from Medina, and were put to great troubles by the Bedouins on the way. The Persian pilgrims suffered the most. They were the last to leave Medina and were stopped at every 3 or 4 miles and made to pay money to the Bedouins.

The Hamda tribe is considered to be the most troublesome tribe, and it is rumoured that this tribe is quite fearless of the Government, and the people do whatever they like. It is almost impossible for any caravan, whether of pilgrims or of merchandise, to pass by this tribe without paying something. The chief place of the Hamdas is a village named Kheif, which is situated on the Yembo-Medina road, and thus the caravans travelling on this road have to pass this nest of the thieves. The rendezvous is a little farther up, where the road is narrower with hills on both sides and this gives a very good chance to the Hamdas to stop caravans.

The other route via boat is infested by the Jahena tribe, and is considered to be more dangerous and thus not used for any kind of traffic at all.

I beg, &c.

H. SAID HASAN,

*Indian Police Officer.*

[E 1171/248/91]

No. 175.

*Acting Consul Graftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 1.)*

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Jeddah, February 1, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 1.

I have talked to King Hussein as instructed.

His lengthy reply is being sent by bag to-day. He declares that he will not ratify treaty unless articles affecting Ibn Saud and Idrisi limit these rulers to pre-war boundaries and authority. Reply covers copy of letter addressed to Prime Minister, dated 30th December last, reasserting his old grievances and pressing for sympathetic treatment on lines of his correspondence with MacMahon. This was evidently to be Abdullah's basis of discussion.

King Hussein adds that unless he receives answer "Yes" or "No" to these claims by 27th February he will abdicate.

[E 1378/656/91]

No. 176.

*Acting Consul Graftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 7.)*

(No. 7. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, January 20, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 1st-20th January, 1922.

(Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Delhi.)

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 176.

(Secret.)

*Jeddah Report, January 1-20, 1922.*

#### *Visit of King Hussein to Jeddah.*

KING HUSSEIN arrived from Mecca on the 8th January, accompanied by the Emir Zeid, and stayed in Jeddah until the 11th January. The ostensible reason for his visit was his desire to inspect the Waziriah aqueduct, damaged by the November storms. He did, in fact, drive out there during the afternoons of the 8th and 9th: but his interviews with the local merchants were probably of greater interest to him than any question of the Jeddah water supply. His Majesty came to Jeddah to get money, and his usual methods met with their usual success.

There was a strong rumour that a 25 per cent. levy on capital was in prospect, and many merchants endeavoured hastily to remit large balances by bill to Bombay or elsewhere. Their fears, rendered more acute by the consideration that, if and when such a measure is imposed, the King will probably assist in the assessment of their capital, did not, however, in this instance materialise. The King was content to obtain ready money by the sale of shares in the "Industrial Enterprise Company," referred to in my last report, and to ensure a general increase in revenue by the imposition of new taxation.

#### *Industrial Enterprise Company.*

For each share in the company 5L. gold was charged. The sheikhs of the different guilds were summoned and asked how many shares the individual merchants, auctioneers, &c., under their authority could afford to take up. Scrip (a bare receipt) was allotted accordingly. The company have issued no prospectus and, naturally, have fixed no rate of interest. The money is supposed to be earmarked for the purchase and upkeep of two steamers. Someone expressed alarm lest these vessels might be run by the Government only, and no advantage accrue to the shareholders; but the King reassured him, on the ground that, as the Government were acquiring two other steamers of their own, there would be no temptation to them to act thus.

I have not heard that definite steps have yet been taken for the purchase of this nucleus merchant marine, the idea of which was, as recently reported, suggested to King Hussein by George Lotfallah. It is said that the latter is negotiating for purchase in Egypt, while I know that a local (Indian) engineer has been instructed by the kaimakam to suggest means for dry-docking in Jeddah. The venture can have no hope of financial success, more especially since the Khedivial Mail Steamship Company have at last decided to detach a steamer, the steamship "Borulos," for general coastal trade in the Red Sea.

#### *New Taxation.*

The new taxes imposed by the King are likely to prove remunerative. These include a graduated stamp tax on all commercial and various other documents, as set forth in a tariff published in No. 549 of "Al Qibla," forwarded herewith.\* Also a 5 Turkish piastres tax on every package, be it merchandise or personal luggage, leaving Jeddah by sea; this, like the new 5 Turkish piastres tax on packages entering the country, mentioned in my last report, is supplementary to customs dues. The health certificate, with which every sea-going traveller from Jeddah has now to be provided, has been raised from 5 to 20 Turkish piastres (plus 1 Turkish piastre stamp). For each camel plying between Jeddah and Mecca a tax of 20 Turkish piastres (plus 1 Turkish piastre stamp) is collected in respect of each (single) journey. This tax has been raised from 5 Turkish piastres. In Mecca, 20 Turkish piastres per corpse buried is levied as a burial charge by the Government—a very unpopular charge. Most houses in Jeddah have a "sahlif," or reservoir in the foundations, for water storage. Persons filling these with water bought and brought from wells outside the town—the only available source of supply—are mulcted of 200 or 400 Turkish piastres, according to the size of the reservoir, by a Government not ashamed to exploit the very necessities of life.

It is impossible to say where King Hussein, his appetite once whetted, will stop in his invention of imposts. To the pilgrimage aspect of the matter I refer under a later heading. One not improbable corollary to an increase in revenue may be a diminished interest on the King's part in the present conditional offer of a subsidy. The King

\* Not printed.



appears to have become, as a result of the new charges, more feared and better hated than ever by his people; but the people of Mecca and Jeddah are by temperament mainly, and in part by fear of British retribution, inclined to limit their rebellious manifestations to an occasional experiment in *envoûtement*, and to concentrate rather on getting their own back out of the pilgrims. One is led to think that Jeddah and Mecca have the ruler they deserve.

#### Conscription.

If King Hussein is to give effect to the military ambitions with which he is popularly credited, he will need every penny of his new revenue.

Conscription, formerly applied exclusively to the Takrunis in Mecca, has now been extended to others of the poorer and more defenceless elements there, and Jeddah cannot remain long exempt.

On the first Friday of the month, after the ceremony of kissing hands, the King made a strong appeal to the assembled Mecca notables for recruits.

One result of the new methods has been an exodus of 400 or 500 Takrunis from Mecca to the Soudan, and recent arrivals from Lith report that some 300 more were met trekking to the Yemen. Those Takrunis who remain in Mecca are compelled to keep to their houses, and are thus debarred from following their humble street vocations, since to be found by the King's recruiting agents means loss of liberty.

#### Medina Communications.

The Yembo-Medina road is still closed, and conditions on the Rabegh-Medina road remain as recently reported. Two "Peerless" lorries were landed at Yembo on the 4th January.

The Emir Ali is returning on the 21st instant to Medina overland, and the Government are sending 700 men to Yembo *en route* for Medina on the 22nd instant by steamship "Dakahlieh," which is then to proceed to Akaba, with 200 conscript troops.

The November rains have enabled the tribes along the Yembo-Medina road to grow their own wheat. Their consequent independence of the King's rationing system deprives him of a useful measure of control.

In Rabegh rationing is discriminating, the sale of stores to members of certain tribes being forbidden absolutely. The pirate tribesmen along this strip of coast are therefore importing direct from Suakin. Bedouin purchasing stores in Mecca, Medina and Jeddah may not pass the city gates or outpost guards with more than 2 "keilahs" of grain. As many come from considerable distances, and as this measure is an inclusive weight of wheat, barley or rice, or of all three commodities, even those tribes against which there is no discrimination are on short rations. Shopkeepers selling more than the prescribed quantity to individual tribesmen are fined.

Merchants remitting goods to Medina from Jeddah have to give a guarantee that these goods will not be disposed of *en route* to Bedouin along the Rabegh-Medina road. From this guarantee they are only absolved by the production of receipts signed by the consignees in Medina. The tribesmen's habit of attacking caravans and arbitrarily disposing of the stores adds much to the anxieties of the Jeddah guarantor.

The Emir Ali may intend to make a demonstration to the north of Medina, as the Government fear action by Wahhabis, engineered from Hail, against El Ula, and the establishment of Wahhabi contact with El Wejh. The Juhaima and Billi tribes are reported to be exposed to Wahhabi propaganda. Ali will, however, have no lack of domestic difficulties in Medina, where Shereef Shahad, the drunkard and libertine kaimakam, openly declares himself as leader of the anti-Mecca party. Malefactors imprisoned by order of the acting governor, Ahmed-bin-Mansour, are released by order of the kaimakam, and the Emir Ali will need a strong hand to restore order.

#### Aviation.

The present distribution of the Hashimite air forces is:—

##### In Jeddah—

Two Armstrongs (Beardmore motors of 160 h.p.) not yet unpacked.

Two de Havillands (Siddley-Palmer motor of 200 h.p.). One of these is in good condition, the other lacks essential parts. None of the pilots locally available are familiar with this type of machine.

Two Farmans (fixed Fiat motor of 100 h.p.), both unpacked, but unassembled.

One Caudron, useless.

##### In Taif—

Two Caudrons (Ron motor, 120 h.p.), one in good condition, the other under repair.

The efforts of the whole force are at present directed towards getting the de Havilland to Taif, for bombing operations against Kleikh and Taraba.

The personnel in Taif consists of an Italian mechanic named Delicata and a Greek pilot, holding British certificates, named Stavris. The latter, who arrived from Egypt on the 5th instant, flew a Caudron from Jeddah to Taif without mishap on the 18th instant. He differs from the Russian pilots in Jeddah in that he considers himself engaged for military as well as civil flying, and it is he who will be detailed to bomb Taraba when, if ever, the de Havilland machine reaches Taif. The Caudrons now in Taif cannot remain up long enough for an operation against Taraba. The new aerodrome at Taif is 900 yards long and from 100 to 300 yards wide. Entry can only be made with a north or south wind, that is, not after about 4 p.m., when the wind veers to the west.

The personnel in Jeddah has been increased by the arrival of five Russian refugees from Egypt on the 5th January. Of these, two are mechanics, and the remainder pilots. Of Messrs. Jungmeister, Minchanok and Kousnietzof, the pilots, the first is an ex-colonel in the Tsarist army. He has made one small flight round the Jeddah aerodrome, and is now suffering from a diplomatic malady likely to last until one of his compatriots puts the de Havilland out of action.

The second endeavoured to fly when King Hussein inspected the aerodrome on the 10th January, but, having got the machine 5 yards up, he crashed at His Majesty's feet.

The King left the scene without comment.

M. Kousnietzof has proved unable to fly any machine as yet, and he now assures the local authorities that he is a sea-plane expert, and cannot be expected to fly on land.

The new mechanics are named Agnaief and Seleguene.

All the Russians have applied to me for British protection during their stay in the Hedjaz. Unless they manifest more competence than has yet been visible, their stay is likely to be a short one.

#### Pilgrimage.

The King has been repeatedly asked since September last to fix the quarantine dues payable by pilgrims this year, and in recent conversations with the Emir Zeid and with His Majesty, I pressed for an early decision. The King makes a show of dallying with the idea of a 1l. sterling tax per head, but only to dismiss it, on the ground that he cannot make so high a charge before all the comforts, hospitals and rest-houses, which pilgrims would have a right to expect, are actually in being. The first pilgrimships from the Netherlands East Indies will thus sail without having received notification of the 1922 dues. They will presumably collect from the pilgrims 37½ Turkish piastres only, on last year's scale, and we shall have a repetition of last year's disputes and difficulties between shipping agents and the Director-General of Quarantine. This is much to be deplored, but it is probably what the King desires. He welcomes every occasion for blackening the shipping companies by representing them as wolves preying on the pilgrims, and if his own negligence in fixing Jeddah dues leads to a situation in which he can intervene on these lines, his four months' procrastination is explained.

Happily Thabet Bey, Director-General of Quarantine, stands less securely than he did. His accounts are at present under investigation, and they alone should hang him. His late chief clerk and crony, the equally abhorrent but more subtle Constantine Yanni, leads the pack against him, and I believe the kaimakam, the Director-General of Customs and the Rais-ul-Baladia to be united in working for his downfall. If he goes, quarantine affairs may be better than they were last year. They cannot fall into worse hands.

Whatever may be the quarantine dues finally fixed, pilgrims this year must be prepared for much expense due to the new taxation, which will probably be raised during the pilgrimage season. It is rumoured that the 3 Turkish piastres per package



landing tax and the 5 Turkish piastres per package leaving-tax will alike be raised to 20 Turkish piastres, and that the camel tax will be raised to 1*l.* sterling per journey between Mecca and Jeddah. Whether this happens or no, pilgrims will be well advised to bring their personal effects in a few large bundles rather than in many small. The anxiety of the populace to recoup their taxes from pilgrims will mean higher prices all round and busy exploitation.

The sum which Yusuf-el-Qahtan, Minister of Public Works, has, as Sheikh-ul-Mashaikh of Javanese pilgrims in Mecca, promised to pay to the King this year is 200,000*l.* This is the man who, for his prowess as a chess-player, was taken by Shereef Aun from donkey-driving and promoted to be Sheikh-ul-Mashaikh of the Javanese. He can neither read nor write.

Popular estimate puts the King's prospective receipts from pilgrims this year at 8*l.* sterling per head.

#### Mecca.

On the 10th January there was a free fight, with loss of life, in the Suleimani and Naqah quarters of Mecca. This was at first reported in Jeddah as having been provoked by Mecca recruiting methods, but I now understand that the cause was popular resentment at the new burial tax. The Suleimani quarter is largely inhabited by Afghans, the Naqah quarter by the Shuruf.

It is piquant to recall that when this tax was imposed by the Turkish Government some twelve years ago King Hussein, then Shereef, led the opposition. Events took a serious turn; there was shooting and bloodshed in the mosque itself, and as a result the tax was abolished.

The municipal control of bread, referred to in the last report, has been extended to "samm" (clarified butter) and to kerosene oil. With a slight further extension of the system, the municipality of Mecca—that is, the King—will hold a monopoly of all that poor folk can afford or simple needs require.

According to a popular rumour, a letter has been received in Mecca from Khalid guaranteeing immunity from harm to all who detach themselves from the local Government on his proximate triumphant entry into Mecca.

#### Slave Traffic.

One feature of the period under review has been the arrival, in three batches, of over eighty slave-children of from 8 to 14 years of age from Midi in the Yemen. Many of them were stolen from the Moslem village of Antajbura in Abyssinia, shipped across from Obokh or Asab to Midi, which is an important distribution centre for the whole of the Red Sea, and thence consigned by Sayed Abdul Matloub, Sheikh of Midi, to his son, Sayed Abdul Hamid, of Ru'is, near Jeddah. The local authorities made a show of confiscating them, on the ground that such traffic is illegal, but they are now disposing of them to their own advantage through brokers. These children sell for about 30*l.* each.

The matter has been reported to the senior naval officer, Red Sea patrol, and to other authorities concerned.

#### Missionaries.

Since the 1st January two efforts have been made by English missionaries to initiate missionary work in the Hedjaz.

In both cases political considerations have appeared to me to justify official discouragement of such endeavours, and the return of the missionaries to Egypt has been arranged.

#### Gellatly, Hankey and Co.

In order to settle the dispute with the local authorities about the coal referred to in the report for the period 1st–20th August last, this firm have, as an act of grace, knocked 25 per cent. off their account. This involves them in a loss over the transaction.

The Government have sent me to see and return a letter addressed to the King by Mohyi-bin-Saleh, Ma'aza-bin-Mohammed, Ahmed-bin-Jabir, Ali-bin-Abdul Aziz, Mohammed-bin-Bawwah and Abdullah-bin-Sha'ur, reporting Wahhabi activity in Jebel Asir and a conflict in the Beni Shehr country. The letter appeals to the King for the assistance of Sheikh Faraj-bin Said and Shebili-bin-el-Arif, but its language is so obscure that I have been unable to estimate its value as intelligence or, indeed, to

elucidate the details reported. I am not convinced that reference is not rather to the depredations of a section of the Beni Wahhab than to the followers of Ibn Saud.

The King, in conversation with me, doubled his previous generous assessment of the number of camelmén whom a Jeddah-Mecca railway would ruin, by estimating it at 150,000. He painted a glowing picture of this multitude established on the land.

The Emir Zeid informed me that His Majesty personally favoured the idea of a tram-line, rather than a railway, between the port and the capital.

#### Press ("Al Qibla").

No. 548 contains an official proclamation protesting against the rumour that the Government of Medina have appropriated the Moorish waqfs there.

No. 549 publishes the scale of stamp taxes on commercial and other documents. These papers contain nothing else of interest.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

#### Enclosure 2 in No. 176.

#### Shipping Intelligence to January 20, 1922.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between December 31, 1921, and January 20, 1922:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Cargo Discharged.
Dakahlieh ..	British	..	Suez	..	Jan. 1 ..	Packets.
Massana ..	Italian	Massana ..	Suez	Dec. 31 ..	" 1 ..	1,737
Mansourah ..	British	Suez ..	Port Soudan	Jan. 5 ..	" 5 ..	642
Mansourah ..	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 11 ..	" 12 ..	1,050
Dakahlieh ..	British	Suez ..	Port Soudan	" 15 ..	" 15 ..	2,642
Asmara ..	Italian	Massana ..	Suez	" 15 ..	" 15 ..	2,672
Massana ..	Italian	Suez ..	Massana ..	" 17 ..	" 17 ..	492
<i>Omitted from previous Return.</i>						
Asmara ..	Italian	Massana ..	Suez	Dec. 24 ..	Dec. 24 ..	1,493

[E 1974/248/91]

No. 177.

Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, February 20, 1922.

MY telegram No. 9 of 1st February.

King Hussein asked me to remind you of his desire to abdicate 27th February. He is coming to Jeddah during next few days.

Bluffing or not, he will certainly ask me to take note formally of his abdication, and general assurances in soothing terms will be of little use in reply. Finances of country are very bad, and I think King is fairly desperate.

He considers himself personally indispensable to us, and trades on that. I would deprecate reply, merely confirming him in this belief without backing of material concessions.

If he is not pressed for reconsideration of decision, three things are possible: he may say no more about abdicating and carry on as at present, more antagonistic because more desperate than ever; he may announce abdication publicly and still remain in Mecca (of all eventualities the most disastrous); or he might abdicate and accept passage to Egypt in one of His Majesty's ships. Latter course certainly best for welfare of Hedjaz.

I should be grateful for very early intimation of lines on which His Majesty's Government desire his announcement of abdication to be received.



[E 1219/248/91]

No. 178.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah).*

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, February 21, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 9 of 1st February and other telegrams regarding Hussein's threatened resignation.

You should inform King Hussein that note has been taken of his decision to resign on 27th February, and add that His Majesty's Government, mindful of his loyal co-operation during the war and of their cordial relations with His Majesty during the last six years, regret that he should find it necessary to take this step, but realise that it is a matter which King Hussein must settle with his own people. (End of R.)

(Confidential.)

If Hussein should in fact abdicate, it is desirable that Ali should accede to the throne forthwith. Should this take place, you can assure him of the friendly feelings which His Majesty's Government entertain for him.

[E 1974/248/91]

No. 179.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah).*

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, February 22, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 16 of 20th February: Hussein's abdication.

I incline to the view that, if Hussein abdicates, it would be better that he should stay on at Mecca, where he cannot give much trouble if Ali succeeds him. Our intervention in any way, such as facilities for voyage to and stay in Egypt, would probably be exaggerated and misinterpreted. What precise disasters do you foresee from his staying in Mecca?

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 59.)

[E 2276/656/91]

No. 180.

*Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received February 28.)*

(No. 12. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, February 10, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period from the 21st January to the 10th February, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Delhi.

I have, &amp;c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH,

*Acting British Agent.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 180.

*Jeddah Report for the Period January 21–February 10, 1922.*

(Secret.)

FUEL has been added to the fire of King Hussein's ever-glowing resentment at the ungenerous treatment he considers himself to have received at British hands by the articles appearing in the "Times" of the 27th–30th December last, and by the recent message that the Emir Abdullah's visit to London is to be made conditional upon the King's ratification of the document signed at Amman.

The postponement of his son's mission, upon which he evidently based hopes of advantages ranging from the mere excuse for further tergiversation to the fulfilment of his every material ambition, has been a harder blow to him than any partisan criticism in the press. The latter affords him a welcome opportunity to state his case,

nominal against the "Times," but actually against Great Britain, in successive numbers of "Al Qibla." This he does at great length, with apposite reproduction of official correspondence—communications from the High Commissioner, Cairo, and from His Majesty's Government—addressed to him through this agency in 1918; his comments thereon, pungent in the light of *post bellum* developments, reach a degree of malicious innuendo with reference to the Arabian policy of His Majesty's Government, against which I have felt compelled to register a strong protest. He has not scrupled to publish, as binding upon His Majesty's Government, an article from what appears to be one of his own unacceptable drafts of the treaty, where his argument was thereby served.

This article has at once been seized upon by "Al Ommah," of Cairo, as evidence of King Hussein's radical dependence upon His Majesty's Government, and, whatever the purpose of its publication, it has boomeranged back, in its evocation of criticism of his self-confessed betrayal of the best interests of Islam.

The convention, so often reiterated, that King Hussein has no connection with "Al Qibla" newspaper, is not allowed to cramp his journalistic style. A "reader in Jeddah" is invented, into whose hands fate has thrown whatever strictly confidential correspondence it may suit His Majesty to reproduce. This convenient contributor joins battle with the "Times," using language identical with that in which His Majesty has often expressed himself to me. In this "Qibla"—"Times" controversy the King probably rather enjoys himself; he certainly forgets himself, in that he allows his shadowy protagonist to use language which conforms far more nearly to his own recent behaviour than does that same behaviour to his royal protestations of sincerity and gratitude.

The increased bitterness, by whatever circumstance prompted, is, however, there. It is apparent in the tone of his correspondence with this agency and in his attitude towards matters under discussion.

In a letter dated the 2nd Jamad-uth-Thani (30th January), he has announced his intention of abdicating on the last day of that month unless a definite answer to his request for a reconsideration of his claims reaches him before then. His voluntary abdication is, in fact, the least probable of events, and hypothetical conjecture as to its possible consequences is futile. But it is a card which previous experience leads him to think has the force of trumps, and until he is disabused of this conviction he will continue to believe that the British Empire exists by his favour, and that he really is the navel of the universe. Some thought of the strong position that would be his as the result of an act of abdication which left him as a distinguished resident in Mecca may, however, have occurred to him.

While the formulae of gratitude and of attachment to Great Britain continue to grace the King's correspondence, the action of the Hashimite Government officials, always dictated personally over the royal telephone, suggests anything rather than a friendly disposition towards things British.

On the 23rd January the three sons of a British pilgrim from Kanu (Bornu), who came on pilgrimage in 1921 and held British passports as natives of Nigeria, were set upon in their hut in Jeddah by the local police, and were being beaten at the city gate as a preliminary to being taken for military service to Mecca before their father came to seek help from this agency. I telegraphed at once to the King requesting their immediate release, which was effected. In voluminous later correspondence the King claims admiration for his benevolence in giving free barrack accommodation to vagrants, and in clothing them (in uniform) and medically treating them free of charge. I had to request that British subjects might be exempted from the exercise of this charitable measure. To my objection at the treatment of the men's sister, who, in endeavouring to shield them from the police, was brutally cut over the breast, the King replied with a dissertation on the low morality of Jeddah butter-sellers, adding that, as for the police, "they are doing their work well, thank God." I could only reply that my protest was directed not against their efficiency, but against the nature of the work given them to do.

The men in question were not vagrants; nor is the son of the Mecca agent of the Begum of Bhopal, whom the King has conscribed, with three other British Indians. These four men are so terrified of eventual royal reprisals that they are anxious that I should not intervene on their behalf. The same humiliating conviction, that the Hashimite Government can do British subjects in the Hedjaz more harm than the British Government can good, deters the doyen of the local Patni Indian community from invoking official aid in the prosecution of a large claim against the Jeddah customs authorities. This is the spirit, a broken spirit, for which King Hussein works. There is not a kick left in the Indian community in Mecca.



If there were any reasonableness or any equity in Hashimite Government methods or Hashimite Government justice, the exposure thereto of our British Indian subjects would be less deplorable.

Rida Ali Khan, a reputable merchant of Bareilly (U.P.), was arrested (almost certainly in mistake for some one else), while performing his Haj ceremonies in August last. He lay in prison in Mecca while letter after letter from this agency was ignored by the Hashimite Government. Only on the 28th January, after the most vigorous representations, did I manage to get him out. He had never been tried; the charge against him had never even been formulated.

In a case between two British Indians, heard before the Jeddah Court during the autumn, the Qadi, bribed by the plaintiff and in the most blatant defiance of certified evidence which he had himself called upon the defendant to produce, condemned the latter to pay the former 1,400 rupees. Judgment had not been executed when the plaintiff applied to me for permission to proceed to Egypt. I am happy to say that as a result of careful exploitation of this circumstance, the case has now been settled out of Court—the plaintiff paying the defendant 1,000 rupees, and given him satisfaction in other directions.

I have referred in some detail to specific instances, not because these are exceptional, but because they are typical and could be duplicated from the files of this agency for any similar period since the quarantine affair in May 1920. The incessant recurrence of such incidents is evidence of the line King Hussein has taken to achieve recognition of his claim on His Majesty's Government. Until he himself, or his sense of grievance, be removed, every path will be explored which offers him a chance to get home on us. His occasional failures hurt him less than his occasional successes hurt us. And it will be realised that he has successes in Mecca of which, in the absence of any British representative there, this agency only hears after the desired effect has been already made upon the local British and native communities.

#### H.M.S. "Cornflower." Incident off Serom.

On the 22nd January, H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived at Jeddah, and remained until the late afternoon. Her visit and her programme for a three or four days' cruise between Jeddah and Lith were the result of the recently reported activity in slave traffic between Midi and Ru'is.

On the 26th January, the following telegram was received from Port Soudan:—

"Following from H.M.S. 'Cornflower.' Dhow off Serom, 195 miles 184 from Jeddah, resists boarding by rifle fire. Driving crew ashore. Suggest you get corps from Jeddah to capture about dozen."

This, owing to the telegraphic omission of a decimal point, was taken as referring alternatively to the place Serom on the coast south of Kunfudah (latitude 18.46, miles from Jeddah approximately 180), or to the Island of Saran, north of Kunfudah (latitude 19.40), and a correction from Port Soudan reading: "Position is off Serom 195 miles 184" from Jeddah, that is, 195 miles south of Jeddah," unfortunately confirmed my misapprehension of the facts.

I arranged with the King for a dhow to be sent with twenty-five men from the Bahrieh and a machine-gun. Their departure was delayed until the morning of the 27th January. H.M.S. "Cornflower" was asked to effect contact with them. The commander was also asked whether the despatch of a second party by land from Jeddah was considered essential. Believing that the scene of the incident lay some distance to the south of Kunfudah, I was disinclined to prejudice any future settlement in this district by requesting the King to send a land force to demonstrate, as if of right, in disputed territory.

In fact, the place Serom in question will be found on the chart 19½ miles south of Jeddah. The Hashimite dhow was met by H.M.S. "Cornflower" on the 28th January, and the local marine force spent some days ashore, searching for the men who had fired on the "Cornflower's" boats.

A copy of Commander Campbell's report is attached.

He brought the captured dhow to Jeddah on the 29th January and here awaited instructions as to its disposal. These were received on the 4th February. The moral effect of the presence of H.M.S. "Cornflower," with dhow, in Jeddah harbour, is likely to be excellent.

I have been unable to ascertain what prompted the occupants of the hostile dhow to take the action they did. It was at first believed that they were slave-traders

returning to Midi with the proceeds of Hedjaz sales, but from conversation between their fellow-tribesmen, overheard by an agent, it appears that they were from the Rabegh district—the dhow is known to hail from Rabegh—and were proceeding to the Yemen to purchase supplies in order to evade the King's virtual blockade of unruly tribes along that coast. Either explanation would account for their bad consciences, and the latter is probably the true one.

Two arrests were made by the Hashimite marine force at Serom, but the men arrested were released, their innocence being certified by the Jeddah authorities. Thus none of those who fired upon the White Ensign from Hashimite territory have yet been captured. The King informs me that he has charged the Emir-ul-Urban to continue the search.

The incident has given the King material for several letters in which His Majesty's Government are reproached with their neglect to supply him with aeroplanes and steamships, with indulgence towards arms smuggling into other parts of the Arabian coast and with an invidious discrimination against these waters in their exercise of slave-traffic control.

I am endeavouring to obtain from the Hashimite Government a statement of opinion on the subject of the importation of slaves into the Hedjaz.

#### Medina.

A recent arrival from Medina reports that a profound impression, and one very favourable to Ibn Saud, has been caused by his bloodless capture of Hail and by his subsequent conciliatory policy. The first feeling of the Medina inhabitants was one of alarm, due in great part to the fear of disorderly Bedouin elements in and around the town, and there were signs of a movement towards stampede. But Ibn Saud is reported to have instructed the tribes of that district to profit by the November rains for the cultivation of their land, and to have promised no aggressive action for a period of at least four months. Consequently, Ibn Saud is locally lauded as a wise, benevolent and in every respect desirable ruler, and, should he approach Medina, opposition to him would be, as far as the populace is concerned, hardly more than formal.

Shereef Shahad, the Kaimakam of Medina, has also gained in favour with the inhabitants by a relaxation of his despotic methods. In his character as the champion of the Medina populace against Mecca authority, he recently refused to hand over to Shereef Ahmed Mansur, the acting Governor, thirty individuals whom the King had ordered to be exiled to Mecca.

Reports of the extension of an atmosphere favourable to Ibn Saud and to the propagation of Wahhabi tenets, to the tribes along the Hedjaz railway, find confirmation in King Hussein's often expressed anxieties. He has sent to me an original proclamation addressed by Abdurrahman-ibn-Thunayan to the people of El Ala, attacking Shereef Mansur and the Government to the advantage of Ibn Saud. The seal on this document has, however, been intentionally obliterated.

The King also complains of propaganda among the Fugara, the Sha'an and the Tawwayah and Beni Jazi sections of the Huweitat, made on the strength of Ibn Saud's letter to Farhan-al-Aida. He assumes that His Majesty's Government can, but will not, take steps to check this dissemination of propaganda, and he reiterates *ad nauseam* his willingness to hand over the country to Ibn Saud or to any other Emir whom Great Britain may select.

King Hussein's own methods have done more than anything else to promote conditions favourable to his rival. Were he not so unpopular, propaganda directed against him would not find such ready acceptance. But, whatever the cause, it is, I believe, the fact that the ground is being well prepared for some such dramatic extension of Wahhabi influence as that suggested in paragraph 4, p. 1, of the report for the period ending the 31st December last. If Ibn Saud is to be induced by His Majesty's Government to use his influence to check the further spread of Mudayyin tenets within Hedjaz borders, he will have to close a field of very rapidly extending promise. It seems almost impossible that he should possess the influence to achieve this: the movement proceeds by its own impetus, favoured by the circumstance of local discontent. But unless and until Ibn Saud formally disclaims responsibility for any proselytising action by his friends in the Hedjaz, and elsewhere outside Nejd, King Hussein will continue to see in such activity the hand of His Majesty's Government supporting the Sultan of Nejd, and all the forces of militant heresy against himself.

The Emir Ali, who left Mecca for Medina via Yambo with an escort of 400 camels



on the 21st January, met at Yambo the 700 troops which had left Jeddah by sea on the same day, but no news of his arrival at Medina has yet been received in Mecca.

It is, indeed, strongly rumoured in Jeddah that he is at present in Rabegh endeavouring to pacify the more or less insurgent tribes of that district, and that the popular memory of Sheikh Hussein of Rabegh, who, after making his peace with the King in 1919, was invited to Mecca and there murdered, makes the tribesmen distrustful of Government assurances.

#### Mecca.

There has been since the beginning of January an epidemic in Mecca of what the inhabitants call "typhus" or "Al Humma An-nariyya" (the fiery fever); but the symptoms, which are set forth in detail in an enclosure to this report, do not suggest typhus. This malady is said to be the indirect result of an unusual accumulation of water in a valley to the south-east of Taif. It originated in Taif and has now spread to Mecca, where it has a mortality of twelve or fifteen per diem. No cases of recovery after the first day have been traced. There have been two deaths in the palace itself. The French representative, who made a special study of this epidemic on the spot, states that he has not met with identical symptoms in the course of his long experience in the East.

The King chooses this moment to inform an Indian druggist in Mecca that his licence to retail drugs will not be extended after the 1st Ramadan next; while the only important chemist's shop in Mecca, run by an Indian, Al Hakim Ramzan, is being closed by the owner, who has preferred to refuse delivery of stock rather than to pay the exaggerated customs dues charged by the Government on his imported drugs and medicines.

The prospect for Indian pilgrims, if they are to depend upon the Hashimite hospitals for medicine, is very unfavourable.

Recruiting still proceeds in Mecca, many of the older students being collected from the schools.

The King is said to have sent considerable stocks of foodstuffs to Taif.

#### Arrivals: Yemen Mission.

The steamship "Firuzy," arriving on the 30th January from Aden, brought Sayed Mohammed-ibn-Alawi-as-Sagoff, the King's emissary to the Imam, and Sayed Mohammed-ibn-Mohammed Zabara, who has been sent on a return mission by the Imam. They are now in Mecca. It is rumoured that the Yemen representative is to proceed later to Medina and thence to Amman. Sayed-as-Sagoff asked for and obtained a letter from the Political Resident at Aden to King Hussein, commending in general terms His Majesty's endeavours to bring about peace between the Idrisi and the Imam.

The King's nephew, Jaafar Pasha, arrived from Egypt on the 5th February and proceeded at once to Mecca.

Mr. W. C. Parkinson, a British subject in the employ of the Carnegie Institute of Washington, spent some days in Jeddah during the period under review for the purpose of checking certain magnetic observations. The local authorities granted him all necessary facilities.

#### Press: "Al Qibla."

No. 553 contains extracts from the "Times" articles, reproduced from "Al Ahram" of Cairo, and replies to the charge of bad faith implicit in the suggestion that King Hussein has attacked Ibn Saud despite his undertaking to abstain from such aggression.

It reproduces a telegram as having been sent to the "Times" by King Hussein, in which the King invokes the good offices of the editor for the persuasion of His Majesty's Government to allow him to hand over the country to Ibn Saud or any other Emir.

With reference to the suggestion that Ibn Saud was only deterred by His Majesty's Government from advancing on Mecca, the editor expresses gratitude for this benevolent prevention and adds:—

"And this is in accordance with the articles of our treaty, article 2 of which prescribes that:—

"Great Britain undertakes to protect this Government and to secure it against interference of whatsoever nature in the interior and to safeguard its frontiers by land and by sea against any aggression whatsoever; even if a civil insurrection

should occur due to enemy intrigue or to the rancour of one of the Emirs, Great Britain shall then render to the Government in question moral and material aid to quell this insurrection until it ends. This assistance in the quelling of insurrections or revolts is to hold good until such time as the said Arab Government be firmly established."

The paper attributes Ibn Saud's alleged defeat of the Hedjaz forces to British aid, relates instances of assistance rendered by King Hussein to Ibn Saud on the latter's request, reproduces extracts from King Hussein's address to the Nejd delegation and ends by blaming British and French statesmen for the present state of affairs.

No. 554 reproduces from the "Carmel" of Palestine an account of an interview with the Emir Abdullah, in which his Highness expresses his desire for Arab unity under one strong Arab Government.

Also two articles from "Al Moqattam" of Cairo, which are made the text for an enthusiastic appeal to Arabs to work in unity for the fulfilment of their aspirations.

There is a lengthy account of the farewells to the Emir Ali, on the occasion of his departure for Medina.

No. 555 publishes a long article, said to have been contributed by a "reader in Jeddah," attacking the "Times"—extracts from official British correspondence with King Hussein are reproduced, with appreciations by the late Lord Cromer of the Arab effort in the war. The Allies are blamed for dividing up among themselves Arab territories, despite their promises, and so of committing the same breach of faith with which King Hussein is charged by the "Times."

The "Times" report that a Hedjaz delegation is discussing terms of peace and friendship with the Imam is scouted on the grounds that these desirable relations already exist, and that the mission of the delegation is to effect a settlement of matters in dispute between the Imam and the Idrisi.

The practice of medicine is officially forbidden to men not holding diplomas or other evidence of qualification.

In No. 556, the rumour that the Hedjaz Government has disposed of any part of the Hedjaz railway to Europeans is denied, and occasion is taken again to protest against French usurpation of the northern section of this railway.

No. 557 contains nothing of interest beyond a poem, urging the Arabs to unite.

No. 558 announces the arrival of the Imam's delegation, and publishes the speeches made at the inauguration of the School of Agriculture in Mecca.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH,  
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 180.

#### Report by Commander Campbell on the Capture of a Hostile Dhow off Serom.

Sir,

H.M.S. "Cornflower" at Jeddah, January 31, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that P.M. on Sunday, the 22nd January, I left Jeddah, in accordance with orders, to patrol between Jeddah and Lith, in consequence of the slave traffic reported in previous correspondence, and orders from the Senior Officer, Red Sea Patrol.

2. On Monday, the 23rd January, sent boat with Sub-Lieutenant to examine a dhow anchored inside reef some 15 miles south of Jeddah. Population walked away, and dhow was found empty and very sanitary. A woman and child on foreshore were the only people who remained in vicinity.

3. Tuesday, the 24th January. Proceeded about 4½ miles down coast, intending to examine and search a dhow which had been seen anchored there the previous day. She was in latitude 21° 8½' N., longitude 39° 9½' E.

4. On closing this dhow at Serom, I observed that occupants behaved in a suspicious manner, most of them leaving hurriedly in their dug-out and landing on an adjacent island with apparently a woman in front carrying a bundle that appeared like rifles or sticks. "Cornflower" anchored at 7.30 A.M., and, being suspicious, I personally went away with Sub-Lieutenant Sherwood in whaler to board dhow. We were allowed to approach within about four or five hundred yards, when rifle fire was opened on us from the island and the dhow. Just previously, a man in dhow had waved a red flag, to which I replied by waving. As soon as fire was opened I retired, and, on way off to

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ship, signalled to fire a 3-pr. blank. This was done, and fire from Arabs ceased almost at once.

5. I asked for instructions from the Commander-in-chief and the Senior Officer, Red Sea Patrol, by W/T, and meanwhile closed dhow as far as possible with ship, anchoring about 1,200 yards off her.

6. Having received orders to use force and capture, sea was too rough for boat work that night, and dhow and island were kept under searchlight observation. Meanwhile crew had been seen ferrying between dhow and island and disembarking cargo, apparently in small boxes. One man in dhow was seen to go down and up a rope more than once leading down dhow's side. During the night, the dug-out was seen going to the mainland from the island.

7. Wednesday, January 25. At daylight, two men in dug-out were seen to land on a sandy spit about 400 yards behind dhow, having apparently come from mainland. Main party was in sight, camped on mainland.

8. At 6.15 A.M., I took both whalers away, colours flying—myself in one and Lieutenant Parkes in the other. Approached dhow again with Lewis guns in boats, also rifles and pistols; whalers about 200 yards apart. On arriving about 500 yards from dhow, rifle fire was again opened on boats from sandy spit 400 yards behind dhow. I ordered both boats to retire at once (as, by pursuing, the effort, it appeared morally certain that casualties would occur). By my orders, ship and boats opened fire on dhow with Lewis guns, Maxim and rifles. Both whalers returned to ship without casualties, but second whaler, with Lieutenant Parkes in command, was hit by bullet in stern grating, the bullet then passing between Lieutenant Parkes and Chief Petty Officer Gissing.

9. On return to ship I opened fire with 4-inch shrapnel, Lewis guns and Maxim on sandy spit, and shelled the two men there on to what appeared an island further back. Continued to shell them on to the mainland, they evacuating their dug-out.

10. At 10.20 A.M. left ship as before with both whalers, and boarded dhow without further resistance. Dhow had no one on board, and we proceeded to sail her out of reefs, towing whalers, ship having to weigh to pick us up.

11. At 4.10 P.M., I landed with Lieutenant Parkes and armed party of sixteen ratings, and camped on end of island where dhow party had camped the previous night. Searched island that night as far as causeway joining mainland. During night had outposts of Lewis guns and riflemen on island, and found near camp small bag of cartridges buried in the sand. Burned searchlights all night.

12. Thursday, January 26, A.M. Walked with practically whole party across the entire island. No enemy found in occupation. At night returned to camp. During this day a bag of five rifles in all, loaded with ten cartridges, was found buried in sand (adjacent but different spot to place cartridges had been found). Burnt searchlights as required.

13. Friday, January 27, 9.45 A.M. Hashimite armed dhow arrived in reply to signals made by me suggesting they be sent to search mainland. I searched with my party near our camp and launched whalers to come off. Sent Lieutenant Parkes with second whaler off to ship about 11 A.M. Kept first whaler and proceeded in a borrowed fishing boat to capture the dug-out. On arrival at sandy spit found two holes dug in the sand where the two riflemen had evidently fired from, eighteen empties being picked up. Found dug-out in good order on the mainland, the island previously referred to being in reality a part of the mainland with causeway in first instance covered by water. Proceeded inland with a petty officer for some 300 yards covered by three riflemen. No one approached us or was seen near, and I returned to ship with party and dug-out. Turned situation over to Hashimite troops who camped in island we had occupied, gave them a few rations, pending arrival of rations I asked Hedjaz Commander-in-chief to send them. I also issued on loan to them twenty-five water-bottles.

14. "Cornflower" sailed on Sunday, the 28th January, towing dhow to Jeddah. After conferring with the British consul I claimed dhow as prize, and, on informing Minister for Foreign Affairs at Mecca, by telephone, that I proposed to tow the dhow to Port Soudan as such, was told that King Hussein had no objection.

15. In the dhow were found four rifles, some ammunition, two swords, one pistol, large cargo of dates, &c.; no papers later than November. Dhow hails from Rabegh, and it is stated by Hashimite officials that she was carrying a cargo of dates, specie and arms to Yemen.

16. Under the circumstances, I have the honour to claim the dhow as a prize, observing she twice fired on me before I answered, the second time when the White Ensign was flying in each boat, while on the previous occasion the ship was in full view with colours flying.

17. I further claim that the specie, when recovered, be adjudged part of the prize, and that the occupants of the dhow, when captured, are suitably punished.

18. On searching vicinity of dhow's anchorage from boat with buoy down where rope referred to had been, I discovered nothing like booty on bottom, and, later, I made a search with water-glass borrowed from armed dhow, but failed to find anything, the position then being no longer buoyed, depth of water 14 feet, bottom very clear in water-glass.

19. I do not connect this dhow with the one searched on Monday, the 23rd January, the only similarity being that the woman in each case was dressed in the same way, and there was possibly a child also on the second occasion by footmarks in the sand on island, and I am not sure if I actually saw one or not on island before we occupied it.

20. After long consultation with the British consul, it was decided to send a telegram to the Foreign Office, outlining procedure proposed, and in which I claimed dhow as prize. "Cornflower" now awaits reply.

21. The majority of bullets found are .45 and flat-nosed. A few .303 ordinary pointed bullets. The nine rifles are of various makes, including one British, two French and some Turkish.

I have, &c.

L. B. G. A. CAMPBELL,  
Commander.

Enclosure 3 in No. 180.

*Symptoms of Fever Epidemic in Mecca and Taif, January-February 1922:*  
*Information supplied by the French Representative.*

PREMIER jour: Après-midi, lassitude générale; vers le soir picotements du nez, coryza et douleurs violentes de la tête; température un peu élevée; soif intense, qui dure jusqu'à la fin.

Deuxième jour: Température s'élève peu à peu à 39°; relâchement intestinal, non fétide; couleur jaune; sudation intense.

Troisième jour: Température continue à monter jusqu'à 40° et au delà; le corps est exsangue par la partie inférieure, et à partir de la poitrine—poitrine, tête, bras—violacé et noir; le cœur bat fébrilement et à petits coups précipités. Le soir du troisième jour ou au début du

Quatrième jour: Température atteint 41°; après, il y a frigidité du corps, qui dure trois, quatre ou cinq heures, et alors, la mort.

Enclosure 4 in No. 180.

*Shipping Intelligence to February 10, 1922.*

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between January 21 and February 10:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Cargo Discharged.
Dakahlieh ..	British	Port Soudan	Suez	Jan. 21 ..	Jan. 22 ..	Packages. 766
Massana ..	Italian	Massana ..	Suez	" 21 ..	" 21 ..	1,091
Asmara ..	Italian	Suez	Massana ..	" 24 ..	" 24 ..	195
Mansourah ..	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 25 ..	" 25 ..	3,502
Tantalus ..	Dutch	Amsterdam	Batavia ..	" 30 ..	" 30 ..	General 14,287
Firooz ..	British	Bombay	Bombay	" 30 ..	Feb. 3 ..	603
Mansourah ..	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 31 ..	" 1 ..	1,394
Asmara ..	Italian	Massana	Suez	Feb. 4 ..	" 4 ..	609
Dakahlieh ..	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 5 ..	" 5 ..	127
Borulos ..	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 8 ..	" 8 ..	

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived January 22, left January 22.

" " " " January 29, " February 5.



*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 4.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, March 3, 1922.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to refer to paragraph 2 of this Department's letter of the 3rd March on the subject of the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, and to offer the following observations on the question of boundaries in connection with article 27 of that treaty.

2. The section of the frontier with which this Department would normally be concerned is that defined in paragraph II (3) of article 27. With regard to this section, of the frontier, I am to refer to this Department's letter of the 5th January, 1922, with which was transmitted copy of a despatch of the 9th December, 1921, from the High Commissioner for Irak. Mr. Churchill adheres to the recommendations made in that letter, and requests that advantage may be taken of the opportunity afforded by the impending discussions on the Treaty of Sèvres to secure a rectification of this section of the frontier in the direction which Sir P. Cox indicates as the most desirable. I am to request that Lord Curzon's especial attention may be invited to the desirability of excluding Amadia from the territory remaining to Turkey, not only for military reasons, since this village is a strategic point of the utmost importance to the Government of Irak, but also for political reasons, since it is the home of a large number of the Assyrians who were recently repatriated by His Majesty's Government, and for whom Mr. Churchill feels that His Britannic Majesty as mandatory has incurred some degree of moral responsibility.

3. Mr. Churchill is not aware what attitude Lord Curzon proposes to adopt towards the recently concluded Franco-Kemalist Agreement, which altered the boundary between Syria and Turkey as defined in paragraph II (2) of article 27, but he presumes that His Majesty's Government do not intend to insist that the French Government shall retain a mandatory responsibility over territory which they have voluntarily retroceded to the Turks. If this assumption is correct, the frontier will presumably have to be modified in such a way as to make the frontier between Turkey and Syria, as defined in the treaty, coincide with that laid down in the Franco-Kemalist Agreement. The effect of this modification would be to leave a wedge of Syrian territory between the north-western boundary of Irak and the line of communications along which Turkish troops would have to pass if they were contemplating hostile action against Irak, and which, but for the Franco-Kemalist Agreement, would have remained in Syrian territory. According to the information at Mr. Churchill's disposal the French authorities in Syria are not in effective occupation of this wedge of territory, nor does it appear likely that they will be so in the near future. Mr. Churchill is not aware to what extent the French Government attach importance to Syria having access to the upper waters of the Tigris, but he presumes that the fact that they have now handed back to Turkey the Syrian section of the Bagdad Railway, which is, so far as he is aware, the only means by which such access could be maintained, points to the French Government having arrived at the conclusion that access to the Tigris is not so important to Syria as the maintenance of friendly relations with Turkey. I am to transmit herewith copy of telegrams No. 116 of the 9th February and Nos. 120 and 121 of the 10th February from the High Commissioner for Irak, with copy of this Department's telegram No. 79 of the 3rd February, to which they were a reply. Mr. Churchill presumes that the "unnumbered telegram of the 3rd February," referred to in Sir P. Cox's telegram No. 116 is the second part of this Department's telegram No. 79 of the 3rd February, which was not repeated to the High Commissioner for Palestine. Lord Curzon will observe that King Feisal presses for the inclusion of Jeziret-ul-Umar and Nisibin in Irak. He regards the wedge of territory referred to above as indispensable to Irak, but he would prefer that it should be in the hands of the Turks rather than of the French, if it cannot be held by Irak. To support the claims of Irak as against Turkey he points out that the retrocession of territory inhabited by Arab populations to Turkey is in conflict with the principles embodied in the Anglo-French Agreement of May 1916. Mr. Churchill considers that there is some force in the King's contention that the wedge of territory south of the Nisibin-Jeziret-ul-Umar line, which is now included in Syria, should be included in Irak. This appears to be a matter for the British and French Governments only. But the inclusion of the strip north of the Nisibin-Jeziret-ul-Umar line, as suggested by King Feisal, would involve the cession by Turkey to Irak of the towns of Nisibin and Jeziret-ul-Umar, and the road between them. In

view of the more important adjustments recommended in Sir P. Cox's despatch of the 9th December, to which reference was made in paragraph 2 of this letter, it appears unlikely that the Turks would agree to make this concession, and Mr. Churchill does not suggest that it should be pressed for. There remains the question whether the wedge of territory south of the Jeziret-ul-Umar-Nisibin line should remain Syrian territory or be included in Irak. Mr. Churchill understands that King Feisal, apart from his natural desire that as large an Arab population as possible should be included under his suzerainty, is moved by the opinions of his military advisers, as set forth in the memorandum from the General Staff, Irak army, enclosed in Sir P. Cox's despatch No. 244 of the 9th January, of which a copy is enclosed. In view of articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Mr. Churchill assumes that the General Staff of the Irak army are mistaken in their assumption that passage would not be afforded through Syrian territory to British or Irak forces in the event of Turkish aggression against Irak. Mr. Churchill assumes that in the event of Turkish aggression against Irak, air action by Imperial forces against Turkish troops in retroceded territory would in any case be justified, even if for this purpose it were necessary for aircraft to fly over Syrian territory. He would be glad of Lord Curzon's views on these two points at the earliest possible date, since it appears to him that, if it were understood that this wedge of territory did not constitute an insuperable barrier to counter-attack by British or Irak forces against the Turkish lines of communications, an immediate communication in this sense should be made both to the French Government and to His Majesty King Feisal.

4. Mr. Churchill is, of course, prepared to give due weight to any arguments which may be brought forward by King Feisal, but he is himself disposed to regard the question from the administrative rather than from the military point of view. An additional argument for the inclusion in Irak of the wedge of territory referred to above is that it is inhabited by Arab tribes who are economically dependent upon Mosul. Mr. Churchill does not propose to deal in this letter with the whole question of the Anglo-French frontier as originally defined by the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, but some reference to the northern sector of this frontier is inevitable in connection with the question of the Turkish frontier, since the Treaty of Sèvres specifies the point at which the Turkish frontier ceases to march with Syria. It appears to Mr. Churchill that a good case could be made with the French Government for pressing for the inclusion of the Nisibin-Jeziret-ul-Umar section of the Turkish frontier in paragraph II (3) rather than in paragraph II (2) of article 27. A possible line of argument would be as follows: His Majesty's Government assume that when negotiating the Franco-Kemalist Agreement the French Government felt themselves bound not to take any step which would alter the Turco-Irak section of the frontier, since they were not in communication with His Majesty's Government on the subject. It is reasonable to suppose that if the Franco-Kemalist Agreement had been negotiated in consultation with His Majesty's Government, the wishes of the latter would have been met in so far as the proposed adjustments affected Irak. His Majesty's Government must therefore claim that, in return for their recognition of the Franco-Kemalist boundary, their own wishes with regard to the taking-off point of the Anglo-French Convention line from the Turkish frontier, as ultimately defined, should be taken into friendly consideration by the French Government. Their view is that the taking-off point should be in the immediate neighbourhood of Nisibin, but far enough to the east of that town to leave the railhead and the town itself in Turkish hands. If this proposal were accepted, the necessary readjustments of the Anglo-French Convention line could be discussed independently by the British and French Governments.

5. Mr. Churchill understands from Colonel Newcombe, who has just returned from Palestine via Paris, that the President of the Council has declined to agree to the proposal made by the two boundary commissioners that the convention frontier should be signed for the section from Ras-el-Nakura to El Hamme, and has taken the ground that the modifications proposed exceeded, in his opinion, the powers of boundary commissioners, and that the whole question must be reserved for discussion between the British and French Governments in connection with the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. If the attitude of the French Government is correctly represented by Colonel Newcombe, there appears to be no great difficulty in the way of inducing the French Government to reconsider the whole question of the Anglo-French frontier, not only in connection with that portion of the line on which the boundary commissions have actually been working, but in connection with the line as a whole. Mr. Churchill will be prepared to offer his observations on the subject of the alignment of the Anglo-French frontier as soon as he has been made acquainted with Lord Curzon's views on his



suggestion that the taking-off point should be in the neighbourhood of Nisibin and not of Jeziret-ul-Umar, as laid down in article 27 of the Treaty of Sèvres. Copies of this letter have been sent to the India Office, War Office and Air Ministry.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 181.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.*

(No. 116.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bagdad, February 9, 1922.*

OWING to mutilation, your unnumbered telegram of the 3rd February, in continuation of your telegram No. 79, received the 7th February, has arrived somewhat obscure, but your enquiry was, I gathered, whether we would prefer wedge of territory lying north of Bagdad Railway alignment between Nisibin and Irak frontier near Rumelan Keui should become Turkish, or, in accordance with Franco-Kemalist Agreement, remain French.

In reply, both myself and the General Officer Commanding are of the opinion that there is no strategic objection to giving Turks this wedge, and in view of the fact that the further south from Nisibin the Turks bring their line of communications, the more valuable would it become, it would be slightly advantageous to follow this course. Moreover, the important line of communication between Nisibin and Jeziret is also vulnerable so long as wedge is Turkish, whereas unless Irak had right of moving troops through wedge it would be protected if it were French.

As regards frontier between Tel Rumai [? lan] and Tigris hitherto undetermined, the importance of including Kara Chok Dag in Irak, vide your telegram No. 58 of the 28th January, should be noted.

I am telegraphing separately as regards boundaries as a whole and Feisal's views thereon.

Enclosure 2 in No. 181.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.*

(No. 120.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bagdad, February 10, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 79. The military view of the most satisfactory line, assuming [? east] arrangement for Khabur south of Nisibin is still out of the question, would be one passing due south from Nisibin through Tel Antaor and thence to Abu Kemal, which we have recently agreed shall be left, if necessary, to Syria. (See my telegram No. 206, Secret, dated the 13th January.) It is assumed and accepted in above view that Turkey would be left with the wedge north of Nisibin-Rumelan line.

As regards boundary south of Euphrates, between Abu Kemal and Imtar (one group), the 39th parallel of longitude was temporarily accepted as provisional frontier between Irak and Transjordan, according to suggestion made at Cairo Conference and referred to in my telegram No. 87 of the 6th May, 1921. Accordingly, Irak-Syria frontier [one group], that portion of Abu-Kemal Imtar line east of 39th parallel. Doubtless the necessity of deflecting line in places to suit natural features or tribal spheres would be indicated upon an examination of the ground by joint delimitation commission. I personally think with that reservation that it might stand for the present as provisional [one group], but in a separate telegram conveying Feisal's views I will transmit any special observations which he may make in regard to this section.

Enclosure 3 in No. 181.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.*

(No. 121.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bagdad, February 10, 1922.*

REFERENCE my telegrams Nos. 116 and 120.

Feisal's deliberate views and representations in regard to western frontier are narrated below.

First, north of Euphrates. Jeziret-ul-Umar and Nisibin should, he claims, both

be included in Irak, and that frontier should run from Jeziret to Nisibin, thence southward to bank of Khabur and should then follow central course of that river to its junction with Euphrates.

He urges, if that should not be accepted by the French, that tribes concerned should be allowed to choose which State they would prefer to adhere to. He claims that in this zone the natural tribal boundary is Khabur.

As regards wedge north of Nisibin-Rumelan, he claims that its possession is indispensable [one corr. group] to Irak, but he would prefer it should be in the hands of Turks than of the French if it cannot be held by Irak. He reminds His Majesty's Government, however, that country south of Jeziret-ul-Umar-Nisibin line was specifically recognised as Arab zone "A" in Sykes-Picot Agreement, and further that France and England mutually undertook that only to an Arab State should territory in the zones assigned to them respectively be alienated. (Article 9 and article 10 he presumably refers to). Thus France is violating the principles which she accepted in 1916 in surrendering wedge in question to the Turks.

As regards the frontier south of Euphrates, Feisal considers that a suitable provisional boundary between Irak and Transjordan would be the 39th parallel of longitude, and in the abstract does not object to Abu Kemal-Imtar line as provisional boundary between Irak and Syria, but points out that it would involve shifting of Euphrates-Imtar line further up the Euphrates if his representations as regards the Khabur alignment be accepted.

Enclosure 4 in No. 181.

*Mr. Churchill to Sir P. Cox.*

(No. 79.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Colonial Office, February 3, 1922.*

IN view of impending discussions at Paris on revision of Treaty of Sèvres, which are expected to commence shortly, kindly send by telegraph brief summary of articles which you recommend should be reconsidered with reference to past correspondence, if any. An opportunity may possibly arise of raising boundary question with the French. On the information before me, I understand that, while for the section east of El Hammo the French desire the Southern Druse district and Abu Kemal, we are anxious to obtain the Yarmuk valley and the Jebel Sinjar. We appear unlikely, in return for what we have to offer, to obtain our desiderata, though Foreign Office may be able in consideration of concessions elsewhere to bring pressure to bear.

With regard to the Irak section I am anxious for a considered recommendation as to final boundary alignment. What do you consider the arguments for and against readjusting Anglo-French boundary, so that the possible alignment of Bagdad Railway to Turkey may be restored and consequently eliminate possible French sector east of Nisibin? I should be glad to be informed separately of any views Feisal has of his own, but you should hold out no hope to him of any material alteration of the convention line.

(First part repeated to Jerusalem.)

Enclosure 5 in No. 181.

*Secretary to the High Commissioner for Irak to Colonial Office.*

(No. 244. Secret.)

BY direction of his Excellency the High Commissioner for Irak, copy of enclosed memorandum from the Ministry of Defence is forwarded, with compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, in continuation of High Commissioner's telegram No. 846 dated the 31st December, 1921.

*Bagdad, January 9, 1922.*

*Memorandum on the Jeziret-Nisibin "Wedge."*

(Secret.)

THE recent Franco-Kemalist Agreement has produced a situation on the northern and north-western frontiers of Irak which, while in certain respects it tends towards

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the security of this frontier, in other respects handicaps the Irak Government both from a military and political point of view in the measures necessary for the maintenance of security in the northern portion of the country.

The boundaries of the French zone of influence are not very definitely known to this Ministry, but it appears that the new boundary between this zone and the territory administered by the Angora Government follows approximately the trace of the Bagdad Railway as far as Nisibin, and thence to Jeziret-ibn-Omar.

As regards the Irak boundary: the existing line of demarcation between Irak and the French zone is understood to run approximately from Faish Khabur on the Tigris, over the Karachok Dag and Jebel Sinjar, to El Kaim on the Euphrates.

A wedge, therefore, of territory under French influence and having no connection with the State of Irak lies between the northern boundary of this country from the Tigris westwards and the Turkish frontier.

The existence of this wedge of territory, in view of recent pronouncements on the part of the French Government, even if it does not afford a complete guarantee against Kemalist aggression across it, at least ensures that in such an event French pressure on the Angora Government may be relied upon in support of this country.

There is, however, another aspect of the case which is not so favourable to this country.

The existence of the wedge, whilst preventing any aggression by the Kemalist forces from this quarter (unless French neutrality be violated), at the same time offers an invulnerable barrier against any threat directed from this country at the main Turkish line of communication with Jeziret-ibn-Omar. The result is that should the Kemalist forces attempt operations from Jeziret-ibn-Omar against Zakho and Mosul, they can effect their concentration, and maintain their supplies and reinforcements with no fear as to their line of communication to their right rear.

The importance of this, it is submitted, is very great. In the hills of Kurdistan nothing but a defensive attitude is possible. Should the Kemalist attack fail or a successful counter-stroke be delivered, the enemy is being driven back directly on his line of communication through a country affording numerous positions for delaying our advance. Should our advance be successful, a decisive military result can hardly be hoped against an enemy possessed of the men and resources of the Kemalists; while on this line there is no good political objective the attainment of which might be counted on to assist in Irak the rousing of that national spirit which is the only final guarantee of the safety of the country.

In the opinion of the Irak General Staff, the correct stroke to a Kemalist advance, either east or west of the Tigris, is a threat to their communications, which are vulnerable along the whole length from Ras-al-Ain to Jeziret. A raid on these or on the important towns in this area could be organised very largely from Arab tribes west of the Tigris, with, as a nucleus, a small body of regular mounted troops. The existence of such a threat would hamper the enemy and force him either to shift his communications to the north (in which case the danger to his town remains) or to detach troops to guard his exposed flank.

The existence of a neutral wedge guarantees him against such a contingency. It is therefore submitted that the right should be reserved to the military forces in this country to traverse this wedge of country in the case of Turkish aggression against the northern boundaries of Irak.

It is further submitted as a matter for consideration whether it is not possible so to change the line of demarcation between Irak and the French zone as to include in the former the whole of Jebel Sinjar and as much as possible of the Shammar territory.

In order to prepare for the offensive-defensive outlined above, it might be necessary to establish at Jebel Sinjar a post both to guard any stores it was deemed advisable to keep there, and to guard against counter-propaganda on the part of the Kemalists. In the present situation, with the exact frontiers unknown, such a post would be in a difficult position, and its establishment might give rise to misunderstandings on the part of the French authorities. It would also appear desirable, from an administrative point of view, that Jebel Sinjar should be entirely under one administration, but this aspect of the question is not one for consideration by this Ministry.

NOURY SAID,

*Irak Army Headquarters.*

*Bagdad, December 28, 1921.*

[E 2959/656/91]

No. 182.

*Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 17.)*

(No. 14. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, February 28, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period 11th to 28th February, 1922.

Copies of this despatch and report have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH,

*Acting British Agent.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 182.

*Jeddah Report, February 11-28, 1922.*

(Secret.)

KING HUSSEIN, accompanied by Emir Zeid and Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib, arrived from Mecca on the 25th February, nominally to welcome a Syrian poet named Amin Rihani—(author of the "Book of Khaled" and translator of the "Luzumiyat" of Abul A'la)—who reached Jeddah on the same day from America, via Egypt. This gentleman, who has not yet favoured me with a visit, is treated as a royal guest. I have as yet been able to obtain no information as to the reason for His Majesty's interest in his arrival.

The reply of His Majesty's Government to King Hussein's announcement that he proposed to abdicate on the 27th February was communicated to him on the 24th February. He was informed that while His Majesty's Government regret that he should find it necessary to take this step, they realise the matter to be one for him to settle with his people.

The gist of His Majesty's acknowledgment of this message is that his people, having had nothing to do with his original action, nor with his reliance upon Great Britain, have no qualifications to decide as to his movements now.

I have had several hours of conversation with the King since his arrival in Jeddah, either alone or in the presence of Zeid and Sheikh Fuad. Of abdication there has been no mention, beyond the usual reiteration of his willingness to hand over the country to Ibn Saud, and a statement that he considers himself responsible to God and to Great Britain, but not to his people. I could only assure him that his sincerity and attachment to Great Britain were known to His Majesty's Government, but that his sense of responsibility as towards his country was at least equally notorious; that he himself had frequently referred to it, and that His Majesty's Government felt that he should be guided in this matter by the considerations which this sentiment dictated.

His abdication is a development so profoundly desirable, so universally hoped for by all who have the interests of this country and of Arabia at heart, that I was tempted for a moment to provoke him to whatever action an access of rage might inspire. But the certainty of success alone would have justified such methods, and it has become increasingly clear at each interview that King Hussein will abandon dignity, but not his throne. His bluff has been called, and he has been fighting since the receipt of His Majesty's Government's message to save his face. It seems better to let him stay where he is, with the bitter reflection that he is not personally indispensable to us, rather than to give him any excuse for thinking that the British attitude towards his personal tenure of the throne, formerly friendly, now neutral, should have become definitely hostile.

A telegram has been received from the High Commissioner, Bagdad, expressing King Feisal's desire to have Emir Zeid to stay with him for a while.

This innocuous request King Hussein has exploited to justify himself for not abdicating. He pretends to consider Zeid's visit to Bagdad as something to which His Majesty's Government attach tremendous importance—"else why should Sir Percy Cox, who does not know Zeid, ask for him?" If the British Government ask King Hussein to send them his son Zeid—(I follow his line of argument)—they cannot be as indifferent to the personal importance of King Hussein as their official message about his abdication would suggest. They really know, whatever they may say, that King

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Hussein and no one else must rule over the Hedjaz . . . and so on. The fact that Feisal had already asked his father to send Zeid, and had been told that King Hussein would consider it if it were put up through the British authorities, is sufficient commentary on this rather pathetic manifestation of outraged vanity.

His Majesty spoke at great length during our interviews of the treaty signed at Amman. I did my best to convince him that he would not, by the act of ratification, prejudice his case for the settlement of frontiers between himself and Ibn Saud. In the Amman treaty King Hussein's own frontiers are undefined; in that between ourselves and Ibn Saud, to a version of which, dated the 22nd January, 1915, the King now constantly refers, frontiers are left for later definition. If His Majesty would ratify the Amman treaty, His Majesty's Government would, if desired, at once use their good offices to promote and assist a settlement.

These considerations I have, in conversation and by letter, urged upon King Hussein, and I have deplored his obvious suspicion of our motives. Pressure is also brought to bear on him by Sheikh Fuad and by Emir Zeid; by the Qadi-ul-Quddah of Mecca (Grand Qadi and Acting Prime Minister), with whom I had two long conversations recently in Jeddah, and, I understand, by Emir Abdulla. But King Hussein insists that, pending the arbitration of His Majesty's Government, Ibn Saud should retire behind a provisional line practically identical with that for which the King's representative would be eventually instructed to press. I have informed him that I see no useful purpose in telegraphing this suggestion to His Majesty's Government, and there the matter at present stands.

King Hussein recently requested the Italian representative to inform his Government that the King would be pleased to receive an invitation to the Genoa Conference. The message was sent, and an unfavourable reply received from Rome. The King has never mentioned the Genoa Conference to me.

#### *Yemen Delegation.*

The Yemen delegate left on the 22nd February for Aden, the idea of a tour to Medina and Amman having been suddenly abandoned. The Qadi-ul-Quddah of Mecca and Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib were sent to Jeddah to bid him farewell.

#### *Pilgrimage.*

The steamship "Teucer" arrived on the 21st February bringing the first of the season's pilgrims, 228 in number. The steamship "Neleus" on the 25th February brought 141. The "Merauke," "Patroclus" and "Prometheus" arrived on the 27th February with 763, 327 and 451 pilgrims respectively. These boats came from the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore. All received clean bills of health from Kamaran. The pilgrims arriving by the "Teucer" and the "Neleus" were sent to the quarantine islands for twenty-four hours. I have just learned that the "Patroclus" and "Prometheus" pilgrims are to be detained for seventy-two hours on the islands on the ground that the bills of health issued to them in Batavia show that there is plague there. Thabet Bey, the Director-General of Quarantine, thus testifies early in the season to his conviction that international conventions are made to be ignored, and that Kamaran, in non-Arab hands, serves no useful purpose. I hope strongly to represent to the King that his support of this ignorant and mischievous person is directly prejudicial to his own best interests.

Those pilgrims who have already landed are loud in their protestations to the Dutch consul against the treatment they received on the islands and at the Customs, some even offering to bear any expense involved in the transmission of a warning to their fellow-countrymen.

Of their personal effects, the very clothes they were wearing were taxed, if they could be called "new" by the Customs authorities. The King objects to pilgrims wearing their national dress in this country, and many buy new clothes for their journey.

For a head-dress which cost the wearer 2*l.*, a tax of 1*l.* was charged; the same sum was charged in respect of a woman's dress costing 60 rupees. A rice-bag, value 1 rupee, was taxed 2½ rupees. Body-linen costing 30 rupees was taxed 10 rupees. The P. T. 3 tax per package landed was enforced on an empty kerosene tin, on a metal drinking vessel and on a water bucket. (In correction of this detail on p. 2 of my penultimate report, the tax per article landed is P. T. 3; per article leaving the country, P. T. 5).

I would repeat my recommendation that our pilgrims should land with the smallest possible number of separate articles. Anything, a walking-stick or an orange carried in the hand, constitutes a taxable package to the wolves of the Jeddah Customs.

Tariffs of licensed charges by Mutawwifin have been drawn up under the auspices of a high-sounding but non-existent pilgrim control board. That communicated to the Dutch consul purports to announce the tariff of expenses of pilgrims coming from all the Moslem world, but its charges are higher than those set forth in the "Tariff for Indian and Bengali Pilgrims" communicated to me. This discrepancy is the result of private arrangements between the sheikhs of Javanese pilgrims in Mecca and the King, who, in consideration of a large sum down, allows these sheikhs to extort extra dues from Javanese pilgrims.

I enclose translations of both these documents, with the Arabic of that affecting Indians.\* Their value as a tariff is considerably diminished by the proviso about "voluntary donations," upon the interpretation of which the Hedjaz Government and the pilgrims will probably hold different opinions.

#### *Mecca.*

All shopkeepers, auctioneers and pedlars have been ordered to find some one to stand surety for their professional character and financial standing. A tax varying from P. T. 20 to 40 is charged for the obligatory Government endorsement of the record of this formality.

No camel may be sold in Mecca for more than 15 majidis (P. T. 300), and the Government alone has the right to purchase.

Small-pox is still prevalent among the Bedouin around Mecca, but less so among the townfolk. I learn that there is an epidemic of influenza in Mecca.

#### *Medina.*

The Emir Ali reached Medina on the 22nd February. A party of merchants, who left Medina on the 3rd February, reported on the 18th February that Sheeref Shahat, the Kaimakam of Medina, expected dismissal on the Emir's arrival, and was prepared to oppose His Highness's authority.

There are in Medina many deserters from the Emir Abdulla's followers at Amman. The lack of public security is shown by the fact that the Egyptian in charge of the Egyptian Tekieh in Medina was recently robbed and stripped naked between the city gate and the mosque of Sayedna Hamza, 2 miles outside the walls.

King Hussein consented earlier in the month to the departure of a "rukab," a privileged caravan organised with some pomp by the sheikhs of the twelve quarters of Mecca, to proceed from Mecca to Medina for the ceremonies of Sayedna Hamza. The departure of this "rukab" has now been forbidden.

It is rumoured at Medina that the Emir Ali will not stay long there, but will proceed to Amman to consult with his brother Abdulla about common policy. Activity at the Medina railway station has encouraged the belief either that Ali proposes shortly to visit Abdulla or that the latter will visit his brother in Medina.

#### *Aviation.*

I understand that Stavris, the Greek pilot, flying from Taif recently made two attempts to bomb Taraba—stopping at Kleikh for petrol supplies. Colonel Jongmeister, one of the Russian pilots, crashed at Taif on the 25th February and broke his leg. He and all the other Russian mechanics except M. Maximof are to leave the country. Eleven Italians, pilots and mechanics, have been telegraphed for from Italy.

#### *General.*

(a.) Captain J. B. Bolitho, Royal Corps of Signals, visited Jeddah from the 12th to the 15th February and inspected the local wireless arrangements, with a view to reporting to the Soudan Government on the possibility of establishing regular wireless communication between Jeddah and Port Soudan.

The suggestion that such communication might be arranged was made by the Hashimite Government.

(b.) Jeddah sambuk-(lighter)men are now constrained to pay to the Government as tax one-fifth of their takings.

(c.) King Hussein has sent me, to see and return, a banner captured from the Wahhabi by the Beni Shehr (of Asir).

\* Not printed.



(d.) Two more British subjects, one a Nigerian pilgrim holding a passport for the 1921 pilgrimage, have been taken by the local authorities for military service. I am endeavouring to obtain their release.

(e.) Mr. D. Lambie, junior of the two British clerks at this agency, proceeded to the United Kingdom on well-earned leave of absence on the 22nd February. The pressure of work in this agency, always considerable (the office has been closed for part of two days only since May last)—will be much felt during his absence by the remaining British clerk and myself.

Press: "Al Qibla."

No. 561 publishes an official proclamation deploring, as unjustifiable, that Medina is threatened by the Wahhabis.

No. 562 reproduces the *démenti* of the rumour that King Hussein contemplates disposing by sale of the Hedjaz Railway.

The remaining numbers contain little of interest.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 182.

#### Pilgrim Tariff.

THE Pilgrim Control Board established at Jeddah announces the following tariff of necessary expenses of those of our Moslem brothers of the eastern and western world who purpose fulfilling the obligations of pilgrimage for the preservation of their rights and the advancement of their welfare; and this applies to all who defray the expenses of their journey to Jeddah and thence to Mecca through the agent of their Mutawwif, in accordance with the decision of the eminent Committee of Experts.

And any one of our pilgrim brothers who may consider a charge exceeding those now following to have been imposed should refer to the local Government, unless he desires this to be considered as a personal donation. As for those wishing to incur their own expenses, they are at liberty to do so:—

	P.T.	Paras.
1. Sambuk fare from steamer (outside the harbour) to the wharf. All pilgrims ...	12	...
2. Sambuk fare from steamer (half way) to the wharf. All pilgrims ...	9	...
3. Sambuk fare from steamer (inside the harbour) to the wharf. All pilgrims ...	7	...
4. Charges for carrying every pilgrim's luggage (big or small) from the wharf to the lodging. These charges are for Javanese, Egyptian, Cape Colony, coasts of Africa, Oman, Bahrein, Moorish and Persian pilgrims ...	5	...
5. Charges for carrying the luggage of Syrian, Turkish, Bokharan, Bulgarian, Yemeni and Soudanese pilgrims ...	4	...
6. Charges for carrying the luggage from the sambuk to the shore ...	...	20
7. Children and those who want to carry their own luggage are exempted from this charge ...	...	...
8. Charges for lodging per person for each night of the first three nights in Jeddah (in case these nights are spent in Jeddah) ...	2	20
9. Charges for lodging, after the first three nights, per night ...	1	20
10. For the Mutawwif agent at Jeddah, including portage of luggage of the pilgrim from the lodging and charges for Naqib ...	20	...
11. Municipality charges per shukduf for all pilgrims ...	2	...

12. The Pilgrim Control Board has considered closely the services rendered to the Javanese pilgrims by their Mutawwifs after their arrival at Mecca and up to their departure to their home, including house-rent at Mecca and oil, during their stay and their feeding on the first day, the day of Arafat and the four days of Muna; charges for tents at Arafat and house-rent at Muna; oil, wood, water and tea or coffee and camel hire for carrying tents and provisions and other necessary things for these places; and the Board has decided that the charges for all these services will be 22½ dollars (Sinchos) per person ...

630 ...

13. For the Zemzem water man, per person, 2 rupees, for the Javanese, Indian and Bengali pilgrims...

16 ...

As the camel hire and shukduf charge to Mecca, Arafat and Medina and back to Jeddah depend on the supply of camels and price of matting, these will be decided according to circumstances; thus they have not been included in this tariff.

#### Pilgrim Tariff (Indian and Bengali Pilgrims).

After preamble as in general tariff:—

	Rupees.	Annas.
1. Sambuk fare (outside the harbour), per person ...	1	4
2. Sambuk fare (half way), per person ...	...	15
3. Sambuk fare (inside the harbour), per person ...	...	10
4. Charge for carrying Indian pilgrims' luggage (small or big) to the house ...	...	2
5. Charge for carrying Bengali pilgrims' luggage (small or big) to the house ...	...	6
6. Charge for lodging during the first three nights (in case of staying), per person ...	...	4
7. Charge for lodging for more than the three nights ...	...	2
8. Baladieh dues for shukduf ...	...	4
9. For services rendered by Jeddah agent ...	2	8
10. For services rendered by Mecca Mutawwif ...	10	...
11. Charge for lodging at Mecca, per person ...	12	8
12. For the Zemzem water man, per person ...	2	...
13. For the tent during the days of pilgrimage, per person (Indian and Bengali) ...	2	...
14. Charge for servant up to Medina, per pilgrim ...	4	...

As the camel hire and shukduf charge to Mecca, Arafat and Medina and back to Jeddah depend on the supply of camels and price of matting, these will be decided according to circumstances.

#### APPENDIX.

##### Shipping Intelligence for Period February 11-28, 1922.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
Dakahlieh	British	Port Soudan	Suez	1922, Feb. 11	1922, Feb. 12	...	Packages, 1,938
Massana	Italian	Massana	Suez	12	12	...	1,106
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massana	15	15	...	383
Mansourah	British	Suez	Port Soudan	15	15	...	635
Massana	Italian	Suez	Massana	21	21	...	54
Mansourah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	21	22	...	1,302
Teucer	British	Singapore	London	21	22	228	...
Akbar	British	Port Said	Bombay	22	22	...	...
Massana	Italian	Massana	Suez	25	25	...	2,219
Dakahlieh	British	Suez	Port Soudan	25	25	...	5,464
Neleus	British	Singapore	Liverpool	25	25	141	...
Patroclus	Dutch	Java	London	27	27	327	...
Prometheus	British	Java	London	27	28	451	...
Meranke	Dutch	Java	Rotterdam	27	...	763	...



*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, March 17, 1922.*

I AM directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd March regarding the possible revision of article 27 of the Treaty of Sèvres with reference to the boundaries of Irak.

2. The recommendations made by your Department regarding the revision of the northern frontier of Irak east of the Tigris have already been carefully noted by this Department, and when the time comes for detailed revision of the actual clauses of the treaty, every effort will be made to secure the most advantageous of the four lines proposed as the frontier in the final treaty.

3. Lord Curzon notes—and agrees with—the views of Mr. Secretary Churchill that any attempt to obtain further boundary concessions from Turkey in the direction of Jeziret-ibn-Omar and Nisibin should not be pressed for. As Mr. Churchill points out, the further question whether the point where the boundary between Syria and Irak meets the southern frontier of Turkey should be pushed westwards to a point just east of Nisibin raises an Anglo-French issue and the revision of the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, rather than that of the Treaty of Sèvres, in which little more than a drafting change in the provisions of article 27 would be required.

4. Lord Curzon appreciates the force of the argument, which has indeed already been emphasised in correspondence with the French Government, that the agreement of Angora was made by France without consultation with His Majesty's Government and therefore without proper regard for the interests of Irak, but he is not clear how such an argument could in fact be elaborated in detail—and in a manner likely to convince the French—in order to prove the necessity for the transfer to Irak from Syria of the wedge of Syrian territory south of the Nisibin-Jeziret-ibn-Omar line. Neither ethnographically nor strategically does the case for such a transfer seem clear. Ethnographically the French Government are hardly likely to admit that the Arab population of Irak should be increased at the expense of the Arab population of Syria. Strategically it appears difficult, in view of the assurances given to His Majesty's Government by the French Government in the course of the correspondence regarding the Pact of Angora, to cast doubt on French intentions with regard to the prevention of Turkish attacks on Irak across this wedge of Syrian territory. It might, of course, be possible to point to the probability that this strip of territory will not be occupied by French forces for some time; but on the other hand, it would be necessary to support this argument by emphasising the ability of Irak on their side to garrison this territory against the Turks, and his Lordship understands that Irak forces will not in fact be in a position to do this for a considerable period.

5. Quite apart from this aspect of the matter, Lord Curzon is extremely doubtful as to the utility and wisdom of attempting in this manner to reopen with the French Government the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, some fifteen months after its conclusion. It must be recalled that it was only after long and difficult negotiations that the French Government were persuaded to modify the frontier fixed between the French and British zones in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 in such a way as to increase the territory of Palestine and to leave the Mosul area to Mesopotamia. The French Government were in fact seriously attacked at the time for the concessions on the Sykes-Picot Agreement made by France in the convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

6. Lord Curzon is not aware of the precise modifications in other parts of the frontier laid down by the above-mentioned convention which have been mooted, but he believes that the cession of the Yarmuk Valley to Great Britain in return for the part of the Druse territory and of half the town of Abu Kemal has been discussed between the local authorities on both sides, and that the Irak Government desire to include the whole of Jebel Sinjar in Irak. I am to point out, however, that, as far as Lord Curzon is aware, the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Paris has never countenanced these local negotiations or indicated in any way that it approves so general a reopening of the convention. With regard to the instrument actually delimiting the frontier as far as El Hamme, Lord Curzon understands that the delimitation in question does not modify the frontier as laid down in the convention of the 23rd December, 1920, to a degree which would entail the reopening of the latter agreement. His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, in reply to enquiries, has also now reported that the French Government merely prefer to sign the delimitation of the frontier laid down by the convention of

1920 as a whole and not piecemeal, and that, contrary to Colonel Newcombe's information, they are not raising specific objections to the delimitation as far as El Hamme, and do not desire to raise the question at the forthcoming conference in Paris.

7. Lastly, I am to point out that the latter conference in Paris, which opens on the 22nd March, is primarily designed to bring to an end the Græco-Turkish conflict and to secure peace with Turkey. Lord Curzon would therefore be reluctant to broach a question which only concerns France and Great Britain and must inevitably lead to considerable controversy between them.

8. In these circumstances Lord Curzon trusts that Mr. Churchill will not press for the proposed shifting of the boundary between Syria and Irak westwards to Nisibin. At the same time this recommendation will not be lost sight of, should there arise the question of a specific concession by Great Britain to France which might be suitably linked up with the cession of this wedge of territory to Irak and be made the subject of a bargain.

9. With regard to articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Lord Curzon is advised that the provisions relating to members of the League affording passage through their territory to forces of members of the League co-operating to protect the covenants of the League do not come into play unless the aid of the League for the settlement of the dispute has been invoked and unless the non-member should have refused to accept the obligations of temporary membership of the League for the purposes of the dispute and should have resorted to war against the member. In that event the effect of the provisions would be that a member of the League (e.g., France) would be bound to allow passage through her territory (including territory under a mandate, such as Syria) to the forces of any member of the League (e.g., Great Britain) who was co-operating to protect the covenants of the League, even where the offending State was a non-member of the League (e.g., Turkey). Lord Curzon sees no objection to a communication in this sense being made to King Feisal, but he sees no reason to draw the attention of the French Government to these articles of the Covenant at this stage. For the rest, should Turkey in fact attack Irak across the Syrian corridor of territory or otherwise, Lord Curzon feels sure that not only in view of the assurances given by the French Government to His Majesty's Government in connection with the Angora Pact, but also in virtue of the alliance which must be held to continue as long as Turkey is in a state of war with both France and Great Britain, the French Government could not refuse to allow Irak land and air forces either to cross this corridor of Syrian territory, which the French are unable at present to occupy, in order to attack the Turks, or *a fortiori* to attack any Turkish forces that may be using the corridor.

10. Copies of this letter have been sent to the India Office, War Office and Air Ministry.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

*Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received March 29.)*

(No. 19. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, March 10, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 1st to 10th March, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 184.

*Jeddah Report for the Period March 1-10, 1922.*

(Secret.)

KING HUSSEIN returned suddenly to Mecca on the 2nd March in order to compose the differences of the Beni Zobeid and the Beni Saleim, two sub-tribes of the Masruh, whom he had summoned to Mecca to meet him. He was accompanied by the



Emir Zeid. Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib remained in Jeddah in attendance upon the poet Amin Rihani.

On the 1st March King Hussein motored Mr. Rihani out to the village of Ru'is for an evening's entertainment of Bedu dance and song. On the following morning he took him to the Quarantine Islands to inspect Dr. Thabet's quarantine arrangements. It is doubtful which was the more primitive spectacle.

From His Majesty's letters to Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib, written for my perusal, I gather that he is restless, uncertain in his own mind as to how he stands in the eyes of His Majesty's Government, and vaguely anxious to end a situation which he appears no longer to control. He cannot, of course, and never will be able to believe that he does not know everything best. His pride and long habit of domination have been touched by the palsy of time to a morbid and ludicrous obsession of omniscience. He criticises the war methods of Foch and Haig, regulates the minor sanitary arrangements of Mecca, and edits "Al Qibla" with an absolute conviction of being unique in his competence to engage in these varied activities. But while sure of himself, he now knows that His Majesty's Government do not share his views as to the universality of his attributes. This has rather shaken him. It seems better to abstain from exploiting his discomfiture; to press on a sore nerve would only enrage him. I believe that he is himself seeking a solution compatible alike with his dignity and with his peace of mind.

Before leaving Jeddah, King Hussein summoned the merchants and told them that he knew they considered his periodical borrowings as ruinous to trade, and he could only recommend them to pray God to strike him dead. He added that he felt he was growing an old man—he is, in fact, ageing—and that it was possible that they might never see his face again, for he had it in mind to retire to Taif. One merchant brought confusion on his neighbours by muttering "Amen" behind his hand.

The King is due to arrive in Jeddah again to-morrow, the 11th March.

Fuad-el-Khatib informs me that the Emir Ali spoke to him seriously last year of leading a movement against his father, whose intransigent personal animosities are recognised by his sons to be obstacles to the progress of the Arab cause. Sheikh Fuad dissuaded his Highness from such a project, urging that the hostile propaganda to which Emir Ali would thereby expose himself might well prove overwhelming.

The French are believed to be considering Shereef Ali Pasha, maternal uncle of the Emirs Ali, Abdullah and Feisal, and himself Emir of Mecca before the Young Turkish revolution, as a candidate for Syria. Shereef Ali Pasha is at present living in Cairo.

The Imam's delegate, when in Mecca, told Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib that the French had recently asked the Imam to permit some twenty Frenchmen to establish themselves in Mocha to trade in hides and sheep. It was understood that these men would accept the judgment of Sharia courts, would observe any wishes the Imam might express, and would supply the Imam with rifles and ammunition if desired. Their real interest was believed to be Sheikh Sa'id. The Imam's delegate added that the Imam had refused to grant their request on the grounds that the French are notoriously hostile to the Arabs.

#### Aviation.

When Colonel Jongmeister recently crashed at Taif, he did not, as at first reported, break his leg, but he severely cut his knee. The Caudron machine he was flying is in splinters. M. Stavris has now flown the second Caudron down to Jeddah, and Delicata, the Italian mechanic, is also in Jeddah. No machines or personnel remain in Taif.

The Caudron brought from Taif is laid up for repairs, which cannot well be effected in less than six weeks. There is thus, for the moment, no machine in the country ready for immediate flight. The Russian pilots and mechanics have all been dismissed, except M. Maximof. The Hedjaz Government have cabled to the Italian aviator Schiona, and they expect him to arrive with ten other pilots and mechanics at an early date. If these people arrive it will no longer be possible to delay, as at present, the flight of the de Havilland to Taif.

I learn that there is a considerable store of machine guns and bombs (of German manufacture) at Taif. Also that there are two unused German machines at Medina—one an "Albatross," one an "A.G." Of these Medina machines, one is said to have been left by the Turks, the other to have arrived recently at the Holy Place.

King Hussein's ambition is to have his own Moslem pilots. There are six ex-Turkish officers now in Jeddah awaiting instruction. Stavris and Delicata and, on

his arrival, Schiona are to do the instructing. In order to mend the Caudron machine for instruction purposes, the Hedjaz Government require a large number of spare parts and dope ("émailite") for the wings from Egypt. It is in the interests of Arabian peace that these commodities, which Messrs. Schumacher and Lavison and Messrs. Mirshak of Egypt offer to sell, should not be sold to the Hedjaz Government.

#### Medina.

Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib informs me that the Emir Ali is shortly proceeding on a tour of inspection north of Medina; his object is probably both to examine the possibility of reopening railway communication with Amman and Damascus and to take such action as he can to impede the further spread of Wahhabi propaganda.

#### Mecca.

The sale of sheep is now controlled by the municipality, that is, by the King.

The presence in Mecca of hundreds of refugees from Basra, 240 kilom. south-east of Taif, and other parts of the Hedjaz-Asir marshes is reported. These people state that they have fled from the tyranny of marauding Wahhabis.

The leading ammunition merchant of Mecca, Abdul Kheir-bin-Siddiq, after paying King Hussein one large sum as a forced loan, was ordered to pay another. He declared that he could not raise the money, and was thrown into the "Qabu," the prison pit under the palace. He found the money, paid it, and was released. On the 5th March he was ordered to pay a further 4,000L. He promised to do this, returned to his house, and there took poison. Eight cart-loads of cartridges and powder have already been taken to the palace, and his house, wealth and effects have been confiscated by the King.

#### General.

Amin Rihani, the Syrian poet now in Jeddah as a guest of King Hussein, called on me on the 3rd March. He is an American citizen and a man of some culture. He proposes to visit the Idrissi and the Imam. Aden, the Persian Gulf and Bagdad before returning to Syria and thence to the United States. The alleged purpose of his tour is the collection of material for a book about Arabia with which he hopes to interest literary America. He is a keen Syrian Nationalist. He may be accompanied on his visits to Southern Arabia by Constantine Yanni, whose connection with any enterprise makes it suspect.

I learn from a usually well-informed source that the local authorities show great interest in the cargo of a small steamer said to have left an Italian port for Jeddah direct towards the end of February. My informant believes this vessel to be bringing aeroplanes and spare parts; also a minting machine with which King Hussein is said to desire to mint coins of his own from English sovereigns.

The reference to a minting machine is interesting, and would appear to confirm M. Pastori's remarks reported in my report for the period the 11th to 31st December, 1921.

It is perhaps not irrelevant to add that the latest "Al Qibla" to hand publishes a proclamation reminding the public of the prohibition of the export of gold.

The Nigerian pilgrim of the 1921 pilgrimage, whom I mentioned in my last report as having been conscribed for military service, remained for ten days in the Jeddah barracks, while my letter about him to the kaimakam was ignored. Finally, I telegraphed to the King, who replied rather peevishly that "the observance of obligations and commitments offers scope for more than a persistent demand for the release of one individual British subject, whom I have taken for his own good for my army." However, the individual in question was released, much to the relief of the Hashimite officers responsible for him, none of whom speak Hausa. The conscript speaks nothing but Hausa, and I understand that he habitually behaved on parade deaf to the comments of his Arab officers, with the unsophisticated licence of a child of nature.

#### Hashimite Flag.

The Hashimite flag has been changed. The Ommayyad white now comes between the Abbasid black (at the top) and the Fatimite green (at the bottom). This is, I believe, as the flag is flown in Bagdad. The change is an improvement.



*Press ("Al Qibla").*

No. 564 reproduces an article from the "Lisan-ul-Arab" of Jerusalem (to which King Hussein is a prolific, though anonymous, contributor), attacking the Havas Press Agency, and, through it, the French Government.

The pilgrim tariff is published in this number.

No. 565 opens with the following official proclamation:—

"Certain journals having continued to assert that the peace and welfare of the country are menaced by the Sultan of Arid (Ibn Saud) and his Wahhabism, the Government finds it expedient again to proclaim that the roads between the two Holy Cities and their neighbourhood are, by the grace of God, perfectly safe.

"The Government are, nevertheless, preoccupied by the probability of further aggression on the part of the above-mentioned. For, should the Government meet him in the same manner, they would appear to be fighting their friend—Great Britain—for she is, as stated by the Colonial Secretary and as reported in this paper, supporting him with her subsidy.

"The qualities of character and honour do not allow a man to be to his friend at one and the same moment both friend and foe; this has been remarked in the official announcement published in No. 544 of 'Al Qibla.'

"If they (the Wahhabis) are not impeded or repulsed, they say, as is notorious, that all who do not unconditionally obey them are infidels. There is clear authority that whosoever calls a believer an infidel himself becomes an infidel. Enquirers are referred to p. 230 of the 'Khulasat-el-Kalam' of El Sayed Ahmed Dahlan.

"The Government, however, have to choose the lesser of two evils, with prayers that God may support them and guide them aright."

This sort of thing is, of course, the best possible advertisement for Wahhabism, and betrays the King's real apprehensions.

No. 566 also publishes a proclamation reminding the public of the prohibition of the export of gold.

#### SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims disembarked.	Cargo discharged.
				1922.	1922.		Packages.
Merauke	Dutch	..	Rotterdam..	..	Mar. 1	..	..
Boruloz	British	Port Soudan	Suez ..	Feb. 28	" 2	..	3,777
Karimata	Dutch	Java ..	Amsterdam	Mar. 1	" 3	1,431	..
Pak Ling	British	Java ..	Liverpool ..	" 1	" 2	520	..
Dakahlieh	"	Port Soudan	Suez ..	" 2	" 3	..	218
Mansourah	"	Suez ..	Port Soudan	" 5	" 5	..	1,211

[E 3678/78/65]

No. 185.

*Mr. Harvey to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 6.)*

(No. 151.)

My Lord,

*United States Embassy, London, April 5, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Lordship's communications of the 22nd and 29th December, 1921, on the subject of mandates. The suggestions of the Government of the United States regarding the terms of the various mandates were set forth in my memorandum of the 24th August, 1921. The position of my Government must necessarily remain as thus stated, since the views advanced were confined to the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the United States and the fair and equal opportunities which it was believed the United States should enjoy in common with the other Powers.

In the communication of the 29th December, 1921, your Lordship drew particular attention to the situation in Palestine. A state of peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey does not yet exist. Nevertheless, the United States appreciates the desire of His Majesty's Government to remove the existing uncertainties regarding the terms of the mandate for Palestine in order that a legalised civil administration may be

established as early as possible. The Government of the United States is gratified to note your Lordship's cordial expression with respect to the relation of the victory over Turkey to the victory of the Allied and Associated Powers over Germany and the contribution thereto by the United States, and especially the emphatic disclaimer of His Majesty's Government of any intention on their part to discriminate against the United States or to refuse to its nationals and companies full equality of commercial opportunity. My Government had entertained no doubt that this was the attitude of His Majesty's Government.

In view of these assurances, my Government is convinced that there will be no difficulty of delay in the negotiation of a treaty embodying the assent, upon appropriate conditions, of the United States to the terms of the draft mandate for Palestine. The capitulatory rights which the United States possesses in Turkey in common with other Powers rest upon the provisions of a treaty, and consequently these rights can be modified or abrogated only by a treaty. For this reason alone a treaty would be desirable, apart from the general considerations mentioned in my memorandum of the 24th August. Such a treaty could recite the mandate in full, and should contain appropriate undertakings on the part of His Majesty's Government for the suitable protection of the rights and interests of the United States. In this view, taking up the various points to which your Lordship refers, it may be observed:—

1. *Capitulatory Rights.*—The assurances given in the note of the 29th December regarding the establishment of adequate courts and the insertion of a provision in the proposed Constitution of Palestine by virtue of which nationals of the United States shall have the right to be tried by a court with a majority of British judges, except in trivial cases where this provision would lead to administrative inconvenience, when United States nationals will have the special right to appeal to a court composed of a majority of British judges, may be considered satisfactory in view of Anglo-Saxon traditions of law.

It does not seem possible to accept, however, the suggestion which your Lordship made with regard to the question of the revival of the American capitulatory rights in the event of the termination of the mandate régime. As my Government now possesses these capitulatory rights, it should be provided that, in the event of the termination of the British Administration under the mandate, there should be an immediate and complete revival of these rights. If the circumstances then justify their modification or suspension, the matter could readily be made the subject of suitable agreement.

2. *Discrimination.*—I have already alluded to the assurance upon this point contained in your Lordship's note. My Government do not desire to insist that the terms of the mandate itself, in its reference to the States members of the League of Nations, and their nationals, should be altered. It will be sufficient to have an undertaking, as suggested by your Lordship, with regard to the equal treatment of the United States, its nationals and companies, and this undertaking may be set out in the proposed treaty. In other words, it should be provided that His Britannic Majesty will guarantee to the United States and its nationals the same freedom from discrimination that article 18 of the mandate gives to the States members of the League of Nations, and their nationals.

The treaty should contain a general provision that the United States and its nationals should have and enjoy the benefit of all the engagements of His Britannic Majesty defined in the mandate, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.

With respect to the matter of concessions, my Government has carefully noted the suggestions made by your Lordship with respect to the peculiar conditions existing in Palestine, and, in view of these conditions, it is not the intention of my Government to insist on the inclusion of a provision in this mandate against the granting of monopolistic concessions, as it is recognised that these may be justified to a certain extent for appropriate local development. The Government of the United States will be satisfied with the assurances which His Majesty's Government proposes to give in regard to equality of commercial opportunity. It should be clearly understood, however, that this position is taken by my Government solely in recognition of the special situation in Palestine and is not to be considered as prejudicial in any respect to the contentions which have been made, and which are still being made, in connection with other mandate territories. It is also to be understood, of course, that the existing legal rights of American citizens or companies in Palestine are to be fully respected and safeguarded, and that the treaty will contain a suitable provision to this effect.

3. *Missionaries and Religious Freedom.*—My Government has noted the provision of article 2 of the proposed mandate for Palestine to the effect that the mandatory shall



be responsible "for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion."

And also the provisions of article 15, as follows:—

"The mandatory will see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, is ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief. . . ."

And also the following provision of article 16:—

"The mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies, or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality."

Also that the mandatory accepts "all responsibility in connection with the holy places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights, or securing free access to the holy places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum."

In addition, my Government has noted the statement of your Lordship that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to make a declaration in suitable terms regarding the rights of United States missionaries, that is, that they "shall have the right to acquire and possess property, to erect buildings for religious purposes and to open schools, providing that they conform to the local law."

My Government is satisfied with these stipulations and assurances on the assumption, as already stated, that there will be a general provision in the proposed treaty giving to the United States the benefits, rights and privileges which, under the proposed mandate, are to accrue to the States which are members of the League of Nations.

4. *Modification of Mandate.*—My Government has observed the statement of your Lordship in your note of the 22nd December, to which you refer in your note of the 29th December, that it would be difficult to insert in the mandate itself a provision that the consent of the United States should be obtained before any alteration is made in the text of the mandate. My Government does not believe such an insertion to be necessary, in view of the fact, to which your Lordship adverts, that there is "nothing to prevent the mandatory giving a separate undertaking to this effect." Such an undertaking may be embodied in the proposed treaty. It would not, however, be deemed by my Government to be sufficient to provide merely for consultation with the United States.

5. As His Majesty's Government is aware, the Japanese Government has agreed to furnish a duplicate—not a copy—of its annual report which is to be submitted to the League of Nations on the administration of mandate territories. A provision to this effect is incorporated in the treaty between the United States and Japan relating to the mandated islands in the Pacific north of the Equator, and it is desired that a similar provision should be included in the treaty relating to the mandate for Palestine.

6. My Government assumes that any provisions which may be agreed upon as necessary to safeguard the rights and interests of the United States will apply to the territories mentioned in article 25 of the mandate.

If His Majesty's Government is willing to meet the wishes of the United States with reference to the matters upon which concurrence has not already been indicated, the Government of the United States is prepared to enter immediately upon the negotiation of the necessary treaty.

In conclusion, I beg to convey additional information regarding the Philippine Petroleum Act, which was referred to in your Lordship's note of the 28th February, 1921, and in my memorandum of the 24th August, 1921. The Governor-General of the Philippines has reported that the Act was amended at the last session of the

Philippine Legislature so that it now permits equality of treatment in accordance with the principle of reciprocity embodied in the United States General Leasing Law.

I have, &c.

GEORGE HARVEY.

[E 3737/65/65]

No. 186.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Count de Salis (Vatican).*

(No. 90.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, April 8, 1922.*

THE Colonial Office have received a letter from Dr. Weizmann stating that, in course of conversation with Cardinal Gasparri, he gained a distinct impression of hostility on the part of the Vatican towards the Zionist movement, despite the genial attitude of his Eminence.

2. According to Dr. Weizmann, the Vatican authorities have sent a memorandum regarding the Palestine mandate to the Council of the League of Nations, and he suspects that this document refers to, and probably protests against, terms of articles 2, 4 and 14.

3. I request you to report by telegraph whether you have any knowledge of the despatch of such a memorandum.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 3724/248/91]

No. 187.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, April 13, 1922.*

MR. GRAFFTEY-SMITH'S telegram No. 24 of 29th March: Hedjaz Treaty negotiations.

You are authorised to suggest the suppression, by an amending protocol, of the latter half of article 5 should an occasion arise when, by doing so, you would be certain of securing Hussein's ratification of treaty and the protocol amending it.

[E 4020/248/91]

No. 188.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 14.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, April 13, 1922.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to refer to the Colonial Office letter of the 10th April, enclosing a copy of Bagdad telegram No. 283, and to inform you that he would be glad to learn the views of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston as to the pilgrimage from Nejd to Mecca during the coming season.

2. Subject to any observations which Lord Curzon may have to make, Mr. Churchill is disposed to take the view that the total exclusion of Nejd pilgrims from Mecca for a fourth year is out of the question, and that the suggestion in the final sentence of the High Commissioner's telegram is the only possible compromise in the present difficulty.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

[E 4091/65/65]

No. 189.

*Count de Salis to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 19.)*

(No. 58.)

My Lord,

*Rome, April 13, 1922.*

DR. WEIZMANN, the head of the Zionist movement, called on me on the 29th March last, and at his request I arranged with the Cardinal Secretary of State for an interview, which took place on the following Sunday, the 2nd April. As



Dr. Weizmann spoke to me of the hostility to his schemes which he anticipated he might encounter at the Vatican, I replied that, as far as I could see, it would never be easy to induce the Holy See to have much liking for the Zionist policy; it might, however, be possible to remove causes of friction and misunderstanding. The views of the late Pope had been defined in the allocution delivered to the cardinals on the 13th June, 1921, and I accordingly gave Dr. Weizmann a copy of our English translation; he might find it useful to look at the paper before seeing the cardinal, who would probably refer to points mentioned in it; he would see how far it was possible to remove misconceptions.

Dr. Weizmann subsequently left for Naples. He was anxious to see the Pope himself, and inclined to think that failure to arrange for an audience for him would be a sign of hostility on the Pope's part. For my part, I have spoken twice to the Cardinal Secretary of State. It is possible that an audience may be arranged for on Dr. Weizmann's passing through Rome on his return to England; in any case, he is to see Cardinal Gasparri again.

As mentioned above, the views of the late Pope were defined in an allocution, copy of which was sent to your Lordship in my despatch No. 65 of the 20th June, 1921, while a summary of it will be found in my telegram No. 18 of the 14th June, 1921. These views are still, I think, held at the Vatican, while for some weeks past I understand that a memorandum has been under consideration, summing up the criticisms of the Holy See on the draft mandate presented by Sir A. Balfour to the League of Nations on the 7th December, 1920. This paper, which has been subject to some revision before being approved by the Pope, has now been communicated, and I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation. It may be that this is the memorandum referred to in your despatch No. 90 of the 8th April, but I cannot for the moment say whether it has also been communicated to the Council of the League of Nations. On this point I will inform myself, if possible, and telegraph to your Lordship as desired; there may be a little delay owing to this being the end of holy week.

As your Lordship will observe, the memorandum sets out at length the criticisms of the Vatican on the draft text of the mandate. The Holy See, it states, is not opposed to the grant to the Jews of civil rights equal to those of other nationalities, but cannot agree to their having a privileged and preponderant position, or that the rights of Christian confessions should not be sufficiently protected. In support of the first point, reference is made to the text of various articles of the draft and to a lecture given by Dr. Weizmann on the 4th April at the Collegio Romano, in accordance with which, according to the memorandum, the programme of Zionism tends to the foundation of a true Hebrew State in Palestine, liberal, as far as desired, towards other nationalities and confessions, but sovereign in its own territory.

As regards the second point, particular attention is directed to article 14, which concerns the Holy Places. The Cardinal Secretary of State deals with the objections which the Holy See feel to the article in its present form. I had not had this paper when I saw Dr. Weizmann, but, as I remarked to him when he alluded to article 14, the interests of Zionism would not, in this particular, appear to be directly concerned.

I have, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 189.

Cardinal Gasparri to Count de Salis.

(Translation.)

*Dal Vaticano, March 6, 1922.*

THE undersigned Cardinal Secretary of State of His Holiness has the honour to lay before your Excellency the following observations on the draft British mandate for Palestine which Mr. Balfour presented to the secretary-general of the League of Nations on the 7th December, 1920:—

The Holy See does not oppose the acquisition by Jews in Palestine of equal civil rights as are enjoyed by other nationalities and confessions, but it cannot consent—

1. That the Jews should have given them a privileged and preponderant position over other nationalities and confessions;
2. That the rights of Christian confessions should not be adequately safeguarded.

As regards the first point, although the draft in its preliminary considerations with reference to the establishment of a national home for the Jews, guarantees that "rien ne pourra être fait qui puisse porter préjudice aux droits civils et religieux des communautés non juives existant en Palestine," in the actual articles it establishes an absolute economic, administrative and political preponderance of Jews over other nationalities.

In the articles of the draft:—

- (a.) Recognition as a public body is given to a Jewish commission which is no other than the powerful Zionist organisation (article 4).
- (b.) This Jewish commission is placed alongside of the Palestine Administration and has been given a powerful voice in even all questions relative to the "développement du pays."
- (c.) A favoured position is provided for the Jews in regard to immigration (article 6) and naturalisation (article 7); a close settlement is to be provided for them on the land, including State lands and waste lands (article 6). They are given a privileged position with regard to the construction of public works (article 11).

The draft mandate, therefore, in aiming at the absolute preponderance of Jews over all other peoples in Palestine is not only seriously damaging to the rights acquired by other nationalities, but is also contrary to article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, which establishes the idea and aim of each mandate. Indeed, according to the above-mentioned article, the mandate is a tutelage which one Power assumes of peoples who are not "encore capables de se diriger eux-mêmes dans les conditions particulièrement difficiles du monde moderne," and it has for its object "une mission sacrée de civilisation," that is, "le bien-être et le développement de ces peuples."

A mandate would be contrary to all of this were it the instrument for subordinating native populations to the advantage of other nationalities. And, indeed, while Dr. Weizmann assured the undersigned cardinal that Zionism did not have, and did not wish to have a privileged and superior position in Palestine over other nationalities or religious confessions, at his conference of the 4th April at the Collegio Romano he expounded the Zionist programme as aiming at the constitution of a real Jewish State in Palestine, as liberal as could be desired towards other nationalities and confessions, but sovereign in its own territory.

As regards the second point, particular attention is given to article 14 of the draft mandate, which, in accordance with article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres, sets up "une commission spéciale pour étudier et régler toutes les questions et réclamations relatives aux différentes confessions religieuses." As regards this commission (which is to be appointed by England, but with a president chosen by the Council of the League of Nations) it is not stated in the draft how many members it is to consist of, but all religions whose interests are in discussion are to be represented on it—in what proportion is not mentioned. The Holy See, as is evident, cannot agree that Catholic interests should be dealt with by representatives chosen, not by the competent hierarchical authorities, but by England. The commission, moreover, will have the task "d'assurer que certaines places saintes, bâtiments ou sites religieux, considérés avec vénération spéciale par les adhérents d'une religion particulière, soient confiés au contrôle permanent de corps appropriés, représentant les adhérents de la religion en question."

Owing to their vagueness, the terms of this article, as it reads, are such as to give rise spontaneously to many difficulties. It is not mentioned how these "corps appropriés" representing the several religious confessions are to be eventually constituted, no indication is given of the limits of their control, nor is anything said of what will be done regarding those places which are regarded with special veneration by the adherents of different religions (i.e., Catholics and schismatics).

Dealing in this case with sanctuaries which concern several confessions, it is only too probable that in the commission itself, composed of representatives of all religions, a fierce conflict will arise, with the inevitable result that every member will unite against those of the confession which is in the possession of the sanctuary in question, thus hindering any possibility of calm judgment.

Finally, it is to be observed that, in the terms of the mandate, "le choix des places saintes, des bâtiments ou sites religieux, qui seront ainsi confiés, sera fait par la commission, assujettie à l'approbation du mandataire." This last clause, as is evident, gives to England an excessive power, without mentioning that it seems to be contrary to article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres. In conformity with the above, it seems



that some modifications, as your Excellency will realise, are necessary in the text of the mandate.

The undersigned cardinal has the honour to bring the foregoing to the knowledge of your Excellency and avails himself, &c.,

P. CARD. GASPARRI.

[E 4085/656/91]

No. 190.

*Acting Consul Grafftey-Smith to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 19.)*

(No. 23. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, March 31, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the Jeddah report for the period 11th–31st March, 1922.

Copies of this despatch and report are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 190.

*Jeddah Report for the period March 11–31, 1922.*

(Secret.)

KING HUSSEIN, accompanied by Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib, arrived from Mecca on the 11th March. The Emir Zeid followed his father to Jeddah on the 14th March.

When I called upon His Majesty on the 11th and 12th March, he touched upon no controversial subjects. He spoke with great geniality of Arab folk-lore, of weather-lore and of his own school-days; he produced for my stupefaction a gigantic lizard which he had picked up on the road from Mecca; he was, as always when he manages to keep off politics, a garrulous but charming host.

On the 13th March, however, his charm evaporated in the heat of argument. For two and a half hours he recited his love for Great Britain, adding that he was now painfully compelled to realise that Great Britain's love for him was cooler than of yore. I assured him that just as his affection for us remained—despite his obvious deprecation of our attitude over the ratification of the Amman Treaty—a thing of great strength and great beauty, so—despite our natural regret at his refusal to ratify—remained our affection for him. I asked him to believe that his sentiments for Great Britain were, as they had ever been, precisely reciprocated. I doubt if this thought held much of consolation for him.

He said that he was tortured by the fear that Great Britain believed him to be opposing her, than which, he swore, nothing more ridiculous could well be suggested. I asked what made him think that the mere fact of his saying "No," where it had been hoped he would say "Yes," could have been construed as opposition. He cited the refusal of Abdullah's visit to London. I said that if the Emir Abdullah, who was King Hussein's plenipotentiary and the signatory of a treaty which his father now refused to ratify, were in present circumstances to visit London, the delicacy of his Highness's position would be inconsistent with his princely dignity. King Hussein replied, with a magnificent gesture, "Am I a foreigner? Is Abdullah a foreigner? I will sign and seal my name on this blank paper, and you may write whatever treaty or articles you wish above it." I reminded him that he already held a document to which his signature alone was lacking. He said that he had not meant a tumbledown treaty like that. Conversation with His Majesty is always exhilarating, but rarely conclusive.

On the following day, King Hussein called at this agency. He was in a state of considerable mental excitement—possibly because he had just been calling at the Dutch consulate and had heard M. Van de Plas on the subject of quarantine—and his speech was wild both in substance and delivery. He declared that he was desperate; he took it as a personal grievance that Great Britain never consulted him about her real interests; if Great Britain would only ask him for his help, he would tell the people of Egypt and India that, in opposing Great Britain, they were opposing the Grand Shereef of Mecca; he could not abdicate, for chaos would follow in the country, and there was no one to take his place, for no one had his capacity for government; on

the other hand, how could he remain, feeling himself estranged from Great Britain? He was very bitter and very eloquent.

I called again upon King Hussein on the 15th March and spent two hours with him. He was by turns erudite and witty, and we read together from "Anwar-ur-Rabi," a collection of Arabic metaphors, *jeux de mots* and other stylistic refinements. He was particularly pleased with a quatrain upon which I stumbled, in which the poet states that Allah, when anxious to exalt a virtuous man, raises up tongues of envy against him. King Hussein, much gratified, took this as of personal application, and in the ensuing number of "Al Qibla" this verse was made the text of a eulogy on Hussein ibn Ali contributed by the inevitable "Reader in Jeddah."

On the 16th March, the King and his party returned to Mecca. As on the occasion of his last visit, the foreign representatives were not previously notified of the date or hour of His Majesty's departure.

The tone of King Hussein's conversations in Jeddah and of his official correspondence during the period under review suggests that he has stiffened against us, and that any expectation of a gesture on his part towards compromise is, as has been every past hope of his reasonable behaviour, premature. The tone of letters received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is generally a reliable indication of the warmth of the King's sentiments, since he personally dictates all correspondence. These letters have recently been of an insolence barely tolerable: they might have been written by a spiteful child.

The apparent lack of any material advantage in his attachment to Great Britain, and the contrast of Italian eagerness to help him to aeroplanes, machine guns and the like, must carry weight with him. Recent questions in the House about his subsidy have also irritated him, and it is difficult to imagine anything better calculated to complicate the task of the British representative in Jeddah than the recently-published recommendation of the Government of India that Turkey should resume suzerainty over the holy places.

#### Quarantine.

Last year's procedure is being followed, in that pilgrims arriving by ships on which there has been a death from any cause, be it senile decay or infantile paralysis, are sent to the islands for one or more days. The ships leave in quarantine or not, according to the inspiration of Thabet Bey's caprice.

Pilgrims have been incited by the Director-General of Quarantine to claim from their consular authorities a refund of the 8 rupees at present charged for Kamaran quarantine dues, on the ground that the pilgrims of a clean ship get no value for their money.

The King has ordered Javanese mutawwifs in Mecca to obtain signatures of Javanese pilgrims to a document belauding the Hedjaz quarantine and other pilgrimage arrangements, protesting against Kamaran, and protesting also against the interference of any foreign consular authority in pilgrimage affairs.

The suggestion has been made to me more than once lately, notably by Emir Zeid, that an Arab doctor should be allowed to watch Hedjaz quarantine interests at Kamaran. If there were such a person as an Arab doctor, he might usefully be employed in the quarantine office in Jeddah.

The Dutch consul has been zealous in pointing out to the King the iniquities of Thabet Bey, hitherto without much success. I learn from M. Van de Plas that a quarantine commission of the League of Nations is now in Egypt, charged with the duty of reporting to the League on quarantine conditions in the Near East. This commission His Majesty has invited to visit Jeddah. If Thabet Bey survives its visit, it will be because King Hussein is still convinced that, in international quarantine affairs, all except the Hedjaz are out of step.

Thabet Bey having again insisted that payment of quarantine dues must actually be made to him by Messrs. Holt's agent before clearance is given to the ships, I have formally guaranteed this agent's ability to pay, and have demanded that no ship be detained for reasons connected with the payment of dues after the master has given Thabet Bey the usual bill on the agent.

#### Palestine Wafd in London.

King Hussein telegraphed 2,000L. to the Palestine Arab delegation in London towards the end of February. I understand that the president of the Wafd has asked His Majesty to send one of his sons to London, personally to support the delegation's efforts.

[8975]



### Hashimite Government Steamers.

Rushdy Bey, commandant and harbour-master of Jeddah, and Mohammed Tawil, Director-General of Customs, are leaving shortly for Massawa to conclude arrangements for the purchase of two steamers from M. Pastori.

I do not yet know what price is being paid, nor what arrangements will be made for manning or for docking these vessels. Rushdy Bey informs me that they will be primarily used by His Majesty, not for commercial exploitation, but for carrying arms and machine guns. They probably will: not only, as Rushdy Bey presumably intended, by way of equipment as coastal patrol boats, but as cargo from Massawa.

In the Red Sea the capacity for mischief of a Hashimite Government steamer with a part-Italian crew is considerable.

The company "Marittima Italiana," hitherto represented in Jeddah by Messrs. Haji Zeinal Ali Riza, have now an Italian agent named Meli, an employee of their Suez agents, Messrs. G. Lazzerini and Co., M. Lazzerini himself has been the last three weeks in Jeddah.

### Aviation

The Italian Government appear to attach importance to maintaining a preponderating influence in local aviation. The chief air mechanic, M. Delicata, who is an uneducated person of strongly chauvinistic and particularly bitter anti-British views, not above boasting that the Italian Government have recently sent 15,000 rifles to the Egyptian Extremists, works hard for the replacement of the present personnel and material in the Hedjaz by Italian pilots and mechanics, and Italian machines. The Italian consul is reported to have arranged with his Government to send to Jeddah, presumably via Massawa, a fighting aeroplane, machine guns, bombs and an armoured car, and to engage ten pilots and mechanics. Schiona, the Italian aviator for whom the Hashimite Government have repeatedly telegraphed, is not likely to return to the Hedjaz, as he has signed a contract to fly in Japan.

Italian enterprise has local supporters. Rushdy Bey, Constantine Yanni and the Director-General of Customs are all believed to have a financial interest, accorded to them by M. Pastori and M. Lazzerini, in the purchase of Italian air material.

My impression is that the Italian consul, a once cheerful little Neapolitan doctor, has been rather rushed off his feet by this concentration of national high politics and high finance. But he is indubitably popular with His Majesty in consequence. Locally he is even said to have promised King Hussein protection against Ibn Saud, in case of need, and as many Italian Moslem troops from Eritrea as the King may desire.

The pilot Stavris has made three attempts to fly to Asfan, on the Mecca-Rabegh road, where he is required to produce a moral effect upon the tribes through whose territory the Mecca-Medina caravan must pass. The only Caudron machine available is, however, still too defective for a successful flight.

Stavris has recently been ordered to fly via Rabegh and Yembo to Medina, to place himself there at the disposal of the Emir Ali.

A Farman machine has been packed and is being sent by sambuk to Yembo, where a new Russian mechanic has arrived from Cairo. M. Maximof has been offered his own terms to go to Medina to keep in repair the machines which Stavris is to fly. He is not likely to accept.

### Medina.

I learn that the Emir Ali left Medina for a tour of inspection to the north along the Hedjaz Railway and among the tribes to the north-east, towards Kheibar, on the 18th March. In Kheibar Farhan-el-Aida has considerable influence, and the recent extensive Wahhabi propaganda among the tribes to the north and east of Medina makes the atmosphere of this whole district electric. If the Emir carries out his tour in a spirit of tact and conciliation he may do much to check this subversive propaganda; otherwise he may well precipitate a conflagration.

All arrivals from Medina are unanimous in their reports of the rapid spread of pro-Ibn Saud and pro-Wahhabi doctrines around Medina. Tribe after tribe declares for the "Mudayyanin." Emir Ali evidently hopes to get trains running again soon on the Hedjaz Railway, but he has but little co-operation from the tribes. Diab Nasir, a former "Bab-ul-Arab," was sent to Bueir to arrange for fuel supplies for the railway, but he was attacked by Wahhabis, and had to return to Medina.

Sheikh Abdullah Abu Rub, Sheikh of the Sahliyyeh Auf, a section of the Masruh, appealed recently to the Emir Ali for arms and ammunition for the protection of his tribe against Wahhabi encroachments. He was informed that if he and his tribe cared to come within the walls of Medina they would receive protection. A similar request made to Ahmed-ibn-Mansur, the sub-governor, met with a similar reply. Sheikh Abdullah Abu Rub thereupon took his followers to the camp of the Emir Ali's own camel corps, outside Medina town, looted it of camels and arms, and made off into the desert.

The matter may have serious consequences, for the prescribed route for the Mecca-Medina pilgrim caravans is that passing from Rabegh through Bir Mabeirik and Bir-al-Mashi, and practically the whole of this road from Rabegh to Medina is in Masruh country. The first trade caravan to pass after the incident, one of 500 camels, was plundered by Sheikh Abdullah Abu Rub's people.

Sheikh Fuad-el-Khatib informed me on the 17th March that Ali had wired to his father to say that he could accept no responsibility for the security of this year's Medina pilgrimage.

### Pilgrimage.

The King originally entrusted the Masruh with the transport of Medina pilgrims from Mecca, but this arrangement appears now to have been cancelled. The first pilgrim-caravan, consisting of some 7,000 pilgrims—that is, approximately 4,000 camels—left Mecca on the 28th March for Medina by the eastern route, but the camels were provided, and the caravan escorted, by tribesmen from the Hedjaz proper, that is, from the Qoreish and other tribes round Mecca and Taif. No camels or camel-men have arrived as usual at Mecca from Medina tribes and the north.

The route prescribed is safer than that via Yembo, and, provided the friendship of the Masruh is assured, probably the only dangers are those of the road between Asfan and the Wadi Fatma. But the eastern route from Rabegh is trying for women and children because, unless a supplement of 1L is paid, shuqdufs (camel-swung litters) are discarded before the camels mount the steep Ghar, three days outside Medina, and there is thus a certain period on the double journey when women and children pilgrims have to ride, instead of being carried. It is probable that those conducting the caravan have come to some terms with the Masruh through whose country they must pass, for there is a general feeling that the King would not have allowed the caravan to start if there had been a real risk of anything more serious than mere levying of tolls. The evil-minded, however, say that King Hussein was in a hurry for his "koshan," and is indifferent to the fate of the caravan.

The charge for the return journey, Mecca-Medina, by pilgrim caravan is 95 mejidis (1 mejidi = 20 Turkish piastres), payable one-half before starting, 30 mejidis at Medina and the balance after the return to Mecca. King Hussein receives as "koshan" from the mutawwifs and camel-men about 2L per camel. The camel-men themselves only touch about half the sum paid by the pilgrims. Hence they resort to other means of pilgrim-milking.

The Government of India have notified me that they are not disposed to insist upon return tickets for Indian pilgrims, owing to the attitude of Moslem members of the Indian legislature.

It is profoundly discouraging to think that, despite the reiterated representations of this agency, shiploads of potential destitutes are again to be allowed to travel from India to the Hedjaz, in contravention of Koranic injunction and, apparently, for the personal satisfaction of various Moslem gentlemen on Haj committees and other bodies whose responsibility appears not to extend to the combating or obviation of this nuisance, but to cease with its initiation. Indian pilgrims may, in any case, be assured a warm welcome as being subjects of a Government which has officially recommended the return of the holy places to Turkish suzerainty.

### Slave Trade.

During the period under review, from 200 to 250 slaves have arrived in Jeddah from Midi. The dhows have in every case discharged their cargo about a mile south of Jeddah harbour, near the non-Moslem cemetery. The local authorities make no show of interference, and they continue to receive 75 per cent. of the price realised, leaving 25 per cent. for the traders. These slaves are mostly children of from 10 to 15 years, but there are some adults. All appear to be Abyssinian.



There has been for some little time no Red Sea patrol sloop in the Red Sea. H.M.S. "Cornflower" is refitting at Malta, and H.M.S. "Clematis" has taken Zaghlul Pasha to the Seychelles. The opportunity has been well exploited by slave traders; the large stocks which had accumulated at Midi must have been almost all liquidated by now. The market in Mecca is better than that in Jeddah, and many children are being sent for sale there.

#### General.

(a.) Amin Rihani, the King's Syrian-American guest, left for Port Soudan, en route for Aden, on the 15th instant. He was accompanied by Constantine Yanni.

(b.) The King has instructed the Arab agent in Cairo to apply to "the new Egyptian Government" for recognition as a diplomatic agent.

(c.) The Hashimite Government have informed me of a recent conflict on the Asir-Hedjaz border between local tribesmen and Wahhabis, whose object is alleged to have been to cut off supplies of sheep and of *samn* from Mecca. A fortnight has elapsed since I received this notification, but there has been no confirmatory Jeddah or Mecca rumour. There was, indeed, a sudden and serious shortage of meat in Mecca during the week ending the 26th March, but supplies are now normal again.

Wahhabi aggression is a normal feature of life on the Asir-Hedjaz marches, but if an effort to cut off sheep supplies from the south were to be successful the situation in Mecca would soon be precarious. I do not think the town could dispense with the meat supplied from the Yemen. Hedjaz resources are not sufficient for Hedjaz needs, and Nejd is no longer a popular source of supply.

(d.) The French representative left Jeddah for Medina, via Yembo, on the 22nd March. He is expected to return by the Khedivial mail steamer arriving at Jeddah on the 5th April.

(e.) Major Marshall, M.C., R.A.M.C., His Majesty's agent and consul, probably returns on the same day from leave of absence in the United Kingdom.

#### Press ("Al Qibla")

No. 567 contains, besides a long commentary on a "Moqattam" article about the Wahhabis, the following official notification:—

"For the information of the inhabitants of the country and to enable them to appreciate the real value of news diffused by telegraph agencies and by many sections of the press about our country, and to judge of the degree of falsehood in such communications, the Government publishes the following telegram from the Arab agent in Egypt:—

"Havas have circulated a very mischievous communiqué, referring to a fight at the doors of the Haram, the imposition of a tax on the dead and the conscription of pilgrims. Reuter's confirm this. I have issued a categorical *démenti*."

"(Note by the Editor.—It is known to us and to the whole world that the people of Great Britain are famed for their aversion from falsehood. We are unable to account for the temerity of Reuter's in traversing the truth.)"

[This is a stone in my garden, since foreign representatives are always held responsible by King Hussein for whatever news about the Hedjaz appears in their national press. The imposition of a burial tax and the conscription of pilgrims are, of course, facts. These denials are for the benefit of readers abroad; they carry no conviction to readers in the Hedjaz.]

No. 568 announces the decoration of Dr. Mohammed Hussein, Acting Director-General of the "Public Health Department" with the Order of Al Istiqlal, 3rd Class.

[This is one of the two Hussein brothers who were prominent during the quarantine disputes of 1920.]

The change in the Hashimite flag is brought to public notice.

The greater part of this number is taken up with comments on articles published by "Al Ommah" and the "Moqattam" of Egypt about Hedjaz affairs. The "Ommah," on the strength of the King's publication of an article from an imaginary treaty between himself and Great Britain (see report for the period ending the 10th February), enquires whether the Hedjaz is under British protection, and states that King Hussein considers himself as a British official.

The King replies by publishing—not for the first time—his letter of the 21st Zil Qa'da, 1336, to Sir H. McMahon. The rest of his commentary is of the "I could speak and I would" type, with dark references to disclosures that would blast the enemies of the Hedjaz did not King Hussein's solicitude for the interests of the whole East forbid his ever making them.

A Parliamentary question, in reply to which Mr. Churchill is reported by the "Moqattam" to have stated that King Hussein had received 18,000L. out of 20,000L. voted for his current subsidy is referred to, and the world is informed that King Hussein's subsidy, after being reduced during 1919, was stopped during 1920. King Hussein gives Mr. Churchill the lie, stating that he has not received this sum of 18,000L.

[It is only fair to King Hussein to say that, if, as is presumably the case, the sum in question was voted for him but has been spent by Feisal, Haddad Pasha, &c., King Hussein has never been informed that his son's and other people's expenses were being debited to his new "subsidy account."

The "Bourse égyptienne's" version of the reply to Mr. Lambert's question stated that King Hussein stood to receive a lump sum of 120,000L. down and 20,000L. a month from August 1921; this brought the French representative round to this agency in a hurry.]

No. 569 publishes the thoughts inspired in "a Reader in Jeddah" by the perusal of a quatrain which I had had the pleasure of reading with King Hussein two days before. They are very creditable to King Hussein.

The same number reproduces an article from No. 504 of "La Argentina" of Buenos Aires.

No. 570 announces the departure of the first Medina pilgrim-caravan for the 23rd March.

[It did not, in fact, leave until the 28th March.]

No. 571 discusses the declaration of Egyptian independence, and publishes the first rescripts of His Majesty King Fuad.

No. 572 reprints an article from No. 323 of "Al Qibla" of the 27th September, 1919, setting forth King Hussein's official views on the Caliphate question. Those readers, in response to whose urgent request this article is said to be reproduced, are reminded that, while King Hussein will not shirk the responsibilities of the Caliphate if and when offered to him by the Moslem world, he does not personally aspire thereto and is content to abide by the decision of Islam in the matter.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH.

#### APPENDIX.

##### Shipping Intelligence.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1922.	1922.		Packages.
Mansurah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	March 11	March 12	..	1,535
Lorenzo	British	New York	Karachi	12	15	..	15,000
Massana	Italian	Suez	Massana	12	12	..	255
Asmara	Italian	Massana	Suez	12	12	..	2,547
Borulos	British	Suez	Port Soudan	15	15	..	516
Karimoen	Dutch	Java	Amsterdam	15	16	1,503	..
Medan	Dutch	Java	Rotterdam	15	17	989	..
Demodocus	British	Singapore	Liverpool	19	20	1,010	..
Koweit	British	Bombay	Bombay	19	26	..	32,049
Phœnix	British	Singapore	London	20	21	242	..
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massana	20	20	..	149
Asmara	Italian	Massana	Suez	25	25	..	1,151
Borulos	British	Port Soudan	Suez	21	22	..	2,968
Mansourah	British	Suez	Port Soudan	25	25	..	888
Agapenor	British	Singapore	London	27	27	234	..
Massana	Italian	Suez	Port Soudan	27	27	..	127
Elpenor	British	Singapore	Liverpool	28	28	920	..
Kambangan	Dutch	Java	Amsterdam	29	29	1,205	..
Soerakarta	Dutch	Java	New York	30	31	1,215	..



[E 4127/65/65]

No. 191.

*Count de Salis to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 19.)*

[By Bag.]

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Vatican, April 15, 1922.

YOUR despatch No. 90 and my despatch No. 58 of 13th April.

Note has not been sent to League of Nations.

[E 4201/274/89]

No. 192.

*Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 22.)*

(No. 54.)

My Lord,

Beirut, April 11, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the afternoon of the 7th April Assad Bey, Director of the Interior of the Grand Liban, was murdered outside the French hospital by two unknown persons. There seems to be but little doubt that the crime was a political one. Two persons have been arrested as being the actual murderers and certain other individuals have also been arrested. Among these are Aref Dervish, who describes himself as Director of Agriculture in the Hedjaz; Mustaf-el-Golaini, a Syrian, who claims to have been Secretary-General in Transjordan; Abido Inkidar, of Kemalist sympathies; Saad-ed-Din Shetila, described as having been an Enver Pasha, and Rashid Shetila. Whether these arrests are in connection with the murder or with the recent demonstrations in Damascus I cannot say, but it looks as though the authorities consider themselves to be dealing with a Moslem movement, and in this case there may be truth in the story that at a meeting at the house of Dervish Khairi on the day before the murder it was decided to regard as infidels all Moslems in French service. The murder of Assad Bey may have been meant as a warning.

In any case, the existence of a certain effervescence is to be noticed. The decree regarding the new Lebanon Representative Council (copy of which was sent in my despatch No. 40 of the 29th March) is partly responsible. Its terms have aroused feelings of general disappointment and have led to much discussion in the press and elsewhere. Recently a letter from the Acting High Commissioner to the Governor of the Grand Liban has been published, pointing out that the decree marks a beginning and not the end. Anyhow, the matter has served as an occasion for the ventilation of existing anti-French sentiments, and a mixed deputation of Christians and Moslems recently visited the Maronite Patriarch to submit their views and to obtain his regarding the council. It is unfortunate that Mr. Crane, the result of whose visit to Damascus is described by Mr. Palmer in his despatch No. 101, should be in Beirut at this time, and by an unlucky coincidence he went out to see the Patriarch on the same day as the deputation mentioned above. He has been described as a kindly, but none too tactful, busybody, and I understand that steps have been taken as far as possible to isolate him here lest further trouble should result.

If the Moslems are really at the bottom of the trouble they have doubtless been encouraged, both by the Angora Agreement and its sequels, including the visit of Bekir Sami Bey, to the belief that they have little to fear from the French and that they need not hide their feelings regarding them; but the prompt measures taken at Damascus will no doubt have a salutary effect here. I believe that the murderer of Assad Bey will in due course be hanged.

I have, &amp;c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 4398/248/91]

No. 193.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, April 28.)*

(No. 319.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

April 26, 1922.

MY telegram No. 283.

In a letter received to-day, Ibn Saud says that to prevent his subjects from performing the pilgrimage this year is impossible. He begs that we notify Hedjaz this year and guarantee that there will be no aggression on the part of the Hedjaz on Nejd pilgrims. For his own part he guarantees that there shall be no aggression by Nejd.

I should be glad to be furnished at an early date with material for reply to Ibn Saud.

[E 4409/248/91]

No. 194.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received April 29.)*

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, April 29, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 14 of 22nd April: Nejd pilgrimage.

King Hussein takes same position as last year. He says they may come to pilgrimage by sea without conditions. Claims that 5,000 Nejd pilgrims came by sea last year and that small number have already arrived this year. I do not think it possible to alter his opinion.

[E 4577/78/65]

No. 195.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Harvey.*

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 29, 1922.

HIS Majesty's Government have had under careful consideration the note which you were good enough to address to me on the 5th April respecting the mandate for Palestine, and I desire to express their appreciation of the very friendly manner in which the Government of the United States has dealt with this question.

2. The proposals now made by the Government of the United States are acceptable to His Majesty's Government, who will be prepared to enter without delay into negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty on the lines proposed.

3. I gather from your Excellency's note that the Government of the United States do not now desire to suggest any alterations in the text of the draft mandate, with the possible exception of article 8, dealing with the Capitulations. His Majesty's Government agree that, in so far as the United States are concerned, the Capitulations should only be suspended during the period of the British mandate, it being left to the United States, on the termination of the mandate, to deal with the matter by negotiation with the authorities concerned. His Majesty's Government are at present disposed to consider that the most convenient means of providing for this would be to leave the text of article 8 unaltered, but to provide in the treaty that the United States do not accept the definite abrogation of their capitulatory rights, but consent to their suspension during the continuance of the mandate. I should, however, be glad to know the views of the Government of the United States on this point.

4. I desire to inform you that a suggestion has been made that article 23 should be modified so as to ensure that, on the termination of the mandate, adequate provision should be made to safeguard the interests in judicial matters of foreigners whose capitulatory rights are abrogated by article 8 as at present drafted. If this suggestion were adopted, the article would read as follows:—

"In the event of the termination of the mandate conferred upon the mandatory by this declaration, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for protecting the interests of foreigners in judicial matters, and also for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by articles 13 and 14, and for securing, under the

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guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities."

This alteration would not, if the course suggested in paragraph 3 is adopted, affect in any way the interests of the United States, who would be free to make their own arrangements on the termination of the mandate and the consequent revival of their capitulatory rights, but I should be glad to learn that your Excellency's Government would raise no objection to this amendment.

5. Inasmuch as the terms of the Palestine mandate are to be recited in the treaty, it is necessary that those terms should be definitely settled before the treaty can be negotiated and signed. His Majesty's Government are therefore extremely anxious to obtain the approval of the Council of the League of Nations to the terms of the mandate at their meeting on the 11th May, even if the mandate cannot be actually issued at present, and for this purpose they desire, with the consent of the United States Government, to lay the correspondence between your Excellency and myself before the Council of the League, as showing that agreement between the two Governments has now been reached. I have therefore the honour to request the assent of the Government of the United States to this course being adopted, in which case the negotiations for the treaty will be entered into as soon as the terms of the mandate have been approved by the Council of the League.

6. Your Excellency will observe that the period before the meeting of the Council is short, and I should therefore be grateful if the views of your Excellency's Government on the proposals made in this note could be communicated to me at the earliest possible date.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 4453/4453/91]

No. 196.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 1.)*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Admiralty, April 28, 1922.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of a submission of the 9th February from the commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, on the subject of the slave traffic in the Hedjaz.

2. I am to state that their Lordships concur in the remarks of the commander-in-chief.

3. A similar letter has been sent to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.

I am, &c.

CHARLES WALKER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 196.

*Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Cornflower" at Port Soudan, to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Station.*

(Confidential.)

*January 21, 1922.*

REFERENCE my letter of the 5th December, 1921, and my signal 2324/19, I enclose copies of two letters received from Jeddah—the former in answer to mine, and dated the 13th December, 1921, and received by me on arrival at Port Soudan on the 31st December, 1921, and the latter dated the 10th January, 1922, and received by me, approximately, 16th January, 1922.

2. In accordance with instructions received from the Senior Officer, Red Sea Patrol, in his 1230/20 in reply to my 2324/19, I am this day leaving Port Soudan for Jeddah and a cruise between Jeddah and Lith.

L. G. B. CAMPBELL.

The attention of their Lordships is drawn to this traffic as it is considered that pressure should be brought to bear as soon as possible to terminate this state of affairs. "Cornflower" has done well to expose these proceedings, and it appears

now for His Majesty's Government to show something more than the "official humanitarianism" of the Hashimite Government, of which the British agent speaks slightly, though he himself is apparently of the opinion that to take the matter up will only be to drive the traffic further underground. Such an argument for inaction is somewhat familiar. Whilst we have influence with King Hussein we should exert it unquestioningly to suppress a trade so iniquitous—to ignore it, when it is known by all that we have become aware of it, only brings our principles into contempt.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *Admiral,*  
*Commander-in-chief.*

"Iron Duke," February 9, 1922.

Enclosure 2 in No. 196.

*Commander Campbell to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

*H.M.S. "Cornflower" at Port Soudan,*  
*December 5, 1921.*

Sir,

I BEG to inform you that while at Jeddah my native interpreter got into conversation with a native in a café in the market, and, as a result, reported to me in the following sense.

He learns that slavery and kidnapping transactions are frequently made from the African coast to the Hedjaz and Yemen.

The chief places from which the said transactions are enacted are along the coast on either side of Massowa, where chiefly children, but also men and women, are kidnapped and taken by dhows to the slave markets of Hedjaz and Yemen.

There is not any objection made by the Hashimite Government against the importations of slaves into Jeddah or any other place, and there is actually a market in Jeddah for the sale of slaves.

He further informed me that the same day as "Cornflower" arrived at Jeddah (26th ultimo) two dhows arrived during the night full of slaves, and these were landed openly during the night, through the customs, and that the customs authorities in Jeddah levied revenue on the slaves generally.

He was further told that, if he liked, he could go and see the open slave market in a house in Jeddah and observe the selling of slaves going on, and that anybody would take him to the slave market to show him.

I have no corroboration of this statement, but there certainly were a few dhows in sight in the offing of Jeddah on the day I arrived.

The interpreter also informed me that the usual route of the dhows carrying slaves is to cross the Red Sea direct, and then turn north or south accordingly as to whether the slaves are for Hedjaz or Yemen.

I forward you the above statement for your information and any action you may deem necessary.

I have, &c.

L. G. B. CAMPBELL.

Enclosure 3 in No. 196.

*Major Marshall to Commander, H.M.S. "Cornflower," Port Soudan.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, December 13, 1921.*

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your memorandum of the 5th instant on slave traffic in the Hedjaz. This traffic has never been stopped by the Hashimite Government, but your informant is wrong in his statement that there is a market in Jeddah for the sale of slaves. The open slave market in Mecca—Dukka-el-Rakik—was closed about two years ago by order of King Hussein.

The vast majority of slaves imported into this country come from the Yemen, having been previously taken there from the African coast. On the occasion you mention about thirty slaves, mostly females, arrived in Jeddah from the Yemen. Customs dues are levied on these slaves.

These slaves can only be bought in the houses of certain delals in Jeddah, to

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whom they are consigned. The price is settled privately and there is no auction. The price of a slave is now about 60*l.*, but one trained in household duties may be sold for as much as 100*l.*

I have, &c.  
W. E. MARSHALL,  
*British Agent and Consul.*

Enclosure 4 in No. 196.

*Vice-Consul Grafftey-Smith to Commander, H.M.S. "Cornflower," Port Soudan.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Jeddah, January 10, 1922.*

WITH reference to this agency's despatch of the 13th December last, I have the honour to inform you that the following consignments of slaves have arrived in Jeddah from the 1st instant to date:—

January 1: 37 children, aged 8–14 (12 girls and 25 boys).

January 2: 45 children, aged 8–14.

January 4: 5 children, aged 8–14 (2 girls and 3 boys).

Other batches are expected.

Many of these children are stolen, I understand, from the Moslem village of Antajbura in Abyssinia, which is mentioned as an important source of supply. They are taken by the raiders by camel to Obokh or Asab on the coast, whence they are shipped by sambuk across to Midi in the Yemen, either after sale to the sambukmen or under the escort of their original captors.

In the case of one consignment of the children who have recently arrived in Jeddah, ten men accompanied them across to Midi and there delivered them to Syed Abdul Matloub, Sheikh of Midie, who is by birth a native of Ru'is, near Jeddah. Four of the men conducted them from Midie to Jeddah, where, with the connivance of the local authorities, they were transhipped with a smaller sambuk and taken to Ru'is. Here Syed Abdul Hamid, son of the man in Midi, took them in charge.

The attitude of the local authorities towards this traffic is peculiar. In previous cases customs dues have been charged, in gold or in kind, an impost of 3½*l.* gold per slave having recently roused the protests of the traders. But in the cases under review, I understand that the Government informed the traders officially that such traffic is illegal and that the slaves must be confiscated by the Government. They were, in fact, shepherded through the Jeddah Suq to the Khosh Badquq, where they were accommodated, by two Hashimite Government policemen. Official humanitarianism appears, however, to have been limited to this public announcement. The slaves are now on sale privately and unofficially by brokers, and the Government get all the proceeds except an approximate 25 per cent. down, with which the traders have to be content. Three girls, aged from 10 to 14, were purchased by the local *cadi* for 35*l.* apiece, but prices are expected to drop to 20*l.*

I am credibly informed that 200 more slave are awaiting transport to Jeddah at Midi, which seems to be the most important distributing centre.

I hope, when favourable opportunity offers, to take the matter up with King Hussein, but I have small hope of success attending these representations, the result of which may only be to drive the traffic further underground.

Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea Patrol, the Governor of the Red Sea Province and the Director of Intelligence, Khartoum.

I have, &c.  
L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH,  
*Acting British Agent and Consul.*

[E 4545/65/65]

No. 197.

*Count de Salis to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 3.)*

[By Bag.]

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Cardinal Secretary of State has informed Mr. Dormer that a further note on mandate of Palestine is in course of preparation. It would make some constructive suggestions, especially as regards article 14. In reply to further enquiries he said that memorandum was being sent to League of Nations respecting this article.

*Vatican, April 21, 1922.*

[E 4577/78/65]

No. 198.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to the British representatives at Paris (No. 160) and Rome (No. 136 (D)).*

[By Bag.]

(Telegraphic.)

PALESTINE mandate.

*Foreign Office, May 4, 1922.*

Practical agreement having now been reached with United States Government, His Majesty's Government propose to invite Council of League of Nations at their next meeting on 11th May definitely to approve terms of mandate, if they are not prepared to issue it at once, as treaty with United States Government regarding latter cannot be concluded until its final terms, which must be recited in treaty, are definitely known. Matter is very urgent and His Majesty's Government regard it as important that no difficulty should arise when subject is discussed by council.

You should therefore inform Government to which you are accredited that His Majesty's Government propose to raise question before council on 11th May and urge that their representative may be instructed to support his British colleague and to give such assistance as he can with a view to procure an early and satisfactory decision.

[E 4653/656/91]

No. 199.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 6.)*

(No. 29. Secret.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, April 20, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 1st to 20th April, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Delhi, Transjordan and Damascus.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
*British Agent and Consul.*

Enclosure in No. 199.

*Jeddah Report, April 1 to 20, 1922.*

(Secret.)

*Pilgrimage.*

THE total number of pilgrims now in the Hedjaz is approximately 18,400. All are from the Dutch East Indies and Singapore. The first Indian pilgrim boat has reached Kamaran, and is expected to arrive at Jeddah on the 22nd instant.

In spite of Emir Ali's telegram to his father that he would not be responsible for



the safety of pilgrims going to Medina, three caravans, comprising from 5,000 to 6,000 pilgrims, left Mecca for Medina. The first caravan arrived safely on the 9th April. It is said that Emir Ali has come to terms with the chief of the Abamda tribe and with Sheikh Abdullah Abu Ruba of the Sahliyyah Auf section of the Masruh tribe, and that both roads to Medina, via Rabegh, are open. It is rumoured, on the other hand, that the pilgrim caravans went by another route, still farther east, which is not much frequented. We shall be able to find out the true state of affairs when the first caravan, which has reached Rabegh on the return journey, reaches Mecca.

We are having the usual difficulty this year over quarantine. Kamaran quarantine is ignored, and all the pilgrims are being sent to the quarantine islands for twenty-four hours. Not only so, but the ships themselves are being kept in quarantine, and the agent, pilot and coolies treated accordingly. The Dutch consul and I have protested strongly against this, and Dr. Thabet, the quarantine doctor, in a reply to the Dutch consul, said he could not accept the word of any ship's doctor as to the presence of any infectious disease on board. I understand that King Hussein has wired to ask the committee of the League of Nations, which recently visited Alexandria and Constantinople to discuss the International Quarantine Convention, to visit Jeddah. Perhaps, if they accept, they will be able to convince the King of the folly of his quarantine arrangements and hasten the downfall of Dr. Thabet, an event which would be welcomed by all the foreign representatives and shipping agents.

#### *Hedjaz Shipping.*

Mohammed Tawil, Director of Customs, and Rushdi Bey, Commandant of Jeddah, left for Massaua on the 10th April to arrange for the purchase of two steamers for the Hashimite Government. It is said that the two steamers they propose to buy are the "Paslo" and the "Mascotte," which were both doing coastal work in the Red Sea during the summer of 1921. The latter boat has a condensing plant. Both boats are small.

With reference to the purchase of these steamers an official proclamation appeared in "Al Qibla," No. 577, to the effect that the Hashimite Government are making arrangements for the transport of Syrian, Transjordanian and Palestinian pilgrims from Maan to Akaba by motor-lorry, and from Akaba to Jeddah by steamer. So far I have no knowledge of the purchase of the motor-lorries required for this purpose, but, in his despatch No. 103 of the 31st December, 1921, Mr. Grafftey-Smith mentioned that the Italian Pastori had talked of motor transport concessions between Akaba and Maan.

I have informed the Egyptian and Palestinian authorities of the possibility of pilgrims returning by this route, so that if it actually comes to pass arrangements may be made for the quarantine of these returning pilgrims.

#### *Aviation.*

M. Maximof's contract expired on the 31st March. Great pressure was brought to bear upon him and upon M. Stavris to induce them to go to Medina. Stavris was to fly via Rabegh and Yenbo, where M. Maximof was to join him. The Government dhow taking petrol to Rabegh in preparation for this flight had an engagement with the insurgents of that coast and had to return to Jeddah. This circumstance, and the notorious lack of public security in the district over which he was expected to fly, did much to deter Stavris from accepting the mission offered to him. Maximof also refused, as he was unwilling to renew his contract. After considerable discussion, these two and Delicata, the Italian mechanic, signed a declaration to the effect that they would continue to work on condition that their employment was specifically limited to Jeddah only. The King thereupon closed the aerodrome.

Maximof left on the 12th without receiving either his pay for the four days' work done after the expiration of his contract or his return fare to Egypt. Delicata has established himself in the Italian consulate and Stavris in the French consulate. A new Russian mechanic, named Klibensky, arrived from Cairo on the 8th. I understand that he is not very competent.

#### *General.*

(a.) Dr. Naji-al-Assil Bey, a Mesopotamian, came to see me on the 12th April. He is the representative of the Anglo-French Middle East Development Corporation,

and has been to Mecca to see the King. He left the same day for Egypt and England. He said that the Foreign Office knew the purport of his visit to Mecca. I understand that King Hussein has signed an agreement with him for various projects in the Hedjaz.

(b.) The Frenchman named Victor Cherreau, alias Hassan Ahmed, mentioned in Aden letter of the 29th March, arrived at Jeddah by the steamship "Djemmer" from Kamaran on the 3rd. He stayed at the French consulate. At the request of the French consul he was given a free passage by the steamship "Celebes" to Port Said, as an indigent, and the French consul at Port Said was to arrange for his onward journey to France. The "Celebes" left on the 17th.

(c.) On the 9th April there was a deliberate attempt to blow up the local ordnance depot in Jeddah. A man laid a trail of gunpowder into the building and fired the gunpowder. Luckily this was seen and extinguished. There was another rumour of fire three days later. On both occasions dwellers in large numbers left their houses, as they say that, should an explosion occur in the ordnance depot, which is within the city wall, the whole town will fall. I understand that the officer in charge of the depot has been taken to Mecca. Sabri Pasha, the Minister of War, came to Jeddah to investigate the matter.

(d.) Small-pox is still present in Mecca, and I have seen two children in the streets of Jeddah with the rash still present. The disease referred to in Mr. Grafftey-Smith's despatch No. 12 was, I think, influenza, which has been prevalent in Mecca. The epidemic has passed. I can find no evidence of cases of typhus fever having occurred.

(e.) It is rumoured that about three weeks ago 300 Bedouin went to Taraba, where they surrounded the mosque at the time of the midday prayer, and killed all the men inside.

#### *Press ("Al Qibla").*

No. 573 contains a reply, in the form of a firman by King Hussein, to criticisms of himself reproduced by "Al Moqattam" of Cairo from the "Times," with particular reference to his alleged Caliphate ambitions and to his subsidy during the war.

He asks how a man who has so often expressed his desire to abdicate, and whose desire has been refused, "as is known from the available proofs" by Great Britain, can be credited with any wordly ambitions. He quotes again extracts from his letter of the 21st Zil Qu'da, 1336, to Sir H. McMahon.

As for his subsidy, he thinks it ungrateful now to suggest that the aid rendered by him was overpaid.

The editor reminds "Al Moqattam" of an article published in "Al Moqattam" at the time of the taking of Damascus belauding the Arab troops.

This number also reproduces an article from the "Lisan-ul-Arab" of Jerusalem on the attitude of Indian Moslems towards the Sultan of Turkey and the King of the Hedjaz respectively. The editor of the "Qibla" states that before boasting of their zeal for Islam, as manifested in their religious loyalty to Turkey, the Moslems of India might well reconsider their present acquiescent attitude towards the Qadyan heresy.

The early establishment of wireless stations at Akaba and at Kufuda is announced, and the departure of the Medina caravan of 2,034 camels from Mecca is noted.

Nos. 574 and 575 contain nothing of interest.

No. 576 publishes the telegrams exchanged between the King and his sons on the anniversary of the Mahda (7th April), and gives details of the celebrations at Mecca.

No. 577 contains the official proclamation already referred to in this despatch.

In No. 578 there is an article deploring the lamentable condition of the Arabs, and an appeal is made to the Americans to succour the Arabs.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.



## SHIPPING INTELLIGENCE.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
				1922.	1922.		Packages.
Mansourah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	Mar. 31	Apr. 1	..	4,170
Djemher	Dutch	Java	Marseilles	Apr. 3	" 5	1,606	Specie.
Dakahlieh	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 5	" 5	..	587
Krakatau	Dutch	Java	Amsterdam	" 6	" 6	852	Planks.
Kumasus	British	Singapore	Marseilles	" 7	" 9	927	
Idomansus	"	Java	Amsterdam	" 7	" 7	876	
Borulos	"	Suez	Port Soudan	" 8	" 8	..	452
Massana	Italian	Massana	Suez	" 8	" 8	..	1,701
Tantalus	Dutch	Java	Amsterdam	" 10	" 10	620	
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massana	" 10	" 10	..	345
Dakahlieh	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 11	" 12	..	3,772
Glaucus	"	Singapore	London	" 14	" 14	243	
Stentor	"	Java	Amsterdam	" 15	" 17	678	
Mansourah	"	Suez	Port Soudan	" 15	" 15	..	756
Celebes	Dutch	Java	London	" 16	" 17	717	
Massana	Italian	Suez	Massana	" 17	" 17	..	90
Jason	British	Java	..	" 20	" ..	703	

[E 4545/65/65]

No. 200.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Count de Salis (Vatican).*

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, May 8, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 17 of 21st April, received 3rd May: Cardinal Secretary of State's intention of taking further action regarding British mandate for Palestine.

I am at a loss to understand in what manner Vatican can regard itself as being entitled to intervene in the matter in this way, except in so far as it may reasonably expect to be consulted about selection of the Roman Catholic representative on the commission on the Holy Places. On this point the Cardinal Secretary of State has no ground for supposing that His Majesty's Government wish to ignore reasonable views of Roman Catholic hierarchy. It appears to me that memorandum from Cardinal Secretary of State of 6th March, enclosed in your despatch No. 58 of 13th April, amounts to nothing less than protest against whole policy which His Majesty's Government are being commissioned by the Powers and the League of Nations to carry out in Palestine.

I request that you will make a communication to his Eminence in sense of foregoing remarks, adding that if Vatican through any channel raises the matter at the next meeting of the Council of the League, the British representative will make a statement in the above sense.

[E 4800/274/89]

No. 201.

*Consul-General Satow to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 9.)*

(No. 61.)

My Lord,

*Beirut, April 28, 1922.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 41 of the 15th March, instructing me to report further as to constitutional developments in Syria, I have the honour to state that as yet no steps have been taken to carry out the scheme of federation outlined in my despatch No. 84 of the 27th June, 1921. Although no great enthusiasm for the scheme appears to exist anywhere in Syria, I have gathered of late that the French authorities were feeling that it had become necessary to take up the matter, and that they were awaiting the arrival of General Gouraud. The latter returned on the 23rd, and some steps in the matter may now be taken. It seems likely that the creation of two common services, those of Finance and of Public Works, may be decided upon, and that some sort of a federal council will come into existence at Beirut, where it will be under the guidance of the Haut-Commissariat.

With regard to the second paragraph of your despatch, it will perhaps be most convenient to take the various States in order, and explain what the position is in each of them.

*Grand Liban.*

There has until recently been a nominated administrative council. Some weeks ago it was dissolved, and it is to be replaced shortly by an elected body, to be known as the representative council (see my despatch No. 40 of the 29th March). There is much dissatisfaction as to the limited powers to be given to the council.

The Governor of the State is a French naval officer, Commandant Trabaud, who, during the war, was Governor of the Island of Rouad. He also acts as the delegate of the High Commissioner. The secretary-general, Auguste Pasha Adib, a Lebanese, is an amiable nonentity, who was formerly in the Egyptian service and who, before his present post, held that of Director of Finance in the Grand Liban. There is a French "conseiller du Gouvernement," who represents the Governor at the meetings of the council and who has under his special care the Department of the Interior. There are native directors of this Department and of the other principal Departments such as Finance, Justice, Public Works, &c., and attached to each is a French "conseiller."

The Grand Liban is divided into four sanjaks (Liban nord, Liban sud, Mont Liban and Bekaa) and two municipalities (Beirut and Tripoli). Each sanjak has a native mutessarif, with a French "conseiller administratif" attached to him. Similar "conseillers" are attached to the two municipalities. The sanjaks are divided into kazas, with native kaïmakams, to whom, however, no French officials are attached.

Whatever nominal authority is given to the native officials, they are in practice bound, albeit not always willingly, to follow the wishes and advice of their advisers.

As regards the municipalities, the last Beirut municipal council was a nominated body. It has, however, now been replaced by an elected council, which has not, however, yet started work, the elections having only just finished.

*Alaouite Territory.*

This district was until recently the scene of military operations. It is a region in parts of which Turkish rule was little more than nominal, and is therefore politically less advanced than other parts of Syria. In the circumstances, the system of administration is necessarily more direct. The delegate of the High Commissioner is General Billotte, who is also "administrateur du territoire." At headquarters there is a "conseiller du Gouvernement" and an assistant, and "conseillers" for Finance, Public Works, Agriculture, Health and Gendarmerie. There are two sanjaks, Lattakia and Tartous, each having a "conseiller administratif" and an assistant, while the municipality of Lattakia has also a "conseiller." There is no sort of council, either nominated or elected, at present.

*Aleppo.*

The delegate is General Delamothe and the "conseiller du Gouvernement" is M. Reclus. There are also a native Governor-General and native heads of Departments with French advisers attached. Full details are given in Mr. Morgan's despatch No. 306 of the 22nd April, of which a copy is enclosed. The real power at Aleppo is in the hands of the French delegate and advisers.

Alexandretta, one of the three sanjaks of the State of Aleppo, has under the Angora Agreement a special administrative autonomy. At present this seems to be nominal, and the only outward and visible sign thereof is the recognition of Turkish as an official language.

*Damascus.*

Particulars as to the system in force are given in Mr. Palmer's despatch No. 71 of the 18th April, of which a copy is enclosed. Here again the real power is in French hands. Both here and at Aleppo census operations have begun.

*Hauran.*

This is a primitive district, and is therefore dealt with on special lines. Mr. Palmer has already reported on several occasions as to the method of administration.

[8975]



As regards the last paragraph of your despatch under reply, I would state that, while the effective administration of Syria is at present undoubtedly in French hands, I do not see how in the circumstances it can be otherwise. A child must undoubtedly learn to walk before it can run, and the fact that it believes that it can do both does not alter the case. Self-confidence is no substitute for lack of experience, and there is no doubt that at present the people of Syria have neither the experience nor the capacity for self-government. This fact is admitted by the more reasonable members of the community. In a region which suffered severely during the war and was the scene of military operations followed by sporadic lawlessness, which lost considerably in population and in which all the branches of Government, such as it was, had become thoroughly disorganised, the French have in three years set going a workable form of administration. It is too much to expect that within the same short period they should also have been able to form a staff of native administrators out of material largely inexperienced. That the choice of French officials has not always been happy is admitted, and there seems to be an absence among them of really first-class men, who, even in return for generous remuneration, seem unwilling to come to Syria. Complaints and dissatisfaction are now more openly expressed, but it is curious to note how often these complaints are against some action taken by the French authorities which has resulted, or is believed to have resulted, in financial loss to the complainant.

I disagree with Mr. Palmer's remarks both as to the French having rendered no assistance in the direction of self-government and as to their intention to make Syria a French colony. Originally this pet theory of Mr. Palmer limited itself to the Lebanon, but now he is beginning to see all Syria in gradual process of colonisation. The French have undoubtedly lost ground here, and they are aware of the fact. Before the war, with a small consular staff, they enjoyed a popularity at a small monetary cost which is now lacking, despite all the money spent and the men employed. It seems only reasonable to suppose that in the circumstances they will endeavour to reduce their commitments rather than to increase them.

I do not think that foreign interests lose from the fact that for the moment the executive power is in French hands. The native element is, I believe, at heart anti-foreign, and if the Capitulations were abolished and foreigners were left to the tender mercies of the native official they might have almost as bad a time as if they were dealing with Kemalist Turks.

I have, &c.  
H. E. SATOW.

Enclosure 1 in No. 201.

*Consul Palmer to Consul-General Satow.*

(No. 71.)  
Sir,

I HAVE the honour to advert to your despatch No. 12 of the 31st March, in which you ask me to furnish details as to constitutional progress in the State of Damascus.

1. I gave at great length the system of administration of this State in my despatches to the Foreign Office No. 13 of the 2nd February and No. 21 of the 9th March, 1921, and in my despatch No. 90 of the 27th June, 1921, I dealt with the proposed federal council which, in a speech made here, General Gouraud declared that he intended to create.

I hasten to add that not the slightest attempt of any sort has been made—as far as this State is concerned—to give effect to one single item of the programme outlined in this formal declaration of the general.

One hears that this may now be done upon his forthcoming return from France, but it is scarcely matter for surprise that Damascus is by now sceptical.

2. The definite points you raise can be answered in a few words:—

All the functionaries of this State are nominated by the delegation—from the Governor and his council of directors-general down to the smallest employee in the public offices.

This is to say, no minor official can be appointed without the approval of the delegation.

Quite recently (cf. my despatch No. 83 of the 14th March, 1922, to the Foreign Office) the French delegate forced the Director-General of Education to resign and selected his successor.

My previous despatches mentioned above will already have made it sufficiently clear that the native population has no voice in the selection of any of the departmental heads or staff. They have recently protested against the maintenance in office of the Governor and the chief of police, with the sole result that the loudest-voiced of those protesting were arrested as agitators and are to be tried to-day by a French court-martial.

3. Under these circumstances it is somewhat in the nature of a farce that French "conseillers" should be attached to each native "director-general."

The latter are merely the machinery to execute the wishes and orders of the French, no director-general being able to take any executive action of any importance without reference to his respective "conseiller."

The latter are all under the orders of the French delegate and refer all important questions to him (and through him, if necessary, to General Gouraud), and their offices are situated in the buildings of the French delegation. The directors-general are therefore mere figure-heads, paid salaries to sign documents put in front of them which have received the previous approbation of their particular French "conseiller."

The Public Debt—which is still in touch with Constantinople—and the Régie appear to be the sole Administrations which enjoy a small measure of independence.

4. There is no such thing as a "Parliament" in existence. The Medjliss Shura is equally under the complete control of the delegation, which can veto any election to this body and evict anyone from it.

But in general I have nothing to add to the full outline already given in my despatches Nos. 13 and 21 of 1921, of which you have received copies.

5. Turning to your last question, as to whether the French have done anything to help prepare Syria for self-government, I must answer that they have done nothing of the sort in this State.

Until the return of General Gouraud and until it is possible to see whether it is intended to give effect to his declarations of June 1921 (cf. enclosure to my despatch No. 90 of the 27th June, 1921), it is difficult to make any definite statement, which must, under the circumstances, be somewhat in the nature of a prediction.

But I have formed the impression that the French are working with a view to gradually converting all Syria into (to all intents and purposes) a French colony. So far, owing to its Mahomedan numerical superiority, they have veiled their intentions somewhat more in this State than in the Grand Liban, but the thinkers and patriots among the native population have no longer any illusions left upon this point.

Hence the reception given to the American Crane, and the speeches and demonstrations which have led to the recent disturbances reported in my Nos. 101, 106 and 107 of April 1922.

As already said above, the persons arrested in connection with these are to be tried to-day by a French court-martial.

6. I may also refer to an article in the "Revue des Deux Mondes" of December 1921, entitled "L'Organisation de la Syrie sous le Mandat français."

This of course gives the purely French view, and glosses over the worst defects and faults of the present Administration.

The true position is, however, criticised with accuracy and much sarcasm by M. Jonnart in a speech to the Chamber of Deputies at Paris, made, as far as I recollect, during the summer of 1921. His views agree with mine.

I have, &c.  
C. E. S. PALMER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 201.

*Consul Morgan to Consul-General Satow.*

(No. 306.)  
Sir,

IN reply to your despatch No. 11 of the 31st March, I have the honour to report that the former vilayet of Aleppo has been divided into the States of Aleppo, Alexandretta and Deir-az-Zor.

Up to the present no elections have taken place in these States, but a census of Aleppo is going on as a preliminary step to establishing the body of electors and setting up a representative régime.

A native Governor-General has been appointed by the French in Aleppo and native Governors in Alexandretta and Deir-es-Zor. They are supported by native



directors of Interior, Justice, Finance, Agriculture, &c., also nominated by the French. No administrative posts have been filled by Frenchmen, but a French adviser has been attached to each State and French advisers to each Department in the State, who in reality exercise all power and authority and control the Government. Most of the French advisers to Aleppo State, such as those of Justice, Agriculture and Education, exercise the same functions in Alexandretta and Deir-es-Zor States, and, in a general way, these two States are subordinate to Aleppo, having the status of sanjaks, while Aleppo is considered a vilayet.

The members of the municipality are elected by the people and a French adviser is attached to it.

The native Governors and directors do not act independently from the French advisers.

Correspondence between all Departments and foreign authorities passes through the French adviser to the State.

It will be seen that the people of the three States have no voice in the Government, although they have in the municipalities. While they accepted this state of things in the beginning without murmuring, they are now becoming more bold in manifesting their discontent with the régime, and their discontent, in Aleppo at least, is increased by the fact that the native Governor-General has appointed a number of his relatives to various posts in the Administration, with the result that there is some resentment among those who have not succeeded in obtaining posts for themselves and their relatives.

It is no bad thing that the power is in the hands of the French civil and military authorities and of the High Commission. The people of Syria are not fit to stand alone as yet. Independence would mean Moslem supremacy, and I think that Moslems, whether brought up in the Turkish school or not, have yet to learn to govern with justice.

French authorities are somewhat inclined to truckle to the Moslem element to keep them peaceful and win them over. This truckling weakens French authority among the Moslems. The latter show signs of being anti-French, and allege that they are pro-British. They are in reality anti-European, and use the pro-British pose to try to get support for their anti-French sentiments.

The Capitulations are in force, but the native Moslem officials use the old Turkish methods to try and render them non-effective. In Aleppo their attitude in this respect seems to be regarded with benevolence by the French, although, in theory, the latter uphold the Capitulations.

In general it may be said that the French have made no change from the former Ottoman system of administration, justice, commerce, &c.

Some natives have been accepted in volunteer levies, but military service is not compulsory.

I requested the vice consul in Alexandretta to give me a short report on conditions in his district, but have not received it. In these circumstances, perhaps the enclosed article from the "Syrie" of the 9th March, entitled "L'Autonomie du Sandjak d'Alexandrette et le Recensement," may give an idea of conditions in that State.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 201.

Extract from the "Syrie" of March 9, 1922.

#### L'AUTONOMIE DU SANDJAK D'ALEXANDRETTE ET LE RECENSEMENT.

NOUS est-il permis de demander quel doit être notre avenir administratif? Naturellement nous sommes soucieux de le savoir parce que nous nous trouvons à la veille des grands événements qui vont déterminer la forme définitive des Gouvernements au Liban et en Syrie: Les élections.

Alexandrette depuis son heureuse occupation fut l'objet d'une faveur spéciale de la part de la Puissance mandataire qui, tout en agrandissant son territoire, lui accorda l'autonomie administrative. Mais cette autonomie, proclamée devant les États syriens et reconnue à la Conférence de San-Remo et plus tard dans l'Accord d'Angora, ne fut malheureusement que nominale sans posséder les avantages réels, puisque le sandjak d'Alexandrette a toujours dépendu administrativement ou de Beyrouth ou d'Alep, et

dans certains cas de toutes les deux à la fois, c'est pourquoi on se demande si cette situation indéfinie doit exister longtemps? Que signifie alors l'autonomie d'un Gouvernement quand ce Gouvernement est impuissant dans la direction de ces affaires intérieures, liée dans tous ses mouvements administratifs, devant rendre compte de la piastre qu'il dépense et du planton qu'il nomme, soumis corps et âme aux ordres d'un autre Gouvernement? Est-ce cela qu'on appelle autonomie? Mais l'autonomie pratiquée dans tout le monde s'élève sur l'indépendance administrative, et Larousse la définit ainsi: "Droit de se gouverner par ses propres lois." D'autre côté l'autonomie ne peut être que complète. Il n'existe pas dans la science politique d'autres termes ou définitions à l'autonomie. Nos dirigeants ne peuvent que reconnaître cette vérité, c'est pourquoi nous aimons attirer leur attention afin qu'ils s'empressent de mettre fin à cette situation devenue gênante tant au point de vue administrative que sociale.

Le sandjak d'Alexandrette est riche, il peut se suffire et se dispenser de tout secours étranger. Nous avons à maintes reprises décrit ses différentes ressources, qui exigent l'attention particulière d'un Gouvernement autonome patriote pour travailler à augmenter sa richesse et mettre en valeur ses ressources. Son autonomie ne lui fera pas du tort, mais, au contraire, elle le rendra prospère et heureux, vu sa position géographique et les minimes frais qu'exige son administration. Son autonomie ne touchera en rien ses relations économiques avec Alep, lesquelles se poursuivront normalement pour le bien des deux contrées, car, si Alexandrette a besoin d'Alep pour son commerce, cette dernière en a plus besoin pour faciliter son trafic d'exportation et d'importation, qui lui permettra en même temps de tirer profit en faisant économie de temps et de finances; c'est là d'ailleurs une vérité incontestable.

Notre attachement administratif à Alep ne peut nous être que préjudiciable: il place notre sandjak dans le second rang de préoccupation, il affaiblit les soins dans notre relèvement, et ce pour plusieurs raisons que nous nous contentons, pour le moment, d'en faire allusion seulement. Il est par conséquent plus profitable, du moment que nous possédons le privilège d'autonomie, de nous en faire jouir complètement et librement.

Le régime spécial dont on a doté le sandjak d'Alexandrette à la suite de la Convention d'Angora, s'est vu traduire par l'agrément de la langue turque comme langue officielle dans les différentes administrations. Le nombre des langues officielles jusqu'ici atteint, donc, le trois. Nous voulons espérer que ce régime spécial s'arrête aux pieds de langues et ne dépassera pas ces limites, car, à ce qu'il paraît, la propagande turque de nos voisins fait entendre que nous aurons prochainement parmi les fonctionnaires de notre Gouvernement quelques spécimens de nos anciens oppresseurs, à Dieu ne plaise, soi-disant comme techniciens dans l'art administratif, et ce pour manque de fonctionnaires de carrière dans la Syrie. Tout en n'ajoutant pas foi à ces rumeurs inexacts et sans fonds, nous aimons en voir donner un démenti formel, de la part de la Puissance mandataire, affirmant une fois encore que la principale condition pour ce qui désire s'employer dans les Gouvernements locaux est d'avoir la nationalité syrienne. Nous voudrions avoir de bonnes relations avec les Turcs, mais toujours de loin, de très loin. Nos affaires intérieures appartiennent à nous et nous devons nous en occuper. Nous avons cotés nos conseillers et amis les Français qui nous guident et nous donnent les meilleurs conseils techniques dans l'art administratif.

Le recensement a été ordonné dans tous les États syriens sauf dans notre sandjak. Dans tous les milieux on attend l'arrivée des ordres pour connaître les résultats de cette opération. Naturellement cet événement est considéré par la population comme étant de la plus haute importance où un nouvel ordre des choses sera établi; il sera aussi pour le pays une nouvelle et heureuse ère d'évolution, car rien n'est plus exact qu'après le recensement, les élections générales suivront, et c'est alors que la vie nationale verra le jour et formera l'unité dans les sentiments. La France, qui se spécialise dans l'éducation politique et la science des sentiments, aura la mission la plus noble et la plus délicate à exercer dans ce pays: c'est de nous enseigner l'amour de la patrie.—FRÉDÉRIC ZRAÏCK.

[E 4453/4453/91]

No. 202

The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah).

(No. 59.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 9, 1922.

THE question of slave traffic in the Hedjaz, regarding which you were in correspondence with the commander of H.M.S. "Cornflower" in December and January



last, has been referred to the Admiralty by the commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, who has represented in strong terms the desirability of suppressing this traffic.

2. The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty share Admiral de Robeck's recommendations, and there is no doubt that every effort should be made to bring about the termination of the present state of affairs.

3. I request, therefore, that you will take an early opportunity of informing King Hussein that His Majesty's Government learn with deep distress that slaves are being imported into the Hedjaz and surreptitiously sold there. They are reluctant to suppose that his Majesty is in fact countenancing so iniquitous a trade, which is universally regarded as a disgrace to any enlightened community, but, at the same time, they find it difficult to believe that the local authorities are unaware of its existence. In any case, His Majesty's Government will not be able to enter into treaty relations with the ruler of a country in which such traffic is permitted. They will consequently find themselves compelled to withhold their ratification of the treaty recently concluded between the Emir Abdullah and Colonel Lawrence until such time as they are satisfied that steps have been taken to suppress the slave trade in the Hedjaz.

4. You should, if you are in possession of the necessary information, report by telegram the nationality of the dhows engaged in transporting slaves.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 4453/4453/91]

No. 203.

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 9, 1922.*

WITH reference to the letter from the Admiralty dated the 28th ultimo,\* I am directed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch which has been addressed to the British agent at Jeddah, instructing him to make representations to King Hussein with a view to the suppression of the slave traffic in the Hedjaz.

2. It is understood that a report has been called for by your Department from the Resident at Aden on the slave traffic in the Yemen, and I am to request that, if this has not already been done, he may be instructed to endeavour to ascertain the nationality of the dhows in which the traffic is carried on, in case Major Marshall is not in possession of this information.

3. I am to transmit herewith a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Admiralty proposing that the French and Italian Governments shall be approached in the hope of obtaining their support in the endeavour to bring about the termination of the present state of affairs.†

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 4847/178/65]

No. 204.

*Count de Saint-Aulaire to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 10.)*

LE Saint-Siège a saisi le Gouvernement français d'une demande tendant à l'ajournement de la désignation par le Conseil de la Société des Nations du président de la Commission pour l'Étude des Questions religieuses prévue à l'article 14 du projet du mandat britannique sur la Palestine. En outre, le Nonce à Paris estime que la présidence en question devrait être donnée à un catholique belge.

L'Ambassadeur de France a été chargé de demander à son Excellence le principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté aux Affaires étrangères si le Gouvernement britannique a été saisi d'une demande analogue de la part du Saint-Siège.

Le point de vue du Gouvernement français en cette matière n'a pas varié; il estime qu'une telle désignation est prématurée. Le projet de mandat britannique sur la Palestine n'a pas encore reçu l'approbation du Conseil de la Société des Nations, et

\* No 202.

† Not printed.

l'article 14 de ce projet n'est d'ailleurs destiné qu'à donner effet à l'article 95 du Traité de Sévres, qui n'a pas été ratifié.

Par suite, le Gouvernement français est d'avis de proposer au prochain conseil de décider d'ajourner cette désignation; toutefois, il pense qu'il y aurait intérêt, le moment venu, à ce que les deux Gouvernements de Paris et de Londres s'entendissent au préalable sur les noms des candidats à présenter au conseil.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisi, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,*

*le 9 mai 1922.*

[E 4854/78/65]

No. 205.

*Consul London to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 10.)*

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Geneva, May 10, 1922.*

FOLLOWING for Secretary to the Cabinet from Mr. Tufton:—

"Palestine mandate.

"Lord Balfour is prepared to take up mandate question with council, even though formal assent of the United States Government to communication of notes exchanged has not been received yet.

"Matter will therefore probably come before council early next week.

"Please ask Colonial Office to send out expert as arranged; he should arrive Monday, if possible."

[E 4860/78/65]

No. 206.

*Mr. Harvey to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 11.)*

(No. 218.)

My Lord,

*United States Embassy,*

*London, May 10, 1922.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's note of the 29th April last in regard to the mandate for Palestine, I have the honour to convey to your Lordship my Government's appreciation of the cordial spirit with which the suggestions regarding this mandate have been received by His Majesty's Government. The Government of the United States is gratified to note that its views, as set forth in my memorandum of the 5th April, 1922, with respect to the various subjects which have been under discussion, have been accepted by His Majesty's Government, which states its readiness to enter without delay into negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty on the lines proposed.

With reference to the safeguarding of the capitulatory rights of the United States in Palestine, my Government is pleased to note that His Majesty's Government is willing to provide in the proposed treaty that the United States does not accept the definite abrogation of its capitulatory rights, but consents to their suspension during the continuance of the mandate. In the light of the understanding as to the appropriate preservation of the capitulatory rights of the United States, my Government would prefer that the mandate itself should not undertake to provide for the abrogation of capitulatory rights and accordingly desires that the provisions of article 8 of the draft mandate should be altered so as to read:—

"The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but shall be revived immediately and completely upon the termination of the mandate régime."

It is understood, of course, that the assurances given in paragraph 5 (a) of your note of the 29th December, 1921, will be suitably embodied in the Constitution of Palestine; that is to say, that the assurances regarding the establishment of adequate courts and the insertion of a provision by virtue of which nationals of the United States shall have the right to be tried by a court with a majority of British judges, except in trivial cases where this provision would lead to administrative inconvenience when United States nationals will have the special right to appeal to a court composed of a majority of British judges, which my Government considers satisfactory in view of Anglo-Saxon traditions of law.



The Government of the United States will raise no objection to the suggested amendment in article 28 of the draft mandate, as set forth in paragraph 4 of your note, with the understanding, of course, that any arrangements made by the League of Nations relating to the interests of foreigners in judicial matters would not impair any of the rights and interests of the United States and would be ineffective without the consent of the United States. It would seem, however, that, if article 8 is amended as proposed, there would be no necessity for the suggested amendment to article 28.

The Government of the United States appreciates the desire of His Majesty's Government to lay the terms of the draft mandate before the Council of the League of Nations at its forthcoming meeting, and has no objection to the procedure suggested in paragraph 5 of your Lordship's note: provided that it is understood that the approval of the mandate given by the Council of the League shall not be deemed to be binding upon the United States, but shall be subject to the assent of the United States upon the terms and conditions which have been set forth in our correspondence upon this subject. With regard to the suggestion that the correspondence between your Lordship and myself on the subject of the Palestine mandate should be laid before the Council of the League of Nations, my Government would like to accede to the wishes of His Majesty's Government, but does not desire that the correspondence be made public until, in the due course of the negotiation of the proposed treaty, it can be made public in the United States. My Government puts forward its preference upon this point upon the assumption that His Majesty's Government will be able in a convenient manner to inform the Council of the points which have been discussed and upon which the two Governments are in preliminary agreement.

It is my pleasure to convey again the assurance that the Government of the United States is prepared to facilitate in every way the negotiation of an appropriate treaty in accordance with the views that have been expressed.

I have, &c.  
(For the Ambassador),  
POST WHEELER,  
Counsellor of Embassy.

[E 4861/78/65]

No. 207.

*Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 11.)*

(No. 183.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Rome, May 10, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 136 of 4th May: Palestine mandate.  
Secretary-General informs me that Marquis Imperiali is being instructed in the sense desired.

[E 4893/78/65]

No. 208.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva).*

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 11, 1922.

FOLLOWING for Tufton from Acting Secretary, Cabinet:—

"Your telegram of 10th May: Palestine mandate.

"American note received to-day.

"They prefer that correspondence should not be made public, so it cannot be laid before council, but they are publishing communiqué to-day which will serve same purpose. This communiqué can be used by us in council if and when necessary. Formal reservation is made that American concurrence is on understanding that League's approval of draft mandate shall not bind United States, but shall be subject to assent of United States upon terms and conditions set forth in correspondence. They have also pressed for alteration to article 8 instead of article 28 of mandate. Details follow by hand of Colonial Office representative with fresh draft memorandum for presentation to council and a copy of American communiqué. Representative will leave for Geneva Saturday or Sunday. Colonial Office suggest no action be taken either upon mandate or Holy Places Commission until he arrives except to place the mandate on the agenda."

[E 4887/78/65]

No. 209.

*Sir M. Cheetham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 12.)*

(No. 1148.)

My Lord.

Paris, May 11, 1922.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 160 of the 4th instant concerning the Palestine mandate, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a note dated the 10th instant which I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Your Lordship will observe that M. Poincaré is not in favour of the proposal to invite the Council of the League of Nations definitely to approve the terms of the Palestine mandate at their next meeting on the 11th May.

I have, &amp;c.

MILNE CHEETHAM.

Enclosure in No. 209.

*M. Poincaré to Lord Hardinge.*

Ministère des Affaires étrangères,

Paris, le 10 mai 1922.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

PAR une lettre en date du 5 de ce mois, vous avez bien voulu me faire part du désir du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de faire approuver d'urgence les termes du mandat pour la Palestine par le Conseil de la Société des Nations au cours de la session qui va s'ouvrir le 11 de ce mois.

Je désirerais, en premier lieu, demander au Gouvernement britannique de considérer si, au moment où des négociations sont engagées pour arriver à la conclusion d'un traité de paix définitif en Orient, il est opportun de faire sanctionner, par le Conseil de la Société, les termes d'un mandat sur une partie de l'ancien Empire ottoman, dont la situation ne pourra être, en droit, fixée qu'après la mise en vigueur du traité avec la Turquie.

Le Gouvernement de la République, tout aussi désireux que le Gouvernement britannique d'obtenir, sans retard, l'approbation définitive des termes du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban, est obligé de reconnaître que les délais, dus à l'opposition des États-Unis, ont permis que de profondes modifications survinssent à la situation en Orient.

En décembre 1920, quand les projets de mandats ont été déposés à la Société des Nations, l'on pouvait encore escompter une prochaine ratification du Traité de Sèvres, et, en tous cas, les Alliés n'avaient devant eux que le Gouvernement de Constantinople: aucun contact n'avait été pris avec les chefs nationalistes d'Ankara.

Aujourd'hui, et surtout depuis les communications adressées au Gouvernement nationaliste turc par les Ministres des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne, de France et d'Italie, il n'en va plus de même, et il est à présumer que trop de hâte à faire approuver les mandats irait à l'encontre des desseins de pacification générale, que les trois Puissances alliées doivent poursuivre en commun.

Je serai obligé à votre Excellence de soumettre ces observations au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique. Il vaudrait mieux, à mon avis, réserver cette question pour une prochaine session du Conseil de la Société; cette réunion aura, d'ailleurs, forcément lieu, une fois la Conférence de Gênes terminée, puisque le Conseil aura à s'occuper des tâches qui incomberont à la Société pour donner suite à certaines résolutions des Commissions économique et financière et des communications de la Conférence de Gênes.

Cette procédure aura, en outre, l'avantage de ne pas bouleverser l'ordre du jour du Conseil et de ne pas lui proposer soudainement des questions sur lesquelles ses membres n'ont même pas le temps de se documenter auprès de leur Gouvernement.

Les présentes observations ne portent que sur une question d'opportunité et n'affectent aucunement l'entente entre nos Gouvernements telle qu'elle résulte de l'échange des lettres en date des 29 décembre 1921, 9 janvier et 13 janvier 1922.

Veuillez agréer, &amp;c.

R. POINCARÉ.

[8975]

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[E 4900/78/65]

No. 210.

*Consul London to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 12.)*

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Geneva, May 11, 1922.

FOLLOWING from Lord Balfour for Secretary of Cabinet:—

"As soon as Council of League of Nations met to-day I proposed that question of Palestine mandate should be added to orders of the day during present meeting. Italians objected on the ground that they have never been consulted on terms of the mandate and are not prepared to agree to them as they stand. French also asked for time to consider proposal, as M. Bourgeois wishes to consult his Government. I had no alternative but to adjourn discussion till Saturday.

"Italy is probably main difficulty. Apparently she has not been squared about a mandate and resents her exclusion from negotiations. Do you think matter might be referred to Prime Minister and Schanzer at Genoa?

"This would be the quickest method of settling differences, and the only one which holds out the least hope of dealing with the subject during this meeting of council."

(Sent to Genoa.)

[E 4926/78/65]

No. 211.

*Mr. Gregory to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 12.)*

(No. 181.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Genoa, May 12, 1922.

FOLLOWING addressed to Geneva, No. 1:—

"Following from Secretary of Cabinet for Lord Balfour:—

"Your telegram No. 8 of 11th May.

"Marquis Imperiali spoke to Prime Minister a few days ago in presence of Signor Schanzer on the subject of Palestine mandate. Prime Minister refused to discuss question in detail as he is not well up in latest developments. He asked Marquis Imperiali to discuss matter personally with you at Geneva, and, if you were unable to reach agreement, to telegraph points at issue to Genoa, where Prime Minister and Signor Schanzer can take them up."

[E 4900/78/65]

No. 212.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Consul London (Geneva).*

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 12, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 8 of 11th May: Palestine mandate.

Italian Secretary-General informed Sir R. Graham, 10th May, that Imperiali was being instructed to support his British colleague and give such assistance as he can to procure early and satisfactory decision regarding Palestine mandate.

[E 4582/248/91]

No. 213.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 12, 1922.

PLEASE repeat your telegram No. 29 of 29th ultimo to Bagdad regarding King Hussein's attitude towards Nejd pilgrims to Mecca.

(R.) Ibn Saud requests that King Hussein be informed of his inability to prevent Nejd's performing pilgrimage this year, but he guarantees that there shall be no aggression on their part if they are unmolested.

You should inform King Hussein accordingly, warning him that pilgrims will probably travel overland. (End of R.)

[E 4940/78/65]

No. 214.

*Memorandum communicated by United States Embassy.—(Received May 13.)*

THE American Embassy is instructed to advise the Foreign Office informally that the Department of State desires to make the attached announcement on the 11th May, when it is presumed similar statement will be made by the British Government to the Council of the League of Nations, as showing points upon which agreement has been reached between the United States and Great Britain.

*United States Embassy, London, May 10, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 214.

*Proposed Announcement.*

AS a result of correspondence between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain on the subject of the draft mandate for Palestine, agreement has been reached upon the following points:—

1. A treaty will be negotiated between the United States and Great Britain embodying the assent, upon appropriate conditions, of the United States to the terms of the draft mandate, such treaty to recite the mandate in full and to contain appropriate undertakings on the part of the British Government for the suitable protection of the rights and interests of the United States. The treaty will contain a general provision that the United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy the benefit of all the engagements of His Britannic Majesty defined in the mandate, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.

2. Assurances regarding the establishment of adequate courts will be suitably embodied in the constitution of Palestine, which will contain a provision by virtue of which nationals of the United States shall have the right to be tried by a court with a majority of British judges, except in trivial cases when this provision would lead to administrative inconvenience, when United States nationals will have the special right to appeal to a court composed of a majority of British judges.

3. In the event of the termination of the mandate régime the capitulatory rights of the United States in Palestine will be revived immediately and completely, and any arrangement that may then be made relating to the interest of foreigners in judicial matters shall not impair the rights and interests of the United States and shall be ineffective without the consent of the United States.

4. The proposed treaty will contain an undertaking with regard to the equal treatment of the United States, its nationals and companies, guaranteeing to the United States and its nationals the same freedom from discrimination that the mandate gives to the States members of the League of Nations and their nationals.

5. The British Government will give adequate assurances with respect to equality of commercial opportunity. Furthermore, the existing legal rights of American citizens or companies in Palestine are to be fully respected and safeguarded, and the treaty will contain a suitable provision to this effect.

6. The mandatory shall be responsible for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine; for maintaining freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals; for the protection of religious and eleemosynary bodies of all faith; and for securing existing rights and free access to the holy places. The British Government will guarantee to United States missionaries the right to acquire and possess property; to erect buildings for religious purposes; and to open schools, providing that these conform to the local law.

7. The consent of the United States shall be obtained before any alteration is made in the text of the mandate.

8. The British Government will furnish to the Government of the United States a duplicate of its annual report which is to be submitted to the League of Nations on the administration of the mandate territory.

9. All the provisions of the treaty safeguarding the rights and interests of the United States will apply to the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined.

*United States Embassy, London, May 10, 1922.*

[8975]



[E 4945/4453/91]

No. 215.

*Mr. Churchill to Political Resident, Aden.—(Received in Foreign Office May 13.)*(Telegraphic.) P.  
SLAVE trade.

Can you ascertain nationality of dhows carrying on the traffic? (See my confidential despatch of 4th May.)

Colonial Office, May 11, 1922.

[E 4957/78/65]

No. 216.

*Consul London to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 13.)*

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Geneva, May 13, 1922.

MY telegram No. 8 of 11th May: Palestine mandate.

Following from Lord Balfour for Secretary of Cabinet:—

"M. Bourgeois came to see me privately yesterday afternoon, and said he had received definite instructions from Paris which would preclude his agreeing to approval of terms of mandates at present session of council.

"His argument was, firstly, legal difficulty that all 'A' mandates derived their origin from the Treaty of Sèvres, which had not been ratified, but was actually in process of transformation. Ministers for Foreign Affairs recently in Paris had, indeed, made such radical amendments that it was impossible to regard the treaty as ever having been signed. How was it possible, therefore, to put into force one part of that treaty? Secondly, even if League of Nations thought it in the interests of peace and prosperity to ignore strictly legal difficulty, there were in existence three draft 'A' mandates—two English and one French—and there was no reason why the League should treat the two nations otherwise than on a footing of complete equality. Indeed, to give one Government authority over one particular region while refusing that authority to the other in a neighbouring region would merely weaken the position of the latter and lead to every kind of conflict.

"Adjourning examination of these mandates to an early meeting of council would give time (1) to the Allies to agree on alterations to the Treaty of Sèvres and (2) to France and Great Britain to terminate their negotiations with United States about 'A' mandates.

"Bourgeois also showed me a copy of note which M. Poincaré had addressed recently to Lord Hardinge, using, so far as I can recollect, the same line of argument as above. I am rather surprised that I have received no hint from Foreign Office that such a note had been sent.

"It is clear, however, that both from what Bourgeois and Imperiali tell me, that little or nothing has been done to square their Governments. This makes position of all three of us one of extreme difficulty.

"There is evidence of Vatican intrigue behind all this, and influence has undoubtedly been brought to bear from Rome on Spanish, Brazilian and Belgian members of the council, as well as on French and Italians.

"In these circumstances I see little hope of being able to do more than get the two questions of mandates and Holy Places Commission put on agenda of next meeting of council, but even that will not be sufficient unless the matter is taken up actively in the meantime with the various Governments concerned.

"Further discussion has been postponed until next week, and I am awaiting the arrival of Colonial Office expert before putting in memorandum about Holy Places Commission."

(Sent to Genoa.)

[E 4926/78/65]

No. 217.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir R. Graham (Rome).*

(No. 144.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1922.

ITALIAN support for Palestine mandate.

Lord Balfour telegraphed on 11th May that when he raised question of Palestine mandate, Italians objected on ground that they had not been consulted regarding its terms.

Please ascertain whether Marquis Imperiali has been in fact instructed in sense reported in your telegram No. 183 of 10th May.

[E 4978/78/65]

No. 218.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Gregory (Genoa).*

(No. 110.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1922.

FOLLOWING for Sir Maurice Hankey from Mr. Churchill:—

"Your telegram No. 1 to Geneva.

"Most important that terms of Palestine mandate be approved at present session of Council of League. Without such approval Palestine can raise no loan, and without loan industrial development gravely hampered. Understand Italian Government have now instructed Imperiali to support Balfour, but personal representation to Schanzer might go far to secure that this support is maintained. Please put to Prime Minister."

(Repeated to Lord Balfour, Geneva, No. 16.)

[E 4954/78/65]

No. 219.

*Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 14.)*

(No. 184.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Rome, May 14, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 144 of 13th May.

Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs telegraphed to me from Genoa in Italian on 9th May:—

"I will see to it that reply which you desire is given. Marquis Imperiali will come here to-morrow to arrange [*sic*] instructions."

I naturally assumed that Imperiali was being instructed in the sense desired by you. I am enquiring at once what instructions were given him, and whether telegram of 9th May did not correctly represent facts.

[E 5031/78/65]

No. 220.

*Mr. Gregory to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 15.)*

(No. 192.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Genoa, May 15, 1922.

FOLLOWING for Secretary of State for Colonies from Sir M. Hankey:—

"Your telegram No. 110 of 13th May.

"Principal difficulty now is with French (see Lord Balfour's telegram No. 10 of 13th May). In president of the council's absence we can do nothing here with French Government on Palestine mandate. Prime Minister has already spoken to Schanzer on the subject, and will do so again if Lord Balfour notifies him of points at issue."



[E 4887/78/65]

No. 221.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 1472.)

My Lord.

*Foreign Office, May 16, 1922.*

WITH reference to Sir Milne Cheetham's despatch No. 1148 of the 11th instant, transmitting a copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the Palestine mandate, I shall be glad if you will inform the French Government that, an understanding having now been reached with the Government of the United States on the subject of the Palestine mandate, His Majesty's Government are extremely anxious to obtain the approval of the League of Nations to the terms of the Palestine mandate at the present session.

2. His Majesty's Government do not share the apprehension of the French Government that the raising of this question would affect the negotiations with Turkey, and they assume that the French Government are not contemplating the possibility of making concessions to Turkey which could in any way affect the position of Palestine.

3. His Majesty's Government fully recognise that the definite and formal entry into operation of the mandate depends technically on the cession of the territory by Turkey in the Treaty of Peace. But they are unable to see that the formal approval by the Council of the terms of the mandate must necessarily be postponed until the technical cession of the territory has taken place. They would point out that the French Government themselves, in February 1921, in advising His Majesty's Government that the Council of the League of Nations might be prepared to approve the terms of the "A" mandates in advance of the ratification of the Turkish Treaty if concerted action to that end were taken by the French and British representatives, urged that such action should be taken at the then forthcoming session of the Council. His Majesty's Government, though they found themselves at the time reluctantly compelled to postpone the consideration of the mandates for Iraq and Palestine, gave the assurance that their representative on the Council would certainly raise no objection to the consideration of the Syrian mandate.

4. His Majesty's Government trust that the French Government will appreciate the fact that, owing to the great haste with which it has been found necessary to conduct the negotiations with the Government of the United States regarding the Palestine mandate, in order to reach an agreement in sufficient time to admit of submitting that mandate to the Council of the League of Nations at its present session, it has not been possible to keep the French Government *au courant* of the most recent developments in these negotiations.

5. The United States Government have expressed the wish that the correspondence which has passed should not be made public at present, but they have issued a communiqué which the French Government have doubtless seen. You should explain to the French Government that the only modification in the terms of the mandate which is being proposed to the Council of the League of Nations is in the case of article 8. The text of this article as now proposed reads: "The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but shall be revived immediately and completely upon the termination of the mandate régime, unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such rights should agree, or have agreed, by treaty to their suspension or modification." The French Government will recollect that, in the note addressed to you on the 9th January, they expressed their readiness to agree to the introduction into the terms of the mandate of a stipulation to this effect, and His Majesty's Government accordingly assume that they will see no objection to this emendation.

6. I feel confident that, in the light of the considerations set forth above, the French Government will see their way to instruct the French representative on the Council to support his British colleagues in endeavouring to regularise the position of His Majesty's Government as mandatory for Palestine pending the final settlement of peace with Turkey, as, for practical reasons of administration, this is of great importance to His Majesty's Government.

I am, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 4860/78/65]

No. 222.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Mr. Harvey.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, May 16, 1922.*

WITH reference to your note of the 10th instant regarding the Palestine mandate, I have the honour to convey to your Excellency the appreciation felt by His Majesty's Government of the friendly manner in which the Government of the United States has collaborated with them in their efforts to secure an early settlement of this question.

2. In view of the desire expressed by the Government of the United States, His Majesty's Government agree that article 8 of the draft mandate should be modified, and they agree that any amendment of article 28 is consequently unnecessary.

3. In view, however, of the intimation contained in the note which you addressed to me on the 5th April that the modification or suspension of American capitulatory rights in Palestine could, if circumstances then justified it, readily be made the subject of a suitable agreement, I suggest that it would be convenient to add to the text of article 8, as now proposed by the Government of the United States, the words "unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such rights should agree, or have agreed, by treaty to their suspension or modification." This wording has been communicated to the British representative on the Council of the League, and it is hoped that the Council will be prepared to accept it.

4. His Majesty's Government have taken note of the desire of the Department of State that the correspondence which has passed on this subject should not be made public, and have instructed their representative on the Council accordingly.

5. I shall not fail to address a communication to you regarding the negotiation of the treaty as soon as the Council of the League of Nations shall have approved the terms of the mandate.

I have, &amp;c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 4940/78/65]

No. 223.

*Memorandum communicated to United States Embassy.*

WITH reference to the memorandum of the 10th instant from the United States Embassy, and the subsequent oral enquiry by Mr. Post Wheeler on the subject of the Palestine mandate, His Majesty's Government had not intended themselves to issue any statement regarding the agreement which had been reached between the United States and Great Britain in the matter.

2. His Majesty's Government see, however, no objection to the publication by the Department of State of the announcement on this subject, the text of which the United States Embassy was good enough to communicate informally to the Foreign Office.

3. It is understood, of course, that the terms of this announcement refer to the Palestine mandate only.

*Foreign Office, May 16, 1922.*

[E 5090/78/65]

No. 224.

*Sir R. Graham to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 17.)*

(Unnumbered.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Rome, May 16, 1922.*

MY telegram No 184 of 14th May: Palestine mandate.

Secretary-General, in reply to telegram which I had sent to him, writes from Genoa to confirm that he has done all he can to have question settled in the sense I desired. He adds that he is continuing his action, but that circumstances have supervened which make him consider that it might perhaps be advisable to adjourn question. This looks as if objection came from Minister for Foreign Affairs. Possibly some pressure could be brought to bear on him at Genoa.

(Repeated to Genoa.)



[E 5260/248/91]

No. 225.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 22.)*

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, May 22, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 18 of 12th May.

Hussein absolutely refuses to accept Nejd pilgrims by land. He says if even a small number come he will at once leave Mecca for Jeddah. He states that owing to spread of Mudayyanism there will be great danger of local riots being stirred up by his enemies. Zeid and Fuad confirm this.

I suggested that Zeid and I should meet pilgrims near Taif, and they should be asked to hand over arms to me there, but the King did not accept, in view of possible danger to our pilgrims. I advise that, if possible, Nejd land pilgrimage be stopped this year. Question can be reopened after pilgrimage, and fresh attempts made to settle dispute between Hussein and Ibn Saud.

Despatch follows.

(Copy to Bagdad.)

[E 5412/248/91]

No. 226.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.—(Communicated by Colonial Office, May 25.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, May 23, 1922.

HEDJAZ situation appears somewhat disquieting. On receipt of your telegram of the 10th May I informed Ibn Saud's agent, then at Mohammerah, that, in view of the Sultan's guarantees, Hussein had been notified that subjects of Nejd would not be debarred this year from the pilgrimage and that we had demanded reciprocal guarantees from Hussein.

Reports since received from Ibn Thanayan and from Koweit indicate that large contingents of Akhwan pilgrims are waiting to proceed to the Hedjaz.

Now see Jeddah telegram of the 18th May to the Foreign Office reporting the spread of Akhwan tenets in the Hedjaz. I received yesterday from Feisal copy of telegram from his brother Zaid urging him to remove his family, as the Hedjaz was in great danger. Feisal followed up the letter by visit to-day. He is clearly much disturbed and points [on] out that he cannot bring away his wife and child without removing other ladies, such as his sister, and worst possible impression would be created if he removed them all.

Feisal admits that present dangerous situation is entirely the result of the mad obstinacy of his father, which has alienated his subjects as well as hostilised his neighbours; and he urges that influx of large numbers of Akhwan into the Hedjaz at present juncture will, in spite of any assurances given, almost inevitably result in a conflagration which will extend to the Holy Places themselves, at a time when they are full of Mussulmans of all nationalities, whose lives would be in jeopardy. Consequence will be great consternation throughout Islam, and though His Majesty's Government would not in any way be responsible, it would react injuriously on their prestige and interest.

Asked if he did not think it would perhaps ease the position if his brothers were to depose his father and make an announcement accordingly, he replied that in principle that would be a salutary measure which he would welcome at heart, but it would be impossible to bring it off just at the time of pilgrimage. I then asked him what he thought could be done, and he replied that in his belief the only remedy was for us to appeal to Ibn Saud to stop his people going on the pilgrimage in the interests of Islam as a whole, and that official assurances should be given to him at the same time to the effect that His Majesty's Government in no sense supported the Shereef, and that latter would be given a period of three or four months to make terms with Ibn Saud, and be informed that His Majesty's Government would accept no responsibility for the consequence if he did not do so.

I replied that I would communicate his observations to you and ask instructions, though I feared it was too late for such action to be taken with effect.

It is obviously very difficult for us to make an appeal to Ibn Saud at this late hour; and even supposing he wishes to stop the tide, I doubt if it is physically possible

for him to do so at this juncture. There is, however, probably just time for an appeal to reach him if His Majesty's Government decide to make it.

I suggest that appeal, if made, should be made in the interests of Islam as a whole and the message should be in a form which we can publish if necessary. If it proves too late, we shall, at all events, have done our best to avert the danger, but we have no time to lose.

We could not well hold Bin Saud responsible if the Hedjaz voluntarily embraced Wahabi faith in order to escape Hussein's intolerable misrule, but it is difficult to foresee what would be the effect on Islam and how far Great Britain would be taxed with responsibility for the resulting chaos.

[E 5426/656/91]

No. 227.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 26.)*

(No. 33 Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, May 10, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 21st April to the 10th May, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden, Simla, Transjordan and Damascus.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. MARSHALL.

Enclosure in No. 227.

*Jeddah Report April 21 to May 10, 1922.**Pilgrimage.*

THE total number of pilgrims now in the Hedjaz is approximately 27,500. The three caravans which went to Medina have returned safely to Mecca. Except for the usual taxes paid to the Bedouin for safe transit, they do not seem to have been interfered with. Other pilgrims who have also been to Medina via Yenbo confirm this, but complain of the long time spent on the journey: some have taken ten days on the single journey from Yenbo to Medina.

We made representations to the Hashimite Government that customs dues on pilgrims' personal effects should be waived or moderated. In their reply the Hashimite Government notified us that the following articles brought by pilgrims would be exempt from customs dues:—

1. Rice, if not a full sack.
2. Oil, petroleum and sugar, if not a full tin.
3. Bread called "Kejib," syrups and cocoanuts, in any quantity.
4. "Ibram," clothes, all used towels and five new ones, for each person.
5. All perfumes for private use.
6. Flour, lentils and wheat, not more than one-sack per person.
7. All ladies' ornaments, silk, &c.

With the possible exception of the cereals, I think the Hashimite Government will carry out these regulations.

The pilgrims from the steamship "Jeddah" (Bombay and Karachi) disembarked yesterday, and all full sacks of cereals were set aside and kept in the customs. These will be claimed by the pilgrims to-day, and it remains to be seen what tax will be paid.

In any case considerable concessions have been made. The Dutch consul informed me that, before these regulations were announced, one Javanese pilgrim paid 29l. customs duties on his personal belongings.

The quarantine arrangements remain entirely unsatisfactory. A new line of pilgrim steamers belonging to Hemazes of Hong Kong, with Haji Zeimal Aly Reza, the kaimakam's firm, as local agents, are being treated much more leniently than the Dutch and Blue Funnel boats. The ship's officers are allowed to disembark without disinfection and the ship allowed *libre pratique*, after the pilgrims have disembarked and left for the quarantine islands. On the arrival of the steamship "Jeddah" the ship was put in quarantine for twenty-four hours and the captain was forbidden to come

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ashore. Nevertheless, one first class pilgrim, Dr. Mohammed Hussein, at one time Italian vice-consul at Jeddah, was allowed, with his family, to disembark direct to the town. On the same day, the Italian consul, Dr. Torre, who is also a medical man, went on board an Italian boat which was in quarantine. The following morning, the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Mecca sent a telegram to all the foreign representatives stating that the Government intended to take action in the matter, and that they would not recognise the qualifications of any representative of any Government who interfered in such important questions.

This year Indian pilgrims are being registered at the agency. Passports are checked, numbered and returned to the holder; counterfoils are deposited here. Pilgrims deposit their return tickets and are given a receipt for the same on their passports. If they wish to do so they can deposit money against a separate receipt.

#### *Hedjaz Shipping.*

The new Hashimite steamers, the "Paolo" and the "Mascotte," were expected to arrive from Massawa on the 27th April. King Hussein arrived from Mecca on that day and many flags were flown in honour of the event. The steamers did not arrive. The King left again for Mecca at 5 P.M., as the fast of Ramadan commenced the same evening.

The "Paolo," which is a boat of 120 tons, arrived on the evening of the 29th. The arrival was heralded by a salute of ten guns. The "Mascotte," a boat of 50 tons, arrived on the evening of the 1st May and received a similar salute. The purchase of the boats, 6,000l. for the two, is not yet complete, and the boats are still flying the Italian flag. It is said that the Hashimite Government wish to pay in instalments. They are to be named the "Yawil" and the "Rushdi" after the two Hedjaz officials who went to Massawa to arrange the purchase.

Both boats, which carried a full cargo from Massawa, called at Kufuda and Lith. At present the masters and chief engineers are Italians, and the crews are Italian native subjects from Massawa. It is not yet known whether the Hashimite Government will retain the services of these people or man the ships with fresh crews. If they choose the latter alternative, the results are sure to be disastrous. They have already approached two Indian engineers to replace the Italians, but they have both refused.

These ships are to be used for coastal traffic—pilgrims and cargo—as patrol boats and as transports.

Three native chaffeurs, two Moslem and one Christian, arrived on the "Paolo" for service with the Hashimite Government.

It is said that the Hashimite Government propose to purchase a large motor launch from Massawa.

#### *Demonstrations in Mecca and Jeddah.*

On account of recent disturbances in Syria, King Hussein organised demonstrations in Mecca and in Jeddah. The former took place on the 25th April and the latter on the 26th April.

On the morning of the 26th all shops in Jeddah were shut by order of the King. The majority of the people did not understand the reason and asked one another why the shops were closed. The procession assembled at the Government buildings, and visited, in turn, each of the foreign consulates. I invited the leaders to come to see me, and about twenty people came into the office. The chief spokesmen were: Suleiman Gabel, Reis of the Halediyeh; Said Taha, head of the Finance; and Abdur Rahman Suleiman, cadi of Jeddah. The latter was the only one who showed any enthusiasm. The procession was orderly and in good humour.

The King sent a telegram to urge the demonstrators to return to their work, as he would take up the matter politically. He sent telegrams to His Majesty King George, to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, to the President of the French Republic (two), and to the president of the Genoa Conference. The unfortunate and unwilling demonstrators are now being ordered to pay for these telegrams.

#### *General.*

1. H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 27th April and left on the 1st May.
2. In a private letter the Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that they have identified three persons who fired on H.M.S. "Cornflower" in January last. One was killed, and the two others are in prison at Lith.
3. The French agent at Jeddah has been notified officially by the Hashimite

Government that Senegalese should not come on the pilgrimage. The reason given is the anger of the people of the Hedjaz against the Senegalese for their share in the fighting in Syria.

4. Further evidence has been received to-day to confirm the report of the massacre in the mosque at Tarabah, and it is said that King Hussein has conferred a decoration upon the responsible sheikh. Retaliation is expected from the Mudayan of Khurma and Tarabah. There are said to be no soldiers of Ibn Saud's army among these Mudayans, who are all local people, plus some deserters from the Arab irregular army. It is said that Khalid has strict orders from Ibn Saud not to enter any towns of the Hedjaz, and to plunder only Shereefian subjects not resident in the towns.

5. Ahmed Ramadan, an Egyptian, who has been town engineer at Medina for some years, has resigned his post and has arrived in Jeddah. He says that there is a strong pro-Turkish party in Medina, and that he was asked by this party to swear an oath of fidelity to the Sultan of Turkey. He refused. He says that the propagandists say that Mustapha Kemal is the hero of Islam, and that all the Turkish employees in the Hedjaz are patiently awaiting the return of the Turks.

#### *Press ("Al Qibla").*

No. 578. Leading article reviewing the state of affairs in the Jeziret-al-Arab, with particular reference to the reports of aggression by Ibn Saud upon Iraq tribes.

Great Britain's attitude is incomprehensible. The conflict between former assurances and present developments foreshadows conflict between Great Britain and the Arabs. Everyone knows the source of Ibn Saud's strength. Left to himself he cannot possibly attack Iraq. He is not even strong enough to avenge his brother Saad's death at the hands of the Ajmanis, to kill one of their sheep or one of their camels. Who gives him the funds for his enterprises? Can one be to the Arabs at one time both enemy and friend? The Arabs want nothing but perpetual friendship with those who are their allies, but they must know what British plans for the Arabs are. The Arabs only claim what other nations of less distinguished tradition have already attained. They appear to have advanced not one step since first formulating their claim. If Great Britain wishes to make Ibn Saud Emperor of the peninsula, let her carry on by all means, but without bloodshed. None can disapprove the Mesopotamians if they fight Ibn Saud when driven thereto by political circumstance. Their forbears have set them a gallant example. We await with anxiety the fabulous and amazing commentaries which will doubtless be made by the Tehran, Hamadan, Laurencian or Philbian correspondents of the "Times."

The arrest of the ringleaders of a demonstration in Damascus during the visit of the American, Mr. Crane, is noted, and the special attention of the United States Government called to the matter.

No. 579. Leading article deploring the trend of modern Western civilisation as typified in the French, who have imprisoned Moslem women in Damascus. How can a nation with the honourable past of France submit to General Gouraud's deception? He declares that all in Syria are happy under French Government at a moment when patriotic manifestations and military reprisals are the order of the day in Damascus. The article ends, after an atrocious pun on the name of Gouraud, with an appeal to the liberal elements in French public life.

The Hazirieh aqueduct has been repaired after the ravages of November rains, and water now flows in abundance into Jeddah, "right into the reservoirs." Popular enthusiasm for King Hussein evoked by this event.

Reference to the King's *démenti*, circulated by Reuters, of the rumour crediting him with the intention of selling part of the Hedjaz railway.

A newspaper in "one of the colonies inhabited by Moslems" having remarked that many of the young men proceeding to the Hedjaz for purposes of study, return disease-stricken to their homes, and having urged the authorities of the "colony" to establish local institutions for study to obviate this risk to the student's health. "Al Qibla" challenges the paper to produce any institutions comparable with those of the Holy Places, and adds that all disease in the Hedjaz is brought from outside. None can deny this but those who "seek to extinguish the Light of God, but He wills that His Light should continue."

Commenting upon the attempted assassination of the editor of "Al Maqiqa" of Beyrout, "Al Qibla" admonishes the Beyrout agency of Havas to meditate on conditions of public security in Beyrout before criticizing conditions in the Hedjaz.

Reference is made to the murder of Astad Bey, Minister of the Interior in the Government of Grand Lebanon, in Beyrout; to the agitation of the "Democratic



Assembly" in Beyrout against the Mandatory Powers, and to their confabulations and those of Mr. Crane with the Maronite Patriarch.

An account of Lord Milner's visit to Transjordan and of his replies to an Arab deputation from Es Salt is reproduced from "Al Subah."

Much space is given to an account, supplemented by extracts from Egyptian newspapers, of the demonstrations in Damascus during and after the visit of Mr. Crane, the American president of the former commission of enquiry. The spokesman of a gathering of 300 or 400 patriots is reported to have expressed to Mr. Crane the universal dissatisfaction of Syrians with the French régime, for numerous reasons specified, and their aspirations towards complete independence. Mr. Crane replied, exhorting them to prosecute their claims by lawful means in unity and concord, then they would attain their aim if God so willed.

Three Syrian ladies rode on one step of Mr. Crane's car to the station, Dr. Shahbandar and an unspecified number of notables on the other, through streets crowded with demonstrators. As a result Dr. Shahbandar and four others were imprisoned by the French authorities. Their fellows closed the shops in protest, named a delegation to represent their case to Europe, and offered themselves for imprisonment with their leaders.

No. 530. Leading article on the Damascus incidents.

The excitement of the multitude waiting for news outside the office of "Al Qibla" is pictured as yielding in intensity only to the emotions provoked by "Al Qibla's" account of French tyranny against "our Syrian people." "If this is French honour and French protection," how long? Arabia, Syria, and Iraq are essentially one. "All suffer in Syria's pain." By way of consolation readers are reminded that all these calamities were foreseen, and the Allies warned against inevitable disaster by King Hussein in his letter of 21st Zil Qa'da 1336, long extracts from which again appear. The "experts" and "specialists," thanks to whose advice these warnings were disregarded, are reproached with their failure. Circumstances have compelled His Majesty's Government, who were never going to shake the blood-stained hand of Russia, to modify that attitude. Perhaps circumstances will induce His Majesty's Government to be guided by Arab advice. It is good, for "you will find in the river things you won't find in the sea." Let developments in Syria be a warning.

Where are our friends of Reuter and Havas, that they make no comment on what is happening in Damascus? Where is America, guarantor of the world's peace? Why has a German-Russian treaty been signed?

Description of a ceremony in Mecca, at which patriotic speeches of sympathy with Syria were made by schoolboys. King Hussein attended and listened with evident pleasure to the oration of the evening, which appears to have been a re-hash of recent "Qibla" articles from the Royal pen: "We have come to the end of our patience. The Arab revolt is not yet over. Arab blood flowing from Syria's wounds constrains us. It is our turn to strike," &c.

The arrival at Mecca of the first pilgrim caravan returning from Medina, the departure from Medina of the second caravan and the arrival at Medina of the third caravan are reported. With reference to the arrival in Mecca of a caravan of 2,200 camels from Jeddah, Reuter and Havas are twitted with their recent accounts of insecurity in the Hedjaz, and reminded that, while caravans in the Hedjaz can traverse 50 miles of desert in safety, train robberies between Paris and Italy suggest bad management in cultured Europe.

Articles are reproduced from "Al Moqattam" on the failure of Zionism and on the revolt of the East.

Mr. Ronald Storrs receives the 1st Class of the Order of Al Wahda; Sheikh Sultan ibn Adwan is awarded the 3rd Class (presumably for his exploits at Tarabah).

#### Special Supplements.

Description of the giant demonstrations of sympathy with oppressed Syria which took place in Mecca and Jeddah. King Hussein, by whose orders these were organised, ingenuously asked the leader of the Mecca manifestation what it was all about, and, on receiving a gratifying reply, made a speech ordering the people back to work.

No. 581 reproduces the speeches made during these sympathetic demonstrations. King Hussein's address ran as follows:—

"Be calm, O people, and return to your work in peace. Know that no minute passes but that it finds me striving impartially to defend the rights of our peoples the Arabs.

"You have risen to-day to prove your sentiments towards that Syria who appeals for your aid. I appreciate this keenly. It is one of the rights inherent in your national Arab sympathies, &c.

"I am one of you. I share that sentiment. But the moment has not yet come to take measures which are not peaceful, for I am of all men the most careful in shedding indiscriminately Arab blood and in protecting their property and homes. And if peaceful measures are barren of result, then you and I with you are exempt from any responsibility for whatever measures national honour may dictate. Be calm and return to your own business. I will take all possible steps to achieve your demands. Peace and God's mercy and His blessing be upon you."

No. 582. Under the heading "Good Tidings for the Arabs" is announced the arrival in Jeddah of the first steamer flying the Hashimite flag. In point of fact, the "Paolo" arrived under Italian colours, and is likely to continue to fly them until her purchase price is paid by the Hedjaz Government.

The effect of news from Damascus in Palestine and Transjordan is the subject of a long article.

Account of a memorial service for the Syrian martyrs in the mosque of the Harem.

No. 583 continues the relation of incidents in Syria and of the reactions in Palestine and Transjordan. The silence of Reuter and Havas on the subject is proof of their lying and unreliable attitude.

An Indian notable in Lucknow has telegraphed for news of the safety of the Medina road. "Al Qibla" says: "We do not consider that any answer to such a question can be expected, in view of the notoriously anti-Hedjaz sentiments of Indians and of the Indian Government. As we have often said: 'What have we to do with Indians?'"

The paper goes on to state that, as thousands of pilgrims can testify, the Medina road and all other roads are absolutely safe. "The truth is true and cannot be gainsaid."

No reference is made to the tolls levied on pilgrim caravans by Bedouis.

W. E. MARSHALL.

#### SHIPPING intelligence, April 21 to May 10, 1922.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
Jason ..	British ..	Java ..	Amsterdam	..	April 21	..	Packages.
Billiton ..	Dutch ..	Java ..	London	April 21	21	394	..
Shushtar ..	British ..	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	21	22	712	2,671
Mansourah ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	21	22	450	2,424
Telemachus ..	British ..	Singapore ..	Genoa ..	25	25	935	..
Antenor ..	Dutch ..	Java ..	London ..	25	25	396	..
Tangistan ..	British ..	Batavia ..	Port Soudan	25	26	908	..
Dakahlieh ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan	25	25	..	580
Borulos ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	29	May 1	421	3,708
Paolo ..	Italian ..	Massawa ..	..	29	..	..	?
Samarinda ..	Dutch ..	Java ..	Amsterdam	May 1	May 2	1,340	..
Dakahlieh ..	British ..	Port Soudan ..	Suez ..	1	2	205	1,546
Mascotte ..	Italian ..	Massawa ..	..	1	..	..	?
Rondo ..	Dutch ..	Java ..	Amsterdam	3	May 3	87	..
Mechaon ..	British ..	Singapore ..	London ..	5	5	553	..
Massawa ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massawa ..	7	8	..	?
Arabestan ..	British ..	Batavia ..	Bombay ..	5	9	1,014	..
Mansourah ..	British ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan	5	5	..	5,424
Jeddah ..	British ..	Bombay ..	..	7	..	1,208	19,731
Hwah Jah ..	Chinese ..	Batavia ..	..	8	..	872	..

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on April 27 and left on May 1.



[E 5405/78/65]

No. 228.

*Lord Hardinge to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received May 26.)*

(No. 1259.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note from the French Government, dated the 23rd May, 1922, respecting the Palestine mandate.

*British Embassy, Paris, May 25, 1922.*

Enclosure in No. 228.

*M. Poincaré to Sir M. Cheetham.**Paris, le 23 mai 1922.*

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

VOUS avez bien voulu, le 17 de ce mois, insister auprès de moi pour que le représentant de la République au Conseil de la Société des Nations reçoive des directions en vue de hâter l'approbation par le conseil des termes du mandat sur la Palestine.

La session du conseil a pris fin, vous le savez, le 17 de ce mois. Au cours de cette session, dans des conversations cordiales M. Léon Bourgeois et Lord Balfour ont étudié la question des mandats avec le vif désir d'éviter tout ce qui aurait pu marquer un désaccord entre la France et l'Angleterre.

Si, en effet, comme l'indiquait ma lettre du 10 de ce mois, le Gouvernement français avait demandé au Gouvernement britannique de considérer l'opportunité de faire valider le mandat palestinien pendant la session de mai du conseil, il n'avait pas l'intention de manifester une opposition contre la thèse britannique.

En examinant ensemble la question, M. Léon Bourgeois et Lord Balfour ont dû reconnaître qu'il serait difficile d'obtenir une majorité parmi les membres du conseil pour la mise en discussion du projet de mandat palestinien. Ils sont convenus de se borner à demander au conseil de remettre à une prochaine session, fixée au 15 juillet, la discussion des termes des mandats non encore validés. Ils ont estimé, en effet, que pendant le court délai qui nous sépare de cette session, il sera possible d'obtenir l'agrément du Gouvernement des États-Unis pour les mandats qui sont encore en suspens. Il sera sans doute plus facile pour l'ensemble des mandats de lever les oppositions, qui se sont manifestées à la dernière session du conseil.

Je vous remercie, d'ailleurs, des indications que contient votre lettre du 17 de ce mois sur l'état des négociations entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le Gouvernement des États-Unis. L'Ambassadeur de la République à Londres saisira très prochainement Lord Curzon de propositions touchant les mandats (A) et (B), et j'ai confiance que la bonne entente de nos deux Gouvernements permettra d'arriver à une solution satisfaisante pour le 15 juillet prochain.

Agréer, &amp;c.

POINCARE.

[E 5161/4453/91]

No. 229.

*The Earl of Balfour to Count de Saint-Aulaire.\**

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, May 27, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government have learnt that there has of recent months been a recrudescence of slave traffic in Western Arabia.

2. It appears that consignments of slaves have been reaching the Hedjaz from the emen, having been shipped into the latter country from the north-east coast of Africa.

3. His Majesty's Government have caused the strongest representations on the subject to be made to King Hussein and have, at the same time, instructed the British Resident at Aden to institute detailed enquiries in the Yemen.

4. There is, however, reason to believe that shipments of slaves have been effected

\* Also to Italian Chargé d'Affaires, *mutatis mutandis*.

from the coast of French Somaliland and His Majesty's Government fear that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to bring about the cessation of the traffic in slaves so long as such shipments can be made from that territory.

5. I am, therefore, bringing this matter to your Excellency's attention, in the hope that the French Government will assist His Majesty's Government in their endeavour to stamp out this iniquitous trade by instructing their local authorities in French Somaliland to keep the most careful watch on shipping along the coast of the territory under their control, and I need hardly add that the British authorities are exerting a strict supervision over the coasts under their influence.

6. Similar representations are being made to the Italian Government as regards reported shipments from Eritrea.

I have, &amp;c.

BALFOUR.

[E 5495/65/65]

No. 230.

*Count de Salis to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received May 29.)*

(No. 89.)

My Lord,

*Rome, May 25, 1922.*

IN my despatch No. 58 of the 13th April, I forwarded to your Lordship a note received from the Cardinal Secretary of State, summing up the criticisms of the Holy See on the draft mandate presented by Lord Balfour to the League of Nations on the 7th December, 1920. In my telegram No. 17 of the 21st April, I reported that a further note, making some constructive suggestions, especially with regard to article 14, which deals with the Holy Places, was in course of preparation.

In your Lordship's opinion the Vatican was not entitled to intervene in the matter in this way except as regards the Roman Catholic representative on the Commission for the Holy Places, a point on which there was no ground for supposing that His Majesty's Government wished to ignore the reasonable views of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy. But the memorandum of the Vatican amounted to nothing less than a protest against the whole policy which His Majesty's Government were being commissioned by the Powers and League of Nations to carry out in Palestine. In so informing the cardinal, I added that if the Vatican raised the latter at the next meeting of the League of Nations, the British representative would make a statement in this sense.

I now have the honour to enclose translation of a note from the Cardinal Secretary of State. It was not the intention of the Holy See to call in question the British mandate for Palestine. Quite the contrary. The draft mandate is now being submitted to the League of Nations for examination and approval, and as in this draft there are articles which deserve amendment the Holy See was entitled to send, and has in fact sent, its observations to the members of the Council of the League. In communicating these observations to the British Government, the Cardinal Secretary of State considered that he was acting with straightforwardness and courtesy; he is surprised that they should have given an unfavourable reception to a note drawn up in that spirit.

I have, &amp;c.

J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 230.

*Cardinal Gasparri to Count de Salis.*

(Translation.)

*Vatican, May 24, 1922.*

IN reply to your Excellency's recent verbal communication of the 9th May, on the subject of the mandate for Palestine, entrusted to His Britannic Majesty's Government, the undersigned Cardinal Secretary of State has the honour to state as follows:—

The Holy See in that note in no way meant to call in doubt the British mandate for Palestine; the intention of the Holy See was altogether different. The draft of the mandate is now being submitted for examination and approval to the League of Nations, and as in that draft there are articles deserving of amendment the Holy See was entitled to transmit, and indeed has transmitted, to the members of the Council of the League of Nations its observations on the subject. At the same time, the undersigned cardinal believed it to be an act of straightforwardness and courtesy to communicate



those observations to the British Government, and it has therefore been not a little surprised that they should have given an unfavourable reception to a note drawn up with that intention.

P. CARDINAL GASPARRI.

[E 5443/248/91]

No. 231.

*Foreign Office to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, May 29, 1922.*

WITH reference to my letter of the 20th instant, I am directed by the Earl of Balfour to state, for the information of Mr. Secretary Churchill, that, as the result of enquiries from the British agent at Jeddah, it has been ascertained that the precise meaning of mudayyanism is: "adherence to the cause of combatant proselytizers to Wahhabi tenets."

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 5573/248/91]

No. 232.

*The Earl of Balfour to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Foreign Office, May 31, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 32 of 22nd May: Nejd pilgrimage.

Further representations to Ibn Saud would be useless at this juncture, and King Hussein should be informed that His Majesty's Government have done everything possible to prevent trouble and cannot intervene further in any way.

(Confidential.)

This applies also to your proposal that you should assist in disarming Nejd pilgrims, as such action might lead to His Majesty's Government being held responsible if anything happened to these pilgrims.

Please acknowledge, on my behalf, telegram on same subject from Hashimite acting Foreign Minister.

[E 5476/78/65]

No. 233.

*The Earl of Balfour to Count de Salis (Vatican).*

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, May 31, 1922.*

IN view of recent discussion at Geneva regarding Palestine mandate, I wish you to come home in order that I may consult you as to policy to be adopted *vis-à-vis* of Vatican, whose opposition mainly prevented acceptance of mandate. I could see you after 13th June. I fear this will interfere with Dormer's plans for leave.

[E 5600/78/65]

No. 234.

*Mandate for Palestine.*

*Note by the Secretary-General.—(Communicated by League of Nations, May 27, 1922.)*

THE following letter from Cardinal Gasparri, Secretary of State to the Holy See, is communicated to the Council:—

(Translation.)

*The Vatican, May 15, 1922.*

"The under-signed, Cardinal Secretary of State to His Holiness, has the honour to submit to your Excellency, and through your Excellency to the Council of the League of Nations, the following observations regarding the draft British mandate

for Palestine, which was laid before the secretariat of the League of Nations by Mr. Balfour on the 7th December, 1920.

"The Holy See makes no objection to the same civil rights being conferred on the Jews as are enjoyed by other nationalities and creeds, but it cannot agree—

- "1. That the Jews should be given a privileged and preponderating position as against the other nationalities and creeds;
- "2. That the rights of the Christian denominations should not be adequately safeguarded.

"Now, as regards the first point, although the preamble of the draft gives assurances, in regard to the creation of a 'National Home' for the Jews, 'that nothing should be done which might prejudice the religious and civil rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine,' nevertheless it appears from the wording of the articles that there is an intention to confer a definitely preponderating influence, from an economic, administrative and political point of view, on the Jewish element as compared with the other nationalities. Thus, in the articles of the draft mandate—

- "(a.) A Jewish agency, which is nothing less than the very influential Zionist organisation, is recognised as a public body (article 4);
- "(b.) This Jewish agency is given the rôle of co-operating with the Administration of Palestine and is endowed with very wide powers even in questions regarding 'the development of the country';
- "(c.) The immigration of Jews (article 6) and the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews (article 7) are encouraged; provision is especially made for 'close-settlement by Jews' who are even to receive grants of State lands and waste lands (article 6); they are also to be given preference in connection with the construction of public works (article 11).

"The effect of all these provisions of the draft tending to give the Jewish element a definitely preponderating influence over all the other races of Palestine appears to be not only a grave injury to the established rights of other nationalities, but also to be incompatible with article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, which defines the nature and the objects of all mandates.

"According to the article referred to above, a mandate is a form of protection which is assumed by some Power for the benefit of 'peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world,' and its object is 'a sacred trust of civilisation,' namely, 'the well-being and development of such peoples.'

"The passages just quoted are obviously incompatible with a mandate which would prove to be an instrument for the subjection of the native populations for the benefit of another nationality.

"As regards the second point, special attention should be directed to article 14 of the draft, which provides—in conformity with article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres—for a 'special commission to study and regulate all questions and claims relating to the different religious communities.' This commission (which is to be constituted by Great Britain, though with a chairman appointed by the League of Nations), consists of a number of members—the total is not stated in the draft—who are to include representatives, in a proportion which is not fixed, of all the religious interests concerned.

"It is evident that the Holy See cannot agree that the interests of Catholics should be in the hands of representatives who have not been selected by the competent hierarchical authorities. Moreover, the commission in question has the duty to 'ensure that certain Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, regarded with special veneration by the adherents of one particular religion, are entrusted to the permanent control of suitable bodies representing adherents of the religion concerned.'

"The wording of this article is—it will be observed—so vague that it gives rise to a number of difficulties. For instance, nothing is laid down as to the manner in which these 'suitable bodies' representing the different religions are to be constituted; further, no indication is given of the extent of the powers of this body or what steps are to be taken for the protection of the places regarded with such veneration by the adherents of different religions (e.g., by Catholics and schismatics). In this case, as the Holy Places in question are of interest to numerous religions, it is only too probable that bitter dissensions will arise within this commission, composed of representatives of all religions; and that these dissensions will inevitably result in a combination of



all the other members against those of the religion which is in possession of the Holy Places which may be concerned; the result will be to make any reasoned and impartial decision impossible.

"Finally, it should be noted that, by the terms of the mandate, 'the selection of the Holy Places, religious buildings, or sites so to be entrusted shall be made by the commission, subject to the approval of the mandatory'; this clause would, it is clear, give England undue influence, not to mention the fact that it is apparently incompatible with article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

"For all these reasons, article 14 appears to be unacceptable, and the Holy See ventures to suggest that the members of the commission should be the consuls maintained in the Holy Land by the Powers represented on the Council of the League of Nations.

"The undersigned Cardinal has the honour to bring the above considerations to your Excellency's notice; and to request that you will be good enough to submit them to the most excellent Council of the League of Nations.

"I have, &c.  
"CARDINAL GASPARRI."

[E 5624/78/65]

No. 235.

*The Earl of Balfour to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).*

(No. 200.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, June 1, 1922.*

FOR reasons which will be familiar to your Excellency it is most important that Palestine mandate should be passed by League of Nations as soon as possible.

At recent meeting of council at Geneva, it became apparent that French Government's opposition then manifested was largely influenced by not unnatural apprehension of an impression unfavourable to France being created if Palestine mandate was passed before passing of Syrian mandate was assured. Latter cannot proceed so long as United States Government have not signified their acceptance. This makes it a matter of supreme interest to His Majesty's Government that a Franco-American understanding respecting Syrian mandate should be arrived at in time to allow of both mandates being passed at next meeting of council on 11th July.

Our mandate for Irak may not be ready by then, but this need not delay those for Palestine and Syria.

Please endeavour to find opportunity for pressing on State Department the urgent importance of their settling with France about Syria, using your discretion as to best way and moment of approaching them.

[E 5624/78/65]

No. 236.

*The Earl of Balfour to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 193.)

(Telegraphic.)

[By Bag.]

*Foreign Office, June 2, 1922.*

AT recent meeting at Geneva of Council of League of Nations, I derived distinct impression that French Government were opposed to completion of British mandate for Palestine before similar treatment of French mandate for Syria as tending to imply greater satisfaction on part of League with British administration in Palestine than with that of French in Syria.

I beg your Excellency to do everything possible to expedite agreement between French and United States Governments regarding Syrian mandate at the same time as Sir C. Hurst, who has gone to Paris, is sounding M. Fromageot in connection with the agreement between French, ourselves and United States over "B" mandates. If satisfactory progress can be made before special meeting of council on 11th July, we may entertain some hope that no further objection to the Palestine mandate will be pressed by the French representative.

Colonial Office consider it most improbable that Irak mandate can be ready by July. French Government need not, however, feel themselves on that account precluded in any way from pushing forward with Syrian mandate.

I have requested Count de Salis to come home in order to consult with him as regards policy to be pursued *vis-à-vis* of Vatican. If Holy See were to persist in endeavour to thwart mandates, it will in all probability suffer rebuff, seeing that

mandates are based on covenant of League of Nations, and opposition would really be directed against giving effect to Treaty of Versailles. At last meeting of Council, Vatican obstruction proved effective because, as Palestine mandate did not figure on agenda, Catholic Powers were able to side with France and Italy and give indirect support to Vatican on this technicality.

[E 5654/248/91]

No. 237.

*Major Marshall to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 3.)*

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Jeddah, June 3, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 23 of 31st May: Nejd pilgrimage

In reply, King Hussein says responsibility too great, and that when he hears of the near arrival of Nejd pilgrims he and Government officials will proceed to Jeddah. He also gives ultimatum, which may or may not be sincere, that if no favourable reply is received in ten days he will notify all other Governments of his decision. He will certainly blame us for sending Nejd pilgrims, and he is even capable of making trouble during pilgrimage to justify himself.

(Sent to India and Bagdad, No. 36.)

[E 5651/78/65]

No. 238.

*Lord Hardinge to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 4.)*

(No. 302.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, June 3, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 193.

Sir M. Cheetham saw Political Director this morning and impressed on him the importance of early conclusion of agreement between United States and French Government regarding Syrian mandate. Count de Peretti said that he saw no reason why a satisfactory understanding with United States should not be reached before 11th July.

M. de Peretti took note of the fact that Irak mandate would not be ready by that date, but he did not seem to consider this any reason for delaying Syrian mandate. He volunteered the statement that, in spite of objections raised in French note of 10th May last, there did not appear to be any sufficient ground for delaying settlement of Silesian mandates until the conclusion of peace with Turkey, which might still be distant. Sir M. Cheetham said that your Lordship would be so informed.

Political Director also suggested that it should be possible to overcome any difficulties raised by the Vatican.

[E 5716/248/91]

No. 239.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.—(Communicated by Colonial Office June 6.)*

(No. 390.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bagdad, June 1, 1922.*

YOUR telegram of 18th May.

I have since received letter from Ibn Saud enclosing Khalid-bin-Mausur's original letter, dated 27th March, in which latter complains that inhabitants of Turabah while at prayer in mosque were attacked by a force sent by Hussein under command of Rajih-bin-Mohammed and Jaafar Sultan, and suffered ten casualties. Feisal now shows me telegram from Hussein which states that Khalid has invaded Ghamidsaa, occupied Mukhwah, plundered inhabitants and imposed fine of 30,000 dollars. Can you corroborate this? If so, please telegraph your opinion as to whether Khalid's action has any connection with complaint in letter forwarded by Ibn Saud. What is motive of incursion and attitude of Idriisi in regard thereto.

(Addressed to Jeddah, No. 266 S.)



[E 5716/248/91]

No. 240.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.—(Communicated by Colonial Office June 6.)*

(No. 391.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, June 1, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 305 of 27th May.

I explained decision of His Majesty's Government to King at my weekly interview on 31st May. Cornwallis was present. King was greatly upset, and stated that if Hedjaz was placed in lively danger—and he was convinced that would be case—he would feel bound to leave at once to join his family. In any case, he continued, his mission in Irak would be made impossible if Ibn Saud's authority were established in Hedjaz in any form. We endeavoured to persuade him that his very natural feelings of domestic anxiety probably tended to make him exaggerate danger.

I said that I thought that we must regard the Secretary of State's reply as final, and rely on Ibn Saud's good faith and power to control his adherents. I continued that if he thought that it would be beneficial I would send Ibn Saud a personal telegram impressing upon him that the danger of a great conflagration being caused by ignition of some trivial spark was a very real one, and adjuring him to take all possible steps to safeguard against any such contingency. Feisal meanwhile, to reinforce his argument, produced a telegram received from Hussein stating that Khalid-bin-Mansur had attacked Ghamid district with four bairags of Akhwan, plundered the tribes and imposed on them a fine of 30,000 dollars. They had then proceeded to occupy Mikhwah, some 50 miles north-east of Kunfida. This meant that they had secured a jumping-off ground both for Tihamah and for routes south and north.

After leaving King I drafted personal telegram to Ibn Saud and sent it to Cornwallis, requesting him to show it to the King and to spend the evening with His Majesty.

This was done, and Cornwallis informed me last night that Feisal was still in a great state of perturbation and talking of asking for a ship at once in which to return to Hedjaz to join his family, though he recognised that this proceeding would probably involve his abdication. In order to cool him down I thought it necessary to inform him that on the strength of the Mikhwah report I would again communicate with you. I am sending no personal communication to Ibn Saud pending your reply.

My immediately preceding telegram to Jeddah was repeated to you. If report regarding Khalid is true (information is very circumstantial), outlook is undoubtedly fraught with dangerous possibilities. I also have a report from Koweit stating that Ibn Saud contemplates sending a force to the Yemen under his second son. I am asking for further particulars about this.

It seems to me that these two items of news, which I will amplify as soon as possible, give His Majesty's Government reasonable grounds for reconsidering their attitude with regard to Hajj. If we cannot press Ibn Saud at this stage to stop it altogether, we could at any rate urge upon him to limit it to smallest possible proportions, and we could warn him at the same time that if untoward developments are caused in the Hedjaz by Khalid's action or any enterprise of his own for the extension of his territory at this juncture, Islam will certainly not absolve Great Britain from grave responsibility for not having exerted her influence to prevent it, and our relations with him will be seriously affected. I would suggest that he be called upon to limit his pilgrims to [?] minimum, and that after giving him this warning we should ask him to accept services of British Mahomedan official from Bahrein or the Hedjaz to accompany Nejd Hajj as British Government representative, in order that no precaution for preservation of peace might be neglected.

Feisal, as I have already stated, is very mercurial and I trust will soon cool down. He suffers, however, from an obsession in regard to anything connected with Ibn Saud, and, though I shall do my utmost to make him see that his present duty lies here in Irak, I cannot but feel that the progress of our policy here will be most injuriously affected by any inconvenient development in the Hedjaz.

[E 5716/248/91]

No. 241.

*Mr. Churchill to Sir P. Cox.—(Communicated by Colonial Office June 6.)*

(No. 314.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, June 2, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 391.

I see no objection to your sending Ibn Saud message on the lines suggested in penultimate paragraph of your telegram if Ibn Saud agrees to your arranging for pilgrims to be accompanied by a British Mahomedan official from Bahrein, and if you think this can be done in the time. You should avoid saying anything to Ibn Saud about extension of his territory, as this might lead to arguments about the Nejd-Hedjaz frontier.

[E 5716/248/91]

No. 242.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.—(Communicated by Colonial Office June 6.)*

(No. 394.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, June 2, 1922.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 391, Thanayan now informs me that no expedition against Yemen has been or is being prepared. Origin of rumour was request from people of South Asid to come under protection of Ibn Saud.

[E 5654/248/91]

No. 243.

*The Earl of Balfour to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 6, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 36 of 3rd June: Nejd pilgrimage.

Sir P. Cox was authorised by Colonial Office on 2nd June to send message to Ibn Saud calling upon him to limit his pilgrims to a minimum and warning him that if untoward developments are caused in the Hedjaz by Khalid's action or any enterprise of his own Islam will certainly not absolve Great Britain from grave responsibility and our relations with him will be seriously affected. Sir P. Cox is also to arrange for pilgrims to be accompanied by a British Mahomedan official from Bahrein as representative of His Majesty's Government, if Ibn Saud agrees and if it is not too late.

Above is for your own information.

[E 5754/4453/91]

No. 244.

*M. Cora to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 7.)*

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Italian Embassy, May 31, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I did not fail to communicate to the Italian Government the contents of your note of the 27th instant.

The acting Italian consul at Jeddah had also reported a recrudescence of activity in the traffic in slaves, who are embarked principally at Tajurah and are transported to the Jeddah market. On the ground of the above information the Italian Ministry for the Colonies did not fail to issue instructions to the Governor of Asmara for a rigorous surveillance to be maintained in the territory of our colony, and especially at every place of embarkation. At the same time the Ministry for Foreign Affairs gave instructions to the Italian Ambassador at Paris to move the French Government to exercise a stricter supervision from Jibuti such as appears to be exercised by Great Britain in the Red Sea in order to check the slave trade, and instructed the Italian Minister at Adis Ababa to bring, in the most suitable manner, to the attention of the Abyssinian Government this matter of the slave trade, which has its origin in Abyssinian territory and which it should be in the Abyssinian Government's interest to suppress in defence of their own population.

I have, &amp;c.

G. CORA.



*M. de Montille to the Earl of Balfour. — (Received June 7.)*

*Ambassade de France, Londres,  
le 6 juin 1922.*

M. le Comte,

LE Conseil de la Société des Nations ayant décidé de traiter avant le 15 juillet prochain la question des mandats, il a paru indispensable au Gouvernement français de saisir avant cette date le Conseil de ses projets, qui sont déjà arrêtés en ce qui concerne les mandats "A."

Votre Seigneurie se souvient que les textes établis après entente officieuse entre les Gouvernements français et britannique furent déposés à Genève, en décembre 1920, M. Poincaré dut se préoccuper ultérieurement d'apporter au projet relatif à la Syrie et au Liban les modifications répondant aux vues des États-Unis et de prévoir, en même temps, un projet d'accord séparé avec le Gouvernement américain comportant la reconnaissance par ce dernier du mandat français. J'ai l'honneur de faire parvenir, ci-jointe, à votre Seigneurie les textes qui ont été préparés à ce sujet par mon Gouvernement.

Parmi les modifications à apporter au projet de mandat, il a paru au Gouvernement français qu'il serait sans doute insuffisant de déclarer à l'article 5 que les droits résultant des Capitulations sont suspendus. Cette rédaction risquerait, en effet, de donner l'impression que les Capitulations sont définitivement abolies en Syrie et au Liban et ne seront pas susceptibles de "revivre" par la seule cessation du mandat.

Il a donc semblé nécessaire qu'en cas de cessation du mandat, les Capitulations soient expressément rétablies par un engagement formel de la part de la Syrie et du Liban. Le paragraphe ajouté à l'article 18 permettrait au Conseil de la Société des Nations de ne pas consentir à la cessation du mandat sans que la Syrie et le Liban aient préalablement admis le rétablissement du régime capitulaire s'il était jugé nécessaire.

En raison du parallélisme existant entre la situation de la Syrie et celle de la Mésopotamie, ainsi que de l'appui que les Gouvernements français et britannique ont intérêt à se prêter mutuellement dans la question des mandats, il serait désirable qu'après entente officieuse sur les nouveaux textes relatifs à la Syrie et à la Mésopotamie les deux Gouvernements les soumettent simultanément au Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Cependant, au cas où le mandat britannique pour ce dernier pays ne pourrait être soumis avant le 15 juillet au Conseil de la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement français n'en serait pas moins tenu de répondre, en ce qui le concerne, au Conseil de la Société des Nations dans les délais qu'il a fixés.

En communiquant à votre Seigneurie les projets ci-joints, je serais heureux de savoir, notamment en ce qui concerne l'addition proposée à l'article 18, s'ils appellent des observations de votre part. M. Poincaré sera également désireux de pouvoir prendre connaissance aussitôt que possible des mesures et des textes correspondants que le Cabinet de Londres se propose d'adopter pour donner satisfaction au Gouvernement américain en ce qui concerne la Mésopotamie. Aussitôt après la réponse de votre Seigneurie, le texte français serait communiqué, pour accord, au Gouvernement des États-Unis, puis soumis au Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Veuillez, &c.

B. DE MONTILLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 245.

*Modifications proposées au Texte déposé à la Société des Nations le 1<sup>er</sup> Décembre 1920.*

*Proposition tendant à l'Approbation des Termes du Mandat pour la Syrie et le Liban.*

*Préambule.*

CONSIDÉRANT que, par l'article du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie signé à , la Turquie a renoncé en faveur des principales Puissances alliées à tous ses droits et titres sur les territoires de l'ancien Empire ottoman situés au sud de la frontière méridionale de la Turquie telle qu'elle est fixée au dudit traité ;

Considérant que, par l'article dudit traité, les hautes parties contractantes ont agréé que la partie desdits territoires dénommés Syrie soit selon les termes de l'article 22, alinéa 4, du Pacte de la Société des Nations, constituée en État indépendant, devant être guidée dans son administration par les conseils et l'aide d'une Puissance mandataire jusqu'au moment où cet État sera en mesure de se gouverner lui-même ;

Considérant que les principales Puissances alliées ont décidé que le mandat sur les territoires visés ci-dessus comprenant la Syrie et le Liban serait conféré au Gouvernement de la République française, qui l'a accepté ;

Considérant que les termes de ce mandat, également formulés dans les articles ci-dessous, ont été agréés par le Gouvernement de la République française ;

Que le Gouvernement de la République française s'engage à exercer ledit mandat au nom de la Société des Nations, en conformité avec lesdits articles ;

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations approuve les termes du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban :

#### Article 5.

Seront sans application, en Syrie et au Liban, les privilèges et immunités des étrangers, y compris la juridiction consulaire et la protection tels qu'ils étaient autrefois pratiqués dans l'Empire ottoman, en vertu des Capitulations et des usages. Toutefois, les tribunaux consulaires étrangers continueront à fonctionner jusqu'à la mise en application de la nouvelle organisation judiciaire prévue à l'article 6.

#### Article 10.

Le contrôle exercé par le mandataire sur les missions religieuses en Syrie et au Liban se bornera maintien de l'ordre public et de la bonne administration ; aucune atteinte ne sera portée à la libre activité desdites missions religieuses. Les membres de ces missions ne seront l'objet d'aucune mesure restrictive du fait de leur nationalité, pourvu que leur activité ne sorte pas du domaine religieux.

Les missions religieuses pourront également s'occuper d'œuvres d'instruction et d'assistance publique, sous réserve du droit général de réglementation et de contrôle du mandataire ou des États sous mandat en matière d'éducation, d'instruction et d'assistance publique.

#### Article 11.

Il appartiendra au mandataire de faire en sorte qu'aucune mesure ne soit prise de nature à mettre, en Syrie et au Liban, les ressortissants, y compris les sociétés et associations, d'un État membre de la Société des Nations dans un état d'infériorité soit par rapport à ses propres ressortissants, y compris les sociétés et associations, soit par rapport à ceux de tout autre État étranger, aussi bien en matière fiscale et commerciale qu'au point de vue de l'exercice des industries et professions, de la navigation et du traitement accordé aux navires et aéronefs. De même, il ne sera imposé en Syrie et au Liban aucun traitement différentiel entre les marchandises originaires ou à destination de l'un desdits États il y aura, dans des conditions équitables, liberté de transit à travers les territoires sous mandat.

Sous réserve des stipulations ci-dessus, le mandataire pourra établir ou faire établir par le Gouvernements locaux tous taxes et droits de douane jugés nécessaires.

Cette disposition ne fait pas obstacle au droit du mandataire ou du Gouvernement local agissant sur ses conseils, de conclure, pour des raisons de voisinage, des arrangements douaniers spéciaux avec un pays limitrophe.

Le mandataire pourra prendre ou faire prendre sous réserve des dispositions de l'alinéa 1 toutes mesures propres à assurer le développement des ressources naturelles des territoires sous mandat et à sauvegarder les intérêts des populations locales.

Les concessions pour le développement desdites ressources naturelles seront accordées sans distinction du fait de la nationalité entre les ressortissants de tous les États membres de la Société des Nations, mais à des conditions qui conserveront intacte l'autorité du Gouvernement local. Il ne sera pas accordé de concession ayant le caractère d'un monopole général. La stipulation du présent alinéa ne portera pas préjudice au droit de la Puissance mandataire ou des États locaux d'instituer des monopoles d'ordre fiscal ou d'assurer dans certains cas particuliers l'exploitation des ressources naturelles soit directement par l'État ou en régie, soit par un organisme soumis à son contrôle, sans qu'il puisse en résulter aucun monopole des ressources naturelles au profit de la Puissance mandataire.



## Article 14.

Le mandataire élaborera et mettra en vigueur, dans l'année qui suivra l'entrée en vigueur du présent mandat, une loi sur les antiquités, conforme aux dispositions de l'article du Traité de Paix conclu entre les Puissances alliées et la Turquie. Cette loi assurera aux nationaux de tous les États membres de la Société des Nations l'égalité de traitement en matière de fouilles et recherches archéologiques.

## Article 18.

Le consentement du Conseil de la Société des Nations sera nécessaire pour toutes modifications à apporter aux termes du présent mandat. Ce consentement résultera pour toutes modifications proposées par le mandataire de l'approbation par la majorité du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations prendra toutes dispositions utiles pour que le présent mandat ne prenne pas fin sans que les immunités et privilèges des étrangers, y compris le bénéfice de la juridiction et de la protection consulaires aient été rétablis tels qu'ils y existaient au 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914 dans les pays visés par ce mandat, exception faite pour les ressortissants des États qui renonceraient entièrement ou partiellement à ce rétablissement.

Enclosure 2 in No. 245.

*Projet de Convention franco-américaine relative à la Syrie et au Liban.*

CONSIDÉRANT que par le Traité de Paix conclu avec les Puissances alliées l'Empire ottoman renonce à tous ses droits et titres sur la Syrie et le Liban ;

Considérant que par l'article 22 du Traité de Versailles il a été stipulé que ces territoires, cessant de demeurer sous la souveraineté ottomane, seraient placés sous le mandat d'une autre Puissance et que les termes de ce mandat devraient être explicitement définis par le Conseil de la Société des Nations ;

Considérant que les principales Puissances alliées ont convenu que la France exercerait le mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban ;

Considérant que les termes de ce mandat ont été définis comme suit par le Conseil de la Société des Nations :

[Texte du mandat.]

Considérant que le mandat, dont les termes viennent d'être reproduits, sera déclaré à l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie ;

Considérant que les États-Unis d'Amérique, en participant à la guerre contre l'Allemagne, ont contribué à sa défaite et à celle de ses Alliés et à la renonciation par ses Alliés à leurs droits et titres sur les territoires transférés, mais considérant que les États-Unis n'ont pas encore ratifié le Pacte de la Société des Nations incorporé dans le Traité de Versailles ;

Considérant que le Président des États-Unis désire donner son adhésion à l'exercice par la France du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban ;

Considérant que, en qualité de mandataire pour la Syrie et le Liban, le Gouvernement de la République française désire assurer aux États-Unis d'Amérique et à leurs citoyens les mêmes droits en Syrie et au Liban dont ils jouiraient si les États-Unis étaient membres de la Société des Nations ;

Considérant que le Président de la République française et le Président des États-Unis d'Amérique ont décidé de conclure une convention à cet effet et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires :

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.

Sous réserve des dispositions de la présente convention, les États-Unis se déclarent d'accord pour que la France exerce le mandat en Syrie et au Liban du mandat ci-dessus défini.

ARTICLE 2.

Les États-Unis et leurs nationaux auront le bénéfice de tous les engagements pris par la France aux termes de ce mandat, y compris les engagements concernant l'égalité économique, sans qu'y puisse faire obstacle le fait que les États-Unis ne sont pas membres de la Société des Nations.

ARTICLE 3.

Il est également convenu que les droits de propriété américains en Syrie et au Liban seront respectés et sauvegardés.

ARTICLE 4.

Il sera remis aux États-Unis un texte authentique du rapport annuel à présenter par le mandataire conformément à l'article 17 du mandat.

ARTICLE 5.

Aucune modification qui affecterait les droits résultant de la présente convention ne sera apportée sans l'assentiment des États-Unis aux termes du mandat ci-dessus reproduits.

ARTICLE 6.

La présente convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications seront échangées le plus tôt possible. Elle prendra effet du jour de l'échange des ratifications. Au cas où, à la date où elle prendra effet, le mandat n'aurait pas encore été déclaré par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement de la République française s'engage à exécuter autant qu'il sera possible la présente convention dans l'application qu'il fait dès maintenant du mandat à la demande du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

En foi de quoi

[E 5771/248/91]

No. 246.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, June 7.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Bagdad, June 5, 1922.*

YOUR telegram of 2nd June.

In order to gain time in which to communicate with you again, I am informing Feisal that I am meanwhile authorised to send proposed personal message to Ibn Saud while subject is being considered by His Majesty's Government.

I am somewhat perplexed at attitude of disinterestedness displayed in your telegram, and it is causing me no little misgiving.

In first place, I cannot tell whether it is your personal attitude or that of His Majesty's Government, and, secondly, whichever it is, it is important for me to know on what grounds attitude is based. Is it that danger of conflagration is not considered serious in view of Ibn Saud's guarantee, or is it that His Majesty's Government are tired of Hussein and all his works, and consider any change that may come in Hedjaz would be welcomed as being an improvement on existing state of affairs?

If former is the principal ground I would respectfully observe that no guarantees have been given by Hussein, that he is practically demented and that there is no suicidal act of provocation of which he might not be capable. Feisal admits as much.

If latter is the principal ground, I can only repeat the conviction that any untoward incident in the Hedjaz during the pilgrimage is bound to react injuriously upon our interests throughout Islam. In India, for instance, it would bring grist to the mill of Khalifat propaganda, and support their contention that the Arabs are not suitable rulers for the Hedjaz; it would encourage Kemalists in their claim as an Islamic military Power to regain control over the Holy Places; and generally the blame for any bloodshed either at Mecca or Medina would undoubtedly be laid at our door; we should be charged with inability to secure the safety of pilgrims and neglect to bring the existing danger to the notice of other Islamic States concerned.

I have not reverted to the subject with Feisal since my telegram of 1st June, but he still maintains that, in the event of the danger becoming imminent, he will be in honour bound to join his family. He has sent me a message suggesting that, if it is



impossible to avert the danger by other means, detachments of Mahomedan troops should be sent by England and France and Italy to demonstrate their interest in maintenance of security. I doubt whether this suggestion is within the range of practical politics, but we would appear to be fully justified in issuing a stern official warning to both parties and also in taking any steps which can be concerted between Jeddah and here for accompaniment or meeting of Nejd pilgrims by British agent[s].

[E 5748/78/65]

No. 247.

*Mr. Dormer to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 7.)*

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Vatican, Rome, June 6, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 13.

Count de Salis left for London last night.

[E 5777/4453/91]

No. 248.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 8.)*

Sir,

Colonial Office, June 7, 1922.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of the Earl of Balfour, a copy of a despatch from the Political Resident, Aden, on the subject of the slave traffic in the Hedjaz.

I am, &amp;c.

J. E. MASTERTON-SMITH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 248.

*Political Resident, Aden, to Mr. Churchill.*

(No. 71 Confidential.)

Sir,

Aden, May 18, 1922.

WITH reference to your confidential despatch and telegram, dated respectively the 4th and 11th May, 1922, on the subject of the slave traffic in the Hedjaz, I have the honour to forward, for your information, a copy of report dated the 22nd March last from Captain M. Fazluddin, I.M.S., Political Officer, Hodeida, whom I directed to investigate the matter at Midi.

2. I am now making further enquiries from the British Agent, Jeddah, and the Political Officer, Hodeida, and I shall communicate the result to you in due course.

I have, &amp;c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

Enclosure 2 in No. 248.

*Report by Captain Fazluddin to the First Assistant Resident, Aden.*

REFERENCE your endorsement of the 16th February last, I beg to report that I made careful enquiries both at Midi and Hahl during my last visit to these places at the end of the last month and succeeded in ascertaining the fact that, although the chief dealers in slaves in the Idrisian country during the last ten years have been Sayed Abdul Mutlook, a merchant of Midi, and Sheikh Saeed-bin-Musayyed, of Hahl, yet, since the last year or so they have practically relinquished this trade altogether.

Both these men have been merely the agents between the Dankali slave traders of the Erithrean coast and the slave merchants of Hedjaz—the chief centre of slave trade in Arabia. During the war time, as well as for some time after there were certain difficulties of landing slaves on the Hedjaz coast, but these men on account of their influence in the country could surreptitiously land slaves in Jeddah and Ruwais, and hence they were much sought after by the slave traders in Erithrea. They have, however, now since the last year or so practically renounced these agencies, partly under pressure from Sayed Mustapha, who, though he personally takes no objection to slave

trade as such, always tries to please us by taking severe actions against any cases in which slavery is concerned; and partly on account of the Hedjaz Government at present taking no objection to the landing of slaves at Jeddah or any other place on the Hedjaz coast. Consequently it does not now pay the Dankali slave dealers to send their commodities to Midi or Hahl and thus pay the commission of the agents there in addition to the heavy customs duty at Jeddah.

As regards, however, the eighty slave children imported into Jeddah in January last as reported by our agency at Jeddah, there does not seem to be any evidence that they have passed through Midi or Hahl. The customs house records of Midi are absolutely silent about any slaves having been shipped or transhipped from that port during December 1921 and January 1922, the only two months of which the records I have seen. I shall keep you informed if these people again resume their trade in slaves, or any other persons take to it in the Idrisi country.

M. FAZLUDDIN, Captain, I.M.S.,

Political Officer, Hodeida.

Aden, March 22, 1922.

[E 5797/33/65]

No. 249.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 8.)*

Sir,

Colonial Office, June 8, 1922.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to invite reference to Cabinet Paper No. C.P.-3748 of the 17th February, with which was circulated a draft of the proposed treaty with King Feisal of Irak, and to transmit herewith, for the information of the Earl of Balfour, copies of telegrams Nos. 378 and 379 of the 28th May from the High Commissioner for Irak on this subject.

These telegrams were discussed on the 1st June by an Inter-Departmental Conference, at which the Foreign Office were represented, and which was also attended by Mr. Tufton. Subject to Lord Balfour's concurrence, Mr. Churchill proposes to reply in the terms of the four draft telegrams, which are also transmitted herewith.

2. The conference assumed that the word "independent" had been inadvertently retained both in the preamble and in article 16, since it had been deleted from article 1.

3. With regard to article 1, I am to inform you that in a personal telegram dated the 30th April the High Commissioner for Irak reported as follows:—

"Up to the present Feisal has not gone back on his request that words 'at the request of His Majesty the King of Irak,' which your draft omits, should be inserted. Can this not be considered? It does not seem crucial, and Feisal's obligation to be guided by our advice in important matters appears to afford adequate safeguards."

Mr. Churchill replied, in a telegram dated the 5th May: "I am prepared to give way on article 1." The words were accordingly inserted by the High Commissioner in the draft, to which reference is made in the enclosed telegrams. King Feisal now suggests that the sentence "without prejudice to the right of national sovereignty" should be added at the end of the article. The conference saw no objection to this, since this provision cannot be taken to cancel such terms of the treaty itself as might possibly be regarded as inconsistent with sovereignty.

4. With regard to article 3, the High Commissioner requested authority, in his personal telegram referred to above, to submit to King Feisal, as possible alternatives for insertion in this article, either the phrase "shall be in conformity with the present treaty and" after the words "organic law which" or the words "in consultation with the High Commissioner" after the words "agrees to frame." Mr. Churchill replied that he would accept either of these two alternatives. The alternative proposal now made by the Irak Council of Ministers appeared unacceptable to the conference, since there are other articles of the treaty, notably articles 2, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14 and 15, which contain provisions with which an organic law might possibly not be in complete conformity. Mr. Churchill therefore proposes to instruct Sir P. Cox to adhere to the first alternative originally proposed by him.

5. With regard to article 4, considerable difficulty has always been anticipated by Sir P. Cox. After fully considering the arguments brought forward in favour of the

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wording now proposed by King Feisal and his Ministers, and after informal consultation with representatives of His Majesty's Treasury and discussion by the Inter-Departmental Conference referred to above, Mr. Churchill has decided, subject to Lord Balfour's concurrence, to insist upon the retention of the original article down to the words "for the whole period of this treaty" and to accept the present proposal for the remainder of the article. I am to point out that the separate financial agreement provided for in article 15 will ensure a binding obligation upon the Irak Government to fulfil direct financial liabilities and obligations incurred by them to His Majesty's Government, and that the modified wording now adopted for the second half of the article will not involve any direct financial risk. Mr. Churchill has been guided throughout in his consideration of the second half of this article by his conviction that any apparent advantage secured by a stricter wording would be more than counterbalanced by the possible creation of an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust.

6. With regard to article 5, the conference saw no objection to King Feisal's proposed addition to the Colonial Office alternative in Cabinet C.P.-3748, which was subsequently approved by the Cabinet. He accordingly proposes to concur in its adoption.

7. With regard to article 17, I am to point out that the insertion of the provision that the treaty should remain in force after the expiry of the twenty years' period until such time as its termination had been approved by the Council of the League of Nations on the application of either or both of the high contracting parties was originally inserted at the request of the Foreign Office. Mr. Churchill has given this matter his careful consideration, and concurs in the recommendation of the conference, at which, however, the foreign representatives reserved their opinion, that His Majesty's Government, in accepting the mandate for Irak, has not incurred a permanent and indefinite responsibility. He feels that the treaty with His Majesty King Feisal is not the place for a provision of this kind to be inserted, even if it were decided that some such provision should be included in the draft mandate. He is confident that Lord Balfour will concur in this view, and that he will agree to treat the question as one which affects the relations between His Majesty's Government and the League of Nations rather than as affecting the instrument which defines the relations between His Majesty's Government and the Irak Government under the mandate.

8. I am to request that Mr. Churchill may be favoured with a very early reply to this letter, since the High Commissioner has reported that the political situation in Irak will be greatly eased by the definite conclusion of the treaty negotiations. Lord Balfour will observe that the penultimate sentence of the first draft telegram provides for the conclusion of a treaty with the United States on the lines of the proposed treaty relating to the Palestine mandate.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 249.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.*

(No. 378.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 28, 1922.

WE have reached following stage in treaty negotiations. King asks for following modifications on following lines and expresses confidence that he can count on Naqib's signature if they are conceded. As Bairam Festival is at hand, I think it advisable to communicate present position with reference to draft sent with my endorsement of the 11th May, though modifications are subject to confirmation in one or two details.

Preamble. Retain clause 1. Omit clauses 2, 3 and 4. Retain clause 5, deleting words "and responsible for Government of the country." Retain clause 6. Amend clause 7 to run as follows: "Whereas His Britannic Majesty is satisfied that the relations between himself and His Majesty the King of Irak can now better be defined by such a treaty than any other means." Retain clause 8 to end of preamble.

Article 1. Omit the word "independent" before word "State," and insert at end of sentence in place thereof words "without prejudice to right of national sovereignty." ("Siyadat al Wataniyah" is Arabic expression used for latter.) Remainder of article stands as it is.

Article 3 runs: "His Majesty the King of Irak agrees to frame an organic law for presentation to Constitutional Assembly of Irak and to give effect to said law, which must not contain provisions inconsistent with the terms of this article and of those

of articles 9, 11 and 12 of the present treaty and shall take account," &c. Remainder of article stands.

Article 4 runs as follows: "Without prejudice to provisions of article 17 of this treaty, His Majesty the King of Irak agrees to accord all due consideration to advice given to him by His Britannic Majesty, through High Commissioner, in all important matters affecting international and financial obligations of His Britannic Majesty for whole period of this treaty. His Majesty the King of Irak will consult High Commissioner in what is conducive to a sound financial and fiscal policy, and ensure the permanence and good organisation of finances of Irak Government so long as that Government is under financial obligation to Government of His Britannic Majesty."

Article 5. Read words "In London and other capitals and places" instead of words "In London and other places."

Article 17 runs as follows: "This treaty shall come into force as soon as it has been ratified by high contracting parties and it shall remain in force for twenty years, and nothing shall prevent high contracting parties from reviewing from time to time provisions of this treaty and those of separate agreements arising out of articles 7, 10 and 15 with a view to any revision which may seem desirable in circumstances then existing; and any modification which may be agreed upon by high contracting parties shall be communicated to League of Nations."

Other articles stand as they are. For my comments see my immediately following telegram.

Enclosure 2 in No. 249.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.*

(No. 379.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 28, 1922.

I SUBMIT following comment on treaty modifications given in my immediately preceding telegram:—

Preamble. Council of Ministers apparently desire general curtailment of clauses referring to responsibility of King on the ground that they are incompatible with the position of the constitutional monarch.

Article 1. Additional words are intended to disarm criticism of the extremists. As an alternative wording I suggested that we should insert words "and with due respect to the rights inseparable from national independence" after the words "subject to the provisions of this treaty." They prefer their own wording, however.

Article 3. Reason given for proposed alteration is that contents of organic law had no bearing on the greater part of the treaty and consequently it would be more logical not to refer to the treaty as whole, but rather to the specific articles concerned. If you see reason to object in principle to their proposal please consider whether reference to four articles mentioned suffices or not. I am also considering this point.

Article 4. Reason given for omitting reference to the last sentence of article 3 is that new wording, which provides for due consideration of our advice "in all important matters," &c., covers, among other important matters, those mentioned in article 3.

In the King's draft "His Britannic Majesty" is referred to instead of "His Majesty's Government," and reference to our "interests" is omitted. King supports this recommendation on the ground that word "interests" will be criticised by extremist elements as suggesting that we may have predominant interests, and that it is not right that Irak should be required to accept guidance or advice which may be "interested." If you find difficulty in agreeing to omission of the word we might, perhaps, qualify it by prefix of adjective "recognised" or "legitimate." You will observe that second part of article 4 has been recast and provides for consultation with the High Commissioner instead of with His Britannic Majesty. This alteration is designed to safeguard Irak Government against interference or criticism by His Majesty's Government in regard to detailed expenditure in estimates. Their contention is that in this respect His Majesty's Government must rely on vigilance and cohesion of their men on the spot. Sassoon has strong convictions on this point; Slater, Smallwood and I entirely support him in that attitude. Feisal asks for specific assurances on this point.

The King's wording provides for nothing more than consultation with High Commissioner. I think we must either have "fully consult" or "pay due regard to the advice of."

Article 5. Also explains grievance.



Article 17. They do not like the idea of being at the mercy of the League of Nations on completion of the twentieth year of the treaty. I have explained difficulty of allowing no discretion to the League to insist on Great Britain's responsibilities being continued in the event of Irak being unfit for complete freedom from supervision. I suggest that a solution would be to alter last sentence of article to run "the termination and any modification which may be agreed upon," &c.

It would be very convenient for me to have earliest possible indication of your views regarding modifications.

Enclosure 3 in No. 249.

*Draft Telegrams to Sir P. Cox.*

(1.)

June, 1922.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 378 and 379 of the 28th May. Preamble. I presume word "independent" inadvertently retained both here and in article 16. Subject to its excision I concur in draft preamble.

Article 1. No objection.

Article 3. You should press for retention of words "shall be in conformity with provisions of present treaty." There are many other articles besides those quoted which might be stultified by a badly framed organic law.

Article 4. You may agree to wording given in my immediately following telegram (see my telegram No. containing message to Feisal).

Article 5. No objection.

In view of contemplated treaty with America, following should be inserted after "League of Nations" in Article 11: "or of any State to which His Britannic Majesty has agreed by treaty that the same right should be ensured as it would enjoy if it were a member of the said League."

Article 17. Foreign Office agree on reconsideration to delete provision for treaty remaining in force after expiry of twenty years. Your proposed solution is therefore accepted.

(2.)

June, 1922.

Following is draft of article 4:—

Without prejudice to the provisions of article 17 of this treaty, His Majesty the King of Irak agrees to be guided by the advice of His Britannic Majesty, tendered through the High Commissioner, on all important matters affecting the international and financial obligations and interests of His Britannic Majesty for the whole period of this treaty. His Majesty the King of Irak will fully consult (or pay due regard to the advice of) the High Commissioner on what is conducive to a sound financial and fiscal policy, and will ensure the permanence and good organisation of the finances of the Irak Government so long as that Government is under financial obligations to the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

(3.)

June, 1922.

I trust that my telegram No. will finally solve outstanding difficulties, and that you will be able to proceed to signature of treaty.

We could not possibly agree to phrase "agrees to accord all due consideration to" in article 4. Feisal must surely realise that this is a meaningless undertaking, since he could always assert that our arguments had been duly considered, but regretfully rejected. Nor can we accept deletion of word "interests" since "obligations" alone, whether international or financial, are not sufficiently comprehensive. I do not fully understand argument that substitution of High Commissioner for His Britannic Majesty involves any diminution of control by His Majesty's Government. Though I have accepted proposed modifications for local consumption, the High Commissioner will, of course, be responsible to His Majesty's Government in this as in all other matters.

The English and Arabic texts as finally signed should be sent by the first air

mail. I am sending by next air mail the English draft as finally approved here; but you need not await it if you are satisfied that our intentions are clear and delay is objectionable. The treaty should not be published until I have had sufficient warning to arrange simultaneous publication here.

You are authorised to give Feisal personal message in my immediately following telegram.

(4.)

June, 1922.

Following is message referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

"I have never doubted your sincerity, and am confident that you will work in closest friendship and co-operation with High Commissioner in future as you have in the past. You will recognise that it was with reluctance that I felt bound to point out to you that insistence upon cancellation of mandate which merely defines our self-imposed responsibility to League of Nations would have been incompatible with continuance of our advice and support. I rely upon you now not merely to accept the treaty for yourself, but to use every effort to carry the country with you when National Assembly meets to discuss it. Do not think that I have not realised your local difficulties. I fully realise them, and to the extent that we are free ourselves we have done our best to meet them. I trust that signature of this treaty will mark commencement of a long period of prosperity and progress in Irak."

[E 5813/248/91]

No. 250.

*Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.*—(Communicated to Foreign Office, June 8.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

MY telegram of 1st June.

Bagdad, June 5, 1922.

Jeddah reply, dated 2nd June, which apparently was not repeated to London, is as follows:—

"March 9.

"Your telegram No. 266.

"I can confirm attack on Ghamid carried out by Khalid, Bin Atiyan, of Bisha, and Sultan Uddin, of Ateibah, and fighting is said to be continuing there. I think Khalid will probably say that it is reprisal for attack on Tarabah, but, in my opinion, it is also calculated development of Mudayyana movement. Emir Zaid assures me that attack on Tarabah was personal reprisal by Rajih for loss of property there, and that Hussein had nothing to do with it. On the other hand, Hussein's gratification and rumoured telegram to Emir Ali suggest some complicity. Apart from your despatch, I have no knowledge of attitude of Idrisi."

[E 5788/78/65]

No. 251.

*Sir A. Geddes to the Earl of Balfour.*—(Received June 8.)

(No. 261.

(Telegraphic.)

Washington, June 7, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 200.

Neither Secretary of State nor my French colleague has received any recent communication in regard to Syrian mandate question, and no request has been made to United States Government for their concurrence in terms of mandate. My French colleague has telegraphed for instructions.

[E 5801/4453/91]

No. 252.

*The Earl of Balfour to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

(No. 26.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 8, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 35 of 27th May: Slave traffic in Hedjaz.

You are authorised to confine your representations to such language as you consider unlikely to have an adverse effect on our relations with King Hussein.



[E 5809/248/91]

No. 253.

*The Earl of Balfour to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

(No. 27.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 8, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 36 of 3rd June.

Hussein should be warned that if trouble arises during pilgrimage owing to any aggressive action on his part, our relations with him will be seriously affected. W regard to proposal that Mahomedan official from Bahrein should accompany Nejdīs, it might be advantageous, either as alternative or in supplement to this proposal, if pilgrims were met by British Moslem at Hedjaz end. If Hussein agrees, and if you think this desirable as means of ensuring peaceful pilgrimage, you should make necessary arrangements in direct communication with Sir P. Cox, to whom this telegram is being repeated.

[E 5809/248/91]

No. 254.

*The Earl of Balfour to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 8, 1922.

YOUR telegram No. 403 of the 5th May.

His Majesty's Government are by no means indifferent, but their attitude as defined in correspondence ending with my telegram No. 314 is governed by following considerations:—

Military intervention of any kind is out of the question. His Majesty's Government have no effective hold over Hussein, who is quite as likely to provoke disturbance as Ibn Saud and has given no guarantee that he will not be the aggressor. Ibn Saud, on the other hand has promised to refrain from hostilities unless attacked. The only hold His Majesty's Government have over him is the fact that he is subsidised. Since Hussein cannot be effectively threatened, they are unwilling to menace Ibn Saud with stoppage of his subsidy to cover the hypothetical contingency of his breaking his promise. You have already been authorised to convey a message to Ibn Saud in terms suggested by yourself and you will see from my immediately following telegram that a warning on similar lines is being addressed to Hussein. With regard to accompaniment or meeting of pilgrims by British Moslem, you should concert with British Agent, Jeddah, whether Nejdīs should be accompanied or met or both. Substance of my telegram No. 314 has been communicated to Jeddah by Foreign Office.

(Sent to Bagdad with Colonial Office No. 325.)

[E 5858/78/65]

No. 255.

*Sir C. Hurst to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 10.)*

My Lord,

Paris, June 9, 1922.

MY discussions in Paris with M. Fromageot on the subject of the Palestine mandate led to the discovery, as reported in the Embassy telegram No. 310 of the 8th June, that the modifications which had been introduced into the later of the two Palestine drafts of 1921, i.e., that contained in Cmd. Paper 1500, had not been communicated to, or accepted by, the French Government. The only one of those modifications which M. Fromageot and the member of the staff of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs who was with him felt any difficulty about accepting was the new article 25, dealing with the right of the mandatory to postpone or withhold some of the provisions of the mandate in the Transjordan area. Your Lordship will have learned from the telegram referred to above the nature of the objections felt by the French to this article. They seem to think that it would enable the mandatory to leave the Transjordan area almost devoid of government and control, and that in this condition it might become a source of danger and disturbance to the neighbouring territory of Syria. As I was unacquainted with the history and the object of the clause

in question, I felt unable to contribute any suggestions to meet the French objections.

On the subject of the new clause 8 of the Palestine draft, dealing with the abolition or suspension of the régime of the Capitulations, I found that M. Fromageot was disinclined to adopt the formula which has been proposed by the American Government and accepted by His Majesty's Government, to the effect that the rights and immunities should be suspended while the mandate is in force, and should, in the absence of a new agreement, revive on its termination. The reason is that from the theoretical point of view it is the severance of the territory from Turkey which abrogates the Capitulations. He much prefers the formula which the French Government have now suggested for article 5 of the Syrian mandate in their note of the 6th June: "Seront sans application en Syrie et au Liban les privilèges et immunités des étrangers . . .," coupled with a provision in article 18 (corresponding to article 28 of the Palestine mandate) that "Le Conseil de la Société des Nations prendra toutes dispositions utiles pour que le présent mandat ne prenne pas fin sans que les immunités et privilèges des étrangers . . . aient été rétablis tels qu'ils y existaient au 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914 dans les pays visés par ce mandat, exception faite pour les ressortissants des États qui renonceraient entièrement ou partiellement à ce rétablissement."

From the purely legal point of view this formula may be the more correct, but I pointed out to M. Fromageot that His Majesty's Government were already bound *vis-à-vis* the United States by the new text which they had accepted. In these circumstances we agreed that the French Government should propose to the American Government their new formula which is given above, and then, if the United States can be induced to accept it, and if opportunity offers, the French formula can be substituted in the Palestine mandate for the American formula which His Majesty's Government have accepted.

Apart from article 25, the draft of the Palestine mandate, as enclosed with this report, may be regarded as accepted by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Your Lordship will observe that small verbal alterations have been made as follows:—

*Preamble.*—"Renounces" instead of "renounced." (The Treaty of Sèvres is not yet in force.)

*Article 1.*—"This" for "the present."

*Article 4.*—"Affect" instead of "effect."

*Article 12.*—"He" instead of "it."

*Article 27.*—"This" for "the present," and omission of the proviso.

*Article 28.*—Second paragraph, "Members of the League" for "Powers Signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey."

I have given copies of the Palestine draft mandate in the form enclosed as agreed with M. Fromageot to the Italian and Japanese members of the Committee of Legal Advisers, warning them that article 25 may undergo further modification. I have also given them copies of the draft treaty with the United States, which forms Enclosure 2 to this report. The terms of this draft treaty I agreed with M. Fromageot.

As regards the Syrian and Mesopotamian mandates, I explained to M. Fromageot that His Majesty's Government would not be able to proceed with the Mesopotamian mandate at the forthcoming session of the Council of the League of Nations, as negotiations were still proceeding with the American oil interests as to oil in Iraq, and it was desired not to proceed with this mandate until these negotiations were finished. There was no reason, however, why the French Government should not proceed with the Syrian mandate if they would then be in a position to do so. M. Fromageot gave me copies of a draft treaty between France and the United States concerning the Syrian mandate which he had prepared, and the list of modifications to be made in the text of the Syrian mandate, which is already in your Lordship's possession. These papers form Enclosures 3 and 4 to this report.

I trust that the result of my discussions in Paris may be that negotiations may now be initiated with the United States Government on a satisfactory basis, and that the terms of the Palestine and Syrian mandates may be finally approved at Geneva in July.

I have, &amp;c.

CECIL J. B. HURST.



*Draft Mandate for Palestine.*

## THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

WHEREAS by article 132 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Sèvres on the 10th day of August, 1920, Turkey renounces in favour of the Principal Allied Powers all rights and title over Palestine; and

Whereas by article 95 of the said treaty the high contracting parties agreed to entrust, by application of the provisions of article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as might be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a mandatory to be selected by the said Powers; and

Whereas by the same article the high contracting parties further agreed that the mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on the 2nd November, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the terms of the mandate in respect of Palestine have been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions;

Hereby approves the terms of the said mandate as follows:—

## ARTICLE 1.

His Britannic Majesty shall have the right to exercise as mandatory all the powers inherent in the Government of a Sovereign State, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

## ARTICLE 2.

The mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

## ARTICLE 3.

The mandatory shall encourage the widest measure of self-government for localities consistent with the prevailing conditions.

## ARTICLE 4.

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

## ARTICLE 5.

The mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power.

## ARTICLE 6.

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in article 4 close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

## ARTICLE 7.

The Administration of Palestine will be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

## ARTICLE 8.

The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but shall be revived immediately and completely upon the termination of the mandate régime, unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such rights should agree, or have agreed, by treaty to their suspension or modification.

## ARTICLE 9.

The mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall safeguard (a) the interests of foreigners; b) the law, and (to the extent deemed expedient) the jurisdiction now existing in Palestine with regard to questions arising out of the religious beliefs of certain communities (such as the laws of wakf and personal status). In particular the mandatory agrees that the control and administration of wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

## ARTICLE 10.

Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

## ARTICLE 11.

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country and, subject to article 311 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

## ARTICLE 12.

The mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine, and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside the territorial limits.



## ARTICLE 13.

All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights, of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the mandatory, who will be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected therewith: provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the mandatory from entering into such arrangement as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

## ARTICLE 14.

In accordance with article 95 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, the mandatory undertakes to appoint as soon as possible a special commission to study and regulate all questions and claims relating to the different religious communities. In the composition of this commission the religious interests concerned will be taken into account. The chairman of the commission will be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations. It will be the duty of this commission to ensure that certain Holy Places, religious buildings or sites regarded with special veneration by the adherents of one particular religion, are entrusted to the permanent control of suitable bodies representing the adherents of the religion concerned. The selection of the Holy Places, religious buildings or sites so to be entrusted, shall be made by the commission, subject to the approval of the mandatory.

In all cases dealt with under this article, however, the right and duty of the mandatory to maintain order and decorum in the place concerned shall not be affected, and the buildings and sites will be subject to the provisions of such laws relating to public monuments as may be enacted in Palestine with the approval of the mandatory.

The rights of control conferred under this article will be guaranteed by the League of Nations.

## ARTICLE 15.

The mandatory will see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, is ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language (while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose) shall not be denied or impaired.

## ARTICLE 16.

The mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

## ARTICLE 17.

The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of forces maintained by the mandatory.

The mandatory shall be entitled at all time to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

## ARTICLE 18.

The mandatory must see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any of the States Members of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under their laws) as compared with those of the mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population.

Nothing in this article shall prevent the Government of Palestine, on the advice of the mandatory, from concluding a special customs agreement with any State, the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

## ARTICLE 19.

The mandatory will adhere on behalf of the Administration to any general international conventions already existing or that may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

## ARTICLE 20.

The mandatory will co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

## ARTICLE 21.

The mandatory will secure, within twelve months from the date of the coming into force of this mandate, the enactment, and will ensure the execution of a law of antiquities based on the provisions of article 421 of Part XIII of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. This law shall replace the former Ottoman Law of Antiquities, and shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of archaeological research to the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations.

## ARTICLE 22.

English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statements or inscriptions in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statements or inscriptions in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

## ARTICLE 23.

The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

## ARTICLE 24.

The mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

## ARTICLE 25.

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the mandatory shall be entitled to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of articles 15, 16 and 18.



## ARTICLE 26.

If any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of these provisions which cannot be settled by negotiation, this dispute shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

## ARTICLE 27.

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

## ARTICLE 28.

In the event of the termination of the mandate conferred upon the mandatory by this declaration, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by articles 13 and 14, and for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations, legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

The present copy shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Made at                      the                      day of

Enclosure 2 in No. 255.

*Draft Treaty with the United States of America respecting Palestine.*

WHEREAS by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Turkey renounces all her rights and titles over Palestine; and

Whereas article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles provides that in the case of certain territories, which as a consequence of the late war ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, mandates should be issued, and that the terms of the mandate should be explicitly defined in each case by the Council of the League; and

Whereas by article 95 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey the high contracting parties agreed to entrust, by application of the provisions of the said article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as might be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a mandatory to be selected by the said Powers, and further agreed that the mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on the 2nd November, 1917, by the British Government and adopted by the other Allied Powers in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil or religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed to entrust the mandate for Palestine to His Britannic Majesty; and

Whereas the terms of the said mandate have been defined by the Council of the League of Nations as follows:—

[Terms of Mandate]

And—

Whereas the mandate in the above terms will be issued on the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey; and

Whereas the United States of America by participating in the war against Germany contributed to the defeat of her and her allies, and to the renunciation of the rights and titles of her allies in the territory transferred by them, but has not ratified the Covenant of the League of Nations embodied in the Treaty of Versailles; and

Whereas the President of the United States is desirous of concurring in the British mandate for Palestine; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty as mandatory for Palestine is desirous of ensuring to the United States of America and its citizens the same rights in Palestine as they would enjoy if the United States were a member of the League of Nations:

His Britannic Majesty and the President of the United States of America have decided to conclude a convention to this effect, and have nominated as their plenipotentiaries:—

Who  
have agreed as follows:—

## ARTICLE 1.

Subject to the provisions of the present convention, the United States concurs in the British mandate for Palestine, including the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, and in the British administration of Palestine pursuant to the terms of the said mandate.

## ARTICLE 2.

The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy the benefit of all the engagements of His Britannic Majesty defined in the mandate, including therein equality as regards commercial opportunity, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.

## ARTICLE 3.

Vested American property rights in Palestine shall be respected and in no way impaired.

## ARTICLE 4.

A duplicate of the annual report to be made by the mandatory under article 24 of the mandate shall be furnished to the United States.

## ARTICLE 5.

Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate as recited above, unless such modification shall have been assented to by the United States.

## ARTICLE 6.

The present convention shall be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional methods of the high contracting parties. The ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as practicable. It shall take effect on the date of the exchange of the ratifications. If at the date when the convention takes effect the mandate has not yet been issued by the Council of the League of Nations, His Britannic Majesty agrees to apply the convention so far as may be possible in the provisional administration of Palestine which he is now conducting at the request of the Council of the League.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this convention, and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at                      this                      day of

Enclosure 3 in No. 255.

*Projet de Traité avec les États-Unis relatif au Mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban,  
le 6 Juin 1922.*

CONSIDÉRANT que par le Traité de Paix conclu avec les Puissances alliées l'Empire ottoman renonce à tous ses droits et titres sur la Syrie et le Liban;

Considérant que par l'article 22 du Traité de Versailles il a été stipulé que ces territoires, cessant de demeurer sous la souveraineté ottomane, seraient placés sous le mandat d'une autre Puissance et que les termes de ce mandat devraient être explicitement définis par le Conseil de la Société des Nations;



Considérant que les principales Puissances alliées ont convenu que la France exercerait le mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban ;

Considérant que les termes de ce mandat ont été définis comme suit par le Conseil de la Société des Nations :

[Texte du mandat.]

Considérant que le mandat dont les termes viennent d'être reproduits sera promulgué au moment de l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie ;

Considérant que les États-Unis d'Amérique, en participant à la guerre contre l'Allemagne, ont contribué à sa défaite et à celle de ses Alliés et à la renonciation par ses Alliés à leurs droits et titres sur les territoires transférés par eux, mais considérant que les États-Unis n'ont pas ratifié le Pacte de la Société des Nations incorporé dans le Traité de Versailles ;

Considérant que le Président des États-Unis désire donner son adhésion à l'exercice par la France du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban ;

Considérant que, en qualité de Puissance mandataire pour la Syrie et le Liban, le Gouvernement de la République française désire assurer aux États-Unis d'Amérique et à leurs citoyens les mêmes droits en Syrie et au Liban dont ils jouiraient si les États-Unis étaient membres de la Société des Nations ;

A cet effet, le Président de la République française et le Président des États-Unis d'Amérique ont décidé de conclure une convention et ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires :

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

#### ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.

Sous réserve des dispositions de la présente convention, les États-Unis se déclarent d'accord pour que la France soit chargée en Syrie et au Liban du mandat ci-dessus défini et y exerce l'administration conformément aux termes dudit mandat.

#### ARTICLE 2.

Les États-Unis et leurs nationaux auront le bénéfice de tous les engagements pris par la France aux termes de ce mandat, y compris les engagements concernant l'égalité économique, sans qu'y puisse faire obstacle le fait que les États-Unis ne sont pas membre de la Société des Nations.

#### ARTICLE 3.

Il est également convenu que les droits de propriété américains en Syrie et au Liban seront respectés et sauvegardés.

#### ARTICLE 4.

Il sera remis aux États-Unis un texte authentique du rapport annuel à présenter par le mandataire conformément à l'article 17 du mandat.

#### ARTICLE 5.

Aucune modification qui affecterait les droits résultant de la présente convention ne sera apportée sans l'assentiment des États-Unis aux termes du mandat ci-dessus reproduit.

#### ARTICLE 6.

La présente convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications échangées le plus tôt possible. Elle prendra effet du jour de l'échange des ratifications. Au cas où, à la date où elle prendra effet, le mandat n'aurait pas encore été déclaré par le Conseil de la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement de la République française s'engage à exécuter autant qu'il sera possible la présente convention dans l'application qu'il fait dès maintenant du mandat à la demande du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

En foi de quoi

Enclosure 4 in No. 255.

*Modifications proposées au Texte déposé à la Société des Nations le 1<sup>er</sup> Décembre 1920.*

*Proposition tendant à l'Approbation des Termes du Mandat pour la Syrie et le Liban.*

#### Préambule.

CONSIDÉRANT que, par l'article du Traité de Paix avec la Turquie signé à la Turquie a renoncé, en faveur des principales Puissances alliées, à tous ses droits et titres sur les territoires de l'ancien Empire ottoman situés au sud de la frontière méridionale de la Turquie telle qu'elle est fixée audit traité ;

Considérant que, par l'article dudit traité, les hautes parties contractantes ont agréé que la partie desdits territoires dénommés Syrie soit selon les termes de l'article 22, alinéa 4, du Pacte de la Société des Nations, constituée en Etat indépendant devant être guidée dans son administration par les conseils et l'aide d'une Puissance mandataire jusqu'au moment où cet Etat sera en mesure de se gouverner lui-même ;

Considérant que les principales Puissances alliées ont décidé que le mandat sur les territoires visés ci-dessus comprennent la Syrie et le Liban serait conféré au Gouvernement de la République française, qui l'a accepté ;

Considérant que les termes de ce mandat également formulés dans les articles ci-dessous, ont été agréés par le Gouvernement de la République française ;

Que le Gouvernement de la République française s'engage à exercer ledit mandat au nom de la Société des Nations, en conformité avec lesdits articles ;

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations approuve les termes du mandat sur la Syrie et le Liban.

#### Article 5.

Seront sans application en Syrie et au Liban les privilèges et immunités des étrangers, y compris la juridiction consulaire et la protection tels qu'ils étaient autrefois pratiqués dans l'Empire ottoman, en vertu des Capitulations et des usages. Toutefois, les tribunaux consulaires étrangers continueront à fonctionner jusqu'à la mise en application de la nouvelle organisation judiciaire prévue à l'article 6.

#### Article 10.

Le contrôle exercé par le mandataire sur les missions religieuses en Syrie et au Liban se bornera au maintien de l'ordre public et de la bonne administration ; aucune atteinte ne sera portée à la libre activité desdites missions religieuses. Les membres de ces missions ne seront l'objet d'aucune restriction du fait de leur nationalité, pourvu que leur activité ne sorte pas du domaine religieux.

Les missions religieuses pourront également s'occuper d'œuvres d'instruction et d'assistance publique, sous réserve du droit général de réglementation et de contrôle du mandataire ou des États sous mandat en matière d'éducation, d'instruction et d'assistance publique.

#### Article 11.

Il appartiendra au mandataire de faire en sorte qu'aucune mesure ne soit prise de nature à mettre, en Syrie et au Liban, les ressortissants, y compris les sociétés et associations, d'un Etat membre de la Société des Nations dans un état d'infériorité soit par rapport à ses propres ressortissants, y compris les sociétés et associations, soit par rapport à ceux de tout autre Etat étranger aussi bien en matière fiscale et commerciale qu'au point de vue de l'exercice des industries et professions, de la navigation et du traitement accordé aux navires et aéronefs. De même, il ne sera imposé en Syrie et au Liban aucun traitement différentiel entre les marchandises originaires ou à destination de l'un desdits États ; il y aura, dans des conditions équitables, liberté de transit à travers les territoires sous mandat.

Sous réserve des stipulations ci-dessus, le mandataire pourra établir ou faire établir par les Gouvernements locaux toutes taxes et droits de douane jugés nécessaires.

Cette disposition ne fait pas obstacle au droit du mandataire ou du Gouvernement local agissant sur ses conseils, de conclure, pour des raisons de voisinage, des arrangements douaniers spéciaux avec un pays limitrophe.

Le mandataire pourra prendre ou faire prendre, sous réserve des dispositions de



l'alinéa 1, toutes mesures propres à assurer le développement des ressources naturelles des territoires sous mandat et à sauvegarder les intérêts des populations locales.

Les concessions pour le développement desdites ressources naturelles seront accordées sans distinction du fait de la nationalité entre les ressortissants de tous les États membres de la Société des Nations, mais à des conditions qui conserveront intacte l'autorité du Gouvernement local. Il ne sera pas accordé de concession ayant le caractère d'un monopole général. La stipulation du présent alinéa ne portera pas préjudice au droit de la Puissance mandataire ou des États locaux d'instituer des monopoles d'ordre fiscal ou d'assurer dans certains cas particuliers l'exploitation des ressources naturelles soit directement par l'État ou en régie, soit par un organisme soumis à son contrôle, sans qu'il puisse en résulter aucun monopole des ressources naturelles au profit de la Puissance mandataire.

#### Article 16.

Le mandataire élaborera et mettra en vigueur, dans l'année qui suivra l'entrée en vigueur du présent mandat, une loi sur les antiquités, conforme aux dispositions de l'article du Traité de Paix, conclu entre les Puissances alliées et la Turquie. Cette loi assurera aux nationaux de tous les États membres de la Société des Nations l'égalité de traitement en matière de fouilles et recherches archéologiques.

#### Article 18.

Le consentement du Conseil de la Société des Nations sera nécessaire pour toutes modifications à apporter aux termes du présent mandat. Ce consentement résultera pour toutes modifications proposées par le mandataire de l'approbation par la majorité du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations prendra toutes dispositions utiles pour que le présent mandat ne prenne pas fin sans que les immunités et privilèges des étrangers, y compris le bénéfice de la juridiction et de la protection consulaires, aient été rétablis tels qu'ils y existaient au 1<sup>er</sup> août 1914 dans les pays visés par ce mandat, exception faite pour les ressortissants des États qui renonceraient entièrement ou partiellement à ce rétablissement.

[E 5853/248/91]

No. 256.

*Mr. Churchill to Sir P. Coz (Bagdad).—(Communicated to Foreign Office, June 10.)*

(Telegraphic.) P.

June 8, 1922.

YOUR telegram of 5th May.

His Majesty's Government are by no means indifferent, but their attitude as defined in my telegram No. 314 and previous correspondence is governed by following considerations:—

Military intervention of any kind is out of the question. His Majesty's Government have no effective hold over Hussein, who has given no guarantee that he will not be the aggressor and is quite as likely to provoke disturbance as Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud, on the other hand, has promised that provided he is not attacked he will refrain from hostilities. The only hold His Majesty's Government have over Ibn Saud is the fact that he is subsidised and, since there is no effective means of threatening Hussein, they are unwilling to menace former with stoppage of his subsidy to cover the hypothetical contingency of his breaking his promise. I have already authorised you to convey a message to Ibn Saud in terms suggested by yourself, and you will see from my immediately following telegram that a warning is being addressed to Hussein on similar lines. With regard to question of British Moslem accompanying or meeting of pilgrims you should concert with British agent, Jeddah, whether Nejd should be accompanied or met or both. Foreign Office have communicated to Jeddah substance of my telegram No. 314.

[E 5884/248/91]

No. 257.

*Major Marshall to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 12.)*

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 11, 1922.

FOLLOWING addressed to Bagdad:—

"Your telegram No. 278 (S).

"Interviewed King Hussein to-day and gave him His Majesty's Government's warning about Nejd pilgrimage.

"At first he agreed to accept them provided that they were villagers and not nomads, and they came via Medina in separate caravans of not more than 800 camels each, and not in one large party.

"I said that I could send a Moslem official to meet pilgrims, but he replied that if above procedure, which I think is advisable, be carried out this will not be necessary.

"Afterwards he said that all this was conditional on His Majesty's Government sending him four British aeroplanes and pilots to be under his orders during pilgrimage.

"I said that this was impossible. I presume that things must take their course. If possible, wire approximate numbers."

[E 5891/248/91]

No. 258.

*Major Marshall to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 12.)*

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 11, 1922.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

In event of King Hussein resigning or leaving Mecca on account of Nejd pilgrimage, Emir Zeid informs me secretly that Government will not accompany him, but will declare for Emir Ali, who is expected to arrive at Mecca in about a month's time.

[E 6063/33/65]

No. 259.

*Treaty with the King of Irak. (Draft of June 13, 1922.)*

#### PREAMBLE.

HIS Britannic Majesty of the one part, and His Majesty the King of Irak of the other part;

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has recognised Feisal Ibn Hussein as King of the State of Irak; and

Whereas His Majesty the King of Irak considers that it is to the interests of Irak and will conduce to its rapid advancement that he should conclude a treaty with His Britannic Majesty on the basis of alliance; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty is satisfied that the relations between himself and His Majesty the King of Irak can now be better defined by such a treaty than by any other means.

For this purpose the high contracting parties have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; Sir Percy Zachariah Cox, G.C.M.G., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., High Commissioner and Consul-General of His Britannic Majesty in Irak; His Majesty the King of Irak; His Highness Saiyid Sir Abdurrahman, G.B.E., Naqib-al-Ashraf, Bagdad;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due order, have agreed as follows:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

At the request of His Majesty the King of Irak, His Britannic Majesty undertakes, subject to the provisions of this treaty, to provide the State of Irak with such advice and assistance as may be required during the period of the present treaty. His Britannic Majesty shall be represented in Irak by a High Commissioner and consul-general assisted by the necessary staff, without prejudice to the right of national sovereignty.

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## ARTICLE 2.

His Majesty the King of Irak undertakes that, for the period of the present treaty, no gazetted official of other than Irak nationality shall be appointed in Irak without the concurrence of His Britannic Majesty. A separate agreement shall regulate the numbers and conditions of employment of British officials so appointed in the Irak Government.

## ARTICLE 3.

His Majesty the King of Irak agrees to frame an organic law for presentation to the Constitutional Assembly of Irak, and to give effect to the said law, which shall be in conformity with the provisions of the present treaty, and shall take account of the rights, wishes and interests of all populations inhabiting Irak. This organic law shall ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals. It shall provide that no discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Irak on the ground of race, religion or language, and shall secure that the right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Government of Irak may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. It shall prescribe the constitutional procedure, whether legislative or executive, by which decisions will be taken on all matters of importance including those involving questions of fiscal, financial and military policy.

## ARTICLE 4.

Without prejudice to the provisions of article 17 of this treaty, His Majesty the King of Irak agrees to be guided by the advice of His Britannic Majesty tendered through the High Commissioner on all important matters affecting the international and financial obligations and interests of His Britannic Majesty for the whole period of this treaty. His Majesty the King of Irak will fully consult (or pay due regard to the advice of) the High Commissioner on what is conducive to a sound financial and fiscal policy, and will ensure the permanence and good organisation of the finances of the Irak Government so long as that Government is under financial obligations to the Government of His Britannic Majesty.

## ARTICLE 5.

His Majesty the King of Irak shall have the right of representation in London and such other capitals and places as may be agreed upon by the high contracting parties. Where His Majesty the King of Irak is not represented he agrees to entrust the protection of the interests of Irak nationals to His Britannic Majesty. His Majesty the King of Irak shall himself issue exequaturs to representatives of foreign Powers in Irak after His Britannic Majesty has agreed to their appointment.

## ARTICLE 6.

His Britannic Majesty undertakes to use his good offices to secure the admission of Irak to membership of the League of Nations as soon as possible.

## ARTICLE 7.

His Britannic Majesty undertakes to provide such support and assistance to the armed forces of His Majesty the King of Irak as may from time to time be agreed by the high contracting parties. A separate agreement regulating the extent and conditions of such support and assistance shall be concluded between the high contracting parties and communicated to the League of Nations.

## ARTICLE 8.

No territory in Irak shall be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of any foreign Power; this shall not prevent His Majesty the King of Irak from making such arrangements as may be necessary for the accommodation of foreign representatives, and for the fulfilment of the provisions of the preceding article.

## ARTICLE 9.

His Majesty the King of Irak undertakes that he will accept and give effect to such reasonable provisions as His Britannic Majesty may consider necessary in judicial matters to safeguard the interests of foreigners in consequence of the suspension (or non-application) of the immunities and privileges enjoyed by them under capitulation or usage. These provisions shall be embodied in a separate agreement which shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

## ARTICLE 10.

The high contracting parties agree to conclude separate agreements to secure the execution of any treaties, agreements or undertakings which His Britannic Majesty is under obligation to see carried out in respect of Irak. His Majesty the King of Irak undertakes to bring any legislation necessary to ensure the execution of these agreements. Such agreements shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

## ARTICLE 11.

There shall be no discrimination in Irak against the nationals of any State, member of the League of Nations, or of any State to which His Britannic Majesty has agreed by treaty that the same rights should be ensured as it would enjoy if it were a member of the said League (including companies incorporated under the laws of such State), as compared with British nationals or those of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Nor shall there be any discrimination in Irak against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States. There shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across Irak territory.

## ARTICLE 12.

No measure shall be taken in Irak to obstruct or interfere with missionary enterprise, or to discriminate against any missionary on the ground of his religious belief or nationality, provided that such enterprise is not prejudicial to public order and good government.

## ARTICLE 13.

His Majesty the King of Irak undertakes to co-operate in so far as social, religious and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

## ARTICLE 14.

His Majesty the King of Irak undertakes to secure the enactment, within twelve months of the coming into force of this treaty, and to ensure the execution of a law of antiquities based on the contents of article 421 of part XIII of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. This law shall replace the former Ottoman law of antiquities, and shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of archaeological research to the nationals of all States, members of the League of Nations.

## ARTICLE 15.

A separate agreement shall regulate the financial relations between the high contracting parties. It shall provide, on the one hand, for the transfer by His Britannic Majesty's Government to the Government of Irak of such works of public utility as may be agreed upon, and for the rendering by His Britannic Majesty's Government of such financial assistance as may from time to time be considered necessary for Irak, and, on the other hand, for the progressive liquidation by the Government of Irak of all liabilities thus incurred. Such agreement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

## ARTICLE 16.

So far as is consistent with his international obligations His Britannic Majesty undertakes to place no obstacle in the way of the association of the State of Irak, for customs or other purposes, with such neighbouring Arab States as may desire it.



## ARTICLE 17.

Any difference that may arise between the high contracting parties as to the interpretation of the provisions of this treaty shall be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In such case, should there be any discrepancy between the English and Arabic texts of this treaty, the English shall be taken as the authoritative version.

## ARTICLE 18

This treaty shall come into force as soon as it has been ratified by the high contracting parties, and shall remain in force for twenty years, at the end of which period the situation shall be examined, and if the (or, possibly, either or both of the) high contracting parties are of opinion that the treaty is no longer required it shall, subject to the assent of (or, possibly, confirmation by) the League of Nations, be terminated. Nothing shall prevent the high contracting parties from reviewing from time to time the provisions of this treaty and those of the separate agreements arising out of articles 7, 10 and 15 with a view to any revision which may seem desirable in the circumstances then existing, and any modification which may be agreed upon by the high contracting parties shall be communicated to the League of Nations.

[E 6011/78/65]

No. 260.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 14.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, June 14, 1922.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th June, 1922, regarding the note addressed to the Earl of Balfour by the French Ambassador on the subject of the Palestine mandate, and to state for his Lordship's information that Mr. Churchill concurs in the terms of the proposed reply.

I am, &amp;c.

G. GRINDLE.

[E 6037/248/91]

No. 261.

*Major Marshall to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston.—(Received June 15.)*

(No. 38.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, May 22, 1922.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 32 of to-day's date on the subject of the Nejd pilgrimage, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies in translation of letters from King Hussein and from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.\*

As I stated in my telegram No. 30 of the 18th instant, the districts of Ghamid and Zarhan have joined the Mudayyana. While the sheiks of these districts were in Mecca Sultan-id-Din, one of the chiefs of the Ateibah, Bin Atiyan, Emir of Bisha, and Khalid, Emir of Khurma, with 1,500 men, visited these districts, burnt villages in Ghamid and imposed a fine of 15,000 reals on the inhabitants, who have in consequence joined the ranks of the Mudayyana. In the north repeated rumours are received of the occupation of Medain Saleh by the Mudayyana. It is interesting to note in this connection that Mr. Philby reports the presence of Mudayyana as far north as Kaf in the Wadi Sirhan.

There is considerable danger attendant on this movement. The tribes are afraid of the Mudayyana, and would rather join them than resist, and the possibility of the movement spreading rapidly throughout the Hedjaz must be kept in view. This will not be a peaceful penetration, but will be accompanied by massacre and pillage.

It seems essential that some treaty should be settled between King Hussein and Ibn Saud if this country is to remain safe for foreign pilgrims. King Hussein and the Minister for Foreign Affairs both state that, so long as there is any danger to these pilgrims the Nejd pilgrims should not come by land. In this I concur. For this reason I recommend that, if possible, the Nejd land pilgrimage should be stopped this

\* Not printed.

year, and that further efforts be made after the pilgrimage to make peace between King Hussein and Ibn Saud and to settle the boundaries between their respective kingdoms. In view of the fact that there are now approximately 30,000 foreign pilgrims in the Hedjaz it would be unwise, in my opinion, to run the risk of hostilities during this year's pilgrimage.

Owing to the spread of Mudayyanism in the north, I think it would be advisable to hasten on the repairs of the Hedjaz Railway, so that communication may be restored between Medina and Transjordan. From reports received it appears that Medina is in a bad way, and many of the inhabitants would welcome the Mudayyana instead of the present Government. Emir Ali is still at Bueir.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. MARSHALL,

*British Agent and Consul.*

[E 6040/4453/91]

No. 262.

*Major Marshall to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 15.)*

(No. 45.)

My Lord,

*Jeddah, May 29, 1922.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 59 of the 9th instant, relative to slave traffic in the Hedjaz, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that, in my opinion, the delivery of an ultimatum on this subject to King Hussein at the present stage of treaty negotiations cannot fail to remove from these negotiations any prospect still remaining to them of a successful issue.

The secular influence of slavery on the social and domestic life of the Hedjaz and the familiar and patriarchal relations here existing between slaves and their owners have been well described by Dr. Snouck Hurgronje in the second volume of his work "Mekka: Aus dem heutigen Leben" (M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1888). King Hussein's character is essentially conservative, not to say reactionary, and it will be as difficult to persuade him of the ethical wrongness of an institution the roots of which lie deep in his social tradition as to convince him that any practical advantage will result from its abolition. The task of reminding him that this iniquitous trade is universally regarded as a disgrace to any enlightened community will not be rendered easier by the circumstance that the Italian representative keeps a native concubine imported from Eritrea, while a Dutch (European) doctor recently established in Jeddah purchased an Abyssinian slave-girl in November last for the sum of 70l.

I enclose copies of correspondence which passed between this agency and the Hashimite Government at the time of the Serom incident. I would strongly recommend that I may be permitted to endeavour to obtain from King Hussein some such expression of disapproval of the system of slave traffic as will suggest authority for the activity of His Majesty's sloops in the Red Sea, whether in Hedjaz territorial waters or not, without making this pronouncement an essential preliminary to the ratification of the Abdullah-Lawrence Treaty. It would be idle to expect from King Hussein any general condemnation of the institution of domestic slavery, and I fear that, if the ratification of the treaty by His Majesty's Government is to be made conditional upon the adoption by King Hussein of such an attitude, His Majesty will be left with the impression that His Majesty's Government are anxious, by adding to the points of difference between themselves and the Hashimite Government, to minimise their failure to obtain satisfaction in those details at present in dispute.

If, however, your Lordship desires that the question should be made a primary one, I should be grateful if I might be informed what, if any, understanding exists on the subject of slavery between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Abyssinia, whence the great majority of slaves arriving in this country are exported through French and Italian territory; and what preventive measures have been guaranteed by the Idrisi and by Ibn Saud, whose treaty relations with His Majesty's Government are a subject of frequent reference in the Abdullah-Lawrence negotiations.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,

*British Agent and Consul.*



Enclosure 1 in No. 262.

*Hashimite Government to British Agency, Jeddah.*

(Translation.)

January 21, 1922.

IT has been communicated through the concerned authorities to-day that some reports of firing have been heard at sea, and, having enquiries made about the matter, it has been found out that the firing was from British steamers on certain sambuks steering towards the anchorage to the north of Jeddah.

This has been done under the pretext of searching for slaves. The sambuks were then set free, as nothing of the above has been found.

As both the slaves and their traffic are from the coasts of Africa, the Government of these regions should prohibit the traffic without such measures, which cause disturbances of mind.

This is proved by the fact that slaves are brought to Midi and Gizan without the world hearing of British steamers' control, as is the case with us.

Carrying of slaves from these regions is proved by their arrival of all kinds here by land.

This statement is given in spite of the neglect of our complaint regarding the carrying by these sambuks of certain firearms and war equipments to certain Arab coasts, and Great Britain's unwillingness to consider this important; in the same time it has been pointed out that the trouble resulting from that is very harmful to Great Britain.

We do not know what to say about that subject, except to consider this important case one of those neglected cases which we meet, and which are only due to the personal misfortune of His Majesty, my Lord.

This has been written important as it is, and no doubt it will be neglected just as other letters have been.

Respects.

(For Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs),  
SADAQA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 262.

*Acting British Agent to Hashimite Government.*

After respects,

Jeddah, February 3, 1922.

WITH reference to your letter of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that the Commander of H.M.S. "Cornflower," with whom I discussed the matter, states categorically that he has fired on no sambuks, whether steering towards the anchorage to the north of Jeddah or elsewhere, except in the case of the dhow "Mahroussa" (No. 101), off Serom, and then only after her crew had fired twice upon his ship's boat.

As to the question of slaves, I am interested in what you say about their importation into the Hedjaz by land, from the coasts of Africa by way of Midi. I note that you recommend that the Governments of the regions of Africa concerned should prohibit this traffic. I agree that if the traffic could be stopped at its source it would be a good thing, and you, no doubt, will agree that if it is right to stop the traffic at one point, it cannot be wrong to stop it at another.

The duties of the British naval authorities in this respect are known. If the importation of slaves into the Hedjaz is known to the Government and permitted, such traffic will always be attempted, by land and sea, since upon the attitude of the Hashimite Government depends the encouragement or otherwise of the traders' hopes for profit in the Hedjaz.

I regret that I do not understand your allusion to the alleged negligence of Great Britain, in permitting sambuks to smuggle arms and ammunition to parts of the coast of the country. Please refer me to your previous complaint as regards this matter.

The suggestion made in the last paragraph of your letter is justified by nothing in the history of your relations with this agency. This you know.

Compliments.

L. B. GRAFFTEY-SMITH,  
Acting British Agent and Consul.

[E 6042/656/91]

No. 263.

*Major Marshall to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 15.)*

(No. 47. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, May 31, 1922.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the Jeddah report for the period 11th-31st May, 1922.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Transjordan, Aden, Simla and Damascus.

I have, &amp;c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,  
British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 263.

*Jeddah Report, May 11-31, 1922.*

(Secret.)

*Spread of Mudayyanism in the Hedjaz.*

AS I reported to you in my telegram No. 30 of the 18th May, the districts of Ghamid and Zahran, east of Kufuda, have joined the Mudayyana. While many of the sheikhs of these districts were in Mecca, Sultan-id-din, one of the chiefs of the Ateibah, Bin Atiyan, an Emir of Bisha, and Khalid, Emir of Khurma, with 1,500 men, visited these districts, burnt villages in Ghamid and imposed a fine of 15,000 reals on the inhabitants. They captured and imprisoned Ibn Aseidan and Ibn Rayush, two important sheikhs of the Zahran. In consequence of this expedition, the tribes of these two districts have joined the Mudayyana. As this threatens Kufuda and, to a certain extent, communications between Jeddah, Mecca and Taif, there is considerable anxiety in Mecca at the spread of this Mudayyana movement. So far as I know, the sheikhs of these districts are still in Mecca. It is stated that some of the Ghamid people have arrived in Mecca bearing letters to the King from some of the sheikhs. In these letters they say that they have captured Khalid and Bin Atiyan, and that they await the King's orders. King Hussein, who suspects treachery, has detained these messengers and is sending some of his own people to find out the truth.

In the north, Farhan-el-Aida is in open revolt against the King, and there are repeated rumours, still unconfirmed, that the Mudayyana have captured Medain Saleh. Emir Ali is still at Bueir. It is stated that he wished to withdraw his headquarters to Medina, but the King sent him instructions to remain at Bueir, as he was sending reinforcements and ammunition. Machine guns and ammunition left for Yembo on the Hedjaz Government steamer "Rushdi," and have been sent to Bueir.

It is said that the Mudayyana influence is predominant all round Medina, and that Emir Ali is in a very difficult position. At Kheibar it is said that the Mudayyana hold the town, while the Kaimakam of Kheibar, Sherif Ali Wisam, holds the fort in the name of the King. His conduct, however, is not above suspicion, and it is suspected that he has been converted to Mudayyanism and that he remains in the fort as a bait for Emir Ali to attack Kheibar. Sherif Shahat, the Kaimakam of Medina, whose influence in and around Medina is very great in spite of his dissolute habits, is with Emir Ali at Bueir. It is said that the Mudayyana have offered him the post of Governor of Medina when they take that town.

Fear of the Mudayyana and a desire to placate them at all costs are ruling passions round Medina. Only the tribes between Medina and Yembo and between Yembo and Jeddah are as yet untainted, and that because they have not yet come into contact with the proselytisers.

The Mudayyana are the combatant proselytisers of the Wahhabi movement.

Conditions in Medina are bad. There is great scarcity of fuel, and foodstuffs are very expensive owing to the high cost of camel hire between Medina and Yembo.

*General.*

*Hedjaz Shipping.*—The purchase of the two small steamers has been completed; the smaller of the two, the "Rushdi," has made trips to Yembo and to Kufuda.

*Quarantine.*—The Hashimite Government have at last come to a decision with regard to the quarantine regulations. They have notified us that they will follow the "Dispositions applicables aux Pèlerins et aux Navires à Pèlerins pendant le Pèlerinage

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du Hedjaz de 1913," published by l'Administration sanitaire de l'Empire ottoman. They have asked us to notify them if these regulations are not carried out by the local Th rantine authorities.

I pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that these regulations were issued annually by the Sanitary Administration of Constantinople, and that the latest publication was 1914. I also explained that Turkey signed the International Convention of 1912, and that these regulations were published in accordance with that convention.

His Highness Emir Zeid, accompanied by Fuad-el-Khatib, arrived in Jeddah on the 14th. He was sent by King Hussein to protest to the foreign representatives against the conditions in Syria. They returned to Mecca on the 16th. King Hussein is expected in Jeddah soon after the Id, i.e., in a few days.

It is said that Bin Saud is in correspondence with Sheikh Rashid Rida, of Egypt, editor of "El Manar," that this sheikh is sending fifteen teachers to Hasa for the schools there, and that a newspaper, to be called "El Riyadh," will be published in Hasa.

With regard to the massacre at Taraba, mentioned in my previous despatch, Emir Zeid informed me that it was a local affair carried out by Sherif Ragih as a reprisal for the loss of his property in Taraba. The Emir assured me that King Hussein had no connection with the affair.

#### Press ("Al Qibla").

No. 584. Official proclamation warning the public against counterfeit sovereigns.

Leading article, under the title "The Arab Question in its New Phase," giving extracts from King Hussein's speech to Sir M. Sykes and M. Picot, and from his letter of 21st Zil Q'ada 1336, with "open letters" to General Gouraud and to Ibn Saud, written by El Sayed Mahmoud Rashad in "Al Ahram," of Cairo.

An article on "Wahhabism in the Arabian Peninsula," reproduced from the Damascus "Fati-el-Arab," states, *inter alia*, that: "the Wahhabis to-day are waiting at the gates of the Hedjaz, armed with the weapons of the British Curzon policy, to raze to the ground that lofty edifice which God set up with His own hand to be the Qibleh of the world of Islam and of the East . . . England has provided the Wahhabis with arms, supplies and money, and has incited them to attack Iraq and the Hedjaz; Britain has two rôles towards the Arabs, enemy and friend . . ." &c. ["Al Qibla" makes no criticism of this point of view, which King Hussein is known to share.]

"Al Qibla" thanks the Government and people of Eritrea for facilities granted to Mohammed Tawil and to Rushdi Bey during their mission to purchase steamers from Massawa.

No. 585. Leading article on familiar lines on the subject of recent events in Syria, applauding the measures taken by King Hussein and the Emir Abdullah to calm the passions of their people.

A note on the agitation in the Egyptian press against the practice of "zar." "Al Qibla" remarks that anyone in the Hedjaz found practising "zar" goes straight to prison, "but perhaps the survival of this evil in Egypt is a necessity of democracy."

An eloquent appeal "To the people of Lebanon, issued by the Young Lebanon Society, of Cairo.

No. 586. Leading article prompted by the demand of "The Times" and the "Morning Post" for a revision of Great Britain's Near Eastern policy. Mr. Lloyd George has declared that the Treaty of Versailles can never be made effective. Are not all the politicians of the world now envious of the Hedjaz, who steadily refused to ratify this treaty, and so is not now compelled to eat her words?

No. 587. Gives the text of messages sent to King Hussein by Syrian patriots and of his replies, together with the text of King Hussein's telegrams of protest to the French President (2), His Majesty the King, the Prime Minister (2), the President of the Genoa Conference and the League of Nations.

Extract from an article in "Al Ahram," of Cairo, by El Sayed Mahmoud Bey Rashad, containing salutary advice to rulers in Arabia. The editorial comments are for the most part directed to rebutting the author's criticisms of the Hedjaz public security arrangements; these are not, of course, reproduced.

No. 588. Long extracts from "Al Ahram," of Cairo, on the Kerbela Conference, from "Al Carmel," of Haifa, on Palestine and Arab nationalism, from "Al Sabah," of Jerusalem, on the same subject, and from an Egyptian journal on the inspiration of Ramadan.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.

Enclosure 2 in No. 263.

#### Shipping Intelligence.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Dis-embarked.	Cargo Discharged.
Jeddah	British	..	Basrah	1922	1922		Packages.
Hwah Jah	Chinese	..	Aden	..	May 11	..	..
Rushdi..	Hedjaz	..	Yembo	..	" 21	..	..
Mansourah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	May 11	" 11	..	..
Massawa	Italian	Massawa	..	" 12	" 12	526	1,151
Dakahlieh	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 15	" 15	..	1,763
Nurani	..	Bombay	Bombay	" 17	" 23	..	673
Rushdi..	Hedjaz	Yembo	Kunfuda	" 18	" 21	..	47,775
Borulos	British	Suez	Port Soudan	" 20	" 20	..	..
Antiochus	..	Singapore	Liverpool	" 21	" 22	594	245
Sumatra	Dutch	Java	Amsterdam	" 21	" 21	39	..
Dakahlieh	British	Port Soudan	Suez	" 21	" 22	367	470
Mansourah	..	Suez	Port Soudan	" 25	" 25	47	804
Asmara	Italian	Massawa	Suez	" 25	" 25	..	general
Shushitar	British	Karachi	Bombay	" 26	" 27	756	1,525
Firoozi	..	Bombay	Suakin	" 26	" 28	..	9,656
Massawa	Italian	Suez	Massawa	" 27	" 27	..	general

[E 5797/33/65]

No. 264.

#### Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 15, 1922.

WITH reference to your letter of the 8th instant on the subject of the proposed treaty with King Feisal of Irak, I am directed by the Earl of Balfour to state that, subject to the following observations, he concurs in the modifications which Mr. Secretary Churchill proposes to introduce into the treaty in order to meet as far as possible the recommendations of the High Commissioner for Irak.

2. In view of the fact that the treaty with King Feisal is intended to provide His Majesty's Government with the powers to carry out their obligations under the mandate, his Lordship considers that the former instrument must not be allowed to lapse before the latter. The logical conclusion is therefore that the termination of the treaty should be subject to the approval of the League of Nations. I am accordingly to propose that the words "at the end of which period the situation shall be examined, and, if the high contracting parties are of opinion that the treaty is no longer required, it shall, subject to the assent of the League of Nations, be terminated" should be inserted in the article on this subject after the words "twenty years" in substitution for the sentence of which Sir P. Cox recommended the deletion. Should Sir P. Cox be unable to obtain the agreement of King Feisal to the words "assent of," Lord Balfour would be reluctantly prepared to accept the substitution of the words "confirmation by" instead of "assent of." Further, in the event of King Feisal preferring that this article should be so drafted as to provide for possible disagreement between the high contracting parties, his Lordship would see no objection to the use of the phrase "and if either or both of the high contracting parties are of opinion," &c.

3. It is presumed that in the case of the text of article 4 the reference by Sir P. Cox to article 17 of the treaty should have read article 18. I am, however, to suggest that in any case the position of articles 17 and 18 might with advantage be inverted, in which case no correction in the text of article 4 will be required.

4. His Lordship's attention has also been invited to the reference in article 9 to the "abrogation" of capitulatory rights. As in the case of the Palestine mandate, it is provided that these rights shall be only "suspended," and, as the French Government intend in the case of the mandate for Syria to provide only for their being *sans application*, I am to suggest that either "suspension" or "non-application" should be substituted for "abrogation."

[8975]



5. Subject to the inclusion of the above amendments, his Lordship concurs in the terms of the draft telegrams to Sir P. Cox which accompanied your letter under reply.

6. I am to request that copies of the draft treaty in its final form may be communicated to this Department in due course.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 6011/78/65]

No. 265.

*The Earl of Balfour to Count de Saint-Aulaire.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, June 16, 1922.*

WITH reference to your note of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that the agreement regarding the Palestine mandate which has been reached as the result of the correspondence with the Government of the United States provides that a treaty shall be concluded between that Government and His Majesty's Government.

2. As the terms of the mandate are to be recited in the treaty, the latter cannot, however, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government be signed until the terms of the mandate have been definitely settled by the Council of the League of Nations.

I have, &c.

BALFOUR.

[E 5858/78/65]

No. 266.

*The Earl of Balfour to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).*

(No. 987.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 20, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 879 of the 25th ultimo I transmit to your Excellency herewith two copies of the draft of the proposed treaty with the Government of the United States regarding the Palestine mandate, which has been drawn up by Sir C. Hurst, in collaboration with M. Fromageot, of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who has framed a similar treaty with regard to the Syria mandate.

2. I shall be glad if your Excellency, in communicating a copy of this draft to the Department of State, will ascertain whether they agree to its terms, and, if not, what modifications they consider desirable.

3. As the terms of the mandate are to be recited in the treaty, the latter cannot of course be finally concluded until the former have been approved by the Council of the League of Nations. You should, however, take the opportunity of informing the State Department that His Majesty's Government are not contemplating any modifications of substance in the text of the mandate, except for the insertion in article 25 of the phrase "with the consent of the League of Nations" between the words "be entitled" and "to postpone," and except for some modification of article 14, as to which a separate despatch is being addressed to you.

4. You will observe that the operative clauses of the draft treaty are very similar to those in the draft treaty as to the East African mandate, explanations as to which have been transmitted to you in my despatch No. 961 of the 15th June, 1922.

I am, &c.

BALFOUR.

Enclosure in No. 266.

*Draft Treaty with the United States of America.*

*Palestine.*

WHEREAS, by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Turkey renounces all her rights and titles over Palestine; and

Whereas article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles provides that in the case of certain territories which, as a consequence of the

late war, ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them, mandates should be issued, and that the terms of the mandate should be explicitly defined in each case by the Council of the League; and

Whereas, by article 95 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, the high contracting parties agreed to entrust, by application of the provisions of the said article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as might be determined by the principal Allied Powers, to a mandatory to be selected by the said Powers, and further agreed that the mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on the 2nd November, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil or religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas the principal Allied Powers have agreed to entrust the mandate for Palestine to His Britannic Majesty; and

Whereas the terms of the said mandate have been defined by the Council of the League of Nations as follows:—

[Terms of Mandate.]

And whereas the mandate in the above terms will be issued on the coming into force of the treaty of peace with Turkey; and

Whereas the United States of America by participating in the war against Germany contributed to the defeat of her and her allies and to the renunciation of the rights and titles of her allies in the territory transferred by them, but has not ratified the Covenant of the League of Nations embodied in the Treaty of Versailles; and

Whereas the President of the United States is desirous of concurring in the British mandate for Palestine; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty as mandatory for Palestine is desirous of ensuring to the United States of America and its citizens the same rights in Palestine as they would enjoy if the United States were a member of the League of Nations;

His Britannic Majesty and the President of the United States of America have decided to conclude a convention to this effect and have nominated as their plenipotentiaries

Who

have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

Subject to the provisions of the present convention, the United States concurs in the British mandate for Palestine, including the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, and in the British administration of Palestine pursuant to the terms of the said mandate.

ARTICLE 2.

The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy the benefit of all the engagements of His Britannic Majesty defined in the mandate, including therein equality as regards commercial opportunity, notwithstanding the fact that the United States is not a member of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 3.

Vested American property rights in Palestine shall be respected and in no way impaired.

ARTICLE 4.

A duplicate of the annual report to be made by the mandatory under article 24 of the mandate shall be furnished to the United States.

ARTICLE 5.

Nothing contained in the present convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the mandate as recited above unless such modification shall have been assented to by the United States.



## ARTICLE 6.

The present convention shall be ratified in accordance with the respective constitutional methods of the high contracting parties. The ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as practicable. It shall take effect on the date of the exchange of the ratifications. If at the date when the convention takes effect the mandate has not yet been issued by the Council of the League of Nations, His Britannic Majesty agrees to apply the convention so far as may be possible in the provisional administration of Palestine which he is now conducting at the request of the Council of the League.

In witness whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this convention and have hereunto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at \_\_\_\_\_, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_

[E 5858/78/65]

No. 267.

*The Earl of Balfour to Sir G. Grahame (Brussels).*

(No. 650.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 20, 1922.*

SINCE the last meeting of the Council of the League of Nations the terms of the Palestine mandate have been carefully examined by His Majesty's Government in connection with the points raised by the United States Government and in certain other quarters.

2. As the result of correspondence with the Government of the United States, article 8 has been amended so as to read: The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but shall be revived immediately and completely upon the termination of the mandatory régime, unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such rights should agree, or have agreed, by treaty to their suspension or modification."

3. Excepting in the case of article 14, regarding which a separate despatch will be sent to you, the only further modifications of substance which have been made in the final draft of the mandate for Palestine, as published in August 1921, occur in articles 25, 27 and 28. In the case of article 25 the words "with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations" have been inserted between the words "shall be entitled" and "to postpone." Article 27 now reads: "The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate," and in the concluding sentence of article 28 the words "members of the League" have been substituted for the words "Powers signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey."

4. I shall be glad if your Excellency will inform M. Hymans of these modifications, and at the same time communicate to him one of the enclosed copies\* of the draft treaty which it is hoped to conclude with the Government of the United States, as soon as the terms of the mandate have been approved by the Council of the League of Nations, adding that this draft has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington with instructions to open negotiations with the Department of State.

I am, &amp;c.

BALFOUR.

[E 5858/78/65]

No. 268.

*The Earl of Balfour to Baron Hayashi.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, June 20, 1922.*

AT the recent session of the Council of the League of Nations it was decided that a special meeting of that body should be called in July to consider the "A" mandates.

2. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government have been considering the points raised by the United States Government and observations made in other quarters regarding the text of the draft mandate for Palestine, and the following modifications have now

\* See enclosure in No. 266.

been made in the final draft of the mandate for Palestine, as published by His Majesty's Government in August 1921:—

- (1.) Article 8 now reads: "The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but shall be revived immediately and completely upon the termination of the mandatory régime, unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such rights should agree, or have agreed, by treaty to their suspension or modification."
- (2.) In article 25 the phrase "with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations" has been inserted between the words "shall be entitled" and "to postpone."
- (3.) Article 27 now reads: "The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate."
- (4.) In the concluding sentence of article 28 the words "members of the League" have been substituted for the words "Powers signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey."

3. Of these modifications, the revision of article 8 has been made in connection with the agreement regarding the Palestine mandate which His Majesty's Government have reached with the Government of the United States, with whom it is hoped to conclude a treaty as soon as the actual terms of the mandate have been approved by the Council of the League of Nations. A copy of the draft of this treaty, which has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, with instructions to open negotiations with the Department of State, is transmitted herewith.\*

4. No other modifications of substance are otherwise being made by His Majesty's Government except for a revision of article 14, regarding which a separate communication is being addressed to you.

5. His Majesty's Government are anxious that the approval of the Council of the League for the mandate for Palestine should be obtained at the forthcoming session of the Council, and they confidently hope that in this object they will receive the support of the Japanese representative on that body.

6. I shall be glad if your Excellency will arrange for a copy of this note to be communicated to the Japanese Ambassador in Paris.

I have, &amp;c.

BALFOUR.

[E 5858/78/65]

No. 269.

*The Earl of Balfour to M. de Martino.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, June 20, 1922.*

AT the recent session of the Council of the League of Nations it was decided that a special meeting of that body should be called in July to consider the "A" mandates.

2. Meanwhile His Majesty's Government have been considering the points raised by the United States Government and observations made in other quarters regarding the text of the draft mandate for Palestine, and the following modifications have now been made in the final draft of the mandate for Palestine, as published by His Majesty's Government in August 1921:—

- (1.) Article 8 now reads: "The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but shall be revived immediately and completely upon the termination of the mandatory régime, unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such rights should agree, or have agreed, by treaty to their suspension or modification."
- (2.) In article 25 the phrase "with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations" has been inserted between the words "shall be entitled" and "to postpone."

\* See enclosure in No. 266.



- (3.) Article 27 now reads: The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.<sup>a</sup>
- (4.) In the concluding sentence of article 28 the words "members of the League" have been substituted for the words "Powers signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey."

3. Of these modifications the revision of article 8 has been made in connection with the agreement regarding the Palestine mandate which His Majesty's Government have reached with the Government of the United States, with whom it is hoped to conclude a treaty as soon as the actual terms of the mandate have been approved by the Council of the League of Nations. A copy of the draft of this treaty, which has been sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington with instructions to open negotiations with the Department of State, is transmitted herewith.<sup>a</sup>

4. No other modifications of substance are otherwise being made by His Majesty's Government except for a revision of article 14, regarding which a separate communication is being addressed to you.

5. His Majesty's Government are anxious that the approval of the Council of the League for the mandate for Palestine should be obtained at the forthcoming session of the Council, and they confidently hope that in this object they will receive the support of the Italian representative on that body.

I have, &c.  
BALFOUR.

[E 5858/78/65]

No. 270.

*The Earl of Balfour to Count de Saint-Aulaire.*

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, June 20, 1922.*

IN reply to your note of the 6th instant, I have the honour to state that His Majesty's Government cordially reciprocate the desire of the French Government to co-operate in securing the issue of the Palestine and Syrian mandates at the next session of the Council.

2. As your Excellency is doubtless aware, the texts of the additions to the Syrian mandate and of the proposed treaty with the United States were considered in the course of the discussions on the "A" mandates which have taken place in Paris between M. Fromageot and Sir C. Hurst, who reached a general agreement on the subject. I now desire formally to confirm that agreement.

3. In the course of these discussions the view was expressed by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs that the present text of article 25 of the Palestine mandate appeared to accord to the mandatory excessive liberty of action in Transjordan. The adoption of the new text for this article was primarily intended to give the mandatory the power to differentiate, in so far as the application of the measures connected with the Jewish national home is concerned, between Palestine west of the Jordan and the zone between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine, as ultimately determined. His Majesty's Government are, however, anxious to meet the wishes of the French Government on this point, and are accordingly prepared to insert the phrase "with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations" between the words "shall be entitled" and "to postpone."

4. As regards the mandate for Iraq, it has been explained to M. Fromageot that His Majesty's Government will probably find themselves unable to proceed with that mandate at the forthcoming session of the Council of the League of Nations, since it is unlikely that by that time they will have secured the recognition by the United States Government of the validity of the rights claimed by the Turkish Petroleum Company, which has been the subject of protracted correspondence.

5. The present text of the Irak mandate is, however, unlikely to undergo any substantial modification beyond such as may be necessitated in the course of negotiations with the United States. It will, doubtless, eventually include provisions regarding the Capitulations similar to those to be added to the Syrian or Palestine mandates, but until the above-mentioned negotiations with the United States are completed, His Majesty's Government cannot foresee what, if any, provisions regarding monopolies can be included in the Irak mandate.

<sup>a</sup> See enclosure in No. 266.

6. Certain minor textual changes may also have to be made in the Irakman date as the result of the conclusion of the projected treaty with King Feisal, but it is anticipated that these will be confined to modifications by which the existence of an Irak State is recognised, and His Majesty's Government, instead of undertaking to adopt certain measures themselves, will undertake to ensure that they are adopted. It is proposed, for example, to substitute "Irak" for "Mesopotamia" throughout, and to alter the first sentence of article 1 of the mandate for Irak to read "The mandatory undertakes that an organic law shall be framed . . . ."

7. The texts of the mandates for Syria and Irak are, however, already not identical, and His Majesty's Government are confident that the French Government will agree that the introduction into the latter of modifications of the nature indicated above is inevitable.

8. It is regretted that the final texts of the mandates for Irak and Palestine, as issued in the summer of 1921, were not communicated officially to the French Government at the time, but it was thought that that Government would have full cognisance of the modifications which had been introduced as the result of their publication by His Majesty's Government in the white paper of August last, of which copies are understood to have been supplied in the usual course to the French Embassy here.

9. In conclusion, I have the honour to express the hope that the forthcoming negotiations between the French Government and the United States Government regarding the mandate for Syria will reach an early and satisfactory conclusion, and that the efforts in which our two Governments are collaborating to secure the approval by the Council of the League of Nations of the terms of the mandates for Syria and Palestine at the forthcoming session of that body may prove successful.

I have, &c.  
BALFOUR.

[E 6037/248/91]

No. 271.

*The Earl of Balfour to Major Marshall (Jeddah).*

(No. 72.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 22, 1922.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 38 of the 22nd ultimo, I have to inform you that the question of the attitude to be adopted by His Majesty's Government in the matter of the Nejd pilgrimage has, since the receipt in London of information to the effect that Ibn Saud was unlikely to be able for the fourth consecutive year entirely to prevent his subjects from performing the pilgrimage, been constantly under the most careful consideration.

2. From the first, King Hussein has adopted in this question an entirely uncompromising attitude, which was in no way modified as the result of the communication to him of a message from Ibn Saud guaranteeing that there should be no aggression on the part of the Nejd if they were unmolested (see my telegram No. 17 of the 12th May), which was conveyed to him at the same time as he was warned that the pilgrims would probably travel overland.

3. Your telegrams Nos. 30 and 32 laid stress on the spread of Mudayyanism and on the likelihood of serious trouble in the Hedjaz if the Nejd pilgrimage by land were allowed to take place. The situation was fully reviewed in the light of these telegrams, but it was felt that His Majesty's Government would not be justified in pressing Ibn Saud once more to prevent his subjects from performing the pilgrimage. He might, moreover, though anxious to do so, be unable to restrain them and they would in that case probably set out in a provocative spirit and unfettered by any guarantee of non-aggression. If, on the other hand, His Majesty's Government did not attempt to veto the pilgrimage, Ibn Saud's assurances would hold good and the responsibility for any unprovoked attacks which might be made by his pilgrims would fall entirely upon his shoulders. In any case, His Majesty's Government had no wish to find themselves directly involved in the threatening struggle between the Wahabis and the orthodox Moslems.

4. You were, therefore, instructed (see my telegram No. 23 of the 22nd May) to inform King Hussein that His Majesty's Government were unable to intervene further, Sir P. Cox being, however, subsequently authorised to urge Ibn Saud to limit the numbers of his pilgrims and to impress on him the serious light in which His Majesty's Government would view any untoward developments in the Hedjaz which might arise as the result of his own or Khalid's actions (see my telegram No. 24 of the 6th June).

[8975]

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5. The decisions communicated to you in my telegrams Nos. 27 and 28 were those reached at an inter-departmental conference on the 7th June attended by members of the Colonial Office and India Office, as well as of this Department, when recent telegrams on the subject received from the High Commissioner for Iraq, together with the various telegrams from you and the Hashimite Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, were discussed in detail. The considerations which led to the decision that His Majesty's Government should adhere to the attitude of non-intervention may be briefly summarised as follows:—

- (a.) His Majesty's Government are not prepared to have recourse to military measures in order to keep the peace in Arabia.
- (b.) The only ruler over whom they have a direct hold is Ibn Saud, to whom they pay a subsidy of 60,000*l.* per annum.
- (c.) Ibn Saud has on the whole behaved well and has shown loyalty to His Majesty's Government. Moreover, of all the chieftains in Arabia he alone has shown signs of statesmanship.
- (d.) To threaten him with a stoppage of his subsidy before he has taken any action to justify recourse to such a measure, and having regard to the fact that, admittedly, His Majesty's Government are unable to guarantee that his followers may not be subjected to unprovoked attack, would be straining his friendship to the breaking-point, and might have the effect of throwing him into the arms of the French, who are only too anxious to welcome him to their bosom.
- (e.) To yield to Feisal's threat of leaving his throne in order to succour his family would only encourage him to adopt similar tactics, whenever he wishes to extort something from His Majesty's Government which they are unwilling to give.

6. The foregoing exposition of the trend of events at this end will show you that the fullest consideration was given to your recommendation that the Nejd pilgrimage by land should be prevented this year. Meanwhile, recent telegrams from Sir P. Cox indicate that Ibn Saud is anxious to discuss the question of a settlement with King Hussein and it is to be hoped that the chances of an agreement being reached between these potentates will not be prejudiced by any untoward incidents during the present pilgrimage.

I am, &c.  
BALFOUR.

[E 6298/65/65]

No. 272.

*Sir J. Tilley to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 23.)*

(No. 90.)

(Telegraphic.) R

*Rio de Janeiro, June 23, 1922.*

MONTEVIDEO despatch No. 123 and your despatch No. 241, 1921.

M. Wilenski is now here. Are you sending any instructions about representations to Brazilian Government?

[E 6318/178/65]

No. 273.

*Mr. Dormer to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 25.)*

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

*The Vatican, June 24, 1922.*

CARDINAL Secretary of State told me to-day that Gout, of French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had called on Nuncio and made following proposal with regard to Palestine mandate and question of Holy Places.

Commission should consist of a representative of France, Great Britain, Italy and Spain "and perhaps Belgium." President was to be a Frenchman and a Catholic. Gout had said that this proposal was acceptable to His Majesty's Government, and would no doubt be agreed to by League of Nations. French Government would then insist on liturgical honours being paid to president. To this Nuncio had expressed surprise and pointed to San Remo agreement.

Cardinal Secretary of State remarked he felt post of president should be held by

each representative in turn and not permanently by a Frenchman. Holy See would not object to liturgical honours, but naturally they could only be paid to the Catholic. Belgium should certainly be represented. He said he had spoken in a similar sense to Spanish Ambassador.

I said commission now seemed to be something different to that referred to in article 14, which was more a tribunal to define rights. On the face of it, I did not see how question of honours came in. I had not heard of French proposal, and, as it stood, doubted it being acceptable in any quarter.

[E 6365/78/65]

No. 274.

*Sir R. Graham to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 26.)*

(No. 575.)

My Lord,

*Rome, June 21, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 518 and 559 of the 8th and 16th instant, I have the honour to report that the Syrian and Palestine mandates are becoming the subject of some attention on the part not only of the Catholic Popular Party, but also of the Fascista organisation.

Signor Mussolini has published a resolution in the name of the directorate of the Fascista parliamentary group defining its views as follows:—

1. In consequence of the lapse of the Treaty of Sèvres, all mandates connected therewith and all questions of the Eastern Mediterranean are reopened for discussion.
2. The Syrian and Lebanon mandates, as also that for Palestine, are open violations of the principles of the independence and liberty of peoples, especially the two former.
3. The Italian representatives at the League must see that illiberal mandates no longer having any legal foundation, which would inevitably lead to bloodshed, are not ratified or are postponed *sine die*.
4. The material and moral interests of Italy lie in favouring the constitution of independent or federated States in the Eastern Mediterranean as the sole escape from strangulation by French and English imperialism and for bringing about peaceful Italian commercial expansion among those peoples who have given proof of the warmest sympathy for Italy.

In a signed article in the "Popolo d'Italia" on the 16th June Signor Mussolini states that the issue of the Palestine mandate is apparently irreparably prejudiced, in spite of Vatican opposition, after the adherence of the United States, even with reserves, and of Italy, as Senator Schanzer has explicitly admitted. What would happen it is easy to see; in any case it is a veritable abuse of power—a fraud—since the Treaty of Sèvres has lapsed. He then discusses at greater length the Syrian and Lebanon mandates. Syria and Lebanon were better off under Turkey, and are now in revolt against French military dictatorship and economic exploitation. The League had hitherto abetted English and French imperialism; it is the policy of France to make the Mediterranean practically a French sea. Leaving principles aside, is it to Italian interests to have an anglicised Palestine and a gallicised Syria? Let the Minister for Foreign Affairs take note that two powerful Italian parties—the Popular Party and the Fascisti—had declared definitely against the ratification of the Anglo-French mandates, and let him act accordingly.

The directorate of the Popular Party, which, with its hundred odd members, is an essential element in the present Government's majority, has declared that Italy should oppose any form of real political protectorate in the mandates, and should favour a policy of autonomy for the peoples of Syria, the Lebanon and Palestine with effective guarantees for minorities. It also "re-expressed the wishes of all the Catholics of the world for the guardianship of the Holy Places, where Italy had glorious traditions and imprescribable rights, especially for the Cenaculum."

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.



[E 6321/78/65]

No. 275.

*Baron Moncheur to the Earl of Balfour.—(Received June 26.)**Ambassade de Belgique, Londres,  
le 23 juin 1922.*

Milord,

LE Conseil de la Société des Nations a décidé, au cours de sa session du mois de mai, d'examiner, en vue de son approbation définitive, le projet de mandat britannique sur la Palestine.

Comme ne l'ignore pas votre Seigneurie, ledit projet ne put être approuvé en mai par suite de l'attitude prise par certaines Puissances. De son côté, le Saint-Siège exprima au Conseil de la Société des Nations, par l'intermédiaire d'une communication du Cardinal Gasparri, diverses observations au sujet dudit projet.

Il semble que cette action du Saint-Siège a amené l'ouverture de négociations entre celui-ci et la Grande-Bretagne au sujet des questions soulevées par le Vatican et touchant à la situation des catholiques de Palestine.

Le délégué de la Belgique à la prochaine session du Conseil de la Société des Nations aura à exprimer son avis sur les termes du mandat britannique. En conséquence, M. le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Belgique estime qu'il serait utile pour lui d'être mis au courant des pourparlers entre le Saint-Siège et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de façon à pouvoir tracer en connaissance de cause la ligne de conduite du Gouvernement belge au sujet de la question dont il s'agit.

Je serais très reconnaissant à votre Seigneurie si elle voulait bien avoir l'obligeance de me mettre en mesure de satisfaire au désir de M. Jaspar et de m'informer du résultat des négociations relatives au projet de mandat britannique sur la Palestine.

Je saisis, &amp;c.

Bx. MONCHEUR.

[E 6415/248/91]

No. 276.

*Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 28.)*

Sir,

*Downing Street, June 27, 1922.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of the Earl of Balfour, a copy of a telegram from Sir P. Cox, Bagdad, to the political agent, Bahrein, transmitting a personal message to Ibn Saud on the subject of the visit of Nejd pilgrims to Mecca.

I am, &amp;c.

J. E. MASTERTON-SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 276.

*Sir P. Cox to Political Agent, Bahrein.*

(No. 647.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Bagdad, May 31, 1922.*

FOLLOWING for Ibn Saud:—

"I request your Highness to regard what follows as a personal message from me. Your agent, Ahmad Thanayan, and the political agent, Bahrein, were recently informed, for your information, that in view of their assurances of last year and of the guarantees which your Highness has given of non-aggression by your subjects, His Majesty's Government did not feel justified in demanding of you that Nejd pilgrims should be debarred this year from undertaking the Haj. You were also informed that similar guarantees of non-aggression were being demanded from King Hussein.

"I know that on the one hand this intimation would have given you a feeling of relief in that you would no longer be obliged to resist the importunities of your subjects desiring to undertake the pilgrimage. On the other hand, I am sure that you will share with me a feeling of great anxiety lest, by reason of the heated relations which exist between some of the tribesmen of Nejd and those of the Hedjaz, some petty dispute should occur which might act like the small spark which ignites a great conflagration, of which no one can foresee the extent. Your Highness is well aware

that I have the strongest reliance on your personal good faith and loyalty to your engagements with Great Britain and you, I believe, place similar reliance on my great personal regard and friendship for yourself and my keen desire that your relations with my Government should remain firm and, similarly, that your relations of amity with the friends of my Government such as the State of Irak should be firmly established. I feel sure that you also will realise that the danger which gives me such anxiety is a real one and that, granting the most loyal intentions on your part and that of King Hussein to ensure that your subjects should perform their pilgrimage to the Holy Places in all friendliness and security, it can only be by the dint of very great precautions and most stringent orders on the part of both Governments that that end can be assured. It is only now that I learn of the recent expedition of Khalid Ibn Mansur into Ghamid, and his occupation of Mikhwah. This alone may well lead to trouble at this critical juncture. Had it been possible for you to discourage your subjects from going even for another year I think it would have been fortunate from the point of view of the unity of Islam and the peace of the Jezirat-al-Arab, but I well understand that it may not now be possible for you to take such action and in that case I can only urge you to be alive to the danger involved and pray you with great earnestness both to reduce the numbers of your pilgrims to the lowest limit and to send with them representatives in whom you can place complete confidence and whom you can warn of the vital importance of demonstrating to the British Government and to the world at large that your subjects are completely under your control and that where your guarantee is given for their good behaviour it can be accepted with complete confidence by those to whom it is given. I beg you also to remember that in the event of any disturbance of the peace of the Hedjaz owing to the influx of your subjects, the responsibility for not preventing it will certainly be laid at the door of Great Britain.

"I need not say that our agents in the Hedjaz will similarly do their utmost to assist King Hussein to fulfil his obligation and to ensure that your subjects receive just the same friendly treatment as the pilgrims of other nations. The mere fact that the Hedjaz at this time is full of subjects of all nations occupied with the pilgrimage will doubtless bring home to you the more forcibly how vitally important it is that nothing should occur during the Haj likely to place them in difficulty or danger."

[E 6318/178/65]

No. 277.

*The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Dormer (The Vatican).*

(No. 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, June 29, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 25 of 24th June: the Holy Places Commission.

(Confidential.)

His Majesty's Government are considering a possible modification of article 14 of the mandate and the question of the method of selecting the commission. Meanwhile you should confine yourself to denying the correctness of the views expressed by M. Gout. His Majesty's Government have said nothing to give any colour whatever to his assertion that his proposal was acceptable to them.

[E 6298/65/65]

No. 278.

*The Earl of Balfour to Sir J. Tilley (Rio de Janeiro).*

(No. 90.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Foreign Office, June 29, 1922.*

YOUR telegram No. 90 of 23rd June: Palestine mandate.

Modification of article 14 of Palestine mandate and assurances regarding method of appointing commission are under consideration here with a view to remove misapprehensions entertained by Vatican and other quarters. Representations will be made to Brazilian Ambassador here.



[E 6068/78/65]

No. 279.

*The Earl of Balfour to Mr. Chilton (Washington).*

(No. 1033.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 29, 1922.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 987 of the 20th June, I transmit to you, for your personal information, the accompanying advance copy of a memorandum regarding the Palestine mandate, which has been prepared by the Colonial Office for submission to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, with copy of the letter from Cardinal Gasparri therein referred to.

2. You should communicate to the State Department as soon as possible a copy of the enclosed new draft of article 14 of the Palestine mandate with an explanation on the lines of the latter portion of the Colonial Office memorandum.\* You may add, for the information of the United States Government, that His Majesty's Government regard the United States as one of the Great Powers interested in Palestine which should not be without representation upon the commission. His Majesty's Government confidently assume that the United States Government will welcome these fresh proposals as likely to show more clearly the precise intention of articles 13 and 14 of the Palestine mandate, and to dispel the unfounded apprehensions which have been expressed in certain quarters on this subject.

I am, &amp;c.

BALFOUR.

[E 6068/78/65]

No. 280.

*The Earl of Balfour to Count de Salis (Vatican).*

(No. 148.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 29, 1922.*

I DULY received your despatch No. 58 of the 13th April enclosing a copy of a memorandum from the Vatican criticising the draft mandate for Palestine.

2. As a result of the meeting which you attended in Sir C. Hurst's room in the Foreign Office on the 14th June, and at which representatives of the Colonial Office were present, it has been decided that a reply should be prepared by the Colonial Office to the memorandum (practically identical with that enclosed in your above-mentioned despatch) which the Vatican recently addressed to the Council of the League of Nations. This reply will be made direct to the Council for purposes of circulation to the members of the League by that body, and an advance copy is enclosed for your personal information.

3. I shall be glad if you will return to your post at as early a date as possible, and explain to the Cardinal Secretary of State the action which His Majesty's Government are taking, as explained above. You should at the same time point out to him how unfounded are the apprehensions which appear to be entertained by the Vatican regarding the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine. For this purpose the Colonial Office memorandum, with its enclosures, will furnish you with material for a reply to the criticisms of the Holy See on such points as the position of the Zionist Organisation with respect to the Government of Palestine and the close control which the mandatory proposes to exercise over that Government.

4. You may at the same time discuss with Cardinal Gasparri the draft article which His Majesty's Government intend to propose to the Council of the League in substitution for the present article 14 of the Palestine mandate. A copy of this draft article forms part of the enclosures to the Colonial Office memorandum, which explains fully the intentions of His Majesty's Government with regard to the proposed Holy Places Commission. You are authorised to guarantee to the Cardinal Secretary of State that the name of a Roman Catholic will be included among those finally put forward for approval by the Council of the League of Nations.

5. Your conversation should throughout take the form of explaining to the Cardinal Secretary of State the lines of the reply of His Majesty's Government to the Council of the League of Nations. In view of the facts that none of the enclosures to this despatch has yet been published and that the memorandum to the League has not yet been sent off, you should not at present communicate officially copies of any of

\* See Enclosure in No. 281.

them, except the new draft of article 14, to the Cardinal Secretary of State, but there is no objection to your handing to him unofficially a copy of the letter to the League of Nations. I may add, for your information, that copies of the new draft of article 14 have been communicated to the French, Italian, Japanese, Spanish, Belgian, Brazilian and Chinese representatives in London, and to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington for communication to the United States Government.

6. You should report in due course the result of your conversation.

I am, &amp;c.

BALFOUR.

Enclosure 1 in No. 280.

*Note in reply to Cardinal Gasparri's Letter of May 15 addressed to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.*

CARDINAL GASPARRI'S letter of the 15th May appears to His Majesty's Government to be based upon an imperfect understanding of the measures which they propose to introduce in Palestine in consequence of the charge laid upon them by article 95 of the Treaty of Sèvres. In order to remove all possibility of misapprehension they have the honour to communicate herewith, for the information of the Council of the League of Nations, copies of correspondence which has passed between His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Secretary of the Zionist Organisation, together with copies of a draft Order in Council which will shortly be promulgated to regulate the administration of Palestine.

2. His Majesty's Government fully share the opinion expressed by Cardinal Gasparri that article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations would be incompatible with a mandate that proved to be an instrument for the subjection of the native populations for the benefit of another nationality. That they associate themselves with this view is clear from the interpretation which they place upon the declaration originally made on the 2nd November, 1917, by the British Government and accepted by the other Allied Powers in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies has defined this interpretation in the statement enclosed with his letter of the 3rd June to the Secretary of the Zionist Organisation, and the organisation have accepted it in their reply of the 18th June. The Council will observe that His Majesty's Government contemplate that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and that it has never been intended that they or any section of them should possess any other juridical status.

3. As the Secretary of State for the Colonies has pointed out in the statement referred to above, the special position assigned to the Zionist Organisation in article 4 of the draft mandate for Palestine does not imply administrative functions. That special position relates to the measures to be taken in Palestine affecting the Jewish population, and contemplates that the organisation may assist in the general development of the country, but does not entitle it to share in any degree in its government. The draft Order in Council providing for the administration of Palestine does not even refer to the existence either of a Jewish agency or of the Zionist Organisation, which has not desired to possess and does not possess any share in the general administration of the country.

4. The immigration of Jews and their close settlement upon the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes, are integral and indispensable factors in the execution of the charge laid upon the mandatory of establishing in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people. Article 6 of the draft mandate, which provides for these measures and which is quoted by Cardinal Gasparri, expressly reaffirms that the rights and position of other sections of the population must not thereby be prejudiced.

The acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine, which is provided for in article 7 of the draft mandate, to which the Cardinal Secretary of State also refers in his letter, is designed to emphasise the policy, to which reference has already been made, that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and is therefore a safeguard



against the very injury which the Cardinal Secretary of State anticipates will result from it.

5. Cardinal Gasparri also alludes to article 11 of the draft mandate in support of his contention that the Jews are to be given a privileged and preponderating position as against other nationalities and creeds. His Majesty's Government regard the provision by which the Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in article 4 to construct or operate upon fair and equitable terms any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration, as a legitimate recognition of the special situation which arises in Palestine from the charge which has been laid upon them by the Principal Allied Powers, and also of the fact that the Jewish people, in virtue of that policy, are ready and willing to contribute by their resources and efforts to develop the country for the good of all its inhabitants.

6. His Majesty's Government invite the attention of the Council of the League of Nations to article 18 of the draft Palestine Order in Council, which provides that no ordinance shall be passed by the Legislative Council which shall restrict complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, save in so far as is required for the maintenance of public order and morals, or which shall tend to discriminate in any way between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. It also provides that no ordinance shall be passed which shall in any way be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the provisions of the mandate to be issued for Palestine.

7. Article 26 of the same draft order provides that the High Commissioner shall in any case reserve for the signification of the pleasure of His Majesty any ordinance passed by the Legislative Council which concerns matters dealt with specifically by the provisions of the mandate.

8. Article 86 of the same document provides for appeals to the Council of the League of Nations by any religious community or considerable section of the population in Palestine which complains that the terms of the mandate are not being fulfilled. His Majesty's Government are confident that the council will agree that these provisions taken together provide ample safeguards against the risk that any nationality or creed will be subordinated in any way to any other.

9. As regards the second point raised by the Cardinal Secretary of State, namely the provision of adequate safeguards for the rights of the Christian denominations, His Majesty's Government offer the following observations: In so far as civil and political rights are concerned, it will be apparent to the council from what has already been said that the apprehensions of the Cardinal Secretary of State are unfounded. With regard to religious rights, His Majesty's Government invite the attention of the council to the provisions of articles 54 and 83 of the draft Palestine Order in Council, which provide for the jurisdiction of the Christian religious courts and for the enjoyment by each religious community recognised by the Government of autonomy for the internal affairs of the community, subject to the provisions of any order or ordinance issued by the High Commissioner.

His Majesty's Government are anxious to ensure that no religious community shall feel any apprehensions as to the position of its adherents in Palestine under the British mandate. They are conscious that Palestine is the centre of a variety of religious interests, each one of which, considered separately, is world-wide. As a Christian Power they are fully alive to the paramount necessity of ensuring to all Christian communities the consciousness that nothing will be done in Palestine which might be construed as negligence of or indifference to Christian sentiment.

10. They have carefully considered the observations offered by the Cardinal Secretary of State on article 14 of the draft mandate in its present form, and in order to remove all possible ground for apprehension have prepared an alternate draft, of which a copy is enclosed. For the purpose of ensuring that the delicate task of deciding what are the existing rights in the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites which His Britannic Majesty, as mandatory for Palestine, is responsible for protecting should be entrusted to a body of whose impartiality there can be no question, they now suggest not only that the composition of the commission shall be subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, but that any report made by them shall also be laid before the Council of the League for confirmation.

11. As a further means towards ensuring absolute impartiality, His Majesty's Government would be prepared, if the Council of the League approved this course, to select nominees for the commission from a panel put forward in the first place under some international procedure, whether by the Assembly or Council of the League of

Nations or by the President of the Court of International Justice, while reserving to themselves the right to submit additional names for stated reasons to the Council of the League for approval. The panel should, in their opinion, be composed of persons of world-wide reputation, to be selected in such a way that the commission would be a thoroughly representative international body, on which none of the Great Powers interested in Palestine and none of the three confessions, namely, Christian, Mahomedan and Jew, would be without representation. His Majesty's Government would also invite the Council of the League to appoint one of the members of the commission as its first chairman by whatever procedure commends itself to the council.

12. The council will observe that His Majesty's Government do not propose in the draft article which is now enclosed to retain the obligation that the commission shall necessarily ensure that certain Holy Places, religious buildings or sites are entrusted to the permanent control of suitable bodies. Nor have they attempted to define the exact number of members of whom the commission shall be composed beyond providing that the body shall be sufficiently large to ensure all interests being represented upon it.

13. The reason which has prompted His Majesty's Government to suggest that prospective nominees shall be recommended under some international procedure rather than by political or hierarchical authorities is that it appears to them preferable that a body to which this responsible task is to be entrusted should not be composed of persons who might possibly be regarded as agents of a particular power or community whose interests might be directly concerned. Political interests are fully safeguarded by the provisions that the appointment of the commission shall be subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations and that all reports presented by the commission shall require their confirmation. Religious interests are equally well protected by the provisions that the commission shall be in consultation with representatives of the confessions concerned and that any religious confession which considers that the mandatory is not giving effect to the provisions of the report may appeal to the Council of the League of Nations, who may require the mandatory to reassemble the commission.

14. His Majesty's Government confidently expect that the Great Powers and confessions who are interested in Palestine, and who will, it is hoped, also be represented upon the commission, will realise that the traditional policy of His Majesty's Government, its application in Palestine, and the proposals now put forward for the Holy Places Commission are such as to dispel all legitimate apprehensions. They invite the council to agree that no further political or religious safeguard is either necessary or practicable.

Enclosure 2 in No. 280.

#### Article 14.

1. IN order to determine the existing rights in the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, which the mandatory is pledged under the preceding article to maintain, a commission, consisting of not less than seven members, shall be appointed by the mandatory, subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations. The duty of the commission shall be to frame a report defining these rights, including rights of ownership, user and access. The report shall be laid before the Council of the League of Nations for confirmation, and when confirmed shall be binding on the mandatory.

In the preparation of its report the commission will consider all conflicting claims to any of the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites, and will endeavour, in consultation with representatives of the confessions concerned, to arrive at an agreed definition of existing rights. If no agreement can be arrived at within a period to be fixed in each case by the commission, the commission, after hearing all parties, shall decide judicially on the claims of which it has had notice, and shall embody such decisions in its report.

2. The report of the commission may also contain recommendations for ensuring that certain Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, which the commission finds to be regarded with special veneration by the adherents of one particular religion, are entrusted to the permanent control of suitable bodies representing the adherents of the religion concerned.

Such control will be guaranteed by the League of Nations.

[8975]



3. The commission will settle its own procedure, and shall appoint its own staff. Each member of the commission will in turn act as chairman of the commission. The expenses of the commission shall be defrayed by the League of Nations.

4. In all cases dealt with under this article, the right and duty of the mandatory to maintain order and decorum in the place concerned shall not be affected, and the buildings and sites will be subject to the provisions of such laws relating to public monuments as may be enacted in Palestine with the approval of the mandatory.

5. Any religious confession which considers that the mandatory is not giving effect to the provisions of the report may appeal to the Council of the League, who may require the mandatory to reassemble the commission for the purpose of considering and reporting upon any such appeal. Such report shall be laid before the Council of the League of Nations for confirmation, and when confirmed shall be binding on the mandatory.

Enclosure 3 in No. 280.

*Colonial Office to the Zionist Organisation.*

Sir,

*Colonial Office, June 3, 1922.*

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to enclose, to be laid before your organisation, copy of a statement which it is proposed to publish, dealing with the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine. The statement discusses in some detail the means by which it is intended to carry into effect the establishment of a Jewish national home in the country. Under article 4 of the draft mandate submitted to the Council of the League of Nations, a special position is assigned to your organisation as an agency authorised to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in this respect. In these circumstances it appears to Mr. Churchill essential, not only that the declared aims and intentions of your organisation should be consistent with the policy of His Majesty's Government, but that this identity of aim should be made patent both to the people of Palestine and of this country, and indeed to the world at large. Mr. Churchill feels sure that you will appreciate this consideration and will be anxious to do all in your power to remove any misunderstandings that may have arisen. He would accordingly be glad to receive from you a formal assurance that your organisation accepts the policy as set out in the enclosed statement and is prepared to conduct its own activities in conformity therewith.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

*British Policy in Palestine.*

The Secretary of State for the Colonies has given renewed consideration to the existing political situation in Palestine, with a very earnest desire to arrive at a settlement of the outstanding questions which have given rise to uncertainty and unrest among certain sections of the population. After consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine the following statement has been drawn up. It summarises the essential parts of the correspondence that has already taken place between the Secretary of State and a delegation from the Moslem Christian Society of Palestine, which has been for some time in England, and it states the further conclusions which have since been reached:—

The tension which has prevailed from time to time in Palestine is mainly due to apprehensions, which are entertained both by sections of the Arab and by sections of the Jewish population. These apprehensions, so far as the Arabs are concerned, are partly based upon exaggerated interpretation of the meaning of the declaration favouring the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, made on behalf of His Majesty's Government on the 2nd November, 1917. Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English." His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the declaration referred to do not contemplate that

Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish national home, but that such a home should be founded in Palestine. In this connection it has been observed with satisfaction that at the meeting of the Zionist Congress, the supreme governing body of the Zionist Organisation, held at Carlsbad in September 1921, a resolution was passed expressing, as the official statement of Zionist aims, "the determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a flourishing community, the upbuilding of which may assure to each of its peoples an undisturbed national development."

It is also necessary to point out that the Zionist Commission in Palestine, now termed the Palestine Zionist Executive, has not desired to possess, and does not possess, any share in the general administration of the country. Nor does the special position assigned to the Zionist Organisation in article 4 of the draft mandate for Palestine imply any such functions. That special position relates to the measures to be taken in Palestine affecting the Jewish population, and contemplates that the organisation may assist in the general development of the country, but does not entitle it to share in any degree in its government.

Further, it is contemplated that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they or any section of them shall possess any other juridical status. So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned, it appears that some among them are apprehensive that His Majesty's Government may depart from the policy embodied in the declaration of 1917. It is necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these fears are unfounded, and that that declaration, reaffirmed by the conference of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sèvres, is not susceptible of change.

During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs and elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns, elected councils in the towns and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected chief rabbinate and rabbinical council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has, in fact, "national" characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish national home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre, in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish national home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection.

This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews.

For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment. Hitherto the immigration has fulfilled these conditions. The number of immigrants since the British occupation has been about 25,000.

It is necessary also to ensure that persons who are politically undesirable are excluded from Palestine, and every precaution has been, and will be, taken by the Administration to that end.

It is intended that a special committee should be established in Palestine, consisting entirely of members of the new Legislative Council elected by the people, to confer



with the Administration upon matters relating to the regulation of immigration. Should any difference of opinion arise between this committee and the Administration, the matter will be referred to His Majesty's Government, who will give it special consideration. In addition, under article 81 of the draft Palestine Order in Council any religious community or considerable section of the population of Palestine will have a general right to appeal, through the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State, to the League of Nations on any matter on which they may consider that the terms of the mandate are not being fulfilled by the Government of Palestine.

With reference to the Constitution which it is now intended to establish in Palestine, the draft of which has already been published, it is desirable to make certain points clear. In the first place it is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab delegation, that during the war His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that an independent national Government should be at once established in Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated the 24th October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon, then His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Shereef of Mecca, now King Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hedjaz. That letter is quoted as conveying the promise to the Shereef of Mecca to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But this promise was given subject to a reservation made in the same letter which excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the independent sanjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of the Jordan was thus excluded from Sir H. McMahon's pledge.

Nevertheless, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government in Palestine. But they are of opinion that in the special circumstances of that country this should be accomplished by gradual stages and not suddenly. The first step was taken when, on the institution of a civil Administration, the nominated Advisory Council which now exists was established. It was stated at the time by the High Commissioner that this was the first step in the development of self-governing institutions, and it is now proposed to take a second step by the establishment of a Legislative Council, containing a large proportion of members elected on a wide franchise. It was proposed in the published draft that three of the members of this council should be non-official persons nominated by the High Commissioner, but representations having been made in opposition to this provision, based on cogent considerations, the Secretary of State is prepared to omit it. The Legislative Council would then consist of the High Commissioner as president, and twelve elected and ten official members. The Secretary of State is of opinion that before a further measure of self-government is extended to Palestine and the Assembly placed in control over the executive it would be wise to allow some time to elapse. During this period the institutions of the country will have become well established, its financial credit will be based on firm foundations, and the Palestinian officials will have been enabled to gain experience of sound methods of government. After a few years the situation will be again reviewed, and if the experience of the working of the Constitution now to be established so warranted, a larger share of authority would then be extended to the elected representatives of the people.

The Secretary of State would point out that already the present Administration has transferred to a Supreme Council, elected by the Moslem community of Palestine, the entire control of Moslem religious endowments (Wakfs) and of the Moslem religious courts. To this council the Administration has also voluntarily restored considerable revenues derived from ancient endowments which had been sequestered by the Turkish Government. The Education Department is also advised by a committee representative of all sections of the population, and the Department of Commerce and Industry has the benefit of the co-operation of the Chambers of Commerce which have been established in the principal centres. It is the intention of the Administration to associate in an increased degree similar representative committees with the various Departments of the Government.

The Secretary of State believes that a policy upon these lines, coupled with the maintenance of the fullest religious liberty in Palestine and with scrupulous regard for the rights of each community with reference to its Holy Places, cannot but commend itself to the various sections of the population, and that upon this basis may be built up that spirit of co-operation upon which the future progress and prosperity of the Holy Land must largely depend.

Enclosure 4 in No. 280.

*The Zionist Organisation to Colonial Office.*

Sir,

77, Great Russell Street, London, June 18, 1922.

WITH reference to your letter of the 3rd June, receipt of which has already been acknowledged, I have the honour to inform you that the executive of the Zionist Organisation have considered the statement relative to the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine, of which you have been good enough to furnish them with a copy, and have passed the following resolution:—

"The executive of the Zionist Organisation, having taken note of the statement relative to British policy in Palestine transmitted to them by the Colonial Office, under date the 3rd June, 1922, assure His Majesty's Government that the activities of the Zionist Organisation will be conducted in conformity with the policy therein set forth."

The executive observe with satisfaction that His Majesty's Government, in defining their policy in Palestine, take occasion once more to reaffirm the declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, and lay it down as a matter of international concern that the Jewish people should know that it is in Palestine as of right.

The executive further observe that His Majesty's Government also acknowledge, as a corollary of this right, that it is necessary that the Jews shall be able to increase their numbers in Palestine by immigration and understand from the statement of policy that the volume of such immigration is to be determined by the economic capacity of the country from time to time to absorb new arrivals. Whatever arrangements may be made in regard to the regulation of such immigration, the executive confidently trust that both His Majesty's Government and the Administration of Palestine will be guided in this matter by the aforesaid principle.

The Zionist Organisation has at all times been sincerely desirous of proceeding in harmonious co-operation with all sections of the people of Palestine. It has repeatedly made it clear, both in word and deed, that nothing is farther from its purpose than to prejudice in the smallest degree the civil or religious rights or the material interests of the non-Jewish population. The Zionist Organisation will continue on its side to spare no efforts to foster the spirit of goodwill to which His Majesty's Government have pointed as the only sure foundation for the future prosperity of Palestine. The executive earnestly hope that the statement of policy which His Majesty's Government propose to issue will once and for all dispel such misapprehensions as may still exist, and that, loyally accepted by all parties concerned, it may mark the opening of a new era of peaceful progress.

I have, &c.

CH. WEIZMANN.

[E 6068/78/65]

No. 281.

*The Earl of Balfour to Count de Saint-Aulaire.*

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, June 30, 1922.

WITH reference to your note of the 9th ultimo, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government have not received from the Vatican a specific request that the appointment of the chairman of the Holy Places Commission should be postponed. They have, however, received a memorandum raising certain objections with regard to the proposals in the draft mandate for Palestine for dealing with the Holy Places and, in particular, to article 14 of that draft.

2. His Majesty's Government have carefully considered these objections and, in order to remove all possible ground for apprehension, they intend to propose at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations that a new article, a draft of which I have the honour to enclose, should be substituted for article 14 of the Palestine mandate. His Majesty's Government confidently expect that your Government will welcome the fresh proposals of His Majesty's Government as likely to show more clearly the precise intentions of articles 13 and 14 of the Palestine mandate, and to dispel the unfounded apprehensions which have been expressed in certain quarters on this subject.



3. I shall be glad if you will communicate a copy of this article at as early a date as possible to your Government, with the intimation that His Majesty's Government are suggesting to the Council of the League that nominees for the commission should be selected from a panel put forward under some international procedure, and composed of persons of world-wide reputation to be chosen in such a way that the commission shall be a thoroughly representative international body on which none of the Great Powers interested in Palestine and none of the confessions, namely, Christian, Mahommedan and Jew, shall be without representation.

4. His Majesty's Government regard France as one of the Great Powers interested in Palestine which should not be without representation upon the commission.

5. They would also invite the Council of the League of Nations to appoint one of the members of the commission as its first chairman by whatever procedure recommends itself to the Council.

I have, &c.  
BALFOUR.

Enclosure in No. 281.

*Draft Article 14 of the Palestine Mandate.*

1. In order to determine the existing rights in the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, which the mandatory is pledged under the preceding article to maintain, a commission consisting of not less than seven members shall be appointed by the mandatory subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations. The duty of the commission shall be to frame a report defining these rights, including rights of ownership, user and access. The report shall be laid before the Council of the League of Nations for confirmation, and when confirmed shall be binding on the mandatory.

In the preparation of their report the commission will consider all conflicting claims to any of the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites, and will endeavour, in consultation with representatives of the confessions concerned, to arrive at an agreed definition of existing rights. If no agreement can be arrived at within a period to be fixed in each case by the commission, the commission, after hearing all parties, shall decide judicially on the claims of which it has had notice and shall embody such decisions in their report.

2. The report of the commission may also contain recommendations for ensuring that certain Holy Places, religious buildings or sites which the commission finds to be regarded with special veneration by the adherents of one particular religion, are entrusted to the permanent control of suitable bodies representing the adherents of the religion concerned.

Such control will be guaranteed by the League of Nations.

3. The commission will settle its own procedure and shall appoint its own staff. Each member of the commission will in turn act as chairman of the commission. The expenses of the commission shall be defrayed by the League of Nations.

4. In all cases dealt with under this article the right and duty of the mandatory to maintain order and decorum in the place concerned shall not be affected, and the buildings and sites will be subject to the provisions of such laws relating to public monuments as may be enacted in Palestine with the approval of the mandatory.

5. Any religious confession which considers that the mandatory is not giving effect to the provisions of the report may appeal to the Council of the League, who may require the mandatory to reassemble the commission for the purpose of considering and reporting upon any such appeal. Such report shall be laid before the Council of the League of Nations for confirmation, and when confirmed shall be binding on the mandatory.

[E 6068/78/65]

No. 282.

*The Earl of Balfour to Baron Hayashi.\**

Your Excellency,

*Foreign Office, June 30, 1922.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the objections recently raised in certain quarters to the proposals in

\* Also to the Italian, Brazilian and Belgian Ambassadors and the Spanish and Chinese Chargés d'Affaires, *mutatis mutandis*.

the draft mandate for Palestine for dealing with the Holy Places and, in particular, to article 14 of that draft.

2. In order to remove all possible ground for apprehension His Majesty's Government intend to propose, at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, that a new article, a draft of which I have the honour to enclose,<sup>o</sup> should be substituted for article 14 of the Palestine mandate. The intention of this article is to make it quite clear that His Majesty's Government are desirous that the existing rights in the Holy Places, religious buildings or sites in Palestine should be investigated and determined in the first place by a thoroughly representative international commission of whose impartiality there can be no question, whose appointment shall be subject to the approval of the League of Nations, and that any subsequent disputes to which the application of these decisions may give rise should be similarly dealt with. His Majesty's Government confidently expect that your Government will welcome the fresh proposals of His Majesty's Government as likely to show more clearly the precise intention of articles 13 and 14 of the Palestine mandate and to dispel the unfounded apprehensions which have been expressed in certain quarters on this subject.

3. I shall be glad if your Excellency will communicate a copy of this article at as early a date as possible to your Government, with the intimation that His Majesty's Government are suggesting to the Council of the League that nominees for the commission should be selected from a panel put forward under some international procedure and composed of persons of world-wide reputation, to be chosen in such a way that the commission shall be a thoroughly representative international body on which none of the Great Powers interested in Palestine and none of the three confessions, namely, Christian, Mahommedan and Jew, shall be without representation. (†His Majesty's Government regard Italy as one of the Great Powers interested in Palestine which should not be without representation upon the commission.) They would also invite the Council of the League of Nations to appoint one of the members of the commission as its first chairman by whatever procedure recommends itself to the Council.

I have, &c.  
BALFOUR.

[E 6516/78/65]

No. 253.

*Foreign Office to Cabinet Offices.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 30, 1922.*

I AM directed by the Earl of Balfour to transmit to you herewith, for communication to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, copies of the revised final draft of the mandate for Palestine.

2. It will be observed that, in addition to the revision of article 14, regarding which the Colonial Office are understood to have addressed you a communication, certain modifications have been made in the final draft of the mandate as published in August last.†

Article 8 now reads:—

"The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but shall be revived immediately and completely upon the termination of the mandate régime, unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such rights should agree, or have agreed, by treaty to their suspension or modification."

In article 25: The words "with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations" have been inserted between the words "shall be entitled" and "to postpone."

Article 27: The words after "mandate" have now been omitted,

3. The following verbal alterations have also been made:—

Preamble: In first sentence: "Renounces" vice "renounced."

Article 1: "This mandate" vice "the present mandate."

Article 4: "Affect" vice "effect."

Article 12: In second sentence: "He" vice "it."

\* See enclosure in No. 281.

† To Italian Ambassador only.

‡ C.P. No. 1500.



Article 21: Concluding words now read "to the nationals of all members of the League of Nations."

Article 27: "This mandate" vice "the present mandate."

Article 28: Concluding words now read "members of the League" vice "Powers signatories of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey."

4. I am to request that the above emendations may be pointed out to the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and that the Council may be urged, in the light of these emendations, formally to approve the terms of the mandate at their forthcoming session.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

Enclosure in No. 283.

*Revised Final Draft of the Mandate for Palestine for the Approval of the Council of the League of Nations.*

THE Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas by article 132 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Sèvres on the 10th day of August, 1920, Turkey renounces in favour of the Principal Allied Powers all rights and title over Palestine; and

Whereas by article 95 of the said treaty the high contracting parties agreed to entrust, by application of the provisions of article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as might be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a mandatory to be selected by the said Powers; and

Whereas by the same article the high contracting parties further agreed that the mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on the 2nd November, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine, and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the terms of the mandate in respect of Palestine have been formulated in the following terms, and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine, and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions:—

Hereby approves the terms of the said mandate as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

His Britannic Majesty shall have the right to exercise as mandatory all the powers inherent in the Government of a sovereign State, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

ARTICLE 2.

The mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ARTICLE 3.

The mandatory shall encourage the widest measure of self-government for localities consistent with the prevailing conditions.

ARTICLE 4.

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

ARTICLE 5.

The mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.

ARTICLE 6.

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ARTICLE 7.

The Administration of Palestine will be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ARTICLE 8.

The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are suspended in Palestine, but shall be revived immediately and completely upon the termination of the mandate régime, unless the Powers whose nationals were entitled on the 1st August, 1914, to such rights should agree, or have agreed, by treaty to their suspension or modification.

ARTICLE 9.

The mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall safeguard (a) the interests of foreigners; (b) the law and (to the extent deemed expedient) the jurisdiction now existing in Palestine with regard to questions arising out of the religious beliefs of certain communities (such as the laws of Wakf and personal status). In particular the mandatory agrees that the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 10.

Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

ARTICLE 11.

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to article 311 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.



The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

#### ARTICLE 12.

The mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

#### ARTICLE 13.

All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights, of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the mandatory, who will be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected therewith: provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the mandatory from entering into such arrangement as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric of the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

#### ARTICLE 14.

In order to determine the existing rights in the Holy Places and religious building or sites in Palestine, which the mandatory is pledged under the preceding article to maintain, a commission consisting of not less than seven members shall be appointed by the mandatory subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations. The duty of the commission shall be to frame a report defining these rights, including rights of ownership, user and access. The report shall be laid before the Council of the League of Nations for confirmation, and when confirmed shall be binding on the mandatory.

In the preparation of their report the commission will consider all conflicting claims to any of the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites, and will endeavour in consultation with representatives of the confessions concerned to arrive at an agreed definition of existing rights. If no agreement can be arrived at within a period to be fixed in each case by the commission, the commission after hearing all parties shall decide judicially on the claims of which it has had notice and shall embody such decisions in their report.

The report of the commission may also contain recommendations for ensuring that certain Holy Places, religious buildings or sites which the commission finds to be regarded with special veneration by the adherents of one particular religion are entrusted to the permanent control of suitable bodies representing the adherents of the religion concerned.

Such control will be guaranteed by the League of Nations.

The commission will settle its own procedure, and shall appoint its own staff. Each member of the commission will in turn act as chairman of the commission. The expenses of the commission shall be defrayed by the League of Nations.

In all cases dealt with under this article, the right and duty of the mandatory to maintain order and decorum in the place concerned shall not be affected, and the buildings and sites will be subject to the provisions of such laws relating to public monuments as may be enacted in Palestine with the approval of the mandatory.

Any religious confession which considers that the mandatory is not giving effect to the provisions of the report may appeal to the Council of the League, who may require the mandatory to reassemble the commission for the purpose of considering and reporting upon any such appeal. Such report shall be laid before the Council of the League of Nations for confirmation, and when confirmed shall be binding on the mandatory.

#### ARTICLE 15.

The mandatory will see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, is ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language (while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose) shall not be denied or impaired.

#### ARTICLE 16.

The mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

#### ARTICLE 17.

The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of forces maintained by the mandatory.

The mandatory shall be entitled at all time to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

#### ARTICLE 18.

The mandatory must see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any of the States Members of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under their laws) as compared with those of the mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may on the advice of the mandatory impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population.

Nothing in this article shall prevent the Government of Palestine, on the advice of the mandatory, from concluding a special customs agreement with any State, the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

#### ARTICLE 19.

The mandatory will adhere on behalf of the Administration to any general international conventions already existing or that may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation, and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication, or literary, artistic or industrial property.

#### ARTICLE 20.

The mandatory will co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.



## ARTICLE 21.

The mandatory will secure, within twelve months from the date of the coming into force of this mandate, the enactment, and will ensure the execution of a law of antiquities based on the provisions of article 421 of Part XIII of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. This law shall replace the former Ottoman law of antiquities, and shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of archaeological research to the nationals of all members of the League of Nations.

## ARTICLE 22.

English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscriptions in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statements or inscriptions in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

## ARTICLE 23.

The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

## ARTICLE 24.

The mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

## ARTICLE 25.

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the mandatory shall be entitled with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of articles 15, 16 and 18.

## ARTICLE 26.

If any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of these provisions which cannot be settled by negotiation, this dispute shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

## ARTICLE 27.

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

## ARTICLE 28.

In the event of the termination of the mandate conferred upon the mandatory by this declaration, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by articles 13 and 14, and for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations, legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

The present copy shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Made at                      the                      day of                      .

## CHAPTER IV.—GENERAL.

[F 1248/5/44]

No. 284.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 344.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, February 2, 1922.*

THE French Ambassador came to see me this afternoon and in the course of our conversation handed me a document of many pages containing, in a formal shape and drawn up, as he believed, by M. Poincaré himself, the observations of the French Government concerning the modifications which they desire to introduce into the text of the proposed treaty of guarantee between France and Great Britain. The substance of this memorandum he had communicated to me before in our various conversations, but only, as he said, in a personal capacity. He now desired to hand it in collectively and formally on behalf of his Government.

His Excellency then passed on to renew, in an apologetic vein, his observations on the recent unfortunate letter of his Government concerning the Græco-Turkish situation, which letter I now knew, and he also was aware that I knew, even though the substance of it might have been sent to him from Paris, had been composed by himself. While he repeated to me with much reiteration what he had intended to convey, I had no alternative, but to reply that he had signally failed to convey it, and that the impression which his letter had produced upon me had been shared by everyone who had read the document.

I told him, however, that I was much more concerned with what we were going to do at the conference at Paris than with what had previously been written. I was aware from a telegram from your Lordship what had passed in the interview between yourself and M. Poincaré, and, indeed, the Count de Saint-Aulaire proceeded to give me the same information on his own account. I was glad, I said, to learn that M. Poincaré had modified his attitude on many of the important particulars upon which I had commented; but there remained two important points upon which, so far, he did not appear to have given your Lordship or myself any satisfaction. If, as I gathered, M. Poincaré or the Turks were going to press for the complete evacuation of Anatolia by the Greeks, what, I asked, were the guarantees the French were going to propose for the safety and indeed the lives of the large Greek population in Smyrna, Aivali, and other towns in the interior. It was out of the question to trust them to the tender mercy of the Turks. We had ample and reliable evidence that the Angora Turks had been deporting the Christian populations of Eastern Anatolia in large masses to the coast amid every circumstance of cruelty and suffering. Their policy was indeed admitted by them to be one of deliberate extermination. Was it the least likely that Europe would stand by to see the Greeks on the Smyrna coast or in the interior treated in a similar fashion? Was it not absurd to rely upon the paper guarantees for minorities in the European treaties?

His Excellency admitted that something much more substantial would be wanted in the present case, though he did not indicate to me clearly where it was to be found. He thought, however, that complete and immediate evacuation would be found impossible and that it could only be effected by stages. Meanwhile he placed great reliance upon the creation of a gendarmerie under Allied officers.

I said I did not believe for one moment that any such body would be able to prevent massacre if the Turks were bent upon it, and I earnestly urged the French Government, if their proposals were going to be of the character indicated by M. Poincaré, to address themselves to the case not merely of the Greeks whom they wished to turn out, but of the Greeks who were going to be left behind.

The second point upon which I said I had so far had no reply from M. Poincaré was the view of the French Government as to the steps to be taken if an agreement arrived at between the Powers was absolutely rejected by the Turks.

The Ambassador asked me what I would do in those circumstances, to which I replied that the question was one which I had originally contemplated examining in concert with the French at Paris, but it was they who had forced the matter to the front and compelled an earlier examination by laying down that in no circumstances whatsoever would they apply coercion to the Turks.

His Excellency reiterated that for the French Government to fight the Turks



or move forces against them was out of the question, and I readily allowed that we were as little anxious or as little likely to take a similar step. But this did not exhaust the possibilities of coercion which might be applied in many forms, and I urged the Ambassador to press upon his Government the deep consideration of this matter before the discussions in Paris began. One such form of pressure I did indeed indicate in my conversation, and that with a particular object. This might be a withdrawal of the permission accorded to the Turks (equally with the Greeks) at the last meeting in Paris to purchase arms, munitions and stores, not, indeed, from the Allied Governments, but from any private firms who chose to supply them. I told the Ambassador that I was well aware that French firms had taken ample advantage of this permission, and that Mustapha Kemal had been largely supplied by them, but the French had gone even further, for, in spite of the pledge against Government action, M. Briand had handed over to the Angora Turks, when evacuating Cilicia, large military stores, a great number of rifles, and no small amount of ammunition, on the plea that they would be useful for the gendarmerie whom it is proposed to set up. M. Franklin-Bouillon had frankly admitted the gift, but had excused it, as did the Ambassador, on the ground that its dimensions had been greatly exaggerated.

I observed that, whether its dimensions were great or small, it was a deliberate violation of an Allied agreement, and tended to emphasise the suspicion and dislike with which we naturally regarded the whole Franklin-Bouillon transaction. The Ambassador, I am inclined to think, entirely shares my views about the latter, for he informed me with some satisfaction that he had declined to meet that voluble negotiator when he had recently been in this country.

Count de Saint-Aulaire pressed me to name a day when the suspended conversations in Paris might begin, but I declined to do this for the moment, remarking that the return of Lord Allenby next week and the necessity of discussing the Egyptian situation with him would necessarily occupy me for the best part of the week after the opening of Parliament, while the news which had just been received of the fall of the Italian Ministry rendered it more than doubtful whether they would be able to participate at an earlier date.

Before concluding our conversation, the Ambassador said a few words to me about the impending conference concerning Tangier. As he appeared to be a little uncertain about the assurances given to me by M. Briand and M. Poincaré, I repeated them to him. He suggested—not, I am afraid, without deliberation—that the subject of the conversations was to be the assurance by France to Great Britain of guarantees for the maintenance of our commercial and strategical position at Tangier.

I assured him at once that that was not the least the case. The conference was to be a tripartite one between France, Spain and ourselves. It was to deal, not with guarantees to Great Britain or to Spain, but with the internationalisation of the town of Tangier. I proposed to take up the negotiations from the stage at which they were dropped in 1914, soon after the beginning of the war, and the object was to set up, not a ridiculous form of petty municipal administration, such had recently been proposed by the French, but a genuine form of international government for the town.

The Ambassador enlarged to me upon the interests of France in the place, especially in connection with the projected railway, which was to be the starting point of a great transcontinental system leading to her possessions in the heart of Africa.

This, I said, was important and would have to be safeguarded, but France must not forget and could not ignore that Tangier was not in or adjacent to the French protectorate of Morocco, but was actually in and surrounded by the Spanish zone. Further, that the great majority of its population were not French but Spanish, and that the Spanish claims to influence there could not, therefore, be denied.

Upon the Ambassador remarking that the Spanish policy was that of annexation pure and simple, I observed that whilst this might have been the case, and I was not sure that an analogous policy had not been in the minds of some Frenchmen, the Spanish Government now knew perfectly well that any such solution was out of the question. I had myself told them quite candidly that their only chance was an international régime. They had accepted this and I did not imagine for a moment that they would seek to depart from it. That was the basis upon which our conversations must begin.

When I said that I supposed that the Ambassador, from his long Moroccan

experience, would be invited to represent his country, he said he thought this extremely unlikely, because he would be regarded as prejudiced in the matter.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[C 2000/458/62]

No. 285.

*The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).*

(No. 405.)

My Lord,

*Foreign Office, February 9, 1922.*

THE French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon, and in the course of our conversation touched upon three questions which are under discussion between our two Governments, namely, the Genoa Conference, the Near Eastern Conference and the proposed Anglo-French Guarantee. I will record in turn what passed between us upon each of these subjects.

Firstly, as to the Genoa Conference, his Excellency asked me whether the Cabinet had yet had time to consider the note from the French Government which the French Chargé d'Affaires had presented to the Foreign Office on the 6th February.

I was obliged to tell him that owing to the pressure of work arising out of the opening of Parliament, neither in this case nor in that of the so-called "Pact" had the Cabinet yet found time to arrive at a final decision. I was, however, quite prepared to make certain preliminary observations to him about each.

Concerning the Genoa Conference, I asked at once whether I was right in believing that the French Government intended to be represented.

The Count de Saint-Aulaire answered this question unhesitatingly in the affirmative, stating that the French Government held themselves absolutely bound by the decisions arrived at at Cannes with the consent of the late French Premier, although he did not conceal from me that M. Briand's successor held somewhat different views on the matter from those which had been entertained by M. Briand himself. The Ambassador further added that as the French Government had decided to take part it was indispensable in the interests of our own two countries in particular, and of Europe in general, that the conference should not be a failure. Such a result would be an immeasurable disaster to Europe. Any steps that could be taken to prevent such a calamity ought, therefore, to be taken in advance, whether by due preparation, investigation or otherwise.

Accepting these propositions, I went on to say that M. Poincaré's note seemed to me to admit of two possible interpretations, and the way in which it should be met must depend entirely on the question which of the two was right. For instance, the note might be regarded as containing a number of perfectly legitimate questions put by the French Government in order to remove obstacles or elucidate doubts. As such, it would deserve the fullest consideration, which we should be glad to give to it. On the other hand, it might be thought—and had indeed been suggested in some quarters—that by raising the number of points which were contained in the note the French Government was adopting—whether consciously or unconsciously—the best method for postponing the meeting of the conference, and perhaps even preventing it from being held. Furthermore, the latter point of view might find some justification in the suggestion, with which the note had ended, that the Genoa Conference should be postponed for at least three months.

As to this suggestion, I told the Ambassador quite frankly that I did not conceive that it would be entertained for a moment, either by my Government or by the Italian Government, who had issued the invitations. Nor could I see why the preliminary examination which the French had suggested should involve so protracted a delay. Indeed, postponement for three months, with the great issues at stake and with the present unsettled position of affairs, would certainly be regarded in some quarters as postponement *sine die*, and might end in the complete disappearance of the project. As a matter of fact, the date of the meeting did not rest either with the French Government or with ourselves. It rested with the Italian Government, who were the conveners of the meeting. So far as my information went, they had not even, in spite of the fall of Signor Bonomi's Ministry, expressed any desire to make a change, and I felt sure that the new Government, whoever might be its head, would feel disposed in this respect to adhere to the plans of its predecessor. On the other hand, a delay in forming a Government might, if much further protracted, render some slight postponement necessary. For that we must await the initiative of the new



Italian Ministry, whenever constituted. If they thought that postponement for two weeks, or three weeks—to the end of March, for instance—was necessary, we should be quite prepared, as no doubt would be the French, to consider their views. But I did not think that the British Cabinet would favour a proposal for any longer or indefinite extension of time.

As regards the main question which I put, the Count de Saint-Aulaire said that my first interpretation of the note was unquestionably the right one, and that the French Government had no desire, by inventing obstacles, to retard indefinitely, much less to defeat, the conference to which all had agreed.

In that case, I replied, it seemed to me that the sooner the points about which the French Government had doubts, or were in apprehension, could be removed, the better, and I felt sure that if the French Government were disposed to send over their experts to London to examine the matter with our own, we should be delighted to receive them. A committee had, I said, been sitting here to report upon the work in the economic sphere that would lie before the conference, and its members would, I felt sure, be prepared to join without delay in conversations with colleagues from France, if the latter were disposed to come over.

When the Ambassador asked me how soon such discussions might take place, I replied as soon as he liked, and as soon as the French delegates found it convenient to attend. I further informed the Ambassador that the Prime Minister had just delivered an answer in the House of Commons to a question put by Commander Kenworthy with regard to the conditions under which the Soviet delegation was likely to attend at Genoa. The Prime Minister had just informed me that he had stated in his reply that he regarded the acceptance of the invitation by the Soviet Government as an acceptance of the conditions which had been laid down at Cannes for their attendance, and I suggested to his Excellency that he should read the terms of the answer in the newspapers to-morrow morning.

Passing to the question of the Near East, the Ambassador asked me if I was satisfied with the note which I had received from M. Poincaré himself in reply to the despatch which I had written to Paris.

I replied that I gladly recognised its courteous and conciliatory character, and that it rendered me more hopeful of the impending conference than I had previously felt inclined to be.

The Ambassador added that the necessity of finding real and substantial guarantees for the protection of the minorities in Turkish territory was fully recognised by the French, and that difficult as might be the task they would lend us every support in endeavouring to secure them. They would also be quite willing to discuss in Paris the various steps that might be possible for putting pressure upon the Turks, always premising that the French could not be called upon to put troops into the field against them—a condition which, he believed, equally applied to ourselves. Any other forms of sanction they were anxious to discuss in a favourable spirit.

Without pursuing the question now, I said it was a question which we were still engaged in studying, and that I had hoped at a later date to have some proposals to make.

His Excellency then passed to the question of the proposed Anglo-French Treaty, and asked whether His Majesty's Government was yet in a position to reply to the full note which M. Poincaré had recently sent in.

I said that though I had not yet had time to go into this in detail with the Cabinet, as I hoped in a day or two to do, I was in a position, after the last two days' debate in both Houses of Parliament, to state even more clearly and frankly to the French Ambassador what the attitude, not merely of the British Government, but of public opinion in England, upon the question was likely to be. If his Excellency had looked at the papers he would have seen that while no speaker had expressed any feelings but those of the warmest respect and regard for France and of the necessity for continuing the friendship and close understanding between the two nations, there were definite and not negligible sections of opinion who had not merely objected to any extension of the draft proposal of 1918, but had actually protested against any guarantee being given at all. Among the latter class was no less a person than Lord Robert Cecil. The Ambassador would, therefore, be able to appreciate the different currents of thought in this country, and would realise the impossibility for the Government to go beyond that in which they would be supported by public opinion in granting. In fact, I said, I must tell his Excellency quite frankly that I did not think the Cabinet would be moved to go in substance at all outside the

boundaries of the Treaty of 1918. Nothing would be more unfortunate than to put a treaty before the House of Commons against which there voted a considerable minority. It would destroy not only the graciousness of the gift, but would permanently weaken its value. I should like, if the Pact were concluded, to hand it to France by the unanimous voice of both Houses of Parliament, but, if this were found to be impossible, at any rate let the minority be small and inconspicuous.

The Ambassador expressed a very strong hope that we might be able to meet the French case over articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles.

I said, in reply, that while I could not dispute the right of the French Government to raise and to press this question, and while situations might arise out of the violation of those two articles which might be tantamount to acts of aggression against France, I could not hold out the slightest hope that we should be able to accept the French proposal. It would be regarded by British opinion as embarking upon a policy of military adventure and potential danger.

His Excellency felt confident that even in this respect we should be able to find a formula, a refuge to which he has an extraordinary fondness for retreating when in difficulty.

I expressed the gravest doubt as to whether any formula could be found to cover the situation, and told him that I thought he must contemplate refusal on that point.

In leaving, his Excellency told me, "à titre personnel" (a qualification which he habitually employs when he is at all afraid of getting a rap over the knuckles at Paris) that he did not attach any value to the suggested consultations between the two General Staffs. As a matter of fact, they would in the ordinary course of business—granted that the agreement existed between us—confer from time to time, and he did not see the necessity of putting any provision to this effect into the treaty. On the other hand, he urgently requested me not to repeat these personal views at Paris.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 2406/31/91]

No. 286.

*Memorandum respecting British Political Relations with Koweit.*

IN view of the question that has arisen as to the position of foreigners in Koweit, it may be of interest to give a brief account of the relations of His Majesty's Government with that territory.

2. Although from about the middle of last century friendly intercourse had been maintained with the representative of the British Power in the Persian Gulf, nothing of consequence occurred until early in 1897, when Sheikh Mubarak, alarmed by the arrival of a Turkish sanitary official and other developments, requested an interview with the British Resident, and, representing that he was much concerned by recent incidents, strongly urged that Great Britain should undertake to prevent the absorption of Koweit by Turkey; if this were done, he was prepared to assist, with all the force at his command, in maintaining law and order in his part of the Gulf. At that time no definite arrangement was made, though at the end of the year (1897) a threatened attack on Koweit by the sheikhs of El Katr was prevented by the despatch of a British gunboat, and Sheikh Mubarak renewed his request for British protection.

3. Various forward moves were made by the Turkish authorities, and, in view of the developments which took place, an agreement was concluded on the 23rd January, 1899, by His Majesty's Government with the sheikh, binding him, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation any portion of his territory to foreigners without the previous assent of the British Government, or to receive the agent of any foreign Power at Koweit. His Majesty's Government, on their part, assured the sheikh of their good offices. The relations of the sheikh with the Ottoman Government remained in a more or less unsatisfactory condition until September 1901, when a temporary settlement was reached by the latter undertaking to His Majesty's Government that they would not send troops to Koweit, and that they would maintain the *status quo* there on condition that His Majesty's Government would not occupy the place or establish a British



protectorate; and the Marquess of Lansdowne gave an assurance to the Turkish Ambassador to that effect.

4. The sheikh's promise of 1899 as to non-alienation of territory was confirmed in a secret agreement of the 15th October, 1907, respecting the lease of the Bunder Shiveikh lands; and these two agreements continued until July 1913 to form the basis of British relations with Koweit.

5. The British and Ottoman Governments, having felt for some years that it was desirable formally to regularise the situation at Koweit, arrived at the agreement contained in articles 1-10 of the Anglo-Turkish Convention of the 29th July, 1913,\* by the terms of which the territory of Koweit was recognised as an autonomous kaza of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman flag was to be flown by the sheikh, but he was to have the right to insert a distinctive emblem in the corner; he was to continue to be a Turkish kaimakam; and his successors were to be appointed to a similar position by the Ottoman Government. The boundaries of the sheikh's immediate territory and his wider tribal jurisdiction were delimited; the Ottoman Government recognised the existing agreements between the sheikh and His Majesty's Government, and His Majesty's Government undertook, on their part, not to alter the nature of British relations with the Government of Koweit, or to establish a protectorate there, so long as the *status quo* as defined in the convention underwent no change.

6. On the 8th August, 1914, Sheikh Mubarak was informed officially by the officiating Resident in the Persian Gulf that a state of war existed between Great Britain and Germany, and on the 21st August he made a declaration of loyalty to His Majesty's Government on behalf of himself and his tribes, placed "his efforts, his men and his ships" at Great Britain's disposal and expressed a desire to eject the Turkish garrisons from the islands at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, which he claimed to be lawfully his. He repeated this declaration in a letter of the same date to the officiating Resident in the Persian Gulf, which was formally acknowledged by the latter on the 25th August, 1914.

7. In view of the increasing likelihood that Turkey would intervene in the war on Germany's side, it became clear that His Majesty's Government's previous undertakings to the Sheikh of Koweit would have to be renewed, and contingently extended, against the event of a state of war arising between Great Britain and Turkey. Accordingly a letter containing the following assurances was despatched to the sheikh on the 3rd November, 1914, by the acting Resident in the Gulf:—

"In return for the valuable co-operation which we expect from you, I am authorised by the Government, in the event of success—and, insha Allah, we shall succeed—to assure you again that Basra will never again be subject to Turkish authority.

"I am further to give your Excellency personally the following special assurances:—

"(1.) The date gardens which you now possess between Fao and Gurnak shall remain in the full possession of you and your heirs, and for ever be immune from taxation.

"(2.) You are guaranteed by the great British Government against all consequences of your attack against Safwan, Umm Kasr and Bubiyan.

"(3.) Koweit shall be recognised as an independent principality under British protection."

8. On the 28th February, 1917, upon the death of Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Subah, these undertakings were renewed in the "Kharita" to his son, and after the latter had also died and had been succeeded by his brother, Sheikh Salim-bin-Mubarak, the Government of India forwarded to Sir P. Cox, for presentation to the new ruler, a "Kharita" from the Viceroy renewing to him likewise the undertakings given to his father.

9. Sheikh Salim, during the first half of 1918, made considerable difficulties for His Majesty's Government over the question of the control of the blockade in Koweit territories and ports, and in that connection the following message was conveyed to him through the Resident at Koweit on the 5th July, 1918:—

"Government have deeply regretted the events of the last two years at Koweit, but they welcome your declaration† as affording an opportunity for re-establishment of our traditional friendship. In order that there may be no

\* This convention was never ratified.

† Accepting the measures of control desired by the British authorities.

misunderstanding in the future, they desire to explain their policy towards your Excellency.

"On the one hand, should you show to Government same friendship and assistance which they have experienced for many years in their dealings with the rulers of Koweit, they will continue to you the assurances given to your illustrious father, the late Sheikh Mubarak, especially that 'the town of Koweit and its boundaries likewise belong to Sheikh Mubarak-us-Subah, ruler of Koweit, and to his heirs after him,'\* and will extend to you the friendship and protection and assistance which they gave to him; and, finally, they hope that you will raise the name of your house and of Koweit to the high position which it held in the past in eyes of British Government and of peoples of Arabia.

"On the other hand, it is the plain duty of ruler of a State which is on terms of friendship with Government† to prevent all acts, either by his own subjects or by other persons in his territory, which may be contrary to interests of Government; and since they know that, if you wish to do so, you have the power to control your subjects and others in your territory, Government will be compelled to hold your Excellency personally responsible should any such act unfortunately be committed in future. They hope your Excellency will fully realise your responsibility as the ruler of Koweit towards Government under whose protection and friendship Koweit has so greatly prospered in the past, and will understand that prosperity depends entirely on preservation of true friendship, both in word and deed, with Government."

10. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf having apparently suggested, in November 1918, the declaration of British protectorates over Bahrein, Koweit, &c., the Viceroy considered that such declaration would (1) excite the suspicions of the neighbouring peoples, who would regard it as a prelude to annexation, and (2) provoke jealousy of other Powers, and involve us in heavy obligations, both military and financial. The Viceroy suggested that the better policy would be at an inter-Allied conference to put our cards frankly on the table, explaining our special interests and prescriptive position in the Persian Gulf, and the measures into which we have been driven by the special protection of those interests, and to express the hope that those interests and position might be fully recognised without need for further definition.

11. In December 1919 the Civil Commissioner at Bagdad raised again the question of the making of a jurisdictional Order in Council for Koweit (which question, as will be seen on reference to my memorandum‡ in E 7915/6681/91/1921, was considered in 1911 and then left over until a settlement should have been arrived at with Turkey in regard to the Arab littoral), but the India Office considered that although the order was desirable in itself, and there would be an advantage in issuing it at an early date, that moment, when the question of the machinery for the administration of the mandate for Mesopotamia was unsettled, and the effect of the mandate upon the relations of His Majesty's Government with contiguous countries was still uncertain, did not appear opportune for its issue, a view that was endorsed by this Office.

12. On the 9th July, 1921, the Colonial Office, who had become responsible for policy on the Arab littoral of the Persian Gulf, communicated an enquiry from the High Commissioner, Bagdad, as to the status of Koweit as a result of the war, and asking whether it could not be placed on a similar basis to that of Bahrein, and whether an Order in Council could not be issued now that Turkey had lost suzerainty over it. The Colonial Office were told in reply that, from the legal point of view and on the supposition that there was no intention of including Koweit within the boundaries of Mesopotamia, the status of that territory would seem to be governed by article 132 of the Treaty of Peace.‡ In practice, provided some prior agreement were reached with the Sultan of Koweit, it would appear unlikely that any foreign Power would challenge the issue of an Order in Council on the lines of "The Bahrein Order in Council, 1913," although the extension of British jurisdiction, as in that order, to foreigners might involve the prior concurrence of some foreign Powers. It was further suggested to the Colonial Office that the High Commissioner, Bagdad, might be instructed to open negotiations with the Sultan with a view to ascertaining the measure of British supervision which the latter was prepared to accept, but that the

\* From article 9 of secret agreement of the 15th October, 1907, referred to in paragraph 4.

† Not printed.

‡ By article 132 of the Treaty of Sévres, Turkey renounced in favour of the Principal Allied Powers all rights and title over territories outside Europe not otherwise disposed of by the Treaty.



actual issue of any Order in Council consolidating any agreement that might be reached with the Sultan should be postponed until the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

Foreign Office, March 29, 1922.

JOHN W. FIELD.

[E 5476/78/65]

No. 287.

*The Earl of Balfour to the Secretary to the Cabinet.—(Received May 20.)*

Sir,

Geneva, May 17, 1922.

YOU will be aware, from the telegrams I have despatched to London during the last week and from my despatch dated the 12th May, of the situation which has arisen at the Council during its present session over the request which I put forward at the first meeting, on the 11th May, that the terms of the mandate for Palestine should now be formally approved by the Council with an announcement of their intention to issue it in that form as soon as the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey has been concluded.

2. Two elements have militated against success attending my efforts to induce the Council to take on this occasion the action desired; the first being the fact that the question of the Palestine mandate was not formally on the agenda of the Council as circulated to its members beforehand.

3. This was due, of course, to the desire of His Majesty's Government to await the assent of the United States Government to the communication to the Council of the notes which had been exchanged between the two Governments on the subject. That assent was not forthcoming on the day the Council met and has now, in fact, been withheld, although the United States Government have, on their own account, published a statement of their attitude on this question and have said that they see no objection to the result of the negotiations with His Majesty's Government being explained to the Council.

4. The non-appearance of the question on the agenda undoubtedly gave the impression (unwarranted, I admit, but nevertheless inevitable) that the question was being rushed through the Council without proper consideration, and it is now clear that it would have been wiser to have placed the question formally on the agenda some weeks ago and then to have withdrawn it at the last moment if the negotiations with the United States Government had not happily concluded in time.

5. The second obstacle which has been encountered—unexpectedly so far as I was concerned—has been the intervention of the Vatican, the result of which has become more and more evident as the deliberations of the Council proceed.

6. It was only after the first meeting of the Council that I received a copy of the despatch from His Majesty's Minister at the Vatican to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, No. 58 of the 13th April, but since that despatch was written the Vatican would seem to have redoubled its efforts to stir up opposition to the draft mandate for Palestine as it stands at present. At all events the extent of the campaign undertaken by the Vatican can scarcely have been realised in London. It is no exaggeration to say that the reluctance of the French, Polish, Spanish, Italian and Brazilian representatives on the Council to discuss now the Palestine mandate or the question of the chairmanship of the Holy Places Commission has been due to the representations which have been made to their Governments by the Papal representatives.

7. A certain reluctance on the part of Italy to discuss these two questions, except as part of a bargain over the general settlement in the Near East, was not, of course, unexpected after the action taken by the Italian representative at the sixteenth session of the Council last January, which was reported in detail to the Cabinet at the time by Mr. Cecil Harmsworth, M.P., who represented His Majesty's Government on the Council at that session.

8. The arguments of the French Government (contained in M. Poincaré's note to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris dated the 10th May) as to the ill-effects of a premature approval of the Palestine mandate on the mandate for Syria and the position of France in that country, also possess some force and appear to me difficult either to answer or to ignore.

9. Such was, briefly, the situation as disclosed after I had invited the Council to place the Palestine mandate on the agenda for discussion at the present session, and in the circumstances I decided to ask for a public meeting of the Council in

order that I might make clear to the world at large the position of His Majesty's Government, and counteract if possible the statements which have been circulated broadcast that His Majesty's Government, in carrying out the terms of the mandate, would permit themselves to be unduly influenced by one or other of the powerful religious organisations which are interested in that country.

10. At the public sitting held to-day I accordingly made a statement as follows:—

"M. le Président: I had hoped that in the course of the discussions that take place at this meeting of the Council it would have proved possible to make one step forward in the direction of a final settlement of all these mandates connected with the Middle East. I have been disappointed; but do not let anybody suppose that the disappointment is due either to the fact that the absence of discussion at this meeting delays the final settlement of the problem, or because I am afraid that the general policy which the Allied and Associated Powers and the League of Nations have endorsed is in the smallest danger. Neither of these preoccupations have animated me on this occasion. As regards the final juridical date at which the mandates for the Middle East will become part of a fixed and authoritative law of nations, that can only be when the Treaty of Sèvres is finally ratified. But please remember that that is a purely technical point. The Treaty of Sèvres and the remodelling of the Treaty of Sèvres have nothing whatever to do with the policy of mandates either in the Near East or anywhere else. Grave questions undoubtedly are going to be discussed, and have been already discussed among the interested Powers with regard to certain provisions in the Treaty of Sèvres; but those parts of the Treaty of Sèvres which refer either to the general policy of mandates or to the particular mandates required in the Middle East, those parts of the Treaty of Sèvres have never been, and are not going to be, subject to discussion among the Allied and Associated Powers. Therefore, when I say that nothing that this Council at this meeting will do, no number of resolutions that we pass, will make the juridical date earlier than it would otherwise have been, you will observe that I am dealing with a purely technical point which has no relation to the substantial policy with which we are concerned.

"Let me repeat that the general policy has already been decided, and is outside any discussion which could take place round this table. There is not the slightest doubt that the views which the Allied and Associated Powers have explicitly declared are not going to be reversed. Nobody need be under the least fear, and nobody, let me add, need entertain the least hope, that those broad lines of policy are going to suffer any alteration. My regret, therefore, that the discussion has had to be postponed has no relation to the fundamental considerations on which I have just dwelt. It is based purely upon administrative expediency. I ask you to remember not merely that the task thrown upon the mandatory in Palestine is one of great delicacy and difficulty, but that it is also one which requires for its adequate development the obtaining of large pecuniary resources. Unless we are able, as I am confident that ultimately we shall be able, so to develop the economic capacities of Palestine as to enable it to support a much larger population in much greater comfort than is at present possible, then our hopes as to the future of the country are, no doubt, doomed to disappointment. Money, therefore, is required; productive capital is absolutely necessary; and everybody who knows the present condition of the world, and the difficulty of obtaining important sums for any purpose whatever, must be perfectly well aware that anything which postpones, or even appears to postpone, the final and definitive settlement of our problem, discourages the lenders, and makes it more difficult to obtain their much-needed assistance. I hope, therefore, that all my colleagues on the Council will remember that we—the Government I represent—feel ourselves in rather a special position as regards the duties thrown upon us by the mandate, and that in the interests of sound administration every step taken towards the technical regularisation of our position is of the utmost possible value.

"Now I believe the public have been puzzled, and perhaps not unnaturally puzzled, by the delay which has occurred in connection with this mandate; and, being puzzled, some of them say: 'Well, is this delay due to any indecision on the part of either of the Allied and Associated Powers, or of the Council of the League of Nations, or of the mandatory Powers? Are any of these authorities shrinking from the policy already declared?' In other words, they are inclined to interpret delay as a sign of indecision. The error is a grave one; but I think I can dissipate it by explaining in a very few words how the difficulties have occurred. I have already referred to the fact that so far as the embodiment of our policy in a final treaty is concerned, that has suffered delay not at all because of any question



connected with the mandates, but because other questions wholly alien to the mandate problem have preoccupied the Powers who are signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres. On this point I need say no more. But there is another point which I do not think is fully understood by the public, and on which perhaps my colleagues will allow me, as this is a public session, to say a word in order to dissipate prevailing misconceptions.

"Under the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Sèvres it was always contemplated that America, who had signed those treaties, would also share in the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, and would become in that sense a full party to all the responsibilities and all the labours of the Allied Powers. You all know that for various reasons, which I need not discuss, that consummation has not been reached; but America very naturally said: 'The fact that I have not ratified the Treaty of Versailles does not interfere with my rights, or even my duties, as one of the Allied and Associated Powers in connection with the territories which the victory of the Allied and Associated Powers placed in their hands at the conclusion of a successful war.' And America has therefore claimed that she shall have a voice in the mandates; the sort of voice which she would have had, had she been a member of the League of Nations, and had she occupied the seat which still awaits her should she wish to occupy it at this table. The result of this action on the part of the American Government is that a fresh series of discussions had necessarily to take place between them and the Allies upon these problems. Great Britain, for example, has been discussing with the American Government the terms of the mandate, and we are in entire agreement about it. They cordially accept the principle of the mandate in its entirety; and I believe, though I have had no official intimation of the facts, that in addition to this action of the American Government, the American Senate has unanimously expressed its approval of the policy embodied in the Palestinian mandate. But all this has to be put in treaty form. Diplomacy moves slowly. And it was not till the very eve of the meeting of this Council that we received the final statement from our American friends, the general tenor of which I have already explained to you. We received it so late that it was quite impossible for the British Government to give that notice to our colleagues, which of course we should otherwise have done had we intended to raise this question at the Council. The result was that when I came to Geneva this question was not on the agreed agenda, and I had to ask permission of my colleagues to allow me to raise it. They felt, or some of them felt (I dare say all of them felt), but at all events some of them felt, that while there was probably no objection at all to the substance of anything proposed, they had not had sufficient notice either to enable them to discuss the question with their own Governments or to enable those Governments themselves to consider whether this method of dealing with one mandate at a time in the Middle East was or was not a convenient method of procedure from a general point of view. They therefore felt, not unnaturally, that they ought not, in the English phrase, to be 'rushed' in the matter. The last thing that the British Government desires, of course, is to rush anybody into any proposal which they have not had time to consider, and I make no complaint against the action taken. I only want my colleagues to remember that it is an action which has had some inconvenient repercussion in Palestine itself from the administrative point of view.

"You will see, therefore, that the delay, however serious may be its practical effects, in no sense touches any of the broad questions of principle in which the public are interested. Many of them, I think, are in error as to the powers of the League of Nations or of this Council, which for many purposes represents the League; they are in error, I say, as to the powers which these bodies possess in regard to mandates.

"The mandates are not our creation. The mandates are neither made by the League nor can they in substance be altered by the League. Our duties are of two kinds. It is our business in the first place to see that the specific and detailed terms of the mandates are in accordance with the decisions come to by the Allied and Associated Powers in article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, and, in the second place, to see that, in carrying out those mandates, the mandatory Power shall be under the supervision—not the control, but the supervision—of the League of Nations, which possesses an admirable organisation through which it can obtain the fullest information as to the method in which each mandatory Power fulfils the duties which are entrusted to it.

"Remember that a mandate is a self-imposed limitation by the conquerors on the sovereignty which they obtained over conquered territories. It is imposed by the Allied and Associated Powers on themselves in the interests of what they conceived

to be the general welfare of mankind; and they have asked the League of Nations to assist them in seeing that this policy should be carried into effect. But the League of Nations is not the author of the policy, but its instrument. It is not they who have invented the system of mandates; it is not they who have laid down the general lines on which the three classes of mandates are framed; their duty, let me repeat, is to see in the first place that the terms of the mandates conform to the principles of the Covenant, and, in the second place, that these terms shall in fact regulate the policy of the mandatory Powers in the mandated territories.

"Now it is clear from this statement that both those who hope and those who fear that what I believe has been called the 'Balfour Declaration' is going to suffer substantial modifications, are in error. The fears are not justified, the hopes are not justified. The general lines of policy stand, and must stand. I am aware, of course, that a certain wave of anxiety has affected some sections of opinion lest this mandatory system as applied to Palestine should have an injurious effect upon the religious interests of this or that great Christian body. I confess to feeling, I will not say indignation—that would be too strong a word—but surprise, that any human being should suppose that Christian interests should suffer by the transfer of power in Palestine from a Mahomedan to a Christian Power; and, frankly, my surprise is not diminished when I reflect that that Christian Power is Great Britain. I venture boldly to claim for my country—and I do not believe that anybody who listens to me or who does me the honour to read what I say will contest the claim—that no Power has shown itself more equitable in its treatment of different religious creeds, more anxious to avoid offending religious susceptibilities. We have had immense experience in dealing with religions other than Christian. And, as regards the various forms of the Christian religion, everybody will admit who knows anything about the practice of my country, that we have shown the utmost fairness and the utmost generosity in dealing even with those denominations from which the majority of our population widely differ. We are a Protestant country, but I boldly say that I do not believe that in any country, Protestant or Catholic, has the Catholic religion received fairer or more generous treatment than it has within the British Isles. Now, is it credible, that when you have by the fortune of war taken away from a Mahomedan country and put under a Christian mandatory places which have sacred associations for large bodies of Christian believers, is it credible, I ask, that these should suffer by the transfer? And remember that whatever is done in Palestine now or in the future is done in the light of day. The machinery of the Mandates Commission, the machinery of the Council of the League of Nations, the machinery of the Assembly of the League are all contrived to make it quite impossible that any transaction of general interest should take place except in the full glare of the noonday sun of public opinion. And to suppose that in those circumstances there is the least chance of deliberate injustice or careless administration being either practised or permitted in Palestine seems to me one of the most extravagant and baseless fears by which any body of men were ever assailed.

"I have explained, I am afraid at great length, but I hope with adequate detail and lucidity, exactly the position in which, as I conceive it, the general mandate question for Palestine and the Near East stands. I have explained why all the regrettable delay has occurred; I have explained why the final juridical settlement of the whole question is still in the future; I have explained that this in no sense involves a modification of the lines of Palestinian policy laid down by the Allied Powers and emphatically endorsed by America. I have indicated also why it is that I am most anxious that a step forward should be taken as soon as possible in the interests of Palestinian administration. You will permit me, therefore, M. le Président, to conclude by asking my colleagues to agree to a proposal under which this question shall come up again before a future meeting of the Council, and I would suggest that that meeting should be held within the next six weeks."

11. My observations were well received by my colleagues on the Council. The Japanese representative immediately, without any suggestion on my part, gave my proposal for a special meeting of the Council in six weeks' time to consider the Palestine and other mandates his entire support. The French and Italian representatives, whilst supporting my conclusions, pleaded for a little elasticity as regarded the date of the special meeting of the Council. They agreed that the policy which the Allied and Associated Powers had pursued since the Treaty of Peace as regards mandated territories had not changed and never would be modified. After some further discussion, which will be found in the minutes of the eleventh meeting,



it was agreed that a special session of the Council should be held not later than the 15th July next to deal specially with the "A" and "B" mandates.

12. Before concluding this despatch I desire to urge upon the Government at home the necessity of entering at once into communication with the various Governments represented on the Council as well as with the Government of the United States, in order to secure a final settlement of the mandates in July next. It also seems to me desirable that action should be taken to explain fully and frankly to the Vatican the objects of the policy to be pursued by His Majesty's Government in Palestine. Further it is important that nothing should be left undone to expedite an agreement between the French and United States Governments as to the Syrian mandate, and an agreement between the French, ourselves and the United States over the "B" mandates. If this can be accomplished before the special meeting of the Council in July, I am confident that no further obstacle to the formal approval of the Palestine mandate will be encountered.

I am, &c.  
BALFOUR.

[C 8635/8635/22]

No. 288.

*The Earl of Balfour to Sir R. Graham (Rome).*

(No. 810.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, June 14, 1922.*

The Italian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon, and informed me that there was some possibility of Signor Schanzer visiting London on his way from Copenhagen to Italy, and that if he did so it would be in the hope of discussing with the British Government some arrangement by which the close co-operation of the two countries in matters of common interest, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean, might be secured.

I expressed myself as anxious to draw closer the bonds of friendship between our two countries, and asked him what exactly the Italian Government had in view, adding that the rough draft of an agreement which Signor Schanzer had shown to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister in turn had shown to me seemed too vague, as it stood, to be of much practical value.

He referred at once to the tripartite treaty, and seemed desirous that the advantages which this would have conferred upon Italy should be revived. He drew a picture of Italian agriculturists and workmen developing the resources of the thinly populated regions in South-west Anatolia, which, if they could be realised, would doubtless confer a great benefit upon Italy and her superabundant population. But beyond generalities he did not go.

I told him that, so far as I was aware, we had no national aspirations which could in any way clash with those of Italy. What we were most anxious for at the moment was to bring peace in the Near East; to preserve the Greek population of Smyrna; to secure for it some reasonable Government; and endeavour to maintain the international control of the Straits.

With all these objects he expressed sympathy, incidentally observing, however, that the French had already made a separate peace with Kemal, and that Italy had no troops available to carry out any policy which required force behind it.

Speaking generally, our conversation left in my mind the impression that what the Italian Government most desired was to find some plausible answer to the charge that, so far as the Eastern Mediterranean was concerned, Italy had come out of a victorious war in a position less favourable than she possessed before the war began. He had apparently, however, no very clear ideas as to how this object should be accomplished.

I am, &c.  
BALFOUR.